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June 11, 2005

Applying Apprendi to juvenile bind-over

Thanks to a helpful reader, I found this fascinating article from the Dallas Morning News which reports that "State District Judge Manny Alvarez on Friday dismissed a murder indictment against Marco Lopez, 16, saying the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because the teenager was transferred to the adult system without the blessing of a jury." 

I know lawyers have previously claimed that Apprendi might impact judicial fact-finding required for a juvenile transfer to an adult court (where, typically, a much higher maximum sentence is available).  But I have not previously heard of a court actually extending Apprendi to such bindovers.  Indeed, the article states:

In his opposing motion, [Assistant DA] Rogers argued that defense attorneys in other states have unsuccessfully tried to use the same Supreme Court case to influence juvenile transfer cases.  "No other court in the United States has extended Apprendi to this level," Mr. Rogers said.

Interesting stuff, and an issue to follow as this one case is appealed and others are brought with similar claims: "Rogers said he will appeal the ruling [and attorneys involved] in the case said the ruling is likely to spur a flurry of similar motions."

June 11, 2005 in Blakely Commentary and News, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack

Another sentencing week to remember

It was yet another big sentencing week, as you can see based on this review of just some of the major posts from the past seven days:

SUPREME COURT DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARY

STATE BLAKELY DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARY

DISTRICT COURT BOOKER DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARY

CIRCUIT COURT BOOKER DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARY

OTHER SENTENCING DEVELOPMENTS AND COMMENTARY

June 11, 2005 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 10, 2005

Ebbers' plea for leniency

It typically does not make news when a federal defendant asks for leniency. But when that defendant is former WorldCom Inc. CEO Bernard Ebbers, then CNN and the AP and the CBC and the NY Times and the Washington Post are all over the story. 

Interestingly, the brief that Ebbers' legal team filed in US District Court on Friday was "accompanied by 169 letters of support written by his friends and beneficiaries of his charitable donations," and it cited "the 63-year-old's good character, age, poor health and low risk of repeat offense as reasons to impose less than the 'draconian life sentence' under the sentencing guidelines."

UPDATE: Peter Henning at the White Collar Crime Prof Blog is boldly predicting in this post that Ebbers' sentence "will be in the 8-10 year range."

June 10, 2005 in Booker in district courts | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack

Two interesting non-Booker items from the circuits

Though the busy beavers at the Eighth Circuit have the Booker pipeline still whooshing along with yet another big round of dispositions on this official opinion page, it otherwise seems to be a relatively quiet day on the Booker front.   Consequently, I have a chance to note two interesting non-Booker circuit dispositions today:

From the Fourth Circuit, Judge Gregory provides an interesting little dissent (available here) from his colleagues' refusal to reconsider en banc the court's earlier rejection of an ineffective assistance claim in the capital habeas case of Walker v. True, No. 4-22 (4th Cir. Mar. 25, 2005) (original panel decision available here).  Here is the opening paragraph of Judge Gregory's dissent from the denial of en banc consideration:

This case, if distilled to its essence, asks this question: what level of legal assistance for defendants in state capital cases is tolerable enough to justify this Court's denial of the protection of the "great writ"?  Because the level of representation at the sentencing phase of Walker's capital case was too low to be tolerable under a fair assessment of his Sixth Amendment rights, I respectfully dissent from the order denying rehearing en banc.

From the Ninth Circuit, today we get Huftile v. Miccio-Fonseca, No. 03-16734 (9th Cir. Jun. 10, 2005) (available here), which addresses the proper procedural means for a defendant to challenge in federal court his civil commitment under California's Sexually Violent Predators Act.  Huftile is factually interesting and legally intricate, and Mike at Crime & Federalism in this post analyzes the decision better than I can on a late Friday afternoon.

June 10, 2005 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

More (minor) pardons from President Bush

With all the appellate fireworks this week (see, e.g., here and here), I missed the news that President Bush granted seven pardons earlier this week.  The basic details can be found in this AP account and this DOJ press release, but Ellen Podgor has the real scoop in this post over at the White Collar Crime Prof Blog.  She notes:

[F]our out of seven of the pardons granted are clearly white collar and six out of seven could very well be. What can also be said about these pardons is that they are relatively minor offenses (exception perhaps the one drug offense and the conspiracy to commit mail fraud), and that just looking at the names — men seem to be the major recipients of the pardons. 

