« Lots and lots of good reads from The Atlantic, Reason, and Slate | Main | Basic elements of Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act of 2015 »

October 1, 2015

Montgomery wards: might SCOTUS decide it lacks jurisdiction to resolve juve LWOP retroactivity case?

As noted in this prior post, I am doing a series of posts in preparation for the US Supreme Court hearing oral argument in Montgomery v. Louisiana in large part because I find the substantive issues that surround Eighth Amendment retroactivity so dynamic and interesting.  But, critically, the Justices ordered briefing on a preliminary question for consideration in the Montgomery case: "Do we have jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect in this case to our decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ____ (2012)?"  

I have a terrific research assistant drafting summaries of various amicus briefs submitted in Montgomery (all of which can be found via this SCOTUSblog page).  Here is how he summarized and assessed this amicus filing which was requested by the court to make the argument against jurisdiction: 

The United States Supreme Court appointed Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP (“WFG”) to file an amicus brief arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of whether or not Miller applies retroactively in state collateral proceedings.  That is, the Court has charged WFG with the task of arguing that the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision that Miller does not apply retroactively cannot be reviewed by the Court.

WFG’s amicus brief argues against the Court’s jurisdiction in two steps.  First, WFG argues that whether or not Miller is retroactive in the state collateral review context can only present a federally reviewable issue if Teague is binding in such proceedings.  Second, WFG argues that Teague is not binding in state collateral review proceedings because its holding was predicated upon a federal statute and nothing more.  Consequently, Montgomery presents no question of federal law and so any opinion on the merits of the Miller retroactivity issue would be only advisory (or so goes WFG’s argument).  Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to address the Miller retroactivity issue in Montgomery, at least in the case’s present procedural posture.

WFG’s argument turns entirely on the way in which the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted Teague some 23 years ago in a case called Taylor v. Whitley, 606 So. 2d 1292 (La. 1992). In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in addressing the retroactive application of new constitutional rules, stated:

[W]e have yet to consider the issue of retroactivity on collateral review in light of Teague.  We now do so and adopt the Teague standards for all cases on collateral review in our state courts.  In doing so, we recognize that we are not bound to adopt the Teague standards. [. . .] [W]e now adopt Justice Harlan’s views on retroactivity, as modified by Teague and subsequent decisions, for all cases on collateral review in our state courts.  Taylor, 606 So. 2d at 1296–97.

WFG argues that since the Louisiana Supreme Court expressly held that it was “not bound to adopt the Teague [retroactivity] standards,” its subsequent retroactivity decisions, while based entirely on Teague and its progeny, do not “fairly appear[] to rest primarily on federal law or be interwoven with federal law” such that the presumption of federal jurisdiction articulated in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1983), applies.

While this is surely one reading of Taylor, it is a narrow one.  The argument can be made (and was made by both parties in this case, see Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus, Montgomery v. Louisiana, (No. 14-280), at 10) that the Court does have jurisdiction under the Long presumption.

Taylor supports this argument.  The Taylor court states throughout its opinion that it is closely following and examining the federal case law on retroactivity.  See Taylor, 606 So. 2d at 1293 (“In order to address the issue of retroactivity, we begin by tracing the evolution of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions in this area.”).  Further, while the Taylor court stated that it did not feel compelled to adopt the Teague standards, it definitively held that it was adopting those standards and was doing so “as modified by ... subsequent decisions” for all cases in Louisiana under collateral review.  Id. at 1297.  In this way, Taylor supports the notion that Louisiana state law does not just “rest primarily on federal law” and is not just “interwoven with federal law,” but evolves with federal law in a expressly lock-step manner.

As a consequence, Louisiana law vis-à-vis retroactivity in state collateral review proceedings is (arguably) federal law vis-à-vis retroactivity in federal collateral review proceedings as expressed by Teague and “subsequent decisions.”  Accordingly, if ever the presumption of jurisdiction embodied in Long applied in a case, this would be the case.  To be fair, WFG’s argument is unsurprising given its task. Nonetheless, it will in all likelihood be a minor opening act to the main event during oral argument.

I share my RA's sentiment that it is very unlikely a majority of the Supreme Court will decides it lacks jurisdiction in Montgomery, and I suspect relatively little of the oral argument will be focused on this issues. But I suspect the Chief Justice (and perhaps a few other Justices) may be eager to use Montgomery to contend that state courts are never obligated to apply any part of the Teague doctrines that now control federal court retroactivity decisions. Consequently, this issue may get more attention in the argument and in the ultimate opinion than some may want.

Prior posts in series:

UPDATE: A helpful reader reminded me it might be useful in this context to remind readers of this prior post which includes this link to a prior article by Steve Sanders on this jurisdictional topic.

October 1, 2015 at 09:47 AM | Permalink


"But I suspect the Chief Justice (and perhaps a few other Justices) may be eager to use Montgomery to contend that state courts are never obligated to apply any part of the Teague doctrines that now control federal court retroactivity decisions."

Hasn't that already been settled in Danforth?

Posted by: Jonathan Edelstein | Oct 1, 2015 1:42:40 PM

I suspect the Court will hold that, by adopting Teague standards, their law is intertwined with federal law. While the state can, of course, overrule that case, the fact that they weren't bound by Teague prior doesn't do much once they adopt it in its entirety.

Posted by: Erik M | Oct 1, 2015 2:21:08 PM

I see the use of the Teague standards as similar to states using Blockburger to interpret legislative intent on multiple punishment or using case law on federal civil rights acts to interpret their own civil rights acts. The federal case law is being used as persuasive, but not binding authority. The ultimate decision, however, is a matter of state case law.

I also see the Teague discussion as a secondary issue. The first issue (which is one of state law) has to do with the rules for state review. Different states draw the line differently between direct appeal and collateral review. The Supreme Court could draw from Martinez and Thaler and find that if a state requires an issue to be raised on collateral review rather than direct review then the collateral review on that issue is direct-review like and Griffin applies. If the issue could have been raised on direct review, then the state can apply a procedural bar (either partially or fully) to preclude raising a "late" claim based on the change in the law. Some state retroactivity analysis (which does not necessarily have to follow Teague under Danforth) may determine whether the claim is procedurally barred. If the claim is not procedurally barred (i.e. the inmate can bring a Miller claim), then the state courts must follow Miller.

Posted by: tmm | Oct 2, 2015 9:52:17 AM

I don't agree with your RA and wrote a post about why there's no jurisdiction here (assuming that Teague's exceptions aren't constitutionally mandated):


Posted by: Asher Steinberg | Oct 10, 2015 10:08:02 PM

Post a comment

In the body of your email, please indicate if you are a professor, student, prosecutor, defense attorney, etc. so I can gain a sense of who is reading my blog. Thank you, DAB