Tuesday, May 20, 2014

"Save money, reduce crime: Alternative sentencing works, so Ohio needs to do more of it"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable lead editorial appearing in today's Columbus Dispatch. The Dispatch has a reputation as a pretty conservative paper (e.g., it has endorsed only GOP Prez candidates for nearly a century), so I see this editorial as further significant proof that more and more traditional conservative voices are seeing the value of (and now actively making the case for) sentencing and prison reforms.  Here are excerpts from this editorial:

Ohio has made progress in easing prison crowding by offering alternatives for nonviolent offenders. But a look at the numbers shows that more can be done. The good news is, Ohio already knows what works: putting nonviolent felons in programs that make them better prepared to lead crime-free lives rather than in expensive prisons with hardened criminals.  The challenge is to find the resources for the up-front investment.

Alternative-sentencing programs, such as the 18 community-based correction facilities and other programs based on drug-and-alcohol treatment and life-skills training, have a record of reducing recidivism.  But the state hasn’t invested in them equally across the state, according to Ohio Division of Rehabilitation and Correction Director Gary C. Mohr....

A proposal contained in one of the mid-biennium budget-review bills would provide about $13 million to add 400 to 500 community-facility beds across the state.  Because stays in such programs typically are three months, each of those beds could allow three people per year to get help and treatment rather than a prison stay.  That saves taxpayers money and increases the chance that the offender will go on to a productive life — a double win.

As Ohio’s prisons grow more crowded and potentially more dangerous, the need for more alternatives becomes clearer. One in every 175 Ohio adults is in a state prison, and with nearly 51,000 inmates, the system has 30 percent more than it was designed for. Considering that each of those inmates costs taxpayers nearly $23,000 a year and that a large number are low-level, nonviolent offenders, it’s an expensive way to deal with societal problems.

A change to state sentencing law in 2011 aimed to ease the burden by steering more nonviolent offenders to community-based correction programs. The largest counties responded, and two years ago the prison population seemed to be on the decline. But Ohio’s wave of heroin and other opiate addictions, combined with too few alternative-treatment options, have swelled the prison population again.... But Mohr now finds himself with a new peak population and no reduction in sight unless the state invests more in alternatives.

Legislators should take note of the successful track record of alternative correction and steer available funds in that direction. Ohio won’t benefit from more prisons; putting low-level criminals in prison is a lousy business model with a poor return on investment. Spending less to provide the type of supportive correction that can turn around lives is a much smarter proposition. And it saves prison beds for those who pose the greatest threat to society.

Recent related post:

May 20, 2014 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Occupy Wall Street activist sentenced to occupy jail for three months

CecilyAs the New York Times reports here, a "woman whose assault case had become a cause célèbre, first among Occupy Wall Street supporters and then expanding well beyond the movement, was sentenced to three months in jail on Monday, as a judge rejected calls for her immediate release." Here is more about a high-profile state sentencing that occurred yesterday in Manhattan:

The woman, Cecily McMillan, 25, a graduate student at the New School and a volunteer labor organizer, was convicted two weeks ago of assaulting a police officer at Zuccotti Park in Manhattan in 2012.  Before the sentence was delivered, Ms. McMillan remained mostly defiant, even as she characterized the encounter with the officer as “an accident.”.....

But Justice Ronald A. Zweibel, who had remanded Ms. McMillan on May 5 after the four-week trial, imposed the jail sentence that prosecutors had requested, rather than release her on probation, as her lawyers had urged.  She could have faced a maximum of seven years for the second-degree assault.  “A civilized society must not allow an assault to be committed under the guise of civil disobedience,” Justice Zweibel said....

Upon her conviction, Ms. McMillan’s supporters wrote scores of letters to Justice Zweibel, urging him to be lenient.  Five City Council members delivered the same message on the steps of City Hall, and the Russian activists Pussy Riot, who were recently imprisoned for criticizing President Vladimir Putin, visited her on Rikers Island and called for her release. An online petition calling for leniency garnered 160,000 signatures....

Before sentencing, Shanda Strain, an assistant district attorney, said Ms. McMillan deserved a three-month stay in jail because she had falsely accused Officer Bovell of grabbing her breast, lying under oath “to avoid responsibility for her actions.”

“This trial was not a referendum on a large social cause or movement, though the defendant tried and continues to try to make it just that,” Ms. Strain said. Then she added, “In essence, she has repeatedly argued that the rules should not apply to everyone equally — that defendants who are politically motivated deserve special treatment.”...

Ms. McMillan’s lawyer, Martin Stolar ... told the judge that the bruises and mental trauma that Ms. McMillan had suffered during her arrest were punishment enough.  “You touch a police officer and get the hell beat out of you,” he said outside court.  “That’s what happened to her. That’s enough of a deterrent.”

Ms. McMillan also received five years of probation, and was ordered to undergo a mental-health evaluation and treatment.  Mr. Stolar said he had filed a notice of intent to appeal the verdict, and had asked that his client be granted bail pending the appeal.

May 20, 2014 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (10) | TrackBack (0)

Georgia Supreme Court rejects attack on execution drug secrecy

As reported in this local article, yesterday the Georgia Supreme Court "upheld the constitutionality of a state law that keeps secret the identities of the makers and suppliers of Georgia’s lethal-injection drugs." Here is more about the ruling:

The court, in a 5-2 decision, rejected a challenge to the statute filed by lawyers for condemned killer Warren Hill. The ruling should clear the way for a number of executions, which have been on hold while the case was pending.

The reasons for offering privacy are “obvious,” Justice Harris Hines wrote for the majority. These include avoiding the risk of harassment or retaliation from persons related to the prisoners or from others who might disapprove of the execution “as well as simply offering those willing to participate whatever comfort or peace of mind that anonymity might offer,” Hines wrote.

In addition, “we believe that the same logic applies to the persons and entities involved in making the preparations for the actual execution, including those involved in procuring the execution drugs,” Hines wrote. “(W)ithout the confidentiality offered to execution participants by the statute … there is a significant risk that persons and entities necessary to the execution would become unwilling to participate.”

Benham, who authored the dissent, noted the recently botched execution in Oklahoma of inmate Clayton D. Lockett, who died of a heart attack after he writhed, gasped and struggled to lift his head after being declared unconscious on the lethal-injection gurney. “I write because I fear this state is on a path that, at the very least, denies Hill and other death row inmates their rights to due process and, at the very worst, leads to the macabre results that occurred in Oklahoma,” wrote Benham, who was joined by Justice Carol Hunstein. “There must be certainty in the administration of the death penalty.”...

In a statement, Hill’s attorneys said the ruling “effectively affords the state of Georgia to alter (its) lethal-injection protocol in any way it sees fit and to conceal from the public and even the courts the identity and provenance of the chemicals it intends to use to carry out executions.” Benham’s dissent, the statement said, “correctly found that this decision conflicts with basic requirements of due process.”

The full Georgia Supreme Court ruling in Owens v. Hill is available at this link.

May 20, 2014 in Baze lethal injection case, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0)

Sorry for all the tech problems, which I hope are now fixed

It seems the tech folks behind the typepad software had a terrible, horrible, no good, very bad Monday. I spent all day trying to access the blog, and I suspect I was not the only one. It now seem that all is better, and so I plan to return to regular programming. But I first wanted to extend my apologies to any and all reader who, like me, got really tired of seeing loading errors instead of this blog yesterday.

May 20, 2014 in On blogging | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, May 18, 2014

Identifying better DOJ prosecutorial priorities than low-level drug crimes

Perhaps the main reason I am a supporter of the Smarter Sentencing Act is my desire to have Congress send an important message about federal criminal justice priorities to the US Justice Department and others through a relatively modest revision of existing mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.  Notably, the preamble to the SSA makes express mention of this goal, describing the purpose of the Act as designed to "focus limited Federal resources on the most serious offenders."  By reducing (though not eliminating) mandatory minimums for various drug crimes, Congress would be effectively saying that federal prosecutors ought not prioritize federal prosecutions of first offenders who may have been involved in dealing only a few ounces of crack or meth or heroin.

Critically, under current law and after the SSA were to become law, if and whenever a drug offender has even a single prior drug offense or just possesses a firearm or causes any significant bodily harm, additional heightened mandatory sentences kick in.  Thus, the only drug dealers likely to benefit significantly from the SSA are true first-offenders who deal only a few ounces of crack or meth or heroin.  I feel confident that major dealers, repeat dealers, and those who use or threaten violence will still be a priority for federal prosecutors after passage of the SSA, and that the feds will still have plenty of prosecutorial tools to take down serious drug traffickers.  And by making sure that lengthy prison terms are mandated only for the most serious offenders, federal prosecutorial and corrections resources can and should be better focused on other crimes, especially crimes that only federal prosecutors can effectively and efficiently prosecute.

What kinds of other crimes, you might ask, would I want federal prosecutors to prioritize over going after first offenders involved in dealing only a few ounces of crack or meth or heroin?  Helpfully, old pal (and forner federal prosecutor) Bill Otis in a pair of new posts over at Crime & Consequences identifies two classes of federal fraud and corruption that ought to be a signal concern for federal prosecutors. Here I will provide links and highlights from these two posts:

A New Prosecution Priority for DOJ: "The lead story in the Washington Post today reports that possibly a million applicants for Obamacare subsidies may have 'misstated' their income.... DOJ should not allow something like that to happen again.  Whether one loves Obamacare or hates it, no one has the right to bilk it by cheating.   A few hundred highly publicized false statement prosecutions would go a long way toward keeping applicants honest and, therefore, keeping the program as solvent as it's going to get."
Another Prosecution Priority for DOJ:  "My last post suggested that the Justice Department prosecute at least some of the thousands of Obamacare applicants who have intentionally falsified statements of their income in order to bilk the taxpayers for even more than they're being bilked out of already.  There is second priority I would suggest for DOJ examination -- a priority that, it seems, the Department may have taken up.  As the New York Times reports: 'The Department of Veterans Affairs' inspector general is working with federal prosecutors who are trying to determine whether criminal violations occurred at a medical center in Phoenix accused of falsifying data or creating secret waiting lists intended to hide months long delays for veterans to see doctors, a top official told a Senate committee on Thursday.'"

