December 4, 2013
Interesting split DC Circuit opinions about challenging prior convictions and supervised release conditions
While I was spending all my extra time yesterday reviewing the big Blewett en banc Sixth Circuit decision (basics here and here), the DC Circuit handed down two little penal decision concerning relatively technical aspects of modern federal sentence in US v. Martinez-Cruz, No. 12-3050 (DC Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (available here) and US v. Malenya, No. 12-3069 (DC Cir. Dec. 3, 2013) (available here).
Federal sentencing practitioners ought to check out both rulings for the merits, and others may be interested in the lengthy dissenting opinions in each case authored by Judge Kavaugh. Indeed, to provide a summary of each ruling, I will us the first paragraph of the Judge's dissents.
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: As a lower court in a system of absolute vertical stare decisis headed by one Supreme Court, it is essential that we follow both the words and the music of Supreme Court opinions. This case is controlled by at least the music, if not also the words, of the Supreme Court’s decision in Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20 (1992). There, the Supreme Court made clear that the defendant in a recidivist sentencing proceeding may be assigned the burden of proof when challenging the constitutionality of a prior conviction that is being used to enhance or determine the current sentence. Consistent with Parke v. Raley, every court of appeals to consider the question has reached that same conclusion. By ruling otherwise here, the majority opinion, in my view, both deviates from Supreme Court precedent and creates an unwarranted circuit split.
KAVANAUGH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Malenya, then a 41-year-old man, attempted to have sex with someone he knew to be 14. Malenya’s attempt was thwarted only because the 14-year-old’s mother fortuitously intercepted explicit text messages Malenya sent to the 14-year-old. For his conduct, Malenya ultimately pled guilty and received a relatively short prison sentence of one year and a day in prison, followed by three years of supervised release with certain special conditions attached. On appeal, Malenya objects to the special conditions imposed by the District Court and asks that they be vacated. The majority opinion vacates the special conditions. With one exception, I would affirm the special conditions. I therefore respectfully dissent.
December 4, 2013 at 06:36 PM | Permalink
TrackBack URL for this entry:
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Interesting split DC Circuit opinions about challenging prior convictions and supervised release conditions: