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December 11, 2012

Professor Frase guest-blogging on "Just Sentencing"

File.phpEspecially because I so greatly enjoyed Professor Stephanos Bibas earlier this year guest-blogging on "The Machinery of Criminal Justice" (series here), I am very pleased to be able to now welcome Professor Richard Frase as a guest-blogger to discuss sentencing issues raised by his terrific new book titled "Just Sentencing: Principles and Procedures for a Workable System," which was just published by Oxford University Press and is available here.

Richard's first guest post will appear later today, and everyone can get excited about the series based on this summary of the book's coverage via this page at the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice:

What are the most important purposes of punishment, in general and in particular cases?  What makes just sentencing? These eternal questions are very difficult to answer because traditional as well as emerging sentencing purposes often conflict.  Retributive and non-retributive institutions and intuitions of justice are both deeply-rooted and each equally hard to ignore.  There is no generally accepted or well-elaborated theory to guide and evaluate recent or proposed sentencing changes, and most of the major books on sentencing theory are outdated.  There is a compelling need for a new sentencing model.

In Just Sentencing, Richard Frase describes and defends a hybrid sentencing model that integrates theory and practice–blending and balancing both the competing principles of retribution and rehabilitation and the procedural concern of weighing rules against discretion.  Frase lays out a sentencing reform model based on the theory of limiting retributivism.  The theory accommodates retributive values–especially the human-rights-based need to limit maximum sanction severity–along with crime-control goals such as deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and moral education.  It also promotes efficiency and provides sufficient flexibility to incorporate victim and community participation, local values and resource limitations, and restorative justice programs. Frase presents his significantly expanded version of the limiting retributive model and distinguishes it from versions proposed by others. Next, he demonstrates the practical feasibility and widespread support for this approach by showing how it has been successfully implemented in Minnesota, while also identifying the less developed limiting retributive elements found in almost all Western countries.  The final part of the book identifies and attempts to resolve the model’s most important theoretical and practical challenges, and suggest further improvements.

Just Sentencing is the first book in over forty years to present a fully developed punishment theory which incorporates both utilitarian and retributive sentencing purposes.

December 11, 2012 in Guest blogging by Professor Richard Frase | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

December 10, 2012

"Marijuana: A Winning GOP Issue?" ... and a lost 2012 Romney opportunity

The title of this post is drawn from the headline of this notable recent commentary by Nate Cohn at The New Republic, which echoes some points that should be familiar to regular readers of this blog.  Here are excerpts from the commentary:

Young voters might be pro-Obama, but they're even more pro-marijuana.  While 60 percent of 18-29 year olds supported the president's reelection, the CBS News and Quinnipiac polls, as well as the Washington and Colorado exit polls, show an impressive 65-70 percent of voters under age 30 supporting marijuana legalization.  The rise of the millennial generation — not persuasion of older voters — is primarily responsible for marijuana’s growing strength in national polls, with 65 to 70 percent of seniors remaining opposed to marijuana legalization.  With generational change already responsible for the GOP's national struggles, the party could really use a break from cultural questions that pit its elderly base against millennials.

Fortunately for Republicans, they actually have a rare opportunity here to seize the middle ground and appeal to younger voters.  While the Republican rank-and-file still oppose outright marijuana legalization, the issue could fit within the party's ostensible state-rights philosophy.  GOP voters seem to agree.  CBS News found that 65 percent of Republicans support allowing state governments to determine the legality of marijuana, compared to just 29 percent who believed the federal government should decide.  Rand Paul has already suggested moderation on marijuana legalization as a helpful step toward coping with generational change.

But Republican advocates of marijuana moderation don't have an easy task.  Just because GOP voters might accept the state-rights frame provided by a poll question doesn’t mean that the frame would prevail in a debate.  The exit polls in Colorado and Washington, as well as recent Quinnipiac polls, suggest that about 65-70 percent of conservatives, white evangelical Christians, and Republicans are opposed to marijuana legalization.  If the Obama administration allowed Colorado and Washington to violate federal law, moderation might become even more difficult as conservative media launch a crusade against a lawless administration....

