Saturday, November 18, 2017

"Justice for Veterans: Does Theory Matter?"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper I just saw on SSRN authored by Kristine Huskey. Here is the abstract:

The Veterans Treatment Court (“VTC”) movement is sweeping the nation.  In 2008, there were approximately five courts.  Currently, there are over 350 VTCs and veteran-oriented tracks in the United States.  Most view this rapid proliferation as a positive phenomenon.  VTC growth, however, has occurred haphazardly and most often without deliberate foundational underpinnings.

While most scholars assume that a therapeutic jurisprudence (“TJ”) modality is the paradigm for VTCs, there has been little examination of other theories of justice as appropriate for veterans and the courts that treat them.  This Article addresses whether an alternative theory of justice — specifically, restorative justice (“RJ”) — can inform the theoretical foundation of a VTC to enhance its beneficial impact on veterans with post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), traumatic brain injury (“TBI”), or substance abuse issues.  A primary feature of the RJ philosophy is that it is community-driven: it involves the victim, offender, and “community of interests” in the solution, process of restoration, and prevention of future misconduct.

These principles are well suited for a VTC, which is also collaborative, community-based, and places extreme importance on the reintegration of the veteran back into society.  These characteristics stem from an evolved theory that the community is ultimately responsible for the misconduct that was caused by the defendant’s military service. A hypothetical criminal case common in a VTC illustrates that RJ principles and framework may enhance the beneficial impact of VTCs.  RJ may be just the theory of justice that brings to bear Sebastian Junger’s notion of a tribe as a means for the successful reintegration of veterans back into the community.

November 18, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, November 17, 2017

"The Criminal Justice System Stalks Black People Like Meek Mill"

The title of this post is the headline of this New York Times op-ed authored by Jay-Z. Here are excerpts:

This month Meek Mill was sentenced to two to four years in prison for violating his probation. #FreeMeek hashtags have sprung up, and hundreds of his fans rallied near City Hall in Philadelphia to protest the ruling.

On the surface, this may look like the story of yet another criminal rapper who didn’t smarten up and is back where he started. But consider this: Meek was around 19 when he was convicted on charges relating to drug and gun possession, and he served an eight-month sentence.  Now he’s 30, so he has been on probation for basically his entire adult life. For about a decade, he’s been stalked by a system that considers the slightest infraction a justification for locking him back inside.

What’s happening to Meek Mill is just one example of how our criminal justice system entraps and harasses hundreds of thousands of black people every day.  I saw this up close when I was growing up in Brooklyn during the 1970s and 1980s. Instead of a second chance, probation ends up being a land mine, with a random misstep bringing consequences greater than the crime. A person on probation can end up in jail over a technical violation like missing a curfew.

Taxpayers in Philadelphia, Meek Mill’s hometown, will have to spend tens of thousands of dollars each year to keep him locked up, and I bet none of them would tell you his imprisonment is helping to keep them safer. He’s there because of arrests for a parole violation, and because a judge overruled recommendations by a prosecutor and his probation officer that he doesn’t deserve more jail time....

Look at what he’s being punished for now: In March, he was arrested after an altercation in a St. Louis airport. After video of what had actually happened was released, all charges were dropped against Meek. In August, he was arrested for popping a wheelie on a motorcycle on his video set in New York.  Those charges were dismissed after he agreed to attend traffic school. Think about that.  The charges were either dropped or dismissed, but the judge sent him to prison anyway....

[I]t’s time we highlight the random ways people trapped in the criminal justice system are punished every day. The system treats them as a danger to society, consistently monitors and follows them for any minor infraction — with the goal of putting them back in prison.

As of 2015, one-third of the 4.65 million Americans who were on some form of parole or probation were black. Black people are sent to prison for probation and parole violations at much higher rates than white people.  In Pennsylvania, hundreds of thousands of people are on probation or parole.  About half of the people in city jails in Philadelphia are there for probation or parole violations.  We could literally shut down jails if we treated people on parole or probation more fairly....  Probation is a trap and we must fight for Meek and everyone else unjustly sent to prison.

Prior related post:

November 17, 2017 in Celebrity sentencings, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, November 14, 2017

Notable protests and legal appeals as rapper Meek Mill's harsh sentence for probation violation shines light on back-end of justice system

ImagesKMOOADW6Because I do not know Pennsylvania's procedures, I have been a bit unsure how best to cover controversy over the 2-4 year prison sentence given to rapper Meek Mill for violating his probation from a 2008 gun and drug case.  This new CNN article, headlined "Outrage mounts over Meek Mill's prison sentence," provides some useful background on the case while reporting on the protest that took place at Philadelphia's Criminal Justice Center on Monday and highlighting that the "case has sparked outrage not just from the hip-hop community but from activists for criminal justice reform around the nation." 

Now this lengthy new Philadelphia Inquirer article, headlined "Meek Mill appeals sentence, asks city judge Brinkley to step down," provides a useful accounting of legal issues and related stories swirling around this case. Here are excerpts:

Lawyers for imprisoned Philadelphia-born rapper Meek Mill have launched what one lawyer called a “flurry of legal filings” to try to get the 30-year-old hip-hop star released from his 2- to 4-year prison term for violating the terms of his 10-year-old probation.

The first filing Tuesday — a day after hundreds of supporters met outside the city Criminal Justice Center demanding Mill’s release — asked Philadelphia Common Pleas Court Judge Genece E. Brinkley to disqualify herself from further involvement his case and allow a new judge to reconsider Mill’s prison sentence. The 14-page motion, buttressed by 143 pages of court transcripts, maintains that Brinkley, 61, a judge since 1993, had “assumed a non-judicial, essentially prosecutorial role in the revocation process,” and ignored the recommendations of the probation officer and prosecutor, neither of whom sought imprisonment.

The motion contends that Brinkley has gone beyond “the proper bounds of the judicial role, even as supervisor of a probationary sentence. Judge Brinkley has repeatedly offered inappropriate personal and professional advice to the defendant, who had become a successful professional entertainer during the pendency of this case. On some occasions, Judge Brinkley has done so off the record, or on the record while attempting inappropriately to keep that record secret from the defendant and his counsel.”

“Last week’s hearing was a farce,” said defense attorney Brian J. McMonagle. “It was a miscarriage of justice that lacked even the semblance of fairness. Today, we have asked this Judge to step aside so that a fair minded jurist can right this terrible wrong.”

McMonagle said he would file a motion seeking bail for Mill, who was taken into custody following the Nov. 6 hearing before Brinkley for violating his probation from a 2008 drug and gun case. McMonagle said Brinkley has 30 days to respond to the motions filed Tuesday. If she does not respond, Mill’s lawyers can take the case to Superior Court. For Mill, the problem with a Superior Court appeal is that, unless he is allowed bail pending appeal, he could serve his minimum sentence before a decision.

Nor does the Superior Court have a reputation for disturbing lower court sentences in such cases. An article in Sunday’s Inquirer reviewed seven Superior Court appeals of probation violation sentences imposed by Brinkley over the last four years. All were affirmed.

Mill, born Robert Williams, is now in the state prison at Camp Hill near Harrisburg undergoing evaluation before his permanent prison assignment. “He’s holding up OK,” said McMonagle, adding that Mill is in “protective custody” – in a single cell for 23 hours a day with one hour out for exercise.

A motion to reconsider the sentence is the first step in any criminal appeal to the state Superior Court, the intermediate appeals court between the trial courts and the state Supreme Court. Unless she modifies or vacates Mill’s sentence, Brinkley will be required to write an opinion for the appeals court explaining her reasons for sending him to prison.

At the Nov. 6 hearing during which Brinkley sentenced Mill, the veteran judge recounted almost 10 years of court proceedings in which he had violated his probation, and she had sentenced him to short periods in jail and then had extended his probation.

Mill’s most recent “technical violations” were testing positive for the prescription narcotic Percocet earlier this year and two misdemeanor arrests, for an altercation at the St. Louis airport and a traffic violation in Manhattan involving a motorbike.

Brinkley also reminded Mill of the night she actually tried to verify that he was feeding the homeless, part of the community service she ordered. She went to a Center City soup kitchen run by the Broad Street Ministry – and found him instead sorting clothes. “It was only when you realized that I came there to check on you that you decided to serve meals,” Brinkley told the rapper.

Mill’s lawyers contend the judge’s surreptitious visit was also questionable: “Judge Brinkley thereby made herself a fact witness on the question of whether Mr. Williams was in compliance on that occasion, as well as to any statements he may have made. Judge Brinkley then relied on her own version of this incident … among the reasons for imposing a state prison sentence.”

Mill’s lawyers contend that Brinkley also demonstrated a personal bias involving Mill in a private in-chambers meeting during a Feb. 5, 2016, probation-violation hearing. At that hearing, Mill’s then-attorney Frank DeSimone told Brinkley that Mill wanted to discuss his experiences performing community service but “would feel more comfortable relaying some of his thoughts and experiences” to the judge in private....

Joe Tacopina, a lawyer for Mill based in New York City – who was not in the private meeting – has said Brinkley asked Mill last year to record a version of a Boyz II Men ballad, “On Bended Knee,” and to mention the judge in it. Tacopina said Mill laughed off the request and told Brinkley: “I can’t do that. It’s not my music. I don’t sing that stuff. And I don’t do, like, you know, shout-outs to people in my songs.” Brinkley replied, “’OK, suit yourself,’” according to Tacopina.

Tacopina also alleged that Brinkley asked Mill to drop his current management, Jay-Z’s Roc Nation, and to return to Philadelphia-based Charles “Charlie Mack” Alston, who worked with Mill early in his career....

In a related development Tuesday, authorities dismissed a New York Post internet report that the FBI was investigating Brinkley’s role in recommending Mill return to Mack’s management. An FBI spokeswoman in Philadelphia said that, per Justice Department policies, her office could not confirm nor deny the existence of any investigation. However, a federal law enforcement official in the city said that he was not aware of any active probe into the matter.

November 14, 2017 in Celebrity sentencings, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, November 13, 2017

Interesting reviews of accomplishments and challenges in dealing with drug cases in West Virginia

At a time when there is so much talk about reforming how the criminal justice deals with low-level drug offenders, I found both encouraging and depressing this recent local story reporting on recent developments in West Virginia.  The article is headlined "Drug offenses straining already overburdened jail system, prosecutor says," and here are excerpts:

With its jails and prisons already bursting at the seams, Kanawha County Prosecuting Attorney Chuck Miller figures West Virginia is either going to have to come up with another way of handling drug offenders or plan on building more correctional facilities.  Miller recently discussed the available alternative sentencing options with a legislative committee tasked with looking at problems facing the state’s correctional system, points out jails and prisons here are understaffed and overflowing, in large part because drug addiction and the crimes associated with it have spiraled out of control.

How bad is it? According to the Department of Military Affairs & Public Security, 43 percent of the offenders processed at one of the state’s regional jails last year had to go through a detoxification protocol due to substance abuse issues....

It’s not a new problem, either. State leaders long ago realized the prison population was outstripping available resources and in 2012 decided to carve out a data-driven strategy to address it — realizing that, left unchecked, they’d have to spend at least $200 million to build more prison cells plus another $70 million a year in operating costs.  Rather than build more prisons, West Virginia opted to increase its reliance on community-based resources, including drug courts and day report centers.

They’ve not been without success: More than 1,300 adults and juveniles have graduated from drug court, typically an 18-24 month program that helps low-risk offenders.  As of March 2016, West Virginia’s drug courts had graduated 857 and 506 juveniles, in each case just over half of those who’d been accepted in the program.  About 500 more were still active in the program.  According to the West Virginia Supreme Court:

• Recidivism rates for adults after one year was reported to be 1.88 percent, and after two years, 9.4 percent — much lower than the nearly 80 percent recidivism rate for drug offenders who’d been incarcerated. Recidivism for juvenile graduates was said to be 14.6 percent, compared to 55.1 percent for youths in traditional juvenile probation programs.

• Per participant adult drug court program costs — about $7,100 for adults and $6,900 for juveniles — was a fraction of the per diem for housing adult offenders in regional jail (more than $17,000 per year) or prison (more than $28,000 per year).  Likewise, the state said it spent $6,900 to rehabilitate its juvenile drug court alumni — a fraction of what it would have cost to keep them in a secure juvenile facility, a group home or a hospital treatment facility.

Day Report Centers also provide intensive supervision and individualized services, including counseling, to non-violent offenders in lieu of incarceration, helping parolees reintegrate into society and saving millions in jail costs.  Kanawha’s Day Report Center, for example, said its program had saved more than $3 million in jail costs in 2016.  Since its inception in 2005, KDRC has graduated nearly 1,000 clients and had a recidivism rate under 13 percent.

Also in West Virginia’s sentencing toolkit: Pre-trial diversion agreements which allow first-time offenders to avoid jail by obtaining counseling and other treatment, and home confinement, allowing offenders to serve their sentence at home with electronic supervision in lieu of incarceration.  Participants generally must stay within range of a landline telephone and are subject to random drug and alcohol testing....

The programs aren’t without their challenges, however. Pre-trial diversions, for instance, require offenders to undergo treatment, but “availability of detoxification treatment facilities is sparce,” Miller notes.  Likewise, home confinement requires a home and a landline phone.

But, with an opiate epidemic showing no sign of slowing, he said West Virginia is going to have to find answers — even if means building a secure facility dedicated to treating offenders with drug dependencies, one they couldn’t walk away from, or expanding traditional jails and prisons.

“If we have a facility devoted to drug treatment, maybe we’d decrease crowding in our jails and increase our success with people,” Miller said, adding, “We’re not going to prosecute our way out of it and every solution ... requires money.”

November 13, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 09, 2017

Making this case against International Megan's Law

Guy Hamilton-Smith has this new commentary at In Justice Today headlined "We’re Putting Sex Offender Stamps on Passports. Here’s Why It Won’t Curb Sex Tourism & Trafficking." Here are excerpts:

On October 30th, the State Department announced that passports of people who are required to register as sex offenders because of an offense involving a minor will be marked with a “unique identifier” that will read: "The bearer was convicted of a sex offense against a minor, and is a covered sex offender pursuant to 22 United States Code Section 212b(c)(l)."

The law which occasions this requirement, International Megan’s Law (IML), was enacted in 2016 under President Obama.  In addition to the identifier requirement, IML allows for existing passports of those on the registry to be revoked, and imposes criminal penalties on them for failure to provide the government with advance notice of international travel plans.  While U.S. law already provided for destination countries to be put on notice regarding the travel plans of those on the sex offender registry, IML ratchets things up by requiring the person to carry the government’s “identifier” with them wherever they go abroad....

While IML and similar laws are packaged as a way to prevent sexual violence and exploitation, they do little to nothing to meet those objectives because they make assumptions about sexual offending that are incorrect.  For instance, people who have been convicted of sexual offenses generally have one of the lowest rates of re-offense out of any class of criminal. Dozens of studies have consistently confirmed this finding, including research from the U.S. Department of Justice.  Along similar lines, a 2008 time-series analysis of 170,000 unique sex offenses found that 95.9% of the time, the perpetrator was a first-time offender.  In other words, nearly all reported sexual offending is being perpetrated by people who are not on a registry.