Also, in this post over at RedState.org, Buckland comments on the "extreme randomness of the pardons," and then asks: "If it's a good thing to pardon 30 year old, minor, federal crimes then we should do it for all. Why this gang of 7?"  Over at Blogcritics.org, this posts raises similar questions.

Late last year, when President Bush issues a similar set of pardons, this blog and some others buzzed about Bush's stingy pardon practices.  Here are some of the earlier posts on this interesting topic:

June 10, 2005 in Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

News on Oregon's Blakely fix bill

This article from the Salem Statesman Journal provides a terrific account of the proposed Blakely fix legislation moving along in Oregon.  Here are selections from the article detailing the bill's proposed new sentencing procedures:

Some criminal defendants will face two jury proceedings, instead of one, under a bill that allows Oregon to continue to use aggravating factors to lengthen prison sentences.  The Senate passed the bill on a 28-1 vote Thursday and sent it to the House.  There was no debate....

So-called "departure sentences" account for 200 to 300 new cases annually, according to state officials. The new procedures also would apply to an estimated 200 defendants whose sentences have been returned to circuit courts.

Under Senate Bill 528, prosecutors would have to tell defendants upon indictment — or soon afterward — whether they will bring up "enhancement" facts at trial that could lead to longer prison sentences.  Enhancement facts relating to the crime, such as the use of a gun, would be considered by jurors at the same time they decide guilt or innocence.  The trial judge could defer that consideration to a follow-up sentencing phase, however, if it could be "unfairly prejudicial" to the defendant.  Enhancement facts relating to the defendant, such as whether racial or sexual motivation existed, would be considered by jurors in a separate sentencing phase if they found the defendant guilty.

I am intrigued and pleased to see this legislation, which responds to the new Sixth Amendment doctrine through Blakely-ization of sentencing procedures, incorporates a kind of offense/offender distinction in its jury procedures. (I a discuss the offense/offender distinction at length in my Conceptualizing Blakely article). 

For a (now slightly-dated) review of other state Blakely fixes, check out an April post on the State of state Blakely fixes and high court rulings.

June 10, 2005 in Blakely in the States | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 9, 2005

Three observations on Rivera

After having a chance to read closely the majority opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Rivera, which upholds the constitutionality of the state's persistent felony offender statutes (basics here), three big thoughts rush to mind:

1.  The decision seems cert. proof: Because the Rivera court based its ruling on a particular (though debatable) interpretation of the state's statutes, I think it would be unlikely that the Supreme Court would have much interest in giving the decision a second look. 

2.  What about state constitutional law?: The New York State Constitution in Article I, sec. 2 says: "Trial by jury in all cases in which it has heretofore been guaranteed by constitutional provision shall remain inviolate forever."  Perhaps the defendant in Rivera did not also bring a state constitutional law claim (or perhaps such a claim has been resolved in earlier decision).  Nevertheless, as I suggested in this post a few month ago, I think state constitutional law claims can and should play a larger role in the post-Blakely universe.

3.  The continuing importance of the "prior conviction" exception: A critical component of the Rivera decision is the continued vitality of the Almendarez-Torres "prior conviction" exception.  If Justice Thomas gets his way and the exception gets undone by the Supreme Court, New York will certainly have to alter the operation of its persistent felony offender statutes.  Rivera is thus a good reminder that many states without significant Blakely problems may still end up with a significant Sixth Amendment mess if (when?) the Almendarez-Torres "prior conviction" exception is overruled.

UPDATE: The blog Indignant Indigent has posted an interesting take on the Rivera decision here, and the Second Circuit Blog adds a similar perspective in this post.

June 9, 2005 in Almendarez-Torres and the prior conviction exception, Blakely in the States, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

A plea/sentencing ruling of note from the 9th

What a day for appellate court sentencing decisions: the Booker pipeline is flowing, the NY high court is dodging Apprendi, and the First Circuit talks of state/federal disparities.  To all this appellate fun we can also add an interesting Ninth Circuit ruling in US v. Davis, No. 04-50030 (9th Cir. June 9, 2005) (available here). Here is the opening paragraph:

We must decide whether a district court has discretion to permit a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing when the district court finds that defense counsel “grossly mischaracterized” the defendant’s possible sentence, but also finds that the mischaracterization did not actually prejudice the defendant as is required to invalidate a plea post-sentence. We answer “yes.”  Because the district court did not believe it had such discretion, we vacate and remand for reconsideration of defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea.

Needless to say, this Davis ruling could be of great interest to other defendants seeking to withdraw a plea based on counsel's pre- or post-Booker/Blakely sentencing advice.

