Wednesday, June 20, 2018

"Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Ben McJunkin and J.J. Prescott.  Here is its abstract:

More than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their convicted sex offenders using GPS devices.  Many offenders will be monitored for life.  The burdens and expense of living indefinitely under constant technological monitoring have been well documented, but most commentators have assumed that these burdens were of no constitutional moment because states have characterized such surveillance as “civil” in character — and courts have seemed to agree.

In 2015, however, the Supreme Court decided in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person was a Fourth Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the surveillance.  Grady left open the question whether the search — and the state’s technological monitoring program more generally — was constitutionally reasonable.  This Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as it applies to both current and envisioned sex offender monitoring technologies to evaluate whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an effective check on post-release monitoring regimes.

June 20, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (0)

Suggesting home confinement as an incarceration alternative to avoid family separation back home

Tyler Cowen has this notable new commentary bringing home a controversy over immigration policies.  The piece is headlined "American Families Shouldn't Be Separated, Either: What if more parents, when convicted of crimes, were sentenced to house arrest for the benefit of their children?".  Here is how it starts and ends:

One of the worst American policies today is the decision of President Donald Trump’s administration to separate many immigrant parents from their children after they illegally cross the U.S. border.  Obviously, a case can be made for enforcing the border, but deliberate cruelty is never a good idea.  Those children — innocent victims all of them — will likely be traumatized for life.  I am uncomfortably reminded of the U.S.’s long history of separating parents and children from the days of slavery and during Native American removal and extermination.

If you agree with me on this, I’d like to push you one step further.  It’s horrible to forcibly separate lawbreaking parents from their young children, but we do that to American citizens, too.  According to one 2010 study, more than 1.1 million men and 120,000 women in U.S. jails and prisons have children under the age of 17.  These separations can be traumatic, and they help perpetuate generational cycles of low achievement and criminal behavior.

These problems are especially pressing for female prisoners and their children.  From 1991 to 2007, the number of children with a mother in prison more than doubled, rising 131 percent. About two-thirds of the women in state prisons are there for nonviolent offenses.  Sixty percent of those women have children under the age of 18, and in one survey one-quarter of the prisoners’ children were under the age of 4. Forty-one percent of the women in state prison had more than one child.

I have a simple proposal: Let’s take one-tenth of those women and move them from prison to house arrest, combined with electronic monitoring.  That would allow for proximity to their children.  If the U.S. isn’t plagued by a subsequent wave of violent crime — and I don’t think it will be — let us try the same for yet another tenth.  Let’s keep on doing this until it’s obviously not working.  In some of these cases the court might rule that the mother — especially if she is prone to child abuse or substance abuse — will not have full custody rights to her children.  Many other children, though, will benefit, and even visitation rights can help a child....

One estimate suggests that 11 percent of the children of imprisoned mothers end up in foster care.  This is not an area of investigation where data collection has been thorough or systematic, another sign of our neglect of the issue.  Nonetheless it seems that after the arrest of a parent, treatment of the children by the police is irregular across the country and often poorly handled.

In citing this evidence, I don’t mean to normalize the current treatment of illegal immigrant families — I consider it a moral disgrace.  What I am saying is that our treatment of outsiders is rarely an accident, and it so often mirrors how we have been treating each other all along.  That is yet another reason to be nicer to those who are most vulnerable.

June 20, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, June 19, 2018

Georgia Supreme Court rules individual has essentially no procedural rights before being placed on state's child abuse registry

I saw yesterday a notable ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court in Georgia Department of Human Services v. Steiner, No. S18A0281 (Ga. June 18, 2018)(available here).  As I read the case, a 13-year-old's written statement that an older individual (age 52) hugged her and twice "started to hump me a way a dog would" led to his placement on the Georgia child abuse registry.  Upon getting a subsequent notice of his placement on the registry, Steiner challenged the (lack of) procedures on various grounds, and prevailed in lower courts. But on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Steiner loses and the majority opinion gets started this way:

The Georgia Department of Human Services, Division of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) appeals from the decision of the Lamar County Superior Court finding that Georgia’s central child abuse registry is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to appellee Christopher Steiner.  The trial court also found that DFCS failed to prove that Steiner committed an act of child abuse by a preponderance of the evidence as required to maintain Steiner’s listing in the registry.  This Court granted DFCS’s application for discretionary review. 

We hold that Steiner failed to demonstrate a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest sufficient to trigger the due process protections that he claims were violated by operation of the registry, and because the Act was constitutionally applied to Steiner, he lacks standing to bring his facial challenge on that ground.  We further hold that the child abuse registry is not criminal in nature, and that the superior court therefore erred in finding it to be so.  And because an abuse investigator’s determination about whether a report of child abuse is supported by the evidence is not a judicial function, the superior court erred in finding that the statute requiring the investigator to report such cases to DFCS for inclusion in the child abuse registry violates the separation of powers provision of the Georgia Constitution.  Finally, because at least “some evidence” supported the administrative hearing officer’s conclusion that DFCS had proved an act of child abuse as defined for purposes of the child abuse registry, the superior court erred in reversing the administrative law court.  We reverse.

June 19, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Wednesday, June 13, 2018

"When Tribal Disenrollment Becomes Cruel and Unusual"

The title of this post is the title of this new article available on SSRN authored by Judith Stinson. Here is the abstract:

In the past two decades, Native American tribes have disenrolled — permanently removed from tribal citizenship — thousands of tribal members, mainly because of lineage concerns or for political reasons.  In these instances, scholars generally decry disenrollment.  But there is a growing trend to disenroll tribal citizens for criminal conduct, and scholars (and even tribal members themselves) assume this is proper.  This paper argues that tribal disenrollment for criminal conduct violates the Indian Civil Rights Act’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.

The Supreme Court held that denationalization as a result of criminal conduct is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Congress applied that same prohibition to Native American tribes in the Indian Civil Rights Act.  And traditionally, tribes, who had the inherent power to impose any sanction necessary, focused on restoring harmony rather than punishing offenders; permanent expulsion was almost never imposed.  Tribes are nations, and tribal membership is a voluntary compact equivalent in all meaningful respects to United States citizenship — hence, tribes cannot disenroll members for criminal behavior.  Yet Congress also severely limited tribes’ ability to punish criminal defendants by capping incarceration at one year, and crime in Indian country is a significant problem.  To allow tribes to battle crime and yet protect against cruel and unusual punishment, Congress should remove the limit on incarceration and individual tribal members can decide whether they are willing to submit to their tribe’s inherent power — and greater sentences — or voluntarily renounce their tribal citizenship.

June 13, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

"Possession's not enough: Expunge all weed convictions"

Legal Marijuana Oregon Measure 91The title of this post is the headline of this recent editorial from the Newark Star-Ledger.  Regular readers likely know I take a shine to this opinion piece because of my recent work on a recent article, "Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices,"  which call for jurisdictions to take an expansive approach to expungement when moving forward with marijuana prohibition reforms.  Here are excerpts from the editorial:

Even as New Jersey is poised to legalize marijuana, the cops are still arresting tens of thousands of people annually, mostly minorities, just for having a little pot. Many can't find work because of the stigma.

Jo Anne Zito was rejected for a job at Godiva chocolates because of a low-level marijuana possession charge, she told lawmakers last week. So, as we contemplate legalizing recreational weed, we need to ask: Does it make sense that people like her still won't be able TO get work at a candy store?

No. We can't legalize marijuana, yet continue to force them to "walk around with a scarlet letter," as Assemblywoman Annette Quijano (D-Union) put it. The answer is expungement. But the current debate is far too limited.

Quijano introduced a bill to allow those caught with a little pot to apply to have their records cleared; advocates argue they shouldn't have to initiate that onerous process, the state should do it automatically. None of this goes far enough.

We need to think big. We need to admit this was a mistake in the first place, and that a lot of decent people were caught up in the dragnet. So, sparing only those who possessed small amounts is really just a first step.

We need to expunge the records of those caught with more than just a little pot. And we need to expunge the records of low-level dealers as well, if a judge approves, as long as they didn't commit more serious crimes like selling to minors, carrying guns, or committing acts of violence.

Aside from cleaning these records, we need to release those currently imprisoned on such charges. Does it make sense to hold thousands of people behind bars for selling weed, while the government allows sales outside the prison walls?...

All states that have legalized pot have only done so for certain amounts. Anyone arrested for possessing more gets a ticket, rather than a criminal charge. Yet if our expungement policy is modeled to match, those previously charged with having any more pot can't get that wiped from their records. They will continue to be barred from employment, even as people who buy heaps of it after legalization are merely ticketed. That needs to be fixed. Expunging high-level dealing charges is likely impossible, for political reasons. But we should at least include intent to sell and lower level distribution and growing charges.

Granted, this is not without risk. A guy who pled down to a marijuana charge from money-laundering, for example, shouldn't get out of doing his time, or a criminal record. But we could include prosecutorial review, as a bill moving through California's legislature would. It requires the state to automatically dismiss any old marijuana charges, yet prosecutors would sift through the higher-level cases and contest them if necessary. California already allows many past pot charges to be dismissed or reduced based on a defendant's petition, although they might still surface if you apply for a government job.

Yes, it's a huge undertaking to expunge all these convictions retroactively, especially if our state does so without requiring a petition. But we derailed hundreds of thousands of lives with needless marijuana prosecutions, and nobody helped those people get jobs or find housing. Now we are saying it never should have happened. So let the state overcome the logistical hurdles, too.

Actually, with a little bit of advanced planning and the right infrastructure, it does not necessarily have to be a "huge undertaking" to expunge past marijuana convictions. Indeed, as noted in this post over at my marijuana blog, "Code for America helping with technology to enhance marijuana offense expungement efforts in California pilot program," private players are willing to help in various ways with this effort.

I have blogged a lot about this issue over at my Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform blog, and here is just a sampling of some recent postings:

June 12, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Drug Offense Sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, June 07, 2018

"Treatment of sex offenders depends on whether they've challenged rules"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy new Detroit Free Press article. I recommend the piece in full, and here is how it gets started and additional excerpts:

Eight months after the U.S. Supreme Court effectively upheld a decision saying parts of Michigan's sex offender registry law — one of the toughest in the nation — were unconstitutional, thousands of former sex offenders who thought they'd be off the registry by now, or facing less severe restrictions, have seen no changes.

The law remains in place, unchanged, with the state defending it in more than three dozen lawsuits — many of which it has already lost.  The controversy involves a ruling two years ago by the U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati that said provisions enacted in 2006 and 2011 and applied to offenders convicted before then violates constitutional protections against increasing punishments after-the-fact.  Last October, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the state's challenge to that ruling, effectively upholding it.

The rules prohibit offenders — many of whom have gone years if not decades without committing any crimes — from legally living, working or even standing within 1,000 feet of a school, a regulation that many say makes it hard for them to work, or to pick up or see their kids at school, and has forced some to give up jobs and homes.  The rules also require offenders to immediately register email addresses or vehicles and report to police as often as four times a year, in some cases, for the rest of their lives.

Because the appeals court decision came in civil cases and not class action lawsuits, the state has maintained those rulings apply only to the specific plaintiffs who brought them. And with the state Legislature failing to change the law, registrants find themselves in a legal morass, with the requirements they must comply with almost wholly contingent on whether the offender has successfully gone to court.  Michigan now has the fourth-largest sex offender registry in the country, with 43,623 registrants on its database, more than the state of New York, which has 40,623.

The disparities can be wide.  One man convicted 17 years ago of eight counts of sexual contact with several girls under the age of 13 sued prosecutors, arguing that the rules keeping him on the registry — with his photo, name, address listed publicly — for life were unconstitutional.  Last November, after the Supreme Court declined to take up the 6th Circuit decision, the state Court of Appeals agreed, saying those rules no longer apply to him.

But it's different for another man convicted of touching two girls under the age of 16 while drunk 24 years ago in another state but who has had a clean record since.  Last September, as a "Tier 2" offender, he was expecting to come off the registry after nearly a quarter century. But he was abruptly told by police that his case had been reviewed and that since one of those girls was under 13, he’d stay on the list — and be listed among the worst offenders on "Tier 3" — for life.  To this day, under Michigan law, he's subject to all those restrictions from which the first man has been freed....

In Michigan, any legal certainty about what is required of thousands of sex offenders is almost nil.

While some local prosecutors — like those in Wayne and Oakland counties — no longer enforce cases involving retroactive applications of the law, it's far from certain that others are following suit. Macomb County prosecutors, for instance, declined to answer the Free Press' questions about whether they are still enforcing those restrictions. And Michigan State Police — which oversees the registry — says, legally, all restrictions remain in place.

The state’s top law enforcement official, Attorney General Bill Schuette — who is running for governor — won’t say whether the 6th Circuit Court decision should be applied statewide, his office refusing comment.

Prior related post:

June 7, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, June 05, 2018

Is all the recent Trump clemency action creating (unhealthy?) excitement among federal prisoners?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this lengthy Washington Examiner article headlined "Alan Dershowitz says anyone can get clemency from Trump, as buzz builds behind bars." Here are excerpts:

President Trump issued his first prison commutation after lunch with Alan Dershowitz. The men talked about Mideast politics before Trump "asked me what else was on my mind, and I told him.  I took advantage of the moment,” the longtime Harvard law professor recalled.

Dershowitz told the president about Sholom Rubashkin, a kosher meatpacking executive who was seven years into a 27-year prison sentence for financial crimes. Not long after, Rubashkin in December became the first — and so far only — person Trump released from prison. "You have to appeal to his sense of injustice," said Dershowitz, who often says on TV that Trump is treated unfairly in special counsel Robert Mueller’s Russia probe. "He feels he is now being subject to injustice, and so he's very sensitive to injustices."

Trump's approach to clemency, exhibited with a flurry of recent statements and official actions, is markedly different from his recent predecessors, generating enormous excitement among inmates.  Dershowitz believes just about anyone has a shot at bending Trump's ear, even though most successful cases have been pushed by well-connected advocates.   "I think if you write a letter to the president and you set down the case in a compassionate way, I think his staff knows that he's looking for cases of injustice. But you have to write it in a compelling way,” he said. “They have to write something that will catch the attention of someone on the president's staff."

So far, Trump has issued one prison commutation and five pardons.  But the pace is quickening.  Last week, he posthumously pardoned boxer Jack Johnson at the behest of “Rocky” actor Sylvester Stallone, saying Johnson’s early 1900s conviction was a race-motivated injustice.  On Wednesday, Trump met in the Oval Office with celebrity Kim Kardashian, who lobbied him to release Alice Johnson, a grandmother jailed for life since 1996 on drug-dealing charges.  Early on Thursday, Trump tweeted that he would pardon conservative author Dinesh D'Souza, who pleaded guilty in 2014 to a campaign-finance felony. Hours later, Trump told reporters he was considering pardoning celebrity chef Martha Stewart and former Gov. Rod Blagojevich, the Illinois Democrat who allegedly tried to sell President Barack Obama's Senate seat.

Although Johnson has not been given clemency, she remains optimistic.  “I'm feeling very hopeful after speaking with Kim about how well the meeting went with President Trump,” Johnson said in an email from prison Friday, facilitated by her longtime supporter Amy Povah, who leads the CAN-DO Foundation....  “I have strong reason to believe that President Trump is going to surprise many people,” said Povah...