If Republicans don’t seize the middle ground on marijuana legalization, Democrats will eventually use the issue to their advantage.  Not only will Democratic primary voters demand it, they will have a lot to gain.  As more younger, pro-marijuana voters enter the electorate and replace their elders, support for marijuana legalization will continue to increase, absent intervening events that reshape public opinion, like a disastrous ending to the experiments in Colorado and Washington.  If marijuana becomes another partisan social issue, like gay marriage or abortion, it will make it even more difficult for Republicans to appeal to millennial voters.

Regular readers know I think these sentiments are spot on: way back in April 2012, I urged in posts and in a Daily Beast commentary that then-candidate Mitt Romney should embrace "Right on Crime" rhetoric about the need for criminal justice reforms and stress a states-rights approach to pot policy as a means to appeal to young voters.  I further stressed something missing in Cohn's discussion: the unique and important opportunity for the GOP to use crminal justice reform in general (and pot policy in particular) to stress its pro-liberty and small-government themes in a manner that should be especially salient and menaingful to minority voters. 

I very much doubt that conservatives and white evangelical Christians will be too troubled by a robust and honest GOP-led conversation about the real costs and benefits of pot prohibition.  Meanwhile, I genuinely believe many minority voters (young and old, men and women) will be quite thrilled to be supportive of any and all GOP leaders who, in that conversation, stress the considerable (and often disparate) harms to minority communities from low-level arrests and criminal justice entanglements that can flow from potential selective enforcement of pot prohibition.  In other words, if GOP leaders were to make a concern for racial justice an express feature of any effort to "seize the middle ground" with respect to pot policy, they might benefits politically in a number of diverse ways.

Taking these musing just a step further, I cannot help but (foolishly?) suggest that Mitt Romney might have actually won the November 2012 election if he had headed my criminal justice advice way back in April 2012.  As highlighted in this Nate Silver number-crunching post last month, Romney won every red state save one (North Carolina) by 8 or more percentage point.  It is hard to believe Romney loses any of those states by embracing "Right on Crime" rhetoric and stressing a states-rights approach to pot policy.  Meanwhile, Prez Obama eeked out razor thin victories in Florida, Ohio, Virginia, and Colorado, all of which are states in which a targeted states-rights message on pot policy and criminal justice reform could have alone possibly moved the needle a bit.  And, even more important, any move to the center on criminal justice would have usefully suggested that Romney was an independent thinker who would not just rely on the tired-old-GOP playbook on social issues. 

Gosh, it sure is fun and easy to be a pundit giving advice to the guy who lost so I can now say "you should have just listened to me...."   Perhaps this could even get me a gig on FoxNews in place of Dick Morris.

A few recent and older related posts: 

December 10, 2012 in Campaign 2012 and sentencing issues , Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (23) | TrackBack

"Foreword: Criminal Justice Responses to the Economic Crisis"

The title of this post is the title of this SSRN posting that I just came across. Authored by Caren Myers Morrison, the piece previews what will become a must-read symposium (once it comes available on-line).  Here is the abstract:

The epidemic rate of incarceration in the United States, long documented, has come at significant financial and social cost.  But the global financial crisis has forced legislators and government officials to face issues that they had previously been able to ignore: whether incarceration is the best use of resources to deal with non-violent offenders, whether former inmates should be sent back to prison for violations of conditions of their post-conviction release, rather than for new criminal activity, whether sentences should be so long that the prison population becomes increasingly geriatric.  At the same time, taxpayers are beginning to realize that they are not always getting a decent return on their corrections dollar.  Crime, and the fear of it, is no longer dominating the domestic agenda.  And fiscal conservatives are edging out “tough on crime” rhetoric with proposals to be “smart on crime.”

The goal of the Symposium, held in Atlanta on January 27, 2012, was to bring together a number of scholars and practitioners to see how the moment might be leveraged to produce sustainable change.  Cognizant of the ephemeral quality of reform that is solely cost-driven, the participants proposed a variety of solutions that could have staying power, even after the good times return.  While controversial, large-scale reforms may remain out of reach, perhaps an accumulation of incremental changes might add up to an overall shift in focus, away from the punitive overreliance on incarceration, and towards a more just, evidence-based and cost-effective justice system.

December 10, 2012 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Distinguishing Padilla, Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds no Sixth Amendment problem with lack of pension plea advice

An interesting case involving a plea that led to the loss of a pension for a school teacher has now led to an interesting set of opinions from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Abraham, No. 36 WAP 2010 (Pa. Dec. 10, 2012) (links to majority opinion, concurrence one and two, and dissent).  Here is the set up via the start of the majority opinion:

Joseph Abraham was a high school teacher in the Pittsburgh public school system. In 2008, one of his students alleged he offered her $300 to have sex with him and touched her buttocks; she further stated he gave her one of his business cards and wrote his private cell phone number on it.  After these allegations surfaced, appellee, who was 67 years old, retired from teaching and began receiving pension payments of $1,500 per month.  Shortly after appellee retired, he was charged for the above incident. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement, appellee pled guilty to corruption of a minor and indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age.  He was sentenced to probation; no direct appeal was filed.

Because the crime of indecent assault of a person less than 16 years of age is one of the enumerated offenses in the Public Employee Pension Forfeiture Act (PEPFA), 43 P.S. §§ 1311-1315, appellee forfeited his pension when he pled guilty to this charge.  He filed a motion to withdraw his plea nunc pro tunc, alleging he was not informed of his right to seek withdrawal of his plea or of the possible sentences he faced. The trial court denied the motion.

Appellee filed a timely PCRA petition alleging plea counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him he would forfeit his pension upon pleading guilty.  The PCRA court, after giving the required notice pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1), dismissed the petition without a hearing. In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court stated the loss of appellee’s pension was an issue collateral to the plea; thus, under Commonwealth v. Frometa, 555 A.2d 92, 93 (Pa. 1989), plea counsel’s failure to explain this consequence to appellee was not relevant to whether his plea was knowing and voluntary.  Accordingly, the PCRA court held counsel was not ineffective.

On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding a recent United States Supreme Court decision, Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010), abrogated Frometa, which held deportation was collateral consequence of a guilty plea and therefore did not need to be explained to the defendant.  The Superior Court noted Padilla, which also dealt with deportation following entry of a guilty plea, held such consequences were so intimately connected with the criminal process that a direct versus collateral consequences analysis was ill suited to evaluate an ineffectiveness claim arising in this context.  Commonwealth v. Abraham, 996 A.2d 1090, 1092 (Pa. Super. 2010)....

We granted the Commonwealth’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal to determine:

(1) Whether, in light of Padilla v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010), the distinction in Pennsylvania between direct and collateral consequences to define the scope of constitutionally “reasonable and professional assistance” required under Strickland v. Washington, 486 U.S. 668 (1984) is appropriate?

(2) If so, whether the forfeiture of a pension that stems from a public school teacher’s negotiated plea to crimes committed in the scope of his employment is a collateral consequence of a criminal conviction which relieves counsel from any affirmative duty to investigate and advise?

The various opinions reach various in Abraham reach various conclusions on these questions, but here is the heart of the analysis of the majority:

Not getting money as a consequence of breaching an employment contract cannot be equated with being forced to leave the country. Based on PEPFA’s aim, procedure, and consequences, we cannot conclude forfeiture of an employment benefit is so enmeshed in the criminal process that it cannot be subjected to a direct versus collateral consequences analysis. Accordingly, we hold Padilla did not abrogate application of such analysis in cases that do not involve deportation...

Our assessment of the above factors leads us to conclude PEPFA’s pension forfeiture provisions are not so punitive in force or effect as to negate the legislative intent that it be a civil, remedial provision. PEPFA is not punitive, and is thus a collateral consequence of appellee’s guilty plea.