June 9, 2005 in Booker in the Circuits | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Important disparity statement (dicta?) from the 1st Circuit

Thanks to Appellate Law & Practice's post here, I see the First Circuit has provided some food-for-thought (dicta-for-thought?) today in US v. Wilkerson, No. 02-1729 (1st Cir. June 9, 2005) (available here).  As AL&P spots, at the end of a lengthy opinion, the Wilkerson court's explanation of a plain error remand seems to endorse post-Booker consideration of disparities between state and federal sentencing:

The district judge sentenced Wilkerson to the lowest available sentence under the Guidelines.  He repeatedly expressed his concern about disparate treatment between federal and state court sentences in similar cases, but stated that the Guidelines did not permit him to take that disparity into account.  The district judge also observed that Wilkerson had the most horrible young life he had seen in 17 years on the bench.  Both the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities and the history and characteristics of the defendant are among the factors to be considered by the now advisory Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  As this court recognized in Heldeman, where there is a reasonable indication that the district judge might well have given a different sentence under an advisory guidelines regime, and it would be easy enough for him to say no with a minimum expenditure of effort, we are persuaded that remand is required.  We express no view on whether defendant should be resentenced or on any possible resentence.

I am sure prosecutors are not going to be keen on this passage.  Indeed, I would bet they will seek re-hearing on this point since, as noted in this post, DOJ has been saying it will appeal any district court sentence with a variance based on comparisons to state sentencing laws.  Wilkerson as it stands seems to approve such comparisons.

June 9, 2005 in Booker in the Circuits | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

New York's highest court upholds state's felony offender law!

In a major state Blakely ruling — which addresses in a slightly different procedural posture the issues considered last week on habeas by the Second Circuit in Brown (basics here, commentary here) — the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Rivera, No. 86 (N.Y. June 9, 2005) (available here) has upheld the constitutionality of the state's persistent felony offender statutes.

Rivera is rich and interesting in so many ways (in part because of two nuanced dissents).  The decision mostly rests on a reaffirmation of the court's prior interpretation that the state's persistent felony offender statutes requires "no additional fact-finding beyond the fact of two prior felony convictions" for an enhanced sentence.  But a wondrous footnote 8, which walks through some of the fact/judgment ideas I developed in this recent post, provides (perhaps) a back-up justification for the ruling:

In New York, the exercise of this type of discretion [in applying the felony offender enhancement] has never fallen to juries, except in the unusual context of capital cases.  In Apprendi, [Ring, Blakely and Booker] all of [the] prohibited judicial findings relate to the crime for which the defendant was on trial and, as quintessential fact questions, would properly have been subject to proof before the jury, in stark contrast to traditional sentencing analysis of factors like the defendant's difficult childhood, remorse or self-perceived economic dependence on a life of crime (cf State v Rivera, 102 P3d 1044, 1058 [Haw. 2004] [distinguishing between "intrinsic" aspects of the crime itself, which must be proved to the jury, and "extrinsic" characteristics of the defendant, which are subject to judicial determination]).

Although we do not rest our decision on it, we note that the prohibited findings in these Supreme Court cases are thus readily distinguishable from the subjective determination by the sentencing court operating under our recidivism statutes in this case.  Our statutes contemplate that the sentencing court — after it has adjudicated the defendant a persistent felony offender — will consider holistically the defendant's entire circumstances and character, including traits touching upon the need for deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation unrelated to the crime of conviction.  This is different from the type of fact-finding involved in Apprendi.

June 9, 2005 in Blakely in the States, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Move along, little appeal (aka quantity and speed kills effective appellate review)

Can you hear that whooshing sound?  It's the sound of appeals rushing through the Booker pipeline.  Already this morning the Sixth Circuit's opinion page has a half-dozen dispositions with sentencing issues, and the busy beavers at the Eighth Circuit have on this official opinion page another half-dozen dispositions as well.  And though the Ninth Circuit has a lot of catching up to do, an on-line hunt reveals that, aided by its Ameline limited remand approach, the Ninth has already been able this week to punt more than a dozen cases back to the district courts.

