March 21, 2012
SCOTUS recognizes ineffective-assistance claims in Lafler and Frye!
[by Stephanos Bibas]
As Doug is off romping at LegoLand, I'll have to do my best impression of how he would react to the Supreme Court's rulings this morning in Lafler and Frye: Wowza! Oh boy! Court Fryes prosecutors, gives defendants the last Lafler.
Okay, I guess Doug's style is inimitable and I shouldn't pretend to imitate it. After the arguments in both cases last fall, I and most other observers were pessimistic, predicting that the difficulty of specifying a remedy would deter the Court from recognizing the right. Interestingly, Justice Alito (in dissent) is the only one who appears to have been swayed by that specific concern.
As one could have predicted from Justice Scalia's dissent in Padilla, he argues that the Sixth Amendment's sole goal is to protect the accuracy of verdicts of guilt at trial, so in his view the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has nothing to do with plea bargaining, which would essentially be a matter of executive grace like a pardon. He criticized the majority for constitutionalizing a new "boutique" field of plea-bargaining law. The use of "boutique" is particularly ironic given that plea bargaining has spread like kudzu to take over almost all of American criminal justice. Justice Scalia laments that plea bargaining is a necessary evil and should not be protected as a positive good. That complaint might have more force if plea bargaining were not already so prevalent and if he were willing to be a thorough-going originalist and ban all plea bargaining.
The big surprise is that Justice Kennedy, despite multiple, skeptical questions at oral argument, soundly rejected that approach. He grounded his analysis on the basic fact that today, plea bargaining resolves 97% of federal cases and 94% of state ones. It is not a "boutique" corner of criminal justice; it is criminal justice, and (as I've argued elsewhere) it makes little sense to write rules for 5% of cases while ignoring the possibly perverse effects on the other 95%.
Another crucial area of disagreement concerned sentencing. Justice Scalia views the job of the Sixth Amendment as ensuring that a defendant gets an accurate determination of guilt from a jury. Sentencing doesn't factor into that equation, except to the extent that a jury decides to convict of greater or lesser charges (in ignorance of the penalties it is supposedly authorizing). In recognizing that a heavier post-trial sentence is a cognizable injury, Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lafler quotes my recent California Law Review article to analogize sentences to car prices--only an ill-informed consumer pays full sticker price and suffers harm in doing so, as the going rate is usually a bargain well below the sticker price. Prosecutors implicitly agree that the lesser figure is enough punishment, so the extra post-trial punishment is effectively a penalty for being rash enough to go to trial. (I set aside for now cases in which there is a real chance of acquittal.)
One last surprise: These opinions are fully consistent with Justice Kennedy's vote in Padilla v. Kentucky, recognizing that ineffective assistance of counsel protects a noncitizen defendant's right to accurate information about deportation before he pleads guilty. But they appear in tension with his opinion summarily reversing the Ninth Circuit in Premo v. Moore about a year ago. It is particularly surprising that he viewed the right of ineffective assistance at plea bargaining as so well-established that it could survive deferential review under AEDPA in Lafler. Justice Kennedy's pragmatic understanding of the world of criminal justice today trumps Justice Scalia's eighteenth-century focus on jury trials.
In that vein, the most powerful challenge to the majority came not from Justice Scalia, but from Justice Alito, who noted at oral argument and in his brief opinion that crafting remedies for broken bargains is extremely hard, because neither rescission nor specific performance may fit many cases. In response, the majority suggested that courts could balance factors and retain the post-trial sentence, the offered plea sentence, or something in between. We may have to move to a more flexible remedial model, akin to awarding damages, and away from traditional all-or-nothing remedies. Justice Alito is right to worry that it is unclear how this will work out. But Justice Kennedy is right that we haven't seen a flood of ineffective-assistance claims succeed since Hill v. Lockhart, and skeptical judges are likely to disbelieve defendants who claim ineffectiveness only after they have lost at trial.
Stephanos Bibas, guest-blogging
[Full disclosure: I'm a former law clerk to Justice Kennedy, as well as author of Regulating the Plea Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 Cal. L. Rev. 1117 (2011), which the majority quoted in Lafler.]