Because counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to advise a defendant regarding the collateral consequences of a plea, appellee’s ineffectiveness claim fails. Therefore, we reverse the order of the Superior Court granting appellee a PCRA hearing on the issue of prejudice, and we remand for reinstatement of the PCRA court’s order denying appellee relief.

December 10, 2012 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Unique sentencing issues raised in Illinois sentencing 55 years after child's murder

This remarkable state sentencing story out of Illinois, which is headlined "73-year-old faces sentencing Monday for murdering girl in 1957," sound more like the script from a B-movie or an evil sentencing professor's final exam question than a real case.  But here are the reported facts, which raise so many notable sentencing questions:

His sentencing Monday for the 1957 murder of 7-year-old Maria Ridulph will send a powerful message that no killing is ever too old to solve.  That’s what relatives of the slain Sycamore girl think will come from the decades-delayed prosecution of Jack McCullough, 73.

“It’s going to give hope to people who are looking for conclusions in old cases,” said Charles Ridulph, Maria’s older brother. “I think people will stop and look at old cases in a new light.”

McCullough wasn’t charged until 2011 with the kidnapping and killing of the Sycamore girl in 1957 as she played near her home in the small DeKalb County farm town.  The former Sycamore resident and onetime cop was found guilty in September in a trial that was one of the oldest murder prosecutions in the United States, authorities have said.

On Monday, under 1957 sentencing laws, McCullough will face a minimum 14-year prison term and could receive a life sentence.  He would be eligible for parole in less than 11 years.

McCullough’s attorney and several relatives take a radically different view of the time that passed, contending the long gap between the girl’s death and his arrest is the only reason he was charged or convicted.  McCullough’s attorney is highlighting that issue in asking Judge James Hallock to throw out the murder conviction.

Though that legal longshot is likely to fail — Hallock heard the case without a jury and delivered the verdict — the timing of the charges is likely to be the critical issue when McCullough appeals his conviction and whatever sentence he receives.

Most witnesses had long since died by the time McCullough was charged. So prosecutors relied largely on hearsay evidence, testimony from jailhouse snitches and Maria’s childhood friend’s identification of a 1950s photo of McCullough as the man with whom she last saw Maria.  The lack of living witnesses, including FBI agents who investigated Maria’s disappearance on Dec. 3, 1957, severely hampered McCullough’s defense, his attorney and a family member say.

Without those witnesses, crucial police reports and other information from the original investigation into Maria’s disappearance and death were barred from McCullough’s trial. “If he was brought to trial 20 years ago, when some of those people were alive, it would never have gone this far,” said his stepdaughter, Janey O’Connor....

Before he is sentenced Monday, McCullough will tell Hallock that he didn’t kill Maria. He won’t ask for any specific sentence.  “What’s the appropriate sentence for an innocent man?” attorney McCulloch asked.

O’Connor is pinning her hopes on her stepfather ultimately winning his appeal and his freedom, but she worries about how long that process could take. “I’m really hopeful,” O’Connor said. “But at his age, how long will he have to wait?”

This AP story about the case provides more notable details on the 1957 crime and also concerning what the defendant has been doing since it happened:

During the trial, prosecutors contended that on Dec. 3, 1957, a 17-year-old McCullough, who was known as John Tessier at the time, approached Maria and another girl playing in front of Maria's house.  He played with them for a bit and when the other girl ran home to get her mittens, prosecutors said he dragged Maria into an alley choked her with a wire, and then stabbed her in the throat and chest.  Then, prosecutors said, he loaded her body into his car and drove more than 100 miles away, where he dumped it into a wooded area.

Her disappearance and the subsequent massive search made national headlines, and it was said that President Dwight Eisenhower and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover were asking for regular updates on the case. Maria's body was found in April 1958.

McCullough was one of more than 100 people who were briefly suspects, but he had what seemed like a solid alibi. On the day of the girl vanished, he told investigators, he'd been traveling to Chicago for a medical exam before joining the Air Force. McCullough ultimately settled in Seattle and was a Washington state police officer.

These facts sound a bit an evil sentencing professor's final exam question in part because, even putting aside the innocence issues, the details of the crime and aftermath raise a number of modern "hot topic" sentencing issues. For starters, though the defendant is now a (healthy?) senior citizen, he was a juvenile at the time of the 1957 crime. Not only does his elderly status now raise issues about whether his current age is relevant at his sentence, but his juvenile status at the time of the crime raises constitutional issues in light of the Supreme Court's work in Graham and Miller.

Speaking of the Supreme Court, two recent rulings by the Justices, Gall and Pepper, made much of considering under federal sentencing law the positive post-offense behavior by a defendant. In this case, it seems the defendant was a model citizen for more than five decades, during which time he apparently served our country in the armed services and served his local community as a police officer.

These issues not only complicate the today's planned sentencing, but also whether this defendant will be granted bail pending appeal. I do not know Illinois law or procedure well enough to know if a murder conviction makes bail impossible, but I do know that there are surely enough appeal issues here that whether the defendant gets bail pending appeal may impact whether he dies free or in prison more than whatever sentence gets handed down.

UPDATE:  This local story on today's sentencing reports that "A man found guilty of murdering a 7-year-old in Sycamore in 1957 was sentenced to natural life in prison this morning in DeKalb County Court." Here is more on the proceedings:

McCullough remained defiant today, making a 13-minute statement in which he denied committing the murder. He also said that FBI records proved he could not have committed the murder. Those records were ruled inadmissable in pre-trial rulings by Judge James Hallock....

Clay Campbell, the former state's attorney who prosecuted McCullough, called his courtroom statement "self-serving nonsense."

McCullough chose to be sentenced under the law as it existed in 1957. That means that he could, in theory, be eligible for parole in 20 years.

I find a bit peculiar the report that the defendant here "chose to be sentenced under the law as it existed in 1957"; which law applies at a delayed sentencing should not, in my view, generally be subject to "selection" by the defendant.  Moreover, I suspect that Illinois had the death penalty for aggravated murder back in 1957, so I am not sure it is accurate to report that McCullough was "sentenced under the law as it existed in 1957."

December 10, 2012 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack

Is the death penalty now essentially dead in North Carolina?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this lengthy and thorough article from the Fayetteville Observer, which is headlined "Capital punishment under close scrutiny in Fayetteville, statewide."  Here are excerpts:

Convicted murderer Marcus Robinson of Fayetteville was hours away from execution in 2007.  But his life was spared by a court-ordered stay to give him and other death row inmates a chance to challenge the constitutionality of the state's method of execution.  The delay turned into an unofficial moratorium on executions that nearly six years later remains unresolved in the courts.

For Robinson, the delay provided enough time to save him from the executioner's needle. This year, he became the first — and, so far, the only — North Carolina death row inmate to use a new law, the Racial Justice Act of 2009, to have his death sentence commuted to life in prison without parole. 

Now, the Racial Justice Act, other changes to death penalty law and a decline in jurors' willingness to sentence inmates to death are raising questions about the future of executions in the state.  It's unclear when the state will resume administering its ultimate punishment.

"It's been over six years now since an execution has been carried out, so we're a state that still has the death penalty as a law but does not have executions as a reality," said Ben David, district attorney in New Hanover County. David is president of the N.C. Conference of District Attorneys and a death penalty supporter....

Since the [state's capital] law took effect, North Carolina juries have sentenced 400 people to die.  The state has executed 43 of them, according to Department of Public Safety data.  The state is tied at ninth place with South Carolina in the total number of executions carried out in the modern era, according to the Death Penalty Information Center in Washington....

According to an Elon University poll, a majority of state residents support the death penalty.  But statistics show a growing reluctance to hand down the penalty in court. In 1999, 24 people were sentenced to death.  In 2009, two were sentenced.  This year, no one has been sentenced to death in the state, and no more capital trials are scheduled this year.  This will be the first year since the 1977 law when no one in the state has been sentenced to die.