Dershowitz said there's a method to the apparent madness of Trump’s clemency grants, which are a sharp break from the early-term stinginess of his recent predecessors. "You have to make him say to himself, 'There but for the grace of God go I, or other people I identify with.' He has to feel the injustice. It's not enough to get online with hundreds of other people showing a law was misapplied. There has to be a sense of gut injustice,” he said....

If there’s anyone who would know Trump’s thinking on clemency, it’s Dershowitz. In addition to pushing Rubashkin’s release, he was consulted by Trump in advance of the recent pardons of D'Souza and I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, a former aide to Vice President Dick Cheney who was convicted in 2007 but never imprisoned for making false statements. “I said I thought they were both injustices, that there was a whiff of politics around the decision to prosecute D’Souza, and that I did not think Scooter Libby had committed perjury — I thought there was just a difference in recollection,” Dershowitz said.

"When I made the appeal on behalf of Rubashkin, I said, 'You are a businessman, you understand what happens when the government and prosecutors manipulate the system and lower the value of your company in order to increase the value of losses and increase the sentence.' As soon as I said that, he said, 'I get that. I get that. I've been there,’” Dershowitz said. "He immediately glommed onto it because he understood the business implications of it ... there wouldn't have been any losses, or minor losses, but because the government drove the price down, it drove the sentencing guidelines way up."...

“I've always thought President Trump would step up and finish the job that President Obama started but never completed,” said Michelle West, a clemency aspirant in prison for drug-related crimes since 1994. “My daughter, Miquelle West, went to the Obama White House for a clemency summit. In our wildest dreams we never thought that I would be passed over considering she was invited to attend.” West said in an email relayed by Povah that “my daughter was 10 when I went to prison and I pray President Trump will consider me worthy of a second chance.”

Crystal Munoz, 11 years into a 20-year sentence for dealing marijuana, said that she, too, was hopeful, sending Povah the draft of a letter for Trump. Munoz, 38, gave birth to her youngest child in prison.  Connie Farris, a 73-year-old inmate jailed for mail fraud, said "I will never, never give up hope that our president will start releasing women such as myself and others. Please President Trump hear our cry." Farris, seven years into a 12-year sentence, said her husband of 53 years suffers from muscular dystrophy and needs her support.

Although there’s significant hope stemming from Trump’s unconventional approach, there’s also some skepticism that everyday inmates can win a presidential reprieve. “The problem is, the president’s process is a little haphazard, it seems, and a little ad hoc. And then you have this completely Byzantine dead-end of a process at the Justice Department,” said Kevin Ring, president of Families Against Mandatory Minimums.

“I think people are encouraged that he’s going around the Justice Department to look at deserving cases, but it’s not clear that anybody has the ability to get in front of him — so sort of good news, bad news,” he said.  Ring said Dershowitz’s contention that anyone can win clemency with a letter is “a little naive.”  

“There are people who buy lottery tickets every Friday and they’re optimistic because they don’t know the odds. And when people see a winner, that gives them hope,” he said.

Like Kevin Ring, I am a bit concerned to hear that there may be "enormous excitement among inmates" given Prez Trump's clemency record to date.  He has only commuted a single sentence so far, and I have no reason to believe he has plans to start issuing dozens (let along hundreds) of additional commutations anytime soon.  Political realities has seemed to be influencing all of Prez Trump's clemency work to date, and precious few federal prisoner have political forces in their favor.  I sure hope Prez Trump will, as Amy Povah put it, "surprise many people," but I think hopes ought to be tempered for now.

Prior recent related posts about Trumpian clemency activity:

June 5, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Collateral consequences, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Sunday, June 03, 2018

Lots worth reading on eve of historic recall vote of Califorinia Judge Aaron Persky after his lenient treatment of Brock Turner

Regular readers surely already know a lot of the story and backstory surrounding the controversial sentencing of Brock Turner and the controversial recall campaign against the judge who sentenced him.  That recall campaign culminates in a vote this coming Tuesday, and that has prompted another notable round of media coverage.  Here are some recent media pieces with varying degrees of depth:

From CNN here, "Will voters bench the judge who gave a 6-month sentence in the Stanford sexual assault case?"

From the Los Angeles Times here, "Vandalism, threats, broken friendships: The heated campaign to recall judge in Brock Turner case"

From Vox here, "Brock Turner was sentenced to 6 months in jail for sexual assault. Now voters may recall the judge."

From HuffPost here, "When the Punishment Feels Like A Crime: Brock Turner's twisted legacy — and a Stanford professor's relentless pursuit of justice."

I would especially encourage readers to find the time to read the lengthy HuffPost piece, which is particularly focused around Stanford Law Professor Michele Dauber's work on the recall campaign.  The reporting in the piece stuck me as particularly thoughtful and balanced, and I learned new things big and small about the campaign and her efforts and goals.

Despite all this new reporting, I must note my own sense that there are still lots of angles on this case that are still not getting fully explored.  In particular, these articles and others only give passing mention of the fact that Turner was sentenced to a lifetime on the sex offender registry.  I have long speculated that this reality — which I believe was mandatory for his convictions — not only may have largely accounted for Judge Persky's short jail sentence, but also may have been a main reason Turner was unwilling to plead guilty and accept responsibility in the way the victim wished.  Ever since BuzzFeed published the full courtroom statement of Turner's victim (available here and recommended reading), I have always been struck by this passage: "Had Brock admitted guilt and remorse and offered to settle early on, I would have considered a lighter sentence, respecting his honesty, grateful to be able to move our lives forward. Instead he took the risk of going to trial, added insult to injury and forced me to relive the hurt as details about my personal life and sexual assault were brutally dissected before the public."   This passage still has me wondering about what kind of plea had been offered to Turner and whether the prospect of a lifetime on the sex offender registry was central to his decision to go to trial.

The CNN article linked above does make one (possibly overstated) point about the sex offender registry part of his punishment: "That's a penalty so burdensome that if Turner were to have children someday, he wouldn't be able to get near their school."  Of course, being on the registry for life means a whole lot more, too.  I continue to wonder not only if that reality influenced Judge Persky, but if other judges in California or around the nation regularly adjust their prison terms knowing the severe impact of the collateral consequences of sex offender registration.  I hear stories all the time of prosecutors and defense attorneys looking to "charge or plea around" particular crimes that carry sex offender registration or other severe collateral consequences.  If these collateral sanctions influence attorneys, surely they influence sentencing judges in various settings in various ways.  I would love to see more reporting on this element of the Turner case and Judge Persky's decision-making (recalling that Persky himself has been a state sex crimes prosecuot).  But perhaps only a sentencing nerd like me really cares all that much about this part of the story. 

In any event, readers can gear up for the recall election also by reviewing a number of prior posts here about the Brock Turner case.  I think it is fair to say that in these posts I have expressed various concerns about both the lenient sentence Turner received and about the campaign to recall Judge Persky.  Here is just a sampling of the prior posts this case has generated:

June 3, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

Friday, June 01, 2018

"Challenging the Punitiveness of 'New-Generation' SORN Laws"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Wayne Logan now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Sex offender registration and notification (SORN) laws have been in effect nationwide since the 1990s, and publicly available registries today contain information on hundreds of thousands of individuals.  To date, most courts, including the Supreme Court in 2003, have concluded that the laws are regulatory, not punitive, in nature, allowing them to be applied retroactively consistent with the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Recently, however, several state supreme courts, as well as the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing challenges lodged against new-generation SORN laws of a considerably more onerous and expansive character, have granted relief, concluding that the laws are punitive in effect. 

This symposium contribution examines these decisions, which are distinct not only for their results, but also for the courts’ decidedly more critical scrutiny of the justifications, purposes, and efficacy of SORN laws.  The implications of the latter development in particular could well lay the groundwork for a broader challenge against the laws, including one sounding in substantive due process, which unlike ex post facto-based litigation would affect the viability of SORN vis-à-vis current and future potential registrants.

June 1, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, May 23, 2018

"Capitalizing on Criminal Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Eisha Jain now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The U.S. criminal justice system “piles on.”  It punishes too many for too long.  Much criminal law scholarship focuses on the problem of excessive punishment.  Yet for the low-level offenses that dominate state court workloads, much of the harm caused by arrests and convictions arises outside the formal criminal sentence.  It stems from spiraling hidden penalties and the impact of a criminal record.  The key question is not just why the state over-punishes, but rather why so many different institutions — law enforcement institutions as well as civil regulatory agencies and private actors — find it valuable to do so.

This Article argues that the reach of the criminal justice system is not just the product of overly punitive laws, but also the product of institutions capitalizing on criminal law decisions for their own ends.  Criminal law is meant to serve a public purpose, but in practice, key institutions create, disseminate, and rely on low-level criminal records because they offer a source of revenue or provide a cost-effective way of achieving discrete administrative objectives.  These incentives drive and expand the reach of the criminal justice system, even as they work in tension with the state’s sentencing goals.  This dynamic creates obvious harm.  But it also benefits key actors, such as municipalities, privatized probation companies, background check providers, employers, and others who have incentives to maintain the system as it is.  This Article identifies how organizational incentives lead a host of institutions to capitalize on criminal law decisions, and it argues that reform efforts must, as a central goal, recognize and respond to these incentives.

May 23, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 22, 2018

Interesting report touts the potential economicy benefits of restoring felon voting rights in Florida

As regular readers know, I think there are an array of strong moral, social and political arguments for ending felon disenfranchisement.  But this local article from Florida, headlined "Price tag for restricting felons' rights after prison put at $385 million a year," reports on an interesting effort to make an economic argument for a ballot initiative in the state to expand the franchise. Here are the details:

Seven years after Gov. Rick Scott and the Florida Cabinet voted to end the state policy that automatically restored the civil rights of nonviolent offenders after they complete their sentences, a price tag has emerged.  Florida lost an estimated $385 million a year in economic impact, spent millions on court and prison costs, had 3,500 more offenders return to prison, and lost the opportunity to create about 3,800 new jobs.

Those are just some of the conclusions of a new economic research report prepared by the Republican-leaning Washington Economics Group of Coral Gables for proponents of Amendment 4, the proposal on the November ballot that asks voters to allow the automatic restoration of civil rights for eligible felons who have served their sentences.  The report was commissioned by the Alliance for Safety and Justice, a national criminal justice reform organization that works with crime survivors, to show the economic impact of approving the amendment.

But the findings show more than the economic impact of what could happen if voters approve it. They also estimate the cost of the policy that was fast-tracked into law by the governor and Cabinet a month after taking office in 2011, its impact on crime and its cost to taxpayers. Scott, Attorney General Pam Bondi, Agriculture Commissioner Adam Putnam, and then-Chief Financial Officer Jeff Atwater repealed the automatic restoration of rights that had been in place for four years and replaced it with a plan requiring a minimum five-year waiting period before offenders could start the application process to have their voting and civil rights restored.

The action reversed the policy approved by the Cabinet in 2007 at the urging of then-Gov. Charlie Crist. Now, the only way a convicted felon can regain his or her civil rights is to wait five years and apply for a review at the state Office of Executive Clemency, which has limited resources and can take years....

The proposed amendment would restore rights automatically, except for those convicted of murder or a felony sexual offense. To come up with a price tag for the policy, economists looked at the data from 2007 to 2011 and compared it with current data. They focused on the recidivism rate, the number of released felons who returned to prison after being released and projected the costs and the impact those felons would have on the economy if they went to work instead.... By contrast, research shows that felons who have their voting rights restored, "have a greater ability to become full members of Florida’s society and economy, leading to a reduced rate of recidivism,'' the report said.

Before 2007, the recidivism rate for all felons was 33 percent, according to a 2011 report by the Florida Clemency Board. After Crist's policy, the average two-year recidivism rate for felons who had their rights restored was 12.4 percent, lower than the three-year average recidivism rate of all felons, which was 26.3 percent.

Under Crist, 155,315 offenders who were released got their rights restored. Under Scott, just 4,352 offenders have had their rights restored. Of those felons who have had their rights restored, less than 1 percent of them returned to crime and the average three-year recidivism rate for all felons in Florida in 2013 — the last year available — was 25.4 percent.

The governor's office disputes the claim that recividism rates dropped when more felons had rights restored. It argues the recidivism rate has been dropping in recent years in spite of the restrictive approach to rights restoration. Scott's office notes that the three-year recidivism rate has decreased from 30.5 percent for inmates released in 2007, the first year of Crist's policy, to 25.2 percent for inmates released in 2013, which is the latest data available and includes the last year of Crist's policy....

The report calculated the impact on the prison system and the courts using existing data on offenders and recidivism rates. It calculated the economic impact of their labor patterns on Florida using a model that considers the link between the demand one industry has on other industries. The report cites research that shows that felons earn less than average wages, and felons who do not have their voting rights restored earn 12 percent less than that.

"With higher incomes, eligible felons would be able to afford living in less-disadvantaged areas, which is associated with better employment outcomes after release and less recidivism,'' the report states. It estimates that employed eligible felons who had their rights restored would see an $88 million direct increase in income. That will ripple through the rest of the Florida economy, the economists said, "ultimately benefiting employment in many industries and Household Income for Florida residents, not just for the eligible ex-felon population."

The full research report referenced in this article is available at this link.

May 22, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Data on sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, May 21, 2018

"Sex offender registry: More harm than good?"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy report appearing in The Connecticut Mirror. The piece is focused mostly on the history of, and debate over, the sex offender registry in The Constitution State, but much of the discussion has a universal quality to it.  Here is how it gets started:

In the 1990s, in response to a number of horrific and highly publicized crimes against children, states and the federal government created stringent penalties for sex offenders, notably registries where offenders’ names and addresses are available to the public.  But now critics across the country are demanding review and revision of these policies, saying they are based on false assumptions, are a waste of money and do more harm than good.

The registries and related policies “are absolutely and fundamentally flawed. They do nothing to support prevention, are not a deterrent and do nothing for people who have survived sexual violence,” said Prof. Alissa Ackerman of California State University Fullerton, a criminologist and national expert on the treatment of sex offenders.

In 2015 the Connecticut Sentencing Commission, at the behest of the General Assembly, began a lengthy examination of Connecticut’s “system of assessment, management, treatment, and sentencing of sex offenders.”  After a two-year study, the commission recommended changing the state’s public registry from one based on the offense — commit most sex-related crimes and you go on the registry — to one based on the risk an offender poses to the community, as determined by a new, eight-member Sex Offender Registration Board.  Individuals found to be low-risk — and some adjudged moderate-risk — would be on a registry only available to law enforcement personnel.

The proposal was crystalized into a bill introduced during the immediate past session of the General Assembly, though it failed to make it out of the Judiciary Committee.

State Sen. Paul Doyle, co-chair of the committee, said the complexity and emotional nature of the issue made it more appropriate for the longer session next year. “We never got to the merits. Leadership was not prepared to deal with it in a short session.” He said he personally would have had to do more research before deciding how to vote.

In a related matter, the nonprofit Connecticut for One Standard of Justice, which advocates for the civil rights of sex offenders, filed a federal lawsuit on April 4 seeking to overturn a Windsor Locks ordinance which bars persons on the sex offender registry from most public places in town. The town’s “child safety zones” include a “park, school, library, playground, recreation center, bathing beach, swimming pool or wading pool, gymnasium, sports field, or sports facility” either owned or leased by the town. The suit claims banning a group of people from these facilities is unconstitutional....

