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November 15, 2011

Noticing and noting racial skew of recent Texas death sentencing in Harris County

The Houston Chronicle has this notable report on recent death sentencing in Texas headlined "Harris death penalties show racial pattern: 12 of the last 13 men condemned 
in the county have been black." Here are excerpts:

The last white man to join death row from Harris County was a convicted serial killer in 2004.  Since then, 12 of the last 13 men newly condemned to die have been black, a Houston Chronicle analysis of prison and prosecution records shows.  The latest death sentence was handed down in October to a Hispanic.

The role of race in capital punishment has emerged repeatedly this year in the unsuccessful appeals by Duane Buck, an African-American from Houston convicted in a double murder.  His 1997 sentencing featured testimony from a former prison psychiatrist who claimed blacks are more dangerous than whites.

Harris County District Attorney Patricia Lykos, elected as a reformer, has overseen decisions about whether to seek the death penalty since 2009.  Her staff says the decisions are "race neutral" and "fact based."...

As part of its review of the last seven years of death sentences, the Chronicle also examined capital cases first prosecuted in the 1980s and 1990s that were reviewed again after successful death row appeals.  Since November 2004, five men have been re-sentenced to death -- three white, one black and one Hispanic.

Robert Morrow, one of the county's busiest capital defense attorneys, called the string of consecutive African-Americans who received new death sentences from 2004-2011 startling. He said those numbers alone should prompt additional research and debate --especially since relatively few participate in the local decision-making process as jurors or as prosecutors....

Harris County has a long history of aggressive prosecution of capital cases. More than a third of the state's current 305 death row inmates came from Harris County.  So did half of the 121 black inmates on death row, according to Texas Department of Criminal Justice data.

Blacks account for about half of recent murder arrests in Harris County.  But they more often get charged with capital murder than whites or Hispanics, an analysis of more than 300 recent court cases by the Chronicle shows.

November 15, 2011 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

November 14, 2011

Might restoration of felon gun rights actually reduce recidivism?

As first blogged here, today's New York Times has a lengthy front-page article on state restoration of gun rights to former felons.  The piece is (misleadingly?) headlined "Felons Finding It Easy to Get Gun Rights Reinstated," and the suggestion throughout the article is that the public should be very concerned and quite fearful that some states now make it too easy for some felons to get their gun rights restored after having completed their sentence.  But, because recidivism rates for many offenders are often very high, some of the statistics appearing in the Times piece led me to wonder whether resoration of felon gun rights might actually reduce recidivism and enhance public safety.

The Times article rightly noted that sound data on these matters are had to assemble and assess, but the Times was able to run some notable numbers for Washington state.  Here is some of what the Times found and reported:

That [crime] question — whether the restorations pose a risk to public safety — has received little study, in part because data can be hard to come by.

The Times analyzed data from Washington State....  Since 1995, more than 3,300 felons and people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors have regained their gun rights in the state — 430 in 2010 alone — according to the analysis of data provided by the state police and the court system.  Of that number, more than 400 — about 13 percent — have subsequently committed new crimes, the analysis found.  More than 200 committed felonies, including murder, assault in the first and second degree, child rape and drive-by shooting....

The Times’s analysis found that among the more than 400 people who committed crimes after winning back their gun rights under the new law, more than 70 committed Class A or B felonies.  Over all, more than 80 were convicted of some sort of assault and more than 100 of drug offenses.

So the Times here reports a 13% recidvism rate for Washington state offenders with restored gun rights, but apparenently the recidivism rate is this high only due to counting of minor (i.e., misdemeanor) crimes.  As I understand these numbers, the Times found that only about 200 of the 3,300 prior offenders with restored gun rights since 1995 went on to commit a felony — roughly a 6% felony recidivism rate — and only 70 went on to commit Class A of B felonies — roughly a 2% serious felony recidivism rate.  That strikes me as an impressively low felony and serious felony recidivism rate for these offenders, especially given that states often report that half or more persons with a felony record end up committing a future offense.

Seeking general recidivism data for comparison purposes, I found this April 2008 report from the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission, titled "Recidivism of Adult Felons, 2007," which reports that in Washington state the "overall rate of recidivism for men was 65.9% compared to 53.6% among women."  (I think it is fair to assume that the majority of felons seeking restoration of gun rights are men.)  Based on this data, is it fair to suggest that offenders with restored gun rights in Washington state are roughly than five times less likely to recidivate that other offenders?  (I also found this January 2011 report from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy which reports that "recidivism rates have declined" in Washington in the period from 1990 to 2006 and that "the largest reductions have been for higher risk offenders.")

This comparative data would seem to at least support a plausible working hypothesis that restoring gun rights to felons might actually reduce recidivism and enhance public safety.  Of course, there is a huge apples/oranges problem in trying to compare these recidivism rates.  I certainly hope and expect that Washington aspires to restore gun rights to former felons who appear to pose the least risk to public safety, and thus we should hope and expect recidivism rates to be generally lower for these folks than for others with a felony record.  Still, given that recidivism rates are appear to be so much lower for those who get their gun rights restored, there is a reasonable basis for at least speculating that the process and grant of restoration of rights works to provide additional encouragement for these former felons to stay crime-free in the future.

Some related Second Amendment and gun policy posts:

November 14, 2011 in Data on sentencing, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (23) | TrackBack

SCOTUS health care litigation, federalism, freedom, and constitutional limits of federal criminal justice

The huge news out of the Supreme Court this morning concerns the Justices' decision to take up the various constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act.  This post at SCOTUSblog by Lyle Denniston, headlined "Court sets 5 1/2-hour hearing on health care," explains the basics:

Setting the stage for a historic constitutional confrontation over federal power, the Supreme Court on Monday granted three separate cases on the constitutionality of the new federal health care law, and set aside 5 1/2 hours for oral argument, to be held in March. The Court, however, did not grant all of the issues raised and it chose issues to review only from three of the five separate appeals before it.  It is unclear, at this point, whether all of the cases will be heard on a single day.

The Court will hold two hours of argument on the constitutionality of the requirement that virtually every American obtain health insurance by 2014, 90 minutes on whether some or all of the overall law must fail if the mandate is struck down, one hour on whether the Anti-Injunction Act bars some or all of the challenges to the insurance mandate, and one hour on the constitutionality of the expansion of the Medicaid program for the poor and disabled.

I will leave it to others to debate what the particulars of cert grant means for the law and policy debates over federal health care reform.  But, as the title of this post highlights, I will be watching all the forthcoming constitutional talk (and briefing) about federalism and freedom with a keen eye on what this litigation might end up meaning for (new?) constitutional limits on the reach of the federal criminal justice system.  As of this writing given recent precedents like Raich, any and all claims by federal criminal defendants that Congress exceeded its authority via a criminal prohibition is a non-started. Whether that constitutional reality might be subject to change as a result of the ACA litigation is a matter I will be watching in the months ahead.

November 14, 2011 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Prison terms for downloading child porn in Canada are a lot different, eh?

This crime and punishment story from Canada, which is headlined "Man in record child porn bust set for sentencing," spotlights just how different the sentencing scale is for child porn downloading north of the border.  Here are the basics (with my emphasis added):

A New Brunswick man who pleaded guilty in a case involving the largest collection of child pornography in Canada will be sentenced Monday following a delay for a psychiatric evaluation.  Douglas Hugh Stewart, 52, of Moncton earlier pleaded guilty to possessing, accessing and distributing child pornography.

Crown prosecutor Karen Lee Lamrock said police found almost six million images and videos of girls — more than 4.5 million pornographic.  The others were images of children who were nude, including in bathtubs.

Lamrock said Stewart had been collecting since the 1980s and he looked for new material on a regular basis, and the size of the collection is something never dealt with before in Canadian courts.  Police spent 700 hours going through the images, involving girls as young as two years old.

The Crown is recommending a sentence of five to seven years in prison and wants Stewart to be listed as a registered sex offender.  Defence lawyer Maurice Blanchard is requesting a sentence of four years. The defence also noted Stewart has no criminal record, and co-operated with police from the beginning of the case.