Needless to say, because there are so many cases, I cannot keep up with all the action.  When I do find time to check out some of these decisions, I am frequently discouraged by the analysis (or lack thereof) that I see.  For example, the Sixth Circuit today in US v. Williams, No. 04-6191 (6th Cir. June 9, 2005) (available here), resolved a case which raised important post-Booker ex post facto issues.  But, as one lawyer noted in an e-mail to me, the "court's decision on the issue was both anti-climatic and a classic application of ipse dixit resolution.... The court gives no explanation for its ruling, and in fact does not even mention the term 'ex post facto.'  [Williams] decides a significant and thorny question arising from Booker without any explanation except that it the 'most appropriate thing to do.'"

Even more disconcerting is a little unpublished ruling on reasonableness coming today from the Eighth Circuit today.  Though the decision in US v. Verdinez-Garcia, No. 04-3180 (8th Cir. June 9, 2005) (available here) provides precious little background, the court's disposition seems tantamount to a conclusion that a guidelines sentence, even without an accompanying explanation, is per se reasonable:

We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing an unreasonable sentence.  There is no dispute that the court correctly determined the Guidelines sentencing range, and although the court said little about the sentence it imposed, there is no indication in the record that the court failed to consider the circumstances of Verdinez's reentry [to see his terminally ill father] — which he brought to the court's attention in the presentence report and at sentencing — when it sentenced him within the Guidelines range.

Ultimately, I do not think it is fair to pick on these Sixth and Eighth Circuit dispositions alone.  My sense is that every circuit was overburdened with the number of criminal appeals it had to resolve even before Blakely and Booker came along, and I suspect the added workload brought by these cases feels overwhelming.  The sheer quantity of appeals — as well as a need for speed, since some sentencing challenges could be moot if a decision is slow to come — makes it all but inevitable that the quality of justice will be strained.  (Consider also how these dynamics make unsuprising every circuit's endorsement of appeal waivers and the fequent application of "plain error" shortcuts, either through rapid remands or strong presumptions.)

June 9, 2005 in Booker in the Circuits | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

District court dispatches

It has been a while since I collected links to newspaper articles about district court sentencings, but a number of pieces this morning seemed worth spotlighting:

June 9, 2005 in Booker in district courts | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

June 8, 2005

Fantastic Columbia Law Review issue at a discount

In a number of prior posts (e.g., here and here), I have lavished deserved praise on the Columbia Law Review for its recent symposium "Sentencing: What's at Stake for the States?".  The kind folks at CLR were kind enough to send me an advance copy of its May issue with all the articles from the event.  I am truly awed and overwhelmed by all the great sentencing pieces to be found therein.  And today I received this thoughtful note from CLR's editor-in-chief:

I wanted to offer readers of your blog a discounted purchase price on copies of the issue.  Because this issue is about twice the size of our normal issues, we've set the price for the general public at $25 (including shipping and handling), but with the special blog order form [available for download below], readers of your blog can purchase individual copies at $20 a copy using the form.

Though I believe individual articles will eventually be made available on the CLR website, all true sentencing maniacs will want a copy of the full issue for effective beach reading. 

Download clr_sentencing_issue_form.pdf

June 8, 2005 in Blakely Commentary and News, Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

The 2d Circuit's recent Apprendi habeas ruling and distinguishing finding offense facts from making sentencing judgments

The Second Circuit Blog today has this interesting commentary on the Second Circuit's notable ruling late last week concerning Apprendi's applicability to New York's persistent felony offender statute in Brown v. Greiner (basics here).  That commentary laments that "too much has been made of this exceedingly narrow decision," and it correctly emphasizes that the Second Circuit's ruling was applying AEDPA habeas standards and that Brown "is limited to cases that became final before any of the post-Apprendi cases had been decided."

The lengthy critical discussion of Brown at the Second Circuit Blog merits a close read, and it concludes by noting that New York's highest court has a case pending on direct appeal that will require it to address directly whether New York's persistent felony offender statute is constitutionally sound in light of the post-Apprendi decisions in Ring and Blakely

In a future post (and in a future article with the working title "Conceptualizing Booker"), I hope to explain why the ruling in Brown is perhaps not quite as "curious" as the Second Circuit Blog suggests.  Let me preview my idea here and encourage comments from readers: the Second Circuit's decision in Brown, as well as the recent Ohio decisions which find Ohio's sentencing scheme largely dodges Blakely problems, both suggest there is an important constitutional distinction to be drawn between (1) finding offense facts that increase applicable sentences (which is now clearly a task for juries), and (2) making sentencing judgments that increase applicable sentences (which is a task that arguably can still be given to judges). 