The registry and laws such as child protection zones are based on a set of assumptions that research indicates are highly questionable or outright false. The Sentencing Commission’s 204-page report calls them “myths.”  They include:

  • Nearly all sex offenders reoffend.
  • Treatment does not work.
  • The concept of “stranger danger” — that most sexual assaults are the work of people unknown to the victims.

“Research does not support these myths, but there is research to suggest that such policies may ultimately be counterproductive,” the commission’s report says.

May 21, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, April 30, 2018

"One in four American adults lives with a criminal record -- It's time for them to get a second chance"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Fox News commentary authored by James Ackerman, who is president and CEO of Prison Fellowship.  Here are excerpts:

This year the U.S. Senate recognized April 2018 as Second Chance Month. Fittingly, the resolution came six years after the passing of a man who embodied the importance of second chances: former Nixon “hatchet man” Charles Colson.  Today, the prison ministry Colson founded after his release from federal prison is at the head of a nationwide movement to recognize the dignity of people who have paid their debt to society and open up opportunities for them to succeed.

One in four American adults lives with a criminal record, and more than 48,000 documented legal restrictions limit their access to education, jobs, housing, and other things necessary for a productive life. But the people most directly affected are not the only ones who care.  Businesses, faith communities, government leaders, and other diverse groups recognize that second chances are not a partisan issue, but an issue key to the security and flourishing of all our neighborhoods....

The growing resonance of Second Chance Month confirms that the idea of a “clean slate” is central to most Americans’ thinking.  A recent Barna poll commissioned by Prison Fellowship found that about half of Americans agree that former prisoners should be afforded a chance to be productive members of their communities.  One quarter of Americans strongly agree that former prisoners should not face any further penalties after they are released.

While based on our deeply held national values, second chances are also sound criminal justice policy.  Nationwide, the Bureau of Justice Statistics indicates that approximately two out of three people released from prison will be arrested again within three years.  In part, this is because up to 90 percent of the formerly incarcerated struggle to find employment within the first year after release; a criminal record is often enough to put their résumé at the bottom of the stack, if not straight in the waste bin.

Others are unable to find a landlord willing to rent to them, contributing to high rates of homelessness among the formerly incarcerated.  Other restrictions include obstacles to professional licensing, educational opportunities, and voting.  These official limitations, alongside heavy social stigma, can make it extraordinarily difficult to re-integrate smoothly into society. When formerly incarcerated people recidivate, it’s damaging to public safety and costly for taxpayers.

By removing restrictions that are not necessary for safety, we help people get their hands on the rungs of a ladder to a productive, law-abiding future. I am also convinced that second chances are worth giving because so many Americans stand as living proof of their effectiveness....  When given access to second-chance opportunities, many are profoundly hard-working and innovative — because they know what it’s like to live without opportunities.  Many people with a criminal record serve on the staff of Prison Fellowship.  Throughout our society, former prisoners are parents, business entrepreneurs, faith leaders, and more.  Putting unnecessary stumbling blocks in their way only deprives society of their potential contributions.

Hundreds of thousands of men and women are returning from prison every year.  If they have paid their debt to society and are ready to lead transformed lives, we must not throw obstacles into their paths.  When people have a chance to start over, it’s not just their second chance — it’s a chance for all of us to see transformed lives, safer communities, and a more just society.

My most recent article, "Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices," is written in the spirit of this commentary and Second Chance Month (so I figured I should promoting again here).

April 30, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (14)

New York Court of Appeals upholds most serious sex offender registration despite defendant's acquittal on most serious charges

Over at Reason, Jacob Sullum has this effective new review of a notable example of "acquitted conduct" being used to justify a severe collateral consequence.  The posting's full headline provides the basic story: "A Jury Rejected the Charges, but He Still Has to Register As a Sex Offender for Life: New York's highest court says accusations can be considered for registration purposes even when the defendant was acquitted." Here are some of the particulars:

Quinn Britton's 13-year-old niece, identified in court documents as A.B., accused him of raping her during a Thanksgiving Day visit to her grandmother's home in Brooklyn, where her uncle lived, when she was 11. Britton denied any inappropriate behavior, and his mother said A.B. had spent the whole evening watching TV in the living room with her.... The jurors struggled to make sense of these conflicting accounts.  Since there was no physical evidence, the case came down to a question of whether to believe A.B. or Britton. During three days of deliberations, the jurors sent the judge three notes indicating that they were deadlocked. Each time he told them to keep deliberating.

Finally the jurors emerged with a verdict that seemed to split the difference between those inclined to believe Britton and those inclined to believe A.B.  They found Britton guilty of second-degree sexual abuse, a misdemeanor, based on the allegation that he kissed A.B.'s breasts, but not guilty of three felonies: first-degree rape, based on the allegation of penetrative sex, and two counts of a first-degree sexual act, based on allegations that he performed oral sex on the girl and forced her to perform oral sex on him.

During a post-trial hearing, the judge nevertheless assumed that Britton had committed the felonies and therefore assigned him to risk level two under New York's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA), which triggers lifetime registration. Had the judge considered just the crime of which Britton was convicted, he would have been assigned to risk level one, which requires registration for 10 years.

In a 6-to-1 ruling last week, the New York Court of Appeals upheld Britton's classification, noting that it was supposed to be based on "clear and convincing evidence," a less demanding standard than the proof beyond a reasonable doubt required for a criminal conviction.  It is possible, in other words, for an alleged crime to figure in a defendant's risk level even when there is not enough evidence for a guilty verdict.

Writing in dissent, Judge Jenny Rivera charges her colleagues with improperly applying the "clear and convincing evidence" standard, which requires "a high degree of probability" that an allegation is true. A.B.'s testimony should not be treated as reliable under SORA, Rivera argues, because the jury did not find it credible.

April 30, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Wednesday, April 25, 2018

New Jersey Supreme Court finds unconstitutional requiring juveniles to be subject to lifetime sex-offender registration

The Supreme Court of New Jersey yesterday handed down a lengthy unanimous opinion in Interest of C.K., No. A-15-16 (N.J. April 24, 2018) (available here) declaring that the state's sex-offender registry law is unconstitutional as applied to some juvenile offenders. Here is how the opinion begins:

Juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses are barred for life from seeking relief from the registration and community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, -19; N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g).  That categorical lifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes an adult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated, and is a fully productive member of society.  Defendant C.K. was adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than two decades ago and now challenges the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)’s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles.

Subsection (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 subjects all sex offenders, including juveniles, to presumptive lifetime registration and notification requirements.  Unlike subsection (g), however, subsection (f) allows a registrant to seek relief from those requirements fifteen years after his juvenile adjudication, provided he has been offense-free and is “not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.”  Subsection (g) imposes an irrebuttable presumption that juveniles, such as defendant, are irredeemable, even when they no longer pose a public safety risk and are fully rehabilitated.

The record in this case reveals what is commonly known about juveniles -- that their emotional, mental, and judgmental capacities are still developing and that their immaturity makes them more susceptible to act impulsively and rashly without consideration of the long-term consequences of their conduct.  See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017).  The record also supports the conclusion that juveniles adjudicated delinquent of committing sex offenses, such as C.K., who have been offense-free for many years and assessed not likely to reoffend, pose little risk to the public. Indeed, categorical lifetime notification and registration requirements may impede a juvenile’s rehabilitative efforts and stunt his ability to become a healthy and integrated adult member of society.

We conclude that subsection (g)’s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles violate the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Permanently barring juveniles who have committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relief from the Megan’s Law requirements bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective.  In the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provides the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law: no juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released from his registration and notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period.

Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan’s Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided he meets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).

April 25, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, April 23, 2018

"Leveraging Marijuana Reform to Enhance Expungement Practices"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper I have written for a forthcoming issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter which is now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

States reforming marijuana laws should be particularly concerned with remedying the past inequities and burdens of mass criminalization.  State marijuana reforms should not only offer robust retroactive ameliorative relief opportunities for prior marijuana offenses, but also dedicate resources generated by marijuana reform to create and fund new institutions to assess and serve the needs of a broad array of offenders looking to remedy the collateral consequences of prior involvement in the criminal justice system.  So far, California stands out among reform states for coupling repeal of marijuana prohibition with robust efforts to enable and ensure the erasure of past marijuana convictions.  In addition to encouraging marijuana reform states to follow California’s lead in enacting broad ameliorative legislation, this essay urges policy makers and reform advocates to see the value of linking and leveraging the commitments and spirit of modern marijuana reform and expungement movements.

Part II begins with a brief review of the history of marijuana prohibition giving particular attention to social and racial dynamics integral to prohibition, its enforcement and now its reform.  Part III turns to recent reform activities focused on mitigating the punitive collateral consequences of a criminal conviction with a focus on the (mostly limited) efforts of marijuana reform states to foster the erasure of marijuana convictions.  Part IV sketches a novel proposal for connecting modern marijuana reform and expungement movements.   This part suggest a new criminal justice institution, a Commission on Justice Restoration, to be funded by the taxes, fees and other revenues generated by marijuana reforms and to be tasked with proactively working on policies and practices designed to minimize and ameliorate undue collateral consequences for people with criminal convictions.

Cross-posted at Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform.

April 23, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Drug Offense Sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 19, 2018

NY Gov Cuomo restores voting rights to parolees via executive order

Restoring_Voting_Rights_to_NYers_on_ParoleAs reported in this local article, New York's "Gov. Cuomo on Wednesday signed an executive order granting parolees the right to vote in New York." Here is more:

Cuomo announced the signing at the annual convention of Rev. Al Sharpton's National Action Network. He decried the state's current law blocking those who have been released from prison but are still on parole from voting, saying it didn't square with the goals of parole and re-entry.  "At the same time, we're saying we want you a part of society, we want you to get back into the community," he said.

Cuomo said he had proposed legislation to grant voting rights to parolees, but it was shot down by the State Senate — leading him to argue the state needs a new Legislature. But Cuomo said he wouldn't wait that long.  "I'm unwilling to take no for an answer," he said.  "I'm going to make it law by executive order and I announce that here today."

Cuomo signed the executive order later Wednesday afternoon.  There are about 35,000 New Yorkers on parole who could not vote, the governor’s office said.  The executive order will restore the right to vote upon release from incarceration, his office said, citing a disproportionate impact of disenfranchisement on communities of color and links between civic engagement and reduced recidivism.

Fourteen other states and the District of Columbia restore voting rights upon release....

Cuomo’s office pointed to other criminal justice reforms he’s enacted, including raising the age of criminal responsibility and naming the attorney general as a special prosecutor for police-related deaths, arguing he’s long cared about the issue.

Republicans, meanwhile, ripped the order. A "dumbfounded" Senate Majority Leader John Flanagan (R-Suffolk County) blasted it as “illegal and horrific public policy.”... Flanagan said that those on parole, including murderers and rapists, are still serving out their sentences and should not be entitled to their voting rights. He said he would not be surprised if a lawsuit is filed seeking to block the order and accused Cuomo of trying to "expand the universe of people who are eligible to vote."

Dutchess County Executive Marcus Molinaro, the front-runner for the GOP gubernatorial nomination, ... accused Cuomo of being a dictator. "Just months before an election, with the stroke of his pen, Andrew Cuomo, plans to restore the voting rights for cop killer Herman Bell and Palm Sunday killer Chris Thomas and calls it 'justice',” he said. “But if the dictator of a third world nation threw open it's prison doors and granted voting rights to the criminals right before a reelection, we all would be appalled.”...

The New York Civil Liberties Union praised the executive order, but also said Albany should push forward with legislation on same-day voter registration and early voting.

Gov. Cuomo's office issued this press release yesterday with this link to his executive order.  The press releases stressed additional points in support of Gov. Cuomo's decision:

Parole voting restrictions have a disproportionate impact on New Yorkers of color, with African Americans and Hispanic New Yorkers comprising 71 percent of the population so disenfranchised. Civic engagement is linked to reduced recidivism and this action will promote access to the democratic process and improve public safety for all New Yorkers. The executive order is available here. "I am issuing an executive order giving parolees the right to vote. It is unconscionable to deny voting rights to New Yorkers who have paid their debt and have re-entered society," Governor Cuomo said. "This reform will reduce disenfranchisement and will help restore justice and fairness to our democratic process. Withholding or delaying voting rights diminishes our democracy."

This executive action will reverse New York's current disenfranchisement of individuals released from prison who are under post-release community supervision. New York joins fourteen other states and the District of Columbia that restore the right to vote upon release from incarceration. There are roughly 35,000 individuals currently on parole in New York who cannot vote. These individuals are participants in society at large, despite the limitations placed on them by parole conditions. They work, pay taxes, and support their families, and they should be permitted to express their opinions about the choices facing their communities through their votes, just as all citizens do.

Additionally, the current law keeping people on parole supervision from voting is internally inconsistent with New York's approach to voting for people serving sentences of probation. People on probation never lose the right to vote, but many county election officials are unclear about the distinction between those on parole and those on probation, often resulting in illegal disenfranchisement. A 2006 Brennan Center study reported that one-third of all New York counties incorrectly barred people on probation from registering to vote, while another third of all counties illegally made individuals show proof of their voter eligibility status.

April 19, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Collateral consequences, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Sunday, April 08, 2018

Interesting Vermont Supreme Court ruling on sex-offender probation conditions

As reported in this local press article, the "Vermont Supreme Court ruled on Friday that the state cannot uniformly declare pornography off-limits to sex offenders." Here is more from the press report:

The decision does allow a sex offender’s probation to include such restrictions, but only if they are deemed specifically appropriate to the individual offender.  The 18-page decision dealt with the probation conditions of a man convicted of sexual assault in 2012 in Chittenden County....

[Yetha L. Lumumba] appealed several conditions of his probation, including one that prohibited him from “purchasing, possessing or using pornography or erotica and going to adult bookstores, sex shops, and topless bars,” according to court records.  The condition was described at the sentencing hearing as a standard one for sex offenders because pornography is seen as contributing to an increased risk of reoffending

“Vermont’s probation statute makes it clear that a court cannot prohibit a probationer from engaging in lawful behavior unless the prohibition relates to the defendant’s rehabilitation or public safety,” the Supreme Court justices wrote.  “Other courts have persuasively concluded that a sentencing court must provide at least some support on the record for imposing a probation condition restricting a defendant’s use of pornography, even when the defendant was convicted of a sex offense.”

The full ruling in Vermont v. Lumumba, 2018 VT 40 (Vt. April 6, 2018), is available at this link and covers lots of ground and cites a lot of law beyond the Green Mountain state. Here is how the unanimous opinion gets started:

Defendant challenges so-called standard and special sex-offender probation conditions that the trial court imposed following his conviction for sexual assault.  Defendant argues that this Court should strike a number of the standard conditions imposed by the trial court in its written order because the conditions were not orally pronounced during the sentencing hearing and were not sufficiently connected to his crime or rehabilitation.  He also argues that the sex-offender condition prohibiting defendant from purchasing, possessing, or using pornography or erotica and from going to “adult bookstores, sex shops, topless bars, etc.” is unrelated to his offense and unconstitutionally vague.  We conclude that defendant failed to properly preserve his objections to the standard conditions and review them for plain error.  Based on the particular provisions and the State’s concessions, we strike some conditions, remand some conditions, and affirm the remaining conditions.  We strike the challenged special condition as unsupported by the record.

