Wednesday, November 25, 2015

"The Gaping Hole in the Prison Early Release Program: Mental Health Care"

MentalhealthThe title of this post is the headline of this lengthy National Journal article which carries this subheadline: "Much has been made of this latest effort, but inmates who suffer mental illness will continue without the services they need — in and out of prison."  Here are excerpts:

In Oc­to­ber, the Obama ad­min­is­tra­tion an­nounced the early re­lease of more than 6,000 fed­er­al in­mates.  While a surfeit of data on Amer­ica’s over-in­car­cer­a­tion ap­pears to sup­port the ad­min­is­tra­tion’s ra­tionale for the early-re­lease of in­mates serving time for non­vi­ol­ent of­fenses, a cru­cial as­pect went un­ad­dressed in the hoopla sur­round­ing the announce­ment: What kind of men­tal-health re­sources are avail­able in com­munit­ies for in­mates des­ig­nated for early re­lease?

And, across the board, as the ad­min­is­tra­tion and ad­voc­ates un­der­take strategies to ad­dress mass in­car­cer­a­tion, what is the fate of the es­tim­ated hun­dreds and thou­sands of in­mates in Amer­ic­an jails and pris­ons who are men­tally ill?

The U.S. Sen­ten­cing Com­mis­sion’s early-re­lease pro­gram put a point on grow­ing na­tion­al aware­ness about the implcations of Amer­ica’s vast in­car­cer­a­tion uni­verse.  It res­ul­ted from a bi­par­tis­an ef­fort to re­make harsh drug-re­lated sen­ten­cing guidelines that had spurred the mass in­car­cer­a­tion of mostly black and Latino men be­gin­ning in the mid-1980s.  By year end 2014, 2.2 mil­lion people were locked up in Amer­ica’s jails and pris­ons, rep­res­ent­ing the highest rate of in­car­cer­a­tion among de­veloped na­tions world­wide.  The pop­u­la­tion of in­mates who are sched­uled to re­ceive early re­lease is com­posed primar­ily of drug of­fend­ers who will be un­der the watch of pro­ba­tion of­ficers after they return to ci­vil­ian life, ac­cord­ing to Sally Yates, Deputy U.S. At­tor­ney Gen­er­al.

But the ab­sence of a com­pre­hens­ive plan to serve the men­tal health needs of in­mates in the early-re­lease pro­gram high­lights a long-stand­ing con­cern among pris­on re­form ad­voc­ates: the tight in­ter­sec­tion of drug or al­co­hol ab­use, men­tal ill­ness, and in­car­cer­a­tion.  Men­tal health ex­perts cite the “co-oc­cur­ring” pres­ence of drug or al­co­hol ab­use and men­tal ill­ness among in­mates as a ma­jor chal­lenge, one that makes both the daily pro­cess of safely hous­ing pris­on­ers par­tic­u­larly com­plex, and which also com­plic­ates the re­turn of in­mates to com­munit­ies....

A 2014 re­port by the Na­tion­al Re­sources Coun­cil (NRC) showed that men­tal ill­ness in the na­tion’s jails and pris­ons is per­vas­ive.  Pro­duced by an in­ter­dis­cip­lin­ary com­mit­tee of re­search­ers, the re­port ex­amined data from cor­rec­tions-department sur­veys and un­covered the pres­ence of “men­tal-health con­cerns” among 64 per­cent of in­mates in the nation’s jails, 54 per­cent of state pris­on­ers, and among 45 per­cent of in­mates at fed­er­al fa­cil­it­ies.... Con­sequently, a grow­ing num­ber of crim­in­al-justice and pris­on­er-re­hab­il­it­a­tion ex­perts are fo­cus­ing in on men­tal health as a key compon­ent of Amer­ica’s mass in­car­cer­a­tion, both as a primary in­stig­at­or of im­pris­on­ment, and also as a ma­jor challenge that must be ad­dressed in shap­ing re­lease policies and pro­to­cols....

Amer­ica’s jour­ney on the path to be­com­ing the de­veloped na­tion with the most in­car­cer­ated people in the world — and the na­tion where pris­ons and jails are de facto men­tal-health catch­ments — gained steam with the “War on Drugs,” a col­lec­tion of re­gion­al and fed­er­al tough-on-crime policies and harsh sen­ten­cing laws that es­cal­ated dur­ing the 1980s as crack co­caine use in urb­an loc­ales drove up vi­ol­ent-crime rates and gen­er­ated nightly news cov­er­age of com­munit­ies in crisis.  But the spark that lit the fire un­der mass in­car­cer­a­tion in the U.S. was struck long be­fore the mid-1980s.

Be­gin­ning in the 1960s, states began rad­ic­ally re­du­cing tax­pay­er-fun­ded men­tal-health hos­pit­als and in­pa­tient cen­ters, re­leas­ing hun­dreds of thou­sands of men­tally ill or chal­lenged pa­tients in­to com­munit­ies.  Known as deinstitutionala­tion, the pro­cess was deemed ne­ces­sary by state law­makers and gov­ernors in or­der to shut­ter hos­pit­als that of­ten resembled 19th-cen­tury “snake pits” — large, poorly run fa­cil­it­ies in which thou­sands of vul­ner­able men­tally ill citizens were ware­housed, un­der-served, and for­got­ten....

Dur­ing the same era, from Cali­for­nia to New York, a per­fect storm of factors af­fect­ing in­car­cer­a­tion rates loomed and then broke: na­tion­wide, thou­sands of res­id­ents who needed men­tal health at­ten­tion but couldn’t af­ford private care or ac­cess af­ford­able ser­vices turned to self-med­ic­at­ing be­ha­vi­or — through drug or al­co­hol use — which led to crim­in­al activ­ity, which in turn brought them in­to the crim­in­al-justice sys­tem at the very mo­ment when judges and elec­ted of­fi­cials coast to coast pushed for severe sen­ten­cing of those in­volved in drug-re­lated activ­ity.

In city after city, those without money to af­ford private drug treat­ment or men­tal-health care — or private at­tor­neys — were swept in­to jails and pris­ons, some­times fa­cing terms of a dec­ade or longer un­der new man­dat­ory-min­im­um sen­ten­cing rules for pos­sess­ing or selling small or mod­er­ate amounts of nar­cot­ics.  A raft of new sen­ten­cing guidelines nar­rowed av­en­ues for pro­ba­tion for those with mul­tiple drug of­fenses.  These ‘three strikes’ laws, as they came to be known, were ap­proved by a dec­ade’s worth of Con­gress mem­bers, as well as by Demo­crat­ic and Re­pub­lic­an pres­id­ents.

Thou­sands of low-level de­fend­ants, many suf­fer­ing from emo­tion­al- or men­tal-health chal­lenges that they had been "street treat­ing" by us­ing il­leg­al drugs, then pro­duced the co-oc­cur­ring dy­nam­ic of in­di­vidu­als strug­gling with men­tal ill­ness and drug or al­co­hol ad­dic­tion.  Plunged in­to state or fed­er­al pen­it­en­tiar­ies, thou­sands re­ceived poor treat­ment or no treat­ment, and their men­tal health de­teri­or­ated.  In some in­stances, men­tally ill in­mates fell prey to vi­ol­ence from oth­er in­mates, harmed or killed them­selves, or de­veloped deep­er drug or al­co­hol ad­dic­tions.  A Feb­ru­ary study from the Vera In­sti­tute for Justice found that 83 per­cent of jail in­mates in the U.S. do not re­ceive men­tal-health services or treat­ment after be­ing ad­mit­ted....

Justice De­part­ment of­fi­cials and some state judges have star­ted to dis­play act­iv­ist tend­en­cies, for­cing loc­al jur­is­dic­tions to be­gin find­ing solu­tions for the grow­ing num­ber of men­tally ill in­mates with­in the vast net­works of loc­al ­correc­tion­al fa­cil­it­ies.  In Au­gust, for ex­ample, Los Angeles County agreed to im­ple­ment ma­jor re­forms aimed at improv­ing the con­di­tions of men­tally ill in­mates fol­low­ing strong pres­sure from DOJ....  [I]n the state that came to em­body the ac­cel­er­a­tion of mass in­car­cer­a­tion, a blue­print is tak­ing shape for achiev­ing hu­mane and fisc­ally re­spons­ible out­comes for men­tally ill people who come in­to con­tact with the crim­in­al-justice sys­tem.

November 25, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, November 19, 2015

Jared Fogle given (above-guideline and above-prosecutor-recommend) sentence of 188 months in federal prison for sex offenses

As reported in this local article, "Jared Fogle was sentenced to 15 years, eight months in prison Thursday for possession and distribution of child pornography and traveling across state lines for commercial sex with a minor." Here is more about the sentencing:

Judge Tanya Walton Pratt announced the sentence for the former Subway pitchman in federal court in Indianapolis. Fogle was taken into custody of the U.S. Marshal after the four-hour, 42-minute hearing. He was handcuffed behind his back and led out of the courtroom as family members hugged and cried.

Immediately after the hearing, Fogle blew a kiss and waved goodbye to family members in the front row. About a dozen family members and friends attended the hearing. The sentence is more than the 12 1/2 years that prosecutors agreed to seek in a plea deal. Pratt said the advisory sentence range of 135 to 168 months "does not sufficiently account for the defendant's criminal conduct."

Federal prisoners must serve at least 85 percent of their sentences. The judge recommended that Fogle be sent to a prison in Littleton, Colo., because of its program for sex offenders.  "Federal judges do not sentence based on emotion or public sentiment," Pratt said. She added, "The level of perversion and lawlessness exhibited by Mr. Fogle is extreme."

She described Fogle, 38, as having had a "privileged" upbringing before becoming "obsessed" with sex and minors. Pratt talked about Fogle's journey from being morbidly obese while at Indiana University to losing weight and being discovered by Subway.  "What a gift to have such a professional windfall fall in your lap," Pratt said.

Pratt said she believes Fogle is sincere in his remorse and took into account the $1.4 million in restitution he has paid. "This defendant's celebrity cuts both ways," she said. "He will likely get protection when he goes to the Bureau of Prisons."

Prior related posts:

November 19, 2015 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (34)

"Cosmetic Psychopharmacology for Prisoners: Reducing Crime and Recidivism Through Cognitive Intervention"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting-sounding paper available via SSRN authored by Adam Shniderman and Lauren Solberg. Here is the abstract:

Criminologists have long acknowledged the link between a number of cognitive deficits, including low intelligence and impulsivity, and crime.  A new wave of research has demonstrated that pharmacological intervention can restore or improve cognitive function, particularly executive function (including the inhibition of impulsive response), and restore neural plasticity. Such restoration and improvement can allow for easier acquisition of new skills and as a result, presents significant possibilities for the criminal justice system.

For example, studies have shown that supplements of Omega-3, a fatty acid commonly found in food such as tuna, can decrease frequency of violent incidents in an incarcerated population.  Research has also begun to explore the use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) to reduce impulsivity in some violent offenders.  However, there are significant legal and ethical implications when moving from dietary supplements to prescription pharmaceuticals and medical devices for cognitive intervention.  This paper will explore the legal and ethical issues surrounding the use of pharmacological intervention on prisoners as an effort to reduce crime and recidivism.

November 19, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, November 18, 2015

"Some Women Charged Under Tennessee’s Hated Fetal Assault Law Say It’s Not So Bad"

The title of this post is the headline of this interesting new Nashville Public Radio piece (found by my great research assistant) that provides interesting perspectives on a controversial Tennessee criminal law responding to modern drug abuse concerns.  Here are excerpts:

Tennessee has attracted international attention for making it a crime to give birth to a drug-dependent baby. This means women addicted to pain pills or heroin can be charged with assault to a fetus.  After less than two years in effect, the controversial law must be renewed, or it will expire.  While the measure has drawn worldwide disdain from women's health and civil liberty advocates, some of the women who’ve been charged say the threat of jail-time was a wake-up call.

“If I didn’t go through what I went through, I’d probably be down that same road right now," says 26-year-old mother Kim Walker of Johnson City. "But now I’m a totally different person. And I’m on the good road, not the bad road.”  Last year, Walker went into labor at home....  "One push and he was out," she says. “My husband delivered him. Didn’t know he was drug exposed until we got to the hospital," she says. "When we got to the hospital, they took him straight from my hospital room. I didn’t get to see him, didn’t get to hold him, nothing.”

He spent 28 days in the neonatal intensive care unit, withdrawing from the painkillers Walker was taking illegally. Walker had to take a drug test, which she failed. Then she was charged with assault.  But like most women, she chose treatment in order to avoid conviction. Rehab was a rocky road.  There’s been a relapse along the way. But in late October, Walker gave birth to another son — Jack — this time, drug-free.

The idea for Tennessee’s fetal assault law didn’t originate from doctors, nurses or social workers.  It came from law enforcement and legislators.  In fact, the medical community lined up in resistance, saying punishment is no way to treat addiction — especially when young mothers are singled out.

Lisa Tipton falls somewhere in the middle. “I don’t feel the law is perfect," she says. "I don’t feel the law is necessarily the solution...but we were absolutely bombarded.” Tipton runs a non-profit treatment center called Families Free in Johnson City. This part of Northeast Tennessee is the epicenter of the state's — and even the country's — problem with neonatal abstinence syndrome....

Tipton recognizes that Tennessee’s law has a bad rap among women’s health advocates and civil liberty groups.  But she says she’s not hearing great alternatives from the naysayers.  “I would really invite them to go in our area, into the trailer parks where they may be living with several family members who also use drugs and sometimes abuse them, and their children as well. To go into the jails and talk to the women whose lives have been destroyed by drugs and whose children are being raised by somebody else," Tipton says. "Help come up with some very real-life and real-world solutions that are going to change the lives of these women.”

It isn't clear the fetal assault law is doing what it was supposed to do.  In the Tri-Cities, more women have been prosecuted with this misdemeanor than anywhere else in the state.  Sullivan County District Attorney Barry Staubus, who pushed for the law in the first place, has charged more than 20 women this year.  And yet the mountainous region is still home to the largest number of babies being born needing to detox.

State Rep. Terri Lynn Weaver, R-Livingston, sponsored the statute.  She says it needs more time and should be renewed.  “I’m just going to stand my ground on the fact that I believe wholeheartedly this bill does help and does help these women that are in situations that never would have gotten the help they needed,” she says.

Some women say they were too scared to get prenatal care for fear of going to jail. Even getting that medical help is tricky.  Some OBGYNs prefer drug treatment to come first. And only a handful of treatment centers in the state even accept pregnant women and their added complexities.

"I’m not really sure what I feel about the law right now. I kinda of have mixed emotions about it,” says Sabrina Sawyer of Kingsport.  Her nine-month-old son was born with drug-dependency and had to spend several days in the NICU. He's happy and healthy now, which brings to light another important point from critics: It's unclear whether there are any long-term health effects from NAS.

Sawyer, who has two other young children, says she didn't know about Tennessee's fetal assault law until a caseworker walked into her hospital room.  “I was terrified. I had never been in any kind of trouble," she says. "It sent me through an emotional mess for a while.” Sawyer was charged with assault but chose to get treatment and avoid prosecution.  While torn about the effectiveness of the law, she also admits she'd likely still be using if going to jail hadn't been a possibility.

November 18, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

"Aging in Prison: Reducing Elder Incarceration and Promoting Public Safety"

Screen-Shot-2015-11-11-at-12.11.33-PMThe title of this post is the title of this notable new report from published by the Center for Justice at Columbia University.  Here is the report's executive summary:

Columbia University’s Center for Justice, with Release Aging People in Prison/ RAPP, the Correctional Association of New York, the Osborne Association, the Be the Evidence Project/Fordham University, and the Florence V. Burden Foundation, coordinated a symposium in Spring of 2014 to discuss the rapidly growing population of elderly and aging people in prison. In attendance at the symposium were researchers, policy advocates, current and former policy makers and administrators, elected and appointed officials, and those who have directly experienced incarceration.

All agreed that while the overall prison population of New York State has declined in the past decade, the number of people aged 50 and older has increased at an alarming rate. The symposium provided the time and space for key stakeholders and actors to think critically about how best to address the phenomenon of New York’s aging prison population without compromising public safety.

A series of papers emerged from the symposium.  Together, they provide a rich overview and analysis of aging people in prison from some of the best thinkers in this field.  While the authors differ in opinion over some issues, they share several key observations and recommendations:

In New York State, the aging prison population continues to rise.  The population of incarcerated people aged 50 and older has increased by 81% since the early 2000’s. Currently, people aged 50 and older comprise more than 17% of the prison population.  The well-documented racial disparities in the criminal justice system are also reflected in the aging prison population — a vastly disproportionate percentage of aging people in prison are Black men and women.

Prisons were not meant to be nursing homes and are poorly equipped to house an aging population.  Basic structural limitations create formidable difficulties for elderly people in prison who often have limited mobility. The lack of medical or correctional staff with specialized knowledge in geriatric care significantly impairs prisons from providing appropriate care to people experiencing chronic medical problems.

Incarcerating the elderly has serious financial implications.  The cost of incarcerating someone aged 50 and older is two to five times the cost of incarcerating someone 49 and younger. An economist who presented at the symposium estimated that the United States spends at least $16 billion annually on incarcerating elderly people.

The explosion in the aging prison population undermines basic fairness, justice, and compassion.

The boom in the aging prison population is largely the result of tough-on-crime sentencing laws and release policies.  Legislators across the political spectrum are rethinking such policies because they have proved ineffective at addressing crime and have a deleterious impact on the wellbeing and safety of poor people and people of color.

Public safety does not require that we keep aging people in prison when they pose no risk to society.  People in prison aged 50 and older are far less likely to return to prison for new crimes than their younger counterparts. For example, only 6.4% of people incarcerated in New York State released age 50 and older returned to prison for new convictions; this number was 4% for people released at the age of 65 and older. Nationally, arrest rates are just over 2% for people aged 50+ and are almost 0% for people aged 65+.

There are several measures New York State should implement to reform parole policy and release aging people from prison.  These measures are consistent with public safety and will result in significant cost savings for New York State. In addition, there are several measures New York State must implement if it is to provide humane care for its aging prison population. Lastly, reentry services specifically tailored to elders released from prison will help ensure the protection of their human rights and dignity, as well as enhancing public safety and preventing any risk of recidivism.

We are pleased to report that the symposium resulted in the creation of a model pilot project for discharge planning and reentry — the report on this pilot is attached to this series of papers as an appendix.  We hope that the knowledge collected in the symposium, the pilot on reentry, and our continued commitment to improving New York State’s justice system serve as resources for you in your efforts to create a safer and healthier New York for all its residents.  The groups and individuals who participated in the symposium and the Aging Reentry Task Force remain ready to provide expertise and resources to help our policy makers in these efforts.

November 17, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, November 16, 2015

Should SCOTUS deal with Johnson retroactivity through an original habeas petition?

The question in the title of this post should get habeas and/or sentencing geeks like me really excited, and I apologize in advance to everyone else.  But the question is on my mind and has me excited after reading this terrific (and lengthy) new PrawfBlawg post by Steve Vladeck titled "How an Obscure SCOTUS Procedure Can Solve AEDPA's Retroactivity Catch-22 (and a Growing Circuit Split)." The full post is today's must read for habeas and/or sentencing geeks, but the start and end of the effort should whet geeky appetites:

Thanks to Montgomery v. Louisiana, the retroactivity of new Supreme Court decisions is already an important part of the Court's current Term.  But as I explain in the post that follows, a new application pending before the Justices, In re Butler, raises a far more important retroactivity question, one that is already the subject of a 5-3 (and growing) circuit split, one that has an ever-shortening clock, and, most significantly, one that may only be definitively answerable if the Court does something it hasn't done in 90 years — issue an "original" writ of habeas corpus.

To unpack this dense but significant topic, Part I flags the origins of the problem — the restrictions on second-or-successive applications for post-conviction relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and the Supreme Court's fractured 2001 interpretation of those provisions in Tyler v. Cain.  Part II turns to the current circuit split, which involves whether the Court's June decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated a provision of the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA), can be retroactively enforced in second-or-successive petitions.  Part III explains why that circuit split can't be resolved by the Supreme Court via certiorari — and why, instead, the best way for the Court to take up the Johnson question is through an "original" writ of habeas corpus in a case like Butler.  Finally, Part IV argues that the Court should use Butler not just to answer the Johnson question, but also to resolve the debate over Tyler, lest this exact same scenario repeat itself after the next Johnson-like ruling....

In a paper I wrote in 2011, I argued that there's actually a value in preserving the obscurity of the Supreme Court's original habeas jurisdiction — and that, if original writs became common, they'd lose their utility as a safety valve, since Congress would presumably also think to take away that authority as part of future jurisdiction-stripping initiatives.  But there's a difference between elusive remedies and illusory ones.  For two decades, we have labored under the fiction that AEDPA's gatekeeper provisions don't raise serious constitutional problems entirely because of this safety valve.  If, as a result of disuse, it turns out that the safety valve is sealed shut, then we can no longer dodge those constitutional questions.  Thus, although we may be in the midst of a perfect storm for retroactivity, a case like Butler may actually be the perfect vehicle for the Justices to remind themselves about their original habeas authority — and, in the process, to issue an opinion that dramatically reduces the need for such relief in future retroactivity cases.

November 16, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Risk, Race, & Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new and timely empirical paper by Jennifer Skeem and Christopher Lowenkamp now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

One way to unwind mass incarceration without compromising public safety is to use risk assessment instruments in sentencing and corrections.  These instruments figure prominently in current reforms, but controversy has begun to swirl around their use.  The principal concern is that benefits in crime control will be offset by costs in social justice — a disparate and adverse effect on racial minorities and the poor.  Based on a sample of 34,794 federal offenders, we empirically examine the relationships among race (Black vs. White), actuarial risk assessment (the Post Conviction Risk Assessment [PCRA]), and re-arrest (for any/violent crime).

First, application of well-established principles of psychological science revealed no real evidence of test bias for the PCRA — the instrument strongly predicts re-arrest for both Black and White offenders and a given score has essentially the same meaning — i.e., same probability of recidivism — across groups. Second, Black offenders obtain modestly higher average scores on the PCRA than White offenders (d = .43; appx. 27% non-overlap in groups’ scores).  So some applications of the PCRA could create disparate impact — which is defined by moral rather than empirical criteria.  Third, most (69%) of the racial difference in PCRA scores is attributable to criminal history — which strongly predicts recidivism for both groups and is embedded in sentencing guidelines.  Finally, criminal history is not a proxy for race — instead, it fully mediates the otherwise weak relationship between race and re-arrest.  Data may be more helpful than rhetoric, if the goal is to improve practice at this opportune moment in history.

November 16, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sentencing prominent federal defendants: should sex offender Jared Fogle or Sunwest CEO fraudster get longer prison term?

Two notable (and notably different) federal prosecutions are to reach sentencing this week in Indiana and Oregon.  Though the crimes and defendants are not similar, the range of sentences being requested by prosecutors and defendants in these two cases are comparable.  Via press reports, here are the basic elements of these two federal cases (with links to some underlying documents):

Jared Fogle, who pleaded guilty to federal sex offenses, "Jared Fogle asks for 5-year prison term in court filing before sentencing":

Jared Fogle's attorneys asked for a five-year prison term for the former Subway restaurant pitchman in a court filing before his sentencing Thursday.  The filing says Fogle will speak publicly during his hearing before Judge Tanya Walton Pratt in federal court in Indianapolis.  "He is painfully aware of the fact that he has impacted the lives of minor victims, hurt those closest to him and, for all practical purposes, destroyed the life he worked to build over the last 18 years," the filing says.

Fogle has agreed to plead guilty to two counts: possession of child pornography and traveling across state lines to engage in sex with a minor.  The prosecutor is asking for 12½ years in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised probation.  That was the maximum sentence the U.S. attorney had agreed to seek in a plea bargain struck with Fogle in August. Fogle faced a maximum sentence on the two federal felony charges of 50 years.  The judge has discretion to sentence Fogle to more or less than what the prosecution has requested.

The defense filing acknowledges that the advisory sentencing guideline is 135 to 168 months, but said it is "entitled to little weight because it is the result of a flawed and widely criticized set of … provisions."

Jon Michael Harder, who pleaded guilty to federal fraud offenses, "Former Sunwest CEO, facing sentencing for $130 million fraud, apologizes for 'carnage and problems'":

U.S. prosecutors accuse former Sunwest Management CEO Jon Michael Harder of orchestrating the biggest investment fraud in Oregon history, and they are asking a judge to sentence him to 15 years in prison.  IRS criminal investigators say that as the head of a vast network of assisted living centers, he helped make off with $130 million from 1,000 investors between 2006 and 2008.

Harder will go before a judge Monday morning for a rare two-day sentencing hearing before U.S. District Judge Michael H. Simon, who found him guilty last January of mail fraud and money laundering.  

Harder's legal team, seeking leniency, is asking Simon to sentence him to five years in prison. Assistant Public Defender Christopher J. Schatz took the unusual step of filing a court declaration that describes his client as possibly suffering from undiagnosed post-traumatic stress disorder from the emotional clubbing he took after Sunwest's failures.  "Many of the investors in Sunwest were family members, family friends and members of the Seventh Day Adventist community," Schatz wrote. "Mr. Harder feels that he let all the investors down, that he failed them all."  

Harder, too, filed a court paper — a letter of apology to Simon.  "I feel incredibly badly for all the carnage and problems that I have caused," he wrote. "I have obsessed, over the last 7 ½ years, about what I should have or could have done differently in operating Sunwest."

government sentencing memo paints Harder as a chief executive who burned through corporate cash as if it were his own. He drove luxury cars, owned six homes, and once flew about 100 people to Alaska — most of them Sunwest employees — to go fishing.

Intriguingly, it seems that the federal sentencing guidelines would call for a much, much longer sentence for the fraudster than the sex offender: while Jared Fogle appears to be facing a guideline sentencing range of roughly 12 to 14 years, Jon Harder appears to be facing a guideline sentencing range of life without the possibility of parole.

November 16, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Friday, November 13, 2015

"Alternative Courts and Drug Treatment: Finding a Rehabilitative Solution for Addicts in a Retributive System"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper by Molly Webster now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Sentencing drug crimes and treating drug-addicted defendants often stem from contradictory theories of punishment. In the late twentieth century, courts traded rehabilitation for retributive ideals to fight the “War on Drugs.” However, beginning with the Miami-Dade Drug Court, treatment and rehabilitation have returned to the forefront of sentencing policy in traditional and alternative drug courts.

Jurisdictions have implemented a variety of policies designed to treat addiction as opposed to punishing it. Community courts, such as the Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York, community-panel drug courts, such as the Woodbury County Community Drug Court in Iowa, and Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement represent efforts to address treatment within the court system. This Note argues that certain policies are more likely to benefit drug-addicted defendants than others, including procedural justice, predictable sanctions, and an increased focus on treatment. It also posits that qualitative studies measuring long-term success of drug treatment programs should be commissioned to ensure that drug courts utilize the most effective treatment policies that promote rehabilitative ideals.

November 13, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, November 12, 2015

"Who Gets Time for Federal Drug Offenses? Data Trends and Opportunities for Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new data analysis from The Urban Institute.  Here are snippets from the start and end of the short and reader-friendly report:

Almost half (45 percent) of the 95,305 individuals in federal prison for drug offenses are in the lowest two criminal history categories, indicating minimal prior convictions and a low risk of recidivism.2 In fact, over one-quarter (26 percent) have no prior criminal history.

Further, over three-quarters of all individuals in federal prison for drug offenses have no serious history of violence before the current offense. More than half have no violent history, and nearly a quarter have minor histories of violence, such as a simple assault and other crimes that do not typically lead to serious injury....

At the end of the FY 2014, individuals serving drug sentences accounted for 49 percent of the total federal prison population. Though recent policy changes have helped reverse upward trends in population size, the Urban Institute’s Federal Prison Population Forecaster shows that continuing population declines will require significantly shorter lengths of stay for drug offenses.  Congressional leaders are considering legislative action that would reduce some mandatory minimum penalties and grant judges greater discretion to sentence individuals to shorter prison stays for drug offenses.  While the exact impact of these bills is unknown, lasting reductions in the size of the federal prison population will only come from big cuts in lengths of stay for drug offenses.  The Task Force will be considering such reforms as part of its deliberations and expects to build on the efforts under way in Congress.

November 12, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)

"How Parental Incarceration Affects a Child’s Education"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Atlantic article, which summarizes some of the findings from this research report titled "Parents Behind Bars: What Happens to Their Children?" authored by David Murphey and P. Mae Cooper.  Here are excerpts from the Atlantic article:

Research has long found that children who have (or have had) a parent behind bars tend to suffer from problems including poor health, behavior challenges, and grade retention, but it’s been difficult to suss out the degree to which those issues are attributable more generally to other realities common in communities with high incarceration rates. “It can be challenging to disentangle the effects of parental incarceration from … other risk factors, such as extreme poverty,” Murphey and Cooper write. “Complicating matters further, parental incarceration can also exacerbate these associated risk factors, through loss of income, for example.”...

The researchers also found that a child who’s had a parent in prison is more likely than one who hasn’t to experience additional “adverse childhood experiences,” or ACEs—long-term, “toxic” circumstances such as witnessing domestic or community violence, suffering from extreme poverty, or living with someone who’s mentally ill. Research has shown that ACEs, especially when they’re cumulative, often cause childhood trauma, which can ultimately result in poor immunity and mental-health problems in adulthood and even early mortality. As James Perrin, the president of the American Academy of Pediatrics, told The Atlantic’s Olga Khazan last year, “If you have a whole bunch of bad experiences growing up, you set up your brain in such a way that it’s your expectation that that’s what life is about.”

Parental incarceration often acts as one such ACE because it causes a confusing, troubling loss of an attachment figure and involves ongoing contact with law enforcement, the corrections system, and child-welfare officials. But what Murphey and Cooper find is that having a parent in prison is likely to coincide with even more traumatic experiences: Children who’ve undergone parental incarceration suffer from 2.7 ACEs on average, according to their analysis of of the National Survey of Children’s Health, which lists 8 ACEs total. Children who haven’t experienced parental incarceration suffered from 0.7 ACEs on average.

Ultimately, the researchers conclude that “the harm associated with parental incarceration can compound the already difficult circumstances of vulnerable children,” a reality that’s particularly evident in their schooling. Yet, as the University of Minnesota paper shows, education policy has done little to address these kids’ particular needs. And in this age of mass incarceration, perhaps it should. In his recent cover story for The Atlantic about the topic, Ta-Nehisi Coates described mass incarceration as a vicious cycle that victimizes entire families, holding them “in a kind of orbit, on the outskirts, by the relentless gravity of the carceral state.” “Through it all,” Coates wrote, “children suffer.”

November 12, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, November 11, 2015

How many vets, after serving to secure liberty, are now serving LWOP sentences?

The question in the title of this post, in addition to raising an important empirical question on a day devoted to honoring our veterans, seeks to highlight my view that even more disconcerting than the number of veterans who many be on death row (as dicusses in this new DPIC report) is the surely much larger number of vets who are serving a sentence ensuring they will never experience true freedom again after they served to protect that very freedom.

The DPIC report indicates that around 300 veterans may be on death row, which would make vets a little less than 10% of the condemned population.  Using that rough percentage and knowing that at least 100,000 persons (and likely many more) are serving LWOP sentences in the United States, it think it would be reasonable to guess that as many as 10,000 veterans might be serving the ultimate American liberty-depriving sentence after having devoted part of their life to protecting American liberties.

November 11, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (10)

"What Mass Incarceration Looks Like for Juveniles"

The title of this post is the headline of this New York Times op-ed by Vincent Schiraldi. Here are excerpts:

After two decades of researching mass incarceration — and advocating for its demise — I decided in 2005 to take more direct action and accepted a job running corrections departments, first in Washington, D.C., then in New York City.  It was a rude awakening.

The juvenile corrections department in Washington had about 1,000 clients, about 200 of whom were confined to a detention facility, and a staff of 800. For the previous 19 years, the department had been under a court order for unconstitutional conditions; I was the 20th leader in that time.  In the year prior, two scathing reports, one by the district’s inspector general and another from plaintiffs’ experts, detailed appalling conditions: Beatings of children in custody were commonplace, inmates stuffed clothing around the toilets to keep out rats and cockroaches, young people were locked up for so long that they often defecated or urinated in their cells.  Youths who came in clean tested positive for marijuana after 30 days of confinement, suggesting that it was easier to score drugs in my facility than on the streets of the District of Columbia.

My staff and I quickly uncovered more abuses.  Staff members were sexually harassing the kids and one another.  One of my corrections officers married a youth shortly after the boy was released from custody.  A teacher who had been confined in the facility when she was a teenager confided to us that she had been sexually assaulted by a staff member who was still in our employ years later.  The female staff members widely complained that, if they didn’t perform sexually for their supervisors, they were threatened with finding themselves alone and unaided with the facility’s inmates in dangerous situations.

These abuses are not meted out equally in the United States, with African-Americans and Latinos incarcerated at far higher rates than whites.  In my five years running the Washington system, I never saw one white youth (other than volunteers) in my correctional facility....

In New York, where I ran the probation department, I didn’t witness the same hair­raising institutional abuse, mostly because we didn’t run any facilities.  But probation officers reported that they routinely re­incarcerated people on their caseloads for technical, noncriminal violations largely because they were afraid that if they didn’t, and their client was rearrested, they’d be held to account.  As a result, our clients were frivolously deposited into New York’s jail and juvenile facilities, both of which were sued by the Justice Department during my tenure for conditions chillingly similar to what I had witnessed in Washington.  When we put a stop to the over-incarceration, crime did not spike and there was a remarkably low felony rearrest rate of 4 percent a year for people who completed probation.

Two things surprised me about my experiences on the inside.  First, horrific institutional conditions are common, not exceptional.... Since 1970, systemic violence, abuse and excessive use of isolation and restraints have been documented in juvenile institutions in 39 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, according to the Annie E. Casey Foundation, a philanthropic group devoted to children’s poverty issues....

The second major surprise was how much I liked many of my staff members.  I charged into my job with an air of moral superiority.  Surely, I thought, such conditions could be created only by ethically bankrupt characters who would wear their depravity on their sleeves.  But it was far more complicated.  Just about everyone in my Washington facility knew who was beating the kids, having sex with them and selling them drugs.  After all, our facility housed only about 200 young people, roughly the size of a small middle school.

Yet many of the church-going people on my staff were ostensibly very friendly people who, despite their silence, believed they were advancing public safety.  They attended our football games and plays and cheered the youths on, sitting in the stands with their parents.  They were the good guys, rendered complicit by years in a corrupt system....

From what I witnessed during my decade on the inside, the end of mass incarceration can’t come soon enough; conditions poison staff members and kids alike and harm, rather than improve, public safety. Incarceration should be the backstop, not the backbone, of our crime­-control efforts.

November 11, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, November 10, 2015

What should be the minimum age for charging a juve with murder?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this depressing local article, headlined "8-year-old charged with murder in beating death of Birmingham toddler," which suggests that there is apparently no minimum age for prosecution for murder in Alabama.  Here are the sad specifics:

An 8-year-old Birmingham boy is charged with murder in the beating death of a toddler girl left in his care, the youngest person in recent memory charged with murder in Jefferson County. The girl's mother is charged with manslaughter after police say she left her young daughter in the care of a group of children while she partied at a nightclub.

"This is one of the most heartbreaking investigations that I have seen in over 30 years of my law enforcement career," said Birmingham police Chief A.C. Roper. "There are just too many deep rooted issues in this horrific crime. It's extremely troubling from so many different angles and there are no law enforcement answers to prevent it," Roper said. "We've been concerned about the kids and the future effect on their lives. The bottom line is an innocent young baby lost her life and that should be a wake-up call for our community."

Kelci Devine Lewis, who turned 1 in May, was found unresponsive in her crib at 10:45 a.m. Oct. 12. Police were called to the home on Second Avenue South, and Kelci was taken to Children's of Alabama where she was pronounced dead at 11:07 a.m. Authorities have said there were visible injuries to the girl. She died from blunt force trauma to the head, and internal injuries, Birmingham police spokesman Lt. Sean Edwards has said.

Family members said 26-year-old Katerra Lewis and Kelci, her only child, didn't live at the home where Kelci was killed. Grandmother Waynetta Callens said in an earlier interview that they were staying there temporarily with friends while Katerra Lewis waited for Section 8 housing of her own. Edwards said Kelci was left alone that night in the home with five other children, ages 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8. Katerra Lewis, he said, had gone to a nightclub with a friend who was the person she was staying with.

"It is believed that while the mother and friend were at the club, the 8-year-old viciously attacked the 1-year-old because the 1-year-old would not stop crying," Edwards said. "The 1-year-old suffered from severe head trauma as well as major internal organ damage with ultimately led to her death."

Police believe the 8-year-old put the injured Kelci back in her crib, where she remained until her mother found her the following day. Katerra Lewis and the other adult were reportedly gone from 11:30 p.m. until 2 a.m. Police have not and will not release the name of the 8-year-old boy. He is in the custody of the Department of Human Resources....

Katerra Lewis is charged with manslaughter. She turned herself in to the Jefferson County Jail Monday at 3:42 p.m. and was released at 5:02 p.m. after posting $15,000 bond. Katerra Lewis attended a vigil held Oct. 20 at Avondale Park but was too distraught to speak to the group. They lit candles and released white balloons in Kelci's memory. The day after the vigil, Katerra Lewis posted on her Facebook that she was suffering following the loss of her child. "I keep asking can dey bring u back and take me instead."

DHR spokesman Barry Spear said the agency had no prior involvement with Katerra Lewis or Kelci. Privacy laws, he said, prevent him from commenting about the 8-year-old suspect.

November 10, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

"Battle Scars: Military Veterans and the Death Penalty"

BattleScarsCoverThe title of this post is the title of this notable new report from the Death Penalty Information Center.  Here are excerpts from its Executive Summary:

In many respects, veterans in the United States are again receiving the respect and gratitude they deserve for having risked their lives and served their country. Wounded soldiers are welcomed home, and their courage in starting a new and difficult journey in civilian life is rightly applauded.  But some veterans with debilitating scars from their time in combat have received a very different reception.  They have been judged to be the "worst of the worst" criminals, deprived of mercy, sentenced to death, and executed by the government they served.

Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) who have committed heinous crimes present hard cases for our system of justice.  The violence that occasionally erupts into murder can easily overcome the special respect that is afforded most veterans.  However, looking away and ignoring this issue serves neither veterans nor victims....

PTSD is now formally recognized in the medical community as a serious illness.  But for those who have crossed an indefinable line and have been charged with capital murder, compassion and understanding seem to disappear.  Although a definitive count has yet to be made, approximately 300 veterans are on death row today, and many others have already been executed.

Perhaps even more surprising, when many of these veterans faced death penalty trials, their service and related illnesses were barely touched on as their lives were being weighed by judges and juries.  Defense attorneys failed to investigate this critical area of mitigation; prosecutors dismissed, or even belittled, their claims of mental trauma from the war; judges discounted such evidence on appeal; and governors passed on their opportunity to bestow the country's mercy.  In older cases, some of that dismissiveness might be attributed to ignorance about PTSD and related problems.  But many of those death sentences still stand today when the country knows better.

Unfortunately, the plight of veterans facing execution is not of another era.  The first person executed in 2015, Andrew Brannan, was a decorated Vietnam veteran with a diagnosis of PTSD and other forms of mental illness.  Despite being given 100% mental disability by the Veterans Administration after returning from the war, Georgia sought and won a death sentence because he bizarrely killed a police officer after a traffic stop.  The Pardons Board refused him clemency.  Others, like Courtney Lockhart in Alabama, returned more recently with PTSD from service in Iraq.  He was sentenced to death by a judge, even though the jury recommended life.  The U.S. Supreme Court turned down a request to review his case this year.

This report is not a definitive study of all the veterans who have been sentenced to death in the modern era of capital punishment.  Rather, it is a wake-up call to the justice system and the public at large: As the death penalty is being questioned in many areas, it should certainly be more closely scrutinized when used against veterans with PTSD and other mental disabilities stemming from their service.  Recognizing the difficult challenges many veterans face after their service should warrant a close examination of the punishment of death for those wounded warriors who have committed capital crimes.  Moreover, a better understanding of the disabilities some veterans face could lead to a broader conversation about the wide use of the death penalty for others suffering from severe mental illness.

November 10, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, November 09, 2015

New research suggests overcrowding in California prisons increased post-release parole violations

Opponents of modern sentencing reform efforts are often quick and eager to highlight research showing high rates of recidivism among those released from prison to argue that public safety could be adversely affected by any and all sentencing reform.  In light of such claims, I find notable this new published empirical research suggesting that prison overcrowding in California may be in part responsible for high recidivism rates.    The published research is titled "Does Prison Crowding Predict Higher Rates of Substance Use Related Parole Violations? A Recurrent Events Multi-Level Survival Analysis," and here are excerpts from the abstract:


This administrative data-linkage cohort study examines the association between prison crowding and the rate of post-release parole violations in a random sample of prisoners released with parole conditions in California, for an observation period of two years (January 2003 through December 2004).


Crowding overextends prison resources needed to adequately protect inmates and provide drug rehabilitation services. Violence and lack of access to treatment are known risk factors for drug use and substance use disorders. These and other psychosocial effects of crowding may lead to higher rates of recidivism in California parolees.


Rates of parole violation for parolees exposed to high and medium levels of prison crowding were compared to parolees with low prison crowding exposure. Hazard ratios (HRs) with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) were estimated using a Cox model for recurrent events. Our dataset included 13070 parolees in California, combining individual level parolee data with aggregate level crowding data for multilevel analysis....


Prison crowding predicted higher rates of parole violations after release from prison. The effect was magnitude-dependent and particularly strong for drug charges. Further research into whether adverse prison experiences, such as crowding, are associated with recidivism and drug use in particular may be warranted.

November 9, 2015 in Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (8)

Connecticut Gov calls for older teens to be treated as juves in state criminal justice system

As effectively reported in this local article, headlined "Malloy: Raise the age for juvenile justice system to 20," Connecticut's Governor Dan Malloy delivered a significant criminal justice policy speech on Friday focused on bail reform and juvenile justice. Here are some details:

"I would like to begin a statewide conversation about raising the age of eligibility for our juvenile justice system and considering how we think about our young offenders," Malloy said at the University of Connecticut School of Law in Hartford.  "Let's consider this: age within our laws and criminal justice system is largely arbitrary…You can commit a nonviolent offense at 17 without a criminal record, but if you're 18 and you commit the same crime, it lasts a lifetime."

Malloy also would overhaul the bail system, always a politically fraught undertaking at the General Assembly, with the intention of ensuring that no one is jailed for want of a minimal bail, a change that one policy analyst said could shrink the state's jail population by up to 1,000 inmates.

He was the keynote speaker at an all-day symposium sponsored by the Connecticut Law Review.  His audience included judges, prosecutors and the commissioner of correction, Scott Semple.

Malloy, a Democrat who won bipartisan passage earlier this year for a Second Chance Society initiative aimed at reducing incarceration for non-violent crimes, proposed that the records of those under 25 who commit less severe offenses be shielded from public disclosure and possibly expunged.

Malloy said such a change would "wipe the slate clean" for low-risk offenders that have not matured entirely.  "Is it right that that 17 year-old can have a second chance but a 22 year-old cannot? This is the question that we should collectively answer," Malloy said.  He intends to propose a package of reforms to the General Assembly for its 2016 session, which convenes in February.

The changes Malloy proposed would make Connecticut the first state in the nation to raise the age for its juvenile justice system past 18....  He said one inspiration for the idea came on a trip with Semple to Germany, where offenders are treated as juvenile up to age 20.

“This is uncharted territory in terms of going that far," said David McGuire, the legislative and policy director for the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut.  "It makes a lot of sense. It will save a lot of lives. It will really impact an entire generation."

In 2007, state lawmakers changed state law so that 16- and 17-year-olds charged with less serious offenses enter the juvenile justice system, where they are often provided with a range of community-based supports, rather than automatically being sent to the adult court system.  A study commissioned by the state before the age was raised to 18 found that up to 75 percent of teenagers sent to the adult system were receiving no rehabilitative services.  And the services other teens received were subpar, according to the study.

Malloy said the current age is still too low.  "It's time to think about changing the artificial barriers that we imposed. It's time that we get it right.  For that reason we need to take a different approach for these young adults between the ages of 18 and 24," Malloy said, pointing out that many of these young offenders are victims of trauma.

November 9, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, November 05, 2015

US Sentencing Commission hearing about how to fix Johnson problems in sentencing guidelines

As this webpage reports, this morning the US Sentencing Commission is holding a public hearing in Washington, DC "to receive testimony from invited witnesses on proposed amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines."  This hearing is being live-streamed here, and this hearing agenda now has links to all the scheduled witnesses' written testimony.

Helpfully, the start of this written testimony from the first witness, Judge Irene Keeley, Chair, Committee on Criminal Law of the Judicial Conference of the United States, provide a useful overview of what the USSC is working on:

On behalf of the Criminal Law Committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States, I thank the Sentencing Commission for providing us the opportunity to comment on proposed changes to the sentencing guidelines definitions of “crime of violence” and related issues.  The topic of today’s hearing is important to the Judicial Conference and judges throughout the nation.  We applaud the Commission for undertaking its multi-year study of statutory and guideline definitions relating to the nature of a defendant’s prior conviction and the impact of such definitions on the relevant statutory and guideline provisions. We also thank the Commission for considering whether to promulgate these guideline amendments to address questions that have been or may be raised by the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).

The Judicial Conference has authorized the Criminal Law Committee to act with regard to submission from time to time to the Sentencing Commission of proposed amendments to the sentencing guidelines, including proposals that would increase the flexibility of the guidelines.  The Judicial Conference has also resolved “that the federal judiciary is committed to a sentencing guideline system that is fair, workable, transparent, predictable, and flexible.”

As I discuss below, the Criminal Law Committee is generally in favor of the Commission’s proposed amendments, particularly those intended to address or anticipate questions raised by Johnson.  As you know, the definition of the term “crime of violence” for purposes of the career offender guideline has been the subject of substantial litigation in the federal courts.  We support any efforts to resolve ambiguity and simplify the legal approaches required by Supreme Court jurisprudence.  Additionally, our Committee has repeatedly urged the Commission to resolve circuit conflicts in order to avoid unnecessary litigation and to eliminate unwarranted disparity in application of the guidelines.  The Commission’s proposed amendment would reduce uncertainty raised by the opinion while making the guidelines more clear and workable.  

With regard to the proposed guideline amendments concerning issues unrelated to Johnson, the Committee generally supports or defers to the Commission’s recommendations.  The Committee opposes amending, however, the current definition of “felony” in the career offender guideline. Finally, the Committee supports revising other guidelines to conform to the definitions used in the career offender guideline to reduce complexity and make the guidelines system more simple and workable. 

November 5, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, October 30, 2015

"IQ, Intelligence Testing, Ethnic Adjustments and Atkins"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new paper authored by Robert M. Sanger and available via Bepress.  Here is the abstract:

In Atkins v. Virginia the U.S. Supreme Court declared that executing the intellectually disabled violated the U.S. Constitution’s Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.  In Atkins, the Court relied heavily on medical standards, which indicated that individuals with an IQ of approximately or below seventy and who met the other criteria for intellectual disability were ineligible for the death penalty. Twelve years later, in Hall v. Florida, the Court evaluated a Florida statute that created a bright line rule, making anyone whose IQ was above seventy eligible for execution, regardless of other factors suggesting the defendant was, despite his IQ score, intellectually disabled.  Finding the statute violated the Constitution, the Court stated that the Florida statute’s bright line rule made the possibility too great that an intellectually disabled person would be executed.

Since Atkins, some prosecution experts have begun using so-called “ethnic adjustments” to artificially raise minority defendants’ IQ scores, making defendants who would have been protected by Atkins and its progeny eligible for the death penalty.  This Article details this practice, looking at several cases in which prosecutors successfully adjusted a defendant’s IQ score upward, based on his or her race.  The Article then turns to the arguments put forth by these prosecutors for increasing minority defendants’ IQ scores, namely that it would be improper not to adjust the scores.  Statistically, some minority cohorts tend to perform worse on tests than White cohorts; prosecutors argue that this discrepancy is not based on intellectual inferiority, but rather that there are testing biases and behavioral factors that cause minority test-takers to underperform.  Thus, the argument goes, minority IQ scores should be increased to control for these biases and behavioral factors.

Evaluating the merits of these arguments, this Article concludes that ethnic adjustments are not logically or clinically appropriate when computing a person’s IQ score for Atkins purposes.  This Article looks at epigenetics to explain the discrepancies in IQ scores, concluding that environmental factors — such as childhood abuse, poverty, stress, and trauma — can cause decreases in actual IQ scores and which can be passed down from generation to generation.  Therefore, given that individuals who suffered these environmental factors disproportionately populate death row, ethnic adjustments make it more likely that individuals who are actually intellectually disabled will be put to death.  Ultimately, after looking at the Supreme Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence, this Article concludes that the practice of ethnic adjustments for the purpose of determining eligibility for the death penalty violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and would not survive strict scrutiny.

October 30, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, October 29, 2015

Did former House Speaker Hastert get a sweetheart sentencing deal from federal prosecutors?

The question in this post is prompted by this lengthy new Politico article headlined "Hastert's sweet deal: Lawyers question whether federal prosecutors are following guidelines." Here are excerpts:

House Speaker Dennis Hastert’s guilty plea in a hush-money case has some lawyers asking whether the former speaker is getting a sweetheart deal.

At a court hearing in Chicago Wednesday, the prosecution and defense unveiled Hastert’s plea bargain under which he admitted to a felony charge of structuring $952,000 into 106 separate bank withdrawals to avoid federal reporting requirements. The two sides agreed that sentencing guidelines call for Hastert to receive between zero and six months in jail.

But legal experts say those guidelines arguably call for a much longer sentence—closer to two to three years or more, including a potential enhancement for obstruction of justice. And some lawyers say they’re baffled that prosecutors would buy into a calculation that opens the door to Hastert getting a sentence of probation. “It seems like a sweet deal,” University of Richmond law professor Carl Tobias said. “It’s just hard to understand.”

The indictment in the case also charged Hastert with lying to the FBI about what he did with the money, concealing that he paid it to a longtime associate in an effort to hide past misconduct. In the plea deal, Hastert admitted to misleading the FBI, but prosecutors agreed to drop the false statement charge....

The agreement between prosecutors and Hastert’s defense that the zero-to-six-month sentencing range is applicable to his case is not the end of the matter. A probation officer will also calculate the range and could disagree with the parties. Durkin will ultimately decide what the guidelines call for. Under the plea deal, Hastert retains the right to appeal the sentence to the 7th Circuit.

Under a 2005 Supreme Court decision, the judge is required to consult the guidelines but he can impose a more or less severe sentence. Experts in structuring cases say judges often sentence below the guidelines, especially in so-called “clean money” cases where the government does not allege that the funds were the product of illegal activity like drug dealing or were being used to avoid taxes.

"The sentencing guidelines for clean-source money cases are totally out of whack," the ex-prosecutor said. "It's insane to sentence someone for a purely regulatory violation as severely if not more severely than someone who defrauded someone out of $952,000. Having said that, there are a good measure of bad acts here, so maybe there would be some rough justice in it."

Prosecutors have alleged that Hastert paid the $952,000 in illegally structured withdrawals to a longtime associate because of Hastert’s past misconduct against that person, identified in court filings only as “Individual A.” Sources have alleged the behavior involved sexual contact with a male student while Hastert was a coach and high school teacher several decades ago, but the indictment does not mention any sexual aspect to the charges.

Experts say Hastert could not be charged or sued today over such acts years ago because the relevant statutes of limitations have expired. Lawyers say a key factor in Hastert's ultimate sentence could be whether Durkin decides Hastert's underlying misconduct is relevant for the purpose of sentencing on the bank reporting charge.

Criminal defense attorney Michael Monico, who co-authored a handbook on federal court practices in Illinois and the greater Midwest, said Durkin will want to know Hastert's motivation for paying out the $3.5 million and the exact nature of the behavior he was trying to hide.

"If I were the judge I would ask about it, I would want to know. I would want to know, what was he hiding?" Monico said. "I think that’s the number one question in the case: Is it relevant to his sentencing what Hastert did to this fellow decades ago? If it isn’t relevant, then probation is OK. If the conduct was despicable then it’s not an appropriate sentence. It seems to me that’s a question the judge has to answer."

October 29, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

"The Corporation as Snitch: The New DOJ Guidelines on Prosecuting White Collar Crime"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new essay by Elizabeth Joh and Thomas Joo available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Volkswagen, the world’s largest auto maker, acknowledged in September 2015 that it had equipped its cars with software designed to cheat diesel emissions tests.  The VW scandal may become the first major test of the Department of Justice’s recently announced guidelines that focus on individual accountability in white collar criminal investigations. Criminal investigations into safety defects at two other leading car makers, General Motors and Toyota, yielded no criminal charges against any individuals.

But in a recent speech announcing the new guidelines, Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates stated, “Crime is crime,” whether it takes place “on the street corner or in the boardroom.” “The rules have just changed.”  We raise questions about this new approach and some of its possible implications.  The new cooperation policy’s emphasis on individual prosecutions could itself result in leniency: prosecutors may award excessively generous credit to corporations in order to build cases against individuals.

October 29, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, October 21, 2015

"Separation by Bars and Miles: Visitation in state prisons"

SeparationByBarsAndMiles_250The title of this post is the title of this notable new report from the Prison Policy Initiative. This press release about the report provides this overview:

Less than a third of people in state prison receive a visit from a loved one in a typical month [according to] a new report by the Prison Policy Initiative, Separation by Bars and Miles: Visitation in state prisons. The report finds that distance from home is a strong predictor for whether an incarcerated person receives a visit.

“For far too long, the national data on prison visits has been limited to incarcerated parents. We use extensive yet under-used Bureau of Justice Statistics data to shed light on the prison experience for all incarcerated people, finding that prisons are lonely places,” said co-author Bernadette Rabuy, who recently used the same BJS dataset for Prisons of Poverty: Uncovering the pre-incarceration incomes of the imprisoned.

Separation by Bars and Miles finds that most people in state prison are locked up over 100 miles from their families and that, unsurprisingly, these great distances — as well as the time and expense required to overcome them — actively discourage family visits. Given the obvious reluctance of state prison systems to move their facilities, the report offers six correctional policy recommendations that states can implement to protect and enhance family ties. Rabuy explained, “At this moment, as policymakers are starting to understand that millions of families are victims of mass incarceration, I hope this report gives policymakers more reasons to change the course of correctional history.”

October 21, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (12)

Tuesday, October 20, 2015

"Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Tools for Change"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Jason Nance available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The school-to-prison pipeline is one of our nation’s most formidable challenges. It refers to the trend of directly referring students to law enforcement for committing certain offenses at school or creating conditions under which students are more likely to become involved in the criminal justice system such as excluding them from school.

This article analyzes the school-to-prison pipeline’s devastating consequences on students, its causes, and its disproportionate impact on students of color.  But most importantly, this article comprehensively identifies and describes specific, evidence-based tools to dismantle the school-to-prison pipeline that lawmakers, school administrators, and teachers in all areas can immediately support and implement.  Further, it suggests initial strategies aimed at addressing racial implicit bias, which is a primary cause of the racial disparities relating to the school-to-prison pipeline.  The implementation of these tools will create more equitable and safe learning environments that will help more students become productive citizens and avoid becoming involved in the justice system.

October 20, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, October 17, 2015

Remarkable Fusion series on "Prison Kids"

Pk_bannerThe multi-platform media company Fusion puts a number of its platforms to great use in this massive series of videos and articles under the banner "Prison Kids: A crime against America's children." Here is just a partial list (with links) of some of the pieces in the series:  

October 17, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, October 15, 2015

New amicus brief to Eleventh Circuit seeking reconsideration of Johnson vagueness challenge to career-offender guideline

In this post just a few days after the US Supreme Court ruled that a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violated "the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws" in Johnson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (available here), I flagged the question of how Johnson would impact application of the career offender guideline of the US Sentencing Guidelines.  Notably, the Justice Department has consistently conceded Johnson-based constitutional problems with the existing career offender guideline because the key phrase found vague in Johnson is part of the guideline definition of a career offender.  And a few appellate rulings have assumed without deciding that Johnson creates problems for existing career offender guideline sentencing.

But, as noted in this post a few weeks ago, an Eleventh Circuit panel in US v. Matchett, No. 14-10396 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2015) (available here), squarely addressed this issue and ruled that Johnson and its vagueness problem just do not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines.  I considered this ruling suspect, and thanks to Carissa Hessick and David Markus, I have now been able to play a role in explaining to the full Eleventh Circuit just why.  Specifically, Carissa primarily drafted and I primarily tweaked an amicus brief that David helped finalize and file today urging en banc review in Matchett.  The full brief can be downloaded via SSRN, and here is how it gets started:

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines dramatically increase a defendant’s sentencing range if she has at least two prior convictions for a “crime of violence,” which U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) defines to include crimes that “involve[] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  As the panel in this case acknowledged, that definition is identical to the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B), which the Supreme Court in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), found to be unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause.

Nevertheless, the panel in this case held that § 4B1.2(a)(2) is not unconstitutionally vague, reasoning that the vagueness doctrine does not apply to the now-advisory Sentencing Guidelines.  That conclusion is inconsistent with Supreme Court decisions on the vagueness doctrine and the Sentencing Guidelines.  The panel’s decision also upsets the careful balance that the Supreme Court has struck between uniformity and discretion in federal sentencing after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Finally, the panel decision fails to appreciate that it faced a unique situation in which a Guideline contains language identical to a federal statute declared void for vagueness by the Supreme Court.  Both the narrow basis for that decision, as well as ordinary Commission practice of reviewing and revising the Sentencing Guidelines, ensure that few Guidelines will become susceptible to serious vagueness challenges.  This Court accordingly should grant en banc review.

October 15, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, October 11, 2015

"Number of Older Prisoners Grows Rapidly, Threatening to Drive Up Prison Health Costs"

StatelineAgingPrisonersLineGraphThe title of this post is the title of this informative Stateline posting from The Pew Charitable Trusts.  Here are the primary passages: 

In a year when the nation’s overall prison population dropped, the number of older inmates grew rapidly in 2014, continuing a trend that translates into higher federal and state prison health care spending....

In 1999, inmates age 55 and above — a common definition of older prisoners — represented just 3 percent of the total population.  By 2014, that share had grown to 10 percent.

Like senior citizens outside prison walls, older inmates are more likely to experience dementia, impaired mobility, and loss of hearing and vision, among other conditions.  In prisons, these ailments present special challenges and can necessitate increased staffing levels and enhanced officer training, as inmates may have difficulty complying with orders from correctional officers.  They can also require structural accessibility adaptions, such as special housing and wheelchair ramps.  For example, in Florida, four facilities serve relatively large populations of older inmates.  These units help meet special needs, such as palliative and long-term care.

Additionally, older inmates are more susceptible than the rest of the prison population to costly chronic medical conditions.  In 2011-12, for example, 73 percent of state and federal prisoners age 50 years or older reported to the Bureau of Justice Statistics that they had experienced a chronic medical condition such as hypertension, arthritis, asthma, or diabetes, among others.  Younger inmates age 18 to 24 (28 percent) or 25 to 34 (41 percent) were much less likely to have reported such a condition.

All of these challenges create additional health and non-health expenses for prisons, which are constitutionally required to provide adequate medical attention and respond to the unique needs of these inmates.

The National Institute of Corrections pegged the annual cost of incarcerating prisoners 55 and older with chronic and terminal illnesses at, on average, two to three times that of the expense for all other inmates.  More recently, other researchers have found that the cost differential may be wider.

In May, the Department of Justice’s inspector general found that within the Federal Bureau of Prisons, institutions with the highest percentages of aging inmates spent five times more per inmate on medical care — and 14 times more per inmate on medication — than institutions with the lowest percentage of aging inmates.

A few (of many) recent and older related posts:

October 11, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, October 07, 2015

"Why 21 year-old offenders should be tried in family court"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable Washington Post commentary authored by Vincent Schiraldi and Bruce Western. Here are excerpts:

Just over 100 years ago, there was no separate court for juveniles anywhere in the world. Adolescents were viewed as smaller versions of adults, were prosecuted under the same laws and often sent to the same prisons.

But in 1899, a pioneering group of women — Jane Addams, Lucy Flower and Julia Lathrop — persuaded the state of Illinois to create a separate court to handle juveniles’ cases individually, be more rehabilitative and less punitive and ensure that youthful mistakes wouldn’t haunt youngsters throughout their lives.  The family court was a smashing success, spreading to 46 states and 16 countries by 1925 and decidedly reducing recidivism compared with trying children as adults.

But while family court’s founding mothers got a lot right, the setting of 18 as the court’s maximum age was an arbitrary choice based on the mores of the time rather than hard evidence. It’s time we expanded the protections and rehabilitative benefits of the family court to young adults.

Research in neurobiology and developmental psychology has shown that the brain doesn’t finish developing until the mid-20s, far later than was previously thought. Young adults are more similar to adolescents than fully mature adults in important ways. They are more susceptible to peer pressure, less future-oriented and more volatile in emotionally charged settings.

Furthermore, adolescence itself has become elongated compared with that of previous generations. Today’s young people finish college, find jobs, get married and leave home much later than their parents did. Just 9 percent of young adults were married in 2010, compared with 45 percent in 1960.

Non-criminal law and practice frequently recognize these developmental differences. States prohibit young adults from smoking cigarettes, consuming alcohol, possessing firearms, gambling and adopting children. You can’t serve in the House of Representatives until age 25, it costs more to rent a car as a young adult and you can stay on your parents’ health insurance until 26. However, despite the developmental differences between young and fully mature adults, criminal law draws a stark, scientifically indefensible line at 18. This has disastrous public safety outcomes. For example, 78 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds released from prison are rearrested and about half return to prison within three years, the highest recidivism rate of any age cohort.

Fortunately, there has been growing innovation overseas along with some noteworthy U.S. experiments designed to address the challenges and opportunities this transition-aged population presents. The age of family court jurisdiction in Germany and the Netherlands is 21 and 23, respectively. Many European countries have separate correctional facilities for young adults. In Finland, young people can earn accelerated release from prison by participating in educational and professional training programs....

Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch recently convened an expert panel to explore developmentally appropriate responses to young adults caught up in the justice system. “Research indicates that . . . we may have a significant opportunity, even after the teenage years, to exert a positive influence and reduce future criminality through appropriate interventions,” she said. This “offers a chance to consider new and innovative ways to augment our criminal justice approach.”

Such thinking will undoubtedly face political head winds in some places, but improved outcomes can be used to build support with the public. Frequently, U.S. juvenile justice practice moves adolescents in the opposite direction — from family court into adult court and, too often, adult prisons. An estimated 247,000 people under 18 were tried as adults in 2007, and more than 5,000 adolescents are incarcerated in jails and prisons. There, they are at greater risk of sexual assault and experience higher rearrest rates vs. youth retained in the juvenile justice system. Any reforms for young adults need to also reduce this destructive practice of transferring young people into the maw of the adult system.

Given advances in research and successful innovation here and abroad, now is the time for practice to catch up with science — whether it is raising the family court’s age to 21 or 25 or otherwise creating a separate approach to young adults that reflects their developmental needs and furthers public safety.

October 7, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (9)

Tuesday, October 06, 2015

"Man 'too high' on marijuana calls Austintown police for help"

The title of this post is the headline of this (amusing?) article from a local Ohio paper that almost reads like a story from The Onion.  Here are the details:

Township police were called to a home Friday night by a man who complained he was “too high” after smoking marijuana. According to a police report, authorities were called to the 100 block of Westminister Avenue at about 5:20 p.m. Friday by a 22-year old male who had smoked the drug.

The officer who responded to the home could hear the man groaning from a room.The officer then found the man lying “on the floor in the fetal position” and “was surrounded by a plethora of Doritos, Pepperidge Farm Goldfish and Chips Ahoy cookies,” the report said. The man also told police he couldn’t feel his hands.

A glass pipe with marijuana residue, two packs of rolling papers, two roaches and a glass jar of marijuana were recovered from the man’s car after he gave the keys to police.

The man declined medical treatment at the home Friday night.  Austintown police have not charged the man in the incident as of late Monday morning.

I am tempted to react to this story by wondering aloud if the cop-calling, worried-weed consumer has twice enjoyed (white?) privilege by (1) thinking he could seek help from the police for his pot problem, and (2) for not yet getting arrested or charged for his various crimes. But rather than turn this story serious, I will instead just request that readers help me imagine funnier headlines for this tale of foolishness.

October 6, 2015 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Pot Prohibition Issues | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, October 01, 2015

Bipartisan federal sentencing reform bill due to emerge from Senate today

In part because October is my favorite month, I am likley to remember that a potentially historic federal sentencing reform bill emerged from behind the Senate negotiating curtain on the first day of October 2015.  This New York Times article, headlined "Senators to Unveil Bipartisan Plan to Ease Sentencing Laws," previews some of what we should expect to see in the bill.  Here are excerpts:

A long-­awaited bipartisan proposal to cut mandatory prison sentences for nonviolent offenders and promote more early release from federal prisons is scheduled to be disclosed Thursday by an influential group of senators who hope to build on backing from conservatives, progressives and the White House.

The comprehensive plan, which has the crucial support of Senator Charles E. Grassley, the Iowa Republican who heads the Judiciary Committee, is the product of intense and difficult negotiations between Republicans and Democrats who hope to reduce the financial and societal costs of mass incarceration that have hit minority communities particularly hard.

The push has benefited from an unusual convergence of interests in an otherwise polarized Washington and has become a singular issue that usually warring groups have rallied around. Progressive advocacy groups have embraced the possibility of less jail time and better preparation for offenders when they are released; conservatives have championed the potential savings in reducing prison populations and spending on the strained criminal justice system.

According to those familiar with the still­-secret agreement, the legislation proposes an extensive set of changes in federal sentencing requirements. Those changes include a reduction in mandatory minimum sentencing to five years from 10 for qualified cases; a reduction in automatic additional penalties for those with prior drug felonies; and more discretion for judges in assessing criminal history.

The legislation would also ban solitary confinement for juveniles in nearly all cases, and allow those sentenced as juveniles to seek a reduction in sentencing after 20 years. Many of the new rules could be applied retroactively to people now serving time.

The authors also took steps to deny any new leniency to those who committed serious violent crimes or drug felonies. And the bill would put some new mandatory minimum sentences in place for those convicted of interstate domestic violence or providing weapons or other material to terrorists or certain countries.

Lawmakers hoping for more sweeping changes did not win the across­theboard reductions in mandatory minimum sentences they had sought when the negotiations began. They compromised to win the backing of Mr. Grassley, who in the past has been critical of broad efforts to reduce prison time.

If the authors wish to push the legislation through this year, it will require an aggressive effort and a decision by Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky and the majority leader, to make the measure a priority. The bill is most likely to be considered by the Judiciary Committee this month, with a committee vote possible on Oct. 22. Congressional consideration could also be kicked into 2016....

Backers of a criminal justice overhaul were not aware of the details of the legislative deal, which senators were trying to keep under wraps until the announcement Thursday, but they welcomed the movement toward getting the debate in the public arena.

“This sounds good to us,” said Mark Holden, general counsel for Koch Industries, which has led conservatives in calling for new sentencing laws and is part of the bipartisan Coalition for Public Safety. “It is a good place to start, and hopefully this will be the impetus that gets things moving.”  Holly Harris, the executive director of the U.S. Justice Action Network, another part of the coalition, noted that “the devil is in the details.”

I share the sentiments that this sounds like a pretty good deal and that the devil is really in the details. But, absent the details looking very ugly, I am going to be a vocal and aggressive advocate for this bill because it seems like the only federal sentencing reform proposal with any realistic chance of getting to President Obama's desk while he is still President Obama.

October 1, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, September 30, 2015

"The Costs and Benefits of Subjecting Juveniles to Sex-Offender Registration and Notification"

LogoThe title of this post is the title of this notable new research report released by the R Street Institute. Here is the report's executive summary:

Every state and territory in the United States has registration and notification laws that apply to adults convicted of, and juveniles adjudicated delinquent for, certain sex offenses.  Most jurisdictions enacted these laws on their own, but expanded them in response to the Adam Walsh Act of 2006 (AWA).

Registration laws require offenders to appear in person to provide identifying information (e.g., fingerprints, DNA samples) and, at least once a year, to provide an updated current photograph.  States vary with respect to the kinds of additional information they require, but the list is extensive.  An in-person update also is required for any covered change in life circumstances.  These include changes in residential, school, work or email addresses, screen names and even blog avatars.  

The time allowed to complete each update is short. Failure to register or update an existing registration is itself a felony.  Offenders may be covered by multiple states, each with its own rules and procedures.  Notification laws make some of this information publicly available via the Internet.

Registration is calculated to produce about $200 million in social benefits per year.  Social costs are calculated to range from $200 million to $2 billion, depending on the proportion of registrants listed due to offenses committed as juveniles.  Thus, net benefits are calculated to range from -$40 million to -$1 billion per year, with present-value net benefits that range from -$2 billion to -$20 billion.  This result depends on a small number of parameters.  First, based on the best available study in the literature, which applies to all sex offenders and not just juveniles, registration is assumed to have reduced sex-offense recidivism by about one-eighth.  This translates into an annual reduction of about 800 major sex offenses committed by juveniles.

Notification is estimated to produce no social benefits, with social costs per-year that range from $10 billion to $40 billion and present-value costs that range from -$100 billion to -$600 billion.  About three-fourths of these costs are borne by sex offenders’ neighbors. This occurs because living near a registered sex offender – whether an adult or juvenile – has a substantial “disamenity” value.  Costs imposed on juvenile offenders are calculated to range from $400 million to $2 billion per year.  Costs on their families are calculated to add another 50 percent to these amounts.  Additional costs on third parties are calculated as: $3 billion per year on employers for registry searches; $100-$500 million on employers for adaption and mitigation of employment issues; and $200 million to $1 billion on the public for registry searches.

Because notification cannot produce net benefits, the qualitative prospective benefit-cost analysis focuses on ways to reduce the social costs of notification.  A number of reform alternatives warrant consideration to reduce the substantial net social costs of notification. These alternatives involve exempting certain fractions of registrants listed due to offenses committed as juveniles.  High-quality risk assessment is necessary to minimize false positives.

September 30, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, September 29, 2015

New papers looking closely (and differently) at offender-based sentencing considerations

I just noticed via SSRN these two new papers that take very different approaches to considering offender-based factors at sentencing:

September 29, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, September 25, 2015

Depressing new 2005 released-prisoner recidivism data from BJS (with lots of spin possibiities)

I just received notice of this notable new Bureau of Justice Statistics report titled "Multistate Criminal History Patterns of Prisoners Released in 30 States."  Though the BJS report and this BJS press release and this BJS summary are primarily focused on state prisoners released in 2005 who were thereafter arrested in another state, the biggest big-picture message is that for the BJS cohort of roughly 400,000 studied state prisoners released in 2005, nearly 80% were rearrested within the next five years. I cannot help but be depressed and saddened that only about one in five persons released from state prisons in 2005 was able to avoid significant contact with the criminal justice system over the subsequent five years.

Unsurprisingly, Bill Otis and other supporters and advocates of modern American incarceration levels have generally stressed these disconcerting recidivism data to assert crime is certain to increase if we enact reforms to significantly reduce our prison populations and let more folks out of prison sooner. But it bears remembering that these 2005 released prisoners served their time in state prisons and were released when the national prison population was continuing to grow and limited state resources were generally being devoted toward sending more people to prison and spending less money trying to keep people out of prison (or to aid reentry when prisoners were being released). These data thus also suggest what many reform-advocating criminologists have long said: the life disruptions and other impact of a prison term (especially when followed by poor reentry efforts) is itself criminogenic and thus serves to increase the likelihood an offender will commit crimes once released.

However one thinks about these new BJS data, it is depressingly obvious that the experience of prison for those prisoners released in 2005 seems to have done a very poor job of encouraging past offenders from becoming repeat offenders. I am cautiously hopeful that an array of prison and reentry reforms enacted by many states over the last decade will result in a much lower recidivism rate for state prisoners now being released in 2015. But only time (and lots of careful data analysis) will tell.

September 25, 2015 in National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (8)

Thursday, September 24, 2015

Wisconsin appeals court urges state's top court to review use of risk-assessment software at sentencing

This local article, headlined "Court may review use of defendant-risk tool," reports on a Wisconsin appellate court ruling that has urged the state's top court to consider a challenge to the use of risk-asssesment at sentencing. Hetre are the details:

Wisconsin's highest court could decide whether judges are violating thousands of criminal defendants' rights by using specialized software to assess whether they are a risk to society.

Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions, or COMPAS assessments, are routinely used by judges in all Wisconsin counties, said Department of Corrections spokeswoman Joy Staab. The tool is intended to help judges determine the risk a defendant presents to the community as well as the potential to commit another crime. Judges use the results to help decide whether a defendant should be sentenced to prison or instead offered alternative sentences such as probation.

Questions arose after a 2013 La Crosse County case, when Circuit Judge Scott Horne relied in part on a COMPAS assessment to decide that Eric Loomis was not eligible for probation. At sentencing, the judge said the assessment suggested Loomis presented a high risk to commit another crime, according to court records. Loomis, who was convicted of taking and driving a vehicle without the owner's consent and fleeing an officer, was sentenced to six years in prison.

Loomis appealed, questioning the scientific validity of the assessment. Attorneys for Loomis assert that COMPAS was not developed to assist sentencing decisions, but to determine program needs for offenders, according to court records. Proprietary rights held by the company that developed the tool prohibit defendants from challenging the assessment's methodology, leaving Loomis and other defendants with little recourse, according to court filings. The Loomis appeal also questions the use of gender-specific questions during the assessment to help determine potential risk. Federal civil rights laws prohibit courts from relying on gender when making sentencing decisions.

The appeals court opted not to rule in the case, instead asking the Wisconsin Supreme Court to weigh in on the matter. Although judges are given training on how to use COMPAS, the appeals court is asking the higher court to decide whether using the tool violates defendants' rights, either because defendants are not allowed to challenge the scientific basis of the assessments or because gender is taken into consideration. "There is a compelling argument that judges make better sentencing decisions with the benefit of evidence-based tools such as COMPAS,” the Court of Appeals wrote in a Sept. 17 filing. “Yet, if those tools lack scientific validity, or if defendants cannot test the validity of those tools, due process questions arise.”

The software-based assessment, created by Colorado-based Northpointe Inc., eliminates the need for judges and corrections officers to rely on manual assessment procedures, which are often more subjective and discretionary, to assess risk. Wisconsin began using the assessment more than four years ago, Staab said.

The referenced appellate court certification opinion is available at this link, and it begins this way:

We certify this appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to decide whether the right to due process prohibits circuit courts from relying on COMPAS assessments when imposing sentence. More specifically, we certify whether this practice violates a defendant’s right to due process, either because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevents defendants from challenging the COMPAS assessment’s scientific validity, or because COMPAS assessments take gender into account. Given the widespread use of COMPAS assessments, we believe that prompt supreme court review of the matter is needed.

September 24, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, State Sentencing Guidelines, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (3)

First Circuit panel reverses stat max drug sentence based on co-defendant disparity

A panel of the First Circuit handed down a lengthy and significant sentncing opinion yesterday in US v. Reyes-Santiago, No. 12-2372 (1st Cir. Sept. 23, 2015) (available here). Here is how the majority opinion begins:

Appellant Jorge Reyes-Santiago ("Reyes") was among 110 defendants charged in a two-count indictment with drug and firearms offenses arising from a massive drug ring operating in public housing projects in Bayamón, Puerto Rico.  Most of the high-level members of the conspiracy, Reyes among them, pled guilty pursuant to plea agreements. Other than for Reyes, the sentences imposed on Count One, the drug count, ranged from 78 months to 324 months, the latter imposed on the chieftain of the enterprise.  Reyes received the stiffest Count One sentence: 360 months. In this appeal, he seeks resentencing on Count One on three grounds: the government's alleged breach of his plea agreement, the sentencing court's alleged inappropriate conduct in demanding witness testimony, and the disparity between his sentence and those of similarly situated co-defendants.  Reyes also claims the district court erred in ordering a 24-month consecutive sentence for his violation of supervised release conditions imposed in an earlier case.

We find merit in the disparity argument.  Ultimately, in sentencing the lead conspirators, the district court refused to accept stipulated drug amounts only for Reyes, listed as Defendant #9 in the indictment, and for the conspiracy's kingpin, Defendant #1.  Although sentencing courts have the discretion to reject recommendations made in plea agreements, and need not uniformly accept or reject such stipulations for co-defendants, they nonetheless must impose sentences along a spectrum that makes sense, given the co-defendants' criminal conduct and other individual circumstances.  In this case, after reviewing Presentence Investigation Reports ("PSRs") and sentencing transcripts for the leaders in the conspiracy, we conclude that the rationale offered by the district court for the substantial disparity between Reyes's sentence and the sentences of others above him in the conspiracy's hierarchy is unsupported by the record.  We therefore must remand this case to the district court for reconsideration of Reyes's sentence.

September 24, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, September 23, 2015

Wisconsin appeals court declares unconstitutional criminalization of sex offenders photographing kids in public

As reported in this local article, a "Wisconsin law prohibiting registered sex offenders from photographing children in public violates their right to free speech, the state Court of Appeals held Tuesday." Here is more about this notable ruling concerning a notable sex offender restriction:

The decision by the Wausau-based District 3 court reversed the conviction of a 44-year-old Green Bay man who had been sentenced to 12 years in prison for the non-pornographic photos. It also found the law unconstitutional on its face, not salvageable by a narrowed interpretation or severing part of the statute.

Because of a 2002 child sexual assault conviction, Christopher J. Oatman was on probation in February 2011, when his agent searched his apartment and found a camera and cellphone. On them, authorities found photos Oatman had taken the previous fall of children outside his residence doing things like riding skateboards, jumping rope and dropping stones in a soda bottle. None involved nudity or obscenity.

He was charged with 16 counts of intentionally photographing children without their parents' consent, and later pleaded no contest to eight so he could appeal on the constitutional issue. The judge sentenced Oatman last year to consecutive 18-month prison terms, the maximum, on each count.

In an opinion written by Reserve Judge Thomas Cane, and joined by judges Lisa Stark and Thomas Hruz, the court found that even sex offenders have free speech rights to take non-obscene, non-pornographic photographs of children in public places. Any law that aims to restrict speech based on its content must be narrowly drawn to protect a compelling state interest. The court found the law at issue failed both tests.

While protecting children is such an interest, the court said, the law doesn't accomplish that. In fact, it could actually encourage offenders to make personal contact with children, in order to ask who their parents are so the offender might ask permission to take the photos. "Further, children are not harmed by non-obscene, non-pornographic photographs taken in public places," the court said....

The court said it does not like the idea that some people might gain sexual gratification from ordinary photos of children, but that laws can't ban protected speech just because it might lead to crime. "First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that impermissible end," the decision reads, quoting a U.S. Supreme Court case. "The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought."

The full ruling in Wisconsin v. Oatman is available at this link, and the nature of the final ruling meant that the appeals court had no reason to consider or comment on the specific sentence that had been imposed on the defendant under this law. That said, I cannot help but wonder if the judges considering the appeal were influenced by the remarkable fact that the defendant had been sentence to more than a decade in prision(!) for simply taking pictures (presumably from inside his own home) of children playing outside in public.

September 23, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Monday, September 21, 2015

"Rich Offender, Poor Offender: Why It (Sometimes) Matters in Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing paper by Mirko Bagaric recently posted to SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Wealth confers choice and opportunity. Poverty is restrictive and often leads to frustration and resentment.  Rich people who commit crime are arguably more blameworthy than the poor who engage in the same conduct because the capacity of the rich to do otherwise is greater.  Yet, we cannot allow poverty to mitigate criminal punishment otherwise we potentially license or encourage people to commit crime.

These two conflicting considerations are the source of intractable tension in the criminal justice system. The second perspective has generally prevailed.  Offenders from economically disadvantaged backgrounds normally do not receive a sentencing reduction based purely on that consideration.  This article examines the soundness of this approach. It concludes that there is a non-reducible baseline standard of conduct that is expected of all individuals, no matter how poor.  It is never tolerable to inflict serious bodily or sexual injury on another person.  Deprived background should not mitigate such crimes.

A stronger argument can be made in favour of economic deprivation mitigating other forms of offences, such as drug and property crimes.  While the key consideration regarding crime severity is the impact it has on victims (not the culpability of the offender), in relation to these offences the burden of poverty is the more compelling consideration.  This should be reflected in a mathematical discount (in the order of 25 per cent) for impoverished non-violent and non-sexual offences.  A related benefit of this discount is that it will shine a light on the strictures of poverty and thereby encourage the implementation of broader social interventions to eliminate the link between poverty and crime.

To this end, it is suggested that the biggest change that would reduce the link between crime and poverty is improving the education levels of all citizens.  Whilst this article focuses on sentencing law and policy in the United States and Australia, its recommendations are applicable to all sentencing systems.

September 21, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (1)

Eleventh Circuit panel categorically rejects Johnson vagueness attack on career offender guidelines

In this prior post a few days after the US Supreme Court ruled that a key clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act violated "the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws" in Johnson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (available here), I flagged the possibility that Johnson could impact past, present and future sentencings pursuant to the career offender guideline of the US Sentencing Guidelines. 

Since then, I believe that the Department of Justice has consistently conceded Johnson-based constitutional problems with the existing career offender guideline because the key phrase found vague in Johnson is also used in the guideline definition of a career offender.  In addition, as noted in this post from last month, the US Sentencing Commission has proposed amending the career offender guideline to eliminate the Johnson-problematic definition of a crime of violence.   And I believe at least a few appellate rulings have assumed without deciding that Johnson creates problems for existing career offender guideline sentencing.

But today an Eleventh Circuit panel in US v. Matchett, No. 14-10396 (Sept. 21, 2015) (available here), squarely addresses this issue and rules that Johnson and its vagueness problem just do not apply to advisory sentencing guidelines.  Here is how the Matchett opinion gets started:

This appeal presents an issue of first impression for this Court: whether the vagueness doctrine of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the advisory Sentencing Guidelines.  Calvin Matchett pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and now challenges both the denial of his motion to suppress the firearm and the calculation of his sentence.  Police Officer Jesse Smith stopped Matchett when he saw Matchett carrying a flat-screen television in a residential neighborhood on a weekday morning.  After speaking with Matchett, Officer Smith frisked him based on his confrontational demeanor and the risk that he had a burglary tool that could be used as a weapon.  When Officer Smith found a loaded handgun in Matchett’s pocket, Matchett fought with Officer Smith for over three minutes in an attempt to flee.  The district court did not err when it denied Matchett’s motion to suppress.  It also correctly determined that Matchett’s previous convictions for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling were crimes of violence and that Matchett’s resistance created a substantial risk of death or bodily injury in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.  We reject Matchett’s argument that the definition of “crime of violence” in the Sentencing Guidelines is unconstitutionally vague in light of Johnson v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).  The vagueness doctrine applies only to laws that prohibit conduct and fix punishments, not advisory guidelines.  We affirm.

Some prior related posts:

September 21, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (6)

Friday, September 18, 2015

Shouldn't former federal judge Mark Fuller now be federally prosecuted for perjury?

The question in the title of this post prompted by this new AP article, headlined "Judicial Conference says former federal judge's conduct was reprehensible, impeachable." Here are the details:

Judicial investigators told Congress this week that a former federal judge — arrested last year on a domestic violence charge — had demonstrated "reprehensible conduct" and there was evidence that he abused his wife several times and made false statements to the committee reviewing his behavior.

The Judicial Conference of the United States, in a report to Congress this week, said former U.S. District Judge Mark Fuller of Alabama brought disrepute to the federal judiciary and that his conduct might have warranted impeachment if he had not resigned this summer.  

In a letter to the House Judiciary Committee [which can be accessed here], the Judicial Conference noted Fuller's resignation, but said the severity of Fuller's misconduct and its finding of perjury led it to turn the information over to Congress for whatever action lawmakers deem necessary. "This certification may also serve as a public censure of Judge Fuller's reprehensible conduct, which has no doubt brought disrepute to the Judiciary and cannot constitute the 'good behavior' required of a federal judge," Judicial Conference Secretary James C. Duff wrote in a Sept. 11 letter to House Speaker John Boehner....

The Judicial Conference wrote that there was substantial evidence that the judge "physically abused Kelli Fuller at least eight times, both before and after they married, which included and culminated in the assault that took place on Aug. 9, 2014, in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in downtown Atlanta, Georgia." The conference wrote that Fuller denied under oath to the investigating committee that he ever hit, punched or kicked his wife, and that the investigating committee considered those to be false statements. The Judicial Conference also cited a separate incident, on which it did not elaborate, saying Fuller in 2010 made a false statement to the chief judge that caused a disruption in operations and a loss of public confidence in the court.

The House committee is not releasing the full report, which contains some sensitive victim information. Fuller was placed on leave after his arrest. In May, he announced that he was resigning effective Aug. 1. The Judicial Council of the U.S. 11th Circuit at the time said Fuller's actions might have warranted impeachment, but the reasons for the determination were not released until this week.

Fuller was appointed to the bench in 2002 by then-President George W. Bush. He is perhaps best known for presiding over the 2006 public corruption trial of former Alabama Gov. Don Siegelman and former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy. 

As celebrity white-collar attorneys surely recall, in recent times a number of prominent public figures ranging from Barry Bonds to Roger Clemens to Marion Jones to 'Lil Kim to Scooter Libby have been federally prosecuted for alleged acts of perjury that seems far less serious and consequential than what the Judicial Conference has found former judge Mark Fuller committed.  Absent some prominent explanation for why a federal perjury prosecution would not be worthwhile in this setting, I will be mighty disappointed and a bit concerned if Fuller does not face sanctions for his apparent criminal behavior in this matter.  (Critically, I am not — at least not yet — asserting that Fuller should be imprisoned for his lying under oath to cover up his misbehavior and stay in his position as a federal judge.  But I am saying (former state DA prosecutor) Fuller ought to at least face federal criminal charges and be subject to the heat that comes with a formal federal prosecution.)

September 18, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15)

Monday, September 14, 2015

Montgomery wards: gearing up for SCOTUS juve LWOP retroactivity case

In four weeks, the US Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Montgomery v. Louisiana.  Here, via this SCOTUSblog posting and this official SCOTUS page, are the questions that the Justices will be considering in Montgomery:

Do we have jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect in this case to our decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ____ (2012)?

Whether Miller v. Alabama adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison.

Because both of these questions engage many interesting, important and dynamic issues, I am planning to do a (lengthy?) series of posts about this case and the various arguments that have been presented to the Justices via amicus briefs (including one I filed thanks to the efforts of good folks at the Columbus offices of Jones Day).  As the title of this post reveals, I have decided to use "Montgomery wards" as the cheeky title for this coming series of posts.

Notably, as this new SCOTUSblog posting highlights, it would now appear that the Justices share my sense that the Montgomery case raises many interesting, important and dynamic issues because they have now scheduled additional argument time for the case.  Here are the basics via Lyle Denniston's SCOTUSblog report:

The Supreme Court on Monday added fifteen minutes to the argument schedule for its hearing October 13 on Montgomery v. Louisiana, a case that could decide which juveniles convicted of murder can take advantage of a 2012 decision limiting sentences of life without parole for minors.  The added time will allow a Court-appointed attorney to argue a question about the Court’s authority to actually rule on the legal issue in the case.

In March, the Justices agreed to hear the appeal of Henry Montgomery of Baton Rouge, who is seeking retroactive application of the Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which had all but eliminated states’ power to sentence youths to life without parole, as punishment for committing a murder when they were under the age of eighteen.  In taking on the case, however, the Court also added the question whether it has jurisdiction to review and rule on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision refusing to apply the Miller precedent to cases that had become final before June 25, 2012, when Miller was decided.   Louisiana had raised that issue in a filing in an earlier case on the juvenile sentencing question. 

Instead of the usual one hour of argument time, the Court in the Montgomery case will hear seventy-five minutes.  The time will be divided this way: the Court-appointed attorney, Richard Bernstein of Washington, D.C., will have fifteen minutes to argue against the Court’s jurisdiction, Montgomery’s attorney will have fifteen minutes to argue both points, an attorney from the office of the U.S. Solicitor General will have fifteen minutes to argue both issues, and a lawyer for the state of Louisiana will have thirty minutes of time to argue both questions.  The order also said that Bernstein and Montgomery’s lawyer will be allowed to save time for rebuttal.

The federal government, in a brief filed by the Solicitor General, supported Montgomery’s plea to apply Miller retroactively and argued that the Court does have jurisdiction to decide that question.  The brief noted that there are twenty-seven inmates in federal prisons whose sentences could be affected by the retroactivity issue.

September 14, 2015 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, September 13, 2015

Alabama Chief Justice laments mandatory LWOP drug sentence for 76-year-old offender

As reported in this AP article, "Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore says the case of a 76-year-man sentenced to life without parole for a drug offense shows the need to change sentencing laws."  Here is more about the notable separate opinion authored by the top jurist of the the Cotton State:

Moore issued a special writing Friday as the Supreme Court refused to overturn the case of Lee Carroll Brooker. "I believe Brooker's sentence is excessive and unjustified," Moore wrote.

Brooker lived with his son in Houston County, and court documents show police found a marijuana-growing operation there during a search in 2013. The elderly man was convicted of drug trafficking last year, and a judge sentenced him to life without parole because of past robbery convictions in Florida. His son was also convicted. Moore writes that the life-without-parole sentence for a non-violent drug offense shows "grave flaws" in Alabama's sentencing system.

"A trial court should have the discretion to impose a less severe sentence than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole," Moore added. "I urge the legislature to revisit that statutory sentencing scheme to determine whether it serves an appropriate purpose."

The full opinion by Chief Justice Moore is available at this link.

September 13, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, September 10, 2015

New Justice Department sound and fury about white-collar prosecutions signifying....?

The interrupted question in the title of this post is my first-cut reaction and uncertainty in response to this front-page New York Times report on new Justice Department guidance concerning white-collar prosecutions.  The NYTimes piece is headlined "Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street Executives," and here are excerpts:

Stung by years of criticism that it has coddled Wall Street criminals, the Justice Department issued new policies on Wednesday that prioritize the prosecution of individual employees — not just their companies — and put pressure on corporations to turn over evidence against their executives.

The new rules, issued in a memo to federal prosecutors nationwide [which can be accessed here], are the first major policy announcement by Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch since she took office in April. The memo is a tacit acknowledgment of criticism that despite securing record fines from major corporations, the Justice Department under President Obama has punished few executives involved in the housing crisis, the financial meltdown and corporate scandals.

“Corporations can only commit crimes through flesh-and-blood people,” Sally Q. Yates, the deputy attorney general and the author of the memo, said in an interview on Wednesday. “It’s only fair that the people who are responsible for committing those crimes be held accountable. The public needs to have confidence that there is one system of justice and it applies equally regardless of whether that crime occurs on a street corner or in a boardroom.” Photo

Though limited in reach, the memo could erase some barriers to prosecuting corporate employees and inject new life into these high-profile investigations. The Justice Department often targets companies themselves and turns its eyes toward individuals only after negotiating a corporate settlement. In many cases, that means the offending employees go unpunished.

The memo, a copy of which was provided to The New York Times, tells civil and criminal investigators to focus on individual employees from the beginning. In settlement negotiations, companies will not be able to obtain credit for cooperating with the government unless they identify employees and turn over evidence against them, “regardless of their position, status or seniority.” Credit for cooperation can save companies billions of dollars in fines and mean the difference between a civil settlement and a criminal charge....

But in many ways, the new rules are an exercise in public messaging, substantive in some respects but symbolic in others. Because the memo lays out guidelines, not laws, its effect will be determined largely by how Justice Department officials interpret it. And several of the points in the memo merely codify policy that is already in place.

“It’s a good memo, but it states what should have been the policy for years,” said Brandon L. Garrett, a University of Virginia law professor and the author of the book “Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise With Corporations.” “And without more resources, how are prosecutors going to know whether companies are still burying information about their employees?”

It is also unknown whether the rules will encourage companies to turn in their executives, but Ms. Yates said the Justice Department would not allow companies to foist the blame onto low-level officials. “We’re not going to be accepting a company’s cooperation when they just offer up the vice president in charge of going to jail,” she said.

Under Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., the Justice Department faced repeated criticism from Congress and consumer advocates that it treated corporate executives leniently. After the 2008 financial crisis, no top Wall Street executives went to prison, highlighting a disparity in how prosecutors treat corporate leaders and typical criminals. Although prosecutors did collect billions of dollars in fines from big banks like JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup, critics dismissed those cases as hollow victories.

Justice Department officials have defended their record fighting corporate crime, saying that it can be nearly impossible to charge top executives who insulate themselves from direct involvement in wrongdoing. Ms. Yates’s memo acknowledges “substantial challenges unique to pursuing individuals for corporate misdeeds,” but it says that the difficulty in targeting high-level officials is precisely why the Justice Department needs a stronger plan for investigating them....

Ms. Yates, a career prosecutor, has established herself in the first months of her tenure as the department’s most vocal advocate for tackling white-collar crime. She foreshadowed plans for the new policy in a February speech to state attorneys general, in which she declared that “even imposing unprecedented financial penalties on the institutions whose conduct led to the financial crisis is not a substitute for holding individuals within those institutions personally accountable.”...

While the idea of white-collar investigations may conjure images of raids of corporate offices by federal agents, the reality is much different. When suspected of wrongdoing, large companies typically hire lawyers to conduct internal investigations and turn their findings over to the Justice Department. Those conclusions form the basis for settlement discussions, and they are likely to take on greater significance now that companies will be expected to name names....

Still, even if the Justice Department’s effort succeeds, it will not automatically put more executives behind bars. Mr. Garrett, the University of Virginia law professor, analyzed the cases in which corporate employees had been charged. More than half, he said, were spared jail time.

I am going to need to read the new Yates memo a few times before I will have any sense of whether and how this new guidance to federal prosecutors is likely to really "move the needle" with respect to white-collar prosecutions. But, in part because my white-collar expertise and experience is at the sentencing stage after an individual has been charged and convicted of a federal economic crime, I am not sure I will ever be able to see clearly from the very back-end of the federal criminal process how much this memo could alter what typically happens at the very front-end of the federal criminal process in the corporate crime world.

In turn, I would be grateful to receive (in the comments or off-line) input from persons with more experience than me on the front-end of corporate criminal investigations about whether this Yates memo signifies much or not so much in the white-collar world. If nothing else, I suspect the Yates memo will prompt many "client alert memos" from big corporate law firms to their corporate clients, and perhaps what those client alerts say about the Yates memo could matter as much as what the Yates memo itself says.

UPDATE: At this link one can now find the text of the big speech Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates delivered today at New York University School of Law concerning DOJ's "New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing."  White-collar practitioners will want to read the speech in full, and here is one thematic paragraph from the heart of the text:

But regardless of how challenging it may be to make a case against individuals in a corporate fraud case, it’s our responsibility at the Department of Justice to overcome these challenges and do everything we can to develop the evidence and bring these cases.  The public expects and demands this accountability.  Americans should never believe, even incorrectly, that one’s criminal activity will go unpunished simply because it was committed on behalf of a corporation.  We could be doing a bang-up job in every facet of the department’s operations — we could be bringing all the right cases and making all the right decisions.  But if the citizens of this country don’t have confidence that the criminal justice system operates fairly and applies equally — regardless of who commits the crime or where it is committed — then we’re in trouble.

September 10, 2015 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, September 07, 2015

Lots of interesting criminal-justice reading for the long weekend

As I enjoy the tail end of a lovely holiday weekend, I will seek to honor laborers by here labroing to assemble links to a number of recent criminal-justice articles and commentaries from various media outlets.  Each of these pieces could merit its own separate post, but I am content today to throw them all together (in no particular order) with a hope that readers might flag whichever of the pieces they think justify special attention:

September 7, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, September 02, 2015

Prison realities and reform insights from "Mr. Smith Goes to Prison"

51Qm5bXG9NL._SY344_BO1,204,203,200_Politico magazine has this fascinating excerpt from a new book titled "Mr. Smith Goes to Prison: What My Year Behind Bars Taught Me About America’s Prison Crisis."  The book is authored by Jeff Smith, a former Missouri state senator, who spent a year in federal prison for violating federal election laws, and parts of the excerpt read a bit like the Y-chromisone version of Orange is the New Black. But, as these passage highlight, it appears the book covers much more than just the fish-out-of-water elements of prison life for a white-collar offender:

Long story short: Five years after losing the election, I pleaded guilty to two counts of obstruction of justice for impeding the federal investigation Carnahan had initiated. But I requested an unorthodox sentence: two years of home confinement and full-time community service during which I would be allowed to leave my house only to teach civics and coach basketball at a St. Louis charter school I’d co-founded a decade earlier. It would’ve saved taxpayers about $175,000: two years of a teacher’s salary, plus the cost of housing a federal prisoner, since I would’ve paid for my electronic monitoring. More than 300 people, including a bipartisan group of the state’s top elected officials, wrote public letters to the to the judge requesting clemency and arguing that — as the prison counselor in Kentucky would later note — locking me up would be a waste. But the Feds portrayed me as the mastermind of a “textbook case of political corruption” and pushed for a harsh sentence at the top of the federal guidelines. The judge gave me a year and a day in federal prison.

Six months later, I was adrift in a sea of sharks — a professor-turned-politician-turned-felon forced to learn prison patois and the politics of survival. Among other areas, I’d studied and taught criminal justice policy as a political scientist for a decade. But in prison I would be the student, not the teacher.

This is the story of what I learned — about my fellow prisoners, the guards and administrators, and the system in which we operated. It is a cautionary tale of friendship and betrayal. It is a story of how politics prepared me — and didn’t — for prison, and how prison prepared me for life. But more broadly, it is a scathing indictment of a system that teaches prisoners to be better criminals instead of better citizens, and a prescription for how America can begin to decarcerate and harness the untapped potential of 2.2 million incarcerated people through programs that will transform offenders’ lives, infuse our economy with entrepreneurial energy, increase public safety and save taxpayers billions by slashing sky-high recidivism rates....

Prisons have been called “training grounds for rapists,” and according to one estimate based on two decades of surveys, nearly 300,000 rapes occur annually in U.S. prisons. The most recent Justice Department data concluded that from 2003 to 2012, nearly 2 million inmates were sexually assaulted, costing society as much as $51.9 billion annually, including the costs of victims’ compensation and increased recidivism. Advocates hoped that passage of the 2003 Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), which sought to prevent, uncover and address sexual assault, would help, but many large states have refused to comply with it (with little consequence). In 2011, a typical prisoner’s likelihood of being raped was roughly 30 times higher than that of a given woman on the outside, suggesting a depressingly steady trendline despite PREA’s passage. And since reporting assaults will only bring more trouble from fellow prisoners and COs alike, most victims remain quiet, rendering official prison data unreliably low.

Exacerbating this is a dearth of post-rape psychological treatment during incarceration and reentry, which increases the likelihood that victims will suffer from PTSD as well as their odds of recidivism — especially for crimes involving sexual assault. Tragically, prison rape often causes compensatory aggression as untreated victims commit rapes upon release to reclaim their manhood in the same way they imagine it was lost. This vicious cycle by which (frequently) nonviolent offenders become violent is the opposite of the duty that “correctional institutions” are meant to perform....

I spent less than a year in prison. In the words of my first cellie, I had less time in prison than he had done on the prison toilet. I had every advantage upon re-entry: I was a white guy with a Ph.D. from a top school, community and family support, and financial savings. Yet getting a decent job was a struggle. I often think about the re-entry of the guys I was locked up. Most had a GED earned in prison; some hadn’t had a visit in years, or even a decade, and had no one to call on the phone; few had savings to fall back on. They would be coming home to a world in which four of five landlords and nine of 10 employers run criminal background checks on prospective tenants and employees to screen out felons, in which many are not allowed to vote or use food stamps and in which they must immediately find money to pay for a halfway house room and urinalysis tests even as they cannot afford clothes for a job interview.

Mass incarceration is driven in large part by sky-high recidivism rates, and when one contemplates the myriad obstacles to successful prisoner re-entry, one grasps that the system is not, as many claim, broken at all; rather, it appears to be a well-oiled machine, keeping millions of people out of our economic mainstream. And only a shift in our cultural mindset — a realization that people who are incarcerated could, to paraphrase President Obama after his recent prison visit to a federal prison, be our brothers, our sons, our mothers, or ourselves — will change that.

September 2, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, September 01, 2015

"Skin Color and the Criminal Justice System: Beyond Black‐White Disparities in Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new article discussing empirical research on sentencing outcomes in Georgia authored by Traci Burch. Here is the abstract:

This article analyzes sentencing outcomes for black and white men in Georgia. The analysis uses sentencing data collected by the Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC). Among first‐time offenders, both the race‐only models and race and skin color models estimate that, on average, blacks receive sentences that are 4.25 percent higher than those of whites even after controlling for legally‐relevant factors such as the type of crime.

However, the skin color model also shows us that this figure hides important intraracial differences in sentence length: while medium‐ and dark‐skinned blacks receive sentences that are about 4.8 percent higher than those of whites, lighter‐skinned blacks receive sentences that are not statistically significantly different from those of whites.  After controlling for socioeconomic status in the race‐only and race and skin color models the remaining difference between whites and dark‐ and medium‐skinned blacks increases slightly, to 5.5 percent.  These findings are discussed with respect to the implications for public policy and for racial hierarchy in the United States.

September 1, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, August 27, 2015

"When Prisons Need to Be More Like Nursing Homes"

The title of this post is the headline of this new lengthy Marshall Project piece about the challenges posed by an aging prison population.  Here is how it begins:

America’s prison population is rapidly graying, forcing corrections departments to confront the rising costs and challenges of health care in institutions that weren’t designed to serve as nursing homes.

Between 1995 and 2010 the number of inmates aged 55 and up almost quadrupled, owing in part to the tough-on-crime sentencing laws of the 1980s and 90s, according to a 2012 ACLU report. In 2013, about 10 percent of the nation’s prison inmates — or 145,000 people — were 55 or older. By 2030, the report said, one-third of all inmates will be over 55. At the same time, it is widely accepted that prisoners age faster than the general population because they tend to arrive at prison with more health problems or develop them during incarceration. Caring for elderly inmates can cost up to twice as much as caring for younger ones.

In North Carolina, for example, it costs an estimated four times as much. During the fiscal year 2006-2007 — its most recent figures — the state’s corrections department spent $33,824,060 on health care for inmates over 50, a 35% increase from just two years earlier.

Despite these runaway costs, there is no national oversight to determine how prisons handle the challenges of an aging population, says Marc Stern, a consultant in correctional health care.  “If a Medicaid or Medicare auditor walked into [a large urban hospital] to do an audit’’ Stern said, “they would say, ‘O.K., where's your geriatric unit? Where's your dementia unit?’ It's part of the audit process, it's part of the intelligence phase that is part of being part of a national organization.”

But some states are confronting the costs and the problems. Here is a look at some innovative programs in New York, California and Connecticut.

A few (of many) recent and older related posts:

August 27, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, August 21, 2015

New from the Robina Institute: "The Criminal History Enhancements Sourcebook"

FileVia e-mail, I just learned about an exciting new resource from the folks at Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. Here is the text of the e-mail discussing the new resource:

The Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice at the University of Minnesota Law School is pleased to announce the publication of the Criminal History Enhancements Sourcebook, which examines elements of criminal history enhancements in 18 state and federal jurisdictions within the United States.  This publication is the result of the Robina Institute’s Criminal History Enhancements Project, led by project Co-Directors Professor Richard S. Frase and Visiting Professor Julian V. Roberts.

Criminal history scores make up one of the two most significant determinants of the punishment an offender receives in a sentencing guidelines jurisdiction. While prior convictions are taken into account by all U.S. sentencing systems, sentencing guidelines make the role of prior crimes more explicit by specifying the counting rules and by indicating the effect of prior convictions on sentence severity. Yet, once established, criminal history scoring formulas go largely unexamined. Moreover, there is great diversity across state and federal jurisdictions in the ways that an offender’s criminal record is considered by courts at sentencing.

This publication brings together for the first time information on criminal history enhancements in all existing U.S. sentencing guidelines systems. Building on this base, the Sourcebook examines major variations in the approaches taken by these systems, and identifies the underlying sentencing policy issues raised by such enhancements.

The Sourcebook contains the following elements:

  • A summary of criminal history enhancements in all guidelines jurisdictions;

  • An analysis of the critical dimensions of an offender’s previous convictions;

  • A discussion of the policy options available to commissions considering amendments to their criminal history enhancements; and

  • A bibliography of key readings on the role of prior convictions at sentencing.

The Sourcebook is available for download in full text or by chapter. To download the Sourcebook or learn more about the Robina Institute’s Criminal History Enhancements Project, visit our website and the Criminal History Enhancements Project page

August 21, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 18, 2015

"Can a Federal Prisoner Be Too Old to Jail?"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new National Journal article.  Here are excerpts:

When you're locked in federal prison, how old do you have to be to count as "aging"?

That's the question two federal agencies are grappling over, and the answer they pick will determine how the government spends more than $800 million in public funding for prisons.  And for tens of thousands of federal inmates, it could mean the difference between becoming eligible for a late-life release program and spending their twilight years behind bars.

The Federal Bureau of Prisons is struggling to adjust to an aging prison population, a product, in part, of criminal-justice reforms of the late 1980s that dramatically reduced federal parole and imposed mandatory minimum sentences for some offenses.  In fiscal 2013, the Federal Bureau of Prisons spent nearly 20 percent of its $6.9 billion budget to incarcerate inmates aged 50 and older.  And without a policy intervention, those costs are set to rise: Inmates aged 50 and older make up the fastest-growing segment of the prison population, according to Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz.

To meet those costs, the Bureau of Prisons is requesting a 6.1 percent increase in funding for fiscal 2016, an increase from the bureau's $6.9 billion budget in 2015.  But in a report released in May, the Justice Department Office of the Inspector General suggested the Bureau of Prisons consider an alternative solution: expand a "compassionate-release" program that reduces the term of imprisonment for elderly inmates.

To be eligible for the reduced sentencing program, inmates must have "chronic or serious medical conditions relating to the aging process" that "substantially diminish their ability to function in a correctional facility" for which "conventional treatment promises no substantial improvement," according to a statement from the Bureau of Prisons.  They must also have served more than half of their sentence.  For inmates looking for early release under nonmedical circumstances, the time-served bar is higher: "the greater of 10 years or 75 percent of their term."...

But for any of the above criteria to be considered, the inmate must be aged 65 or older. The Inspector General report did not explicitly call on the Bureau of Prisons to lower the limit in its May report.  Instead, it recommended the bureau reconsider the age bar and noted the potential advantages of setting it at age 50.

The lower threshold would cut incarceration costs and relieve prison overcrowding without significantly increasing recidivism rates, the report said.  The report notes several ways in which prisoners 50 and over differ from the rest of the prison population.  Older inmates cost an average of 8 percent more to confine, but they are also less likely to end up back in prison after release.  While the recidivism rate among all prisoners is 41 percent, for those released after age 50, the rate falls to 15 percent.

According to the Inspector General report, lowering the threshold age from 65 to 50 and instituting a 5 percent release rate for only those inmates in minimum or low-security institutions or medical centers could reduce incarceration costs by approximately $28 million per year.  Federal prisons with the most aging inmates spent "five times more per inmate on medical care" and "14 times more per inmate on medication" than institutions with the fewest aging inmates, the report said.

The 65-or-over bar for the program is relatively new, set in 2013 in an effort to clarify the release program's eligibility criteria following a separate Inspector General report released earlier that year....  For now, it's unclear whether the Bureau of Prisons will lower the minimum age for its compassionate-release program.  In its response to the May Inspector General report, the agency said it would "raise the issue with relevant stakeholders for further discussion."

August 18, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, August 13, 2015

New juve research suggests punishment certainty matters over severity to achieve deterence

This recent posting via the Juvenile Justice Information Exchange, titled "Report: Certainty, Not Severity, Key in Deterring Juvenile Crime," spotlights recent research on juvenile punishment's impact. Here are excerpts:

Researchers first reported several years ago that a major longitudinal study of serious adolescent offenders showed the severity of their punishments had little effect on their recidivism rates. Digging into the data, the researchers also found that teenagers who commit serious crimes do respond to the threat or risk of sanctions, though not in a one-size-fits-all way.

In a new report released by the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [available here], researchers say the findings point to the need to devote resources to change risk perceptions, rather than prisons.

The report, “Studying Deterrence Among High-Risk Adolescents,” is one of several OJJDP bulletins based on research from “Pathways to Desistance,” the study that followed more than 1,300 young offenders for seven years after their court involvement.

The resulting research has found no meaningful reduction in offending or arrests due to more severe punishment, such as correctional placement versus probation or longer periods of institutional placement, the researchers said. But it did find that the certainty of punishment can play a role in deterring future crimes. Among adolescents who commit serious offenses, “recidivism is tied strongly and directly to their perceptions of how certain they are that they will be arrested,” the report said.

Edward Mulvey, the principal investigator on the Pathways study, said the idea that adolescents respond to the certainty of punishment, not severity, has found an audience with some policymakers. They are asking whether states should have to justify why the criminal justice system should hold an adolescent offender for a long time....

The new bulletin looks at how young offenders evaluate the risks of crime, which has a deterrence effect. Young people slightly increased their risk perceptions in response to an arrest, it found. The researchers said, though, there is no standard response to the certainty of punishment because risk perceptions vary based on individuals’ prior experiences or history of offenses and other factors.

August 13, 2015 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, August 08, 2015

Ohio Gov (and GOP Prez candidate) links Obamacare and crime/recidivism reduction

I am a big fan of Ohio Gov John Kasich for a variety of reasons, and my affinity for the guy is significantly enhanced by the fact that he has, as noted in this article, appropriately linked health care reforms and public safety.  The article is headlined "Kasich Says Obamacare Empties Prisons — In a Good Way," and here are excerpts:

The Ohio governor says the program, unpopular with Republicans, has reduced recidivism rates. Ohio Gov. John Kasich defended his expansion of Medicaid under Obamacare at Thursday night’s Republican presidential debate.

The Medicaid expansion, unpopular among many of the Republican faithful, has benefited mentally ill prison inmates, said Kasich. “I’d rather get them their medication so they could lead a decent life,” he said.

“Eighty percent of the people in our prisons have addictions or problems,” Kasich added. “We now treat them in the prisons, release them in the community and the recidivism rate is 10 percent….”

I have highlighted in a number of prior posts that a lot of "wonks" have sensibly suggested that Obamacare might prove over time to be an extraordinarily valuable public safety achievement. Here are some of these prior posts:

August 8, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, August 01, 2015

Symposium Introduction: "Vulnerable Defendants and the Criminal Justice System"

The title of this post is drawn from the title of this introductory essay authored by Tamar Birckhead and Katie Rose Guest Pryal now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The News and Observer (Raleigh, N.C.) recently reported that, on a national scale, “studies estimate between 15 and 20 percent of jail and prison inmates have a serious mental illness.”  However, due to lack of state and federal resources and a punitive rather than treatment-oriented approach to misconduct, the mentally ill are often incarcerated rather than provided with appropriate therapeutic care.  Indeed, the mentally ill represent one of the most vulnerable groups that interact with the criminal justice system.

Other particularly fragile groups caught up in the criminal justice system include people of color, undocumented immigrants, the physically and developmentally disabled, the homeless, and LGBTQ persons, including those who identify with more than one of these broad categories.  Defendants from these groups face the challenge of not merely defending their liberty from the prosecutorial power of the state but attempting to do so from a place of extreme vulnerability.

Another vulnerable group is juveniles — those who are under the age of eighteen and charged with criminal offenses.  According to recent data, 1.5 million cases are prosecuted in juvenile court annually.  Large numbers of these child defendants have suffered abuse, neglect, or other maltreatment; are from impoverished families; or suffer mental or emotional disabilities.  Tens of thousands of these young offenders are ultimately prosecuted in criminal court, with sentences to adult prisons where they are at risk of physical, sexual, and psychological victimization by adult inmates and guards.  Adolescents transferred to the adult system can also experience harmful disruptions in their social, emotional, and identity development.

"Vulnerable Defendants and the Criminal Justice System," the symposium that gave rise to this issue of the North Carolina Law Review, explored these and related issues, including the following: How does the criminal justice system handle vulnerable offenders from the moment they are initially processed through to the conclusion of their sentences?  Why are these groups overrepresented within our courtrooms and prisons?  Can we identify and propose strategies for reform?

August 1, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)