March 21, 2012 at 11:37 AM | Permalink
TrackBack URL for this entry:
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference SCOTUS recognizes ineffective-assistance claims in Lafler and Frye!:
"It is particularly surprising that he viewed the right of ineffective assistance at plea bargaining as so well-established that it could survive deferential review under AEDPA in Lafler. Justice Kennedy's pragmatic understanding of the world of criminal justice today trumps Justice Scalia's eighteenth-century focus on jury trials."
When even a former law clerk says that a result was "surprising," one has to question it. The issue, however, putting aside AEDPA, is not pragmatism, but the Constitution. Since it was unquestionably true that the right to counsel was not granted for its own sake, but to protect the right to a fair trial, the result in Lafler/Frye is clearly an extension, and one not dictated by precedent. And where does this right come from--not from the Constitution, but from a pragmatic understanding of how things work. OK, gotcha.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 21, 2012 11:59:47 AM
"argues that the Sixth Amendment's sole goal is to protect the accuracy of verdicts of guilt at trial"
If he so argues, he is wrong. The 6A along with other amendments tend not to have a "sole" goal. They put forth rules, including a right to counsel that in no way is solely about accuracy of guilt. A lawyer has many functions and once you guarantee the right to one, no one crowds out others.
Posted by: Joe | Mar 21, 2012 12:03:29 PM
A clerk says something is "surprising" = must question it? Well, few things are obvious, something more "unquestionably true" than the rest of the first comment, including what due process as a whole entails.
Posted by: Joe | Mar 21, 2012 12:07:15 PM
"And where does this right come from--not from the Constitution, but from a pragmatic understanding of how things work. OK, gotcha. "
My issue is that this turns the Constitution into the province of angels and not of men.
"It is not a "boutique" corner of criminal justice; it is criminal justice, and (as I've argued elsewhere) it makes little sense to write rules for 5% of cases while ignoring the possibly perverse effects on the other 95%."
I agree. Federalist wants to make the perfect the enemy of the good. I don't buy it.
"from Justice Alito, who noted at oral argument and in his brief opinion that crafting remedies for broken bargains is extremely hard, because neither rescission nor specific performance may fit many cases."
But hand-wringing is not an argument. The law is difficult in many places. It's the judges /job/ to sort it out.
Posted by: Daniel | Mar 21, 2012 12:40:09 PM
Professor, - insightful post. A good day for the criminal justice system, though since so many courts had already recognized some form of remedy for IAC during plea bargaining, it is more of a crisis narrowly averted than a great leap forward in protecting the constitutional rights governing in 95% of criminal cases. I would like to thank you on your body of work on plea bargaining, which apparently the Supreme Court found useful (and which I used in an amicus in the Arizona Supreme Court on the same issue).
Posted by: Elias Batchelder | Mar 21, 2012 2:03:18 PM
Justice Samuel "I love the prosecution" Alito is at is again.
His Lafler dissent basically tells lower courts to give no remedy in almost all cases. Specifically, "when the rejection of the plea offer [due to ineffective assistance of counsel] results in a substantial expenditure of scarce prosecutorial or judicial resources," Alito "hope[s]" trial courts will not provide any remedy to the defendant. Depending on how one defines "substantial," that could swallow the rule.
Does any trial, in and of itself, require "a substantial expediture of ... resources"? If so, then under all circumstances no remedy will be provided. Let’s “hope” that’s NOT how trial courts exercise their discretion.
Leave it to Alito to give prosecutors the path to evade the Supreme Court majority's holding.
Posted by: anon | Mar 21, 2012 2:16:00 PM
"Court Fryes prosecutors, gives defendants the last Lafler."
I am sure the victim in Lafler would enjoy reading that.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 21, 2012 2:22:26 PM
"After the arguments in both cases last fall, I and most other observers were pessimistic...."
"Pessimistic" meaning expecting a bad result? Well, pessimism would have been justified, it turns out, because the result is truly awful.
The court quotes your analogy between plea bargaining and car buying. Okay:
Say you offer to buy my car for $10,000. After consulting with my expert, I reject the offer. Turns out my expert gave me bad advice. The next week, I want to go through with the deal. In the meantime, though, I have wrecked the car. Would it be fair to make you pay me $10,000 for the now-wrecked car?
Of course not. The thing you offered $10,000 for no longer exists, at least not in a form worth anywhere near $10,000.