This proposed distinction between finding offense facts and making sentencing judgments dovetails somewhat with the offense/offender distinction developed in my Conceptualizing Blakely article, but it is not the exact same idea.  Indeed, the offense/offender distinction cannot fully justify the Booker remedy, since federal judges applying advisory guidelines are still finding offense facts when determining the guidelines advisory ranges.  But, what makes post-Booker sentencing different is that, as a result of the remedy devised by Justice Breyer, federal judges are now plainly required to make sentencing judgments using the 3553(a) factors concerning whether to follow the guidelines. 

Put another way, the Apprendi-Blakely cases can (and perhaps should) be understood to demand only that juries have a role in finding legally essential offense facts, and these cases do not preclude a judges from making broader sentencing judgments based on facts of all sorts.  (This idea also dovetails somewhat, but not perfectly, with the fact/law distinction emphasized by Judge Easterbrook in Carpenter last month.)  Notably, support for this reading of the Apprendi-Blakely cases can be drawn from Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Ring, where in a final paragraph he asserts that the Ring holding demands "that the jury must find the existence of the fact that an aggravating factor existed," but still allows states to "leave the ultimate life-or-death decision to the judge."

June 8, 2005 in Blakely Commentary and News, Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

More from the 4th Circuit on appeal waivers

The Fourth Circuit today in US v. Johnson, No. 04-4376 (4th Cir. June 8, 2005) (available here) reiterated the consensus circuit view that "the issuance of Booker after the plea agreement was reached does not render [the defendant's] plea unknowing or involuntary" and thus does not provide a basis for upsetting an appeal waiver.  Of course, another Fourth Circuit panel already cover this ground two weeks ago in Blick (available here), although Judge Michael dissented in Blick asserting that "a defendant in this circuit cannot prospectively waive the right to appeal constitutional violations at sentencing."  Notably, the Johnson Court does not engage with Judge Michael's points in Blick, nor does it address the idea (raised here and here) that it is now against public policy, based in congressional-intent concepts and drawing on Justice Breyer's remedial work in Booker, to let prosecutors and defendants opt-out of appellate review because Congress strongly favors the "retention of sentencing appeals ... to iron out sentencing differences." Booker, Breyer slip op. at 21.

June 8, 2005 in Booker in the Circuits | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

A window into the Booker pipeline mess

Today's Eleventh Circuit decision in US v. Sears, No. 03-16550 (11th Cir. June 8, 2005) (available here) provides a window into the mess in lower federal courts in the wake of Booker.  In Sears, the court has to sort out the confluence of a prior 11th Circuit ruling, a district court resentencing, and a Supreme Court GVR.  Sears caught my eye particularly because of this account of what happened at the district court's February resentencing:

The district court advised the Appellant that it would sentence him in accordance with the Booker decision, as he had previously requested, if he wished the court to do so.  The court pointed out that the first time around it had sentenced the Appellant to the highest sentence it could while treating the guidelines as binding.  It explained that treating the guidelines as advisory, rather than mandatory, could result in a higher sentence. The Appellant, after consulting with his attorney during a recess, elected not to be sentenced de novo in accord with the Booker decision but instead to have the district court simply correct the supervisory release terms as the court of appeals' mandate required.  That is what the district court did.

On appeal, the 11th Circuit now affirms by stressing that Sears is "a case in which the Appellant actually waived the right to be sentenced in accord with Booker after that decision came out.  The Appellant could have had the relief he seeks now, but he knowingly elected to forgo it.  In these circumstances, we will not give the Appellant yet another bite at the Booker apple."

Among other reactions, I am pondering why the defendant, being resentenced in February 2005, could "waive" resentencing according to Booker.  As I have suggested in posts about appeal waivers (see here and here), the specific remedy devised by Justice Breyer in Booker did not really grant defendants new rights, rather it devised a new advisory guideline system to avoid constitutional flaws identified in the operation of a mandatory guideline system.  I thus find puzzling the idea that defendants can "waive" some "right" to be sentenced under the new constitutional advisory system and thereby obtain resentencing under the old unconstitutional mandatory scheme.

Of course, as I have suggested in other posts here and here, due process/ex post facto principles might give defendants a right not to receive an increased post-Booker sentence based on pre-Booker conduct.  But the district court's suggestion of a possibly higher sentence upon resentencing suggests that this possible due process/ex post facto right is not the right being "waived" in the Sears case.  Thus, it seem all the Sears action is premised on the questionable assumption that defendants can "waive" their "right" to be sentenced in a constitutional manner in order to be sentenced within an unconstitutional system.

Perhaps an easier way to ponder this issue is to consider whether defendants who committed their crimes before Booker might now have a unilateral right to demand to still be sentenced under the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines system and thereby preclude a sentencing judge from considering the broader 3553(a) factors that Booker brings to the fore.  If one does not think a defendant has such a unilateral right, then what transpired in Sears should seem a bit hinky.  Or, to restate this matter by abusing the 11th Circuit's metaphor, I think every sentencing after January 12 should be taking bites from the Booker federal sentencing apple, even if a defendant might want his sentencing to bite from the pre-Booker (now unconstitutionally bitter) federal sentencing orange.

June 8, 2005 in Booker in the Circuits | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Notable news from Tennessee

Lots of interesting sentencing news coming from Volunteer State:

June 8, 2005 in Blakely in the States, Death Penalty Reforms | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

A Blakely blank spot in sentencing reform principles

As evidenced by this AP story already appearing nationwide, the announcement on Tuesday by The Constitution Project's Sentencing Initiative of this set of "Principles for the Design and Reform of Sentencing Systems" is already generating some press coverage.  Though I have already commented briefly on these principles in this post, I realized this evening that these principles have a Blakely blank spot in that they make no mention whatsoever of incorporating jury decision-making or jury values into the sentencing process. 

The principles do speak to sentencing procedures in point 5, which states:

Meaningful due process protections at sentencing are essential.  Fair notice should be provided and reliable fact finding mechanisms ensured.  Judicial sentencing decisions should be subject to appropriate appellate review.

Relatedly, the principles also criticize the federal sentencing guidelines for placing "excessive emphasis on conduct not centrally related to the offense of conviction."  Nevertheless, as revealed by the reference to "judicial sentencing decisions," the principles suggest a judge-centered vision of sentencing that seems more in harmony with the ideas and themes expressed by Justice Breyer in his Booker remedy opinion than by Justices Scalia and Stevens in their Blakely and Booker opinions.

Though I am generally sympathetic to a judge-centered vision of sentencing, in the wake of Blakely I have come to see a number of potential virtues in incorporating jury decision-making and/or jury values into the sentencing process in some ways.  As detailed more fully in my recent "Conceptualizing Blakely" article, I believe Blakely expresses a fundamental and sound principle that defendants have a right to require the prosecution to prove to a jury all offense conduct for which the state seeks to impose criminal punishment.  I am a bit disappointed that this "Blakely principle" gets no attention in the Sentencing Initiative's initial statement of design principles, though perhaps it will get some play in the forthcoming background report and specific recommendations for a post-Booker federal sentencing scheme.

June 8, 2005 in Blakely Commentary and News, Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Legislative Reactions to Booker and Blakely, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Legislative briefing on "The Girlfriend Problem"

I have received an announcement of a legislative briefing planned for next week in Washington DC entitled "The Girlfriend Problem: How Sentencing Laws Affect Women & Children."  Though the briefing is aimed at House staffers and Representatives, I have been told that this event is open to others to attend. More details are available at this link, and here is part of the announcement's account of issues to be covered:

Women are the fastest growing group in the ever-expanding prison population. Sentencing laws have caused the number of women behind bars to explode, leaving in the rubble displaced children and overburdened families. Current drug laws punish not just those who sell drugs, but also a wide range of people who help or associate with those who sell drugs....

In too many cases, women are punished for the act of remaining with a boyfriend or husband engaged in drug activity, who is typically the father of her children. Many of these women have histories of physical and sexual abuse and/or untreated mental illness.

June 8, 2005 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Another challenge to sex offender law fails

As has already been noted here and here by others in the blogsphere, the 11th Circuit on Monday in Doe v Moore, No. 04-10279 (11th Cir. June 6, 2005) (available here) rebuffed defendants' claims that Florida's sex offender registration/notification scheme and DNA collection statute violated their constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, travel, separation of powers, and freedom from ex post facto legislation.  Considered in conjunction with the recent 8th Circuit Doe v. Miller decision upholding sex offender residency restrictions (discussed here), it is becoming ever more clear that most lower federal courts are unlikely to find constitutional problems with state efforts to regulate the post-incarceration lives of sexual offenders.

On a related note, there was an interesting recent discussion over at PrawfsBlawg about this news that a group of Texas developers are planning a development that promises to be free from registered sex-offenders.  Both Christine Hurt and Kaimi Wegner had thought-provoking posts on the topic.

June 8, 2005 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (66) | TrackBack