January 11, 2013
Great weekend reading for Sixth Amendment fans
My main plans for the coming weekend is to watch a lot of (well-paid) large men running around a small field inflicting brain damage on one another while millions cheer them on while drinking lots of alcohol (aka the NFL divisional playoffs). But I may also have to spend a little time obsessing over the Sixth Amendment and its application to mandatory minimum sentencing fact-finding because Monday brings the Supreme Court oral argument in Alleyne v. United States (basics and briefing here via SCOTUSblog).
Moreover, as Rory Little spotlights in this new SCOTUSblog post, there is also another distinct type of Sixth Amendment case on tap for the Justices on Monday. Here is how Rory's preview gets started:
Monday is apparently “Sixth Amendment Day” at the Court. Most eyes will be on the first case to be argued (Alleyne v. United States), in which the Court will consider whether there an Apprendi right to jury trial for mandatory minimum sentencing facts. But don’t ignore the second case, Boyer v. Louisiana, which presents a Speedy Trial question that seems increasingly important in a world of rising appointed-counsel costs funded by decreasing government budgets.
When a criminal trial is delayed because there are no funds to pay for the indigent defendant’s counsel, does that delay count against “the state” in a Speedy Trial analysis? We’ll see whether the Justices can stay focused on this discrete question presented – which would be an important one to answer around the nation — or whether they will take the bait (offered by both sides albeit in opposite directions) to decide whether the right to speedy trial was actually violated on the (always) unique facts of this case? The normal course would be to answer only the question presented, and then remand for “further proceedings not inconsistent” with the Court’s opinion. While “bad facts” on both sides in this case might tug for a broader ruling, it seems more likely that the Justices will avoid a decision on the ultimate merits – which still leaves a difficult debate on the narrower question.
In addition to the parties' briefs in both cases, there are two amicus briefs filed in Boyer and six amicus briefs filed in Alleyne. If the NFL playoff games fail to hold my attention, I likely will pull some of these briefs up on my e-reader; I would greatly appreciate any informed (or even uninformed) recommendations as to which of all these briefs make for the best reads.
Of course, I am partial to the Alleyne brief I help put together for the New York Council of Defense Lawyers (discussed here), in part because it presents an approach to the Sixth Amendment that does not appear in other briefs. I suspect that, especially in all the Alleyne case, a lot of similar ground may get covered in all the usual discussion of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence; I am thus especially interested to figure out whether and how any fresh ideas about the Apprendi line of cases have been presented to the Justices in all the briefing.
Recent prior posts on Alleyne case:
- SCOTUS grants cert to reconsider Harris
- NYCDL amicus brief in Alleyne with an offense/offender kicker
- Is Alleyne a stare decisis sleeper about "super-duper precedents"?
- Will 2013 finally bring the demise of Harris via the Alleyne case?
January 11, 2013 at 12:11 PM | Permalink
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Boyer is one of those cases that could have either a broad or minimal impact depending on exactly how it is resolved. Based on my understanding of the facts, Louisiana imposed a standard of representation by defense counsel that it was unable to meet (in this case due to inadequate funding).
Putting to the side the question not raised in this case (whether that standard is higher than the constitutional minimum standard for effective representation), a ruling for Boyer, unless very narrowly written, will likely set up the next case -- how to assess a delay caused by the need of appointed counsel (especially a public defender) to manage their caseload. A significant number of public defender offices around the country argue that they have to many cases for the number of attorneys and the standard of representation that they insist upon their attorneys providing. Technically, such defendants are not waiting for counsel to be appointed (as in Boyer), but does such an "understaffing" equate to the systematic breakdown discussed in Brillon that would attribute defense request for continuances to the State instead of the defendant.
Posted by: tmm | Jan 11, 2013 4:34:57 PM