Because the defendant here had downloaded and stored 6 million(!) images, I am tempted to call this case the holocaust of kiddie porn and to call the defendant the Hitler of child porn downloaders.  And yet notably, prosecutors in Canada have responded to the most aggravated of all cases of child porn downloading by recommending a sentence of five to seven years in prison.  

Meanwhile, in the United States, defendants prosecuted in federal court who downloaded 600 images of child porn regularly face guideline recommended sentencing ranges of a decade or more in federal prison — in other words, defendants who downloaded only 0.01% of the number of images downloaded by this Canadian defendant regularly face federal sentences at least twice as long as the sentence being urged by Canadian prosecutors.  And, in a notable state case from Arizona a few years back, Morton Berger received a 200-year state sentence for a much smaller kiddie porn collection (basics here and here), and just a few weeks ago in Florida, Daniel Enrique Guevara Vilca received a life without parole sentence for having lots of kiddie porn on a single laptop (basics here and here).

A few related older and more recent child porn prosecution and sentencing posts:

UPDATE:  The link above (also here) now has the updated sentencing story reporting that the Canadian defendant that I am calling the Hitler of child porn downloaders "has been sentenced to five years in prison in connection with the largest collection of child pornography ever seized in Canada."  Notably, five years is the statutory mandatory minimum term facing federal defendants charged with receipt of just a few images of child pornography, and the latest federal statistics reveal that federal child porn offenders on average receive a 10 year federal prison term.

November 14, 2011 in Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentencing around the world, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (26) | TrackBack

Big (ugly?) NY Times report on felons getting back gun rights

This morning's New York Times has this huge front-page story headlined "Felons Finding It Easy to Get Gun Rights Reinstated." Disappointingly (but not surprisingly), the theme of the article is decidedly not praise for efforts by some states to make it easier for former felons to regain a fundamental constitutional right.  Here are some excerpts from an article that should (and likely will) be the subject of lots of discussion and commentary:

Under federal law, people with felony convictions forfeit their right to bear arms. Yet every year, thousands of felons across the country have those rights reinstated, often with little or no review. In several states, they include people convicted of violent crimes, including first-degree murder and manslaughter, an examination by The New York Times has found.

While previously a small number of felons were able to reclaim their gun rights, the process became commonplace in many states in the late 1980s, after Congress started allowing state laws to dictate these reinstatements — part of an overhaul of federal gun laws orchestrated by the National Rifle Association. The restoration movement has gathered force in recent years, as gun rights advocates have sought to capitalize on the 2008 Supreme Court ruling that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms.

This gradual pulling back of what many Americans have unquestioningly assumed was a blanket prohibition has drawn relatively little public notice. Indeed, state law enforcement agencies have scant information, if any, on which felons are getting their gun rights back, let alone how many have gone on to commit new crimes.

While many states continue to make it very difficult for felons to get their gun rights back — and federal felons are out of luck without a presidential pardon — many other jurisdictions are far more lenient, The Times found. In some, restoration is automatic for nonviolent felons as soon as they complete their sentences. In others, the decision is left up to judges, but the standards are generally vague, the process often perfunctory. In some states, even violent felons face a relatively low bar, with no waiting period before they can apply....

Margaret C. Love, a pardon lawyer based in Washington, D.C., who has researched gun rights restoration laws, estimated that, depending on the type of crime, in more than half the states felons have a reasonable chance of getting back their gun rights.

That universe could well expand, as pro-gun groups shed a historical reluctance to advocate publicly for gun rights for felons. Lawyers litigating Second Amendment issues are also starting to challenge the more restrictive restoration laws. Pro-gun groups have pressed the issue in the last few years in states as diverse as Alaska, Ohio, Oregon and Tennessee.

Ohio’s Legislature confronted the matter when it passed a law this year fixing a technicality that threatened to invalidate the state’s restorations. Ken Hanson, legislative chairman of the Buckeye Firearms Coalition, argued that felons should be able to reclaim their gun rights just as they can other civil rights. “If it’s a constitutional right, you treat it with equal dignity with other rights,” he said.

But Toby Hoover, executive director of the Ohio Coalition Against Gun Violence, contended that the public was safer without guns in the hands of people who have committed serious crimes. “It seems that Ohio legislators have plenty of problems to solve that should be a much higher priority than making sure criminals have guns,” Ms. Hoover said in written testimony.

That question — whether the restorations pose a risk to public safety — has received little study, in part because data can be hard to come by.

The Times analyzed data from Washington State.... Since 1995, more than 3,300 felons and people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors have regained their gun rights in the state — 430 in 2010 alone — according to the analysis of data provided by the state police and the court system. Of that number, more than 400 — about 13 percent — have subsequently committed new crimes, the analysis found. More than 200 committed felonies, including murder, assault in the first and second degree, child rape and drive-by shooting....

[T]he restoration of civil rights, which is now central to regaining gun rights, is relatively routine, automatic in many states upon completion of a sentence. In some states, felons must also petition for a judicial order specifically restoring firearms rights. Other potential paths include a pardon from the governor or state clemency board or a “set aside”— essentially, an annulment — of the conviction.

Today, in at least 11 states, including Kansas, Ohio, Minnesota and Rhode Island, restoration of firearms rights is automatic, without any review at all, for many nonviolent felons, usually once they finish their sentences, or after a certain amount of time crime-free. Even violent felons may petition to have their firearms rights restored in states like Ohio, Minnesota and Virginia. Some states, including Georgia and Nebraska, award scores of pardons every year that specifically confer gun privileges.

Felons face steep odds, though, in states like California, where the governor’s office gives out only a handful of pardons every year, if that. “It’s a long, drawn-out process,” said Steve Lindley, chief of the State Department of Justice’s firearms bureau. “They were convicted of a felony crime. There are penalties for that.”

Studies on the impact of gun restrictions largely support barring felons from possessing firearms. One study, published in the American Journal of Public Health in 1999, found that denying handgun purchases to felons cut their risk of committing new gun or violent crimes by 20 to 30 percent. A year earlier, a study in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that handgun purchasers with at least one prior misdemeanor — not even a felony — were more than seven times as likely as those with no criminal history to be charged with new offenses over a 15-year period.

Criminologists studying recidivism have found that felons usually have to stay out of trouble for about a decade before their risk of committing a crime equals that of people with no records. According to Alfred Blumstein, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, for violent offenders, that period is 11 to 15 years; for drug offenders, 10 to 14 years; and for those who have committed property crimes, 8 to 11 years. An important caveat: Professor Blumstein did not look at what happens when felons are given guns....

Washington’s gun rights restoration statute dates to a 1995 statewide initiative, the Hard Times for Armed Crimes Act, that toughened penalties for crimes involving firearms. The initiative was spearheaded, in part, by pro-gun activists, including leaders of the Second Amendment Foundation, an advocacy group, and the N.R.A.

Although it drew little notice at the time, the legislation also included an expansion of what had been very limited eligibility for restoration of firearms rights. “There were a lot of people who we felt should be able to get their gun rights restored who could not,” said Alan M. Gottlieb, founder of the Second Amendment Foundation, who was active in the effort.

Under the legislation, “Class A” felons — who have committed the most serious crimes, like murder and manslaughter — are ineligible, as are sex offenders. Otherwise, judges are required to grant the petitions as long as, essentially, felons have not been convicted of any new crimes in the five years after completing their sentences. Judges have no discretion to deny the requests based upon character, mental health or any other factors. Mr. Gottlieb said they explicitly wrote the statute this way. “We were having problems with judges that weren’t going to restore rights no matter what,” he said.

The statute’s mix of strictness and leniency makes Washington a useful testing ground. The Times’s analysis found that among the more than 400 people who committed crimes after winning back their gun rights under the new law, more than 70 committed Class A or B felonies. Over all, more than 80 were convicted of some sort of assault and more than 100 of drug offenses.