April 8, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (4)

George Will commentary assails felon disenfranchisement in Florida

I am very pleased to see this effective commentary by George Will under the headline "There’s no good reason to stop felons from voting." I recommend the short piece in full, and here are parts that struck me as especially effective:

Intelligent and informed people of good will can strenuously disagree about the wisdom of policies that have produced mass incarceration. What is, however, indisputable is that this phenomenon creates an enormous problem of facilitating the reentry into society of released prisoners who were not improved by the experience of incarceration and who face discouraging impediments to employment and other facets of social normality.  In 14 states and the District , released felons automatically recover their civil rights.

Recidivism among Florida’s released felons has been approximately 30 percent for the five years 2011-2015.  Of the 1,952 people whose civil rights were restored, five committed new offenses, an average recidivism rate of 0.4 percent.  This sample is skewed by self-selection — overrepresentation of those who had the financial resources and tenacity to navigate the complex restoration process that each year serves a few hundred of the 1.6 million.  Still, the recidivism numbers are suggestive.

What compelling government interest is served by felon disenfranchisement? Enhanced public safety?  How?  Is it to fine-tune the quality of the electorate?  This is not a legitimate government objective for elected officials to pursue.  A felony conviction is an indelible stain: What intelligent purpose is served by reminding felons — who really do not require reminding — of their past, and by advertising it to their community?  The rule of law requires punishments, but it is not served by punishments that never end and that perpetuate a social stigma and a sense of never fully reentering the community.

April 8, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, April 05, 2018

Supreme Court of Illinois rejects claim that state prohibition on sex offenders in parks is violative of substantive due process

The Supreme Court of Illinois today in Illinois v. Pepitone, 2018 IL 122034 (Ill. April 5, 2018) (available here), overturned a lower court ruling that found a sex offender restriction to violate substantive due process.  Here is how the opinion starts and concludes:

Section 11-9.4-1(b) of the Criminal Code of 2012 provides, “It is unlawful for a sexual predator or a child sex offender to knowingly be present in any public park building or on real property comprising any public park.” 720 ILCS 5/11-9.4-1(b) (West 2016). The sole issue in this case is whether that statute is facially violative of substantive due process. The trial court rejected defendant Marc Pepitone’s due process claim, but the appellate court majority accepted it and reversed his conviction. 2017 IL App (3d) 140627. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence....

We conclude that there is a rational relation between protecting the public, particularly children, from sex offenders and prohibiting sex offenders who have been convicted of crimes against minors from being present in public parks across the state.  Avila-Briones and Pollard correctly identified a constitutional nexus.  In Avila-Briones, 2015 IL App (1st) 132221, ¶ 84, the appellate court stated: “[B]y keeping sex offenders who have committed offenses against children away from areas where children are present ***, the legislature could have rationally sought to avoid giving certain offenders the opportunity to reoffend.”  The Avila-Briones court added that whether the statutory scheme covering sex offenders is “a finely tuned response to the threat of sex offender recidivism is not a question for rational-basis review; that is a question for the legislature.” Id.  And in Pollard, 2016 IL App (5th) 130514, ¶ 41, the appellate court concluded, “There is also a direct relationship between the *** presence restrictions of sex offenders and the protection of children.” See Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (N.C. 2008) (upholding a municipal ordinance barring registered sex offenders from entering town parks and stating that the town “has a legitimate government interest in desiring to decrease and eliminate sexual crimes in its parks, and prohibiting those most likely to commit criminal sexual acts — persons previously convicted of such conduct — from entering the town’s parks is a rational method of furthering that goal”).  Because section 11-9.4-1(b) is rationally related to a legitimate government interest, the appellate court erred in holding that the statute is facially unconstitutional under substantive due process. People v. Jackson, 2017 IL App (3d) 150154, which followed the appellate court’s decision in this case, is overruled to the extent that it also found section 11-9.4-1(b) unconstitutional.

April 5, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (13)

Reviewing some modern felony disenfranchisement realities

Stateline has this new piece providing a crisp accounting of modern felony disenfranchisement realities and concerns. I recommend the full piece, which is headlined "Felony Voting Laws Are Confusing; Activists Would Ditch Them Altogether." Here are excerpts:

Disenfranchised felons are about 2.5 percent of the general voting-age population, but that number triples among African-Americans, according to estimates from the Sentencing Project. The disparity is starkest in the Southeast, where more than 20 percent of black voters are disenfranchised in some states.

In Louisiana, where an estimated 108,000 people are disenfranchised because of past criminal convictions, people aren’t allowed to vote until they have finished their parole. For many, that means decades.

At 72, Checo Yancy has been out of prison for over 14 years.  But he’ll be on parole until 2056 and unlikely to cast a ballot before he dies. He is a plaintiff in a Louisiana case that seeks to restore voting rights to people as soon as they leave prison. The case may be decided as soon as this week....

Activists in Florida collected more than 840,000 signatures to put a measure on the November ballot that would allow people with a felony conviction to vote once they complete probation or parole. The state has imposed a lifetime voting ban on 1.7 million Florida residents with felony convictions.  Only a pardon from the governor can restore their voting rights. And in a separate suit challenging the state’s system, a federal judge called it “crushingly restrictive” and later ordered the clemency board to adopt strict criteria and timelines for reviewing applications.

Many who seek to change the laws say the restrictions are rooted in racism, noting that many states enacted them shortly after blacks gained the right to vote. Robert McDuff, an attorney with the Mississippi Center for Justice, is also challenging the list of crimes in the state constitution that disenfranchises an estimated 218,000 people, “chosen because of the framers’ belief that they were disproportionately committed by African-Americans, and it was part of the larger effort by the framers of the 1890 constitution to eliminate the African-American vote.”...

Those who want to ease the restrictions argue that voting helps former inmates feel included and engaged in the community, reducing the likelihood of recidivism. That’s not the way many governors see it. Nebraska Gov. Pete Ricketts, a Republican, vetoed a bill last year that would have allowed felons to vote once they left prison. “Requiring convicted felons to wait before allowing them to vote provides an incentive to maintain a clean record and avoid subsequent convictions,” Ricketts said in his veto letter. Although the bill was reintroduced this year, a spokesman for the governor said his position has not changed.

In recent years, some conservative states have lifted other restrictions on felons, like those that bar them from receiving professional licenses or food stamps, hoping to reduce recidivism and save money on criminal justice costs such as incarceration, probation and parole.

Louisiana state Rep. Walt Leger, a Democrat who has sponsored criminal justice legislation, said the prospect of saving money can get both parties on board. Restoring voting rights, though, is still seen as politically risky. “That financial conversation is not necessarily a part of the right to vote conversation,” he said. “So for some it continues to be a soft-on-crime versus tough-on-crime issue.”

April 5, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, March 20, 2018

Highlighting the Big Apple as a source for In Justice Today

My headline is a not-so-clever attempt to set up the fact that the latest two postings at the always great In Justice Today are focused on not-so-great criminal justice realities in New York.  Here are links to the two recent pieces with excerpts (and links from original): 

"NY Gov. Cuomo’s Terrible, Horrible, No Good, Very Bad Plan to Protect Your Kids" by Guy Hamilton-Smith:

New York Governor Andrew Cuomo recently unveiled a legislative proposal packaged as part of a budget amendment to expand already onerous residency and presence restrictions for some sex offenders in New York.

The proposal expands blanket presence and residency restrictions for sex offenders who are on parole or post-release supervision by vastly increasing the number of places they cannot be near. It would outlaw the presence of some sex offenders within 1,000 feet of school grounds, “any facility or institution that offers kindergarten or pre-kindergarten instruction,” or any other place that is “used for the care or treatment” of minors. The proposal also prohibits level 2 and 3 sex offenders — those whom the state deems most at risk to re-offend — from staying at homeless shelters that serve families, even if they are no longer under supervision.

In dense urban environments like New York City, such restrictions — which make it illegal for sex offenders to merely exist in many places — are tantamount to banishment. While sex offender registries (and many of the restrictions that go along with them) have proven to be ineffective and inhumane, public defenders, experts, and advocates say that few restrictions are as ineffective and punitive as those proposed by Cuomo.

"Despite Leaders’ Progressive Promises, NYC Remains ’Marijuana Arrest Capital of the World’" by Shaun King:

In spite of committing to simply ticketing people for possession of small amounts of marijuana, last year the NYPD arrested an astounding 16,925 people for it. These were not drug lords and kingpins. These were the very low-level offenses they said they’d stop arresting people for.

Do the math. That’s 46 people a day. It’s an enormous waste of time and resources. And it’s horribly disingenuous to publicly make the claim that the arrests are coming to an end when clearly they aren’t.

This literally makes New York City “the marijuana arrest capital of the world,” according to a recent report from the Drug Policy Alliance. And a staggering 86 percent of those arrests are of men and women of color.

And let’s be clear — whites and people of color use drugs at roughly the same rate. Some studies even show that whites actually sell drugs at a higher rate, but people of color make up 86 percent of the arrests here in New York nonetheless.

This is a scandal. And Mayor Bill de Blasio and the NYPD continue to contort themselves to blame anything they can possibly think of other than institutional racism for this racial gulf in arrests and prosecutions.

De Blasio criticized the Drug Policy Alliance report, pointing out that marijuana possession arrests dropped by 37 percent between 2013 and 2016. But that doesn’t explain away the nearly 17,000 arrests last year.

NYPD Chief James P. O’Neill recently said they were making the arrests because people don’t like the smell. Really, man? How about we start arresting people for farts too? Arresting people because someone doesn’t like the smell? That’s not even a good lie.

March 20, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Pot Prohibition Issues, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, March 19, 2018

"Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Jenny Roberts now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

There is no such thing as a low-stakes misdemeanor. The misdemeanor sentence itself, which can range from time served to up to twelve years in some jurisdictions, is often significant.  But the collateral consequences of such a conviction can be far worse, affecting a person’s work and home lives for decades, and sometimes for the rest of their lives. As a result of misdemeanor convictions, defendants can be fired from their jobs, barred from future employment in many fields, deported, evicted from public housing together with their entire family, and refused housing by private landlords.

Under most theories of punishment, a judge at sentencing does not simply look back to the crime and its circumstances but also looks forward at the defendant’s future.  Judges imposing sentences in misdemeanor cases should focus forward much more heavily than back, and should consider the collateral effects of a misdemeanor conviction on the defendant’s future.  Viewed through that more expansive lens, and given the broad discretion of judges in misdemeanor sentencing and lack of existing guidance for that discretion, the sentencing function of judges in misdemeanor cases is in serious need of study and reform.

This Article’s goal is two-fold.  First, it contextualizes judicial responsibility for misdemeanor sentencing in the realities of the lower criminal courts, where a number of structural and systemic barriers — including violations of the right to counsel and pressures on judges to move cases along rapidly — affect but do not excuse the way judges go about sentencing.  Second, the Article calls for judges to undertake “informed misdemeanor sentencing,” which draws on principles of proportionality and parsimony in determining the just sentence in a misdemeanor case.  Accordingly, judges should explicitly acknowledge the many serious collateral consequences an individual suffers after any penal sanction, and incorporate those into the sentencing process to ensure that punishment is proportionate.  In addition, judges should bring parsimony into the sentencing process by making more use of deferred adjudication as well as expungement and related mechanisms for mitigating the unintended effects of a misdemeanor conviction.

March 19, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 09, 2018

"The Reintegrative State"

The title of this post is the title of this timely paper authored by Joy Radice that has just been posted to SSRN.  Here is its abstract

Public concern has mounted about the essentially permanent stigma created by a criminal record. This is no small problem when the U.S. criminal history database currently stores seventy-seven million criminal records, and poor people and people of color constitute a severely disproportionate number of them.  A criminal record makes it harder for people to find housing, get hired, attend college, and reunite with their families.  Yet these very things have the greatest chance of helping people lead law-abiding lives and reducing recidivism.  Scholars, legislators, and advocates have confronted this problem by arguing for reforms that give people with a conviction a second chance.  States have responded.  By one count, from 1994 to 2014, over forty state legislatures passed 155 statutes to mitigate the civil collateral consequences of a criminal record.  Although states have recognized that they have an interest in reintegrating their citizens with convictions, most people with criminal records cannot return to full citizenship.  The stigma of a conviction follows them for a lifetime, even for the most minor crimes.

This Article takes a systematic look at state reforms and integrates them into a more workable and effective whole, which I call the Reintegrative State.  It makes four contributions to the growing literature on collateral consequences and criminal records.  First, it argues that there is a state interest, if not obligation, to create an intentional and sequenced process to remove civil legal disabilities triggered by a conviction and to mitigate the permanency of public criminal records.  Second, this Article argues that reintegrating people with convictions back into society is consistent with the state’s interest in punishment and public safety, especially in light of criminology research showing that a significant number of people stop committing crimes.  Third, it critiques current state experiments with reentry initiatives as piecemeal, discretionary, inadministrable, and limited to a narrow segment of people with criminal records.  Fourth and finally, this Article argues that the state can and should be the external force that destigmatizes a person with a conviction by reestablishing that person’s legal status.  To do so effectively, the state must incorporate reintegration approaches throughout the criminal justice system — not just after sentencing or after release.  The Reintegrative State envisions a holistic framework for helping those with criminal records re-assimilate into society.

March 9, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, March 08, 2018

Highlighting that registries are not only for sex offenders in many states

This new Marshall Project piece, headlined "Convicted of a Drug Crime, Registered with Sex Offenders," focuses on the broad reach of the offender registry employed in Kansas and debate over its reform.  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts from the piece:

Lawmakers have long justified sex offender registries as a way to notify people about potentially dangerous neighbors or acquaintances, while critics say they fail to prevent crime and create a class of social outcasts.  Over the years, several states have expanded their registries to add perpetrators of other crimes, including kidnapping, assault, and murder.  Tennessee added animal abuse.  Utah added white collar crimes.  A few states considered but abandoned plans for hate crime and domestic abuse registries.  At least five states publicly display methamphetamine producers.

But Kansas went furthest, adding an array of lesser drug crimes; roughly 4,600 people in the state are now registered as drug offenders.  As deaths from opioids rise, some public officials have focused on addiction as a public health issue.  Kansas offers a different approach, as law enforcement officials argue that the registry helps keep track of people who may commit new offenses and cautions the public to avoid potentially dangerous areas and individuals.  At the same time, many registrants say it can be hard to move on when their pasts are just a click away for anyone to see.

The Kansas legislature is currently considering a bill proposed by the state’s sentencing commission that would remove drug offenders from the registry.  “It is a drain on resources with no science, studies, or data to justify it,” defense lawyer Jennifer Roth told lawmakers at an early February hearing.

The Kansas law, first passed in 2007, now requires anyone convicted of manufacturing, distributing, or possessing “with intent to distribute” drugs other than marijuana to remain on the registry for a minimum of 15 years (and a maximum of life, for multiple convictions.)  During that time, they must appear at their county sheriff’s office four times a year, as well as any time they move, get a new job, email address, vehicle, or tattoo.  Most of this information is online, searchable by name or neighborhood, and members of the public can sign up to be emailed when an offender moves in or starts work near them.  (In 2013, when businesses expressed fear of vigilantes targeting registrants at work, lawmakers removed employment addresses from the website.)  During the quarterly sheriff visits, they must pay $20 and have their picture retaken; if they work or go to school in another county, they must register there as well.  “Any time I get a new job, I have to say, ‘Sorry, I need time off’ in the first 72 hours,” said Juston Kerns, 35, arrested for involvement in the sale of methamphetamine in 2014.