I suspect Bill would be quick to assert that the federal government in general and DOJ in particular has plenty of resources to keep going after all drug offenders and to now start going after Obamacare cheats and federal executive branch liars.  Though it is surely true that federal prosecutions are not a zero-sum game, the fact remains that the sentencing laws on the books necessarily serve to structure and greatly influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion for this Administration and others.  Plus, state prosecutors can (and still do) go after low-level (and high-level) drug dealers, whereas state prosecutors cannot go after after Obamacare cheats and federal executive branch liars.

In short, I heartily endorse Bill's suggestion that AG Holder and his prosecutorial agents start going after Obamacare cheats and federal executive branch liars.  And that endorsement of DOJ prosecutorial priorities provides an additional reason for my support of the SSA and its effort to reorient federal prosecutorial priorities accordingly.

Some prior posts about the SSA and debates over federal sentencing reform:

May 18, 2014 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15) | TrackBack (0)

Detailing the death-penalty abolitionist's strategy and vision for the path to aboilition

This local article from Oregon, headlined "Death penalty opponent sees tough legal fight ahead," provides a helpful accounting of the current game-plan embraced by many hard-core death-penalty abolitionist.  Here are excerpts:

A professor at American University made no secret of what he hoped to accomplish on a four-city visit to Oregon this week. Richard Stack, author of two books critical of the death penalty, wants to move Oregonians closer to abolishing it. Though Oregon is among the 32 states with it, the number that have abolished it grew from 12 to 18 in the past six years.

“We have a strategy of picking off a state at a time,” he said in an interview prior to a talk at Portland State University. “As we add states to the repeal column, when we hit No. 26, we will have a majority that do not have it.”

Then, he said, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund will go to the U.S. Supreme Court to argue that the death penalty violates the federal constitutional guarantee against “cruel and unusual punishment” under the 8th Amendment. “It’s the only way that some states will fall into line” such as Texas, which has executed 515 people since 1982 when current death-penalty laws were in place. Texas leads the states in executions.

Stack, an associate professor of public communication at the university in Washington, D.C., has written “Dead Wrong” and in 2013, “Grave Injustice: Unearthing Wrongful Executions.” He also spoke at events in Monmouth, Eugene and Corvallis.

Gov. John Kitzhaber, who let two executions proceed in 1996 and 1997 during his first term, has vowed there will be no further executions while he is in office. His temporary reprieve in 2011 of Gary Haugen, an inmate who sought to waive his appeals and be executed, was upheld by the Oregon Supreme Court last year.

Kitzhaber’s current term ends Jan. 12, 2015. If he is re-elected Nov. 4, that term will end Jan. 14, 2019. Washington Gov. Jay Inslee took a similar stance on Feb. 11.

Among other potential states for repeal advocates are Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Montana and New Hampshire.

Oregon voters would have to repeal the death penalty, which since the state assumed responsibility for executions in 1903, voters have repealed twice and reinstated three times. The most recent vote was on a pair of ballot measures in 1984. They were necessitated when the Oregon Supreme Court overturned a 1978 ballot measure on grounds that juries, not trial judges, had to impose the penalty after determining guilt....

Lawmakers heard but failed to advance a proposed repeal measure in their 2013 session. Ron Steiner, who spoke for Oregonians for Alternatives to the Death Penalty, said repeal advocates seek to qualify an initiative measure for the 2016 general election ballot.

Three former Oregon chief justices dating back three decades – Edwin Peterson, Wallace Carson and Paul De Muniz – have announced their opposition to the death penalty, as has Frank Thompson, who as superintendent of the Oregon State Penitentiary oversaw the 1996 and 1997 executions. Steiner acknowledges that Oregonians sampled in a straight up-or-down poll say they support the death penalty. But he also said that support softens when they are asked more specific questions about it – including the substitution of a true life-without-release option.

May 18, 2014 in Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0)

Saturday, May 17, 2014

"Could This Be the Year for a House Reversal on Medical Marijuana?"

Congress and cannabisThe title of this post is the headline of this intriguing article from Roll Call.  Here are excerpts:

The last time Rep. Dana Rohrabacher offered an amendment on the House floor to protect states rights when it came to legalization of medical marijuana, it was defeated 163–262. Since that vote in 2012, four states — Illinois, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Maryland — passed laws or regulations allowing for the use of medical marijuana, bringing the total to 21 states and the District of Columbia.

Now, supporters of medical marijuana anticipate the strongest vote yet on a states-rights amendment when the fiscal 2015 Commerce-Justice-Science appropriations measure (HR 4660) comes to the House floor in a few weeks, while lawmakers are weighing offering additional marijuana provisions on appropriations measures. Most, but not all, of the proposals lawmakers are considering bringing up are aimed at protecting state laws and programs on medical marijuana use.