 

November 14, 2011 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15) | TrackBack

"Challenging the Habeas Process Rather than the Result"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new piece on SSRN authored by Professor Justin Marceau. Here is the abstract:

Habeas scholarship has repeatedly assessed whether the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA’s) limitations on federal habeas relief were as severe in practice as they appeared to be on paper. By analyzing recent doctrinal shifts — particularly focusing on two decisions from this Term — and substantial new empirical data, this Article acknowledges that AEDPA’s bite has reached substantial proportions, in many ways exceeding the initial concerns and hype surrounding the legislation. More importantly, after acknowledging that federal habeas relief from state court convictions has become “microscopically” rare, this Article considers what the rarity of relief ought to mean as a prescriptive matter for federal oversight of state convictions.

Contrary to the dramatic proposals of scholars who have recently suggested that the general futility of habeas litigation dictates that individual, case-by-case habeas review should be abolished, this Article seeks to regain intellectual and practical traction for the longstanding view that federal courts play an important role in overseeing and enforcing the Constitution. To be sure, the path to success for state prisoners on federal habeas review has become infinitesimally narrow, but the recent scholarly interest in abandoning federal review of state convictions in nearly all circumstances other than capital cases misses the mark. This Article suggests that the paucity of success by habeas petitioners does not naturally or necessarily justify the abandonment of federal oversight, as the scholarly trend suggests. Instead, scholars and courts should recognize the critical role federal courts play in ensuring that the state court process is fundamentally fair. Indeed, if the primary responsibility for substantive review now rests with the state courts, the need for federal oversight of the procedures is heightened. To this end, this Article makes the case for focusing more attention on the need for challenges of process rather than result and discusses novel methods, both under § 1983 and § 2254, for bringing such litigation. By focusing federal review on the adequacy of the state process, the deterrence model of federal oversight retains a position of importance and distinction, and principles of comity, federalism, and fair process are well protected.

November 14, 2011 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

NY Times editorial urges Congress to rescind all mandatory minimum sentences

I am pleased to see that this morning's New York Times includes this editorial discussing the US Sentencing Commissions's recent report on mandatory minimum sentences.   The piece is headlined "A Blue-Ribbon Indictment," and here are excerpts:

A 645-page report from the United States Sentencing Commission found that federal mandatory minimum sentences are often “excessively severe,” not “narrowly tailored to apply only to those offenders who warrant such punishment,” and not “applied consistently.”  That is especially so for sentences of people convicted of drug-trafficking offenses, who make up more than 75 percent of those given federal mandatory minimum sentences.

This is a powerful indictment from the commission, which has three Republicans and three Democrats and operates by consensus.  The report shows that harsh mandatory minimums have contributed to the near tripling of federal prisoners in the last 20 years, reaching 208,000 in 2009 and putting federal prisons 37 percent over capacity....

The racial disparities in sentencing are also stark.  In some cases, mandatory minimums can be reduced for offenders if the crime did not involve violence or a gun.  But most African-American drug offenders convicted of a crime carrying a mandatory minimum sentence could not meet these and other requirements: only 39 percent qualified for a reduction compared with 64 percent of whites.

The report notes that inequitable sentencing policies “may foster disrespect for and lack of confidence in the federal criminal justice system.”  Not “may.”  Given the well-documented unfairness, Congress needs to rescind all mandatory minimum sentences.

November 14, 2011 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

November 13, 2011

"Lawsuit seeks compensation for inmates held too long"

The title of this post is the headline of this local article out of Iowa. Here is how it starts:

Iowa inmates held past their proper release dates deserve to be compensated for each day they were improperly confined, according to a class action lawsuit filed this week in Polk County District Court. The lawsuit, filed on behalf of Mahaska County sex offender Richard Scott and other similarly situated inmates, contends that Scott was held for 46 days too long under new rules outlined in a decision this summer by the Iowa Supreme Court.

Justices ruled in July in a case involving convicted sex offender Michael Anderson that Anderson deserved credit for time spent under home supervision even though he was later found to have violated probation during that time. According to the decision, Iowa law clearly requires that any defendant committed to the state Department of Corrections for supervision “who has probation revoked shall be given credit for such time served.”