In light of the evidence, the argument that IML and other sex offense policies misdirect resources and attention from actual causes and obfuscate actual solutions is compelling.  Experts such as John Hopkins professor and Director of the Moore Center for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse Elizabeth Letourneau have argued that, instead of focusing our attention and resources on sex offenders and criminal justice, we ought to focus on education and prevention efforts....

This conclusion is impelled with equal force in the context of international travel.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office and State Department quietly admitted that there is no mass exodus of people on the registry traveling to sex tourism destinations to engage in rape and child molestation: they identified three cases over a five-year period where a person on the registry was convicted for a sexual offense overseas.  To put that number in perspective, there are presently more than 800,000 people on a sex offender registry in the United States in 2017.

IML is more than simply ineffective at accomplishing what its authors have intended.  As commentators have observed, the marking of “a basic badge of citizenship” with a proverbial Scarlet Letter is nearly unprecedented in history.  The freedom of movement, including the right to leave one’s own country, is a basic and fundamental human right outlined in Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Historically, the state marking the travel and civil documents of despised groups was only a prologue to further encroachments on fundamental rights.

As recent years have demonstrated, sex offenders have become a proving ground for law and policy that the public would (and should) otherwise find abhorrent.  IML, and its attendant marking of the sine qua non of international travel documents, is just the latest high-profile example.  By misdirecting attention and resources away from actual causes and solutions, policies like IML obfuscate real solutions to the problems presented by sex tourism, trafficking, violence, and exploitation, and reinforce a narrative that is wholly divorced from facts.  Because of this, policies like IML will only ultimately serve to perpetuate the very harms that they seek to prevent.

November 9, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (13)

Thursday, November 02, 2017

Sex offender registration laws meet Apprendi procedural rights in new Pennsylvania ruling

A helpful reader altered me to an interesting new ruling from appellate court in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v. Butler, NO. J-A21024-17 (Pa. Supp. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2017) (available here). Folks concerned about the reach of sex offender registration laws and fans of the Supreme Court's Apprendi line of jurisprudence will both want to check out this opinion.  Here is how it starts and a key part of the ruling:

Appellant, Joseph Dean Butler, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on August 4, 2016, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence motion on August 10, 2016.  In this case, we are constrained by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017), to hold that 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.24(e)(3), a portion of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act’s (“SORNA’s”) framework for designating a convicted defendant a Sexually Violent Predator (“SVP”), violates the federal and state constitutions. As such, we are compelled to reverse the trial court’s July 25, 2016 order finding that Appellant is an SVP and we remand for the sole purpose of having the trial court issue the appropriate notice under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.23 as to Appellant’s registration requirements....

Apprendi and Alleyne apply to all types of punishment, not just imprisonment.  See S. Union Co. v. United States, 567 U.S. 343, 346-360 (2012).  Thus, as our Supreme Court has stated, if registration requirements are punishment, then the facts leading to registration requirements need to be found by the fact-finder chosen by the defendant, be it a judge or a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Commonwealth v. Lee, 935 A.2d 865, 880 (Pa. 2007)....

We recognize that our Supreme Court did not consider the ramifications of its decision in Muniz with respect to individuals designated as SVPs for crimes committed after SORNA’s effective date.  Nonetheless, our Supreme Court’s holding that registration requirements under SORNA constitute a form of criminal punishment is dispositive of the issue presented in this case.  In other words, since our Supreme Court has held that SORNA registration requirements are punitive or a criminal penalty to which individuals are exposed, then under Apprendi and Alleyne, a factual finding, such as whether a defendant has a “mental abnormality or personality disorder that makes [him or her] likely to engage in predatory sexually violent offenses[,]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.12, that increases the length of registration must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the chosen fact-finder.  Section 9799.24(e)(3) identifies the trial court as the finder of fact in all instances and specifies clear and convincing evidence as the burden of proof required to designate a convicted defendant as an SVP.  Such a statutory scheme in the criminal context cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.  Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that section 9799.24(e)(3) is unconstitutional and Appellant’s judgment of sentence, to the extent it required him to register as an SVP for life, was illegal.

As a fan of Apprendi rights who has long been concerned that courts sometimes work too hard to limit their logical reach, I am pleased to see this state court come to a seemingly sound conclusion in a controversial setting.  In addition, I get a kick out of imagining, if now asked what case applied Apprendi rights to the SORNA setting, saying "the Butler did it."

November 2, 2017 in Blakely in the States, Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Opioid Crisis Commission advocates expanded federal drug court programs and lots of other (mostly public health) stuff

Prez Trump's Commission on Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis issued this big final report yesterday, and the heart of the report's themes and recommendations are usefully summarized in this extended letter to Prez Trump penned by Commission Chair Chris Christie.  This article in The Hill, headlined "Trump opioid commission backs more drug courts, media blitz," provides this even tighter summary, including the one recommendation that may be of focused interest and concern for sentencing fans:

President Trump’s opioid commission laid out 56 recommendations for how the nation should combat the epidemic, including drug courts and a national media campaign, days after the crisis was declared a national public health emergency.  Members voted to approve the report, which was due Nov. 1, at the end of a meeting on Wednesday.

The commission didn’t weigh in on the specific amount of money needed to combat the health crisis. President Trump's declaration of a public health emergency, which doesn't free up millions of dollars in extra cash, sparked calls for more funding by Democrats and advocacy groups.  But the report calls on Congress to determine the funding required....

Advocacy groups argue a robust infusion of federal dollars is needed to combat the epidemic of prescription painkiller and heroin overdose deaths plaguing the nation. Without more money, they say, the emergency declaration won’t make a significant dent in the crisis. The public health emergency fund doesn’t have much left — about $57,000. New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie (R), who helms the commission, predicted Trump will initially ask “for billions of dollars to deal with this.”...

Here are some of the commission’s recommendations:

— A coordinated system: The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) should create a system to track all federally funded initiatives and invest only in effective programs. “We are operating blindly today; ONDCP must establish a system of tracking and accountability,” the report notes.

— A media campaign: The White House should fund and collaborate on a multiplatform media campaign, and the commission noted a similar one occurred during the AIDS public health crisis. It should address “the hazards of substance use, the danger of opioids, and stigma.”

– Opioid prescribing: The Department of Health and Human Services should develop a “national curriculum and standard of care” on prescribing prescription painkillers. It should supplement previous guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

— Improve prescription drug monitoring programs. The Department of Justice should fund and create a hub to share data on prescribing and dispensing.

— Fentanyl: The commission wants to enhance sentencing for trafficking of this potent synthetic opioid.

November 2, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, October 20, 2017

Relying on Packingham, Federal judge strikes down Kentucky limit on sex offender internet access

As reported in this local piece, "Kentucky’s registered sex offenders have the constitutional right to use Facebook, Twitter and other online social media, a federal judge ruled Friday." Here is more on a ruling that seems like a pretty easy application of the Supreme Court's work in Packingham v. North Carolina earlier this year:

Ruling in a lawsuit brought by a Lexington child pornography defendant identified only as “John Doe,” U.S. District Judge Gregory Van Tatenhove struck down Kentucky’s sweeping restrictions on Internet access for registered sex offenders.

“This is a very important decision,” said Scott White, a Lexington attorney who represented Doe. “The laws effectively deprived anyone on the sex offender registry of access to the most effective forms of communication that we have today. It was a complete suppression of speech.”

One law prohibited sex offenders from using social networking websites or instant messaging or chat rooms that potentially could be “accessible” to children — which is to say, much of the Internet. The other law required sex offenders to keep their probation or parole officers updated on all of their email addresses and various online identities.

Van Tatenhove cited a unanimous decision by the U.S. Supreme Court in June that struck down a similar North Carolina ban on social media for sex offenders, in part because so many civic institutions — from elected officials to news media — are now tied into social media.

For example, the Herald-Leader’s Kentucky.com website would be off-limits to sex offenders under the state’s ban because it has a comments section open to the public, Van Tatenhove wrote.

Kentucky’s law “burdens substantially more speech than necessary to further the commonwealth’s legitimate interests in protecting children from sexual abuse solicited via the Internet,” Van Tatenhove wrote.

“Indeed, rather than prohibiting a certain type of conduct that is narrowly tailored to prevent child abuse, the statute prevents Mr. Doe and others similarly situated from accessing what for many are the principal sources for knowing current events, checking ads for employment, speaking and listening in the modern public square, and otherwise exploring the vast realms of human thought and knowledge,” he wrote.

October 20, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Sunday, October 15, 2017

"Why kids don’t belong on sex offender registry"

The title of this post is the headline of this recent op-ed authored by Nicole Pittman. Here is how it starts:

California took an important step toward ending the abusive practice of putting kids on sex offender registries when Gov. Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 384, which allows juveniles to petition for their removal after five or 10 years.

When California became the first state to register children as sex offenders in 1986, there was little known about children who commit sexual offenses. At that time, treating them the same as adults seemed sensible. Today, we have research that tells us that putting them on registries does not prevent future child sexual abuse and can diminish public safety.

Roughly 200,000 people on sex offender registries — including more than 3,500 in California — went on as kids, some for serious crimes but many others for playing doctor, streaking or teenage romances.

Sex offender registration laws stigmatize and isolate the very children they were meant to protect, ensuring their youthful indiscretions follow them into adulthood. Names, photos, and addresses are often made public, leading to vigilante violence, stigmatization, and severe psychological harm. One in five attempt suicide; too many succeed. There’s also now a strong body of evidence demonstrating that very few youth commit more sexual crimes.

October 15, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, October 10, 2017

Big fine and community service, but no prison time, for law firm CFO convicted of fraud in NY state court

This Reuters article, headlined "Ex-Dewey & LeBoeuf executive avoids prison time after fraud conviction," report on the alternative sentence a notable lawyer received after a conviction for his law firm's notable problems. Here are the details:

The former chief financial officer of defunct law firm Dewey & LeBoeuf, whose collapse five years ago was the largest failure of a law firm in U.S. history, has avoided prison time after being convicted of defrauding the firm’s investors. Joel Sanders, 59, was sentenced on Tuesday by Justice Robert Stolz in Manhattan Supreme Court to pay a $1 million fine and perform 750 hours of community service.

The sentence was handed down five months after the firm’s former executive director, Stephen DiCarmine, was acquitted of the same charges, and 19 months after prosecutors dropped charges against its former chairman, Steven Davis.

“I‘m deeply sorry for anything I did or didn’t do that caused anybody harm,” Sanders said in court before being sentenced. His lawyer, Andrew Frisch, declined to comment on the sentence. Frisch said in May that he planned to appeal Sanders’ conviction.

The office of Manhattan District Attorney Cyrus Vance had sought up to four years in prison for Sanders. The criminal case against Dewey & LeBoeuf’s executives was one of the most significant white-collar prosecutions brought by Vance since he took office in 2010. “This case demonstrates the Office’s commitment to prosecuting those who sacrifice professional integrity for financial gain,” Vance said in a statement on Tuesday.

The law firm, which once had close to 1,400 lawyers, went bankrupt in May 2012, unable to pay for the lavish compensation packages it had promised to recruit star partners. Prosecutors said the executives used illegal accounting adjustments between 2008 and 2012 to conceal the firm’s financial difficulties from investors in its bonds, including Bank of America Corp and HSBC Holdings Plc.

Seven lower-level employees pleaded guilty to criminal charges in connection with Vance’s investigation.

The first trial for the three executives ended in a mistrial in October 2015 when jurors, after four months of testimony and a month of deliberations, declared themselves hopelessly deadlocked on most counts.

After that trial, Davis struck a deal with prosecutors to avoid a second trial, agreeing to a five-year ban from practicing law in New York. Justice Robert Stolz dismissed the most serious charge, grand larceny, against the other two men. The second trial for Sanders and DiCarmine began in February 2017 and lasted about three months.

October 10, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, October 08, 2017

New California law limits reach of registry for lower-level sex offenders

As reported in this local article, headlined "California will soon end lifetime registration of some sex offenders under bill signed by Gov. Jerry Brown," some significant changes are now in the works for the sex offender registry in the Golden State.  Here are the details:

Thousands of Californians will be allowed to take their names off the state’s registry of sex offenders as a result of action Friday by Gov. Jerry Brown.  Brown signed legislation that, when it takes effect Jan. 1, will end lifetime listings for lower-level offenders judged to be at little risk of committing new crimes.

The measure was introduced at the request of Los Angeles County Dist. Atty. Jackie Lacey and other law enforcement officials who said the registry, which has grown to more than 105,000 names, is less useful to detectives investigating new sex crimes because it is so bulky.

“California's sex offender registry is broken, which undermines public safety,” said Sen. Scott Wiener (D-San Francisco), who introduced the bill.  “SB 384 refocuses the sex offender registry on high-risk offenders and treats low-level offenders more fairly.”

The registry currently requires law enforcement officials to spend hours on paperwork for annual evaluations of every offender, including those who are low risk and have not committed a crime for decades, Wiener said.

Brown declined to comment Friday, but his office referred to a statement put out last month. “SB 384 proposes thoughtful and balanced reforms that allow prosecutors and law enforcement to focus their resources on tracking sex offenders who pose a real risk to public safety, rather than burying officers in paperwork that has little public benefit,” said Ali Bay, a spokeswoman for the governor, last month.

The measure was opposed by many Republican lawmakers and Erin Runnion, who in 2002 founded the Joyful Child Foundation, an Orange County advocacy group for victims, after the abduction, molestation and murder of her 5-year-old daughter, Samantha.  Runnion said parents should be able to check a comprehensive registry to see if a potential teacher, youth league coach or babysitter for their children has ever been convicted of a sex crime.

California is one of only four states that require lifetime registration of sex offenders. The others are Alabama, South Carolina and Florida.

The new law signed by the governor creates a tiered registry, with high-risk offenders on the registry for life and others able to petition to be removed after either 10 or 20 years without re-offending, depending on the offense.  Offenses for which registrants can be removed from the list after 20 years include include rape by deception and lewd and lascivious behavior with a child under 14.

Offenders who petition for removal after 10 or 20 years will be assessed by a judge — with input from the local district attorney — who can grant or deny the petition.

October 8, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (9)

Thursday, September 28, 2017

US Sentencing Commission releases big new report on "Federal Alternative-to-Incarceration Court Programs"

ThVRFS1G7AThe US Sentencing Commission has this morning released this 100-page report titled "Federal Alternative-to-Incarceration Court Programs."  Here is part of the report's introduction:

During the three decades that it has been in existence, the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission) repeatedly has considered the important issue of when an alternative to incarceration is an appropriate sentence for certain federal defendants. The original 1987 Guidelines Manual provided for alternative sentencing options such as probation for certain low-level federal offenders, and the Commission thereafter amended the guidelines on several occasions to increase the availability of alternative sentences as sentencing options. Despite these amendments, the rate of alternative sentences imposed in cases governed by the sentencing guidelines has fallen steadily during the past three decades, including after United States v. Booker, and Gall v. United States, which increased federal judges’ discretion to impose alternative sentences. In recent years, the Commission has prioritized the study of alternatives to incarceration as a sentencing option.

Many federal district courts around the country, with the support of the Department of Justice (DOJ), have begun creating specialized court programs to increase the use of alternatives to incarceration for certain types of offenders, most commonly for those with substance use disorders. These programs have developed independently of policy decisions of both the Commission and the Judicial Conference of the United States.  Commentators, including judges who have presided over these court programs, have urged the Commission to amend the Guidelines Manual to encourage such programs and provide the option of a downward departure to a non-incarceration sentence for defendants who successfully participate in them and who otherwise would face imprisonment based on their guideline sentencing ranges.

As part of its recent priority concerning alternatives to incarceration, the Commission has studied these emerging court programs. The Commission’s study has been qualitative rather than quantitative at this juncture because of a lack of available empirical data about the programs.  In late 2016 and early 2017, Commission staff visited five districts with established programs, interviewed program judges and staff, and observed proceedings.  On April 18, 2017, the Commission conducted a public hearing about such specialized federal court programs, at which the Commission received testimony from experts on state “drug courts” and other “problem-solving courts” as well as from federal district judges who have presided over three of the more established alternative-to-incarceration court programs.

This publication summarizes the nature of these emerging federal alternative-to-incarceration court programs and will highlight several legal and social science issues relating to them. Part II defines key terms and concepts, discusses the history of alternative-to-incarceration court programs, which originated in the state courts nearly three decades ago, and then specifically describes the types of specialized federal court programs that have been created in recent years.  Part III discusses legal issues related to the federal court programs, including how they fit within the legal framework created by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) and modified by the Supreme Court in 2005 in Booker.  Part IV identifies social science issues related to the programs, including issues related to the efficacy and cost-effectiveness of the federal court programs.

Part V concludes by identifying several questions about the federal court programs that policymakers and courts should consider in deciding whether, and if so how, such programs should operate in the federal criminal justice system in the future.

September 28, 2017 in Booker in district courts, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

"When ‘Not Guilty’ Is a Life Sentence"

The title of this post is the headline of this extended New York Times Magazine article with this summary subheadline: "What happens after a defendant is found not guilty by reason of insanity? Often the answer is involuntary confinement in a state psychiatric hospital — with no end in sight." Here is an excerpt:

James’s insanity acquittal placed him in an obscure, multibillion-dollar segment of domestic detention.  According to a 2017 study conducted by the National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors, more than 10,000 mentally ill Americans who haven’t been convicted of a crime — people who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity or who have been arrested but found incompetent to stand trial — are involuntarily confined to psychiatric hospitals.  Even a contributor to the study concedes that no one knows the exact number.  While seemingly every conceivable data point in America’s prison system is meticulously compiled, not much is known about the confinement of “forensic” patients, people committed to psychiatric hospitals by the criminal-justice system. No federal agency is charged with monitoring them. No national registry or organization tracks how long they have been incarcerated or why.

In 1992, the Supreme Court ruled, in Foucha v. Louisiana, that a forensic patient must be both mentally ill and dangerous in order to be hospitalized against his will. But in practice, “states have ignored Foucha to a pretty substantial degree,” says W. Lawrence Fitch, a consultant to the National Association of State Mental Health Program Directors and former director of forensic services for Maryland’s Mental Hygiene Administration. “People are kept not because their dangerousness is because of mental illness. People stay in too long, and for the wrong reasons.”

Michael Bien, a lawyer who helped bring a successful lawsuit against the California prison system on behalf of prisoners with psychiatric illnesses, concurs. “Under constitutional law, they’re supposed to be incarcerated only if they’re getting treatment, and only if the treatment is likely to restore sanity,” he says. “You can’t just punish someone for having mental illness. But that’s happening.”...

[D]espite its reputation as a “get out of jail free” card, the insanity defense has never been an easy way out — or easy to get. After a defendant is charged, the defendant, her lawyer or a judge can request evaluation by a psychiatrist.  A defendant may be found incompetent to stand trial and committed for rehabilitation if she isn’t stable enough or intellectually capable of participating in the proceedings. If she is rehabilitated, she may be tried; if she cannot be, she may languish in a psychiatric hospital for years or decades. But mental illness is not exculpatory in itself: A defendant may be found mentally ill and still competent enough to stand trial.  At that point, the district attorney may offer an insanity plea — some 90 percent of N.G.R.I. verdicts are plea deals.  If the district attorney doesn’t offer a plea, or the defendant doesn’t take it, the case goes to trial. The defendant may still choose insanity as a defense, but then her case will be decided by a jury....

And when an N.G.R.I. defense does succeed, it tends to resemble a conviction more than an acquittal.  N.G.R.I. patients can wind up with longer, not shorter, periods of incarceration, as they are pulled into a mental-health system that can be harder to leave than prison. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled, in Jones v. the United States, that it wasn’t a violation of due process to commit N.G.R.I. defendants automatically and indefinitely, for the safety of the public.  (Michael Jones, who was a paranoid schizophrenic, had been hospitalized since 1975, after pleading N.G.R.I. to petty larceny for trying to steal a jacket.)  In almost all states, N.G.R.I. means automatic commitment to a psychiatric facility.  In most states, like New York, there is no limit to the duration of that commitment.  In the states that do have limits, like California, the limits are based on the maximum prison sentence for the offense, a model that belies the idea of hospitalization as treatment rather than punishment.  As Suzanna Gee, an attorney with Disability Rights California (a protection and advocacy agency with counterparts in every state), points out, the law allows two-year extensions as patients approach a “top date,” the limit set on their confinement.  And so, she says, “it can be extended in perpetuity.”

September 28, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

"Will SCOTUS Let Fear of Sex Offenders Trump Justice?"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Reason commentary by Jacob Sullum spotlighting two cases I have tracked on this blog as they have made their way up to the Justices. Here is how the piece starts and ends:

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, locking up sex offenders after they have completed their sentences is not punishment, and neither is branding them as dangerous outcasts for the rest of their lives.  Two cases the Court could soon agree to hear give it an opportunity to reconsider, or at least qualify, those counterintuitive conclusions.

Karsjens v. Piper is a challenge to the Minnesota Sex Offender Program (MSOP), which since 1994 has confined more than 700 people who were deemed too "sexually dangerous" to release after serving their prison terms.  Although these detainees are supposedly patients rather than inmates, in more than two decades only one of them has ever been judged well enough to regain his freedom....

Another case pending before the Supreme Court, Snyder v. Doe, is an appeal of a 2016 decision in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit ruled that Michigan's Sex Offender Registration Act, ostensibly a form of civil regulation aimed at protecting public safety, is so punitive that its requirements cannot be applied retroactively without violating the constitutional ban on ex post facto laws.  The 6th Circuit noted that the law "has grown into a byzantine code governing in minute detail the lives of the state's sex offenders," including onerous restrictions on where they may live, work, and "loiter."....

The Supreme Court has let fear of sex offenders, a despised minority that includes many people who pose no real danger to their fellow citizens, trump traditional concerns about due process and just punishment.  By hearing these cases, it can begin to repair the damage it has done to those principles.

September 27, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (20)

Monday, September 25, 2017

Lots more notable new reporting and commentary from The Marshall Project

Regular readers surely recall prior times I have flagged the always terrific Marshall Project for producing many great pieces that should be must-reads for sentencing fans.  As I have said before, I rarely have the time or ability to give blog attention to all of the great work done there.  But I could not resist another shout-out post upon seeing in recent days a bunch of pieces with original reporting and commentary that all struck me as particularly blog-worthy (with the last three connected):

September 25, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Saturday, September 23, 2017

"Mitigating America’s Mass Incarceration Crisis Without Compromising Community Protection: Expanding the Role of Rehabilitation in Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper posted to SSRN authored by Mirko Bagaric, Gabrielle Wolf and William Rininger. Here is the abstract:

The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented mass incarceration crisis.  Financially, this is no longer readily sustainable, even for the world’s largest economy.  Further, the human suffering that prison causes is no longer tolerable from the normative perspective.  Nevertheless, lawmakers have failed to propose or adopt coherent or wide-ranging reforms to mitigate this crisis.  The crisis has emerged over the past forty years largely as a result of the emphasis on community protection as the most important objective of sentencing and the fact that the primary means of pursuing community protection during this period has been incapacitation in the form of imprisonment.

In this Article, we argue that policy makers and courts took a profoundly wrong turn by equating community protection almost solely with incapacitation.  A more progressive and often effective means of protecting the community is by rehabilitating offenders.  In theory, rehabilitation is a widely endorsed sentencing objective, so it should already influence many sentencing outcomes, but the reality is otherwise.  Rehabilitation is rarely a dominant or even weighty consideration when courts sentence offenders.  This is attributable, at least in part, to skepticism regarding the capacity of criminal sanctions to reform offenders.  This approach is flawed.  Empirical data establishes that many offenders can be rehabilitated.

In this Article, we argue that sentencing courts should place greater weight on the objective of rehabilitation and that such a change would significantly ameliorate the incarceration crisis, while enhancing community safety. We make three key recommendations in order to implement our proposal.  First, it is necessary to promulgate rehabilitation as a means of protecting the community.  Second, we propose that the role of rehabilitation in sentencing should be expanded.  In particular, and contrary to current orthodoxy, rehabilitation should have a meaningful role even in relation to very serious offenses.  In indicating the role that rehabilitation has played in their decisions, courts should clearly articulate how they have adjusted penalties in light of assessments of offenders’ potential for rehabilitation. Third, it is necessary to ensure that decisions by courts relating to the prospects of rehabilitation are made on the basis of more rigorous, empirically-grounded and transparent criteria.

To this end, we examine the under-researched topic of the role that instruments that predict the likelihood of an offender’s recidivism should play in guiding sentencing decisions.  The solutions advanced in this Article will provide the catalyst for rehabilitation to assume a much larger role in sentencing and thereby significantly ameliorate the incarceration crisis.

September 23, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, September 21, 2017

Interesting account of gender discrimination in Wyoming alternative sentencing boot camp program

In part because women are a disproportionately small share of criminal offenders, they can experience a disproportionately large share of discriminatory treatment in the operation of criminal justice systems.  An interesting example of this reality comes from this new BuzzFeed News article headlined "Women Are Spending Years In Prison Because Wyoming Won’t Let Them Into Its All-Male Boot Camp."  The piece's subheadline provide a summary of the story: "Taylor Blanchard faced up to 10 years in prison for a crime that would’ve sent men to boot camp for six months to a year. Her fight could change the fate of countless women in Wyoming."  Here are excerpts:

For the past three months, 23-year-old Blanchard had been trying to get into [boot camp] programs.  The one in her home state, Wyoming, lasts six months to a year.  People who finish it successfully can then ask a judge to transfer them into probation, a halfway house, or placement with a family member, effectively shaving years of prison time off their sentences.

Blanchard ticked all the boxes for acceptance, except for one.  The Wyoming Department of Corrections has never housed a woman in boot camp, and it wasn’t going to start with her. Which is how Blanchard ended up in Florida, shipped out of state instead of accommodated in her own. And it’s how she became the central figure in a federal lawsuit accusing the WDOC of discriminating against female inmates.

Across the country, women in prisons and jails are often housed in different conditions than their male peers.  The criminal justice system was built for men, and prison activists say that little thought has been given to providing equal services — much less special considerations — for women, even as their population has ballooned in recent decades....

Wyoming’s boot camp, formally called the Youthful Offenders Program at the Wyoming Honor Conservation Camp, is known widely among public defenders. Open to first-time offenders under 25, the program is made up of “physical training, drill and ceremony, and a paramilitary base program focusing on appearance, life skills, and behavior,” according to the state; about half of those who enter boot camp complete the program successfully.

In an interview with BuzzFeed News, [Blanchard’s court-appointed attorney, John] LaBuda called it a “really good program,” one that teaches discipline but also allows inmates to get their GED or drug and alcohol counseling, or sometimes learn a trade. But when the state first offered the program in 1987, it only housed men; that has continued for 30 years. No attorney or judge, to the state or anyone else’s knowledge, has ever tried to place a female client into the boot camp....

In July, [Blanchard’s civil] lawyers filed suit in federal court, alleging the WDOC was violating her constitutional rights by denying her an opportunity offered to men. [John Robinson and Stephen] Pevar also had the idea to turn Blanchard’s case into a class-action lawsuit. As Pevar wrote in a July email to WDOC lawyers, “Wyoming was not only violating Ms Blanchard’s rights but has been violating the rights of women for many years now who are in her situation. We needed to do something about it.” (In 2013, the ACLU settled a similar lawsuit that opened up a Montana prison boot camp to women, though the program is now ending for both men and women.)

The lawsuit’s proposed class includes current inmates at Lusk’s women’s prison who were first-time offenders under 25 at the time of their sentencing — women who were eligible to be recommended to the Youthful Offenders Program but weren’t given the chance because of the boot camp’s men-only tradition. The proposed class also includes young Wyoming women who will face the same situation in the future. But Pevar doesn’t yet know how many women actually fall under this umbrella, if a judge does approve the lawsuit as a class action. He and Robinson have requested the WDOC reveal the names of eligible women currently at Lusk, a prison with a capacity of 293 women. WDOC has not yet provided these names. Blanchard’s attorneys are also trying to get referrals from public defenders like LaBuda currently representing eligible young women.

The class could end up being 20 people or it could be 200, Pevar said, but the goal is for each woman to get put into boot camp, either immediately or by going back in front of their sentencing judges. (The WDOC would provide each woman with an independent attorney for the latter proposed process.) “We feel that's the only fair way to vindicate the Constitutional rights of the women whose lawyers didn't ask for the recommendation,” Pevar said. No monetary award for the women is involved.

In late August, the WDOC filed a motion to dismiss the suit, arguing that women have never been denied the opportunity to go to bootcamp. It’s just that they’ve never tried to go to bootcamp, it said, until Blanchard. The corrections department also argued Blanchard hadn’t exhausted all of remedies before filing suit, and that her complaint is moot because she’s already been placed in boot camp elsewhere.

September 21, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, September 18, 2017

Noting judicial resistance (and legal questions) as Ohio law pushes judges to avoid state prison sentences for certain offenders

This fascinating article in the Columbus Dispatch, headlined "Some Ohio counties leery of Kasich program to divert low-level offenders from prison," highlights a novel and controversial new  sentencing law in Ohio that some local judges and official plainly dislike. Here are excerpts:

The 43-year-old career criminal broke into three Obetz businesses — a market and two pizza parlors — by smashing windows or door glass with rocks and concrete blocks over a four-day period last summer.  A Franklin County Common Pleas judge sent him to prison for two years, a decision that was upheld last week by the county court of appeals.  But under a program in which Franklin County will be required to participate beginning next July, the state will penalize the county for sending such an offender to prison.

The Targeted Community Alternatives to Prison program, approved by legislators in June as part of the state budget, seeks to reduce the prison population by diverting nonviolent, low-level felons to probation, local jails or community-based programs.  In return, the counties will receive grants from the state Department of Rehabilitation and Correction to offset the cost of supervising, treating or jailing those offenders in their communities.

The program, advocated by prisons Director Gary Mohr and Gov. John Kasich, has received opposition from judges and prosecutors across the state since it was proposed.  Most judges don’t like it because “it infringes on our discretion by telling us there are certain felons we can’t send to prison,” said Judge Stephen L. McIntosh, the administrative judge for Franklin County Common Pleas Court.

Some counties have decided that the grant money being offered by the state won’t be enough to cover the costs of keeping offenders in the community who otherwise would have gone to prison.  Others have offered a harsh assessment of a program that gives grants to judges in exchange for keeping certain offenders out of prison.  “Essentially what judges are being offered is a bribe,” Stark County Common Pleas Judge Kristin Farmer said in August when she and her colleagues on the bench encouraged their county commissioners not to participate in the program this year....

Franklin and Stark are among the state’s 10 largest counties, all of which are mandated under the law to participate in the program beginning July 1, 2018.  Franklin County’s Common Pleas judges will meet Tuesday to decide whether to participate in the program before the mandate kicks in, McIntosh said.  Last week, Cuyahoga County joined Stark in deciding not to implement the program until next summer. “The state’s offer of resources is completely inadequate to the demands that it will put on our local jails and our systems,” Armond Budish, the Cuyahoga County executive, said in a news release....

Under the program, offenders convicted of fifth-degree felonies, the lowest felony level, are not to be sentenced to prison unless they’ve committed a violent offense, a sex crime or a drug-trafficking offense.  The state correction department estimated that 4,000 such offenders were sent to prison last year.  If a participating county sends someone to prison in violation of the criteria, their grant money will be docked $72 a day for each day the offender is held in a state facility.

Clinton County Common Pleas Judge John W. “Tim” Rudduck has been participating since October in a pilot program to test the concept and is a vocal supporter of its benefits. “I’m looking at it from the perspective of a single judge in a semi-rural county with limited resources,” he said.  “The money we have received has been instrumental in developing resources (to support alternatives to prison) that we never had before.”  Before the program was implemented, some offenders were going to prison simply because Clinton County didn’t have the resources to treat or supervise them in the community, he said.

The program is voluntary for 78 counties. So far, 48 counties have agreed to implement the program....  A system in which some Ohio counties follow the program and other don’t is “patently unconstitutional,” said Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O’Brien.  The Ohio Constitution, he said, requires “uniform operation” of all laws.  That concept is violated when a defendant receives a prison sentence in one county for an offense for which he would be prohibited from receiving prison in another.

Those “equal protection” concerns are almost certain to lead to legal challenges for the program, said Paul Pfeifer, executive director of the Ohio Judicial Conference.  “I’d fully expect a test case to be filed on that issue,” said Pfeifer, a former state Supreme Court justice and state senator.  His organization, which represents all judges in Ohio, has expressed concerns about the program, but wants to work with judges to make its implementation as smooth as possible now that it’s the law, he said.

September 18, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, September 12, 2017

So much to read about so many elements of the opioid epidemic

I have a hard time keeping up with all the dimensions of the opioid epidemic.  And, of course, the epidemic is fundamentally a public health crisis more than a sentencing issue.  Nevertheless, I find myself drawn to reading all sort of pieces about the epidemic, and here are links and headlines that have caught my eye recently:

September 12, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

New op-ed and op-doc from New York Times takes on "A ‘Frightening’ Myth About Sex Offenders"

David Feige has a new op-ed and a short video documentary unpacking and attacking the notion that sex offender recidivism rates are extraordinarily high.  This op-ed is headlined "When Junk Science About Sex Offenders Infects the Supreme Court," and this op-doc is titled "A ‘Frightening’ Myth About Sex Offenders."  Here is how the op-ed starts and ends:

This month the Supreme Court will have a rare opportunity to correct a flawed doctrine that for the past two decades has relied on junk social science to justify punishing more than 800,000 Americans.  Two cases that the court could review concern people on the sex offender registry and the kinds of government control that can constitutionally be imposed upon them.

In Snyder v. Doe, the court could consider whether Michigan’s broad scheme of regulating sex offenders constitutes “punishment.”  The other case, Karsjens v. Piper, examines the constitutionality of Minnesota’s policy of detaining sex offenders forever — not for what they’ve done, but for what they might do.

And while the idea of indefinite preventive detention might sound un-American or something out of the film “Minority Report,” the larger problem is that “civil commitment,” like hundreds of other regulations imposed on those required to register, has been justified by assertions about the recidivism of sex offenders. But those assertions turn out to be entirely belied by science.

For the past 24 years, Minnesota has detained sex offenders released from prison in a “therapeutic program” conveniently located on the grounds of a maximum-security prison in Moose Lake.  The “patients” are kept in locked cells, transported outside the facility in handcuffs and leg irons, and subjected to a regimen that looks, sounds and smells just like that of the prison it is adjacent to.

But unlike prison, this “therapeutic” program, which aims to teach the patients to control their sexual impulses and was initially designed to last from two to four years, has no fixed end date. Rather, program administrators decide which patients are safe enough to release.  In the 24 years it has existed, not a single “patient” has ever been fully released.  There are now about 850 people in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program, some with no adult criminal record, and others who, despite having completed every single program ever offered at the facility, have remained civilly committed for over 20 years.

While civil commitment is perhaps the most extreme example of punishments imposed on people convicted of sex crimes, it is by no means the only one. Driven by a pervasive fear of sexual predators, and facing no discernible opposition, politicians have become evermore inventive in dreaming up ways to corral and marginalize those forced to register — a category which itself has expanded radically and come to include those convicted of “sexting,” having consensual sex with non-minor teenagers or even urinating in public.

These sanctions include being forced to wear (and pay for) GPS monitoring and being banned from parks, and draconian residency restrictions that sometimes lead to homelessness.  In addition, punishments can include, on pain of re-incarceration, undergoing interrogations using a penile plethysmograph, a device used to measure sexual arousal.  They have also included requirements that those on the registry refrain from being alone with children (often including their own) and barred from holding certain jobs, like being a volunteer firefighter or driving an ice cream truck.

And when these restrictions have been challenged in court, judge after judge has justified them based on a Supreme Court doctrine that allows such restrictions, thanks to the “frightening and high” recidivism rate ascribed to sex offenders — a rate the court has pegged “as high as 80 percent.”  The problem is this: The 80 percent recidivism rate is an entirely invented number....

Now more than ever, Americans should be able to look to our highest court and expect decisions that are based on reason and grounded in science rather than fear.  The court must rule wisely and bravely, including being willing to acknowledge its mistake and finally correct the record.  More than 800,000 Americans have needlessly suffered humiliation, ostracism, banishment re-incarceration and civil commitment thanks to a judicial opinion grounded in an unsourced, unscientific study.  Simple decency and perhaps more important, intellectual honesty demands better.

A few prior recent related posts:

September 12, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Monday, September 11, 2017

Notable accounting and review of federal collateral consequences facing nonviolent drug offenders

RId15_image2Last week the Government Accountability Office released this interesting new report titled "Nonviolent Drug Convictions: Stakeholders' Views on Potential Actions to Address Collateral Consequences." The 47-page report is worth a full read, and this highlights page provides these highlights (and the graphic reprinted here):

Collateral consequences are the penalties and disadvantages that can be imposed upon an individual with a criminal conviction, in addition to those directly associated with a sentence (such as a fine, prison, or community service). GAO’s review of the American Bar Association’s (ABA) National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction (NICCC) found that, in federal laws and regulations, there are 641 collateral consequences that can be triggered by nonviolent drug convictions (NVDC).  For example, individuals with NVDC may be ineligible for certain professional licenses and federal housing assistance.  The NICCC data that GAO reviewed indicate that these 641 collateral consequences can limit many aspects of an individual’s life, such as employment, business licenses, education, and government benefits.  In addition, GAO also found that the NICCC identified that 497 (78 percent) of the 641 collateral consequences can potentially last a lifetime.

Of the 641 federal collateral consequences for NVDC, GAO found that the NICCC identified 131 (20 percent) as having a relief mechanism in a related law or regulation that prescribed how an individual could potentially obtain relief from the consequence.  For example, individuals may be relieved if they successfully complete a drug rehabilitation program or receive a pardon.

Thirteen of the 14 stakeholders GAO interviewed said the federal government should consider taking action to reduce the severity of (i.e., mitigate) federal collateral consequences for NVDC, such as conducting a comprehensive review of these collateral consequences and implementing a new relief mechanism.  Additional mitigation could, according to some stakeholders, help individuals with NVDC obtain employment, housing, or education; and almost all the stakeholders said mitigation could potentially reduce the likelihood of reoffending.  At the same time, federal collateral consequences can serve public safety functions and protect government interests.  Some stakeholders cautioned that federal action should strike the appropriate balance between preserving collateral consequences that provide a public safety benefit, and addressing consequences that can cause unnecessary burdens and potentially increase the likelihood that individuals with NVDC reoffend.

September 11, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Data on sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, September 01, 2017

Federal district judge finds Colorado's Sex Offense Registration Act, as applied, amounts to unconstitutional punishment

A couple of helpful readers made sure I did not miss a notable extended opinion concerning application of Colorado's sex offender registration laws. The opinion in Millard v. Rankin, No. 1:13-cv-02406 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2017), which can be downloaded below, starts and ends this way:

Plaintiffs are registered sex offenders under the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq. In this civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 they seek declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that continuing enforcement of the requirements of SORA against them violates their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant is the Director of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”), the state agency responsible for maintaining the centralized registry of sex offenders and providing information on a state web site....

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that judgment shall enter declaring that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq., as applied to Plaintiffs David Millard, Eugene Knight, and Arturo Vega, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall enter declaring that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq., as applied to Plaintiff Arturo Vega, violates procedural due process requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall enter declaring that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq., as applied to Plaintiffs David Millard, Eugene Knight, and Arturo Vega, violates substantive due process requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs as prevailing parties shall be entitled to an award reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs, to be determined by the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

Download 20170831 Millard Ruling re Sex Offender Registry

September 1, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (11)

Monday, August 28, 2017

"Less Is More: How Reducing Probation Populations Can Improve Outcomes"

Download (3)The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper emerging from the Executive Session on Community Corrections at the Harvard Kennedy School.  Here is the paper's introduction:

This paper will argue that, similar to the growth in prisons that has resulted in our current state of mass incarceration, the tremendous growth in probation supervision in the United States over the past several decades should be reversed, and the entire system of probation significantly downsized.  Specifically, we argue here that while the number of people on probation supervision in the U.S. has declined over the past several years (as have the number of people incarcerated and crime rates), that decline should not only be sustained but significantly increased, with a goal of reducing the number of people under probation supervision by 50 percent over 10 years.  We then discuss New York City as an example of a jurisdiction that has successfully done this.

In many respects, the rationale for this argument mirrors the argument against mass incarceration.  In most jurisdictions, probation is a punitive system that attempts to elicit compliance from individuals primarily through the imposition of conditions, fines, and fees that in many cases cannot be met (Corbett, 2015; Klingele, 2013).  This is not only a poor use of scarce resources; it contributes to a revolving door in which individuals who cannot meet those obligations cycle back and forth between probation and incarceration without necessarily improving public safety.  In fact, the cycle of incarceration and supervision can actually threaten public safety, and it certainly has harmful and farreaching consequences for those who are caught up in it, including job loss, disconnection from family, and housing instability (Council of Economic Advisers, 2015).  Given this, along with national and local data and examples that clearly demonstrate that reducing “mass probation” can go hand in hand with a reduction in the number of people incarcerated and ongoing declines in national and local crime, it begs the question of why so many jurisdictions continue to promulgate this punitive approach.

Because probation is the most severely underfunded and the least politically powerful of all criminal justice agencies, there is no likelihood of any massive infusion of new resources into the field.  Thus, the limited resources saved from this downsizing may be used to invest in community-based programs that provide employment, substance abuse, and mental health treatment to the remaining population — those that pose the highest public safety risk — as a way to significantly reduce that risk and avoid unnecessary monitoring and supervision.  A portion of these savings should also substitute for the rampant use of probation fees used throughout the U.S. as a way to pay for a structurally underfunded system.  These fees are unjust, counter-productive, and antithetical to the legitimacy of any system of justice (Martin, Smith, and Still, 2017).

August 28, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, August 17, 2017

US Sentencing Commission finalizes policy priorities and publishes notable holdover amendments

As reported in this press release, the US Sentencing Commission "today approved its final policy priorities for the upcoming amendment year ending May 1, 2018, which includes an examination of the overall structure of the guidelines and a continuation of its work on synthetic drugs [and] voted to publish several holdover proposals from the previous amendment cycle."  Here is more:

During the upcoming amendment year, the Commission will continue to explore approaches to simplify and strengthen the guidelines. “On this thirtieth year of the federal sentencing guidelines system, the Commission welcomes the opportunity to work with the Congress, the Courts, the Department of Justice, and other stakeholders to find ways to promote certainty and proportionality in sentencing while reducing the complexity of the guidelines,” stated Circuit Judge William H. Pryor, Jr., acting chair of the Commission.

The Commission will also continue its two-year study of synthetic drugs. In April, the Commission held a public hearing to receive testimony on the prevalence and effect of synthetic drugs. The Commission has since commenced a study of specific categories of synthetic drugs, including fentanyl. The Commission will research their chemical structure, pharmacological effects, potential for addiction, legislative and scheduling history, and other relevant issues. The study is intended to provide a meaningful distinction between categories of synthetic drugs so that closely related substances are more easily determined in the guidelines....

Stemming from the Commission’s research on youthful offenders as well as recommendations made by the Tribal Issues Advisory Group (TIAG) in its May 2016 report, the Commission will also continue to study how juvenile sentences are considered in the calculation of the defendant’s criminal history score.

Other priorities include continued work on mandatory minimum penalties. Following the release of the 2017 Mandatory Minimum Overview in July, which built on the Commission’s 2011 report, the Commission will release additional reports highlighting the impact of mandatory minimum penalties for certain offense categories. The Commission will also continue to work with Congress to adopt a uniform definition of “crime of violence” included in recommendations set forth in the 2016 Report to the Congress on Career Offender Sentencing Enhancements.

The Commission also published today several proposed guideline amendments from the previous amendment cycle and as an extension of its current policy priority work. “Today’s proposed amendments are a continuation of our work during the previous amendment year. These holdover proposals were not voted on last year due to the lack of a quorum during the deliberation process. Publishing today gives this reconstituted Commission an opportunity to carefully review these proposals and consider them as early as possible in the current amendment cycle,” stated Judge Pryor.

Among the proposed amendments published today are changes that would increase the number of federal offenders eligible for alternatives to incarceration. Informed by the Commission’s multi-year study on recidivism, one of the proposed amendments would add a downward adjustment to the guidelines for first offenders.

August 17, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, August 13, 2017

Making a case against sex offender registries

Newsweek has posted this new opinion piece authored by Professor Trevor Hoppe under the headlined "Are Sex Offender Registries Too Strict?." As evidenced by these excerpts, it seems the author believes the answer to this question is yes:

In my work on sex offender registries, I have found that black men in the U.S. were registered at rates twice that of white men—resembling disparities found in the criminal justice system at large. However, these findings speak to the scope of the problem of American sex offender registries, as approximately 1 percent of black men in the U.S. are now registered sex offenders.  My research suggests that inequality is deeply tied to sex offender policies....

Imagine being punished for something you did three decades ago.  You served your time and thought it was in the past. Under American sex offender laws, moving on is nearly impossible: Most state policies are retroactive, meaning they apply to offenders who committed offenses before these laws were put in place.  While these laws are the subject of several ongoing court battles, most remain in effect.

Offenders are subject to extensive public notification requirements, which include state-run search engine listings that feature their address, mugshot, criminal history and demographic information. In some cases, offenders are also required to publicly post flyers with their pictures or run newspaper notices advertising their residency.  Some states, such as Louisiana, stamp “SEX OFFENDER” in large red script on driver’s licenses.

Having a mugshot disseminated across internet search engines is only the tip of the iceberg; once registered, offenders are subject to a wide array of housing and employment restrictions.  In many places in the U.S., sex offenders are effectively zoned out of cities and towns because there are no residential areas that satisfy all of the numerous regulations. For example, offenders may be prohibited from living within a certain number of feet from a playground. They are often left with no choice but to live under highways or in improvised communities, such as the one in Pahokee, Florida depicted in the New York Times 2013 short film, “Sex Offender Village.”...

Lawmakers ... argue that more invasive policies are necessary because sex offenders are highly likely to commit future crimes. In their view, informing the public of their criminal history will offer protection.  But as the U.S. federal government’s Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking notes, sex offender registration requirements “have been implemented in the absence of empirical evidence regarding their effectiveness.”

Now that all 50 U.S. states and Washington, D.C. have developed such registries, the evidence testing the effectiveness of sex offender registries is beginning to mount. It is mixed, at best.

One study followed sex offenders who were labeled “high-risk” for reoffending and who were released from Wisconsin prisons in the late 1990s. That study compared offenders who were subjected to limited public notification requirements with those who were subjected to extensive requirements.  The researchers found no significant difference in the average time between release and a future offense.  In other words, extensive public notification did not deter future offenses.

However, another study evaluated the likelihood of reoffending for sexual offenders labeled “high risk” released from Minnesota state correctional facilities. Here researchers found that offenders subject to community notification were somewhat less likely to commit another sexual offense.

Finally, a recent study found that sex offenders released in Florida between 1990 and 2010 had lower rates of recidivism than offenders of other types of crime -- 6.5 percent for sex offenses, as compared to 8.3 percent for nonsexual assaults and 29.8 percent for drug offenses.  Moreover, that study found that recidivism rates increased after the state legislature implemented sex offender registration requirements in 1997.

While the evidence is mixed that these policies are effective at deterring crime, the evidence of their collateral consequences is more consistent.  Several studies of registered sex offenders have revealed how registries reinforce class inequality by creating patterned experiences of unemployment, harassment and homelessness.

From a public safety perspective, scholars note that registries provide the public with a false sense of security: While the existence of sex offender registries reinforces a myth of “stranger danger,” most offenders in reality are acquaintances or family members.  Balancing the thin support of the registries’ effectiveness against the more robust evidence of their negative effects, one scholar recently concluded these policies do more harm than good.

My research suggests there is also a racialized dimension to the war on sex offenders that complicates arguments in their favor. The evidence does not strongly suggest registries are effective at deterring crime. Rather, their most lasting impact may be their exacerbation of inequalities based on race, class and gender.

August 13, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7)

Wednesday, August 09, 2017

Should and will SCOTUS take up constitutional challenge to Minnesota's sex offender confinement program?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this effective Minnesota Lawyer article headlined "SCOTUS to mull accepting sex offender lawsuit."  The article reviews a cert petition that has garnered a lot of amici interest, which always increases the odds of SCOTUS interest. Here are excerpts from the start and end of the piece:

A case began in December 2011 as a pro se proceeding by patients in the Minnesota Sex Offender Program disputing the conditions including room searches, restrictive telephone and mail policies and bad food, among other things — that’s how the defendant state of Minnesota characterized it, anyway.  When the petitioners got an attorney, it got re-characterized as a matter of substantive due process.

It’s now pending at the United States Supreme Court, where the justices will consider the patients’ petition for certiorari.  The briefs are all in now — one from the state, two from petitioners and four from amicus curiae supporting the petitioners.

The constitutional issue presented to the Supreme Court is the standard of review that should apply to substantive due process claims brought by the patients. Strict scrutiny, the highest standard, as employed by Judge Donovan Frank?  Or simply a reasonable relation standard, as used by the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals? And must one’s conscience be shocked by the actions of the respondents, and if so, at what stage of the review?

As the petitioners’ attorney, Dan Gustafson, sees it, the nub of the problem is that once a person is committed, he or she is labeled dangerous and loses the fundamental right to liberty effectively forever under the state system. The state has failed to enact a procedure to make sure that people are able to be released, Gustafson said. The state does have a statutory reduction in custody scheme in place, but it shifts the burden of proof to the patient and it has never resulted in a release until this lawsuit was filed. “We’ve demonstrated that it hasn’t worked for the last 25 years,” Gustafson said....

Four amicus curiae briefs from a spectrum of philosophical points of view have been submitted by friends of the court in Karsjens, et al. v. Emily Johnson Piper, et al. But they all want the Supreme Court to reverse the 8th Circuit, which didn’t have a problem with the program, which had been found unconstitutional by Judge Donovan Frank.

A group of 26 professors of law or related subjects has submitted a brief written by Mitchell Hamline Professor Eric Janus and Minneapolis attorney Richard D. Snyder. The fatal flaw in the MSOP program is that no one gets out, Janus said. “The core of the case is that the state set up what it said was going to be a civil commitment program. And the core definition of that is people get out, and that’s exactly what is missing in the Minnesota program.  It’s not just missing here or there, it’s systemically missing,” Janus wrote.

The Cato Institute, known as a libertarian think tank and an advocate for limited government, is another friend of the court.  Its brief argues, “Sex-offender laws have bored a hole in the nation’s constitutional fabric.  As state and federal governments expand that hole — threatening to swallow other rights and other’s rights — this Court should intervene.”

Also weighing in are criminology scholars and the Fair Punishment Project of Harvard Law School, as well as the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers. The Fair Punishment Project writes that the commitment statute is a punitive scheme that has responded excessively to “moral panic.”  The Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers promotes sex offender research and treatment.  It argues that granting review is necessary to take account of important advances in the empirical study of rates of recidivism among sexual offenders; effective assessment treatment, and management of sexual offenders; and factors that influence the effectiveness of treatment interventions.

A few prior related posts:

August 9, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Tuesday, August 01, 2017

Eighth Circuit affirms exclusion of juve who moved from Nebraska's sex offender registry

As noted in this prior post last year, a federal judge has blocked Nebraska from putting a 13-year-old boy who moved to the state from Minnesota on its public sex offender registry. Yesterday, an Eighth Circuit panel affirmed this ruling via this opinion which starts this way:

The State of Nebraska, along with the Nebraska State Patrol (NSP) and various state officials (collectively, the State), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to A.W. and A.W.'s guardians, John and Jane Doe, enjoining it from applying to A.W. a provision of Nebraska's Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA).  That provision, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv), applies SORA to any person who, on or after January 1, 1997, "[e]nters the state and is required to register as a sex offender under the laws of another village, town, city, state, territory, commonwealth, or other jurisdiction of the United States."  We hold that this provision does not apply to appellant A.W. and, accordingly, affirm the district court.

The full panel ruling is interesting for how it applied Nebraska's sex offender registry law, but a final footnote highlights some broader constitutional questions the panel saw implicated in the case. Here are excerpts from the footnote:

We note that even if we found "sex offender" to be ambiguous, leaving us with the choice of selecting between two reasonable constructions, one requiring conviction and one not, we would be strongly inclined to affirm the district court.  We believe the application of SORA and its public notification requirement to juveniles adjudicated delinquent in other jurisdictions but not in Nebraska raises serious constitutional concerns under the rights to travel and to equal protection of the laws.  Of the events triggering application of SORA under NSP regulations -- residency, employment, carrying on a vocation, or attending school in Nebraska, 272 Neb. Admin. Code ch. 19 § 003.02 -- it is highly likely a juvenile would be subject to SORA due to residency. This raises troubling implications under the third prong of the right to travel, arising from the Privileges and Immunities and the Privileges or Immunities Clauses of the U.S. Constitution..., as well as under the Equal Protection Clause.  Further, to the extent the purpose of § 29-4003(1)(a)(iv) is to prevent migration into the state of undesirable citizens, application of SORA to A.W. under that provision may raise other constitutional concerns as well. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503 ("The states have not now, if they ever had, any power to restrict their citizenship to any classes or persons." (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 112 (1872) (Bradley, J., dissenting))). Given the choice between two reasonable constructions, we will generally avoid a construction that raises "grave and doubtful constitutional questions." Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States Dep't of Homeland Sec., 738 F.3d 885, 892 (8th Cir. 2013).

August 1, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Sunday, July 23, 2017

Reduced jail time in Tennessee for inmates who ... agree to vasectomy or birth control implant!?!?!

This local story out of Tennessee is hard to believe, but it does not appear to be fake news.  The story is headlined "White County Inmates Given Reduced Jail Time If They Get Vasectomy," and here are excerpts:

Inmates in White County, Tennessee have been given credit for their jail time if they voluntarily agree to have a vasectomy or birth control implant, a popular new program that is being called “unconstitutional” by the ACLU.

On May 15, 2017 General Sessions Judge Sam Benningfield signed a standing order that allows inmates to receive 30 days credit toward jail time if they undergo a birth control procedure. Women who volunteer to participate in the program are given a free Nexplanon implant in their arm, the implant helps prevent pregnancies for up to four years. Men who volunteer to participate are given a vasectomy, free of charge, by the Tennessee Department of Health.

County officials said that since the program began a few months ago 32 women have gotten the Nexplananon implant and 38 men were waiting to have the vasectomy procedure performed.

Judge Benningfield told NewsChannel 5 that he was trying to break a vicious cycle of repeat offenders who constantly come into his courtroom on drug related charges, subsequently can’t afford child support and have trouble finding jobs. “I hope to encourage them to take personal responsibility and give them a chance, when they do get out, to not to be burdened with children. This gives them a chance to get on their feet and make something of themselves,” Judge Benningfield said in an interview.

First elected in 1998, Judge Benningfield decided to implement the program after speaking with officials at the Tennessee Department of Health. “I understand it won’t be entirely successful but if you reach two or three people, maybe that’s two or three kids not being born under the influence of drugs. I see it as a win, win,” he added.

Inmates in the White County jail were also given two days credit toward their jail sentence if they complete a State of Tennessee, Department of Health Neonatal Syndrome Education Program. The class aimed to educate those who are incarcerated about the dangers of having children while under the influence of drugs. “Hopefully while they’re staying here we rehabilitate them so they never come back,” the judge said.

District Attorney Bryant Dunaway, who oversees prosecution of cases in White County is worried the program may be unethical and possibly illegal. “It’s concerning to me, my office doesn’t support this order,” Dunaway said....

On Wednesday, the ACLU released this statement on the program: "Offering a so-called 'choice' between jail time and coerced contraception or sterilization is unconstitutional. Such a choice violates the fundamental constitutional right to reproductive autonomy and bodily integrity by interfering with the intimate decision of whether and when to have a child, imposing an intrusive medical procedure on individuals who are not in a position to reject it. Judges play an important role in our community – overseeing individuals’ childbearing capacity should not be part of that role."

There are many thing so very remarkable about this story, but I am especially struck by how many jail inmates are willing to undergo a life-changing procedure simply to avoid 30 days in jail. Anyone who doubts the coercive pressures of even a short jail stay (say because of an inability to make bail) should be shown this story.

July 23, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (19)

Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds state sex offender registration law punitive and thus unconstitutional to apply retroactively

In a big opinion today, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided its state's sex offender registration law, though civil in design, was punitive in practice and thus cannot be applied retroactively. The 55-page majority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, No. (Pa. July 19, 2017) (available here), gets started this way:

We granted discretionary review to determine whether Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9799.10-9799.41, as applied retroactively to appellant Jose M. Muniz, is unconstitutional under the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.  The Superior Court held SORNA’s registration provisions are not punishment, and therefore retroactive application to appellant, who was convicted of sex offenses prior to SORNA’s effective date but sentenced afterwards, does not violate either the federal or state ex post facto clauses.  For the following reasons, we reverse and hold: 1) SORNA’s registration provisions constitute punishment notwithstanding the General Assembly’s identification of the provisions as nonpunitive; 2) retroactive application of SORNA’s registration provisions violates the federal ex post facto clause; and 3) retroactive application of SORNA’s registration provisions also violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The 13-page dissenting opinion authored by Chief Justice Saylor is available here and concludes this way: "Based on the Mendoza-Martinez factors, which I view as almost uniformly suggesting a non-punitive effect, I would conclude that SORNA’s registration requirements do not constitute punishment and do not violate the federal ex post facto clause."

July 19, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (27)

Details emerging on new Trump Administration approach to asset forfeiture ... UPDATED with new DOJ memo

As noted in this prior post, on Monday Attorney General Jeff Sessions gave a speech in which he indicated that a "new directive on asset forfeiture" was forthcoming that, "especially for drug traffickers," sought "to increase forfeitures."  This new AP article, headlined "US restoring asset seizures - with safeguards," reports on what this new directive is going to include. Here are excerpts from the AP piece:

The Trump administration will soon restore the ability of police to seize suspects’ money and property with federal help, but The Associated Press has learned the policy will come with a series of new provisions aimed at preventing the types of abuse that led the Obama Justice Department to severely curtail the practice.

At issue is asset forfeiture, which has been criticized because it allows law enforcement to take possessions without criminal convictions or, in some cases, indictments. The policy to be rolled out Wednesday targets so-called adoptive forfeiture, which lets local authorities circumvent more-restrictive state laws to seize property under federal law. The proceeds are then shared with federal counterparts.

Former Attorney General Eric Holder significantly limited the practice in response to criticism that it was ripe for abuse, particularly with police seizures of small amounts of cash. Attorney General Jeff Sessions plans to ease those restrictions, but also impose new requirements on when federal law can be used, a senior Justice Department official briefed on the policy said Tuesday. The official, who spoke to the AP on condition of anonymity, was not authorized to discuss the changes before their unveiling.

Key changes include requiring more detail from police agencies about probable cause justifying a seizure before federal authorities get involved. Also, the Justice Department will have to decide more quickly whether to take on local seizures and also let property owners know their rights and the status of their belongings within 45 days of the seizure, faster than federal law requires.

Another key change will make it harder for police to seize less than $10,000 unless they have a state warrant, have made an arrest related to the seizure, have taken other contraband, such as drugs, along with the money, or the owner has confessed to a crime. Without at least one of those conditions, authorities will need a federal prosecutor’s approval to seize it under federal law.

Old rules set that threshold at $5,000, the official said. The old process rarely required a federal prosecutor’s sign-off, said Stefan Cassella, a former federal prosecutor and expert on asset forfeiture and money laundering law.

Sessions’ support for asset forfeiture is in keeping with his tough-on-crime agenda and aligns with his oft-stated view that the Justice Department’s top priority should be helping local law enforcement fight violent crime. Police departments use the seizures for expenses, and some agencies felt Holder’s restrictions left them without a critical funding source. When he forecast the rollback of the Holder provision at a conference of district attorneys, the announcement drew applause.

But an embrace of asset forfeiture follows bipartisan efforts to overhaul the practice, and as a growing number of states have made their own laws limiting its use. Republican Rep. Darrell Issa of California, who sponsored legislation this year to tightly regulate asset forfeiture, told the AP that Sessions’ move is “a troubling step backward” that would “bring back a loophole that’s become one of the most flagrantly abused provisions of this policy.”

“I’m glad that at least some safeguards will be put in place, but their plan to expand civil forfeiture is, really, just as concerning as it was before,” Issa said. “Criminals shouldn’t be able to keep the proceeds of their crime, but innocent Americans shouldn’t lose their right to due process, or their private property rights, in order to make that happen.”

UPDATE Here now is the official US Department of Justice news release, headlined "Attorney General Sessions Issues Policy and Guidelines on Federal Adoptions of Assets Seized by State or Local Law Enforcement." And here is the associated one-page order.

July 19, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, July 10, 2017

Drug Policy Alliance issues big new report calling for drug decriminalization

Download (2)This new press release reports on the latest call by the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) for drug decriminalization in the US.  The DPA has this new report titled "It's Time for the U.S. to Decriminalize Drug Use and Possession," and the press release discusses its work with other organization to push this agenda forward.  Here is start and end of the DPA report's executive summary:

By any measure and every metric, the U.S. war on drugs — a constellation of laws and policies that seeks to prevent and control the use and sale of drugs primarily through punishment and coercion – has been a colossal failure with tragic results. Indeed, federal and state policies that are designed to be “tough” on people who use and sell drugs have helped over-fill our jails and prisons, permanently branded millions of people as “criminals”, and exacerbated drug-related death, disease and suffering — all while failing at their stated goal of reducing problematic drug use.

This report offers a roadmap for how to begin to unwind our failed drug war. It focuses on one practical step that can and should be taken to avoid many of the harms that flow from punitive prohibitionist drug laws and to promote proven, effective health-based interventions.

Drug decriminalization is a critical next step toward achieving a rational drug policy that puts science and public health before punishment and incarceration.  Decades of evidence has clearly demonstrated that decriminalization is a sensible path forward that would reap vast human and fiscal benefits, while protecting families and communities.

Drug decriminalization is defined here as the elimination of criminal penalties for drug use and possession, as well as the elimination of criminal penalties for the possession of equipment used for the purpose of introducing drugs into the human body, such as syringes.  Throughout this report, we will use the phrase “drug possession” to include drug possession, drug use, and possession of paraphernalia used for the purpose of introducing drugs into the human body.

Ideally, drug decriminalization entails the elimination of all punitive, abstinence-based, coercive approaches to drug use; however, for purposes of this report, the term encompasses a spectrum of efforts to eliminate criminal penalties, even if such efforts do not eliminate all forms of coercion entirely.  Drug decriminalization also ideally entails the removal of criminal penalties for low-level sales, given that the line between seller and user is often blurred (this subject and the broader issue of people who sell drugs will be addressed in a subsequent DPA report).

This report is the product of a comprehensive review of the public health and criminology literature, an analysis of drug policies in the U.S. and abroad, and input from experts in the fields of drug policy and criminal justice.  By highlighting the benefits of eliminating criminal penalties for drug use and possession, we seek to provide policymakers, community leaders and advocates with evidence-based options for a new approach....

This report makes the following recommendations for local, state and federal policymakers in the U.S.:

• Congress and U.S. states should eliminate federal and state criminal penalties and collateral sanctions for drug use, drug possession for personal use, and possession of paraphernalia intended for consuming drugs.

• Congress should amend federal law to de-schedule marijuana and remove it from the federal Controlled Substances Act.

• Administrative penalties – such as civil asset forfeiture, administrative detention, driver’s license suspension (absent impairment), excessive fines, and parental termination or child welfare interventions (absent harm to children) – run counter to the intent of a decriminalization policy and should not be imposed.

• Decriminalization policies — like other drug policies — generally function far more effectively when accompanied by robust and diverse harm reduction and treatment-on-demand programs, including medication-assisted treatment.

• Local and state governments should adopt pre-booking diversion and 911 Good Samaritan policies to prioritize public health over punishment and incarceration.

July 10, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, July 09, 2017

"Death Row Dogs, Hard Time Prisoners, and Creative Rehabilitation Strategies: Prisoner-Dog Training Programs"

The title of this post is the title of this recently published article authored by Paul Larkin. Here is the abstract:

More and more prisons have witnessed the success of Prisoner-Dog Training Programs (PDPs) in the last few years.  PDPs entail a prisoner training an animal (usually a dog) to be a service animal for the disabled or a well-behaved household pet.  PDPs at state and federal prisons have turned out to be a win-win-win.  The animals involved in the program are typically those at risk of being euthanized, giving those animals a second chance at life; the community benefits because people adopt well-behaved and trained animals; and the prisoner-trainers learn what it means to contribute to society in a material way, to develop emotional connections, and to care for others.  At first glance, these programs seem perfect—which begs the question: Why are they not in every prison?

This article examines PDPs and the success of those programs in the case studies that have been conducted.  The Article suggests that in order for more successful PDPs to be launched, more data needs to be collected.  In analyzing PDPs, this Article looks at the history of criminal punishment through the lens of rehabilitation versus retribution, then proceeds to an overview of PDPs and their promising initial data.  Finally, this Article discusses the need for further examination of PDPs and their effectiveness, as well as possible mechanisms that could be used to expand their uses. Ultimately, this Article encourages the Department of Justice and Congress to lend greater support to PDPs in federal and state prisons. 

July 9, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, July 08, 2017

DOJ urges SCOTUS not to review Sixth Circuit panel decision finding retroactive application of Michigan sex offender law unconstitutional

As reported in this post from last summer, a Sixth Circuit panel concluded in Does v. Snyder, No. 15-1536 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016) (available here), that Michigan's amendments to its Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) "imposes punishment" and thus the state violates the US Constitution when applying these SORA provisions retroactively.  Michigan  appealed this decision to the US Supreme Court, and SCOTUS in March asked for the US Acting Solicitor General to express its views on the case.

Yesterday, the Acting SG filed this brief with SCOTUS stating that in "the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied." The discussion section of the brief begins this way:

Michigan’s sex-offender-registration scheme contains a variety of features that go beyond the baseline requirements set forth in federal law and differ from those of most other States.  After applying the multi-factor framework set out in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), the court of appeals concluded that the cumulative effect of SORA’s challenged provisions is punitive for ex post facto purposes.  While lower courts have reached different conclusions in analyzing particular features of various state sex-offender-registration schemes, the court of appeals’ analysis of the distinctive features of Michigan’s law does not conflict with any of those decisions, nor does it conflict with this Court’s holding in Smith.  Every court of appeals that has considered an ex post facto challenge to a sex-offender-registry statutory scheme has applied the same Smith framework to determine whether the aggregate effects of the challenged aspects of that scheme are punitive.  And although most state sex-offender-registry schemes share similar features, they vary widely in their form and combination of those features.  Accordingly, to the extent the courts of appeals have reached different outcomes in state sexoffender-registry cases, those outcomes reflect differences in the statutory schemes rather than any divergence in the legal framework.  Finally, petitioners’ concern (Pet. 26-29) that the court of appeals’ decision will prevent the State from receiving some federal funding does not warrant review.  That concern is premature, as it may well be the case that Michigan can continue to receive federal funds notwithstanding this decision.  And the decision does not prevent the State from implementing a sex-offender-registration scheme that is consistent with federal law.  Further review is therefore not warranted.

July 8, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (16)

Wednesday, June 28, 2017

Impressive refreshment of Restoration of Rights Project

CcrcIn this post nearly five years ago, I noted the creation by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) of a terrific on-line resource profiling the law and practice in each US jurisdiction relating to relief from the numerous civil rights and other consequences of criminal conviction.  Now, as detailed in this news release, this resource has gotten an impressive new update. Here are the details via the release:

The Collateral Consequences Resource Center and its partner organizations, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and the National HIRE Network, are pleased to announce the launch of the newly expanded and fully updated Restoration of Rights Project.

The Restoration of Rights Project is an online resource that offers state-by-state analyses of the law and practice in each U.S. jurisdiction relating to restoration of rights and status following arrest or conviction.  Jurisdictional "profiles" cover areas such as loss and restoration of civil rights and firearms rights, judicial and executive mechanisms for avoiding or mitigating collateral consequences, and provisions addressing non-discrimination in employment and licensing. Each jurisdiction's information is separately summarized for quick reference.

In addition to the jurisdictional profiles, a set of 50-state comparison charts summarizes the law and illustrates national patterns in restoration laws and policies.  We expect to supplement these resources in weeks to come with jurisdiction-specific information about organizations that may be able to assist individuals in securing relief, and information on other third-party resources.

The resources that comprise the Restoration of Rights Project were originally published in 2006 by CCRC Executive Director Margaret Love, and the profiles and comparison charts have expanded over the years to broaden their scope and to account for the many changes in this complex area of the law.  The project has recently been hosted by CCRC and NACDL, and its resources have been published in the treatise on collateral consequences published jointly by NACDL and Thompson Reuters (West).

Project resources have now been re-organized into a unified online platform that makes them easier to access, use, and understand.  The short "postcard" summaries of the law in each state -- which serve as a gateway to more detailed information -- have also been reviewed and revised to provide a more current and accurate snapshot of applicable law in each state.

The Project is intended as a resource for practitioners in all phases of the criminal justice system, for courts, for civil practitioners assisting clients whose court-imposed sentence has exposed them to additional civil penalties, for policymakers and advocates interested in reentry and reintegration of convicted persons, and for the millions of Americans with a criminal record who are seeking to put their past behind them.

The Restoration of Rights Project is available now at: http://restoration.ccresourcecenter.org

June 28, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 19, 2017

SCOTUS declares unconstitutional North Carolina criminal law restricting sex offender access to social media

Today was a big day for the First Amendment in the US Supreme Court.  In addition to a notable First Amendment trademark ruling, the Court handed down a widely anticipated ruling in Packingham v. North Carolina, No. 15–1194 (S. Ct. June 19. 2017) (available here), dealing with a state law restricting internet access for sex offenders.  Here is how the Court's majority opinion in Packingham, authored by Justice Kennedy, gets started and a key closing paragraph:

In 2008, North Carolina enacted a statute making it a felony for a registered sex offender to gain access to a number of websites, including commonplace social media websites like Facebook and Twitter.  The question presented is whether that law is permissible under the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause, applicable to the States under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment....

In sum, to foreclose access to social media altogether is to prevent the user from engaging in the legitimate exercise of First Amendment rights. It is unsettling to suggest that only a limited set of websites can be used even by persons who have completed their sentences.  Even convicted criminals — and in some instances especially convicted criminals — might receive legitimate benefits from these means for access to the world of ideas, in particular if they seek to reform and to pursue lawful and rewarding lives.

The majority opinion in Packingham is quite short, but that does not mean it does not pack a punch.  In fact, Justice Alito authored an extended concurrence which was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas in order to lament some of the "undisciplined dicta" in Justice Kennedy's short majority opinion.  Here is how the concurrence begins:

The North Carolina statute at issue in this case was enacted to serve an interest of “surpassing importance.” New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982) — but it has a staggering reach.  It makes it a felony for a registered sex offender simply to visit a vast array of websites, including many that appear to provide no realistic opportunity for communications that could facilitate the abuse of children.  Because of the law’s extraordinary breadth, I agree with the Court that it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

I cannot join the opinion of the Court, however, because of its undisciplined dicta.  The Court is unable to resist musings that seem to equate the entirety of the internet with public streets and parks.  Ante, at 4–5.  And this language is bound to be interpreted by some to mean that the States are largely powerless to restrict even the most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any internet sites, including, for example, teenage dating sites and sites designed to permit minors to discuss personal problems with their peers.  I am troubled by the implications of the Court’s unnecessary rhetoric.

(Though the issues in Packingham are no laughing matter, I am getting a giggle thinking about whether the phrase "undisciplined dicta" would better serve as my stage name if I was part of a nerdy rap band or just ought to be made into a rubber-stamp to help all my students add that commentary to course evaluations.)

June 19, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (16)

Sunday, June 18, 2017

Could jail be "the answer" for drug addicts?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this New York Times opinion piece headlined "Addicts Need Help. Jails Could Have the Answer." This piece is authored by Sam Quinones, the journalist and author of the widely praised "Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opiate Epidemic." Here is how the lengthy piece gets started and its final line:

Not long ago, I visited a Narcotics Anonymous meeting where men with tattoos and short-cropped hair sat in a circle and talked out their errors. One had lived under an overpass, pimping his girlfriend’s daughter for cash to buy heroin. As the thought brought him to tears, his neighbor patted his shoulder. Others owned to stealing from grandparents, to losing jobs and children. Soon, most in the room — men with years of street addiction behind them — were wiping their eyes.

What made the meeting remarkable, however, was not the stories, but where it was taking place. Unit 104 is a 70-man pod in Kenton County Detention Center in northern Kentucky, across the Ohio River from Cincinnati. The unit, and an equivalent one for women, is part of a new approach to jail made necessary by our nationwide epidemic of opiate addiction. Drug overdoses are now the leading cause of death among Americans under 50.

As the country has awakened to that epidemic, a new mantra has emerged: “We can’t arrest our way out of this,” accompanied by calls for more drug-addiction treatment. Yet the opiate epidemic has swamped our treatment-center infrastructure. Only one in 10 addicts get the treatment they need, according to a 2016 surgeon general’s report. New centers are costly to build, politically difficult to find real estate for and beyond the means of most uninsured street addicts, anyway.

So where can we quickly find cheap new capacity for drug treatment accessible to the street addict? Jail is one place few have thought to look.

Jails typically house inmates awaiting trial or serving up to a year for a misdemeanor crime. Many inmates are drug addicts. They vegetate for months, trading crime stories in an atmosphere of boredom and brutality. Any attempt at treatment is usually limited to a weekly visit by a pastor or an Alcoholics Anonymous volunteer. When inmates are released, they’re in the clothes they came in with, regardless of the weather, and have no assistance to re-enter the real world. This kind of jail has always been accepted as an unavoidable fixed cost of government.

But the sheer dimensions of the opiate-addiction epidemic are forcing new ideas. One of them, now being tried in Kentucky, is jail not as a cost but as an investment in recovery. Jails as full-time rehab centers — from lights on to lights out. Jailing addicts is anathema to treatment advocates. However, as as any parent of an addict can tell you, opiates are mind-controlling beasts. A kid who complained about the least little household chore while sober will, as an addict, walk through five miles of snow, endure any hardship or humiliation, to get his dope.

Waiting for an addict to reach rock bottom and make a rational choice to seek treatment sounds nice in theory. But it ignores the nature of the drugs in question, while also assuming a private treatment bed is miraculously available at the moment the addict, who is usually without insurance, is willing and financially able to occupy it. The reality is that, unlike with other drugs, with opiates rock bottom is often death. (Drug overdose deaths last year most likely exceeded 59,000, the most ever in the United States, The Times found in an analysis of preliminary data this month, up about 19 percent over 2015.)

Jail can be a necessary, maybe the only, lever with which to encourage or force an addict who has been locked up to seek treatment before it’s too late. “People don’t go to treatment because they see the light,” said Kevin Pangburn, director of Substance Abuse Services for the Kentucky Department of Corrections. “They go to treatment because they feel the heat.”

Jail may in fact be the best place to initiate addict recovery. It’s in jail where addicts first come face-to-face with the criminal-justice system, long before they commit crimes that warrant a prison sentence. Once in custody and detoxed of the dope that has controlled their decisions, it’s in jail where addicts more clearly behold the wreckage of their lives. And it is at that moment of clarity and contrition when they are typically plunged into a jailhouse of extortion, violence and tedium....

Amid this national epidemic of opiate addiction, rethinking jail, as Kentucky has, as a place of sanctuary and recovery for a population that has lost hope, might not just be advisable; it may be indispensable.

June 18, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7)

Thursday, June 15, 2017

"Support Grows for Civil Commitment of Opioid Users"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Stateline article.  Here is how it gets started:

Amid an opioid addiction epidemic that is killing more than 90 Americans every day, there is a growing movement to make it easier for relatives and health care providers to quickly secure court orders to forcibly confine and treat people who are addicted to drugs.  Most states have civil commitment laws primarily designed to protect people with mental illness from themselves and others.  Many of the laws include drug addiction and alcoholism as a justification for temporary confinement, or at least don’t preclude it.

But in practice, most commitment laws have been ineffective when it comes to people who use heroin and other opioids, in part because some judges have been leery of taking away a person’s civil liberties for what society has long perceived as a moral failing.  Unlike people with severe mental illness, people who are addicted to drugs typically retain the mental capacity to take care of their basic needs, even though the chronic disease alters the brain, making the person eventually value drug use above all else.

New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Washington are considering new civil commitment laws specifically designed for opioid use.  Kentucky has gone back to the drawing board after failing to enact a commitment law for opioid addiction last year.

And in Massachusetts, the one state where civil commitment has been used extensively for opioid addiction, Republican Gov. Charlie Baker wants to make it even more common....

Historically, confining people against their will has been fraught with moral and legal ambiguities and haunted by reports of abuse.  But the parents of young adults who use opioids are pushing state lawmakers and governors to make intervention easier, even as physicians and state health officials search for ways to break the cycle of repeated overdoses.

Addiction professionals generally agree that civil commitment can save lives. But they argue that without effective treatment, confining people with an addiction may do more harm than good.  “People who use substances and have addictions still have civil rights,” said Dr. Alex Walley, director of an addiction medicine fellowship at Boston Medical Center.  “The real question is whether effective treatment is available, which in the case of opioids, is going to be medication. And it’s not OK to limit it to just one medicine,” Walley said.  Another concern is whether the state can ensure that continued treatment will be available once the person is released, he said.

June 15, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, June 08, 2017

"Neither Justice Nor Treatment: Drug Courts in the United States"

PhrThe title of this post is the title of this notable new report issued by the group Physicians for Human Rights. Here is an excerpts from the report's executive summary:

U.S. drug courts [are] specialized courts within the criminal justice system set up to provide alternative sentencing options — treatment instead of jail or prison time — for people charged with criminal behavior linked to drug possession, sale, or addiction.  The first courts were opened in 1989 to ease dockets and jails that were overflowing as a result of strict federal and state laws passed in the 1980s in an attempt to reduce drug supply and consumption.

Almost three decades later, there are more than 3,100 drug courts operating in the United States.  But while the courts’ proponents say they reduce recidivism for people with substance use disorders, critics say the system abuses due process, often mandates treatment for people who don’t actually need it — people without drug dependence — and fails to provide quality care to many who do.

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) assessed the availability and quality of substance use disorder treatment through drug courts in three states — Florida, New Hampshire, and New York, chosen for the diversity of their drug court and health system approaches — and found major obstacles to quality evidence-based treatment for drug court participants in all three states.  Overall, PHR found that drug courts largely failed at providing treatment to those who truly needed it, and filled up limited treatment spaces with courtmandated patients who didn’t always need the care.  In many cases, court officials with no medical background mandated inappropriate treatment not rooted in the evidence base, or mandated treatment for people who didn’t need it.  In all cases, the functioning and mandate of the drug courts posed significant human rights concerns.

At the most basic level, PHR found that access to quality treatment was hampered by the inherent tension between a punitive criminal justice logic and therapeutic concern for drug court participants as patients.  In fact, despite the stated intention of drug courts to treat people who use drugs as ill rather Executive Summary than deviant, drug court participants were often punished for relapsing, missing therapy appointments, or otherwise failing to follow court rules.

One key concern motivating this research was whether drug courts were able to appropriately diagnose and facilitate treatment for people with substance use disorders who are in conflict with the law.  We found that, in many cases, they were not.  Diagnosis and initial treatment plans for drug court participants were often developed by people with no medical training or oversight, at times resulting in mandated treatment that was directly at odds with medical knowledge and recommendations.  The most egregious example of this was the refusal, delay, or curbing of medication-assisted treatment (MAT) (also known as substitution or replacement therapy) to people with opioid use disorders, despite evidence that treatment for such disorders in many cases requires long-term — sometimes permanent — medication.  Some drug courts also prevented participants from accessing or staying on medically prescribed treatment for anxiety, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and other chronic health problems.

Human rights concerns are thus particularly relevant for drug courts, as these courts blur the line between voluntary and coerced treatment, and compel participants to waive the right to confidentiality.  Furthermore, most drug courts operate with regulations that subject medical expertise and advice regarding treatment to prosecutorial oversight and potential veto, raising questions about a person’s ability to access impartial evidencebased care.  Even where courts did not actively violate human rights protections of their participants, the regulatory set-up constantly threatened such violations.

June 8, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, June 06, 2017

"Kinds of Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this essay by Douglas Husak now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Contemporary states execute, imprison, fine, place on probation, conditionally discharge, caution, and do a great deal more to the persons they convict.  What general principles govern how retributivists should choose between the foregoing responses to culpable wrongdoing — or select an altogether different type of sanction?  If my subsequent reasoning is sound, it is easy to understand why retributivists have tended to neglect this issue.  They have neglected it because they have little to contribute to its resolution.  In what follows, I will support this conclusion and discuss a few of the somewhat controversial positions on which it rests.  I hope to make some headway on this topic by defending what I call the deferential view about kinds of punishment (or deferential view for short).

June 6, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 01, 2017

Can football stars help get Ohio criminal justice reform over the goal line?

I am fond of stressing to students in my sentencing classes that a wide array of actors are involved in the development and application of sentencing law and policy.  And now this new local article, which prompts the question in the title of this post, will allow me to highlight in future classes that even famous football players can sometimes get in on the sentencing action.  Here are the basic details (with links from the original):

Three former Ohio State football players and one Cleveland Browns player are among those imploring the Ohio Senate to embrace a plan that will keep low-level offenders out of prison.  Former Buckeyes Malcolm Jenkins, Raekwon McMillan and Chris "Beanie" Wells have signed a letter to Ohio senators in support of the Targeted Community Alternatives to Prison plan.  So, too, has Ibraheim Campbell, a defensive back at Northwestern University who was drafted by the Cleveland Browns in the fourth round of the 2015 NFL draft.

"As NFL players who have personal connections to our broken justice system and have seen its impact on our own neighborhoods, we support justice reforms that strengthen families and restore communities," begins the letter.

The TCAP reforms, which are included in Gov. John Kasich's budget proposal, include eliminating mandatory prison sentences for minor parole violations and transferring low-level, non-violent to local jails or to drug treatment programs or other community-based alternatives.  A House of Representatives version of the budget includes significantly less money than what Kasich wants for TCAP reforms, said Holly Harris, executive director of the U.S. Justice Action Network....

She said the football players who signed the letter are not being paid. "They simply care about their communities," Harris said.

Campbell said during an interview with cleveland.com that he's had family members who have been subjected to injustices in the legal system and that reform is "something that I'm passionate about."

The governor's plan would mean an estimated 3,400 offenders a year would be jailed or supervised locally instead of being sent to prison. The House version would divert only 2,100 offenders, Harris said.

Not everyone supports the plan. John Murphy, executive director of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association, said the plan would limit sentencing options. The County Commissioners Association of Ohio believes the plan has merit, but is concerned about the cost to counties and the timeline for the change.

The Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections has instituted pilot TCAP programs in eight counties - Clinton, Ross,, Medina, Lucas, Defiance, Henry, Williams and Fulton counties.

June 1, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, May 30, 2017

Australia working on a novel travel ban for certain sex offenders ... to keep them in the country

This new AP article, Headlined "Australia plans to ban pedophiles from traveling overseas," reports on a kind of travel ban being discussed down under that is quite distinct from the one now being litigated here in the US.  Here are the details:

Australia plans to ban convicted pedophiles from traveling overseas in what the government said Tuesday is a world-first move to protect vulnerable children in Southeast Asia from exploitation.  Australian pedophiles are notorious for taking inexpensive vacations to nearby Southeast Asian and Pacific island countries to abuse children there.

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop said she would cancel the passports of around 20,000 pedophiles on the national child sex offender register under legislation that will be introduced to Parliament soon.  "There has been increasing community concern about sexual exploitation of vulnerable children and community concern is justified," she told reporters.

Almost 800 registered child sex offenders travelled overseas from Australia last year and about half went to Southeast Asian destinations, she said.  "There will be new legislation which will make Australia a world leader in protecting vulnerable children in our region from child sex tourism," Bishop said.

Justice Minister Michael Keenan said no country has such a travel ban.  He said 2,500 new convicted pedophiles would be added to the sex offender register each year and would also lose their passports.

The register contains 3,200 serious offenders who will be banned from travel for life.  Less serious offenders drop off the register after several years of complying with reporting conditions and would become eligible to have their passports renewed.

Independent Senator Derryn Hinch, who was molested as a child and was jailed twice as a radio broadcaster for naming pedophiles in contravention of court orders, took credit for the government initiative. Hinch said he had not known that convicted pedophiles were allowed to travel before he received a letter from Australian actress and children's rights campaigner Rachel Griffiths soon after he was elected to the Senate last year. "If we can take a passport from a bankrupt, why can't we stop our pedophiles from traveling to Myanmar?" Griffiths wrote. Under Australian law, a bankrupt person cannot travel overseas without a trustee's permission.

Hinch, who was involved in drafting the legislation, said temporary passports could be provided to pedophiles who need to travel for legitimate business or family reasons, and for pedophiles living overseas who need to return to Australia as their visas expire. "This will not apply to a teenager who has been caught sexting to his 15-year-old girlfriend," said Hinch, referring to sexual phone communications. "I know sometimes, I think unfairly, they go on registers, but we're trying to work it out so they don't," he added....

Australia has attempted to crack down on Australian child sex tourists by adding a new criminal offense punishable by up to 25 years in prison for Australian citizens or residents who molest children overseas.

May 30, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentencing around the world, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12)

Sunday, May 21, 2017

"Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses"

The title of this post is the title of this notable paper authored by Neil Sobol and now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Although media and academic sources often describe mass incarceration as the primary challenge facing the American criminal justice system, the imposition of criminal justice debt may be a more pervasive problem.  On March 14, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that state chief justices forward a letter to all judges in their jurisdictions describing the constitutional violations associated with the illegal assessment and enforcement of fines and fees.  The DOJ’s concerns include the incarceration of indigent individuals without determining whether the failure to pay is willful and the use of bail practices that result in impoverished defendants remaining in jail merely because they are unable to afford bail.

Criminal justice debt, also known as legal financial obligations (LFOs), impacts not only those incarcerated but also millions of others who receive economic sanctions for low-level offenses, including misdemeanors and ordinance violations. LFOs, which include bail, fines, and fees, are imposed at every stage in the justice process, including pre-conviction, sentencing, incarceration, and post-release supervision.

For those who are unable to pay criminal justice debt, “poverty penalties” are often added in the form of charges for interest, payment plans, late payments, and collection.  As incarceration rates and local budgetary concerns have increased, so too has the imposition of LFOs. Moreover, while authorities are trying to reduce incarceration, criminal justice debt may become an even greater concern, as one popular alternative is decriminalization and the imposition of monetary charges.

Often the financial charges are unrelated to the traditional notions of punishment or protection of public safety and instead, reflect a desire to maximize revenue collection. Many municipalities outsource services to private probation companies and collectors, which are often unsupervised and use collection procedures not authorized for private parties.  Moreover, new technologies allow for additional collection abuses.

To date, states and municipalities have been ineffective in preventing abuses associated with criminal justice debt. Relying on the approach used for consumer debt collection, I propose a federal solution.  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) provide the foundation for a federal framework for addressing problems with the collection of consumer debts. I contend that the justifications that supported the federal statutory and administrative solution for consumer debts are at least as significant, if not greater, for a similar framework to combat abusive criminal justice debt practices.

Not only do individuals with criminal justice debt encounter the same abuses and consequences that consumer debtors face — including harassment, negative credit reports, and the adverse impact on financing and employment prospects — but they also face denial of welfare benefits, suspension of driver’s’ licenses, arrest, and incarceration.  In practice, the imposition of criminal justice debt reflects actual discrimination and creates distrust in the system. Accordingly, I advocate the adoption of a federal act and the use of the DOJ to coordinate enforcement and outreach activities to attack abuses in the collection of criminal justice debt.

May 21, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, May 19, 2017

US Commission on Civil Rights conducting big hearing on collateral consequences

As detailed in this official meeting notice, the United States Commission on Civil Rights is having a big public "briefing" focused on "Collateral Consequences: The Crossroads of Punishment, Redemption, and the Effects on Communities." The event in DC begins at 9:30 am and will be live-streamed at this link. Here is the scheduled run-down of the panels and speakers:

Panel One: Overview of Collateral Consequences of Incarceration:

National experts provide an overview of the long-lasting effects of incarceration after a prison sentence has ended. Panelists will discuss how these continuing barriers impact recidivism and particular communities. Speakers’ Remarks:

  • Margaret Love, Executive Director, Collateral Consequences Resource Center
  • Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute
  • Traci Burch, Associate Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University
  • John Malcolm, Vice President of the Institute for Constitutional Government, Heritage Foundation
  • Naomi Goldberg, Policy and Research Director, Movement Advancement Project

Panel Two: Access to Civil Participation after Incarceration:

National experts and professors discuss the barriers to civil participation following incarceration, specifically focusing on the right to vote and jury participation. Speakers’ Remarks:

  • Marc Mauer, Executive Director, The Sentencing Project
  • Hans von Spakovsky, Senior Legal Fellow, Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, Heritage Foundation
  • James Binnall, Assistant Professor of Law, Criminology, and Criminal Justice, California State University at Long Beach
  • Anna Roberts, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law and Faculty Fellow, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality

Panel Three: Access to Self-Sufficiency and Meeting Basic Needs:

National experts discuss the barriers to self-sufficiency and meeting basic needs after incarceration. Panelists will focus on employment, housing and access to public benefits. Speakers’ Remarks:

  • Maurice Emsellem, Program Director, National Employment Law Project
  • Kate Walz, Director of Housing Justice, Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law
  • Amy Hirsch, Managing Attorney, North Philadelphia Law Center; Welfare, Aging and Disabilities Units, Community Legal Services
  • Marc Levin, Director, Center for Effective Justice; Texas Public Policy Foundation; Right on Crime

May 19, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, May 18, 2017

"Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul Riskind now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In this article we derive the sentence — choosing among the sanctions of prison, parole, and probation — that achieves a target level of deterrence at least cost.  Potential offenders discount the future disutility of sanctions and the state discounts the future costs of sanctions.  Prison has higher disutility and higher cost per unit time than parole and probation, but the cost of prison per unit of disutility can be lower or higher than the cost of parole and probation per unit of disutility.  The optimal order of sanctions depends on the relative discount rates of potential offenders and the state, and the optimal duration of sanctions depends on the relative costs per unit of disutility among the sanctions and on the target level of deterrence.

We focus on the case in which potential offenders discount the disutility of sanctions at a higher rate than the state discounts the costs of sanctions.  In this case, if prison is more cost-effective than parole and probation — that is, has a lower cost per unit of disutility — prison should be used exclusively.  If prison is less cost-effective than parole and probation, probation should be used if the deterrence target is low enough, and prison followed by parole should be used if the deterrence target is relatively high.  Notably, it may be optimal to employ a prison term even if prison is less cost-effective than parole and probation and even if prison is not needed to achieve the target level of deterrence, because of what we refer to as the front-loading advantage of imprisonment.

May 18, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

New lifetime GPS tracking for old sex offenders raising concerns in Missouri

This lengthy local article, headlined "Hundreds of Missouri sex offenders now required to wear GPS monitoring devices for life," reports on a new sex offender monitoring law that is causing consternation. Here are excerpts:

A sex offender from St. Charles County thought he had moved on with his life after successfully completing five years of probation for sending webcam photographs of his genitals to an undercover police officer posing as a 13-year-old girl.  Now he’s among hundreds of people in Missouri who are learning they must attach GPS monitoring systems to their ankles for life, even though such a requirement wasn’t part of their sentencing agreement.

The devices send out alerts if an offender lingers near a school or a park.  Cut the wide black strap and the waterproof device will tell on them. It beeps to prompt a verbal command from state officials, say to make a payment or report to probation officers immediately.

The retroactive requirements are part of a revised state criminal code that went into effect Jan. 1.  Offenders either found guilty or who pleaded guilty to 13 various sex crimes in question based on an act committed on or after Aug. 28, 2006, are subject to the added security measures.  Previously, the monitoring technology was used for a more limited class of high-risk offenders.

The St. Charles man is among several sex offenders who are suing and challenging the state. In the lawsuit, in which he is named only as D.G., the 40-year-old argues that the law didn’t exist when he pleaded guilty.  He claims he’s no longer “legally subject” to the jurisdiction of state prison authorities. He argues that he shouldn’t be required to pay monthly supervision fees for decades, nor have travel or residency restricted for life.

“I don’t think a lawyer can make a straight-faced argument that it’s constitutional,” said Clayton-based attorney Matt Fry, who is suing the state on behalf of D.G. and has many other plaintiffs in the wings.

A March 29 “Dear Sir/Madam” letter from chief state supervisor Julie Kempker lays out the law, including threat of a class D felony if conditions are violated.  “We understand that this change may be unexpected,” Kempker said in the letter.  “Rather than being detracted by the lifetime supervision requirements, you are encouraged to remain focused on your daily supervision responsibilities and to do those things that improve your life and positively impact your family and the community in which you live.”

Many sex offenders panicked and started calling lawyers. Some are confused: for instance, those no longer on supervision who moved away from Missouri.

A 41-year-old sex offender from south St. Louis County said he sees the changes as unlawful, too costly and ineffective.  “Lifetime. For the rest of your life. I can’t even comprehend it,” said the man, who didn’t want to be identified to avoid bringing more unwanted attention to himself.

According to court records, he pleaded guilty in 2012 to first-degree child molestation for touching the genitalia of a friend’s 7-year-old daughter.  The first-time offender was sentenced to 10 years in prison. He spent four months behind bars before he was let out to undergo treatment in the community. So long as he did well, he’d be done with state supervision after five years on probation, not including registering as a sex offender for life.  But during a monthly visit to his probation officer in April, he found out about being subject to the added layer of oversight.

He said he argued that lifetime GPS monitoring wasn’t part of his sentencing agreement. Still, the device was attached April 26.  He’s still getting used to wearing it. He said the device puts his job stocking snack machines in jeopardy and that he’s too embarrassed to wear shorts in public . He said it seemed like extra punishment added after the fact.

Kim Kilgore, the St. Louis County prosecutor who handled his case, disagreed. “It’s a collateral consequence of his plea,” Kilgore said. “The legislature has spoken that, in the interest to the public, he should be required to wear this. Mind you, his victim was 7 years old.”

She said sex offenses are a public health issue and should be handled accordingly, similar to people with a contagious disease who are quarantined. “Think of the burden that my victim suffers every day of her life for something he chose to do,” she said.

Officials have tried to notify at least 432 sex offenders like the man from south St. Louis County about the new monitoring requirements, according to the Department of Corrections, which oversees the division of probation and parole.  At the end of April, 364 of them had been placed on GPS monitoring.  They were already on state supervision. About 800 prison inmates are on deck. So are 500 people who already completed their sentences and are considered free.

May 16, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (25)

Three new CCRC posts highlighting how collateral consequences have become a focal point for modern criminal justice reform

Regular readers should recall me highlighting all the great work being done regularly over at the Collateral Consequences Resource Center, and three recent postings at CCRC struck me as worth a special mention because they each in distinct ways showcase the heightened attention and concern for collateral consequences in modern criminal justice reform conversations.  (At the risk of being cheeky, one might say collateral consequences are no longer being treated as collateral by serious advocates for criminal justice reform.  

Here are these three posts that caught my eye as highlighting distinct and distinctly important institutional players paying close attention to collateral consequences:

May 16, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, May 14, 2017

Notable review of Colorado's recent experiences and concerns with polygraph testing of sex offenders

The Denver Post has this interesting article about the monitoring and testing of sex offenders in the Centennial State.  The piece is headlined "Colorado’s pricey polygraph testing of sex offenders under fire as critics target accuracy, expense: Psychologist calls state’s $5 million polygraph program 'grossly excessive' as state legislature examines cost."  Here are some excerpts from the extended piece:

Colorado has spent more than $5 million to administer polygraphs on convicted sex offenders over the last seven years despite concerns that the tests are so unreliable they can’t be used as evidence during civil or criminal trials.

Polygraphs help officials decide which prisoners convicted of sex offenses are suited for release from prison by probing their sexual history, attitudes about their crimes and whether they are committing new offenses.  They also guide how offenders on parole or probation are supervised.  “The polygraph really gives useful information,” said Lenny Woodson, administrator for the Colorado Department of Corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program. “And we’ve made it clear in our standards that it isn’t to be used in isolation. We’re using as many avenues as possible to make treatment decisions.”

But a bipartisan cross-section of legislators and a retired judge have joined with offenders and their families to question the validity of the tests.  They contend too much weight is placed on what they argue is little more than junk science.  Flawed polygraphs can complicate efforts for low-risk sex offenders to get paroled and lead to new restrictions for parolees or probationers, critics say.  Failure to take the tests can lead to sanctions, including eventual revocation to prison.

Studies show that up to 70 percent of U.S. states polygraph sex offenders, but experts have testified that Colorado uses the tests aggressively, even polygraphing juvenile offenders for consensual sexting.  Critics contend an entrenched and profitable cottage industry, rife with conflicts of interests, has grown up around polygraphing sex offenders in Colorado.  “To me, there is no question that it borders on a scam,” said Senate President pro tem Jerry Sonnenberg, R-Sterling.  “We incentivize the people who give the polygraph tests to have inconclusive results so an offender has to go back and pay for another one on a more regular basis.”

Colorado’s polygraphing is “grossly excessive,” said Deirdre D’Orazio, a psychologist who serves as an expert on a high-risk sex-offender task force in California, during testimony in federal court in Denver in 2015.  D’Orazio led a team of consultants that issued a report for the Colorado department of corrections in 2013 blasting how it manages sex offenders and how it uses polygraphs.  She returned to the state to testify for Howard Alt, then 51, who a decade earlier was convicted for having sex with a 15-year-old girl and possessing nude computer images of teenage girls.

After his release from prison, Alt had taken 28 polygraphs, often with competing results.  The treatment provider that tested Alt had a “fiduciary incentive conflict” to fail him, D’Orazio said.  The firm was “making money on outcomes that are not in the offender client’s favor” by requiring him to pay for more tests and treatment, she said.

A deceptive finding on one sex-history polygraph had prompted supervision officials to bar Alt, a former software developer, from accepting a job that would raise his salary from $60,000 to $200,000 annually.  Months later, the polygrapher found Alt to be truthful on the same questions even though he did not change his answers, showing the sanction against him was unwarranted, D’Orazio said.  “It is not a scientifically valid procedure,” D’Orazio testified.  “It has a high false-positive rate, which means misclassifying people who are telling the truth as being deceitful. So there is a lot of controversy about using the polygraph in high-stakes decisions.”...

The state of Colorado, relying on court fees paid by those convicted of sex crimes, picks up the tab of the polygraphs for those who are in prison and also often for the indigent who are out on parole or probation.  But when the state fund that pays for the tests runs out of money, parolees and probationers who don’t have the money to pay for them risk running afoul of their supervision requirements.  Revocation to prison can occur for refusing to take the polygraphs, defense lawyers say....

In addition to the legislators, C. Dennis Maes, former chief judge of Pueblo District Court, has criticized the use of polygraphs in Colorado.  He has written to the chief judges of all judicial districts in the state and to Nancy Rice, chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, urging a halt to polygraphing sex offenders, pointing out the results can’t be admitted as evidence during civil or criminal trails.  After his retirement, he represented a sex offender on probation, and was shocked when the results of his polygraph were admitted as evidence during a court hearing.

“The Constitution applies to everyone,” Maes said.  “It doesn’t apply to everyone except sex offenders.  The Constitution was designed to protect those that might be the most easily attacked by the government, even sex offenders.  You don’t see polygraphs in any other area of the law.  You can be the most prolific bad-check writer ever and you don’t have to take them, but you do if you’re a sex offender.”

The Denver Post has this companion article headlined "Professional polygrapher holds position of power on state’s sex-offender treatment board: Jeff Jenks’ firm will receive $1.9 million to test sex offenders in Colorado prisons as he sits on the Colorado Sex Offender Management Board"

May 14, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7)

Friday, May 05, 2017

"Mass Monitoring"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Avlana Eisenberg and now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Business is booming for criminal justice monitoring technology: these days “ankle bracelet” refers as often to an electronic monitor as to jewelry.  Indeed, the explosive growth of electronic monitoring (“EM”) for criminal justice purposes — a phenomenon which this Article terms “mass monitoring” — is among the most overlooked features of the otherwise well-known phenomenon of mass incarceration.

This Article addresses the fundamental question of whether EM is punishment.  It finds that the origins and history of EM as a progressive alternative to incarceration — a punitive sanction — support characterization of EM as punitive, and that EM comports with the goals of dominant punishment theories.  Yet new uses of EM have complicated this narrative.  The Article draws attention to the expansion of EM both as a substitute for incarceration and as an added sanction, highlighting the analytic importance of what it terms the “substitution/addition distinction.”  The Article argues that, as a punitive sanction, EM can be justified when used as a substitute for incarceration, but that its use as an added sanction may result in excessive punishment and raises significant constitutional and policy concerns.

The Article’s findings have crucial implications for hotly contested questions over whether monitoring can be imposed retroactively and whether pretrial house arrest plus monitoring (which resembles the post-conviction use of monitoring as a substitute for incarceration) should count toward time served.  The Article provides a framework for addressing these questions and, at the same time, offers practical policy guidance that will enable courts and policymakers to ensure that EM programs are genuinely a cost-saving, progressive substitute for incarceration rather than another destructive expansion of government control.

May 5, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, May 04, 2017

South Carolina Supreme Court rejects constitutional challenge to juve sex offender's mandatory lifetime registration/monitoring

Yesterday the South Carolina Supreme Court handed down an opinion in In the Interest of Justin B., No. 27716 (S. Ct. May 3, 2017) (available here), unanimously rejecting the contention that "mandatory imposition of lifetime registration and electronic monitoring on juveniles is unconstitutional."  The relatively short opinion is a bit curious because, after reviewing a bunch of previous rulings in which it had "upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory lifetime sex offender registry requirement with electronic monitoring for adults and juveniles," the opinion does not discuss Graham or Miller but does confront and reject the juvenile's assertion that the constitutional analysis should "yield a different result under the reasoning of Roper v. Simmons."

Roper is, indisputably, a relevant precedent if and when a juvenile offender is arguing against mandatory imposition of lifetime registration and electronic monitoring.  But, in my view, the more recent precedents of Graham and Miller are even more critical and central to mounting an Eighth Amendment argument against any mandatory lifetime sanction for a juvenile offender. (As noted in this prior post, more than five years ago the Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Graham to find unconstitutional a mandatory lifetime registration requirement for juvenile sex offenders.)

In the end, I do not think engagement with Graham and Miller would have made any real difference to the South Carolina Supreme Court.  As this conclusion to the opinion highlights, that court has long deemed registration and monitoring to be civil non-punitive provisions that are not really subject to traditional constitutional limits on punishment:

The requirement that adults and juveniles who commit criminal sexual conduct must register as a sex offender and wear an electronic monitor is not a punitive measure, and the requirement bears a rational relationship to the Legislature's purpose in the Sex Offender Registry Act to protect our citizens — including children — from repeat sex offenders.  The requirement, therefore, is not unconstitutional.  If the requirement that juvenile sex offenders must register and must wear an electronic monitor is in need of change, that decision is to be made by the Legislature — not the courts.  The decision of the family court to follow the mandatory, statutory requirement to impose lifetime sex offender registration and electronic monitoring on Justin B. is AFFIRMED

May 4, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (16)

Sunday, April 30, 2017

A rare year without any formal amendments to the US Sentencing Guidelines

Download (1)Hard-core federal sentencing nerds like me know that the end of April/start of May is the time period each year when the US Sentencing Commission submits formal guideline amendments to Congress.  And, as noted in this post from December, just before a number of Commissioners' terms expired, the USSC unanimously voted to publish some ambitious proposed amendments for 2017.

But, is seems personnel transitions mean 2017 will go in the books as one of the rare years without any formal amendments to the guidelines. Acting USSC Chair Judge William Pryor explained why in these remarks given before the start of the USSC public hearing a few weeks ago:

Although the Commission again has the four voting members required to promulgate guideline amendments, the lack of a voting quorum for almost three critical months of our amendment cycle means we will not be able to promulgate amendments this year.  Those who closely follow us know that in December, we voted to publish several proposed amendments for comment, among them an amendment that would add a downward adjustment and encourage the use of alternatives for some first-time offenders, and amendments that would respond to recommendations made by the Tribal Issues Advisory Group regarding how tribal offenses and juvenile sentences are considered.

The public comment period has closed.  We received a great deal of thoughtful public comment, which can be reviewed on our website.  We thank the public for taking the time to give careful consideration to these proposals.

Ordinarily, we would have received testimony about the proposed amendments at a public hearing in March.  But with only two voting commissioners we deferred scheduling a hearing until a reconstituted Commission was formed.

By statute, the Commission is required to submit any amendments to the guidelines to Congress by May 1st for a 180-day congressional review period.  Because we did not have a voting quorum for almost three months, there simply is not enough time for us to schedule a public hearing on the proposed amendments, digest the public comment, deliberate, and hold a public vote by the statutory deadline.  Therefore, this year we will not promulgate any amendments to the guidelines.  But our data analysis, legal research, and public comment on these proposed amendments should provide us a sound basis for considering guideline amendments as early as possible during the next amendment cycle.

April 30, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)