A few years ago, Wesley Harden — convicted in 2008 of selling methamphetamine after he led police on a high-speed chase — was arrested and charged with “failure to register.” Harden, 35, showed up as required, but he’d recently failed to report a jet ski as a new vehicle.  He doesn’t know for sure how the authorities discovered the jet ski, but thinks it has to do with pictures he posted on Facebook.  Harden received three years of probation, but the punishment for failing to register can include prison time, even if the original conviction was handled without incarceration.  Last year, 38 people were sent to prison over their failure to register for drug crimes, and the Kansas Sentencing Commission estimates that removing drug crimes would save the state roughly a million dollars each year....

Many law enforcement officials support the registry on public safety grounds. “People who sell drugs, there tends to be dangerous activity that takes place around their residence,” said Ed Klumpp, a retired Topeka police chief who lobbies for law enforcement at the legislature and opposes the current bill. “If you’re raising children in the neighborhood, it’s good to know there is someone down the street convicted of selling or manufacturing, so maybe they won’t send the kids to get candy there on Halloween.”

In recent years, lawyers around the country have argued to increasing success that registration requirements are unconstitutional.  One county in Colorado recently took its registry offline after a judge found it to be cruel and unusual punishment. California recently passed a law allowing sex offenders to be removed from the registry after 10 to 20 years if they have not committed another serious or violent felony or sex crime.

But beyond the legal questions are practical ones.  Little is known about whether registries prevent crime, and University of Michigan law professor J.J. Prescott has speculated that they may even facilitate crimes that involve buyers and sellers.  “Imagine I move to a new city and I don't know where to find drugs,” he said.  “Oh, I can just look up people on the registry!”

Evidence to support this theory is scant — and law enforcement leaders in Kansas say they have not encountered the problem — but at the February legislative hearing, Scott Schultz, the executive director of the Kansas Sentencing Commission, said he had learned of one registrant who found people at her door, looking to buy drugs.  They’d seen her address online. “I’ve called it, tongue in cheek, state-sponsored drug-dealing,” Schultz said, describing the registry as an “online shopping portal for meth and other drugs.”

March 8, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Via executive order, Prez Trump creates new Federal Interagency Council on Crime Prevention and Improving Reentry

Images (8)As reported in this Axios piece, "President Trump on Wednesday launched, by executive order, the Federal Interagency Council on Crime Prevention and Improving Reentry." Here is more:

The president enacted the council with the aim of reducing crime while looking for ways to "provide those who have engaged in criminal activity with greater opportunities to lead productive lives."...

“We applaud President Trump for following through on his stated commitment to reducing crime, reforming our prisons and rehabilitating individuals who are hungry for a second chance,” [said] Mark Holden, general counsel at Koch Industries who recently launched the Safe Streets and Second Chances prison reform initiative, told Axios. Holden said he is particularly encouraged that Jared Kushner will be one of the co-chairs.

While she thinks this is a good step from the administration, Inimai Chettiar, director of the justice program at the Brennan Center for Justice told Axios, "there can be no real criminal justice reform without reducing the number of people entering prison. The President and Attorney General are attempting to kill bipartisan sentencing reform in Congress, and offering incremental reentry reforms instead."...

The executive order calls for "mental health, vocational training, job creation, after-school programming, substance abuse, and mentoring," for inmates. "Incarceration is necessary to improve public safety, but its effectiveness can be enhanced through evidence-based rehabilitation programs." The order asks for a report from the council within 90 days that will outline a timeline for ways to reduce crime and recidivism.

The council will be co-chaired by Jared Kushner, Attorney General Jeff Sessions and the Assistant to the President of Domestic Policy Andrew Bremberg.  The council will include the heads of: The Department of the Treasury, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Education, the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Office of Management and Budget, and the Office of National Drug Control Policy.

The executive order asks for ways to reduce recidivism and better re-entry for those coming out of the criminal justice system, but does not suggest looking at changes to sentencing guidelines. 

The full Executive Order creating the Federal Interagency Council on Crime Prevention and Improving Reentry can be accessed at this link. The first section of the EO provides as follows:

Section 1. Purpose. The Federal Government must reduce crime, enhance public safety, and increase opportunity, thereby improving the lives of all Americans. In 2016, the violent crime rate in the United States increased by 3.4 percent, the largest single-year increase since 1991. Additionally, in 2016, there were more than 17,000 murders and nonnegligent manslaughters in the United States, a more than 20 percent increase in just 2 years. The Department of Justice, alongside State, local, and tribal law enforcement, has focused its efforts on the most violent criminals. Preliminary statistics indicate that, in the last year, the increase in the murder rate slowed and the violent crime rate decreased.

To further improve public safety, we should aim not only to prevent crime in the first place, but also to provide those who have engaged in criminal activity with greater opportunities to lead productive lives.  The Federal Government can assist in breaking this cycle of crime through a comprehensive strategy that addresses a range of issues, including mental health, vocational training, job creation, after-school programming, substance abuse, and mentoring. Incarceration is necessary to improve public safety, but its effectiveness can be enhanced through evidence-based rehabilitation programs.  These efforts will lower recidivism rates, ease incarcerated individuals’ reentry into the community, reduce future incarceration costs, and promote positive social and economic outcomes.

I am not going to get too excited by this new Council until I see what kind of "recommendations for evidence-based programmatic and other reforms" appear in the various reports it is tasked to issue. But this order provides still more reason to believe that the Trump White House wants to (and wants to be able to claim) it is doing something productive in the arena of criminal justice reform.

Notably, President Barack Obama formally acted in a fairly similar manner via this Presidential Memorandum in late April 2016 discussing "Federal Interagency Reentry Council." That memorandum noted that "in 2011, the Attorney General formed the Federal Interagency Reentry Council, a Cabinet-level working group dedicated to the rehabilitation and reintegration of individuals returning to their communities from prisons and jails" and said the 2016 memorandum was being issued to "ensure that the Federal Government continues the important work of this council and builds on its successes." This new Executive Order by Prez Trump formerly states that it revokes Prez Obama's 2016 memorandum, but in substance it looks quite similar.

March 8, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 05, 2018

Making a fulsome case on the merits against sex offender registries

This morning, the US Supreme Court granted cert in Gundy v. US to consider whether Congress's delegation to the attorney general the power to issue regulations interpreting the federal Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act violates the nondelegation doctrine. That grant on that issue right has Con Law fans buzzing. But sentencing fans more interested in the substance of sex offender registries will want to check out this new commentary by Jesse Kelley in The Hill under the headline "The Sex Offender Registry: Vengeful, unconstitutional and due for full repeal." Here are excerpts:

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that at least 95 percent of all state prisoners will be released from prison at some point. However, convicted sex-offenders almost exclusively face the vengeful, additional punishment of registration under the Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (SORNA).

Generally, under SORNA, an individual who is required to register as a sex offender must register at least once a year; report any change of address within as little as three days; produce vehicle information, a recent photograph and a DNA sample; and abide by stringent residency restrictions, which can force individuals out of urban areas, away from family and into unemployment.

SORNA violates our nation’s founding documents by singling out a specific category of offenders for unfair, unconstitutional punishment. While the Department of Justice cites public safety as its rationale for continuing to enforce the overreaching requirements of SORNA, the program has metastasized, defacing some of our most treasured rights: the right to due process, the right to be free from double jeopardy and the right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment.....

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the state’s version of SORNA violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights because the requirements of satisfying SORNA assume that a juvenile will commit some sex offense in the future without giving him or her the opportunity to challenge that assumption. Equity demands assigning this same ruling to adult reporting requirements.

Another element of due process known as “double jeopardy” appears in the Fifth Amendment and protects an individual from being prosecuted for the same offense twice. It also bars multiple punishments for the same crime. Individuals convicted of crimes who have faced incarceration and then must begin sex registry-reporting are certainly being punished repeatedly.

SORNA requirements punish ex-offenders by inflicting upon them tangible, secondary punishments, like the inability to qualify for housing and increased difficulties securing employment. These secondary punishments effectively banish ex-offenders to a modern leper colony by not only removing re-entry resources but also by affirmatively ostracizing those attempting to rebuild a life after incarceration.

In addition to violating double jeopardy, repeated punishments violate the Eighth Amendment by imposing cruel and unusual punishment. The government is prohibited from imposing a criminal sentence that is either vindictive or far too harsh for the crime committed. Incarceration is intended to be a punishment and a deterrence, so any subsequent punishment can only be vindictive. After incarceration, an ex-offender’s privacy is significantly diminished by the requirement to report one’s name, address, photo, employment status and provide a DNA sample.

Last fall, a federal judge found that the Colorado sex offender registry’s punitive impact outweighed any value it might have had in protecting the public and concluded that registration violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. As the judge specifically stated, “This ongoing imposition of a known and uncontrollable risk of public abuse of information from the sex offender registry, in the absence of any link to an objective risk to the public posed by each individual sex offender, has resulted in and continues to threaten [sex offenders] with punishment disproportionate to the offenses they committed.”

As Clarence Darrow famously said, “You can only protect your liberties in this world by protecting the other man's freedom. You can only be free if I am free.” Protecting the constitutional rights of everyone, even those convicted of sex offenses, is of the upmost importance for protecting our freedom. Therefore, both legislators — by way of developing and amending laws — and judges — via hearing arguments and creating case law — must re-examine SORNA in order to preserve liberty and uphold the Constitution.

March 5, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (9)

SCOTUS grants cert on structural SORNA issue and Justice Sotomayor dissents in capital case with IAC issues

The Supreme Court has been mulling over a number of cases that would, if cert were granted, be of great interest to sentencing fans. But the Justices, via today's new SCOTUS order list, did not grant (or deny) cert on any blockbusters. Here is the SCOTUSblog accounting of what sentencing fans did get today:

The second grant is Gundy v. US, but only limited to the fourth question presented by the petition: whether Congress's delegation of power to the attorney general to issue regulations interpreting the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act violates the nondelegation doctrine....

The non-delegation challenge to SORNA is (1) more plausible than most non-delegation challenges because of the criminal context; but (2) would be the first non-delegation challenge that has prevailed at the Court in a very long time. And it would blast a giant hole in SORNA.

Justice Sotomayor dissented from the denial of review in Wessinger v. Vannoy, a capital case involving an attorney's duties to conduct a mitigation investigation when the court has denied funds for expert assistance.

Justice Sotomayor's solo dissent in Wessinger ends this way:

The Court’s denial of certiorari here belies the “bedrock principle in our justice system” that a defendant has a right to effective assistance of trial counsel, and undermines the protections this Court has recognized are necessary to protect that right. Martinez, 566 U.S., at 12. Indeed, the investigation of mitigation evidence and its presentation at sentencing are crucial to maintaining the integrity of capital proceedings.  The layers of ineffective assistance of counsel that Wessinger received constitute precisely the type of error that warrants relief under this Court’s precedent.  Yet, Wessinger will remain on death row without a jury ever considering the significant mitigation evidence that is now apparent. Because that outcome is contrary to precedent and deeply unjust and unfair, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

March 5, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, February 02, 2018

US District Judge finds unconstitutional Florida's process to restore voting rights to disenfranchised felons

As reported in this local press article, "Florida routinely violates the constitutional rights of its citizens by permanently revoking the "fundamental right" to vote for anyone convicted of a felony, a federal judge ruled Thursday." Here is more about this notable ruling:

U.S. District Judge Mark Walker said the Florida "scheme" unfairly relies on the personal support of the governor for citizens to regain the right to vote. In a strongly-worded ruling, he called the state's defense of voter disenfranchisement "nonsensical," a withering criticism of Gov. Rick Scott, the lead defendant in the case.

"Florida strips the right to vote from every man and woman who commits a felony," Walker wrote. "To vote again, disenfranchised citizens must kowtow before a panel of high-level government officials over which Florida's governor has absolute veto authority. No standards guide the panel. Its members alone must be satisfied that these citizens deserve restoration … The question now is whether such a system passes constitutional muster. It does not."

Walker wrote: "If any one of these citizens wishes to earn back their fundamental right to vote, they must plod through a gauntlet of constitutionally infirm hurdles. No more. When the risk of state-sanctioned viewpoint discrimination skulks near the franchise, it is the province and duty of this Court to excise such potential bias from infecting the clemency process."

The judge condemned a system that he said gives "unfettered discretion" to four partisan politicians, and cited as proof a comment Scott made at one hearing when he said: "We can do whatever we want."

Scott's office issued a statement late Thursday, hinting at an appeal. "The discretion of the clemency board over the restoration of felons' rights in Florida has been in place for decades and overseen by multiple governors," said a statement attributed to Scott's communications director, John Tupps. "The process is outlined in Florida's Constitution, and today's ruling departs from precedent set by the United States Supreme Court."...

Scott was the principal architect of the current system that requires all felons to wait at least five years after they complete their sentences, serve probation and pay all restitution, to apply for right to vote and other civil rights. Scott and the Cabinet, meeting as a clemency board, consider cases four times a year, and usually fewer than 100 cases each time. It can take a decade or longer for a case to be heard, and at present the state has a backlog of more than 10,000 cases.

Scott imposed the restrictions in 2011, soon after he was elected, with the support of three fellow Republicans who serve on the Cabinet, including Agriculture Commissioner Adam Putnam, now a leading candidate for governor. Scott's actions in 2011 reversed a policy under which many felons, not including murderers and sex offenders, had their rights restored without application process and hearings. That streamlined process was instituted in 2007 by former Gov. Charlie Crist, then a Republican and now a Democratic member of Congress. "We've known this policy was unjust, and today a federal judge confirmed it's also a violation of constitutional rights," Crist wrote on Facebook....

Walker's decision came nine days after the state approved a ballot measure that, if passed in November, would automatically restore the voting rights of about 1.2 million felons, not including convicted murderers and sex offenders. That proposal will appear as Amendment 4 on the Nov. 6 ballot in Florida.

A leader of the initiative is Desmond Meade of Orlando, a law school graduate of Florida International University and a convicted felon waiting to have his rights restored. Meade said the judge's decision validated the work of more than a million Florida voters who signed petitions that helped get the measure on the ballot. "The system is broken, and now we know not only is it broken, but the courts are saying it's unconstitutional," Meade said.

Walker, who was appointed by President Barack Obama, ruled that Florida's lifetime ban on the right to vote violates the First and Fourteenth amendments to the U.S. Constitution, which are the guarantees of freedom of expression, due process and equal protection under law. Throughout his 43-page ruling, Walker cited the arbitrariness of Florida's system. Felons routinely have been denied their voting rights because they have received speeding tickets or failed to pay child support.

"So the state then requires the former felon to conduct and comport herself to the satisfaction of the board's subjective — and frankly, mythical — standards," Walker wrote. "Courts view unfettered governmental discretion over protected constitutional rights with profound suspicion."...

The judge gave both sides in the case until Feb. 12 to file briefings on how to permanently remedy the constitutional deficiencies in Florida's system. Scott and Cabinet members are scheduled to hear the next round of clemency petitions in March.

District Judge Walker's 43-page opinion is available in full at this link.  Because I am a fan of expanding the franchise as much as possible, I am always pleased to see a ruling that has the potential effect of broadening voting rights and remedies.  But because Florida's restoration procedures are styled as a form of clemency and court have historically be chary about finding constitutional problems with or limits on clemency powers, I am unsure if this ruling will withstand likely appeals.

February 2, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Collateral consequences, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (19)

Monday, January 29, 2018

"The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new empirical article authored by Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin and Crystal Yang appearing in the American Economic Review. Here is the abstract:

Over 20 percent of prison and jail inmates in the United States are currently awaiting trial, but little is known about the impact of pretrial detention on defendants.  This paper uses the detention tendencies of quasi-randomly assigned bail judges to estimate the causal effects of pretrial detention on subsequent defendant outcomes.  Using data from administrative court and tax records, we find that pretrial detention significantly increases the probability of conviction, primarily through an increase in guilty pleas.  Pretrial detention has no net effect on future crime, but decreases formal sector employment and the receipt of employment- and tax-related government benefits.  These results are consistent with (i) pretrial detention weakening defendants' bargaining positions during plea negotiations and (ii) a criminal conviction lowering defendants' prospects in the formal labor market.

January 29, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, January 17, 2018

"Breaking Down Barriers: Experiments into Policies That Might Incentivize Employers to Hire Ex-Offenders"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new Rand Corporation research report. Here is its summary and some of its key findings and recommendations:

The rate of criminal punishment in the United States has had far-reaching economic consequences, in large part because people with criminal records are marginalized within the labor market. Given these negative economic implications, federal, state and local officials have developed a host of policies to encourage employers to hire ex-offenders, with varying degrees of success.  To inform policies and programs aimed at improving employment rates for ex-offenders, we examined employer preferences regarding policy options targeted to incentivize hiring individuals with one nonviolent felony conviction.

In our experiments, we found employers were 69 percent more likely to consider hiring an ex-offender if a hiring agency also provides a guaranteed replacement worker in the event the ex-offender was deemed unsuitable and 53 percent more likely to hire an ex-offender who can provide a certificate of validated positive previous work performance history.  Having consistent transportation provided by a hiring agency increased the likelihood of being considered for hire by 33 percent. 

Employers also were found to be 30 percent more likely to consider an ex-offender for hire if the government increases the tax credit from 25 percent of the worker’s wages (up to $2,500) to 40 percent (up to $5,000) — double the current maximum amount allowed by the Work Opportunity Tax Credit — and 24 percent more likely to hire an ex-offender if the government completed all tax-related paperwork.

Key Findings

Worker Replacement and Fee Discounts Increase Hiring Prospects for Ex-Offenders...

Tax Credits Have a Similarly Positive Effect...

Employer Access to Previous Performance Could Factor into Hiring...

Recommendations

  • Staffing agencies and reentry or reintegration programs could increase the likelihood of employment for people with a criminal record if they guarantee prospective employers a replacement employee.
  • State policymakers should consider expanding post-conviction certification programs. Across both the tax credit and staffing agency discount experiments, employers demonstrate a clear preference for wanting to know whether an ex-offender job candidate has a consistent work history and verifiable positive employment references versus simply knowing whether the person follows company codes of conduct.
  • Tax agencies should consider reducing the paperwork that companies have to fill out for credits. Government agencies could also consider providing help to prepare and submit the forms.
  • Ensuring reliable transportation to and from a job site for candidates with a criminal record increases the likelihood an employer will support hiring such individuals. As with reducing paperwork, the impact of this policy is more limited than many of our other tested policy features.

January 17, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, January 09, 2018

Making the case against juvenile sex offender registration requirements

Rebecca Fix has this new commentary that caught my eye under the headlined "Young Sex Offenders Shouldn’t Have to Register; It’s Ineffective and Hurts Everyone Around Them." The whole piece (and its many links) are worth checking out, and here is how it gets started:

Sex offender registration policies were initially developed for adults with sexual offenses, but have recently been extended to include youth with sexual offenses as well.  At first glance, sex offender registration and notification (hereafter referred to as SORN) may make us feel safer, produce relief knowing that these individuals are being punished.

However, many of us don’t realize that these practices don’t protect our children.  Required registration of and notification about youth with illegal sexual behavior, in particular, has resulted in serious economic and psychological burdens at multiple levels, affecting not only the youth who have to register (e.g., increase in suicidal ideation), but also their families (e.g., judgment from others, loss of job), neighbors (e.g., devaluation of home value) and communities (e.g., stress levels, potential changes in reputation).

Mental health providers and child advocates like myself and colleagues at the Moore Center for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse who have examined policies concerning sexual offending among youth know that SORN requirements stem from an ill-fitting classification system that has deleterious consequences.

January 9, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, January 03, 2018

Spotlighting felon disenfranchisement in Florida

I am always pleased to see the New York Times editorial board giving attention to criminal justice issues, and I am especially pleased to see this new editorial focused on felon disenfranchisement.  The lengthy piece is headlined "Florida’s 1.5 Million Missing Voters," and here are excerpts:

Everyone remembers that the 2000 presidential election was decided by 537 votes in Florida.  Far fewer remember another important number from the state that year — 620,000, the Floridians who were barred from voting because state records showed, correctly or not, they had been convicted of a felony.

It didn’t matter whether their crime was murder or driving with a suspended license, nor whether they had fully served their sentence. In Florida, the voting ban is entrenched in the Constitution, and it’s for life.  Today, Florida disenfranchises almost 1.5 million of its citizens, more than 11 states’ populations and roughly a quarter of the more than six million Americans who are unable to vote because of a criminal record.

Felon disenfranchisement is a destructive, pointless policy that hurts not only individuals barred from the ballot box, but American democracy at large.  Its post-Civil War versions are explicitly racist, and its modern-day rationales are thin to nonexistent. It can make all the difference in places like Florida, which didn’t stop being competitive in 2000; the state remains a major presidential battleground, and victories for both parties in state and local elections are often narrow.

That could all change if a proposed constitutional amendment gets enough signatures to be placed on the ballot in November and wins enough support.  The initiative would automatically restore voting rights to the vast majority of Floridians who have completed their sentence for a felony conviction, including any term of parole or probation.

This is a long overdue and urgently needed reform.  The only way around Florida’s lifetime ban — as in the other three states with such a ban, Kentucky, Iowa and Virginia — is a direct, personal appeal to the governor.  In the last few years, Terry McAuliffe, as Virginia’s governor, restored voting rights to more than 168,000 people, and the governors in Kentucky and Iowa granted roughly 9 in 10 of the restoration requests they received in the first half of the decade....

The right to vote is the most meaningful mark of citizenship in a democracy. It should be withheld only in extreme circumstances, and its restoration shouldn’t depend on the whims of a governor.  What’s worse, many of these laws, especially in the South, are inextricable from their racist origins. Florida’s was enacted in 1868 — two years after the state thumbed its nose at the 14th Amendment — with the intent to prevent newly freed black people from voting.  Those effects linger today, as one in five black adults in Florida remain disenfranchised because of a criminal record.

The new initiative, which excludes people convicted of murder or sexual offenses, will be placed on the ballot if it receives 766,200 signatures and will take effect if it earns at least 60 percent of the vote. Its advocates have submitted more than one million signatures to date, although many still need to be verified before the Feb. 1 deadline.

One hundred and fifty years after Florida enshrined this awful law, there’s only one clear way to get rid of it.  Legal challenges have fallen short, the governor is no friend to voting rights, and lawmakers have limited power when it comes to constitutional amendments.  It’s time for Florida’s voters to step up and restore the most fundamental constitutional right to more than a million of their neighbors.

I hope this proposed constitutional amendment can get to the ballot and can garner a super-majority of votes.   As long time readers may know, I have long believed as many people as possible should be enfranchised in a democracy, and my basic thinking on this front was explained in this Big Think piece years ago headlined "Let Prisoners Vote."

Thinking beyond this ballot initiative, I suspect Congress could enact legislation that could restrict the reach of extreme state felon disenfranchisement laws.  I know Senator Rand Paul spoke about this issue some years back, and I would guess they might be some opportunity for some bipartisan legislation to try to limit how some states seek to limit the franchise.  (I recognize there could be some constitutional/federalism issues raised if Congress gets too involved in state voting laws, but often if there is a will to expand the franchise, there can be a way.) 

January 3, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

Saturday, December 16, 2017

"Why hiring people with criminal records benefits all of us"

The title of this post is the headline of this recent FoxNews commentary authored by Mike Jandernoa.  Here are excerpts:

In the past, many employers would often not consider hiring people who had even minor criminal records.  But as the former CEO of a 10,000-employee organization, I have one message for America: we can no longer exclude this vital component of our workforce.

An estimated one in three American adults has a criminal record of some kind.  And about 600,000 people leave our nation’s prisons every year, looking to rejoin the workforce. While individuals in this group of workers won’t be right for every job, the right job is out there for everyone.

The benefits of boosting employment for those with criminal records are significant.  First, opening up opportunities to this population will make our country safer. Right now, almost 60 percent of individuals remain unemployed a year after being released from incarceration.  It’s in our collective self-interest for them to get jobs, because steady employment is one of the best ways to ensure that individuals lead productive, crime-free lives.  In one study of 6,000 returning citizens, employment cut the rate of those who committed a new crime in half.

Second, employers all across the country are suffering from a dearth of skilled labor.  Every year, one major national bank surveys small businesses across this country.  This year the survey found incredible optimism: 80 percent of employers said their business is stronger than ever; 40 percent said they plan to make a capital expenditure to grow their companies; and a quarter of those surveyed said they plan to hire more workers.  In West Michigan, most of the business leaders I know plan to expand their workforces. The downside?  The businesses can’t find enough workers....

Our region is almost at full employment, so we must look for alternatives. We have a very strong manufacturing base, and these businesses are looking for people who will show up on time and test negative for drugs — that’s it.  This opens the door for people who were formerly incarcerated and who are serious about turning their lives around.  It is not unheard of for employers to send vans to pick up workers who are in residential community corrections programs because the employers are so desperate for workers.

Some of our country’s largest employers are making second-chance hiring their official policy.  Target and Home Depot have “banned the box” in their employment practices.  “Ban the box” delays inquiry into an applicant’s criminal history until late in the hiring process, ensuring that those with criminal records aren’t tossed aside before having an opportunity to detail their skills, training and qualifications. This policy also allows these individuals to explain the circumstances of their offense, and show potential employers how they have turned their lives around....

Reforms to seal or erase records of criminal convictions are also a priority for job creators.  These policies seal minor criminal records after a certain crime-free period. Research shows that low-level offenders who have remained crime-free for three to five years are no more likely to commit a crime than anyone else.  And in many states, when minor criminal records are sealed, law enforcement and judicial officers still have access to these records, ensuring that public safety continues to be a priority.

Almost all states have some mechanism through which certain criminal records can be erased or sealed, but erasing records at the federal level is virtually impossible. Fortunately, the issue is gaining traction in Congress. Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky., is spearheading the REDEEM Act, with bipartisan support.  And Rep. Hakeem Jeffries, D-N.Y., introduced the Renew Act with Rep. Trey Gowdy, R-S.C.

Occupational licensing reform is another issue important to the business community. Today one in four occupations requires a government license — but a criminal history often bars an individual from the licensing process.  Ironically, such restrictions make us less safe.  One study showed that states with more burdensome licensing laws saw an average 9 percent increase in recidivism, while those with the lowest burdens had a recidivism reduction of 2.5 percent.

States as diverse as Illinois, Arizona, and Louisiana have already begun peeling back the layers of government-issued permission slips to work.  At the federal level, the New HOPE Act, introduced by Rep. Tim Walberg, R-Mich., and similar legislation sponsored by Sen. John Cornyn, R-Texas, would allow states to use federal funding to identify and reduce unnecessary licensing barriers within their regulations and statutes.

Elected officials should look to job creators for sound public policy.  I urge my fellow employers to beat the drum even louder and make their voices heard at the local, state and federal level. We can improve public safety, strengthen the economy and broaden our pool of skilled labor through commonsense criminal justice reforms and offering second chances for those who have earned them.  I don’t know a good businessperson who would turn down that deal.

December 16, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, December 14, 2017

"Second Chance Reforms in 2017: Roundup of new expungement and restoration laws"

2017-Report-Cover-Image-791x1024The title of this post is the title of this notable new publication from the Collateral Consequences Resource Center documenting how states are, in various ways, expanding opportunities to avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of a criminal record. Here is the report's executive summary following the start of its "overview" section:

The national trend toward expanding opportunities for restoration of rights and status after conviction, first documented in Four Years of Second Chance Reforms, 2013 – 2016, has accelerated in 2017. In the past year, 23 states broadened existing second chance laws or enacted entirely new ones, enhancing the prospects for successful reentry and reintegration for many thousands of Americans.  Some of these laws significantly expanded the availability of relief, while others involved relatively minor changes to existing law.

The most frequent type of reform involved limiting public access to criminal records: new sealing or expungement laws were enacted in several states that previously had none, eligibility requirements were relaxed for many existing record-sealing authorities, and new limits were imposed on access to non-conviction and juvenile records -- all making it easier for more individuals to get relief at an earlier date.  However, there is remarkably little consistency among state record-closing schemes, and most states extend relief only to less serious offenses after lengthy eligibility waiting periods.  Moreover, eligibility criteria are frequently so complex as to defeat the sharpest legal minds. Other recurring reforms limit employer inquiries into criminal history at the application stage.  A few states enacted administratively enforceable standards for consideration of criminal history in employment and licensing. To date there has been very little empirical research into the relative effectiveness of different forms of relief, so it is perhaps not surprising that experimentation seems to be the order of the day.

This report documents changes in state restoration laws in 2017, many of which are quite significant.  It is based on research from the Restoration of Rights Project (RRP), an online resource maintained by the CCRC that catalogs and analyzes the restoration laws of all fifty states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system.  Following an overview of 2017 reforms, specific changes to the law in each state are briefly described along with relevant citations. More detailed information about each state’s laws is available in the RRP state profiles.

• In 2017, 23 states enacted laws aimed at reducing barriers faced by people with criminal records in the workplace and elsewhere.  Some of these laws significantly expanded the availability of relief, while others involved relatively minor changes to existing laws.

• Most of the new laws involved either restrictions on public access to records or limits on employer inquiries into criminal history.  A few states enacted administratively enforceable standards for consideration of criminal history in employment and licensing.

• Important new record-sealing schemes were enacted in Illinois, Montana and New York, and nine other states either relaxed eligibility requirements or otherwise supplemented their existing sealing or expungement authorities to make relief more broadly available at an earlier date.  Of these nine, the most ambitious reforms were enacted by Nevada, which was one of several states that created a presumption in favor of relief for eligible persons.

• Seven states enacted substantial revisions to their juvenile expungement and sealing laws in 2017, some of which require courts to order relief automatically after a brief waiting period.

• Ten states enacted state-wide “ban-the-box” laws limiting inquiries into criminal record by public employers at preliminary stages of the hiring process.  California, Connecticut and Vermont extended these limits to private employers as well.

• In California and Nevada, restrictions on application-stage inquiries are part of a broader nondiscrimination scheme that prohibits consideration of certain kinds of criminal records, and establishes standards for individualized determinations in all other cases.  Both states provide additional procedural protections.

• While reforms are moving at a fast pace, there is no consensus about the most effective way to avoid or mitigate the adverse effects of a criminal record, and very little relevant empirical research.

December 14, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Data on sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, December 12, 2017

"Sex Registries as Modern-Day Witch Pyres: Why Criminal Justice Reform Advocates Need to Address the Treatment of People on the Sex Offender Registry"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new In Justice commentary authored by Guy Hamilton-Smith. I quoted the title in full because it is all worthy of reflection, as is the entire commentary that follows. Here is an excerpt:

The sex offender is the modern-day witch: the registry, the contemporary pyre. A scarlet letter for our technocratic era, forcing people to register as sex offenders “is what puritan judges would’ve done to Hester Prynne had laptops been available.” While undoubtedly there are those on the registry who have been convicted of blood curdling crimes, the designation is also extended to those who have been convicted of far more banal ones.

Reformers urgently need to draw public attention to the cruel and unnecessarily harsh treatment afforded to sex offenders within the justice system. Sex offender registries are rapidly proliferating and becoming an increasingly popular back-end tool for feeding people into the carceral state.

In understanding the reasons why sex offenders ought to be a higher priority for mainstream justice reform advocates, a grasp of the evolution and operation of the sex offender registry is critical....

The number of people listed on a sex offender registry in the United States has grown from slightly more than 500,000 in 2005 to 874,725 today. Research has found that sex offender registries have a disproportionate impact on minorities.

While registries and their attendant requirements are sold as enhancing public safety, research consistently indicates that they are exceedingly bad at this goal. One explanation is because, contrary to Smith’s baseless assertion and what most believe, people on the registry have one of the lowest rates of re-offending out of any class of criminal....

As a piece of criminal justice machinery brought to bear on people, the registry can best be thought of as a two-headed beast: a 1–2 punch of distinct effects.

The first head is the direct impact on the lives of those on the registry itself. With no Due Process or Ex Post Facto brakes to slow down the juggernaut, it has become weaponized.  A far cry from its origins as a simple list of purported perverts, it has morphed into a web of prison-without-bars that would make Franz Kafka blush. The oppressiveness, breadth, and lack of due process inherent in these modern day sex offender registries led a federal court in Colorado to label it a cruel and unusual punishment; a legal conclusion virtually unheard of outside of the cloistered world of death penalty litigation.

The second head is the tangle of legal requirements for those on the list: a knot of vague, illogical, ever-expanding, and sometimes contradictory laws that even lawyers, judges, and law enforcement have difficulty interpreting.  Examples can include strict time limits on reporting even minor changes in information (such as online accounts) or residence, residency restrictions, or even the clothing one wears. States promise swift felony prosecutions if individuals do not observe hyper-technical compliance with these requirements.

Unsurprisingly, it is exceedingly easy to run afoul of the requirements, keeping those that do trapped in a cycle of legislatively-crafted “crime” that can be tantamount to a de facto life sentence. “Failure to register” is fast becoming the crime of choice for returning those on the registry to prison.  In 2008 in Minnesota, failure to register charges became the most common reason sex offenders were returned to prison.  Between 2000 to 2016, Texas saw a more than 700% increase in FTR arrests, from 252 in 2005 to 1,497 in 2017. To borrow a phrase from computer programming, this is not some kind of criminal justice bug. It is a feature.

December 12, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Friday, December 08, 2017

"Invisible Punishment is Wrong – But Why? The Normative Basis of Criticism of Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction"

The title of this post is the title of this new piece now on SSRN authored by Christopher Bennett. Here is its abstract:

This article is concerned with the way in which criminal justice systems cause harms that go well beyond the ‘headline’ punishment announced at sentencing.  This is the phenomenon of ‘collateral consequences of criminal conviction’.  This phenomenon has been widely criticised in recent criminological literature.  However, the critics do not normally explore or defend the normative basis of their claims — as they need to if their arguments are to strike home against sceptics.

I argue that the normative basis of the critics’ position should be seen as involving important normative claims about the responsibilities that societies have towards those who break the law.  Some important strands of criticism, I claim, rest on the view that we have associative duties towards offenders (and their dependants and communities) as fellow participants in a collective democratic enterprise, duties that are violated when states impose, or allow, harms that go significantly beyond the sentence.

December 8, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Wednesday, November 29, 2017

"Disrupting the Cycle: Reimagining the Prosecutor’s Role in Reentry - A Guide to Best Practices"

The title of this post is the title of this big new report from the NYU Center on the Administration of Criminal Law.  Here is the report's executive summary:

The report provides concrete recommendations that prosecutors can implement in order to focus on reentry and target the risk of recidivism.  The report proceeds in four parts:

PART I focuses on reforms that prosecutors can implement at the “front end” of the process, including considering how prosecutorial discretion at various stages of a criminal case can impact defendants’ risk of recidivism and affect their reentry process.  This includes using discretion to make screening and charging decisions, considering diversion and other alternatives to incarceration, supporting pretrial release of defendants where appropriate, and considering the use of creative sentencing alternatives;

PART II focuses on reforms that prosecutors can implement at the “back end” of the process to begin preparing for an incarcerated individual’s eventual reentry to their community.  This includes prerelease reentry planning, and removing barriers that interfere with their ability to reintegrate into their communities, such as obtaining identification and drivers’ licenses, providing them opportunities to expunge their convictions and reduce fines that may burden them upon release, and collaborating with employers and community-based resources;

PART III focuses on the prosecutor as office leader and highlights office-wide reforms that can shift office culture to include anti-recidivism concerns as part of a broader focus on public safety; and

PART IV focuses on the prosecutor’s role in the larger community and how he or she can use his or her power to engage a diverse group of stakeholders in outreach and education initiatives, including legislative reforms designed to target recidivism at the front and back ends of the justice system.

November 29, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, November 13, 2017

Might last week's voting results in Virginia help lead to voting rights for everyone, including those with criminal records?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this extended HuffPost piece headlined "Democrats Just Won A Massive Victory For Voting Rights In Virginia." Here are excerpts:

On a night of Democratic victories, one of the most significant wins came in Virginia, where the party held onto the governor’s mansion. Democratic governor-elect Ralph Northam’s victory will enable him to expand voting rights to disenfranchised people and exert some control over the redistricting process.

The election had high stakes for voting rights. Virginia strips people of their right to vote if they are convicted of a felony, and those rights can only be restored by the governor. Gov. Terry McAuliffe (D) moved aggressively to restore rights to more than 168,000 former felons ― a policy Northam has said he is proud of and will continue.

In 2016, the nonprofit Sentencing Project estimated there were 508,680 people in Virginia who remained disenfranchised because of a felony conviction, meaning hundreds of thousands more could benefit from Northam’s policies. More than 1 in 5 people disenfranchised in the commonwealth because of a felony conviction were African-American, according to the organization....

Expanded voting rights restoration will benefit people like LaVaughn Williams and Brianna Ross, who are in their 50s and lost their right to vote decades ago, when they were convicted of felonies. Both women had their rights restored in the last year and voted for the first time in their lives on Tuesday, something they said made them feel like equal citizens. “If you had asked me maybe a year and a half, almost two years ago, I would’ve said ‘No,’ I didn’t never think I would vote,” Williams said on Tuesday after voting.

“Government and governors have come to the conclusion that even though we have not done a lot of good things in our lifetime, as far as I’m concerned, they have decided that they will put those past mistakes in the past and give us that second chance,” she said. “That’s all any person that’s an ex-felon can hope for, that second chance. Me getting my rights back is that second chance.”...

Voting rights became an important issue in the race after Northam’s Republican opponent, Ed Gillespie, used highly misleading television advertisements to criticize the policy of restoring voting rights to former felons. Gillespie also personally oversaw the Republican effort to win state legislators and draw electoral boundaries to the party’s advantage in 2010. The high stakes attracted attention from voting groups like Let America Vote and Holder’s National Democratic Redistricting Committee.

“Ralph Northam’s win tonight is a victory for every Virginian, a victory for the Democratic movement resisting President Trump’s disastrous administration and a victory for the protection of voting rights everywhere,” Jason Kander, the former Missouri secretary of state and president of Let America Vote, said in a statement. “Ralph made his defense of voting rights a campaign priority,” Kander said. “Virginians took notice, which is why they came from all over the commonwealth to join Let America Vote and many other groups to get out the vote.”

Though I am not aware of any exit polling that suggests that Northam swayed a large number of voters with his advocacy for voting rights, I suspect that Gilllespie's attack on restoring voting rights to former felons would have been given too much credit if he had secured a come-from-behind win. More generally, in a nation that rightly takes pride in democratic governance, I am ever hopeful that advocacy for expanding the franchise can and will generally prevail over advocacy for restricting the franchise.

Because I have long thought that the biggest problem with democracy in the US results from too few rather than too many people voting, I continue to adhere to the positions developed here in support of allowing even incarcerated felons the right to political participation through the voting booth. In this context, it is worth recalling that we fought a war for independence based in part on the slogan "no taxation without representation." In that tradition, I think until we hear someone making the case for felons to be exempt from taxation, we ought in turn be ever-suspicious of the case for preventing felons from voting.

November 13, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, November 09, 2017

Making the case against International Megan's Law

Guy Hamilton-Smith has this new commentary at In Justice Today headlined "We’re Putting Sex Offender Stamps on Passports. Here’s Why It Won’t Curb Sex Tourism & Trafficking." Here are excerpts:

On October 30th, the State Department announced that passports of people who are required to register as sex offenders because of an offense involving a minor will be marked with a “unique identifier” that will read: "The bearer was convicted of a sex offense against a minor, and is a covered sex offender pursuant to 22 United States Code Section 212b(c)(l)."

The law which occasions this requirement, International Megan’s Law (IML), was enacted in 2016 under President Obama.  In addition to the identifier requirement, IML allows for existing passports of those on the registry to be revoked, and imposes criminal penalties on them for failure to provide the government with advance notice of international travel plans.  While U.S. law already provided for destination countries to be put on notice regarding the travel plans of those on the sex offender registry, IML ratchets things up by requiring the person to carry the government’s “identifier” with them wherever they go abroad....

While IML and similar laws are packaged as a way to prevent sexual violence and exploitation, they do little to nothing to meet those objectives because they make assumptions about sexual offending that are incorrect.  For instance, people who have been convicted of sexual offenses generally have one of the lowest rates of re-offense out of any class of criminal. Dozens of studies have consistently confirmed this finding, including research from the U.S. Department of Justice.  Along similar lines, a 2008 time-series analysis of 170,000 unique sex offenses found that 95.9% of the time, the perpetrator was a first-time offender.  In other words, nearly all reported sexual offending is being perpetrated by people who are not on a registry.

In light of the evidence, the argument that IML and other sex offense policies misdirect resources and attention from actual causes and obfuscate actual solutions is compelling.  Experts such as John Hopkins professor and Director of the Moore Center for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse Elizabeth Letourneau have argued that, instead of focusing our attention and resources on sex offenders and criminal justice, we ought to focus on education and prevention efforts....

This conclusion is impelled with equal force in the context of international travel.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office and State Department quietly admitted that there is no mass exodus of people on the registry traveling to sex tourism destinations to engage in rape and child molestation: they identified three cases over a five-year period where a person on the registry was convicted for a sexual offense overseas.  To put that number in perspective, there are presently more than 800,000 people on a sex offender registry in the United States in 2017.

IML is more than simply ineffective at accomplishing what its authors have intended.  As commentators have observed, the marking of “a basic badge of citizenship” with a proverbial Scarlet Letter is nearly unprecedented in history.  The freedom of movement, including the right to leave one’s own country, is a basic and fundamental human right outlined in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Historically, the state marking the travel and civil documents of despised groups was only a prologue to further encroachments on fundamental rights.

As recent years have demonstrated, sex offenders have become a proving ground for law and policy that the public would (and should) otherwise find abhorrent.  IML, and its attendant marking of the sine qua non of international travel documents, is just the latest high-profile example.  By misdirecting attention and resources away from actual causes and solutions, policies like IML obfuscate real solutions to the problems presented by sex tourism, trafficking, violence, and exploitation, and reinforce a narrative that is wholly divorced from facts.  Because of this, policies like IML will only ultimately serve to perpetuate the very harms that they seek to prevent.

November 9, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (14)

Thursday, November 02, 2017

Sex offender registration laws meet Apprendi procedural rights in new Pennsylvania ruling

A helpful reader altered me to an interesting new ruling from appellate court in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Butler, NO. J-A21024-17 (Pa. Supp. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017) (available here). Folks concerned about the reach of sex offender registration laws and fans of the Supreme Court's Apprendi line of jurisprudence will both want to check out this opinion.  Here is how it starts and a key part of the ruling:

Appellant, Joseph Dean Butler, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on August 4, 2016, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence motion on August 10, 2016.  In this case, we are constrained by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), to hold that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(e)(3), a portion of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act’s (“SORNA’s”) framework for designating a convicted defendant a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”), violates the federal and state constitutions. As such, we are compelled to reverse the trial court’s July 25, 2016 order finding that Appellant is an SVP and we remand for the sole purpose of having the trial court issue the appropriate notice under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.23 as to Appellant’s registration requirements....

Apprendi and Alleyne apply to all types of punishment, not just imprisonment.  See S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 346-360 (2012).  Thus, as our Supreme Court has stated, if registration requirements are punishment, then the facts leading to registration requirements need to be found by the fact-finder chosen by the defendant, be it a judge or a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 880 (Pa. 2007)....

We recognize that our Supreme Court did not consider the ramifications of its decision in Muniz with respect to individuals designated as SVPs for crimes committed after SORNA’s effective date.  Nonetheless, our Supreme Court’s holding that registration requirements under SORNA constitute a form of criminal punishment is dispositive of the issue presented in this case.  In other words, since our Supreme Court has held that SORNA registration requirements are punitive or a criminal penalty to which individuals are exposed, then under Apprendi and Alleyne, a factual finding, such as whether a defendant has a “mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him or her] likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses[,]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12, that increases the length of registration must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the chosen fact-finder.  Section 9799.24(e)(3) identifies the trial court as the finder of fact in all instances and specifies clear and convincing evidence as the burden of proof required to designate a convicted defendant as an SVP.  Such a statutory scheme in the criminal context cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that section 9799.24(e)(3) is unconstitutional and Appellant’s judgment of sentence, to the extent it required him to register as an SVP for life, was illegal.

As a fan of Apprendi rights who has long been concerned that courts sometimes work too hard to limit their logical reach, I am pleased to see this state court come to a seemingly sound conclusion in a controversial setting.  In addition, I get a kick out of imagining, if now asked what case applied Apprendi rights to the SORNA setting, saying "the Butler did it."

November 2, 2017 in Blakely in the States, Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, October 20, 2017

Relying on Packingham, Federal judge strikes down Kentucky limit on sex offender internet access

As reported in this local piece, "Kentucky’s registered sex offenders have the constitutional right to use Facebook, Twitter and other online social media, a federal judge ruled Friday." Here is more on a ruling that seems like a pretty easy application of the Supreme Court's work in Packingham v. North Carolina earlier this year:

Ruling in a lawsuit brought by a Lexington child pornography defendant identified only as “John Doe,” U.S. District Judge Gregory Van Tatenhove struck down Kentucky’s sweeping restrictions on Internet access for registered sex offenders.

“This is a very important decision,” said Scott White, a Lexington attorney who represented Doe. “The laws effectively deprived anyone on the sex offender registry of access to the most effective forms of communication that we have today. It was a complete suppression of speech.”

One law prohibited sex offenders from using social networking websites or instant messaging or chat rooms that potentially could be “accessible” to children — which is to say, much of the Internet. The other law required sex offenders to keep their probation or parole officers updated on all of their email addresses and various online identities.

Van Tatenhove cited a unanimous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in June that struck down a similar North Carolina ban on social media for sex offenders, in part because so many civic institutions — from elected officials to news media — are now tied into social media.

For example, the Herald-Leader’s Kentucky.com website would be off-limits to sex offenders under the state’s ban because it has a comments section open to the public, Van Tatenhove wrote.

Kentucky’s law “burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the commonwealth’s legitimate interests in protecting children from sexual abuse solicited via the Internet,” Van Tatenhove wrote.

“Indeed, rather than prohibiting a certain type of conduct that is narrowly tailored to prevent child abuse, the statute prevents Mr. Doe and others similarly situated from accessing what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge,” he wrote.

October 20, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Federal judge rules that Prez pardon for Joe Arpaio does not call for vacating his contempt conviction

As reported in this Politico piece, a "federal judge has ruled that President Donald Trump's pardon of former Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio ends his prosecution for criminal contempt of court, but does not wipe out the guilty verdict she returned or any other rulings in the case."   The full (and short) ruling is available at this link, and here is more about it:

In her order Thursday, Phoenix-based U.S. District Court Judge Susan Bolton rejected arguments from Arpaio's lawyers and Justice Department prosecutors that the longtime Maricopa County sheriff was entitled to have all rulings in the case vacated, including the guilty verdict the judge delivered in July after a five-day trial.

“The power to pardon is an executive prerogative of mercy, not of judicial recordkeeping," Bolton wrote, quoting an appeals court ruling. "To vacate all rulings in this case would run afoul of this important distinction. The Court found Defendant guilty of criminal contempt. The President issued the pardon. Defendant accepted. The pardon undoubtedly spared Defendant from any punishment that might otherwise have been imposed. It did not, however, 'revise the historical facts' of this case."

Arpaio, known for his tough stance against illegal immigration and for humiliating treatment of prisoners, was charged with contempt for defying another federal judge's order aimed at preventing ethnic profiling of Latinos. Trump pardoned the 85-year-old Arpaio in August while he was awaiting sentencing. The official White House statement stressed Arpaio's history of public service, but the president indicated in earlier remarks that he considered the ex-sheriff's conviction unfair because he was found guilty "for doing his job." Trump also said Arpaio should have received a jury trial, something courts have said is not required if no penalty of more than a year in jail is sought.

Arpaio's attorneys filed an appeal Thursday evening that will take the issue to the San Francisco-based 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. "We will challenge that order," Arpaio lawyer Jack Wilenchik told POLITICO shortly after the judge's ruling was handed down. He said Bolton had jumbled the facts regarding a key precedent: the case of a Tyson Foods lobbyist who was pardoned by President Bill Clinton after being convicted of giving illegal gifts to Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy.

The battle over the guilty verdict and other rulings is largely symbolic since the prosecution, the defense and the judge all appear to agree Arpaio's prosecution is over and he cannot be punished for the conduct that led to the case. Arpaio's attorneys argue it is unfair for the verdict to remain on the book since the pardon effectively wipes out Arpaio's ability to appeal that decision. However, some ethics-in-government groups and Democratic lawmakers urged the judge to reject the pardon altogether as an unconstitutional intrusion by the executive branch into the judiciary branch's ability to ensure that its orders are enforced.

A few prior related posts:

October 20, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Collateral consequences, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Sunday, October 15, 2017

"Why kids don’t belong on sex offender registry"

The title of this post is the headline of this recent op-ed authored by Nicole Pittman. Here is how it starts:

California took an important step toward ending the abusive practice of putting kids on sex offender registries when Gov. Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 384, which allows juveniles to petition for their removal after five or 10 years.

When California became the first state to register children as sex offenders in 1986, there was little known about children who commit sexual offenses. At that time, treating them the same as adults seemed sensible. Today, we have research that tells us that putting them on registries does not prevent future child sexual abuse and can diminish public safety.

Roughly 200,000 people on sex offender registries — including more than 3,500 in California — went on as kids, some for serious crimes but many others for playing doctor, streaking or teenage romances.

Sex offender registration laws stigmatize and isolate the very children they were meant to protect, ensuring their youthful indiscretions follow them into adulthood. Names, photos, and addresses are often made public, leading to vigilante violence, stigmatization, and severe psychological harm. One in five attempt suicide; too many succeed. There’s also now a strong body of evidence demonstrating that very few youth commit more sexual crimes.

October 15, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Sunday, October 08, 2017

New California law limits reach of registry for lower-level sex offenders

As reported in this local article, headlined "California will soon end lifetime registration of some sex offenders under bill signed by Gov. Jerry Brown," some significant changes are now in the works for the sex offender registry in the Golden State.  Here are the details:

Thousands of Californians will be allowed to take their names off the state’s registry of sex offenders as a result of action Friday by Gov. Jerry Brown.  Brown signed legislation that, when it takes effect Jan. 1, will end lifetime listings for lower-level offenders judged to be at little risk of committing new crimes.

The measure was introduced at the request of Los Angeles County Dist. Atty. Jackie Lacey and other law enforcement officials who said the registry, which has grown to more than 105,000 names, is less useful to detectives investigating new sex crimes because it is so bulky.

“California's sex offender registry is broken, which undermines public safety,” said Sen. Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco), who introduced the bill.  “SB 384 refocuses the sex offender registry on high-risk offenders and treats low-level offenders more fairly.”

The registry currently requires law enforcement officials to spend hours on paperwork for annual evaluations of every offender, including those who are low risk and have not committed a crime for decades, Wiener said.

Brown declined to comment Friday, but his office referred to a statement put out last month. “SB 384 proposes thoughtful and balanced reforms that allow prosecutors and law enforcement to focus their resources on tracking sex offenders who pose a real risk to public safety, rather than burying officers in paperwork that has little public benefit,” said Ali Bay, a spokeswoman for the governor, last month.

The measure was opposed by many Republican lawmakers and Erin Runnion, who in 2002 founded the Joyful Child Foundation, an Orange County advocacy group for victims, after the abduction, molestation and murder of her 5-year-old daughter, Samantha.  Runnion said parents should be able to check a comprehensive registry to see if a potential teacher, youth league coach or babysitter for their children has ever been convicted of a sex crime.

California is one of only four states that require lifetime registration of sex offenders. The others are Alabama, South Carolina and Florida.

The new law signed by the governor creates a tiered registry, with high-risk offenders on the registry for life and others able to petition to be removed after either 10 or 20 years without re-offending, depending on the offense.  Offenses for which registrants can be removed from the list after 20 years include include rape by deception and lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under 14.

Offenders who petition for removal after 10 or 20 years will be assessed by a judge — with input from the local district attorney — who can grant or deny the petition.

October 8, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (9)

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

"Will SCOTUS Let Fear of Sex Offenders Trump Justice?"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Reason commentary by Jacob Sullum spotlighting two cases I have tracked on this blog as they have made their way up to the Justices. Here is how the piece starts and ends:

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, locking up sex offenders after they have completed their sentences is not punishment, and neither is branding them as dangerous outcasts for the rest of their lives.  Two cases the Court could soon agree to hear give it an opportunity to reconsider, or at least qualify, those counterintuitive conclusions.

Karsjens v. Piper is a challenge to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), which since 1994 has confined more than 700 people who were deemed too "sexually dangerous" to release after serving their prison terms.  Although these detainees are supposedly patients rather than inmates, in more than two decades only one of them has ever been judged well enough to regain his freedom....

Another case pending before the Supreme Court, Snyder v. Doe, is an appeal of a 2016 decision in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ruled that Michigan's Sex Offender Registration Act, ostensibly a form of civil regulation aimed at protecting public safety, is so punitive that its requirements cannot be applied retroactively without violating the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.  The 6th Circuit noted that the law "has grown into a byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state's sex offenders," including onerous restrictions on where they may live, work, and "loiter."....

The Supreme Court has let fear of sex offenders, a despised minority that includes many people who pose no real danger to their fellow citizens, trump traditional concerns about due process and just punishment.  By hearing these cases, it can begin to repair the damage it has done to those principles.

September 27, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (20)

Monday, September 25, 2017

Lots more notable new reporting and commentary from The Marshall Project

Regular readers surely recall prior times I have flagged the always terrific Marshall Project for producing many great pieces that should be must-reads for sentencing fans.  As I have said before, I rarely have the time or ability to give blog attention to all of the great work done there.  But I could not resist another shout-out post upon seeing in recent days a bunch of pieces with original reporting and commentary that all struck me as particularly blog-worthy (with the last three connected):

September 25, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Wednesday, September 20, 2017

"Does barring sex offenders from church violate RFRA?"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new article in the Indiana Lawyer discussing interesting litigation working through the Indiana courts. Here is how the piece gets started:

Shortly after the controversial Religious Freedom Restoration Act went into effect in Indiana in 2015, the unlawful entry by a serious sex offender statute, which prohibits certain sex offenders from accessing school property, also became law. Now, those two statutes are at odds with each other as the Indiana Court of Appeals decides whether an interpretation of the statute that prohibits three men from going to church constitutes a RFRA violation.

Under the unlawful entry by a serious sex offender statute, Indiana Code 35-42-4-14, offenders convicted of certain sex offenses cannot knowingly or intentionally enter school property without committing a Level 6 felony. The Boone County sheriff determined that statute meant sex offenders in the county, including John Does 1, 2 and 3, could not attend church if their churches offered programs for children at least 3 years old who are not yet in kindergarten. The Boone Superior Court agreed, determining that anytime churches offer such programs, they are considered “school property,” and, thus, are unavailable to the John Does.

But because each of their churches offer children’s programming simultaneously or nearly simultaneously with adult services or Bible studies, the three men told the Indiana Court of Appeals during oral arguments in the case of John Doe, et al. v. The Boone County Prosecutor, et al., 06A01-1612-PL-02741, the sheriff’s letter effectively prohibits them from attending church at any time. The appellate case turns on two central issues that divided counsel for the state and the offenders: whether churches can be considered “school property” and whether the prohibition against the Does attending church violates their rights under RFRA.

September 20, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision, Religion, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, September 13, 2017

"Erasing the Mark of a Criminal Past: Ex-Offenders’ Expectations and Experiences with Record Clearance"

The title of this post is the title of this paper recently posted to SSRN authored by Ericka Adams, Elsa Chen and Rosella Chapman. Here is its abstract:

Through the process of record clearance, ex-offenders can have certain minor convictions removed from their criminal record or designated as expunged.  This study analyzes data gathered from semi-structured interviews with 40 past offenders to examine the expectations of individuals who seek record clearance and the extent to which completion of the process facilitates efforts to reintegrate into society and desist from crime.

The analysis finds that record clearance benefits ex-offenders through external effects, such as the reduction of barriers to employment, and internal processes, such as the facilitation of cognitive transformation and the affirmation of a new identity.  These benefits accrue from both the outcomes of the record clearance process and from the process itself.  Increased availability of inexpensive or free opportunities for expungement can contribute to more successful reintegration of ex-offenders into the workforce, families, and communities.  Not only would this improve quality of life for the ex-offenders, but it could also increase public safety and reduce public spending.

September 13, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

New op-ed and op-doc from New York Times takes on "A ‘Frightening’ Myth About Sex Offenders"

David Feige has a new op-ed and a short video documentary unpacking and attacking the notion that sex offender recidivism rates are extraordinarily high.  This op-ed is headlined "When Junk Science About Sex Offenders Infects the Supreme Court," and this op-doc is titled "A ‘Frightening’ Myth About Sex Offenders."  Here is how the op-ed starts and ends:

This month the Supreme Court will have a rare opportunity to correct a flawed doctrine that for the past two decades has relied on junk social science to justify punishing more than 800,000 Americans.  Two cases that the court could review concern people on the sex offender registry and the kinds of government control that can constitutionally be imposed upon them.

In Snyder v. Doe, the court could consider whether Michigan’s broad scheme of regulating sex offenders constitutes “punishment.”  The other case, Karsjens v. Piper, examines the constitutionality of Minnesota’s policy of detaining sex offenders forever — not for what they’ve done, but for what they might do.

And while the idea of indefinite preventive detention might sound un-American or something out of the film “Minority Report,” the larger problem is that “civil commitment,” like hundreds of other regulations imposed on those required to register, has been justified by assertions about the recidivism of sex offenders. But those assertions turn out to be entirely belied by science.

For the past 24 years, Minnesota has detained sex offenders released from prison in a “therapeutic program” conveniently located on the grounds of a maximum-security prison in Moose Lake.  The “patients” are kept in locked cells, transported outside the facility in handcuffs and leg irons, and subjected to a regimen that looks, sounds and smells just like that of the prison it is adjacent to.

But unlike prison, this “therapeutic” program, which aims to teach the patients to control their sexual impulses and was initially designed to last from two to four years, has no fixed end date. Rather, program administrators decide which patients are safe enough to release.  In the 24 years it has existed, not a single “patient” has ever been fully released.  There are now about 850 people in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, some with no adult criminal record, and others who, despite having completed every single program ever offered at the facility, have remained civilly committed for over 20 years.

While civil commitment is perhaps the most extreme example of punishments imposed on people convicted of sex crimes, it is by no means the only one. Driven by a pervasive fear of sexual predators, and facing no discernible opposition, politicians have become evermore inventive in dreaming up ways to corral and marginalize those forced to register — a category which itself has expanded radically and come to include those convicted of “sexting,” having consensual sex with non-minor teenagers or even urinating in public.

These sanctions include being forced to wear (and pay for) GPS monitoring and being banned from parks, and draconian residency restrictions that sometimes lead to homelessness.  In addition, punishments can include, on pain of re-incarceration, undergoing interrogations using a penile plethysmograph, a device used to measure sexual arousal.  They have also included requirements that those on the registry refrain from being alone with children (often including their own) and barred from holding certain jobs, like being a volunteer firefighter or driving an ice cream truck.

And when these restrictions have been challenged in court, judge after judge has justified them based on a Supreme Court doctrine that allows such restrictions, thanks to the “frightening and high” recidivism rate ascribed to sex offenders — a rate the court has pegged “as high as 80 percent.”  The problem is this: The 80 percent recidivism rate is an entirely invented number....

Now more than ever, Americans should be able to look to our highest court and expect decisions that are based on reason and grounded in science rather than fear.  The court must rule wisely and bravely, including being willing to acknowledge its mistake and finally correct the record.  More than 800,000 Americans have needlessly suffered humiliation, ostracism, banishment re-incarceration and civil commitment thanks to a judicial opinion grounded in an unsourced, unscientific study.  Simple decency and perhaps more important, intellectual honesty demands better.

A few prior recent related posts:

September 12, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)