Iowa corrections officials say the ruling explicitly changed the math used to calculate prison release dates for more than 3,500 Iowa convicts. “Our position is that they have been prepared for this,” said Jeffrey Lipman, the Des Moines attorney behind the lawsuit. “Knowing that this was an issue, they should have been prepared.”

The class action lawsuit, filed against Iowa Department of Corrections director John Baldwin, contends that “hundreds if not thousands of Iowa inmates” have been detained past the dates they properly should have been set free.

November 13, 2011 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Great early commentary on SCOTUS taking "Another Bite at the Graham Cracker"

Scott Hechinger, who wrote one of the first thorough reviews of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment work in Graham (first discussed here), now has written this commentary for Georgetown Law Journal's online companion, Ipsa Loquitur, which explores the two new juve LWOP cases recently taken up by the Court.  The piece's full title is "Another Bite at the Graham Cracker: The Supreme Court’s Surprise Revisiting of Juvenile Life Without Parole in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs," and here are snippets:

The Supreme Court’s decision this week to review the constitutionality of life-without-parole sentences imposed upon individuals convicted of homicide crimes committed at age fourteen and younger in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs stunned sentencing law advocates and Court watchers, myself included.  This commentary will contextualize these two grants of certiorari within the Court’s shifting Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the broader debate over the harshest forms of juvenile sentencing....

Miller and Jackson give the Supreme Court the opportunity to decide whether life without parole is unconstitutional when imposed on an individual fourteen years or younger (1) for a homicide offense, (2) as a result of a mandatory sentencing scheme, or (3) as a non-triggerman accomplice without a showing of “intent to kill.”  Notably, the cases also ask the court to recognize a new, distinct category of defendants — or subcategory of juveniles — deserving different treatment under the Eighth Amendment: those fourteen and younger....

The two somewhat more straightforward of these questions are (1) whether mandatory JLWOP is unconstitutional and (2) whether non-triggerman accomplice murder where no “intent to kill” is present falls within the ambit of Graham.  In both cases, the plain language of Graham itself seems to compel the affirmative answers the petitioners seek.

As to the mandatory nature of the sentencing schemes, the Graham court itself explicitly noted that “criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.”  Even Chief Justice Roberts, concurring in the judgment as to Terrance Graham’s sentence specifically, but arguing forcefully against the bright line drawn by the majority, demanded that sentencing judges be able to take the defendant’s youth into account on a case-by-case basis.  As to the issue in Jackson of whether non-triggerman accomplice liability should be considered “homicide” or “nonhomicide,” as already discussed above, the heart of Graham’s holding was the recognition that “when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”

The Court, therefore, could — and may — decide to simply rule narrowly in both cases, foregoing altogether the third, yet more fundamental question of whether children fourteen and younger are a distinct class of juveniles, who require greater Eighth Amendment protection — where JLWOP is unconstitutional in all circumstances, including homicide — than older juveniles aged fifteen to seventeen.  Though the Supreme Court successfully dodged the issue last year by dismissing Sullivan, I find it hard to imagine a repeat this time around.  The strength of Miller and Jackson, and the reason I think the Court was willing to grant certiorari so close in time to Graham, derives from this urged distinction between a “young adolescent” and “older teen.”  This distinction is necessary to allow the Court, if a majority is reached, to rule that JLWOP is unconstitutional for murder without overturning Graham....

Perhaps the clearest distinction ... between the two age categories seems to be in national sentencing consensus.  For while there are currently over 2,500 fifteen-to-seventeen year olds serving JLWOP for homicide in forty-one states, there are only seventy-three children age fourteen and younger who have been sentenced to JLWOP in only eighteen states (compared to the approximately 129 juveniles of any age sentenced to JLWOP for nonhomicide offenses found to be “exceedingly rare” in Graham).  This “extreme rarity” — as the petitions put it — is even more striking considering that over the last twenty years 3,632 children age fourteen and younger were arrested for homicide, meaning that they received a life-without-parole sentence only two percent of the time.

A few recent related posts on Jackson and Miller and related issues:

November 13, 2011 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Jackson and Miller Eighth Amendment cases, Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack