Sunday, June 08, 2014
"The Failure of Mitigation?"
The title of this post is this notable new paper by Robert J. Smith, Sophie Cull and Zoe Robinson now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
A vast literature details the crimes that condemned inmates commit, but very little is known about the social histories of these capital offenders. For example, how many offenders possessed mitigating characteristics that demonstrate intellectual or psychological deficits comparable to those shared by classes of offenders categorically excluded from capital punishment? Did these executed offenders suffer from intellectual disability, youthfulness, mental illness, or childhood trauma? The problem with this state of affairs is that the personal characteristics of the defendant can render the death penalty an excessive punishment regardless of the characteristics of the crime.
This Article begins to fill the mitigation knowledge gap by describing the social histories of the last hundred offenders executed in America. Scouring state and federal court records, this Article documents the presence of significant mitigation evidence for eighty-seven percent of executed offenders. Though only a first step, our findings suggest the failure of the Supreme Court’s mitigation project to ensure the only offenders subjected to a death sentence are those with “a consciousness materially more depraved” than that of the typical murderer. Indeed, the inverse appears to be true: the vast majority of executed offenders possess significant functional deficits that rival — and perhaps outpace — those associated with intellectual impairment and juvenile status; defendants that the Court has categorically excluded from death eligibility.
Thursday, June 05, 2014
Split Fourth Circuit highlights ugly mess of SCOTUS "crime of violence" jurisprudence
If you are sentencing nerdy like me, you often wonder what crimes are properly considered "crimes of violence" under federal law. And, if you are sentencing nerdly like me, you also know the Supreme Court's work on this issue sometimes makes very hard to answer whether a particular state crime is a "crime of violence" for federal sentencing law purposes. This reality is on stark display in a 40-page opinion handed down today by a Fourth Circuit panel in US v. Martin, No. 12-5001 (4th Cir. June 5, 2014) (available here).
At issue in Martin is the seemingly simple question of whether the defendant's prior Maryland conviction "for fourth-degree burglary constituted a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(2)." But each judge on the panel had something distinct to say on the matter: "Chief Judge Traxler wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge Diaz joined. Judge Diaz wrote a separate concurring opinion. Judge O’Grady wrote a dissenting opinion." Gluttons for jurisprudential punishment will want to read the entire Martin ruling, but others will get a feel for this story from portions of Judge Diaz's concurrence:
This case raises a vexing question regarding the application of the crime of violence enhancement found in the Guidelines: To what extent does Begay’s “similar in kind” test for analyzing offenses under the residual clause survive Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011)? Specifically, would the Supreme Court apply that test in determining whether Martin’s fourth degree burglary conviction under Maryland law qualifies as a crime of violence? Or would the Court again change course?...
“[T]o put it mildly,” the residual clause is “not a model of clarity.” See James, 550 U.S. at 217 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The clause “is nearly impossible to apply consistently,” and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence “has created numerous splits among the lower federal courts.” See Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 133 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); cf. United States v. Vann, 660 F.3d 771, 797 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (Davis, J., concurring) (“At the end of the day, it may well be that Justice Scalia is right: that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act is unconstitutionally vague.”)
The Supreme Court has struggled mightily to make sense of this sphinx-like provision, but the clause remains an elusive target. We are told that a prior conviction triggers the sentencing enhancement when “the risk posed by [the offense at issue] is comparable to that posed by its closest analog among the enumerated offenses.” See James, 550 U.S. at 203 (majority opinion). But, at least in some cases, the offense must also be “roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the [enumerated] examples.” See Begay, 553 U.S. at 143. To be roughly similar in kind, the crime must be “purposeful, violent, and aggressive.” See id. at 145. Fear not though, because “[i]n many cases the purposeful, violent, and aggressive inquiry will be redundant with the inquiry into risk.” See Sykes, 131 S. Ct. at 2275. As Justice Scalia noted in dissent in Sykes, however, why the inquiry will often be redundant, and when it will not be, “are not entirely clear.” See 131 S. Ct. at 2285....
Beyond this case, however, “[t]he Court’s ever-evolving interpretation of the residual clause will keep defendants and judges guessing for years to come.” Id. at 2287 (Scalia, J., dissenting). I urge Congress or the Court to shed light on this “black hole of confusion and uncertainty.” See Vann, 660 F.3d at 787 (Agee, J., concurring).
Monday, June 02, 2014
Tenth Circuit explains what's the matter with Kansas prior convictions as enhancers
Thanks to a helpful reader, I learned that today the Tenth Circuit handed down a significant opinion concerning the use of prior Kansas offenses in career offender guideline calculations in US v. Brooks, No. 13-3166 (10th Cir. June 2, 2014) (available here). Here is how the opinion in Books starts and ends:
Did Defendant Damian L. Brooks commit enough prior qualifying felonies to be considered a “career offender” under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? The district court below said yes, relying on United States v. Hill, 539 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2008), to classify a prior Kansas conviction of Defendant as a felony because it was punishable by more than one year in prison. On appeal, Defendant admits Hill mandates this classification. He argues, however, that Hill was abrogated by the Supreme Court in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563 (2010). We agree. As such, exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, we reverse and remand for resentencing....
In conclusion, Hill — which looked to the hypothetical worst possible offender to determine whether a state offense was punishable by more than a year in prison — cannot stand in light of Carachuri-Rosendo. We now hold, in line with our pre-Hill precedent, that in determining whether a state offense was punishable by a certain amount of imprisonment, the maximum amount of prison time a particular defendant could have received controls, rather than the amount of time the worst imaginable recidivist could have received. As such, Defendant’s prior Kansas conviction for eluding police is not a felony for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). The district court’s imposition of a career offender enhancement was therefore in error and is REVERSED. This case is REMANDED for resentencing.
The helpful reader who alerted me to this opinion noted that "for those of us who deal with Kansas state convictions, it is (as Ron Burgundy would say), kind of a big deal." Here is part of this reader's explanation for why:
Previous 10th Circuit authority held that a conviction for a Kansas on grid "felony" was punishable by more than one year if a sentence more than one year could be imposed on any hypothetical defendant. That is, the analysis was not limited by a defendant's actual criminal history category on the state guidelines grid. If more than one year could be imposed for any criminal history category, the conviction = felony for purposes of federal law, even though a particular defendant may have only been exposed to a sentence less one year or less....
This ruling will impact multiple areas of federal prosecution and sentencing. For instance, if the high end of a defendant's KS gridbox is 12 months, then the conviction is not a disabling conviction for purposes of 18 USC 922(g)(1). Likewise, such a conviction would not be a predicate conviction for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act or the Career Offender guidelines enhancement.
A more limited effect will be that a few drug-grid convictions will not be a "prior drug felony" that can enhance a controlled substance offense under 21 USC 851.... Certain attempts/conspiracies/solicitations to commit drug crimes would also not be a federal felony for enhancement purposes.
Because I do not know how many federal sentencing cases are significantly impacted by how certain prior Kansas offenses are assessed, I cannot readily guess just how loudly this Brooks ruling might echo in other settings. But I do know that a similar type of ruling from the Fourth Circuit a few years ago concerning how North Carolina priors were to be treated has tied up a lot of federal courts in a lot of jurisprudential knots as they try to unwind the impact of "mis-assessed prior offenses." Consequently, I would advise court officials and federal practitioners in Kansas and perhaps throughout the Tenth Circuit to start reviewing and giving thought to what Brooks says and what it could mean for prior cases as well as future ones.
Sunday, June 01, 2014
Could video kill the sentencing brief?
The question in the title of this post is prompted by this notable Wall Street Journal article headlined "Leniency Videos Make a Showing at Criminal Sentencings: Some Lawyers Supplement Letters of Support With Mini-Documentaries; Effectiveness Is Debated." Here are excerpts:
Randy Ray Rivera, formerly of Springfield, Mass., and now a resident of the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, is the subject of a documentary film that was made for a very limited audience: the federal district judge who held Mr. Rivera's fate in his hands.
It tells the story of a young man who began dealing drugs as a teenager to support his siblings and his heroin-addict mother, who died of AIDS in 2004. The 26-minute video includes emotional interviews with Mr. Rivera's brothers and sisters, daughters and son, current and ex-girlfriends and a social worker, as well as with Mr. Rivera himself, in white-and-gray prison garb.
Such films, while rare, have caught on in some federal public defenders' offices. Now, some private lawyers and investigators are attempting to unlock the potential of video in the sentencing phase of criminal cases, supplementing the memorandum and letters of support that are typically used to plead for leniency.
"The sentences are almost always better than they would otherwise be," said Doug Passon, a veteran assistant federal public defender in Arizona who is considered by his peers to be a pioneer of so-called sentencing-mitigation videos. For the past five years, he has held a sentencing film festival at an annual training conference for federal public defenders....
Judge William Sessions III, who sits on the federal district court in Vermont, gave Mr. Rivera 12 years in prison, after viewing the video Mr. Rivera's legal team put together. It captures the rundown buildings in Springfield that Mr. Rivera's family occupied, sometimes as squatters. At one point, Mr. Rivera's teenage daughter, through tears, calls him "one of the best dads ever."
Judge Sessions, speaking generally about sentencing videos, said, "When you have a video of either a defendant's life or a victim's life, it provides context for that life." But he said videos weren't a substitute for a good legal argument in a sentencing memorandum. "They are supplementary," he said....
Proponents say the videos fall within the scope of a federal rule that allows people convicted of a crime to "speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence" to the courts. But some courts have rejected sentencing videos, after prosecutors protested they weren't given an opportunity to question the witnesses who appeared in the videos, investigators said.
While investigators and lawyers say such videos are used in a small fraction of the tens of thousands of federal cases that end in a criminal sentence each year, the word appears to be slowly spreading. Susan Randall, a former documentary filmmaker who now works as a private investigator in Vermont, said she has created more than 20 sentencing videos for a range of white-collar and drug defendants, including Mr. Rivera....
Katrina Daniel, a former television news reporter who covered crime, started her own production company in 2012 and has made about 10 sentencing videos, charging anywhere from $5,000 to $20,000.Some are simply interviews with the defendants, while others draw on family, friends, co-workers and others. Ms. Daniel said she tries to convey the defendant's remorse and acceptance of responsibility.
Mr. Passon said he got the idea for sentencing videos from an attorney he clerked for in 1995, while he was law student at Washington University in St. Louis. They were representing a man charged with a drug crime whose wife was dying of lupus, and the defendant was her sole caretaker. "We were trying to show how desperately he was needed at home," Mr. Passon said. They went to the client's home with a clunky, tape-fed video camera and recorded the man as he cared for his wife. "It was very, very powerful," said Mr. Passon.
Pop culture fans will know that the title of this post is a bit of an homage to the very first video ever played on MTV and a song which may be my all-time favorite one-hit wonder. And long-time readers will know I cannot resist this excuse for a mini-song parody based on the start of the lyrics to Video Killed the Radio Star:
I heard you sold some drugs back in '92
Bad criminal intent will keep haunting you
Your criminal history points keep coming through
You now get credit for singing like a symphony
And will be helped by machine on new technology
And now I understand the post-Booker scene
We met your children
What will we show them?
Video killed the sentencing brief
Video killed the sentencing brief
Pictures came and eclipse my words,
We can't mitigate down too far
Saturday, May 31, 2014
Looking at some killers benefiting from SCOTUS Eighth Amendment ruling in Hall
As I noted earlier this week when the Supreme Court's handed down its ruling in Hall v. Florida (opinion here, basics here), the Justices' Eighth Amendment decision will be a big deal for the administration of capital punishment in those states with lots of murderers on death row and/or for those states that have been applying Atkins in restrictive ways. Following up these themes, today's New York Times has this lengthy front-page article looking at some of the death row defendants likely to be grateful for the decision. The piece is headlined "On Death Row With Low I.Q., and New Hope for a Reprieve," and here are excerpts:
For Ted Herring, who has spent 32 years on Florida’s death row for murdering a store clerk, signs of intellectual disability arose early and piled up quickly: He repeated first grade and got D’s and F’s through fourth grade. He read like a fourth grader at 14 and did not know that summer followed spring....
His intellectual disability was even obvious to a Florida judge, who found him “mentally retarded” and took him off death row 18 years after his original sentence. At 19, in 1981, Mr. Herring murdered a Daytona Beach 7-Eleven clerk, robbed the store and walked away with $23.84. But because Mr. Herring’s I.Q. scores were 72 and 74, just over the “bright line” cutoff of 70 used by Florida to determine intellectual aptitude, the Florida Supreme Court returned him to death row.
When the Supreme Court ruled this week that states can no longer rely on a fixed I.Q. score cutoff to decide intellectual competency, it increased the likelihood that Mr. Herring and other death row inmates like him will have a chance to avoid execution. Fewer defendants are also less likely to wind up on death row in the future because their claims of intellectual disabilities will be not be as readily discounted by the courts.
The ruling affects roughly 30 death row inmates. The number is low because the vast majority of states follow modern standards of determining intellectual disabilities, going beyond using a single number to be considered disabled. But in those states that will be affected, death row inmates with low, but not low enough, I.Q. scores that have been previously rejected or never put forward can now seek to have their sentences reconsidered....
In Florida, 15 to 20 inmates — perhaps the largest number in the country — will probably seek to overturn their death sentences because of the decision... “Florida has the third largest death row in the country and was the state that was the leader in doing this — the bright-line cutoff,” said William Henniss III, who said he had two clients who would most likely seek redress. “Expect there to be more cases like this.”
In Kentucky, five of 34 death row inmates are also likely to ask for new hearings based on the decision, said David Barron, an assistant public advocate who handles post-conviction cases.
Some of them, like Thomas Bowling, who was sentenced to death after killing a married couple in 1990, are likely to explore what the new I.Q. range will be in Kentucky, where 70 has been the cutoff. Mr. Bowling, who claimed on appeal that he was intellectually disabled, repeated the ninth grade several times before dropping out. But the appeals court rejected his claim because his most recent scores, the ones they viewed as most reliable, were in the 80s....
In Virginia, Alfredo R. Prieto is likely to seek a hearing based on is low I.Q. scores, which ranged between 70 and 75, said his lawyer, Cary B. Bowen. Those scores, Mr. Bowen said, “kind of fall in line” with the I.Q. range described in the Supreme Court decision as the kind that should not be rejected simply because they do not meet a cutoff. Mr. Prieto, who is from El Salvador and whose lawyers argued that he was scarred by the violence he saw there during the country’s civil war, is on Virginia’s death row for the 1988 murders of two people. He faces the death penalty for a murder in California, as well, and has been linked to others.
Recent posts on Hall:
- Big criminal justice decision day for SCOTUS, including 8th Amendment reversal of Florida's Aktins approach
- "Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. See DSM–5, at 37."
- Will Hall have import or impact other then when states seek to execute the possibly disabled?
Thursday, May 29, 2014
"Funding Favored Sons and Daughters: Nonprosecution Agreements and 'Extraordinary Restitution' in Environmental Criminal Cases"
The title of this post is the title of this recent article authored by Paul Larkin that a helpful reader altered me. Here is the abstract:
Over the past eight years, the federal government has entered into more than two hundred nonprosecution agreements with corporations in white-collar crime cases. In such agreements the government promises to cease its investigation and forego any potential charges so long as the corporation agrees to certain terms. And there’s the rub: given the economic realities of just being charged with a white-collar crime these days, corporations are more than willing to accept nonprosecution agreements.
Prosecutors are cognizant of this willingness, as well as of the fact that these agreements are practically insulated from judicial review. This results in the prosecution possessing a seemingly unfettered discretion in choosing the terms of a nonprosecution agreement. The breadth of this discretion is nowhere more apparent than in environmental criminal cases. Nonprosecution agreements in such cases have begun to require corporations to donate monetarily to a nonprofit of the government’s choosing. Indeed, in 2012 British Petroleum agreed to pay more than $2.394 billion to nonprofit agencies.
This Article critiques this practice by highlighting the inconsistencies between nonprosecution agreements and plea bargaining — the latter are subject to judicial review while the former are not — and unearthing the differences between these payments and any common-law understanding of restitutionary principles. The Article then suggests that the practical result of these nonprosecution agreements is that prosecutors are diverting money that ought to be paid to the Treasury to government-chosen nonprofit agencies, a power constitutionally granted to legislative actors. Finally, the Article concludes by suggesting a modest reform: judicial review by a United States magistrate judge, so as not to run into any Article III concerns, to ensure that prosecutors do not take advantage of the nonprosecution agreement process.
May 29, 2014 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Tuesday, May 27, 2014
Will Hall have import or impact other then when states seek to execute the possibly disabled?
Hall is a very big deal for the administration of capital punishment (opinion here, basics here), especially for those states with lots of murderers on death row and/or for those states that have been applying Atkins in restrictive ways. Nevertheless, while a big round of new Atkins/Hall litigation is sure to churn in a number of states in the months and years ahead, in the end the fate of probably only a few dozen capital defendants will be significantly impacted by the holding in Hall.
But, of course, the dicta and direction of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment work in Hall could be a big deal in lots of other setting if lower courts conclude that the import and impact of this ruling should extend beyond capital cases involving intellectionally challenged defendants. Here is a sampling of some (mostly new) Eighth Amendment language from the majority opinion in Hall that I could envision having some bite in some other settings:
The Eighth Amendment’s protection of dignity reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to be. This is to affirm that the Nation’s constant, unyielding purpose must be to transmit the Constitution so that its precepts and guarantees retain their meaning and force....
No legitimate penological purpose is served by executing a person with intellectual disability. To do so contravenes the Eighth Amendment, for to impose the harshest of punishments on an intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity as a human being....
[A]ggregate numbers are not the only considerations bearing on a determination of consensus. Consistency of the direction of change is also relevant.... The rejection of the strict 70 cutoff in the vast majority of States and the “consistency in the trend,” Roper, supra, at 567, toward recognizing the SEM provide strong evidence of consensus that our society does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane....
The actions of the States and the precedents of this Court give us essential instruction, but the inquiry must go further. The Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. That exercise of independent judgment is the Court’s judicial duty....
The death penalty is the gravest sentence our society may impose. Persons facing that most severe sanction must have a fair opportunity to show that the Constitution prohibits their execution. Florida’s law contravenes our Nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world. The States are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic dignity the Constitution protects.
As these quotes highlight, the majority opinion per Justice Kennedy in Hall makes much of the "Eighth Amendment’s protection of dignity." (For those into counts, the term dignity is used nine times in Justice Kennedy's majority opinion, while the term is not used even once in Justice Alito's dissent.) Needless to say, I can identify a number of non-capital punishments that states and the federal government have been known to experiment with that seem to "deny the basic dignity the Constitution protects" (such as LWOP for non-violent offenders). I am hopeful that not only the Supreme Court but also lower courts continue to be open to arguments that it is not only some capital punishment provisions that can and sometimes do "contravene our Nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world."
Today's posts on Hall:
- Big criminal justice decision day for SCOTUS, including 8th Amendment reversal of Florida's Aktins approach
- "Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. See DSM–5, at 37."
"Intellectual disability is a condition, not a number. See DSM–5, at 37."
The title of this post is the sentence and cite that perhaps best summarized the work of the majority of the Supreme Court this morning in Hall v. Florida (opinion here, basics here). In Hall, the Court rejects as violative of the Eighth Amendment Florida's use of a bright-line IQ test cut-off set at 70 for defining who is eligible for execution (while dodging whether a cut off set at 75 would be okay) based principally on the medical community's consensus view that IQ tests are just one factor in assessing intellectual disability and are necessarily imprecise. Here are just a few excerpts from the majority opinion in Hall that highlight these themes:
That this Court, state courts, and state legislatures consult and are informed by the work of medical experts in determining intellectual disability is unsurprising. Those professionals use their learning and skills to study and consider the consequences of the classification schemes they devise in the diagnosis of persons with mental or psychiatric disorders or disabilities. Society relies upon medical and professional expertise to define and explain how to diagnose the mental condition at issue....
Florida’s rule disregards established medical practice in two interrelated ways. It takes an IQ score as final and conclusive evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other evidence. It also relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the defendant’s abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own terms, imprecise....
It is the Court’s duty to interpret the Constitution, but it need not do so in isolation. The legal determination of intellectual disability is distinct from a medical diagnosis, but it is informed by the medical community’s diagnostic framework. Atkins itself points to the diagnostic criteria employed by psychiatric professionals. And the professional community’s teachings are of particular help in this case, where no alternative definition of intellectual disability is presented and where this Court and the States have placed substantial reliance on the expertise of the medical profession....This Court agrees with the medical experts that when a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits.
Not surprisingly, the dissent in Hall recognizes and criticizes the majority's heavy reliance on the medical community's approach to determining intellectual disability. Here is a snippet of this criticism from the dissent:
Under our modern Eighth Amendment cases, what counts are our society’s standards — which is to say, the standards of the American people — not the standards of professional associations, which at best represent the views of a small professional elite....
The Court’s reliance on the views of professional associations will also lead to serious practical problems.
Fascinating research on federal mortgage fraud prosecutions and sentencing in Western PA
I am pleased and excited to have learned over the long weekend that the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and the Duquesne University School of Law collaborated on an innovative Fact Investigations class, led by associate professor and Criminal Justice Program director Wesley Oliver, to study the modern work of Western Pennsylvania's federal prosecutors in response to modern mortage fraus. As explained in this first article of a series about this work, this group "identified 144 prosecutions alleging mortgage-related crimes in the Pittsburgh area ... [and then] analyzed 100 prosecutions in which sentence had been pronounced and for which the federal sentencing guidelines could be discerned." Before getting into the findings, I want to heap praise on everyone involved in this project because it shows what valuable work can be done when law schools and traditional media team up to examine intricate and dynamic issues concerning the federal criminal justice system.
Here, from the start of the first article in the series, are the basic findings of this terrific project:
In 2008, as the housing market dragged the world economy down, orders came from Washington, D.C., to federal prosecutors nationwide: Bust the people whose lies contributed to the mess.
Six years later, the effort by Pittsburgh's federal prosecutors to punish fraudulent mortgage brokers, appraisers, closing agents, property flippers and bank employees can claim 144 people charged, more than 100 sentenced and no acquittals.
That undefeated record, though, came at a price: Some of the worst offenders got extraordinary deals in return for their testimony against others.
A review by the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette and Duquesne University School of Law students of 100 completed cases showed that the sentences of mortgage-related criminals in the Pittsburgh area were driven more by their degree of cooperation with prosecutors than by the number of people they scammed, the dollars they reaped or the damage they did to the financial system. Some of the most prolific offenders used their central places in the fraud conspiracy to secure light sentences.
• Leniency for cooperation was doled out liberally. At least 30 of the 100 defendants were the beneficiaries of prosecutorial motions to reward "substantial assistance" to the investigation. That cooperation rate is nearly double that seen in fraud cases nationwide, suggesting that prosecutors here rewarded more defendants than normal.
• Most of the mortgage criminals who assisted prosecutors got no prison time, and the average amount of incarceration for those 30 defendants was a little more than three months. By contrast, defendants who pleaded guilty but didn't provide substantial assistance to prosecutors, got average sentences of three years in prison. Those few who went to trial faced an average of 6½ years behind bars.
• Several of the figures most central to the region's mortgage fraud problem cooperated with prosecutors, and got non-prison sentences. For instance, Kenneth C. Cowden, formerly of McKees Rocks and now of Florida, performed unlicensed appraisals that exaggerated real estate values in the region to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars. He cooperated and got nine months in a halfway house. Jay Berger of Fox Chapel, who recruited Cowden and lived lavishly from fraudulent mortgages, was sentenced in 2012 to 15 months in prison, but died this month at age 49 without serving time.
Here are links to all the article in the series:
- Mortgage fraud assault a Pyrrhic victory
- Rewards uneven in mortgage fraud cases
- She fought charges, got 10-year term
- Pleading guilty could cut defendant's sentence
Regular readers will not be at all surprised to hear me say that I view this terrific bit of investigative journalism as further proof that those who are really concerned about suspect disparities in federal sentencing ought to be much more focused on the application of (hidden and unreviewable) prosecutorial sentencing discretion than about the exercise of (open and reviewable) judicial sentencing discretion.
May 27, 2014 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Big criminal justice decision day for SCOTUS, including 8th Amendment reversal of Florida's Aktins approach
Clearly the Justices decided to celebrate the Memorial Day week by reminding everyone that the Bill of Rights has a lot of provisions concerning the administration of our criminal justice systems. Returning from the long weekend, the Supreme Court handed down five opinions this morning (four in argued cases, one per curiam), and all but one of the rulings has a criminal justice element. The big one for sentencing fans is the 5-4 Eighth Amendment ruling in Hall v. Florida, No. 12–10882 (S. Ct. May 27, 2014) (available here), which gets started this way:
This Court has held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution forbid the execution of persons with intellectual disability. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 321 (2002). Florida law defines intellectual disability to require an IQ test score of 70 or less. If, from test scores, a prisoner is deemed to have an IQ above 70, all further exploration of intellectual disability is fore closed. This rigid rule, the Court now holds, creates an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed, and thus is unconstitutional.
The other criminal justice rulings in argued cases today concern police use of force and immunity, and the per curiam concerns when jeopardy attaches for the application of the Double Jeopardy clause. How Appealing has its always terrific review of all the essentials (with links) assembled here, and SCOTUSblog is sure to have a lot on all this action in coming posts.
Once I have a chance to read the Hall decision in full, I am sure I will have one or more substantive posts about the decision later today.
Monday, May 26, 2014
"Disarming the Dangerous: Preventing Extraordinary and Ordinary Violence"
The title of this post is the title of this new paper by Mary Fan now available via SSRN. Though posted on line a few weeks ago, this piece strikes me as distinctly and depressingly timely in the wake of the mass shooting in California a few days ago. Here is the abstract:
Recent mass shootings at Navy Yard, Newtown, Aurora and elsewhere have jolted Congress and the states into considering gun violence prevention. More than 1,500 gun-related bills have been introduced since 2013, after the slaughter in Newtown of twenty elementary school children and six adults. Current legislation and debates are shaped by the specter of a heavily armed, mentally ill individual hunting in public places such as schools, businesses, and workplaces. In the states, the most successful type of legislation involves firearms restrictions for the mentally ill. In Congress, the legislation that garnered the most debate was a ban on assault weapons and large-capacity magazines. While the national attention to firearms violence prevention is salutary, for law and policy to tackle the core of the problem it is important to address two empirical questions: Who are the dangerous individuals committing most firearms homicides and why do the law’s current screens miss them?
This article draws on data from the National Violent Death Reporting System to answer the crucial foundational questions of who poses a danger and why the dangerous slip through existing legal screens. Presenting data on the most prevalent place of shooting, victim-shooter relationship, and the shooter’s prior history, the article shows that prevention of extraordinarily devastating firearms violence calls for attention to how the nation addresses “ordinary” violence. By ordinary violence, this article means violence that is often viewed as mundane, such as altercations between family members, friends and intimates in the home. Many perpetrators of firearms homicide have a history of such prior events -- yet a substantially smaller proportion of these violent episodes have been adjudicated, thereby slipping through existing screens for firearms restrictions. Based on these findings, the article discusses how discretion in dealing with “ordinary violence” can improve detection of the dangerous regardless of whether proposed firearms restrictions survive the gauntlet for new gun laws.
Wednesday, May 21, 2014
Should I be hopeful Amy can now recover more restitution after major child porn bust in NYC?
The question in the title of this post is my (perhaps weak) effort to put some kind of positive spin on this depressing new story from CNN headlined "Cop, rabbi, scoutmaster among arrests in child porn bust." Here are just some of the ugly basics:
They are people children are supposed to trust: A New York Police Department officer, a Fire Department of New York paramedic, a rabbi and a scoutmaster were among more than 70 people arrested in a major child porn bust, authorities said Wednesday.
One of those arrested -- a supervisor with the Transportation Security Administration -- allegedly traveled to the Dominican Republic to have sex with children, a law enforcement official said. He allegedly made more than 50 trips there.
The investigation, involving agents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement as well as New York authorities, began as part of an undercover operation into peer-to-peer networks, authorities told reporters Wednesday. The suspects, who do not appear to know one another, were able to search files using graphic terms and descriptions. Software continuously scanned files and automatically uploaded images to personal computers, laptops and mobile phones.
Special Agent in Charge James Hayes, head of Homeland Security Investigations New York, called the arrests the largest enforcement operation in New York "targeting predators (who) possess, produce or distribute sexually explicit images of children." The activity, he said, has "reached epidemic proportions."
"The backgrounds of many of the individuals ... is shocking," Hayes said. "These defendants come from all walks of life ... This operation puts the lie to the classic stereotypical profile that child predators are nothing more than unemployed drifters. Many of the defendants are, in fact, well-educated and successful in private and professional lives. They work as registered nurses, paramedics, caretakers for mentally ill adults, computer programers and architects."
The continuing operation resulted in 71 arrests -- including one woman -- and the seizure of nearly 600 devices, including desktop and laptop computers, tablets, smartphones and thumb drives with tens of thousands of sexually explicit images and videos of children, Hayes said.
The pornographic images of children were shared at no charge, authorities said. About a third of the suspects remain in custody, and the others were released on bonds ranging from $30,000 to $500,000. Hayes said the January arrest of Brian Fanelli, chief of the Mount Pleasant Police Department in upstate Valhalla, New York, on child pornography violations helped lead to the other defendants.
A few months ago, I asked in the title of this post a serious question that comes to mind now again: "Just how many prominent, successful men are child porn fiends?". As the title of this post suggests, following the Supreme Court's messy "split-the-difference" approach to child porn restitution in its recent Paroline ruling (basis here), I am hoping a silver lining to this dark cloud might be that CP crimes committed too often by persons "well-educated and successful in private and professional lives" might now mean more restitution getting paid to the unfortunate victims of these crimes.
A few (of many) prior posts on Paroline and child porn issues:
- SCOTUS splits the difference for child porn restitution awards in Paroline
- Will Congress fix (quickly? ever? wisely?) the "puzzle of paying Amy" after Paroline?
- Fascinating NY Times magazine cover story on child porn victims and restitution
- "Pricing Amy: Should Those Who Download Child Pornography Pay the Victims?"
- Explaining why I am rooting so hard for "Amy" in Paroline
- Just how many prominent, successful men are child porn fiends?
May 21, 2014 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack
Two new juve justice papers from The Sentencing Project
- Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview -- Recent Supreme Court rulings have banned the use of mandatory life without parole for juveniles, as well as in non-homicide cases. Still, the United States stands alone as the only nation that sentences people to life without parole for crimes committed before turning 18. This briefing paper documents the key legal cases in this area, as well as the impact on fiscal costs, racial disparities, and prospects for reform.
- Disproportionate Minority Contact in the Juvenile Justice System -- Despite declining numbers of juveniles held in confinement nationally, racial disparities in the juvenile justice system remain a persistent problem. This briefing paper provides an overview of disparity trends in recent decades, and an assessment of how policy and practice decisions contribute to racial disparities.
Tuesday, May 20, 2014
More useful discussion of the (under-discussed) lead-crime-rate connections
A helpful reader alerted me to this helpful and lengthy new article at the Juvenile Justice Information Exchange headlined "Is Lead Exposure the Secret to the Rapid Rise and Fantastic Fall of the Juvenile Crime Rate?". Here are excerpts from a piece worthy of a full read (and with lots of helpful links to the research discussed):
For the juvenile justice field, there is no larger question. It’s the elephant in the room, the great mystery, the trend that has changed everything — and seemingly without explanation. Why have juvenile crime rates, once predicted to rise inexorably, instead been falling for two decades? Falling... and falling... and falling.
What if the answer was readily available? What if it mostly boiled down to a single element, hiding in plain sight, and we just refused to notice? Well, compelling evidence suggests that much or most of the fluctuation in juvenile crime rates does boil down to a single element — a chemical element.
The element is lead, and a powerful body of research indicates that the recent declines in juvenile offending rates, like the rise in juvenile crime rates that preceded them, stem in large part from changes in children’s exposure to lead paint and exhaust from leaded gasoline. The idea may sound crazy, “like a bad science fiction plot,” quips Rick Nevin, one of the leading researchers documenting the link between lead exposure and crime. But the data don’t lie and here’s what they say.
For centuries it has been clear that lead is a potent poison. At extreme concentrations, lead poisoning causes anemia, blindness, renal failure, convulsions, abdominal spasms, insomnia, hallucinations, chronic fatigue and, ultimately, death. But only in the past four decades have researchers learned that lead exposure can severely damage the cognitive development of children, even at modest levels that produce no physical symptoms. And only through modern scanning technology have we learned that the lead molecule is perfectly designed to cripple young minds in ways that not only lower IQ, but also damage the very parts of the brain that oversee aggression, self-regulation, attention and impulse control.
As Kim Cecil, director of epidemiology and biostatistics at the University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, recently explained to the Chemical & Engineering News, “These are the parts of the brain that say, ‘Ooh, I’ve learned from before that I shouldn’t steal that, or if I do this, then the consequences are that.’” Even moderate levels of lead in the bloodstream of an infant or toddler significantly increase the odds that he will suffer behavioral disorders in childhood, and will engage in delinquency and criminal behavior later on. (Lead seems to affect boys more than girls.) A study published in 2008 tracked 250 children born in low-income Cincinnati neighborhoods between 1979 and 2004. It found that children with elevated levels of lead exposure (either in utero, or in early childhood) were significantly more likely to be arrested for both violent and nonviolent crimes than children with lower lead exposure. Earlier studies in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh also found a significant correlation between early childhood lead exposure and later conduct problems....
[T]he strength and consistency of the findings linking lead exposure and crime trends, plus the wealth of corroborating evidence from other disciplines (such as brain imaging studies and longitudinal studies of small population samples in selected cities) creates what Kevin Drum, a widely-cited blogger and journalist who has written extensively on the lead-crime connection, calls “an astonishing body of evidence.”...
“We now have studies at the international level, the national level, the state level, the city level, and even the individual level,” writes Drum. “Groups of children have been followed from the womb to adulthood, and higher childhood blood lead levels are consistently associated with higher adult arrest rates for violent crimes. All of these studies tell the same story: Gasoline lead is responsible for a good share of the rise and fall of violent crime over the past half century.”
By this point, readers of this column may be wondering: If the evidence linking lead exposure and crime is so strong, why haven’t we heard more about it? The primary reason is that the research has been largely ignored by academics. In 2008, a 250-page report on U.S. crime trends by the National Academies of Science included only one paragraph about lead exposure, drawing no conclusions. Late last year, a National Academies roundtable on crime trends did hold a session on lead exposure.
But even in that day’s session, the opening presentation — delivered by the renowned British criminologist, David Farrington — did not include a word about lead exposure. His talk on “Individual Differences in Antisocial Behavior, Delinquency, and Crime” discussed unemployment, parenting, poverty, family size, peer influences, substance abuse, and even an individual’s resting heart rate — none of which has seen changes in recent times consistent with the larger rise and fall in crime rates. Farrington said nothing about the introduction and subsequent removal of massive amounts of a toxic substance with a powerful known link to subsequent delinquency and criminality.
Drum suggests that the lack of attention to lead exposure is natural, given that the theory is new and unproven. Indeed, some critics have raised legitimate questions about the research — citing the small number of studies, questioning methodology and suggesting that other factors beyond lead (such as demographics, shifting drug markets and more) may also play an important role in determining crime rates over time....
Another factor behind the inattention to the lead exposure research is that most of the studies thus far have been conducted by economists and public health scholars, not criminologists, and the key papers have been published in environmental journals rather than criminology publications. Nevin also sees an element of self-interest: “Everyone has their own theory that they hold dear about why the crime decline has occurred,” he says. “There are a whole lot of people ... on both sides of the political spectrum who want to claim credit for this and don’t really like hearing about this unrelated powerful force.”...
[T]he lead data suggest that perhaps the most important thing our nation can do to reduce juvenile crime — and also to boost youth success in general — has nothing to do with juvenile courts or corrections systems. Maybe our first priority should be lead abatement — finishing the job by removing the last remnants of our tragic 20th century fetish with this terrible toxin.
Some recent related posts:
- Should we thank unleaded gas and the EPA for the great modern crime decline?
- Effective Washington Post commentary talks up great (and still puzzling) crime decline
- Do lead exposure realities continue to best explain modern crime-rate realities?:
- Uh-oh: BJS reporting significant spike up in violent and property crime for 2012
- FBI releases 2012 crime statistics showing stability in relatively low crime rates
- New National Academy of Sciences effort seeking to unpack the crime decline
Occupy Wall Street activist sentenced to occupy jail for three months
As the New York Times reports here, a "woman whose assault case had become a cause célèbre, first among Occupy Wall Street supporters and then expanding well beyond the movement, was sentenced to three months in jail on Monday, as a judge rejected calls for her immediate release." Here is more about a high-profile state sentencing that occurred yesterday in Manhattan:
The woman, Cecily McMillan, 25, a graduate student at the New School and a volunteer labor organizer, was convicted two weeks ago of assaulting a police officer at Zuccotti Park in Manhattan in 2012. Before the sentence was delivered, Ms. McMillan remained mostly defiant, even as she characterized the encounter with the officer as “an accident.”.....
But Justice Ronald A. Zweibel, who had remanded Ms. McMillan on May 5 after the four-week trial, imposed the jail sentence that prosecutors had requested, rather than release her on probation, as her lawyers had urged. She could have faced a maximum of seven years for the second-degree assault. “A civilized society must not allow an assault to be committed under the guise of civil disobedience,” Justice Zweibel said....
Upon her conviction, Ms. McMillan’s supporters wrote scores of letters to Justice Zweibel, urging him to be lenient. Five City Council members delivered the same message on the steps of City Hall, and the Russian activists Pussy Riot, who were recently imprisoned for criticizing President Vladimir Putin, visited her on Rikers Island and called for her release. An online petition calling for leniency garnered 160,000 signatures....
Before sentencing, Shanda Strain, an assistant district attorney, said Ms. McMillan deserved a three-month stay in jail because she had falsely accused Officer Bovell of grabbing her breast, lying under oath “to avoid responsibility for her actions.”
“This trial was not a referendum on a large social cause or movement, though the defendant tried and continues to try to make it just that,” Ms. Strain said. Then she added, “In essence, she has repeatedly argued that the rules should not apply to everyone equally — that defendants who are politically motivated deserve special treatment.”...
Ms. McMillan’s lawyer, Martin Stolar ... told the judge that the bruises and mental trauma that Ms. McMillan had suffered during her arrest were punishment enough. “You touch a police officer and get the hell beat out of you,” he said outside court. “That’s what happened to her. That’s enough of a deterrent.”
Ms. McMillan also received five years of probation, and was ordered to undergo a mental-health evaluation and treatment. Mr. Stolar said he had filed a notice of intent to appeal the verdict, and had asked that his client be granted bail pending the appeal.
Friday, May 16, 2014
Federal judge splits the difference in sentencing former SAC money manager to 3.5 years
As reported in this Wall Street Journal article, a federal district judge in a high-profile white-collar sentencing today imposed a prison term roughly half-way between what federal prosecutors and the defense sought. Here are the basics:
A federal judge sentenced former SAC Capital Advisors LP portfolio manager Michael Steinberg to three and a half years in prison Friday, saying he hoped Wall Street would learn from this case. The term was well below what prosecutors had sought.
U.S. District Judge Richard Sullivan called the former senior SAC employee "a basically good man," citing evidence of his character supplied in 68 letters sent by his family and friends. But he also pointed to the seriousness of Mr. Steinberg's insider trading. "They are crimes that go to the heart of living in an honest society and having a market system," he said during a hearing in Manhattan federal court. Wall Street, he hoped, would "derive lessons."
Mr. Steinberg, 42 years old, is SAC's most senior former employee to be convicted of insider trading. Prosecutors had asked for a sentence of 5¼ to 6½ years to send a strong deterrent message to the market. Mr. Steinberg's lawyers had requested less than half that amount.
Mr. Steinberg was convicted in December on four counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy for trading on confidential information, handing prosecutors the first verdict from a federal jury to back up their allegations that there was insider trading at SAC. There is a chance Friday's sentence won't stick. A pending appeal in a related insider-trading case could bolster Mr. Steinberg's chances to overturn his conviction.
Thursday, May 15, 2014
AG Holder assails solitary for juves with mental illness
As highlighted by this DOJ press release, "Attorney General Eric Holder on Wednesday called for an end to the excessive use of solitary confinement for youth that suffer from mental illness." Here is more about AG Holder's latest use of his criminal justice bully pulpit:
“Across the country, far too many juvenile detention centers see isolation and solitary confinement as an appropriate way to handle challenging youth, in particular youth with disabilities. But solitary confinement can be dangerous, and a serious impediment to the ability of juveniles to succeed once released.
“In a study released last year by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 47 percent of juvenile detention centers reported locking youth in some type of isolation for more than four hours at a time. We have received reports of young people who have been held in solitary confinement for up to 23 hours a day, often with no human interaction at all. In some cases, children were held in small rooms with windows that were barely the width of their own hands.
“This is, to say the least, excessive. And these episodes are all too common.
“This practice is particularly detrimental to young people with disabilities – who are at increased risk under these circumstances of negative effects including self-harm and even suicide. In fact, one national study found that half of the victims of suicides in juvenile facilities were in isolation at the time they took their own lives, and 62 percent of victims had a history of solitary confinement....
“We must ensure in all circumstances – and particularly when it comes to our young people – that incarceration is used to rehabilitate, and not merely to warehouse and forget. Our nationwide effort to end the unnecessary or excessive seclusion of youth with disabilities will not be completed solely with one settlement or court filing. But as a department, we are dedicated – and as Attorney General, I am committed – to doing everything possible to ensure the effectiveness and integrity of our criminal and juvenile justice system. In the days ahead, we will continue to make good on our commitment to the best practices of law enforcement and the highest ideals of our nation.”
"Crime, Teenage Abortion, and the Myth of Unwantedness"
The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new empirical paper by Gary Shoesmith available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
This study shows that varying concentrations of teenage abortions across states drive all of Donohue and Levitt’s (2001, 2004, 2008) crime and abortion results, narrowing the possible link between crime and abortion to mainly 16 percent of U.S. abortions. The widely promoted and accepted claim that unwantedness links crime and abortion is false. Across all states, there is a near one-to-one correspondence between ranked significance of abortion in explaining crime and ranked teenage abortion ratios. The results agree with research showing teenage motherhood is a major maternal crime factor, while unwantedness ranks fifth, behind mothers who smoke during pregnancy. The results are also consistent with the reasons women have abortions by age group.
For future research, a specific means is proposed to reconcile recent papers that apply alternative methods to DL’s data but find no link between crime and abortion link. Given a 2013 Census Bureau report showing that single motherhood is the new norm among adult women, the results suggest the need to reeducate adult women about unwantedness and crime.
Tuesday, May 13, 2014
Fifth Circuit panel grants last-minute capital stay due to key IQ evidence hidden by Texas prosecutors
As reported in this AP article, headlined "Court halts execution over mental health claims," the Fifth Circuit "halted a convicted Texas killer's scheduled execution Tuesday so his attorneys can pursue appeals arguing he's mentally impaired." The reason this is coming up in this way now, as the Fifth Circuit explain in In re Campbell, No. 14-20293 (5th Cir. May 13, 2014) (available here) is because Texas prosecutors hid key IQ evidence from the defense for a decade. Here is how the Campbell opinion starts and a key paragraphs from its closing pages:
Robert James Campbell, a death-row prisoner whose execution is scheduled for Tuesday, May 13, 2014, contends that he is intellectually disabled (formerly called “mentally retarded”) and is, therefore, constitutionally ineligible for the death penalty under Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). He has filed with this court a motion for authorization to file a successive federal habeas corpus petition asserting his Atkins claim and a motion for stay of execution pending the resolution of that claim. For the reasons that follow, we grant both motions....
The evidence presented by Campbell at this stage indicates that, in 2003, the District Attorney’s office had in its possession evidence reflecting Campbell’s IQ score of 68, yet the State opposed Campbell’s 2003 motion to authorize a successive habeas claim based on Atkins on the basis that the “sparse” school records failed to establish intellectual disability. The State also asserted that there was no “credible evidence” of intellectual disability. Also in 2003, Campbell sought funds for intellectual-function testing, which the State opposed even though the District Attorney had evidence of the IQ score of 68.
Moreover, according to Campbell, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice informed Campbell’s prior attorney that, during Campbell’s earlier robbery incarceration, he received an IQ test result of 84. As Campbell now argues, that was not true and contrary to the actual evidence. It is not facially unreasonable that Campbell’s prior attorney relied upon the department’s statement and was persuaded that it was fruitless to pursue this claim further. Indeed, as Judge Alcala of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated in her dissent, “it would be unjust to penalize an applicant for not uncovering such a falsehood previously when he had no basis to believe that a falsehood had been conveyed to him.”...
It is regrettable that we are now reviewing evidence of intellectual disability at the eleventh hour before Campbell’s scheduled execution. However, from the record before us, it appears that we cannot fault Campbell or his attorneys, present or past, for the delay. According to Campbell, in the period immediately after Atkins was decided, his attorney diligently searched for evidence of intellectual disability. And, when the Texas Department of Criminal Justice failed to turn over the results of the intelligence test they had administered on Campbell upon the attorney’s request for “any and all intellectual functioning tests,” the State gave the attorney incorrect and incomplete information. Thus, although the delay is regrettable, we do not see it as militating against a stay of execution in this case
"Modifying Unjust Sentences"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper by E. Lea Johnston now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
The United States is in the midst of an incarceration crisis. Over-incarceration is depleting state budgets and decimating communities. It has also led to the overfilling of prisons, which has degraded conditions of confinement, increased violence, and reduced access to needed medical and mental health care. Judicial sentence modification offers a means to address both the phenomenon of over-incarceration and harsh prison conditions that threaten unjust punishment. Indeed, some legislatures have framed states’ early release provisions as fulfilling goals of proportionality and just punishment. Proportionality is also an express purpose of the proposed Model Penal Code provisions on judicial sentence modification.
This paper explores whether the tools available to judges at sentence modification hearings are adequate to respond to the unjust punishment experienced by prisoners. In examining this question, the article focuses on one population particularly likely to experience disproportionate or inhumane punishment: inmates with serious mental disorders. A deep literature suggests that individuals with serious mental illnesses are especially likely to be victimized by staff and inmates, to be housed in isolation, and to experience an exacerbation of mental illness while incarcerated. This article’s analysis reveals a gap in remedial coverage for some members of this population. In particular, existing remedies are inadequate to respond to the plight of those prisoners who must remain incarcerated, but for whom incarceration in current conditions constitutes a disproportionate or inhumane punishment.
To remedy this shortcoming, the article proposes that states authorize judges, upon a finding of past and likely future unjust punishment, to modify a mentally disordered prisoner’s conditions of confinement. Only with such expanded authority will the process of sentence modification allow judges to reserve prison for those who deserve it and ensure that continued confinement will be a just and appropriate sanction.