Thursday, December 20, 2012
Split Ninth Circuit en banc ruling rejects effort to qualify for safety-valve via state sentence modification
As reported in this post from back in July 2011, an interesting split Ninth Circuit panel decision in US v. Yepez concluded that federal courts must respect the modification of a state sentence at a subsequent federal sentencing. The Ninth Circuit subsequently decided to review this matter en banc, and the en banc court today comes down the other way now in US v. Yepez, No. 09-50271 (9th Cir. Dec. 20, 2012) (available here). Here is a summary of the ruling in Yepez as prepared by court staff:
The per curiam majority opinion in Yepez runs only about six pages, while the spirited dissent runs more than 30 pages and provides a running start (complete with cites to Justice Scalia's new book) for a potential cert petition for the defendants.
Affirming one defendant’s federal drug sentence and vacating another, the en banc court held that a state court’s order terminating a defendant’s probation for a state offense “nunc pro tunc” as of the day before the defendant committed his federal crime cannot alter the fact that the defendant had the status of probationer when he committed his federal crime.
The en banc court concluded that the defendants therefore remained ineligible for safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) from the mandatory minimum sentence because they were properly assessed two criminal history points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) for committing the federal crime “while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation.”
Dissenting, Judge Wardlaw (joined by Judges Pregerson, Reinhardt, Thomas, and W. Fletcher) wrote that because neither Congress, the safety valve provision, nor the Sentencing Guidelines address this question, fundamental principles of justice, federalism, and comity, as well as the rule of lenity and the parsimony principle of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), permit district courts to exercise their broad sentencing discretion when calculating criminal history scores for purposes of safety valve relief, and then to exercise that same discretion in determining the appropriate sentence length.
Prior related posts:
- Fascinating split Ninth Circuit opinion holds federal courts must respect modified state sentence
- Ninth Circuit to review en banc whether federal courts must respect modified state sentence
Wednesday, December 19, 2012
Novel post-trial federal "sentencing settlement" for Montana medical marijuana providerAs reported in this local article, headlined "In plea deal, most of marijuana caregiver's convictions to be dropped," there has been a notable (and disturbing?) development in a notable (and disturbing?) federal criminal case involving a Montana medical marijuana provider. Here are the details:
In a highly unusual move, federal prosecutors have agreed to drop six of eight marijuana convictions for Christopher Williams in exchange for his agreeing to waive his right to appeal. In addition, the government has agreed to ask U.S. District Judge Dana Christensen to dismiss the $1,728,000 criminal forfeiture awarded to the government by a jury earlier this year.
The agreement was outlined under a settlement filed Tuesday in U.S. District Court. In the document, signed by Williams, U.S. Assistant Attorney Joe Thaggard, and federal public defender Michael Donahoe, they note that this agreement “constitutes the final and best offer to resolve this matter.”
Williams, a medical marijuana caregiver, was convicted by a 12-member jury in September after a four-day trial. He was facing a minimum mandatory sentence of between 85 and 92 years, due in part to four counts that involved possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Sentences for those counts, by law, had to run consecutively.
Immediately after his conviction, Thaggard had offered to drop some of the charges, but they still involved a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Williams rejected the offer, saying he was willing to spend the rest of his life in prison to fight what he believed were violations of his constitutional rights.
Under the newest deal, the federal government dropped convictions for conspiracy to manufacture and possess with the intent to distribute marijuana; manufacture of marijuana; possession with intent to distribute marijuana; and three counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. His convictions for one count of possessing a firearm in connection with drug trafficking and one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana will stand.
He faces a maximum term of five years for the distribution of marijuana charge and a mandatory minimum of five years — and a maximum of life — for the firearm-related charge.
Kari Boiter, a friend of Williams, reported late Tuesday that she had talked to him via a phone call. He was incarcerated at the time at the Missoula County Detention Facility. Boiter says Williams told her it wasn’t easy for him to give up his constitutional fight, but as he navigated the complex federal penal system, it became clear that punishment was the only thing that was guaranteed.
“With the rest of my life literally hanging in the balance, I simply could not withstand the pressure any longer,” Williams said in a statement released by Boiter. “If Judge Christensen shows mercy and limits my sentence to the five year mandatory minimum, I could be present at my 16-year-old son’s college graduation. This would most likely be impossible had I rejected the latest compromise.”
Williams was a partner in Montana Cannabis, which operated distribution centers in Helena, Billings, Miles City and Missoula, and had a large marijuana greenhouse west of Helena on Highway 12. The four partners — Williams, Chris Lindsey, Thomas Daubert and Richard Flor — said they tried to set the “gold standard” for medical marijuana businesses after voters overwhelmingly passed legislation in 2004 permitting caregivers to distribute marijuana to people with physical ailments.
But under a federal crackdown in March 2011, Montana Cannabis was one of about 25 medical marijuana businesses that were raided, since marijuana is still considered a Schedule 1 narcotic under federal laws. Williams is the only person in Montana to take his case all the way to trial.
Daubert, Lindsey and Flor all pleaded guilty to various marijuana possession and distribution charges. Daubert received a sentence of five years on probation; Lindsey is expected to be sentenced Jan. 4 and prosecutors have agreed to seek a sentence similar to Daubert’s based upon Lindsey’s health problems and limited involvement in Montana Cannabis. Flor, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison, died from health-related complications while incarcerated....
It’s unknown whether Williams’ sentencing hearing, slated for Jan. 4 in Missoula, will still take place on that date.
As a matter of equitable substantive sentencing justice, I am very pleased to learn that Chris Williams is no longer facing a federal mandatory sentence of essentially LWOP for distrubuting marijuana in compliance with Montana law. But as a matter of constitutional law and federal criminal procedure, I find this new novel "sentencing settlement" disturbing from various perspectives. Let me explain:
Start with the government actors: though federal prosecutors have broad charging and bargaining discretion, what gives them authority to drop 75% of presumptively lawful convictions after a presumptive lawful jury trial? Unless and until prosecutors articulate a constitutional or legal reason for dropping thse convictions, this decision appears to be a form of "prosecution nullification" that strikes me even more lawless than "jury nullification." Prosecutors frequently contest and complain about the power of juries to nullify a prosecutor's criminal charges based on equitable rather than legal claims; here is appears that federal prosecutors are deciding to nullify a jury's criminal convictions based on equitable rather than legal claims.
Even more worrisome, federal prosecutors in this case are going to nullify 75% of presumptively lawful convictions after a presumptive lawful jury trial in order to secure a deal to avoid any appellate scrutiny of the (also suspect?) convictions to be preserved. If federal prosecutors believe there is a sound legal or equitable basis for dropping some of these convictions, why not just drop them without demanding anything in return from the defendant rather than requiring him to give up his statutory rights to appeal his other convictions and sentence? Prosecutors here are not merely nullifying many jury convictions, but they are doing so only after essentially blackmailing the defendant to give up his rights to contest his other convictions on appeal.
Turning to the defense side: though I completely understand why Chris Williams (especially after a few months in federal lock-up) decided to give up right to an uncertain appeal in order to avoid the prospect of a certain mandatory LWOP federal sentence, I am not sure how his attorneys can feel fully comfortable representing this deal as a knowing and voluntary settlement. Based on the comments from the defendant quoted above, it seems plain to me that Chris Williams was essentially coerced by the threat of an extreme (and I think unconstitutional) sentence into giving up his appeal rights. The jury convictions and the extreme mandatory sentencing terms here functioned in this case as a kind of legal sword of Damocles hanging over the defendant's head; Williams appears to have decided to accept this "sentencing settlement" waiving appeal rights only because prosecutors kept swinging this sword past his neck.
Especially because I want Chris Williams to be able to go to his 16-year-old son’s college graduation, I do not want to prevent him from getting the obvious benefit of this deal. But because I also want Chris Williams to be able to pursue on appeal all his constitutional claims on all his convictions and sentence, I hope the judge in this case accepts this novel "sentencing settlement" while striking the waiver of appeal rights as, in this setting, void as against public policy.
December 19, 2012 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Pot Prohibition Issues, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (20) | TrackBack
Tuesday, November 27, 2012
Is Alleyne a stare decisis sleeper about "super-duper precedents"?
Last month the Supreme Court granted cert in Allen Ryan Alleyne v. United States, in which the questions presented is simply "Whether this Court's decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), should be overruled." Because Harris is, of course, one of the holes in Apprendi jurisprudence, hard-core sentencing fans and Sixth Amendment gurus are jazzed about what the Alleyne case might mean for the division of responsibilities of judge and jury in criminal justice decision-making.
However, the notion of whether Harris "should be overruled" has me thinking Alleyne could be a sleeper case concerning the doctrine of stare decisis in constitutional law and practice. Significantly, Harris did not create the constitutional rule that legislatures could allow sentencing judges to find facts by a preponderance of evidence to trigger the application of mandatory minimum prison terms. Harris merely reaffirmed this constitutional doctrine in 2002; it was established back in 1986 in McMillan v. Pennsylvania (and the McMillan opinion suggested its holding was just a reaffirmation of constitutional rules first set out in the 1949 case of Williams v. New York). In other words, Harris is not just a regular precedent: like Roe v. Wade and other controversial rulings often challenged and often reaffirmed, the constitutional doctrines allowing judges to find facts to trigger mandatory minimums arguably qualify as a "super-precedent."
As some may recall (and as highlighted in this Essay by Professor Michael Gerhardt titled "Super Precedent") the idea of super-precedents has been sometimes espoused by defenders of Roe. Indeed, with Roe clearly in mind, then-Senate Judiciary Chairman Arlen Specter asked then-SCOTUS-nominee John Roberts during his confirmation hearings whether he agreed there were "super-duper precedents" in constitutional law. Though I do not fancy myself enough of a constitutional theorist to know whether super-precedents do or should exist, I do know that Alleyne tees up consideration of this idea perhaps as well as any case in recent memory.
NYCDL amicus brief in Alleyne with an offense/offender kicker
As long time readers know, in first trying to make sense of Blakely, I was drawn to distinguishing between offense conduct and offender characteristics in the application of Apprendi's "bright-line rule." I first developed this idea in my Conceptualizing Blakely article, advanced it in a Stanford Law Review article, and unpacked it further (with Stephanos Bibas) in Making Sentencing Sensible. As explained in Conceptualizing Blakely, I believe an offense/offender distinction helps give conceptual content to the prior conviction exception, better links the Apprendi rule to the express text of the Constitution, and resonates with the distinctive institutional competencies of juries and judges.
Consequently, when the Supreme Court decided it would take another trip to Apprendi-land by granting cert in Alleyne to consider the continued validity of the Harris mandatory minimum limit on the the Apprendi rule (basics here and here), I was interested in pitching the Justices yet again on the idea of incorporating an offense/offender distinction into some part of this jurisprudence. Wonderfully, a terrific group of New York lawyers reached out to me about helping the New York Council of Defense Lawyers on an Alleyne amicus brief, and they were willing to add an offense/offender "kicker" to NYCDL's arguments for overruling Harris. The NYCDL brief in which I lended a hand was filed yesterday and can be downloaded below. Here are two key paragraphs from the summary of argument:
As this Court has applied Apprendi’s holding over the last decade, several Justices have expressed con-cerns about the rule’s potential impact on trials and sentencing. As NYCDL’s experience in New York federal and state courts shows, any such effects will be minimal. New York’s federal courts, for example, have operated for seven years under a paradigm for drug offenses that substantially parallels the structure all courts would face should this Court overturn Harris. Practitioners there have been able to apply Apprendi’s rule to drug offenses with relative ease: from the indictment to the jury instructions or to the plea allocution, New York prosecutors and defense lawyers are able to address any facts that expose defendants not just to increased maximums, but also to increased minimums. Similarly, criminal defense attorneys in New York state courts regularly confront situations where a jury is required to find facts that trigger a mandatory minimum sentence, without apparent difficulty or inefficiency. These experiences buttress Petitioner’s argument that “there are no practical impediments to overruling Harris.” Pet. Br. 42.
Moreover, any of the enduring practical concerns identified by certain Justices can be addressed by adopting an approach to overruling Harris that distinguishes between facts that are specific to the offense and facts that are specific to the offender. The Constitution’s text requires that all facts relating to the alleged “crimes” at issue must be stated in the indictment and presented to the jury, which the Due Process clause requires to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. To avoid a requirement that aggravating facts concerning an offender’s past be presented to the jury if such offender-specific characteristics implicate a mandatory minimum, the Court should draw a line for Constitutional purposes that allows judicial determinations of offender-specific facts that are relevant to sentencing, so long as such facts do not alter the range of applicable sentences. Such a rule comports with the particular competencies of the jury and judge: The jury’s traditional role is to answer questions about the criminal conduct alleged in an indictment, while the judge has historically been expected to assess broader offender-based considerations such as an offender’s criminal history, amenability to rehabilitation, and correctional treatment. Where, as here, a sentencing judge acts as “the reverser of juries” in finding offense-related facts only by a preponderance of the evidence, the sentence is unconstitutional. The decision below should be reversed.
November 27, 2012 in Almendarez-Torres and the prior conviction exception, Blakely in the Supreme Court, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Friday, November 16, 2012
Michigan appeals court decides Miller is not retroactive to final juve murder casesAs reported in this local article, which is headlined "Appeals Court: No resentencing for Michigan juvenile lifers, but state law is 'unconstitutional'," an intermediate appellate court has now issued a lengthy ruling on Miller's import and impact in the state up north. Here are the basics from the press report:
The Michigan Court of Appeals today denied a resentencing request for Raymond Carp, 21, who is serving a mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of parole for a first-degree murder conviction when he was 16....
The ruling invalidated strict sentencing laws in Michigan and other states that treat violent offenders as adults, giving hope to hundreds of inmates serving life terms without hope of parole for crimes they committed as kids.
But the three-judge appeals court panel that heard arguments in the Carp case said today that the Supreme Court decision does not apply retroactively to offenders who already have exhausted the direct appeals process. The high court decision "is procedural and not substantive in nature and does not compromise a watershed ruling," they wrote in a 41-page published opinion.
Michigan is home to more than 350 juvenile lifers, one of the highest totals in the nation, and today's ruling may be appealed to the state Supreme Court.
The appeals court made a point to instruct judges in pending cases that Michigan's current law denying parole is "unconstitutional" when applied to juveniles and urged legislators to revise state statutes to comply with the Supreme Court ruling.
The full opinion in Michigan v. Carp, No. 307758 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 2012), is available at this link; it runs 41-pages with nearly 200 footnotes. Here are the unanimous opinion's final paragraphs:
The United States Supreme Court has, through a series of recent decisions culminating in Miller, indicated that juveniles are subject to different treatment than adults for purposes of sentencing under the Eighth Amendment. Specifically, we hold that in Michigan a sentencing court must consider, at the time of sentencing, characteristics associated with youth as identified in Miller when determining whether to sentence a juvenile convicted of a homicide offense to life in prison with or without the eligibility for parole. While Miller does not serve to “foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”
While Miller is applicable to those cases currently pending or on direct review, we find that in accordance with Teague and Michigan law that it (1) is not to be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, such as Carp’s, because the decision is procedural and not substantive in nature and (2) does not comprise a watershed ruling. We urge our Legislature to address with all possible expediency the issues encompassed by and resulting from Miller and that necessitate the revision of our current statutory sentencing scheme for juveniles.
In the interim, as guidance for our trial courts for those cases currently in process or on remand following direct appellate review, we find that MCL 791.234(6)(a) is unconstitutional as currently written and applied to juvenile homicide offenders. When sentencing a juvenile, defined now as an individual below 18 years of age, for a homicide offense, the sentencing court must, at the time of sentencing, evaluate and review those characteristics of youth and the circumstances of the offense as delineated in Miller and this opinion in determining whether following the imposition of a life sentence the juvenile is to be deemed eligible or not eligible for parole. We further hold that the Parole Board must respect the sentencing court’s decision by also providing a meaningful determination and review when parole eligibility arises.
November 16, 2012 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Jackson and Miller Eighth Amendment cases, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
Wednesday, November 07, 2012
California voters appear to be approving three-strikes reform, rejecting death penalty repeal
As of the writing of this post, Election Day has been over for three hours in my time zone and is just about to end in California. According to the result on this official California webpage with right now just over half of all precincts reporting, Proposition 34 calling for the repeal of California's death penalty is losing the popular vote by 46% to 54% and Proposition 36 calling for the reform of California's severe three-strikes sentencing law is winning the popular vote by 68% to 32%.
Assuming that the precinct which have reported are faily representative, it looks as though the voters in California are going to keep the death penalty on the books and are going to curtail the harshest aspects of the state's recidivism sentencing law. Though I had predicted these basic outcomes (informed by the generally on-point polling data from the last few weeks on these issues), I am a bit surprised that the death penalty repeal vote is so close and that the three-strikes reform vote is so one-sided.
Ain't democracy grand!
November 7, 2012 in Campaign 2012 and sentencing issues , Death Penalty Reforms, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack
Monday, November 05, 2012
Examining how Pennsylvania has responded legislatively to MillerThis local story out of Pennsylvania, headlined "New law gives Lancaster County judges discretion in sentencing juvenile killers," provides effective coverage on Pennsylvania's new sentencing laws for juvenile killers in response to the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment ruling in Miller this past June. Here are excerpts:
Additional recent local coverage of this new juve sentencing law in the Keystone State can be found in the Reading Eagle via "Sentencing guidelines for juveniles revised" and in the Wilkes Barre Times-Leader via "Juvenile bill makes changes."
A newly-passed law could lead to lighter sentences for juvenile killers in Lancaster County and statewide, according to local experts.
Gov. Tom Corbett recently signed Senate Bill 850, making life behind bars no longer a mandatory sentence for juveniles convicted of first- or second-degree murder. In fact, a juvenile convicted of second-degree murder, under the law, can't be sentenced to life without parole. The changes in sentencing statutes apply to those convicted after June 24....
In pending and future cases under the new law, judges still have the option of ordering a life-without-parole sentence to anyone convicted of 1st-degree murder, regardless of their age. However, the new law give judges much discretion, and flexibility, in sentencing. "Like it or not, that is the role we entrust to judges," Lancaster County Judge Dennis Reinaker said. "Nobody is going to agree with every decision we make. As judges, we have different ideas about things. And that's as it should be."...
Philadelphia-based Juvenile Law Center, an advocacy group for juvenile offenders, says Senate Bill 850 "misses the mark." The group, a reputable source in the legal community, claims in an opinion piece that the new provisions "not only leave life without parole as an option for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder, but also impose severe mandatory minimum sentences as the only alternative option."
The bill applies many proposals from the state's District Attorneys Association. Lancaster County District Attorney Craig Stedman said those proposals involved some compromise. "We fought hard to preserve higher mandatory minimums and the life-without-parole option for first-degree murderers," he said on Thursday. "And in exchange agreed to take the life-without-parole option off the table for second-degree murderers."...
Those convicted of first-degree murder, meaning an act that is pre-meditated with intention to kill, can still receive life-without-parole terms. A person under age 15 convicted of first-degree murder faces a mandatory 25-year term; a person between 15 and 17 faces a mandatory 35-year term. "It is critical for the protection of the public that Pennsylvania preserved the option to make sure that the worst of the worst have no possibility of ever being released to kill again," Stedman said.
Mandatory sentences are slightly less in second-degree cases, as locals say they should be. Second-degree murder is a killing that happens during the course of another felony, most commonly burglary or robbery. The mandatory minimum sentence for a juvenile 15 to 17 convicted of second-degree murder shrinks to 30 years. Convicted second-degree killers under age 15 face a mandatory minimum of 20 years....
Many lawyers that appeal second-degree cases here argue their client was merely a "lookout," and less culpable than the person who did the actual killing. "That's entirely different than someone who specifically intended to target someone," Lancaster County Judge David Ashworth said. "When I sentence anybody, I consider culpability."
Wednesday, October 31, 2012
Federal district judge refuses to apply arson mandatory minimum (on constitutional grounds?)This local article from Oregon reports on what appears to be a significant sentencing decision by a federal district judge concerning the application of a mandatory minimum provision. Here are the details:
Rejecting mandatory minimum five-year sentences as “grossly disproportionate” to the crimes, a federal judge in Eugene on Tuesday sentenced an Eastern Oregon rancher to three months in prison and his adult son to one year and a day for deliberately setting fires on federal land.
A federal jury in June convicted the Harney County pair after a two-week trial in Pendleton. Jurors convicted Dwight Hammond Jr., 70, on a single count of arson for “intentionally and maliciously” setting the 2001 Hardie-Hammond Fire in the Steens Mountain federal management and protection area. They convicted Steven Dwight Hammond, 43, of the same crime and of a second arson count for similarly setting the 2006 Krumbo Butte Fire. It burned in the same area and in the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge. The jury acquitted both men on arson charges in two 2006 fires.
U.S. Judge Michael Hogan agreed with the Hammonds’ defense lawyers that setting fire to juniper trees and sagebrush in the wilderness was not the type of crime that Congress had in mind when it set mandatory sentences of five to 20 years for anyone who “maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy by means of fire” any federal property. The mandate was part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
Prosecutors alleged that the father-son owners of Hammond Ranches Inc. set a series of fires on U.S. Bureau of Land Management land where the Hammonds had grazing rights. Prosecutors said the fires were set to reduce the growth of juniper trees and sagebrush, and to accelerate the growth of rangeland grasses for the Hammonds’ cattle....
In a sentencing memo, the defense lawyers noted that both men have served on the French Glen School Board, Community Club and Site Council, and were “instrumental” in founding and financing the French Glen Education Foundation, which funds extracurricular activities for area students. The Hammonds also regularly host an annual science and careers fair for seven rural schools, contribute money and food to the Harney County 4-H and FFA clubs, and donate meat to the Harney County Senior Center, the memo said.
Assistant U.S. Attorney Frank Papagni acknowledged that the Hammonds, “both of them, have done many wonderful things for the community.” But he urged Hogan to follow the law, noting that Steven Hammond’s nephew — Dwight Hammond’s grandson — testified that he “thought he was going to get burned up” when flames moved toward him as the then-13-year-old followed his uncle’s orders to light brush with matches.
The arsons also endangered the lives of BLM firefighters and hunters camping near one of the blazes, the government alleged. “Congress decided that this particular offense should carry a mandatory, statutory minimum term of five years,” Papagni wrote in the government’s sentencing memo. “The evidence of defendants’ guilt was substantial. The jury’s verdict of guilt for this particular offense mandates imposition of the required statutory minimum term, as the statute constrains this court’s discretion.”
Hogan disagreed, imposing the lesser terms. He also sentenced both Hammonds to three years of postprison supervision and required them to surrender their firearms. The judge also allowed the men to stagger their sentences in order to keep operating their ranch. He ordered Dwight Hammond to report to prison in January, with Steven Hammond to begin his sentence upon his father’s release.
As the title of this post indicates, it seems from the first sentence of this report that Judge Hogan concluded it would be unconstitutional based on the Eighth Amendment to apply a five-year mandatory minimum under the circumstances. (Side note: this companion article reports that this sentencing took place on Judge Hogan's last day on the bench.)
It will be interesting to follow if federal prosecutors seek to appeal this sentence to the Ninth Circuit. I predict that the feds will fear a "bad panel" and thus a "bad ruling" from the Ninth Circuit and thus will decide not to appeal.
October 31, 2012 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (34) | TrackBack
Tuesday, October 30, 2012
Tenth Circuit continues to struggle through ACCA's ever-elusive residual clauseA helpful reader alerted me to a series of recent notable Tenth Circuit decisions regarding application of the Armed Career Criminal Act and sent along this detailed summary for posting (which probably only hard-core ACCA fans will enjoy, but they should enjoy it lots):
Federal practitioners know that the meaning of the ACCA/4B1.2(a)(2)’s residual clause is one of the most frequently occurring yet confusing issues in federal sentencing law. And the confusion does not seem to be subsiding. Perhaps best illustrating this are three cases issued by the Tenth Circuit within just a two-week time span.
First came US v. Sandoval, No. 11-1303 (10th Cir. Oct. 9, 2012) (available here). The issue there was whether a prior conviction for “heat-of-passion” assault should be classified as a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause. The heat-of-passion offense read: "If assault in the second degree is committed under circumstances where the act causing the injury is performed, not after deliberation, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a serious and highly provoking act of the intended victim, affecting the person causing the injury sufficiently to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person."
The Sandoval court held that such a crime is an ACCA violent felony. But, in doing so, the opinion contained some telling language. The opinion began by explaining: “This is another of those cases, now becoming legion[FN1] where we must decide if a prior conviction constitutes a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).” Footnote 1 then explained how courts continue to face this issue and yet “[t]he law is not well-settled.” A few pages later, the opinion lamented how Sykes, the Supreme Court’s latest excursion into residual-clause land, is “not a model of clarity." Footnote 8 then went on for four paragraphs about the confusion.
Sandoval raises a number of very interesting questions. Among them:
1) What is the meaning of Begay post-Sykes?
2) Is a heat-of-passion offense akin to the type of mens rea crime at issue in Begay, or is Sykes the more analogous case?
3) Is a Begay analysis ever needed when the offense at issue is not one of strict liability, negligence, or recklessness?
4) If so, is a heat-of-passion offense “similar in kind” to the ACCA example crimes, none of which involve either the victim’s provocation or an irresistible passion of a reasonable person?
5) Is Begay's "in kind" analysis solely limited to an inquiry about being "purposeful, violent and aggressive," or can an offense be different from the example crimes "in kind" in a different way?
The first question is the big one, and questions two through five seem to inextricably follow from the first. Despite this confusion, the Tenth Circuit held that a heat-of-passion offense — where A) the victim provokes the offense, B) the offender is acting pursuant to an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, and C) there is no deliberation — is similar to the ACCA enumerated crimes. With so many important questions involved, this may be the perfect post-Sykes case to clarify the US Supreme Court’s residual clause precedents.
Nine days later, the Tenth Circuit returned to the uncertainty surrounding the residual clause in US v. Duran, No. 11-1308 (10th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012) (available here). There, the Circuit held that aggravated assault by recklessly causing bodily injury does not satisfy the residual clause (this time under USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2)). Even though the prior offense required causing bodily injury to the victim, the Circuit reasoned that Begay prevents reckless conduct from satisfying the residual clause. This certainly appears to be the correct outcome; Sykes itself implies that reckless crimes are outside of the residual clause. Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit panel still questioned its earlier precedent on that issue, and wondered aloud “if Begay is still good law.” See footnote 1.
Finally, four days after that, the Tenth Circuit again found itself in residual-clause land with US v. Maldonado, No. 11-2168 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2012) (available here). This time, the Tenth Circuit held that California’s first-degree burglary statute, although not constituting the generic, enumerated offense of burglary, did satisfy the ACCA’s residual clause. The court reached this result by applying “a two-part test, asking first whether the offense poses a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and second, whether the offense is ‘roughly similar’ in kind and degree of risk as the enumerated crimes in the ACCA.” The Circuit stressed again — as it did in Sandoval and Duran — that part two of the test is “subject to some debate,” noting how the Supreme Court is “splintered” on part-two. See footnote 6. The Maldonado panel also felt it important to remind us of Sandoval’s commentary on this confusion. See footnote 7.
The Tenth Circuit is not alone in tiring of the “legion” of cases it must decide on the ever-elusive meaning of the residual clause. And its frustration over this uncertain area of the law is warranted. Tellingly, the three opinions are each authored by a different judge, and they constitute seven of the nine active Tenth Circuit judges and one Senior Judge. Ultimately, the Supreme Court should heed the Tenth Circuit’s frustration and clarify this “splintered” issue sooner rather than later. (Or, for that matter, declare the clause void for its vagueness.) The issue is too important and commonly occurring to continue leaving the lower courts without much-needed guidance.
Friday, October 26, 2012
"How Mandatory Minimums Forced Me to Send More Than 1,000 Nonviolent Drug Offenders to Federal Prison"The title of this post is the headline of this new commentary authored by US District Judge Mark Bennett and published in The Nation. Here are is how it gets going:
Growing up in blue collar Circle Pines, Minnesota, in the 1950s, raised by parents from the “Greatest Generation,” I dreamed only of becoming a civil rights lawyer. My passion for justice was hard-wired into my DNA. Never could I have imagined that by the end of my 50s, after nineteen years as one of 678 federal district court judges in the nation, I would have sent 1,092 of my fellow citizens to federal prison for mandatory minimum sentences ranging from sixty months to life without the possibility of release. The majority of these women, men and young adults are nonviolent drug addicts. Methamphetamine is their drug of choice. Crack cocaine is a distant second. Drug kingpins? Oh yes, I’ve sentenced them, too. But I can count them on one hand. While I’m extremely proud of my father’s service in World War II, I am greatly conflicted about my role in the “war on drugs.”
You might think the Northern District of Iowa — a bucolic area home to just one city with a population above 100,000 — is a sleepy place with few federal crimes. You would be wrong. Of the ninety-four district courts across the United States, we have the sixth-heaviest criminal caseload per judge. Here in the heartland, I sentence more drug offenders in a single year than the average federal district court judge in New York City, Washington, Chicago, Minneapolis and San Francisco — combined. While drug cases nationally make up 29 percent of federal judges’ criminal dockets, according to the US Sentencing Commission, they make up more than 56 percent of mine. More startling, while meth cases make up 18 percent of a judge’s drug docket nationally, they account for 78 percent of mine. Add crack cocaine and together they account for 87 percent.
Crack defendants are almost always poor African-Americans. Meth defendants are generally lower-income whites. More than 80 percent of the 4,546 meth defendants sentenced in federal courts in 2010 received a mandatory minimum sentence. These small-time addicts are apprehended not through high-tech wiretaps or sophisticated undercover stings but by common traffic stops for things like nonfunctioning taillights. Or they’re caught in a search of the logs at a local Walmart to see who is buying unusually large amounts of nonprescription cold medicine. They are the low-hanging fruit of the drug war. Other than their crippling meth addiction, they are very much like the folks I grew up with. Virtually all are charged with federal drug trafficking conspiracies — which sounds ominous but is based on something as simple as two people agreeing to purchase pseudoephedrine and cook it into meth. They don’t even have to succeed.
I recently sentenced a group of more than twenty defendants on meth trafficking conspiracy charges. All of them pled guilty. Eighteen were “pill smurfers,” as federal prosecutors put it, meaning their role amounted to regularly buying and delivering cold medicine to meth cookers in exchange for very small, low-grade quantities to feed their severe addictions. Most were unemployed or underemployed. Several were single mothers. They did not sell or directly distribute meth; there were no hoards of cash, guns or countersurveillance equipment. Yet all of them faced mandatory minimum sentences of sixty or 120 months. One meth-addicted mother faced a 240-month sentence because a prior meth conviction in county court doubled her mandatory minimum. She will likely serve all twenty years; in the federal system, there is no parole, and one serves an entire sentence minus a maximum of a 15 percent reduction rewarded for “good time.”
Several years ago, I started visiting inmates I had sentenced in prison. It is deeply inspiring to see the positive changes most have made. Some definitely needed the wake-up call of a prison cell, but very few need more than two or three years behind bars. These men and women need intensive drug treatment, and most of the inmates I visit are working hard to turn their lives around. They are shocked — and glad — to see me, and it’s important to them that people outside prison care about their progress. For far too many, I am their only visitor.
If lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for nonviolent drug addicts actually worked, one might be able to rationalize them. But there is no evidence that they do. I have seen how they leave hundreds of thousands of young children parentless and thousands of aging, infirm and dying parents childless. They destroy families and mightily fuel the cycle of poverty and addiction. In fact, I have been at this so long, I am now sentencing the grown children of people I long ago sent to prison.
October 26, 2012 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (20) | TrackBack
Wednesday, October 03, 2012
Is SCOTUS gearing up to reconsider Harris and the Sixth Amendment's application to mandatory minimums?
The question in the title of this post is prompted by an exciting paragraph deep within John Elwood's exciting new SCOTUSblog post excitingly titled "Relist (and Hold) Watch." Here it is:
I have so much to say on this topic, but I need to first get my confetti ready and also put on my black-striped Charlie Brown yellow shirt.
Unsurprisingly, the first real order list after the Long Conference left us with a boatload of relists. Eleven, in fact. Apprendi purists, ready the confetti: Two of the relists, Alleyne v. United States, 11-9335, and Dotson v. United States, 11-9873 (which we first discussed in May), ask the Court to overrule Harris v. United States (2002). You might recall that, in Harris, a plurality headed by Justice Kennedy plus Justice Breyer’s concurrence in the judgment held that facts that increased the mandatory minimum sentence need not be decided by the jury. Two members of the Harris majority (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor) are gone, as are two of the dissenters (Justices Stevens and Souter). It would be a pretty big deal if the New ‘n’ Improved Court revisited Harris. But I will try to curb my enthusiasm in case the Court is pulling its Lucy-and-the-football trick again, like it did both during OT2010 and last Term when it relisted cases seeking to revisit another sentencing rule in tension with Apprendi, Almendarez-Torres v. United States (holding that the fact of a prior conviction could be found by a judge rather than submitted to a jury) – only to deny those petitions without comment.
Friday, September 28, 2012
Second Circuit reiterates that mandatory minimum statutes trump parsimony instruction of 3553(a)The Second Circuit has a brief sentencing opinion this morning in US v. Carter, No. 11-3605 (2d Cir. Sept. 28, 2012) (available here), which would have been huge news had it come out the other way. As resolved, the decision still seemed blog-worthy and here is how it begins:
This case reminds us of the tension in federal criminal law between two competing but overlapping systems for imposing a sentence. In most cases, a sentencing court computes the relevant range under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, now advisory under the teaching of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), before making its own determination of an appropriate punishment after considering the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a), including the “parsimony” provision that a sentence must not be “greater than necessary” to serve appropriate sentencing objectives. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). For certain criminal offenses, however, Congress has created a “mandatory minimum” term of imprisonment — a blunt directive that may require judges to give sentences that they consider unduly punitive. See Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2326–29 (2012) (describing the development of and relationship between these two sentencing regimes).
The question presented in this appeal is whether a statutory mandatory minimum provision binds a federal sentencing court when the relevant statute does not specify that it overrides the “parsimony” provision in § 3553(a). For the reasons stated below, we hold that a statutory mandatory minimum binds a sentencing court by explicitly providing a sentencing floor. The relevant statute need not specify that it overrides the “parsimony” provision or other general sentencing considerations in § 3553(a). Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Thursday, September 13, 2012
Latest California poll data showing DP repeal losing so far, while three-strike reform is winning big
Crime & Consequences has lots of good coverage here and here of the latest poll numbers from California concerning the initiative going before the voters to repeal the death penalty in the state. Short story is that the polling numbers suggests those favoring abolition have a up hill battle over the next two months to convince voters to vote for repeal.
Not reported by C&C, but via the data linked in this report, are the remarkable poll numbers showing overwhelming support for reforming California's severe Three-Strikes mandatory sentencing law (this is Proposition 36). According to the data, there is more than 80% support for three-strikes reform, and of those who indicate a strong or somewhat solid opinion, more than 50% support reform and less than 10% are against reform.
Monday, August 27, 2012
Second Circuit limits predicates triggerring 15-year child porn mandatory minimumsThe Second Circuit has released today a lengthy and significant ruling concerning the application of mandatory minimum terms for those convicted of child pornography offenses. The panel opinion in US v. Beardsley, No. 11-2206 (2d Cir. Aug. 27, 2012) (available here) begins this way:
Defendant-appellant Wayne Beardsley appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Northern District of New York (Glenn T. Suddaby, Judge) following his plea of guilty to knowingly receiving and possessing child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(A) and 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court sentenced Beardsley to fifteen years in prison, the mandatory minimum sentence established by 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1), which applies to defendants convicted of certain federal child pornography offenses who have a prior conviction “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” On appeal, Beardsley argues that the district court erred in employing the “modified categorical approach” to analyze the facts underlying his prior state conviction for endangering the welfare of a child, and that under the proper standard -- the “categorical approach” -- his prior state conviction does not qualify as a § 2252A(b)(1) predicate offense. We agree, and therefore vacate his sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.
Wednesday, August 22, 2012
Effective review of three-strikes initiative battle taking place in CaliforniaThe Sacramento Bee has this lengthy new article providing an effective overview of the 2012 election season debate over an effort to reform California's three strikes law. The piece is headlined "'Three-strikes' battle returns to fall ballot in California," and here are excerpts:
Proposition 36 gives the state's electorate another opportunity to weigh in on California's 18-year-old "three-strikes" law, the toughest career-criminal sentencing statute in the nation. Twice in as many decades, voters have sided in favor of a three-strikes law that allows judges to impose a life prison term for offenders who commit a third felony -- no matter how minor -- if they have two previous serious or violent criminal convictions on their records.
Proposition 36 proponents want to change the law to restrict the 25-years-to-life sentences, with some exceptions, to criminals whose third felony was serious or violent; nothing less than a residential burglary would qualify as a strike.
The measure would enable an estimated 3,000 of the 8,873 prisoners serving 25-years-to-life terms in the state as of June 30 to apply for resentencing hearings. If their motions for new terms are granted, a good number of those 3,000 prisoners could go free. The Legislative Analyst's Office estimates passage of Proposition 36 could save the state anywhere from $70 million to $90 million a year in reduced prison costs.
The initiative has had huge cash infusions from two sources. Billionaire financier George Soros, the international hedge fund manager who has contributed millions over the years to change drug laws and other statutes he believes are too harsh, kicked in $500,000, according to the secretary of state's records. David W. Mills, a Stanford law professor and private investment manager, matched and raised the contribution. Mills, a co-chair of the NAACP's Legal Defense Fund, put in $878,000. The money Soros and Mills contributed paid for the $1.4 million signature-gathering effort that qualified Proposition 36 for the Nov. 6 ballot.
In an interview, Mills, 65, said his involvement in California's three-strikes law stems from his long-term interest in civil rights. It is Mills' view that the sentencing measure's "dramatic effect on poor people and African Americans" makes it one of the leading civil rights issues of the day. "The notion I can live in a state in a country where we would send somebody to jail for 25-to-life for stealing a loaf of bread, a pair of gloves, a piece of pizza, for a gram of cocaine, or whatever, to me is incomprehensible," he said.
Opponents of the measure include the California Police Chiefs Association. Sacramento Police Chief Rick Braziel signed the ballot rebuttal argument against Proposition 36 in his capacity as president of the California Peace Officers Association, arguing that thousands of criminals would be released from prison. Top victims' rights organizations, such as Crime Victims United of California, also have lined up to fight the measure....
Mike Reynolds, the Fresno photographer whose daughter was murdered by a repeat offender, has served as guardian of the three-strikes law since its 1994 birth. In an interview, Reynolds noted steep declines in the California crime rate in the 18 years that the law has been in effect. He wonders why anyone would want to change it, and is angry at the thought of 3,000 career criminals getting out of prison.
"One hundred percent of them would have at least two prior serious or violent convictions," Reynolds said. "Make no mistake. We're talking about the bad boys. These are the guys who are responsible for the worst of our crimes, the most active by definition. And you want to put them back on the streets and not expect them to come back with new convictions?"
Another Proposition 36 opponent, Sacramento County District Attorney Jan Scully, sneers at the suggestion that the three-strikes change would save taxpayers' money by releasing people from prison. "This assumes they're not going to commit any more crimes," Scully said. "Trust me, they are. Then we'll have to prosecute them again, so they'll be taking up just as many resources as before, except they'll have new victims in their path."
August 22, 2012 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack
Friday, August 03, 2012
En banc DC Circuit splits over mens rea required for 30-year gun mandatory minimum
The Blog of Legal Times has this new post about this notable en banc ruling handed down by the DC Circuit. Because all the opinions in the ruling run over 100 pages, I will rely here on The BLT's post provide a summary of the two leading opinions:
Bryan Burwell maintains he didn't know the gun he was holding during a bank robbery was capable of automatic fire. The gun, an AK-47, cost him an extra 30 years in prison.
A divided federal appeals court in Washington ruled today that prosecutors were not required to prove at trial that Burwell knew the firearm was a machine gun. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, sitting in a rare session as a full court, upheld the 30-year mandatory prison term for possession of a machine gun. The court ruled 5 to 3 in favor of the U.S. Justice Department.
Judge Janice Rogers Brown, writing for the majority, said there's nothing unfair in the statute. Burwell, the court said, knew he was committing a violent crime when he robbed two banks. It's not unusual, Brown wrote, to punish defendants for unintended consequences of unlawful acts. "The higher penalties attached to the use of the most dangerous kinds of firearms reflect Congress's desire to create a deterrent commensurate with the increased danger posed by these weapons," Brown said.
A jury in Washington's federal trial court convicted Burwell in 2005 for his role in a robbery conspiracy that Brown said employed "old school tactics," including pistol-whipping and subduing bystanders. Burwell was sentenced to about 11 years for the robbery scheme. On top of that, the trial judge tacked on an additional 30 years for possession of a machine gun.
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Federal Public Defender's Office supported Burwell in the appeal, saying that prosecutors should have been required to prove Burwell's knowledge that he was brandishing a machine gun during a robbery spree in Washington in 2004....
Writing in dissent, Judge Brett Kavanaugh posed a hypothetical situation in which, under the majority decision, an altar boy can be found guilty both of theft and drug possession for stealing a collection plate that held cash and a bag of cocaine sewn into the lining. "The presumption of mens rea embodies deeply rooted principles of law and justice that the Supreme Court has emphasized time and again," Kavanaugh wrote in the dissent, joined by Judge David Tatel. "The presumption of mens rea is no mere technicality, but rather implicates 'fundamental and far-reaching' issues, as this case well illustrates."
Kavanaugh wrote in his 51-page dissent — nearly twice as long as the majority opinion — that "the debate over mens rea is not some philosophical or academic exercise. It has major real-world consequences for criminal defendants. And it takes on added significance in an era of often lengthy mandatory minimum sentences."
Tuesday, July 31, 2012
Eleventh Circuit clarifies which defendants can benefit from new crack guidelines
The Eleventh Circuit issued a little, but still important, sentencing opinion in US v. Liberse, No. 12-10243 (11th Cir. July 30, 2012) (available here) to clarify just which defendants can now benefit from the new reduced crack guidelines. Here is how the opinion starts:
This is the third decision we have issued in the past month concerning the application of Amendments 750 and 759 to the sentencing guidelines and the scope of a district court’s authority to reduce a defendant’s sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). In the first two decisions, we held that those amendments did not authorize a court to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) if the defendant’s guidelines range remained the statutory mandatory minimum after the amendments or if the guidelines range was otherwise not affected by the amendments. See United States v. Glover, — F.3d —, No. 12-10580, 2012 WL 2814303, at *3–4 (11th Cir. July 11, 2012) (statutory mandatory minimum); United States v. Lawson, — F.3d —, No. 11-15912, 2012 WL 2866265, at *2–3 (11th Cir. July 13, 2012) (otherwise unchanged guidelines range). Our decisions in Glover and Lawson establish that “a court cannot use an amendment to reduce a sentence in a particular case unless that amendment actually lowers the guidelines range in that case.” Glover, 2012 WL 2814303, at *3.
This appeal raises a different issue because the pro se appellant’s original guidelines range of 121 to 151 months was above, and thus not affected by, the applicable statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months. As a result, Amendments 750 and 759 would reduce his guidelines range. For those reasons, § 3582(c)(2) gives the district court authority to reduce the sentence in its discretion. Because the court believed it lacked that authority, we vacate its order denying the motion for resentencing and remand for the court to determine whether to exercise its discretion to reduce the sentence.
Friday, July 27, 2012
Fascinating deal cut in federal habeas action brought by California pot dispensary owner
A helpful reader alerted me to this Sacramento Bee story from earlier this week, headlined "Plea cuts prison term for medical pot seller Bryan Epis," which reports on a remarkable resolution to a remarkable federal criminal justice matter in California. Here are the highlights:
Bryan James Epis, the first person associated with a California cannabis dispensary to duke it out at trial with federal prosecutors over medical marijuana, has had 2 1/2 years whacked off his mandatory 10-year prison term.
Epis, who has been locked in a pitched battle with law enforcement over his cultivation and use of marijuana for almost 20 years, is an inmate at the Terminal Island Federal Correctional Institution in Southern California. He now should be released in early 2014 instead of September 2016, and will be supervised by probation officers for 10 more years.
The 45-year-old Epis established a cannabis club in Chico, one of the first in the state after passage in 1996 of a California ballot initiative permitting medicinal use of marijuana with a doctor's recommendation. At the conclusion of a highly publicized trial a decade ago in Sacramento federal court, he was found guilty of conspiring to produce 1,000 or more plants at his home within 1,000 feet of Chico High School. The crime carries a mandatory minimum 10 years behind bars. He was free for much of the intervening time pending efforts to overturn the conviction.
The rare agreement, which was approved Tuesday by U.S. District Judge Garland E. Burrell Jr., is surprising on multiple levels:
• Federal prosecutors signed off on it, yet they have zero tolerance for defendants who do what they say Epis did -- grow pot out of a greedy hunger for huge profits.
• The government had argued for years that Epis deserved no reduction because he was less than forthcoming at a debriefing by prosecutors and agents.
• The original sentence is statutorily mandated and had been upheld on appeal.
• The trial prosecutor, Samuel Wong, is known as one of the toughest in the business on pot growers, yet he agreed to the reduction....
A common thread that has run throughout the case, starting with the trial, is Epis' claim that Wong relied heavily on false and misleading evidence, and arguments regarding a spreadsheet seized during a search of his home that the prosecutor knew had nothing to do with the charges in the indictment. Wong heatedly denies the accusation, arguing an appeals panel rejected the claim.
In April, Hollows scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue for June 13. At a pre-hearing conference on June 4, Epis attorney John Balazs and Wong informed Hollows they had reached an agreement....
U.S. Attorney Benjamin Wagner said Tuesday a recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion may have made Epis' challenge more viable. "As set forth in the settlement agreement, Bryan Epis claimed that his trial attorneys rendered ineffective assistance to him with respect to their advice concerning the United States' pretrial plea offer," Wagner said in a prepared statement. "As also detailed in the agreement, his trial attorneys did not refute that claim, and under recent Supreme Court precedent, Epis therefore might have been entitled to some relief."...
Epis, who has a law degree, said Monday that, "given the risks involved in further litigation and the low track record of success in habeas cases in general, I accepted the government's offer despite all its conditions."
One of the conditions Wong insisted on was that Epis give up his constitutional right to speak out in favor of medical marijuana and across-the-board legalization through the end of his supervised release. Epis stands as a symbol among marijuana advocates of the sacrifices they feel have been made in the face of an intractable federal stance on the drug.
"Although we had strong claims, I understand and concur in Bryan's decision to accept the government's offer … in order to get back to his family as soon as possible," Balazs said Monday. "At the same time, it seems un-American for the government to insist … that Bryan give up his First Amendment right to advocate for the reform of our country's marijuana laws."
The helpful reader who alerted me to this story was Epis attorney John Balazs, who has also told me that Bryan Epis has given him permission to share info and comments about his case and that he may provide some additional "blog copy" about this fascinating case in the near future.
Wednesday, July 25, 2012
Massachusetts Gov asked to sign mixed sentencing reform bill
As reported in this local article, headlined "While called ‘balanced,’ sentencing bill lacks provisions sought by Gov. Patrick," the governor of Massachusetts now has on his desk a dynamic state sentencing reform bill. Here are the details:
Advocates on all sides of the crime and sentencing debate continue to speak out about the habitual offender and sentencing reform bill on Gov. Deval Patrick’s desk, urging him to sign it, veto it or send it back to the Legislature with amendments.
In a WBZ-AM radio interview Monday night, Les Gosule, an activist who has pressed for a habitual offender law for about a decade following the rape and murder of his daughter Melissa, said parties disgruntled over issues left unaddressed by the legislation can pursue those initiatives anew in the next session beginning in January. “I want the pen,” Gosule said, urging Patrick to put his signature on the bill.
Patrick has until Sunday to act on the legislation and proponents and opponents of the bill are mindful that formal legislative sessions end for the year at midnight next Tuesday. Patrick can sign the bill, veto it, or send it back with amendments. An eleventh hour amendment from Patrick would force lawmakers to either deal immediately with the amendment or risk seeing their work on the bill go for naught....
While the bill last week cleared the House 139-14 and the Senate 31-7, its supporters and opponents since then have raised concerns about it, with some arguing it lacks crime-fighting tools sought by law enforcement and others arguing that it takes discretionary power in sentencing away from judges and would lead to prison overcrowding.
Among other provisions, the bill reduces mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug offenders and eliminates parole eligibility for certain violent offenders upon their third conviction.
While supporters say the bill represents the “balanced” approach Patrick called for, the legislation appears to lack key policies Patrick highlighted in his State of the State speech in January, giving extra weight to the idea that the bill might be returned with amendments....
The lack of judicial discretion in the bill’s habitual offender initiative drew criticism outside the capital Tuesday. “Who has discretionary power? The prosecutor,” said Rev. George Walters-Sleyon, who was joined by other Boston clergy and Boston City Councilor Charles Yancey in front of the Shaw Memorial on Boston Common Tuesday morning. He said black people and Latinos comprise less than 17 percent of the state’s population but more than 55 percent of those serving time behind bars....
Criticism has also been levied from state prosecutors. Six of the state’s 11 district attorneys signed onto a letter Friday criticizing the bill for leaving out provisions that would strengthen gun laws, and for including “no supervision” of drug traffickers released into the community.
Saturday, July 21, 2012
"The Mandatory Meaning of Miller"
The title of this post is the title of this new piece by Professor William W. Berry III. Here is the abstract:
In June 2012, the United States Supreme Court held in Miller v. Alabama that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on 'cruel and unusual' punishment prohibited the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences on juveniles. This case continued the Supreme Court’s slow but steady expansion of the scope of the Eighth Amendment over the past decade.
In light of the Court’s decision in Miller to preclude mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles, this article explores the possibility of further expansion of the Eighth Amendment to proscribe other kinds of mandatory sentences. Applying the approach of the Court in Woodson and Miller to other contexts provides, at the very least, a basis to remedy some of the injustices created by mandatory sentences.
This article, then, argues that the “mandatory” meaning of Miller is that the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of mitigating evidence by courts in all cases involving “death-in-custody” sentences. In light of this mandatory” meaning, the article then considers several important normative consequences.
Specifically, application of this 'mandatory' meaning would result in the Eighth Amendment barring imposition of a 'death-in-custody' sentence in capital cases where life with parole is not a sentencing option, cases involving a mandatory sentence of life without parole, and cases where the term of the sentence approaches the life expectancy of the offender. As explained below, the key principle here is that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to examine mitigating evidence in any case where the duration mandated legislative sentence exceeds the life expectancy of the offender.
Part I of this article explains the meaning of 'mandatory' as developed by Miller. In Part II, the article describes the normative consequences of adopting the 'mandatory' meaning of Miller -- when 'mandatory' matters -- in applying the Eighth Amendment to 'death-in-custody' cases. In Part III, the article then makes the case -- why 'mandatory' matters -- for adopting this approach in Eighth Amendment cases.