A prosecutor offers a plea bargain to avoid the expense and uncertainty of trial. Once the trial happens, there is no way the prosecution can receive the consideration it offered. Restoration of a pre-trial offer after the trial has occurred is therefore never a fair remedy unless the underlying problem was somehow the fault of the prosecution.
The fairest result possible in this situation is to leave the parties where they are, as if no offer had ever been made. I miss out on an opportunity, but not on anything I had an entitlement to. That's better than sticking you with paying for something you do not receive as a result of something that is not your fault and you could not control.
In past cases, the court has said that ineffective assistance is "attributable" to the state. That is a stretch and a fiction, and it should not be stretched any farther. Once the state appoints a qualified attorney, it has done all it can do. Cooper's attorney's advice was cloaked in privilege. There is no way the state could have learned of it, much less done anything about it.
Posted by: Kent Scheidegger | Mar 21, 2012 2:23:52 PM
The car analogy is the wrong one, because there is no Constitutional right to a car, but there IS a Constitutional right to counsel.
In most cases, ineffective assistance is indeed attributable to the state. For one thing, in many of these cases counsel is state-appointed. It would be an empty right, if there were no requirement that counsel be competent.
But beyond that, as Kent surely knows, the role of the State is not merely to rack up as many convictions as possible, but also to ensure justice is done. That, for example, is the reason why the State is required to turn over exculpatory evidence, even though the defendant has no such reciprocal obligation.
Nevertheless, there are compelling arguments against the Kennedy opinion. As Kent has noted, in these cases the government would not be in a position to know that counsel’s performance was ineffective. This is quite unlike the the typical ineffective assistance case, where counsel’s poor performance is in open court, for all to see.
I also agree with Alito that the remedy is awfully messy, if not downright impractical. And I agree with Scalia that these decisions will open a floodgate of post-conviction litigation with highly inconsistent results, given the complexity of Kennedy’s three-part test. (That is, Would the defendant have accepted the plea deal? Would the prosecution have accepted it? Would the Court have accepted it?)
And I agree with Scalia about the dubiousness of protecting a bargain that the defendant had no right to be offered in the first place.
Posted by: Marc Shepherd | Mar 21, 2012 3:08:36 PM
The court holds that it is a violation of a right designed to secure a fair trial when a fair trial is provided.
Orwellian doesn't begin to describe this state of affairs.
Marc, if I may speak for Kent, his point is more subtle. Remember, the state really isn't in a position to police these issues, so it's a bad policy choice to extend the judge-made law to this situation.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 21, 2012 3:46:19 PM
"But beyond that, as Kent surely knows, the role of the State is not merely to rack up as many convictions as possible, but also to ensure justice is done."
I do indeed know that, which is why if the defendant has received a fair trial and a sentence appropriate to his crime, justice has been done and there is no need to disturb the judgment.
"It would be an empty right, if there were no requirement that counsel be competent."
If appointed counsel performs competently at trial and preparing for trial, the right is hardly empty.
Posted by: Kent Scheidegger | Mar 21, 2012 4:34:49 PM
"The court holds that it is a violation of a right designed to secure a fair trial when a fair trial is provided."
federalist, repeating (or paraphrasing) the same thought over and over on these posts does not make you more correct or the point more valid.
Posted by: anon | Mar 21, 2012 5:39:06 PM
Even the Court can't answer the point. In any event, the NYTimes recognizes that this is a significant expansion. That, of course, should have made it clear that AEDPA barred habeas in Lafler. Of course, the Court once again shows that it is "do as I say, not as I do."
Lafler v. Cooper is one of the worst SCOTUS decisions in memory. Its lawlessness is breathtaking. Federal habeas should be limited to innocence only.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 21, 2012 5:52:16 PM
"That complaint might have more force if plea bargaining were not already so prevalent and if he were willing to be a thorough-going originalist and ban all plea bargaining."
This statement is completely dumb. First of all, how in the world would it be originalist to ban plea bargaining? The constitution is silent on it. Second, Scalia is commenting on the desirability of the practice, not its constitutionality. It is perfectly reasonable to point out, as Scalia has, that plea bargains are not good and hold that the rejection of them doesn't trigger protection. (I actually think that Scalia's argument here is weak. Whether or not plea bargains are an embarrassment seems besides the point.)
What is irksome about the professor's argument is the idea that because a practice has grown up without any constitutional constraints (i.e., the rejection of plea bargain, remember, guilty pleas are subject to Strickland) that it is necessary to impose them. So what if 95% of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargains--that may be a bad thing (for many reasons), but that doesn't mean that there is anything in the Constitution regulating attorney advice in rejecting them. Until 1963, the right to counsel was understood to mean only the right to have counsel that you paid for. Now, it has become a right to complain when you get a fair trial? Wow.
But this cannot even be justified in terms of policy. Whatever the merits of Gideon, stretching it to cover situations like this, where a fair trial happens, and the prosecutor has no control over the process, seems stunningly ill-advised, unless, of course, you care more about the Coopers of the world than the Kali Mundys. And that's not even getting into the practical problems here.
But I need not tarry here. The bottom line is that the professor has showed ignorance with that flip comment about originalism. I wasn't a SCOTUS clerk, but even I know that comment is all wet.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 21, 2012 6:08:26 PM
Federalist, I think “lawless” is an exaggeration, and sadly typical on the Right. Plenty of highly competent scholars and judges, along with the five Justices in the majority, thought this decision the right one.
Personally, I think the Kennedy opinion is a mess, and the Scalia opinion much more cogently argued. But disagreeing with a ruling (as we both do) and calling it lawless are entirely different things.
Posted by: Marc Shepherd | Mar 21, 2012 7:05:25 PM
I have been working on a 2255 Habeas Corpus case, based upon ineffective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining, for 2 1/2 years (filed in November 2009), "Ali Hadi Sawaf v. U.S.", Civil No. 09-7104-KKC (E.D.Ky.). In January 2012, Judge Karen Caldwell scheduled an evidentiary hearing in the case for May 2012, so we will be one of the first pending cases to be impacted by today's Supreme Court rulings. Sawaf was an M.D. charged with writing prescriptions for narcotics without a medical necessity on a large scale (being a "script doctor" or a "drug dealer with a white coat"), although none of his patients died from any overdose. The Government offered him a plea bargain with a 41-month sentence prior to trial. Upon the advice of counsel, he rejected that offer and went to trial (3 week trial), where he was acquitted on a few counts, but convicted on most counts. His young lawyer was 3 years out of law school, and had never previously handled a Federal criminal case. During plea bargain discussions, the attorney failed to advise Dr. Sawaf that if he was convicted at trial, his Guidelines Range would be 235 to 293 months, with a 20 years (240 months) statutory cap. After trial, the young defense attorney could not readily tell the convicted defendant what his sentencing range might be, as he did not possess a copy of the Guidelines Manuel (which he had to order from West Publishing!). Three times, Judge Caldwell has sentenced Dr. Sawaf to 20 years, the statutory maximum sentence. The sentence was vacated and remanded from the 6th Circuit twice for re-sentencing, first because of the 2005 "Booker" decision, and the second time because the Judge refused to permit Dr. Sawaf to allocute at his 2nd sentencing hearing, saying that she had heard what he said at the first hearing and didn't want to hear any more from him. Prior to today's Supreme Court decisions,the outcome of Dr. Sawaf's Habeas Corpus Motion would have been governed by the decision in "U.S. v. Morris", 470 F.3d 596, 602-603 (6th Cir. 2006),a case on all fours (except a 2254 habeas corpus motion from a state court), where the Circuit held that the proper remedy is to give the defendant the benefit of the plea bargain he presumably would have accepted, but for ineffective legal advice. In Dr. Sawaf's case (he is now 70 years old), he has now served more than 10 years in prison (about 3 times the 41-month plea bargain he rejected), so he would have been entitled to immediate release from prison. Today's Supreme Court opinions now cast some(but not total)doubt on the continued viability of the Sixth Circuit's "specific performance" remedy. I will be reading today's opinions carefully and writing a Supplementary Brief next week, before the April status conference scheduled in the case. As a footnote to this story, the incompetent young defense lawyer went on to be elected the Circuit Judge of Harlan County, Ky., were he served for about 5 years, until he was removed from office by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in 2011 for unethical conduct, becoming the first Kentucky Judge so removed from office in more than 50 years.
Posted by: Jim Gormley | Mar 21, 2012 8:32:15 PM
Au contraire, Marc. Remember, Lafler v. Cooper is an AEDPA case. And clearly, the idea that a fair trial is not a Strickland error is reasonable. In fact, it finds a home in Cronic and Strickland itself. So, yes, Lafler IS lawless.
As for the remedy, as Scalia points out, it's rare to see the remedy for a constitutional right have such a small bite. If the state truly is responsible for the violation, then the ambiguity (i.e., whether the guy would have taken the plea etc.) should be resolved against the state.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 21, 2012 8:46:45 PM
"highly competent scholars and judges" or retired prosecutors are no match to the federalist's jeremaids. Ancient Israel was not as "lawless" or "shameless" or warranting "shunning" as various governmental actors these days it seems.
The three points Kennedy makes in Lafler have bite. Scalia has a too limited view on what is required and properly applying what a state provides as a privilege is required even if the state could decide not to have it. The process as a whole is run by the state and any sentence handed down can be deprive liberty w/o due process if the process as a whole is not properly handled, including not putting proper safeguards in place on lawyers. The defendant has little idea there -- the state has some responsibility.
I will leave proper habeas relief to others, but it sure seems like there is a dispute of what that warrants here. As to the problem of dealing with the broken omelet, so to speak, that is probably the hardest question. But, as noted during oral arguments, there probably is as well various cases where some relief could be crafted. As is often the case, the devil will be in the details.
Both Sotomayor and Alito were tri-state prosecutors. They reached different results here. I'll remain agnostic on who is right.
Posted by: Joe | Mar 21, 2012 9:24:30 PM
When you say my comments about originalism and plea bargaining are "flip" and "completely dumb," have you considered Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the Constitution ("The trial of all crimes . . . shall be by jury;")? Have you considered the scholarship of Akhil Amar, John Langbein, and others establishing that the jury trial was not an individual right of the defendant but a non-waivable structural check on other branches of government, notably the executive (Crown, prosecutor) and judges? Have you considered that there is no historical evidence for a system of plea bargaining until decades after the Founding? Please engage the safety on your flamethrower before you use it, or shooting it up against a well-insulated wall will cause the flames to shoot back and engulf you.
Posted by: Stephanos Bibas | Mar 21, 2012 9:51:46 PM
Professor Bibas, I note the backtracking in your post, so I guess that "flamethrower" made things a little hot for you. Your quoted language basically calls Scalia a hypocrite for not manning up like a hypothetical real originalist and voting to ban plea bargains. And when called out, you trot out some scholarship by Akhil Amar and John Langbein--to show what--exactly--that these two are the be all and end all of originalism? Since that's obviously not true, we are left with the conclusion that your citation of these two is a bit of a rhetorical rear-guard action. Contrary to your implication, Scalia can be a real-man originalist, yet not wish to vote to ban plea deals. And citation of some scholars whose views would probably get zero votes from either the Supreme Court or any random Court of Appeals panel doesn't change that.
I am also somewhat mystified by your citation of Article III. Unless I am mistaken, these two cases involved state plea negotiations, and unless there's a smuggling of Article III into the Bill of Rights (a la EPC into Fifth Amendment DPC, but in the other direction), I wasn't aware that an "originalist" could vote to ban state plea bargaining (even an originalist that accepts selective incorporation of the Bill of Rights), notwithstanding the fine scholarship of those two professors. In any event, I don't particularly care when the practice grew up. It seems relatively clear to me that guilty pleas were ok at common law, and it seems relatively clear that prosecutors had discretion as to the bringing of charges. Putting those two unquestionably constitutional practices together, voila, you have plea bargaining. Now that doesn't necessarily remove all doubt as to the constitutionality of plea deals, given the fine scholarship of Amar and Langbein, but it certainly removes all doubt that one must be in favor of finding all plea bargaining unconstitutional (and that doesn't even mention the inability to apply Article III to the states--how did Amar and Langbein get around that issue--do they argue that the jury trial right in the Bill of Rights, despite the differing language, has the same meaning?) in order to be a true originalist.
Professor, I do apologize; I am just a dumb transactional lawyer. What do I know about all this high-minded constitutional law stuff? I am still trying to figure out how a right not granted for its own sake but rather to ensure a fair trial is somehow a violation of that right. And when I figure that out, I'll try to figure out how a court judgment (that's what counts, right?) determining that the particular right was not violated when the accused got a fair trial was unreasonable. And then when I get all of that figured out, I will try to figure out how the government can violate the accused's rights, yet not have the ambiguity it created by such violation required to be resolved against it.
Gotta run. Need to get some milk for the kiddos. Perhaps your insulation isn't as good as you think, or, instead of a flamethrower, I use an oxyacetylene blow torch. You'll have to explain to me how Article III regulates the states--I missed that day in law school.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 21, 2012 10:53:21 PM
From the Sixth Amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
On its face, the amendment does not limit the right to assistance of counsel only to jury trials. Of course, it also doesn't say on its face that the assistance of counsel has to be effective, but the right is meaningless if the assistance is ineffective.
The problem with trying to make a defendant responsible for all the worst decisions of his lawyer is that the vast majority of defendants simply don't have the wherewithal to navigate the complexities of today's criminal prosecutions. The criminal justice process only incidentally touches on actual guilt or innocence, so a defense usually is aimed at damage control, and the intricacies of achieving that are outside the comprehension of most defendants.
Rulings like this are always accompanied by anxiety over the amount of litigation they will spawn and about how many cases will have to be reviewed and modified. But whenever the Supreme Court opens up a door to defendants, the Courts of Appeal can be relied upon to shut the door in most cases. Anyway, there aren't going to be a lot of incidents where lawyers have made decisions as boneheaded as telling a client that shooting someone below the waist is a defense to attempted murder. Defendants who bring collateral challenges based on their lawyer not communicating a plea offer, or essentially lying to the defendant about his chances at trial, will have to convince a judge that actually happened.
I suspect that most habeas hearings will go like this:
Defendant: "My lawyer never told me about the government's plea offer! He told me a trial was a sure thing!"
Trial counsel: "I told the defendant about the offer and I begged him to accept it, but he wanted to take his chances with the jury" (or, in federal court, "The government's offer was to plead guilty and take whatever the judge gave him, and he didn't like that, so he demanded a trial").
Judge: "Motion denied."
In the end, it will be much ado about very little.
Posted by: C.E. | Mar 21, 2012 11:25:13 PM
I am a criminal defense lawyer of 38 years experience. I have succeeded in a number of cases on these issues. The decisions are consequential, but they broke no new ground.
The decisions are a logical interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in Hill v Lockhart (1985), and every federal circuit since then has reached the same conclusion.
The protestations of Justice Scalia and the federalistas are based upon simplistic logic, i.e, that the constitution only guarantees a right to effective counsel at trial. When one considers that most cases are resolved without trial, the argument is clearly not reality based.
Posted by: John Minock | Mar 21, 2012 11:55:24 PM
"The protestations of Justice Scalia and the federalistas are based upon simplistic logic, i.e, that the constitution only guarantees a right to effective counsel at trial. When one considers that most cases are resolved without trial, the argument is clearly not reality based."
The logic is iron-clad. Too bad pro-criminal feelings trump logic.
And the argument is not that the right of effective rep extends to pre-trial stuff, but that a right that exists to protect a fair trial cannot be broken when a fair trial is provided. In my mind, arguments that constitutional rights turn on the percentage of criminal filings ending in plea deals aren't reality based. If Frye is right, then it is right if 1% of cases end in plea deals. And that the justice system IS plea bargaining does not mean that the Constitution must somehow have a provision that regulates it.
The car analogy is weak anyway. No one argues that the Constitution protects car buyers who get a bad deal. It describes a phenomenon, namely that a good lawyer can get a better deal for a particular defendant.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 22, 2012 1:12:33 AM
I see the good professor has no response.
Posted by: federalist | Mar 23, 2012 2:15:31 PM
Reply to "Federal habeas should be limited to innocence only."
by federalist on 21 Mar 2012 at 5:52:16 PM
¦► I respectfully disagree. ◄¦
The first two cases that came to mind were Frank v. Mangum (1913) and Moore v. Dempsey (1923)
Citations available upon request to firstname.lastname@example.org
Posted by: Docile Jim Brady ¦ Nemo Me Impune Lacessit | Mar 25, 2012 8:29:35 AM