Tuesday, April 24, 2012

Very different case provides a very different (sentencing) perspective on Florida gun laws

This new CNN article, headlined "Stand your ground law under scrutiny in domestic violence case," provides a very different view of Florida's criminal justice system and gun laws than comes via the Matin-Zimmerman case. Here are excerpts from the piece:

Marissa Alexander, a 31-year-old mother of three, pleaded for her freedom as an inmate in the Duval County Jail in Jacksonville, Florida. "This is my life I'm fighting for," she said while wiping away tears. She added, "If you do everything to get on the right side of the law, and it is a law that does not apply to you, where do you go from there?"

Alexander is referring to Florida's so-called stand your ground law, a law that has come under scrutiny since the killing of Trayvon Martin. Unlike the Martin case, which involved one stranger killing another, Alexander's case involved her gun and her abusive husband.

On August 1, 2010, she said her husband, Rico Gray, read text messages on her phone that she had written to her ex-husband. She said Gray became enraged and accused her of being unfaithful. "That's when he strangled me. He put his hands around my neck," Alexander said.

She managed to escape his grip but instead of running out the front door of their home, she ran into the garage, she said, to get into her truck and drive away. Alexander said that in the confusion of the fight, she forgot to get her keys and the garage door wouldn't open, so she made a fateful decision. "I knew I had to protect myself," she said, adding, "I could not fight him. He was 100 pounds more than me. I grabbed my weapon at that point."

She went back inside the house and when Gray saw her pistol at her side, she said he threatened to kill her, so she raised the gun and fired one shot. "I believe when he threatened to kill me, that's what he was absolutely going to do. That's what he intended to do. Had I not discharged my weapon at that point, I would not be here."

Alexander, however, said she did not aim the gun at her husband.  She said she fired into the air intending to scare him away and Gray quickly left the house with his two children. No one was hurt in the incident, but Alexander sits in jail facing a 20-year sentence on three charges of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon....

Alexander's attorney filed a motion for dismissal under the stand your ground law but at that proceeding her husband changed his story.  Gray said he lied during his deposition after conspiring with his wife in an effort to protect her.  At the hearing, he denied threatening to kill his wife, adding, "I begged and pleaded for my life when she had the gun." The motion was denied by the judge.

Alexander was offered a plea deal..., but she opted to go to trial. A jury found Alexander guilty in 12 minutes. She is baffled why invoking the stand your ground law wasn't successful in her case. "Other defendants have used it. What's so different about my situation that it doesn't apply to me?" she asked.

The local NAACP believes race may have played a role."There's a double standard with stand your ground," said Isaiah Rumlin, president of the Jacksonville Chapter of the NAACP. "The law is applied differently between African-Americans and whites who are involved in these types of cases," he added. Rumlin cited two shooting cases in Florida with white shooters: One was had a successful stand your ground defense and the other has yet to be charged with a crime....

Through a spokeswoman, State Attorney Angela Corey declined to comment on the case until after the sentencing. Alexander's attorney, Kevin M. Cobbin, is fighting for a new trial and that hearing is tentatively scheduled for next week. If that motion is denied, Alexander will receive a mandatory 20-year sentence with no possibility of parole.

In part because this case is garnering new media attention, the folks at Families Against Mandatory Minimums have released this notable new press release to spotlight the broader sentencing concern these kinds of cases implicate.  Here is how the press release begins:

FAMM President Julie Stewart today called on Florida lawmakers to repeal the state’s “10-20-Life” automatic prison sentence for assault with a deadly weapon without intent to kill. The call comes as Marissa Alexander, a 31-year-old mother of three, prepares to be sentenced for a 2010 incident in which she fired a gun into the ceiling of her house to persuade her abusive husband to leave.

“A lot of attention has been paid to Florida’s ‘Stand Your Ground’ law and far too little to the state’s extreme, one-size-fits-all sentencing laws,” Ms. Stewart said.  “Less than three years ago, Orville Lee Wollard, a lawful gun owner, fired a warning shot in his home to chase off a young man who had been abusing his teenage daughter.  After Wollard rejected a plea deal and a jury rejected Wollard’s self-defense claim, a Florida judge was forced by the state’s mandatory minimum sentencing law for assault to send Wollard to prison for 20 years.  Mr. Wollard’s judge stated that he thought the sentence was excessive, but said his hands were tied.

“In the coming weeks, Marissa Alexander, who was also found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon, will likely be sentenced to the same 20-year mandatory minimum prison term. While reasonable people can disagree on whether Mr. Wollard or Ms. Alexander deserve any prison time for their conduct, no one can honestly believe that these were the types of cases the legislature had in mind when it passed the 10-20-Life automatic gun sentence,” Stewart said.

April 24, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Friday, February 24, 2012

"Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary Observations"

The title of this post is the title of this new short paper by Glenn Harlan Reynolds, which is now available via SSRN and has this on-sentence abstract: "With the Second Amendment now a working part of the Bill Of Rights in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, this brief Essay examines the likely extent of penumbral rights under the Second Amendment, as well as the possible effect on unenumerated rights in general of an enforceable right to arms."

A quick review of the draft leads me to conclude that Professor Reynolds sees, as do I, how the Second Amendment could now have a potentially profound impact on the application of some criminal gun laws. Consider, for example, this interesting passage from the article:

First Amendment analogies, in fact, suggest another doctrine that might apply: chilling effect.  Traditionally, violation of gun laws was treated as mere malum prohibitum, and penalties for violations were generally light.  During our nation’s interlude of hostility toward guns in the latter half of the twentieth century, penalties for violations of gun laws, especially in states with generally anti-gun philosophies, became much stiffer.  Gun ownership was treated as a suspect (or perhaps “deviant” is a better word) act — one to be engaged in, if at all, at the actor’s peril.

But with gun ownership now recognized as an important constitutional right belonging to all Americans, that deviant characterization cannot be correct.  Regulation of firearms cannot now justifiably proceed on an in terrorem approach, in which the underlying goal is to discourage people from having anything to do with firearms at all.  Laws treating fairly minor or technical violations as felonies must be regarded with the same sort of suspicion as pre–New York Times v. Sullivan laws on criminal libel: as improper burdens on the exercise of a constitutional right.

February 24, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Monday, January 23, 2012

Doesn't Heller and McDonald impact old precedents concerning federal FIP crimes?

The question in the title of this post is prompted an interesting (and I think incorrect) ruling today by a Tenth Circuit panel in US v. Games-Perez, No. 11-1011 (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2012) (available here).  The issue and basics of the ruling are explained in the majority opinions's first paragraph:  

Defendant and appellant Miguel Games-Perez was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Claiming that he was unaware that he was actually a felon, Mr. Games-Perez filed a motion inlimine, seeking a pre-trial ruling that the government was required to prove that he actually knew he was a felon.   When that motion was denied, Mr. Games-Perez filed a motion to enter a conditional guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), asking to reserve the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion in limine. The district court granted Mr. Games-Perez’s motion, pursuant to which he entered a conditional guilty plea. The district court sentenced him to fiftyseven months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Mr. Games-Perez appeals his sentence, which we affirm.

The majority opinion affirms the ruling that the defendant need not know he was a felon in order to be guilty of the federal crime of "felon-in-possission" of a firearm by reaffirming a 1996 ruling of the circuit that no mens rea is required as to the "is a felon" element of this federal crime.  Whether that was a sound ruling in 1996 is debatable, but it strikes me that it is a constitutionally problematic ruling in the wake of the SCOTUS Second Amendment rulings in Heller and McDonald that certain persons have a constitutional right to possess a firearm in certain circumstances.

Notably, in a separate lengthy concurrence, Judge Gorsuch assails the soundness of the 1996 precedent stressed by the majority with reference to the Second Amendment:

Following the statutory text would simply require the government to prove that the defendant knew of his prior felony conviction. And there’s nothing particularly strange about that. After all, there is “a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country,” and the Supreme Court has held the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to own firearms and may not be infringed lightly. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). At the same time, of course, the Court has expressly indicated that laws dispossessing felons are consistent with the Constitution. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; but see United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048-49 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (questioning the Court’s analysis on this score). And given all this, it is hardly crazy to think that in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution Congress might require the government to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the only fact (his felony status) separating criminal behavior from not just permissible, but constitutionally protected, conduct.

But, despite this astute analysis, Judge Gorsuch feel compelled to follow the circuit's 1996 precedent rather than to conclude (as his own reasoning suggests) that Heller and McDonald makes this old precedent constitutionally suspect.  Curious -- and worrisome for anyone seriously committed to gun right and/or concerned about broad application of vague laws limiting gun possession.

January 23, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack

Wednesday, January 04, 2012

Fourth Circuit suggests people must be "responsible" to get full Second Amendment protection

The Fourth Circuit has an interesting and notable Second Amendment ruling today in US v. Chapman, No. No. 10-5071 (4th Cir. Jan. 4, 2012) (available here). Here is how the opinion begins, the passage that prompts the title of this post, and the ends of the opinion:

Section 922(g)(8) of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits a person who is subject to a domestic violence protective order issued under certain specified circumstances from, inter alia, possessing a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The sole issue raised on appeal by Ronald Chapman (Chapman) is whether his conviction on one count of violating § 922(g)(8) survives his as-applied constitutional challenge under the Second Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. II.  For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court [which rejected the defendant's Second Amendment claim]....

Chapman’s claim is not within the core right identified in Heller — the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense. Assuming arguendo that Chapman was a law-abiding citizen at the time he possessed the six firearms and 991 cartridges of ammunition set forth in the indictment, he was, without a doubt, not a responsible citizen by virtue of: (1) a judicial finding that he likely committed domestic abuse; (2) his engaging in behavior causing him to be judicially prohibited for 180 days from using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against his intimate partner that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; (3) his serious attempts at suicide using firearms in the very home in which he claims to have possessed such firearms for self-defense and his endangering the life of his ex-wife in the process; and (4) his discharge of a firearm out of the bedroom window in the direction of his ex-wife.   Accordingly, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for Chapman and similarly situated persons....

We also recognize that the prohibitory net cast by § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii) may be somewhat overinclusive given that not every person who falls within in it would misuse a firearm against his own child, an intimate partner, or a child of such intimate partner, if permitted to possess one. This point does not undermine the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii), however, because it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a reasonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny....

For the reasons stated, we hold that § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii), as applied to Chapman, satisfies the intermediate scrutiny standard in analyzing his Second Amendment challenge to such statute. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court.

This ruling just further confirms my view that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a quirky one among those rights expressly recognized in Bill of Rights.  I doubt that a court would hold that someone could, simply by virtue of being subject to a domestic violence protective order, be subject to federal criminal prosecution for, say, just going to church or writing a book or exercising other First Amendment rights.  Perhaps more worrisome for those who care about gun rights, I wonder if and when folks deeply committed to gun control might claim that persons who are, say, unwilling to register their guns with the authorities are not responsible citizens entitled to full Second Amendment protection.

January 4, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack

Thursday, December 15, 2011

Stacked 924(c) counts leads to another very long federal mandatory minimum sentence from Utah

This new piece from The Salt Lake Tribune, headlined "Reluctant Utah judge orders man to 57 years in prison for gang robberies," reports on another case involving stack gun mandatory minimums producing an extremely long federal mandatory minimum sentence. Here are the basics:

Kepa Maumau stared at the courtroom ceiling, fighting to keep his compsure as his father sobbed while giving the 24-year-old man a bear hug on Thursday. It would be the last chance for father and son to embrace after U.S. District Court Judge Tena Campbell ordered Maumau, a once promising running back with plans to play football at Weber State University, to spend 57 years in prison for committing three armed robberies on behalf of the Tongan Crip Gang.

A reluctant Campbell handed down the sentence, which is dictated by federal mandatory minimum guidelines associated with gun crimes.

Maumau’s sentencing in federal court was fourth completed for six members of TCG convicted by a jury in October for a variety of crimes dating back to 2002. The jury convicted Maumau of racketeering conspiracy, robbery, assault with a dangerous weapon and multiple counts of using or carrying a firearm during a violent crime.

Although Maumau’s federal charges marked the first time he’d ever been charged with a felony as an adult, he is subject to a mandatory 57 years for repeatedly using a gun during the robberies.Maumau’s defense attorney, Rebecca Skordas, said she plans to appeal the sentence and used the hearing as a chance to speak out against mandatory minimum sentences.

"This is absurd. It’s just not right," Skordas said. "We as a society have failed when we send a young man to prison for 57 years."

Campbell said the law gives her no alternatives in Maumau’s case. "I can’t change it," she said matter-of-factly.

This case may remind hard-core sentencing fans of another notable federal sentencing case from the same district, which the article goes on to discuss:

Kepa Maumau’s case isn’t the first where a mandatory minimums have come under fire. Earlier this year, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case of Utah music producer Weldon Angelos, who wanted the high court to throw out the 55-year prison sentence he received for drug and weapons crimes despite having no prior criminal record.  The decision ended appeal options for Angelos, 32 -- the founder of hip-hop label Extravagant Records -- who had unsuccessfully argued that his trial attorney mishandled plea negotiations during his court proceedings and that the sentence handed down was unfair.

Angelos sold marijuana to a police informant three times in May and June 2002, each time charging $350 for 8 ounces. He was indicted in federal court on one gun possession count, three counts of marijuana distribution and two lesser charges....

U.S. District Judge Paul Cassell sentenced Angelos to a minimum mandatory 55-year sentence: five years on the first weapons conviction and 25 years each for the next two counts, as required by law. Cassell, frustrated that his hands were tied by the mandatory guidelines, asked former President George Bush to commute the sentence, calling it "unjust, cruel and irrational."

Because I represented Weldon Angelos throughout his unsuccessful 2255 proceedings, I will not comment further on this matter except to note that I am not certain that Angelos is wholly without any more appeal options.

December 15, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Noting some notable denials of cert by SCOTUS on gun rights and CP restitution

As regular readers know, I was giddy yesterday concerning two cert grants by the Supreme Court on sentencing issues (background here): the Justices took up Apprendi's applicability to fines in Southern Union (basics here) and the application of the Fair Sentencing Act in two "pipeline" crack cases (basics here).  However, as well reported in a pair of articles by Warren Richey of the Christian Science Monitor, the Justices denied cert on a couple of notable criminal justices issues as well:

Given that the current SCOTUS Term is already chock full of hot-button issues, I am not very surprised nor very troubled that the Justices decided not to take up new gun and kiddie porn cases.  Still, on both fronts, the only real question seems to be when and how, not whether, these matters will garner Supreme Court review.

November 29, 2011 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Gun policy and sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Monday, November 14, 2011

Might restoration of felon gun rights actually reduce recidivism?

As first blogged here, today's New York Times has a lengthy front-page article on state restoration of gun rights to former felons.  The piece is (misleadingly?) headlined "Felons Finding It Easy to Get Gun Rights Reinstated," and the suggestion throughout the article is that the public should be very concerned and quite fearful that some states now make it too easy for some felons to get their gun rights restored after having completed their sentence.  But, because recidivism rates for many offenders are often very high, some of the statistics appearing in the Times piece led me to wonder whether resoration of felon gun rights might actually reduce recidivism and enhance public safety.

The Times article rightly noted that sound data on these matters are had to assemble and assess, but the Times was able to run some notable numbers for Washington state.  Here is some of what the Times found and reported:

That [crime] question — whether the restorations pose a risk to public safety — has received little study, in part because data can be hard to come by.

The Times analyzed data from Washington State....  Since 1995, more than 3,300 felons and people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors have regained their gun rights in the state — 430 in 2010 alone — according to the analysis of data provided by the state police and the court system.  Of that number, more than 400 — about 13 percent — have subsequently committed new crimes, the analysis found.  More than 200 committed felonies, including murder, assault in the first and second degree, child rape and drive-by shooting....

The Times’s analysis found that among the more than 400 people who committed crimes after winning back their gun rights under the new law, more than 70 committed Class A or B felonies.  Over all, more than 80 were convicted of some sort of assault and more than 100 of drug offenses.

So the Times here reports a 13% recidvism rate for Washington state offenders with restored gun rights, but apparenently the recidivism rate is this high only due to counting of minor (i.e., misdemeanor) crimes.  As I understand these numbers, the Times found that only about 200 of the 3,300 prior offenders with restored gun rights since 1995 went on to commit a felony — roughly a 6% felony recidivism rate — and only 70 went on to commit Class A of B felonies — roughly a 2% serious felony recidivism rate.  That strikes me as an impressively low felony and serious felony recidivism rate for these offenders, especially given that states often report that half or more persons with a felony record end up committing a future offense.

Seeking general recidivism data for comparison purposes, I found this April 2008 report from the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission, titled "Recidivism of Adult Felons, 2007," which reports that in Washington state the "overall rate of recidivism for men was 65.9% compared to 53.6% among women."  (I think it is fair to assume that the majority of felons seeking restoration of gun rights are men.)  Based on this data, is it fair to suggest that offenders with restored gun rights in Washington state are roughly than five times less likely to recidivate that other offenders?  (I also found this January 2011 report from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy which reports that "recidivism rates have declined" in Washington in the period from 1990 to 2006 and that "the largest reductions have been for higher risk offenders.")

This comparative data would seem to at least support a plausible working hypothesis that restoring gun rights to felons might actually reduce recidivism and enhance public safety.  Of course, there is a huge apples/oranges problem in trying to compare these recidivism rates.  I certainly hope and expect that Washington aspires to restore gun rights to former felons who appear to pose the least risk to public safety, and thus we should hope and expect recidivism rates to be generally lower for these folks than for others with a felony record.  Still, given that recidivism rates are appear to be so much lower for those who get their gun rights restored, there is a reasonable basis for at least speculating that the process and grant of restoration of rights works to provide additional encouragement for these former felons to stay crime-free in the future.

Some related Second Amendment and gun policy posts:

November 14, 2011 in Data on sentencing, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (21) | TrackBack

Big (ugly?) NY Times report on felons getting back gun rights

This morning's New York Times has this huge front-page story headlined "Felons Finding It Easy to Get Gun Rights Reinstated." Disappointingly (but not surprisingly), the theme of the article is decidedly not praise for efforts by some states to make it easier for former felons to regain a fundamental constitutional right.  Here are some excerpts from an article that should (and likely will) be the subject of lots of discussion and commentary:

Under federal law, people with felony convictions forfeit their right to bear arms. Yet every year, thousands of felons across the country have those rights reinstated, often with little or no review. In several states, they include people convicted of violent crimes, including first-degree murder and manslaughter, an examination by The New York Times has found.

While previously a small number of felons were able to reclaim their gun rights, the process became commonplace in many states in the late 1980s, after Congress started allowing state laws to dictate these reinstatements — part of an overhaul of federal gun laws orchestrated by the National Rifle Association. The restoration movement has gathered force in recent years, as gun rights advocates have sought to capitalize on the 2008 Supreme Court ruling that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms.

This gradual pulling back of what many Americans have unquestioningly assumed was a blanket prohibition has drawn relatively little public notice. Indeed, state law enforcement agencies have scant information, if any, on which felons are getting their gun rights back, let alone how many have gone on to commit new crimes.

While many states continue to make it very difficult for felons to get their gun rights back — and federal felons are out of luck without a presidential pardon — many other jurisdictions are far more lenient, The Times found. In some, restoration is automatic for nonviolent felons as soon as they complete their sentences. In others, the decision is left up to judges, but the standards are generally vague, the process often perfunctory. In some states, even violent felons face a relatively low bar, with no waiting period before they can apply....

Margaret C. Love, a pardon lawyer based in Washington, D.C., who has researched gun rights restoration laws, estimated that, depending on the type of crime, in more than half the states felons have a reasonable chance of getting back their gun rights.

That universe could well expand, as pro-gun groups shed a historical reluctance to advocate publicly for gun rights for felons. Lawyers litigating Second Amendment issues are also starting to challenge the more restrictive restoration laws. Pro-gun groups have pressed the issue in the last few years in states as diverse as Alaska, Ohio, Oregon and Tennessee.

Ohio’s Legislature confronted the matter when it passed a law this year fixing a technicality that threatened to invalidate the state’s restorations. Ken Hanson, legislative chairman of the Buckeye Firearms Coalition, argued that felons should be able to reclaim their gun rights just as they can other civil rights. “If it’s a constitutional right, you treat it with equal dignity with other rights,” he said.

But Toby Hoover, executive director of the Ohio Coalition Against Gun Violence, contended that the public was safer without guns in the hands of people who have committed serious crimes. “It seems that Ohio legislators have plenty of problems to solve that should be a much higher priority than making sure criminals have guns,” Ms. Hoover said in written testimony.

That question — whether the restorations pose a risk to public safety — has received little study, in part because data can be hard to come by.

The Times analyzed data from Washington State.... Since 1995, more than 3,300 felons and people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors have regained their gun rights in the state — 430 in 2010 alone — according to the analysis of data provided by the state police and the court system. Of that number, more than 400 — about 13 percent — have subsequently committed new crimes, the analysis found. More than 200 committed felonies, including murder, assault in the first and second degree, child rape and drive-by shooting....

[T]he restoration of civil rights, which is now central to regaining gun rights, is relatively routine, automatic in many states upon completion of a sentence. In some states, felons must also petition for a judicial order specifically restoring firearms rights. Other potential paths include a pardon from the governor or state clemency board or a “set aside”— essentially, an annulment — of the conviction.

Today, in at least 11 states, including Kansas, Ohio, Minnesota and Rhode Island, restoration of firearms rights is automatic, without any review at all, for many nonviolent felons, usually once they finish their sentences, or after a certain amount of time crime-free. Even violent felons may petition to have their firearms rights restored in states like Ohio, Minnesota and Virginia. Some states, including Georgia and Nebraska, award scores of pardons every year that specifically confer gun privileges.

Felons face steep odds, though, in states like California, where the governor’s office gives out only a handful of pardons every year, if that. “It’s a long, drawn-out process,” said Steve Lindley, chief of the State Department of Justice’s firearms bureau. “They were convicted of a felony crime. There are penalties for that.”

Studies on the impact of gun restrictions largely support barring felons from possessing firearms. One study, published in the American Journal of Public Health in 1999, found that denying handgun purchases to felons cut their risk of committing new gun or violent crimes by 20 to 30 percent. A year earlier, a study in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that handgun purchasers with at least one prior misdemeanor — not even a felony — were more than seven times as likely as those with no criminal history to be charged with new offenses over a 15-year period.

Criminologists studying recidivism have found that felons usually have to stay out of trouble for about a decade before their risk of committing a crime equals that of people with no records. According to Alfred Blumstein, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, for violent offenders, that period is 11 to 15 years; for drug offenders, 10 to 14 years; and for those who have committed property crimes, 8 to 11 years. An important caveat: Professor Blumstein did not look at what happens when felons are given guns....

Washington’s gun rights restoration statute dates to a 1995 statewide initiative, the Hard Times for Armed Crimes Act, that toughened penalties for crimes involving firearms. The initiative was spearheaded, in part, by pro-gun activists, including leaders of the Second Amendment Foundation, an advocacy group, and the N.R.A.

Although it drew little notice at the time, the legislation also included an expansion of what had been very limited eligibility for restoration of firearms rights. “There were a lot of people who we felt should be able to get their gun rights restored who could not,” said Alan M. Gottlieb, founder of the Second Amendment Foundation, who was active in the effort.

Under the legislation, “Class A” felons — who have committed the most serious crimes, like murder and manslaughter — are ineligible, as are sex offenders. Otherwise, judges are required to grant the petitions as long as, essentially, felons have not been convicted of any new crimes in the five years after completing their sentences. Judges have no discretion to deny the requests based upon character, mental health or any other factors. Mr. Gottlieb said they explicitly wrote the statute this way. “We were having problems with judges that weren’t going to restore rights no matter what,” he said.

The statute’s mix of strictness and leniency makes Washington a useful testing ground. The Times’s analysis found that among the more than 400 people who committed crimes after winning back their gun rights under the new law, more than 70 committed Class A or B felonies. Over all, more than 80 were convicted of some sort of assault and more than 100 of drug offenses.

 

November 14, 2011 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (14) | TrackBack

Thursday, November 03, 2011

"The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms"

The title of this post is the title of this terrifically-interesting new paper on SSRN by Professor Joseph Blocher.  Here is the abstract:

Sometimes a constitutional right to do a particular thing is accompanied by a right not to do that thing. The First Amendment, for example, guarantees both the right to speak and the right not to speak.  This Article asks whether the Second Amendment should likewise be read to encompass both the right to keep or bear arms for self-defense and the inverse right to protect oneself by avoiding them, and what practical implications, if any, the latter right would have.

The Article concludes -- albeit with some important qualifications -- that a right not to keep or bear arms is implied by what the Supreme Court has called the “core” and “central component” of the Second Amendment: self-defense, especially in the home.  Recognizing such a right might call into question the constitutionality of the growing number of “antigun control” laws that make it difficult or illegal for private individuals to avoid having guns in their actual or constructive possession.

November 3, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

"Record-Low 26% in U.S. Favor Handgun Ban"

N9ggmdee1k60atawqdbprqThe title of this post comes from the headline of this new Gallup report, which includes this explanation of the latest poll data on gun control sentiments:

A record-low 26% of Americans favor a legal ban on the possession of handguns in the United States other than by police and other authorized people. When Gallup first asked Americans this question in 1959, 60% favored banning handguns. But since 1975, the majority of Americans have opposed such a measure, with opposition around 70% in recent years.

The results are based on Gallup's annual Crime poll, conducted Oct. 6-9. This year's poll finds support for a variety of gun-control measures at historical lows, including the ban on handguns, which is Gallup's longest continuing gun-control trend.

For the first time, Gallup finds greater opposition to than support for a ban on semiautomatic guns or assault rifles, 53% to 43%. In the initial asking of this question in 1996, the numbers were nearly reversed, with 57% for and 42% against an assault rifle ban. Congress passed such a ban in 1994, but the law expired when Congress did not act to renew it in 2004. Around the time the law expired, Americans were about evenly divided in their views.

Additionally, support for the broader concept of making gun laws "more strict" is at its lowest by one percentage point (43%). Forty-four percent prefer that gun laws be kept as they are now, while 11% favor less strict laws. As recently as 2007, a majority of Americans still favored stricter laws, which had been the dominant view since Gallup first asked the question in 1990.

Americans' preference regarding gun laws is generally that the government enforce existing laws more strictly and not pass new laws (60%) rather than pass new gun laws in addition to stricter enforcement of existing laws (35%). That has been the public's view since Gallup first asked the question in 2000; the 60% this year who want stricter enforcement but no new laws is tied for the high in the trend.

All key subgroups show less support for stricter gun laws, and for a ban on handguns, than they did 20 years ago. In 1991, 68% of Americans favored stricter gun laws and 43% favored a ban on handguns. Those percentages are 43% and 26%, respectively, today.

Relatively few key subgroups favor stricter gun-control laws today, whereas in 1991, all did. Since then, Democrats' views have shown less change, with a 10-point decline in the percentage favoring stricter laws. Republicans show a much larger decline of 35 points. In addition to Democrats, majorities of Eastern residents and those without guns in their household still favor stricter gun laws....

Americans have shifted to a more pro-gun view on gun laws, particularly in recent years, with record-low support for a ban on handguns, an assault rifle ban, and stricter gun laws in general. This is the case even as high-profile incidents of gun violence continue in the United States, such as the January shootings at a meeting for U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona.

The reasons for the shift do not appear related to reactions to the crime situation, as Gallup's Crime poll shows no major shifts in the trends in Americans' perceptions of crime, fear of crime, or reports of being victimized by crime in recent years. Nor does it appear to be tied to an increase in gun ownership, which has been around 40% since 2000, though it is a slightly higher 45% in this year's update. The 2011 updates on these trends will appear on Gallup.com in the coming days.

Perhaps the trends are a reflection of the American public's acceptance of guns. In 2008, Gallup found widespread agreement with the idea that the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of Americans to own guns. Americans may also be moving toward more libertarian views in some areas, one example of which is greater support for legalizing marijuana use. Diminished support for gun-control laws may also be tied to the lack of major gun-control legislation efforts in Congress in recent years.

October 26, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Tuesday, October 04, 2011

Split DC Circuit panel issues important Second Amendment ruling in via Heller II

The DC Circuit has another big Second Amendment ruling in the Heller case today in Heller v. DC, No. No. 10-703 (DC Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) (available here).   Here is how the majority opinion (per Judge Ginsburg) gets started: 

In June 2008 the Supreme Court held the District of Columbia laws restricting the possession of firearms in one’s home violated the Second Amendment right of individuals to keep and bear arms.   See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. In the wake of that decision, the District adopted the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008 (FRA), D.C. Law 17-372, which amended the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, D.C. Law 1-85.  The plaintiffs in the present case challenge, both facially and as applied to them, the provisions of the District’s gun laws, new and old, requiring the registration of firearms and prohibiting both the registration of “assault weapons” and the possession of magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition. The plaintiffs argue those provisions (1) are not within the District’s congressionally delegated legislative authority or, if they are, then they (2) violate the Second Amendment.

The district court granted summary judgment for the District and the plaintiffs appealed. We hold the District had the authority under D.C. law to promulgate the challenged gun laws, and we uphold as constitutional the prohibitions of assault weapons and of large-capacity magazines and some of the registration requirements.   We remand the other registration requirements to the district court for further proceedings because the record is insufficient to inform our resolution of the important constitutional issues presented.

Here is part of the start of the very lengthy dissent by Judge Kavanaugh:

In this case, we are called upon to assess those provisions of D.C.’s law under Heller.  In so doing, we are of course aware of the longstanding problem of gun violence in the District of Columbia.  In part for that reason, Heller has engendered substantial controversy.  See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32.  As a lower court, however, it is not our role to re-litigate Heller or to bend it in any particular direction.  Our sole job is to faithfully apply Heller and the approach it set forth for analyzing gun bans and regulations.

In my judgment, both D.C.’s ban on semi-automatic rifles and its gun registration requirement are unconstitutional under Heller.

October 4, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

"Montana objects to federal gun ban for medical marijuana users"

The title of this post is the headline of this local Montana article, which begins and ends this way:

Attorney General Steve Bullock voiced his objection Monday to the U.S. Justice Department over its recent memo banning the sale of guns or ammunition to licensed medical marijuana users and urged the agency not to prosecute anyone for now.

Bullock wrote U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder about the Sept. 21 memo from the Justice Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives to licensed gun dealers. The memo said it is illegal for medical marijuana cardholders to buy guns and ammunition, and illegal for dealers to sell these products to them.

The letter from Bullock followed criticism of the policy last week from all three members of Montana's congressional delegation, Sens. Jon Tester and Max Baucus, and Rep. Denny Rehberg. A firearms advocacy group and a medical marijuana group had earlier blasted the memo....

Bullock said the federal letter raises Second and Fifth amendment constitutional issues over the right to bear arms, equal protection and due process. In addition, he said, hunting is a constitutionally protected activity in Montana.

The Montana attorney general said he certainly recognizes the supremacy clause in the U.S. Constitution and the importance of maintaining a federal union, but added: "In our federal system of dual sovereignty, I respectfully suggest that the federal government should act in a careful manner when its laws and policies involve conflicts with those of the state."

Bullock conceded there had been abuses and problems with medical marijuana laws in various states, including Montana, but these states have sought to find workable solutions. "In doing so, however, we also face issues that are, candidly, created or exacerbated by federal actions and policies that do not always reflect the kind of careful approach and appropriate accommodation that should be accorded the state," said Bullock, a Democrat running for governor in 2012.

Medical marijuana industry officials have said that changing federal policies on the issue have created problems. Federal authorities raided more than two dozen Montana medical marijuana growing and dispensing operations earlier this year as the Legislature was considering medical marijuana bills.

Gary Marbut, president of the Montana Shooting Sports Association, called Bullock's letter to Holder "a good first step." He said he looks forward to seeing "actual deeds" by state elected officials in following up on the issue.

A few related posts: 

October 4, 2011 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Gun policy and sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Sunday, October 02, 2011

Notable Ohio headlines on many modern crime and punishment fronts

A number of recent articles in my local Columbus Dispatch spotlight a number of modern issues of crime and punishment playing out in the bellwether Buckeye state.  Here are headlines and links:

UPDATE: Here is one more new story of note from Monday's Dispatch: "Crack convicts’ prison time cut; New federal guidelines might affect hundreds"

October 2, 2011 in Death Penalty Reforms, Gun policy and sentencing, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Thursday, September 29, 2011

What do Second Amendment and states' rights fans think about feds latest gun memo?

As detailed in this new AP piece, which is headlined "ATF: Illegal to sell guns to med marijuana users," a new memo/letter from the feds restates the US Justice Department's view that gun dealers violate federal law if and when they sell a firearm to anyone who uses medical marijuana consistent with state law.  Here are excerpts from the AP report:

Federal law already makes it illegal for someone to possess a gun if he or she is "an unlawful user of, or addicted to" marijuana or other controlled substances. A Sept. 21 letter from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, issued in response to numerous inquiries from gun dealers, clarifies that medical marijuana patients are included in that definition....

"There are no exceptions in federal law for marijuana purportedly used for medicinal purposes, even if such use is sanctioned by state law," said the letter by Arthur Herbert [available here], the ATF's assistant director for enforcement programs and services....

The clash between state and federal drug laws has led to lawsuits and criminal cases in some of the 16 states that have legalized medical marijuana use. Officials in two Oregon counties have said they'll appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court after state judges said sheriffs couldn't deny concealed handgun licenses for medical marijuana patients.

The Oregon Court of Appeals and the Oregon Supreme Court said the state law that authorizes concealed handgun permits is separate from the federal law that outlaws gun possession by drug users, and the state gun law doesn't address medical marijuana use.

Federal authorities also raided dozens of medical marijuana operations across Montana this spring, chilling a once-booming pot industry and leading to sweeping changes in Montana law. The Department of Justice followed up with a warning letter to political leaders in many states that federal prosecutors will pursue marijuana distributors but not individual patients who are following state law....

Pro-marijuana and gun groups said the policy clarification amounts to rescinding the gun rights for the thousands of people licensed to use medical marijuana laws. And it appears to contradict a 2009 Department of Justice memo that said the Obama administration would not pursue prosecution of individual medical marijuana users who obey state laws.

Besides that, the government is putting an additional burden on gun dealers to police their customers, said Montana Shooting Sports Association Gary Marbut. "Their business is to be merchants, not to be cops. Unfortunately, the federal licensing scheme complicates that," Marbut said. "It sounds as if the (ATF) is expecting them to drift further into the cop role."

I would be very interested to hear what various Republican candidates for president would have to say on this issue, especially Rick Perry and Michele Bachmann given their vocal support for the Second Amendment and for states' rights.

A few related posts:

September 29, 2011 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Saturday, September 24, 2011

"Should pardoned felons have gun rights?"

41591_37644432732_5613370_n The title of this post is the headline of this front-page article from yesterday's edition of The Tennessean.  Here is how the piece starts:

David Scott Blackwell has repaid his debt to society, by Georgia standards.  He served five years in prison for selling drugs.  He successfully finished his probation.  He was even granted a full pardon by the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles, which would allow him to possess a gun in that state.

But should Blackwell, now living in Franklin, be able to own a gun here? Blackwell is suing the state after being denied a gun permit in Tennessee, arguing that the Georgia pardon fully restored his rights — even the right to bear arms.  It’s a battle being played out in other states as well, as lawmakers in places such as Alaska and Oregon have mulled over laws to loosen firearms restrictions on felons who have had some of their rights restored.

It also has brought out unusually vocal support from Second Amendment advocates, who in prior years have been hesitant to support some felons’ rights to possess firearms.  Among those advocates is the Tennessee Firearms Association, which downplays the fact that Blackwell is a convicted felon, instead painting it as a conflict between the constitutional powers of the pardon and Tennessee lawmakers who have written laws to restrict felons’ rights.

This marks the first time in the association’s 16 years that it has filed a brief in any lawsuit.  “Georgia’s pardon system granted him a full pardon, and it specifically says he has the right to purchase and acquire guns,” said John Harris, a Nashville attorney who serves as the volunteer executive director for the Tennessee Firearms Association.  “This is a question of, can the Tennessee General Assembly pass a statute that restricts the constitutional authority of another branch of the government?”

Blackwell failed to convince a Davidson County Chancery Court judge, but has appealed. The Tennessee Court of Appeals recently heard arguments and is considering the case. “The pardon restores constitutional rights — that’s what a pardon does,” said Blackwell’s attorney, David Raybin.  “Therefore, it restores his right to a firearm.  That’s it, in its simplest terms.”

But the state is opposing Blackwell, saying laws passed by the Tennessee legislature prohibiting felons from possessing firearms apply to those whose rights have been restored.  “It is reasonable for the legislature to determine that felony drug offenders, even those who subsequently receive a pardon, are likely to misuse firearms in the future,” wrote the Tennessee Attorney General’s Office.  “This is due to the well-known connection between guns and drugs.”

The newspaper has this accompanying on-line poll asking whether "a pardoned ex-convict who is allowed to own fire arms in Georgia [and] now lives in TN [should] be allowed to own a gun in TN?".   With just under 500 votes cast as of this writing, the vote has YES at 47%, NO at 45%, and a remaining 8% as Undecided.   (I voted YES in part because I suspect a non-violent offender who has secured a pardon is probably less dangerous and less likely to misuse a gun than an average citizen.)

September 24, 2011 in Clemency and Pardons, Collateral consequences, Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (26) | TrackBack

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Ninth Circuit rejects Second Amendment attack on criminalizing drug addict gun possession

In US v. Dugan, No. 08-10579 (9th Cir. Sept. 20, 2011) (available here), a Ninth Circuit panel needs only two pages to reject a federal defendant's Second Amendment challenge to a federal statute that makes it a felony for a drug addict to possess a firearm.  Here are excerpts from the brief opinion (with a bit of my emphasis added toward the end):

We consider the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) ... [and] uphold the statute against this Second Amendment challenge.

Defendant Kevin Dugan illegally grew and sold marijuana.  He also smoked marijuana regularly.  When police officers responded to a report of domestic violence at his home one afternoon, they discovered his marijuana operation and arrested Defendant.  Because Defendant also had a business of dealing in firearms, a jury convicted him of, among other things, shipping and receiving firearms through interstate commerce while using a controlled substance, in violation of § 922(g)(3).

Defendant argues that § 922(g)(3) runs afoul of the Second Amendment because it deprives him of his constitutional right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation....  [But the Supreme] Court told us that “nothing in [its Heller] opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”  Two of our sister circuits have taken that statement to mean that § 922(g)(3), which embodies a longstanding prohibition of conduct similar to the examples mentioned in Heller, permissibly limits the individual right to possess weapons provided by the Second Amendment.  United States v. Yancey, 621 F.3d 681, 687 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1027 (2011).  We agree.

Like our sister circuits, we see the same amount of danger in allowing habitual drug users to traffic in firearms as we see in allowing felons and mentally ill people to do so.  Habitual drug users, like career criminals and the mentally ill, more likely will have difficulty exercising self-control, particularly when they are under the influence of controlled substances.  Moreover, unlike people who have been convicted of a felony or committed to a mental institution and so face a lifetime ban, an unlawful drug user may regain his right to possess a firearm simply by ending his drug abuse.  The restriction in § 922(g)(3) is far less onerous than those affecting felons and the mentally ill.  Yancey, 621 F.3d at 686-87.  Because Congress may constitutionally deprive felons and mentally ill people of the right to possess and carry weapons, we conclude that Congress may also prohibit illegal drug users from possessing firearms.

I find the logic of this opinion quite suspect, though I fear the usual Second Amendment crowd will not be eager to assail the Ninth Circuit panel's ruling here.  Moreover, I cannot not help but notice that, in the second sentence of the last paragraph, the Ninth Circuit panel jumps from talking about felons to referencing "career criminals" (I have added the emphasis here).  Indeed, the very use of this legally irrelevant and inflamatory term is one of many reasons I find the logic of this opinion suspect.

Obviously, not all felons are "career criminals."  More to the point, perhaps, I find intriguing not only the notion that all criminals and mentally ill and habitual drug users are those "more likely [to] have difficulty exercising self-control," but also the suggestion that all those who are "more likely [to] have difficulty exercising self-control" can, consistent with Second Amendment, be subject to severe criminal punishment for merely possessing a gun for personal self-defense in the home.

Logic aside, this panel opinion is on solid ground when it notes that all persons who have committed any felony (including Martha Stewart and Scooter Libby any many others without any history of violence) are forever subject to stiff federal criminal penalties under current law for possessing a gun even in their homes for self-defense.  Whether that law and others of a similar ilk are so clearly free from serious Second Amendment scrutiny based on Heller's dicta is a question I will continue to raise in this space in response to opinions like the panel work today in Dugan.

September 20, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Does (and should) Casey Anthony now have a Second Amendment right to buy a gun?

The provocative (but still serious) question in the title of this post is inspired by this recent post on Second Amendment jurisprudence and this new ABC News report headlined "Casey Anthony Cops May Provide Her Protection When She Leaves Jail."  Consider first the start of the news report:

The police who investigated Casey Anthony for murder -- and still believe she is guilty -- said today that they are assessing the threat to her safety and may provide police protection for Anthony when she leaves jail this weekend.

Orange County Sheriff Jerry Demings acknowledged the anger over the verdict that found Anthony not guilty of killing her 2-year-old daughter Caylee. The fury has been directed at Anthony, her parents, the judge and the jury.  "Our intelligence section is assessing the threats," said Sgt. John Allen, who helped interrogate Anthony at Universal Studios after she admitted she had lied about working there.

"A lot of people have strong sentiments about the outcome, but no one has the right to take the law into their own hands.... I would hope people step back and, regardless of their feelings, not commit another crime," Allen said at a news conference with other members of the team that investigated Anthony.

Demings said that when Anthony, 25, leaves jail Sunday, "We will assist in her departure from those premises."  If there is an "overriding public safety need," they will escort her to her destination, the sheriff said.  He added, however, "We will not be providing any elaborate protection for Casey once she leaves."

The jury's not guilty verdict has not changed the opinion of the cops who grilled Anthony and investigated Caylee's death.  When asked whether he still believed that Anthony was guilty, Allen replied, "I certainly don't have any doubt."

Consider also the interesting reality that federal gun laws (and apparently also Florida gun laws) only prohibit gun possession by persons convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving domestic violence.  Anthony's acquittal on all felony charges and convictions only for lying to the police would apparently not prohibit her, as a matter of state and federal statutory law, from now buying a gun upon her release from jail in a few days.

But if state or federal statutory laws (or related permitting regulations) were somehow read to prevent Anthony from buying a gun, am I wrong to suggest she might still have a fundamental constitutional right to buy a gun for self protection after Heller and McDonald?  Though not precise on the Second Amendment's contours, Heller and McDonald and subsequent lower court rulings all suggest the right of personal self-defense is closely linked and related to the core of the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  The ABC News story reinforces that few persons in the US may be facing personal threats comparable to Anthony (and the same story may give her reason to worry that local police are now not likely eager to take a bullet for her).

Then again, the Seventh Circuit's recent Ezell ruling (discussed here) strongly suggests that it is only "law-abiding, responsible citizens" who get the full protection of the fundamental rights safeguarded by the Second Amendment.  Notwithstanding her jury acquittal on all felony counts, the evidence presented at Anthony's trial surely established that Anthony is not a prime example of a "law-abiding, responsible citizen."  Thus, I return to the serious question in the title of this post: Does (and should) Casey Anthony now have a Second Amendment right to buy a gun?

A few related Second Amendment posts:

July 12, 2011 in Celebrity sentencings, Collateral consequences, Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack

Friday, July 08, 2011

"Burress says he met two-year prison sentence with disbelief"

The title of this post is the headline of this piece from NFL News, which reports on a recent revealing interview with recently released Plaxico Burress.   Here are excerpts:

Plaxico Burress has seen the view from the top of life, so when he suddenly found himself behind bars, he couldn't believe how low he had sunk so quickly.

Little over a year after his touchdown catch in Super Bowl XLII capped the Giants' 17-14 upset of the previously undefeated New England Patriots in February 2008, Burress was imprisoned on a felony weapons charge, the result of him accidentally discharging an unlicensed handgun in a Manhattan nightclub.

"To go on the other side of that wall, to be on the inside of that fence, knowing what your world and life is supposed to be on the other side, when they close that door behind you, you say to yourself, 'Is this really serious?' " Burress told Fran Charles in an exclusive interview on NFL Network's "NFL Total Access" on Thursday. "I actually said to myself a couple times when I first went in, 'You know what? Somebody's going to come and get me tomorrow.' "...

The wide receiver said he originally expected to serve at most a four- to six-month sentence for reckless endangerment and that it took some time for him to accept the reality of his situation -- a two-year prison sentence.  Burress was released in June, three months early for good behavior....

Burress described his prison time as "an out-of-body experience" that changed him for the better.  He said his approach to life now is about patience, something he'll have to show plenty of as he attempts to return to the NFL.

This interview confirms and continues my concern that Plaxico's legal team failed to fight against his criminal charges as effectively as it might have give the plausible Second Amendment defense that I still think he could and should have mounted.

Some related posts on the Burress cases:

July 8, 2011 in Celebrity sentencings, Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Thursday, June 30, 2011

District judge finds Eighth Amendment problem with stacked mandatories for juve gun offender

Thanks to this post at the Southern District of Florida Blog (which always has lots of interesting coverage of federal law and sentencing), I have learned of this important Eighth Amendment ruling based on Graham and the application of federal gun mandatories.  Here are key excerpts from Judge Cook's opinion in US v. Mathurin:

Here, Mathurin faces a mandatory minimum 307-year sentence.  Because Congress hasabolished the federal parole system, this sentence gives Mathurin no possibility of release basedon demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.  A significant portion of this sentence is comprisedof mandatory 25-year consecutive sentences required under § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides:

[N]o term of imprisonment imposed on a person under this subsection shall runconcurrently with any other term of imprisonment imposed on the person,including any term of imprisonment imposed for the crime of violence or drugtrafficking crime during which the firearm was used, carried, or possessed.

Under Graham, this provision of § 924(c)(1)(D) is unconstitutional as applied to Mathurin, a juvenile offender convicted of non-homicide offenses.  To apply the statute in accordance withthe Eighth Amendment, severance of the constitutionally offensive portion of § 924(c)(1)(D) is necessary....

[C]onsistent with Congress’s intent and with Supreme Court precedent on thedoctrine of severability, I find that the language of § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) mandating consecutive sentences for subsequent violations is excisable from the remainder of the statute as it applies to Mathurin and similarly situated juvenile defendants.  This holding is limited to the unique circumstances of this case, which involves a non-homicide juvenile offender sentenced under § 924(c)(1) for multiple counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime; it does not affect the consecutive sentence requirement as applied to adult offenders or juvenile offenders under different factual circumstances....

Under this narrow holding of this case, Mathurin’s sentence amounts to 492 months in prison.  Additionally, under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), Mathurin may reduce his sentence by 54 days per year of incarceration if he “display[s] exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinaryregulations.”  Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), Mathurin may reduce his total sentence byapproximately 5.5 years.  Thus, if Mathurin demonstrates maturity and rehabilitation, he may beeligible for release at around the age of 53.

Mathurin’s total term of incarceration, consideringthe potential reductions under 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), complies with both the Eighth Amendmentand Congress’s statutory requirements.

June 30, 2011 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Saturday, June 11, 2011

Are severe mandatory minimums for certain gun crimes especially problematic after Heller?

The question in the title of this post is inspired by this Washington Times commentary from FAMM president Julie Stewart headlined " Second Amendment injustice Mandatory minimums for self-defense must end."  Here are excerpts:

In June 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Second Amendment to the Constitution protects an individual’s right to possess a firearm “and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home.”...   This [ruling] must ring awfully hollow to Orville Lee Wollard who, two years ago tomorrow was sentenced to two decades in a Florida prison for protecting his family with a firearm.

On a spring morning in 2008, Wollard got a panicked call from his wife.  The teenage boyfriend who had been beating up his 15-year old daughter was back at their house causing trouble.  Wollard rushed home and found the boy on the porch and his daughter with a black eye.  Wollard told the boy to leave, but instead, the boy attacked him, ripping out stitches from Wollard’s recent surgery, and then ran off with Wollard’s daughter.  When the two returned several hours later, the boyfriend began shoving Orville’s daughter around the Wollards’ home.  Wollard’s wife and eldest daughter screamed for him to do something. Wollard was frightened for his daughter’s and his family’s safety.

He grabbed his legally registered pistol and confronted the boy, again asking him to leave.  The boy stopped assaulting Wollard’s daughter.  He smiled, punched a hole in the wall, and began moving toward Wollard. Wollard, who had had firearms training as a former member of the auxiliary police force, aimed a bullet into the wall next to the boyfriend to scare him. No one was hurt, and the boy finally left.  That is where this story should have ended, but it didn’t. 

Several weeks later, the abusive boy called the police to report Wollard for aggravated assault, and Wollard was arrested.  Orville Wollard did not think he had committed a crime by protecting his family. He rejected a plea deal that would have given him probation and a felony record and instead took his case to court.  Prosecutors charged Wollard with various crimes, including shooting into a dwelling (his own house), child abuse (because the boy was under 18) and aggravated assault with a weapon.  A jury convicted Wollard of possessing and discharging a firearm, which triggered Florida’s mandatory minimum sentence for aggravated assault with a weapon.  Wollard was sentenced to the mandatory prison term of 20 years without parole.

At sentencing, the judge said, “This [sentence] is obviously excessive … if it weren’t for the mandatory minimum … I would use my discretion and impose some separate sentence, having taken into consideration the circumstances of the event.”  For his part, Wollard told the court, “I’m amazed. I’m stunned. I have spent my life pursuing education [and] helped the community. [T]hen one day this person breaks into my house … he continues to do this, he assaults my daughter, he threatens me, I protect myself.  [N]o one is injured in this whole thing, and I’m going to prison. … And again, with all respect to [the court], I would expect this from the former Soviet Union, not the United States.”

Wollard is right.... To be clear, a jury found Wollard guilty.  Jurors apparently did not believe he acted in self-defense..... Whether this jury reached the correct conclusion is open to debate.  Whether prosecutors should have charged a crime that carried such a harsh mandatory minimum sentence bears scrutiny.

What is beyond debate is that when judges are prevented from applying sentences that are appropriate to the unique circumstances of each case, injustice is inevitable.  And when the constitutional right to bear arms is at stake, violations of the bedrock tenet of American justice -- that the punishment should fit the crime and the offender -- are all the more intolerable.

June 11, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (19) | TrackBack