Jurors are not as likely these days to hand down a death sentence, said Ken Rose, a lawyer with the Center for Death Penalty Litigation.  In 1994, North Carolina eliminated parole for people sentenced to life in prison.  Rose thinks that when jurors are comfortable that a killer will never go free, they are less prone to vote for death.  Meanwhile, high-profile exonerations in the past 15 years and television dramas that focus on crime labs have made jurors more skeptical of prosecutors and police, Rose said....  "I think people are more aware that the system is not infallible," Rose said. "They're more aware of the flaws in the system. They're more aware that people make mistakes, and law enforcement officials are human beings and they're going to make mistakes like the rest of us."...

And a law that took effect in 2001 led to a steep decrease in death penalty prosecutions. The law allows prosecutors discretion in seeking the death penalty.  Before the law took effect, if any of 11 specified circumstances applied in a murder case — for example, more than one person was killed — prosecutors were required to seek death and could not accept a plea bargain to a life sentence.

Now that prosecutors have the option, they often choose not to pursue capital punishment. Or they may use the threat of the death sentence to push a murder defendant into pleading guilty and accepting life in prison.

December 10, 2012 in Baze lethal injection case, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

December 9, 2012

NY Times editorial laments lack of compassionate release

Today's New York Times has this editorial headlined "What Compassionate Release?". Here are excerpts:

Federal sentencing law has been indefensibly harsh for a generation, but in theory it has contained a safety valve called compassionate release.  The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act gives federal courts the power to reduce sentences of federal prisoners for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” like a terminal illness.

In practice, though, the Bureau of Prisons and the Justice Department, which oversees the bureau, have not just failed to make use of this humane and practical program, but have crippled it.  That is the disturbing and well-substantiated conclusion of a new report by Human Rights Watch and Families Against Mandatory Minimums.

From 1992 through this November, a period in which the population of federal prisons almost tripled from around 80,000 to close to 220,000 inmates, the bureau released 492 prisoners under this program.  This is a mere two dozen or so on average each year, and the number has so far not surpassed 37.  The percentage of prisoners released has shrunk from tiny to microscopic....

The United States Sentencing Commission has identified several extraordinary and compelling reasons that could justify compassionate release: terminal illness, a permanent physical or mental condition, impairment due to old age, the death or incapacitation of a family member who has been solely responsible for the care of the prisoner’s minor children.

But as things have turned out, the human rights report says, virtually the only ground the bureau accepts for compassionate release is a terminal illness with up to a year of life expectancy.  To make matters worse, even when the prisoner meets its excessively strict tests, the bureau itself decides whether the prisoner should be set free — in effect usurping discretionary powers that Congress awarded the courts.

The report offers some sound remedies. Congress should modify the law to give prisoners themselves the right to seek compassionate release from a court.  Congress should require the bureau to publish all program data, including the number of requests denied and why. And Congress should reaffirm the role of the courts as final arbiter.

Recent related post:

December 9, 2012 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

"Clemency: Old Problems and New Solutions"

The title of this post is the title of this lunchtime event sponsored by The Heritage Foundation in DC on Mondat December 10, 2012.  Here is the description:

Clemency, Alexander Hamilton said, “is an act of grace and humanity.” While President Obama has, at least so far, granted clemency only 22 times, other presidents, both Democrat and Republican, have been far more generous.  President George W. Bush, for example, pardoned, commuted or rescinded the convictions of 200 people, and President Bill Clinton did the same for 459 people.  President Jimmy Carter granted clemency 566 times during his one term in office, although that is far from the record, a distinction which belongs to President Franklin Roosevelt who granted clemency 3,687 times.  The Christmas season, a traditional time for presidential forgiveness, is a good time to re-examine how well the clemency process is working.

Join us for a discussion with a distinguished panel of bipartisan experts who will explore whether and how the clemency process has deviated from its proper, traditional function. Our panelists will also consider how to make pardons, as Chief Justice John Marshall said, “an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.”

The event is to be moderated by Paul Rosenzweig, and here is the impressive group of speakers:

December 9, 2012 in Clemency and Pardons, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack