May 29, 2014
"Funding Favored Sons and Daughters: Nonprosecution Agreements and 'Extraordinary Restitution' in Environmental Criminal Cases"
The title of this post is the title of this recent article authored by Paul Larkin that a helpful reader altered me. Here is the abstract:
Over the past eight years, the federal government has entered into more than two hundred nonprosecution agreements with corporations in white-collar crime cases. In such agreements the government promises to cease its investigation and forego any potential charges so long as the corporation agrees to certain terms. And there’s the rub: given the economic realities of just being charged with a white-collar crime these days, corporations are more than willing to accept nonprosecution agreements.
Prosecutors are cognizant of this willingness, as well as of the fact that these agreements are practically insulated from judicial review. This results in the prosecution possessing a seemingly unfettered discretion in choosing the terms of a nonprosecution agreement. The breadth of this discretion is nowhere more apparent than in environmental criminal cases. Nonprosecution agreements in such cases have begun to require corporations to donate monetarily to a nonprofit of the government’s choosing. Indeed, in 2012 British Petroleum agreed to pay more than $2.394 billion to nonprofit agencies.
This Article critiques this practice by highlighting the inconsistencies between nonprosecution agreements and plea bargaining — the latter are subject to judicial review while the former are not — and unearthing the differences between these payments and any common-law understanding of restitutionary principles. The Article then suggests that the practical result of these nonprosecution agreements is that prosecutors are diverting money that ought to be paid to the Treasury to government-chosen nonprofit agencies, a power constitutionally granted to legislative actors. Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting a modest reform: judicial review by a United States magistrate judge, so as not to run into any Article III concerns, to ensure that prosecutors do not take advantage of the nonprosecution agreement process.
May 29, 2014 at 11:34 PM | Permalink
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It seems to me that there is a far more fundamental concern at play. By making an offer (no prosecution) and then accepting some recompense (money) the prosecutor is in effect serving as both prosecutor and judge, violating the traditional American separation of these two roles. The better answer, then, is not to have such agreement overseen by Article III judges. The better answer is to say that prosecutors are not allowed to accept directly or indirectly any thing of value in exchange for not prosecuting. That was the traditional understanding and it is what should be happening.
Posted by: Daniel | May 30, 2014 2:09:39 AM
Gov't sanctioned blackmail at it's finest.
Posted by: rodsmith | May 30, 2014 5:48:11 PM