The chief provision, which will be offered as an amendment to the appropriations bill funding the Commerce and Justice departments, would prohibit the federal government from prosecuting medical marijuana users and providers who are abiding by their state’s law. The House has voted on similar proposals six times since 2003, with about 150 to 160 members supporting it each time. But advocates expect that more lawmakers than ever will support the bipartisan proposal this year, which will likely be introduced by two California lawmakers, Rohrabacher, who is a Republican, and Democrat Sam Farr. Boosters expect to win new backers this year because of the increasingly high poll numbers supporting legalization....

That increasing support may lead lawmakers to hold additional marijuana policy votes on other appropriations bills. Rep. Ed Perlmutter, D-Colo., may consider offering an amendment to the Financial Services appropriations measure that would help marijuana businesses get access to banking by updating federal rules, according to his office. An aide for Colorado Democrat Jared Polis said he also may offer marijuana policy amendments, although he has not made a decision yet....

The backers of the Rohrabacher amendment are an unusual group of social liberals and conservatives who see legalization as a states’ rights issue. Lawmakers including Blumenauer, Michigan Republican Justin Amash and Texas Republican Steve Stockman have voted for it in the past.

Georgia Republican Paul Broun, a physician who supports the amendment, said in a statement that the provision makes sense “from both a medical perspective and a Constitutional perspective.” He added, “This amendment would ensure that medical marijuana patients adhering to their state’s laws would not be punished by an overreaching federal government.”

Cross-posted at Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform

May 17, 2014 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, May 16, 2014

Lots of intriguing "show me" litigation as Missouri prepares for next execution

As reported in this Kansas City Star article, a number of news organizations, "including The Kansas City Star and The Associated Press, filed suit Thursday against the Missouri Department of Corrections over its refusal to reveal the source of drugs used to carry out executions." Here is more about the suit:

The suit, filed in Cole County Circuit Court in Jefferson City, alleges that the Corrections Department is violating the Missouri Sunshine Law by denying repeated requests for information about the “composition, concentration, source and quality of drugs used to execute inmates in Missouri.” By withholding access to information that historically has been publicly available, the department also is violating the First and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution, according to the suit....

Thursday’s suit [claims] that public disclosure of the information “reduces the risk that improper, ineffective or defectively prepared drugs are used.”

“The constitution thus compels access to historically available information about the type and source of drugs used in lethal injection executions because disclosure promotes the functioning of the process itself and is essential for democracy to function,” according to the suit.

Joining The AP and The Star in the suit are Guardian US, the New York-based digital news service of England’s The Guardian; the St. Louis Post-Dispatch; and the Springfield News-Leader.

Meanwhile, over in federal court has detailed in this new Reuters report, a "Missouri death row inmate is asking a federal court to allow videotaping his execution, scheduled for next week, to record any evidence of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the U.S. Constitution." Here is more on this other legal front:

A lawyer filed a motion on Friday in Kansas City on behalf of Russell Bucklew, 45, who is scheduled to die by lethal injection on May 21 for the 1996 murder of Michael Sanders in southeast Missouri. Last week, Bucklew filed a motion in the same court to halt his execution because of a rare health condition that his lawyer, Cheryl Pilate, said would cause him extreme pain and possible suffocation.

A videotape would preserve evidence if he survives and wants to oppose another execution or is injured and wants to file a claim, the motion states. It further states that if the inmate dies but suffers "prolonged and excruciating execution or chokes and suffocates to death," the video would be evidence for a claim by his estate. "If Missouri officials are confident enough to execute Russell Bucklew, they should be confident enough to videotape it," Pilate said in a news release. "It is time to raise the curtain on lethal injections."

May 16, 2014 in Baze lethal injection case, Death Penalty Reforms, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack (0)

Federal judge splits the difference in sentencing former SAC money manager to 3.5 years

As reported in this Wall Street Journal article, a federal district judge in a high-profile white-collar sentencing today imposed a prison term roughly half-way between what federal prosecutors and the defense sought.  Here are the basics:

A federal judge sentenced former SAC Capital Advisors LP portfolio manager Michael Steinberg to three and a half years in prison Friday, saying he hoped Wall Street would learn from this case. The term was well below what prosecutors had sought.

U.S. District Judge Richard Sullivan called the former senior SAC employee "a basically good man," citing evidence of his character supplied in 68 letters sent by his family and friends. But he also pointed to the seriousness of Mr. Steinberg's insider trading.  "They are crimes that go to the heart of living in an honest society and having a market system," he said during a hearing in Manhattan federal court.  Wall Street, he hoped, would "derive lessons."

Mr. Steinberg, 42 years old, is SAC's most senior former employee to be convicted of insider trading.  Prosecutors had asked for a sentence of 5¼ to 6½ years to send a strong deterrent message to the market.  Mr. Steinberg's lawyers had requested less than half that amount.

Mr. Steinberg was convicted in December on four counts of securities fraud and one count of conspiracy for trading on confidential information, handing prosecutors the first verdict from a federal jury to back up their allegations that there was insider trading at SAC.  There is a chance Friday's sentence won't stick.  A pending appeal in a related insider-trading case could bolster Mr. Steinberg's chances to overturn his conviction.

May 16, 2014 in Booker in district courts, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Form, function and finality of sentences through history: the Modern Era

As explained here, I am "celebrating" the official publication of my new article titled "Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences" (which is available in full via this SSRN link) through a series of posts exploring sentence finality doctrines and practice.  And, as set forth in this prior post, a central theme of my piece is that different conceptual, policy, and practical considerations are implicated when a defendant seeks only review and reconsideration of his final sentence and does not challenge his underlying conviction.  

As noted in prior posts, my theme is developed descriptively in the first part of my article as I showcase (perhaps too briefly) how the forms and functions of different punishment systems throughout US history provide different frameworks for the legal and practical relationship between conviction finality and sentence finality.  In this post, I will reprint my article's final historical observations about sentence finality during the "Modern Era" stretching from the the 1970s through today.  At the start of this period, U.S. sentencing philosophies, policies, and practices changed dramatically.  Legislatures through this period have embraced determinate sentencing laws that require prison sentences for most offenses and require very lengthy prison terms for nearly all serious offenses and repeat offenders.  These modern sentencing realities, in turn, has considerably changed the nature and stakes of issues surrounding sentence finality:

[Modern incarceration] statistics suggest there may now be more individuals condemned to die in America’s prisons based on their current “final” sentences than the total prison population in the 1960s when courts and scholars began earnestly discussing the importance of finality for criminal judgments.  As explained before, the then-prevailing practices of indeterminate sentencing and parole entailed that the vast majority of 300,000 persons incarcerated in 1970 could take comfort in the then-prevailing reality that the duration of and justification for their ongoing prison terms would be regularly reviewed and reconsidered by corrections officials.  Today, in sharp contrast, the majority of the 2.25 million incarcerated individuals in the United States cope with the now-prevailing reality that their prison sentences are fixed and final and not subject to any regularized means of review or reconsideration for any purposes.

In sum, the transformation of the sentencing enterprise and embrace of mandatory sentencing schemes throughout the United States over the past four decades has been remarkable and remarkably consequential for the considerable number of offenders sentenced to significant terms of imprisonment.  The highly discretionary indeterminate sentencing systems that had been dominant for a century have been replaced by an array of sentencing structures that govern and control sentencing decisionmaking.  Most pertinent to the topic of this Essay, prison sentences that had for more than a century been defined by a lack of finality are now fixed and final in the vast majority of all serious criminal cases at the moment they are announced by a sentencing judge.  Consequently, two centuries of U.S. criminal justice experience in which sentence finality was not a distinct concern has given way, due to dramatic changes in sentencing laws, policies, and practices, to a modern era of mass and massive terms of incarceration that makes the treatment of final sentences arguably the most important issue for hundreds of thousands of current prisoners and for the tens of thousands more defendants being sentenced to lengthy prison terms each year throughout the United States.  Sentence finality, in short, has gone from being a non-issue to being arguably one of the most important issues in modern American criminal justice systems.

Prior posts in this series:

May 16, 2014 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Recommended reading, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)

New commentary highlights why DOJ's new clemency initiative is not enough of a good thing

Megan Quattlebaum has this notable new commentary up at Huffington Post under the headline "2,785 Petitioners for Clemency Need All of the Mercy Obama Can Give."  It highlights one of many cases not formally covered by the new DOJ clemency guidelines but still subject to what seems like an unfair federal drug sentencing system. Here are excerpts:

Shortly after high school, Michael Keating fell in with a bad crowd in his rural hometown in Missouri, and began experimenting with meth. By the age of 20, he was hooked and using the drug on a daily basis.  He met a man who said that if Michael allowed him to use the woods behind his house to produce drugs, he would give the young addict some of what he made.

Soon thereafter, police officers received information that meth was being made at Michael's home. They searched his property and found a bucket of waste water in the backyard. Although the waste water contained less than a gram of methamphetamine, pursuant to the Eastern District of Missouri's practice (which has been rejected by the majority of federal circuit courts and the U.S. Sentencing Commission) Michael, the sole defendant in the case, was charged as though the entire weight of the water in the bucket -- more than 2,700 grams -- was a marketable drug. He was sentenced to serve more than 11 years in federal prison.

Late last month, the Department of Justice announced a laudable initiative to seek out nonviolent drug offenders with long prison sentences whom it will consider for clemency. The initiative is open to federal prisoners who meet six criteria, including that they have served at least ten years of their sentence and likely would have received a substantially lower sentence if convicted of the same offense today. The goal, according to President Obama, is to help "restor[e] fundamental ideals of justice and fairness" to our penal system by releasing those who "would have already served their time and paid their debt to society" had they been sentenced under current law.

This is a tremendous step forward, but it won't help Michael Keating. He has only served seven and a half years in prison, not ten, as the initiative requires. And the law under which he was sentenced hasn't changed -- in Missouri, possession of the un-ingestible by-product of drug production is still punished just as harshly as possession of the same amount of marketable drugs. Michael's case is emblematic of our need to go even further to right the wrongs of failed sentencing policies.

Still, some who have commented on the initiative seem to view it as too much justice. One group of critics fears the "early" release of convicted felons into our communities. But, as Michael's story demonstrates, we need to take a hard look at individual cases before we assume that those with past convictions pose a present danger....

[W]hile President Obama is right to search out new candidates for sentence mitigation, he shouldn't neglect those meritorious individuals whose cases are already before him. Michael Keating's application has been pending for over two years; it is one of the 2,785 sentence commutation petitions on which the Pardon Attorney has not yet acted. In addition to seeking out new submissions, the President should take a close look at those he has in hand. On the path to saner sentencing policy, we will need all of the mercy that he can give.

May 16, 2014 in Clemency and Pardons, Drug Offense Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Record-long sentence?: 81-year-old child molester gets 935- to 1,870-year prison sentence

As reported in this local article, in order to "serve as a warning to other child predators," Pennsylvania Judge Albert Cepparulo "has imposed a 935- to 1,870-year prison sentence to an 81-year-old man who sexually abused a girl for four years and videotaped nearly every assault."  Here is what led the judge to require an elderly offender to remain imprisoned until at least the year 2949:

Thomas Holliday was convicted in January of 234 crimes, including hundreds of counts related to creating and possessing child pornography.  Prosecutors said Holliday began abusing the girl in 2009, when she was 14.

Holliday was a family friend who offered to help the girl's mother financially and the girl was sent to live with him. He denied the charges, telling the judge that he and the teen were in love. 

May 16, 2014 in Scope of Imprisonment, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (9) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, May 15, 2014

Intriguing Second Circuit opinion concerning which priors trigger 10-year child porn mandatory

Today in US v. Lockhart, No. 13-602 (2d Cir. May 15, 2014) (available here), a Second Circuit panel resolves a notable statutory question concerning what prior sex offenses serve as predicates triggering a 10-year mandatory minimum prison term for a child porn possession offense.  Here is how the opinion in Lockhart starts along with a later paragraph highlighting why this issue could perhaps get Supreme Court attention:

In this case, we must decide whether a sentencing provision that provides for a ten‐year mandatory minimum term of imprisonment if a defendant was previously convicted “under the laws of any State relating to aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward,” 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2), requires that an “aggravated sexual abuse” or “sexual abuse” conviction involve a minor or ward, or whether only “abusive sexual conduct” is modified by the phrase “involving a minor or ward,” such that a sexual abuse conviction involving an adult victim constitutes a predicate offense. We conclude that the statutory text and structure indicate that the latter reading is correct and therefore affirm the district court’s imposition of a ten‐year sentence on Defendant‐Appellant Avondale Lockhart....

Looking at § 2252(b)(2) as a whole, we find, as a number of other circuits have explained, that “it would be unreasonable to conclude that Congress intended to impose the enhancement on defendants convicted under federal law, but not on defendants convicted for the same conduct under state law.” United States v. Spence, 661 F.3d 194, 197 (4th Cir. 2011).... This reasoning compels us to conclude that “involving a minor or ward” modifies only prior state convictions for “abusive sexual conduct,” not those for “sexual abuse” or “aggravated sexual abuse,” each of which would constitute a predicate federal offense if committed against an adult or a child.

We acknowledge that the Sixth, Eighth and Tenth Circuits have reached the opposite conclusion, namely, that the phrase “involving a minor or ward” modifies all three categories of state sexual abuse crimes.  However, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have drawn this conclusion without elaborating on their reasoning. Indeed, these circuits appear merely to have assumed that a prior state‐law sexual abuse conviction requires a minor victim for purposes of the sentencing enhancement, an assumption that made little difference in those cases since the predicate violations at issue involved minor victims.... The Sixth Circuit has reached this conclusion most explicitly, although it did so because it found that another panel of that court had “already considered the proper construction of the statutory language at issue,” and that that prior decision bound the current panel, even though the earlier opinion did not engage in any express analysis of the statutory language.  United States v. Mateen, 739 F.3d 300, 304–05 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Gardner, 649 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2011)), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Apr. 9, 2014).  We are not compelled to follow such unexplored assumptions in coming to our conclusion here.

May 15, 2014 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack (0)

AG Holder assails solitary for juves with mental illness

As highlighted by this DOJ press release, "Attorney General Eric Holder on Wednesday called for an end to the excessive use of solitary confinement for youth that suffer from mental illness." Here is more about AG Holder's latest use of his criminal justice bully pulpit:

“Across the country, far too many juvenile detention centers see isolation and solitary confinement as an appropriate way to handle challenging youth, in particular youth with disabilities. But solitary confinement can be dangerous, and a serious impediment to the ability of juveniles to succeed once released.

“In a study released last year by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 47 percent of juvenile detention centers reported locking youth in some type of isolation for more than four hours at a time. We have received reports of young people who have been held in solitary confinement for up to 23 hours a day, often with no human interaction at all. In some cases, children were held in small rooms with windows that were barely the width of their own hands.

“This is, to say the least, excessive. And these episodes are all too common.

“This practice is particularly detrimental to young people with disabilities – who are at increased risk under these circumstances of negative effects including self-harm and even suicide. In fact, one national study found that half of the victims of suicides in juvenile facilities were in isolation at the time they took their own lives, and 62 percent of victims had a history of solitary confinement....

“We must ensure in all circumstances – and particularly when it comes to our young people – that incarceration is used to rehabilitate, and not merely to warehouse and forget. Our nationwide effort to end the unnecessary or excessive seclusion of youth with disabilities will not be completed solely with one settlement or court filing. But as a department, we are dedicated – and as Attorney General, I am committed – to doing everything possible to ensure the effectiveness and integrity of our criminal and juvenile justice system. In the days ahead, we will continue to make good on our commitment to the best practices of law enforcement and the highest ideals of our nation.” 

May 15, 2014 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack (0)

"Crime, Teenage Abortion, and the Myth of Unwantedness"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new empirical paper by Gary Shoesmith available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This study shows that varying concentrations of teenage abortions across states drive all of Donohue and Levitt’s (2001, 2004, 2008) crime and abortion results, narrowing the possible link between crime and abortion to mainly 16 percent of U.S. abortions.  The widely promoted and accepted claim that unwantedness links crime and abortion is false. Across all states, there is a near one-to-one correspondence between ranked significance of abortion in explaining crime and ranked teenage abortion ratios.  The results agree with research showing teenage motherhood is a major maternal crime factor, while unwantedness ranks fifth, behind mothers who smoke during pregnancy.  The results are also consistent with the reasons women have abortions by age group.

For future research, a specific means is proposed to reconcile recent papers that apply alternative methods to DL’s data but find no link between crime and abortion link.  Given a 2013 Census Bureau report showing that single motherhood is the new norm among adult women, the results suggest the need to reeducate adult women about unwantedness and crime.

May 15, 2014 in Data on sentencing, National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0)

Poll after ugly execution highlights enduring death penalty support and openness to various execution methods

As highlighted by this NBC News article, headlined "Americans Back Death Penalty by Gas or Electrocution If No Needle: Poll," a new poll seems to confirm my suspicion in this recent post that the ugly execution in Oklahoma would not change many modern capital perspectives. Here are the results of this poll:

A badly botched lethal injection in Oklahoma has not chipped away at the American public's support of the death penalty, although two-thirds of voters would back alternatives to the needle, an exclusive NBC News poll shows.

One in three people say that if lethal injections are no longer viable — because of drug shortages or other problems — executions should be stopped altogether, according to the survey of 800 adults by Hart Research and Public Opinion Strategies for NBC News. But many others are open to more primitive methods of putting prisoners to death: 20% for the gas chamber, 18% for the electric chair, 12% for firing squad and 8% for hanging....

The most recent example of what can go wrong [with lethal injection] is the April 29 execution of Clayton Lockett, who appeared to regain consciousness and writhe in pain midway through. The procedure was halted but Lockett, convicted of rape and murder, died anyway. The details of his death were condemned by the White House and provoked fresh debate over capital punishment and how it's carried out.

Most people polled said they knew about the uproar, but it did not appear to change minds about whether the government should kill murder convicts. A comfortable majority of those questioned — 59% — said they favor the death penalty as the ultimate punishment for murder, while 35% said they are opposed.

That split is in line with surveys done before Lockett's death in the last two years, and also reflects the erosion of support for capital punishment since the 1990s, when it was more than 70%. "I don’t think this fundamentally altered views about the death penalty," said Bill McInturff of Public Opinion Strategies.

Republicans, whites, Protestants and older people were more likely to favor execution than Democrats, blacks and Latinos, Catholics and young people. More than a third of those in favor said the strongest argument for the death penalty is that it's an "appropriate consequence." A similar proportion of those against it said the risk of killing someone who had been wrongly convicted was the most powerful argument....

All 35 capital punishment states use lethal injection as their primary method, although eight of them would allow electrocution, gas, hanging or firing squad in some cases, according to the Death Penalty Information Center. But lethal injections are becoming increasingly difficult to carry out because pharmaceutical companies don't want their products used, some compounding pharmacies are getting out of the execution business, and inmates are trying to force states to reveal their suppliers.

Some state lawmakers have introduced measures that would bring back the older methods, but some pro-execution advocates believe that would lower support from a public that has gotten used to "medicalized" deaths.

A few recent related posts:

May 15, 2014 in Baze lethal injection case, Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, May 14, 2014

"Federal Judges Are Cutting Rich Tax Cheats Big Sentencing Breaks"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy and interesting new piece at Forbes by Janet Novack.  Here are excerpts:

Increasingly, federal judges are going easy on tax cheats, or at least easier than the U.S. Sentencing Commission’ s guidelines say they should. The trend has been quietly building since 2007, but was given a high profile Forbes 400 face in January when a Chicago federal judge let billionaire H. Ty Warner off with probation for hiding as much as $106 million in UBS AG and a smaller Swiss bank for more than a decade and evading at least $5.5 million in tax on his secret accounts.  According to the sentencing guidelines, the 69-year-old Warner, who made his fortune by creating Beanie Babies, should have gotten 46 to 57 months in the federal pen.  Prosecutors have appealed Warner’s sentence, asserting, among other things, that the judge was unreasonably impressed by his “not so extraordinary” charity and by gushing letters from employees, and business associates....

[I]n 2005, the Supreme Court ruled in U.S. v Booker that the guidelines were merely advisory.  Subsequent Supreme Court and appellate decisions have made it clear that trial judges have broad discretion to depart from the guidelines and will only be overturned if they’ve failed to properly consider the guidelines or their decision is clearly unreasonable.  “Once they make the noises about calculating the guidelines, they can come up with their own numbers, and they can base it on anything they want,” says Scott A. Schumacher, a professor at University of Washington Law School who has written a new paper on tax-sentencing post-Booker that is being published in the Villanova Law Review.  While the percentage of all sentences that fall within the guidelines has steadily declined since Booker, the change in tax sentences has been particularly dramatic, he adds.

For example, in fiscal 2013, judges gave below guideline sentences, without buy-in from prosecutors, to 45% of those sentenced for tax crimes, but just 28% of those sentenced for embezzlement; 26% of those sentenced for fraud; and 22% of those sentenced for forgery or counterfeiting. (Another 20% of tax offenders got sentence reductions which prosecutors sponsored, usually as a reward for providing “substantial assistance” to the government.)

While the light sentencing of some offshore cheats has gotten attention, the larger leniency-for-tax crimes trend has been mostly obscured by Internal Revenue Service reports, which show the average prison term for “tax and tax related crimes” rising from 21 months in 2004 to 31 months in 2013.  The IRS numbers, however, are skewed by the long prison sentences (some more than 10 years) being meted out to those convicted in the recent epidemic of identity theft refund fraud — a crime Kathryn Keneally, U.S. Assistant Attorney General for the Tax Division described at an American Bar Association Tax Section meeting last week as “more like street crime.”

The Sentencing Commission’s statistics, by contrast, count only pure tax crimes and not those in which identity theft, public corruption, drug dealing or some other charge is considered the primary offense and tax evasion is thrown in.  By the USSC’s figuring, the average sentence for a tax convict last year was just 14 months, with a median of 12 months.  In those cases where sentencing judges handed out a downward departure citing the Booker decision, the commission’s data shows, the median sentence was cut by 78.5%; in such cases the most lenient within-guideline sentence would have been a median of 16 months and the lucky convicts got a median sentence of just four months. (A side benefit: such short sentences can be served in community facilities, instead of the federal pen.)

Surprisingly, the average sentence for tax crimes hasn’t changed much, even as the percentage of tax cheats getting a sentencing break has risen.  The likely explanation is found in the way the sentencing guidelines work, ratcheting up prison terms as the amount of tax the government was cheated out of rises.  As prosecutors have focused more on wealthier tax cheats and bigger dollar cases involving both onshore and offshore evasion, the sentences tax offenders are supposed to get have risen too. Last Friday, for example, a federal judge sentenced Patricia Hough, a 67-year-old Fort Myers, Fla. psychiatrist, to 24 months in jail.  That might sound like a lot, except her guideline sentence was 80 to 100 months....

These days, sentencing judges routinely give lip service to that need for general deterrence, but still seem sympathetic to the argument that by being prosecuted, individual defendants have already suffered more than their chiseling peers.  In offshore cases, defendants’ lawyers never fail to point out that tens of thousands of people (the last count released by the IRS was, 43,000) with undeclared foreign accounts have escaped prosecution through the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program....

Sentencing judges also tend to be sympathetic to other arguments typically made by wealthy and successful convicts: that they have given a lot to charity; have already been publicly humiliated; have paid heavy fines (in Warner’s case a $53 million penalty for failing to file required reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts ); and even that they are simply too valuable as either job creators or community volunteers to be sitting in jail. Chicago Federal District Court Judge Charles P. Kocoras, before giving Warner probation, cited all those considerations....

[S]ince the Supreme Court’s Booker decision, only one tax sentence has been reversed on appeal. In that case a sentencing judge gave probation to Frederick L. Engle, who had evaded his taxes for 16 years using shell corporations.  According to sentencing guidelines, he should have gotten 24 to 30 months.  The sentencing judge’s stated reason for the leniency was that Engle, a high earning sales rep for shoemaker Nine West who had relationships with Wal-Mart, Target and J.C. Penny, would be able to earn good money to pay back the IRS if he was kept out of jail and allowed to travel abroad.

In overturning the sentence, a three judge panel of Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals wrote: “Reduced to its essence, the district court’s approach means that rich tax-evaders will avoid prison, but poor tax-evader will almost certainly go to jail. Such an approach, where prison or probation depends on the defendant’s economic status, is impermissible.”

After Engle failed to appear for his new sentencing hearing and continued to evade tax, he was sentenced in absentia to 60 months in jail.  When U.S. Marshals caught up with him, he got an additional year for failure to appear.  Now 73, Engle is serving his time at the Butner, N.C. federal correctional institution and is not scheduled for release until October 2015.

May 14, 2014 in Booker in district courts, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack (0)

Form, function and finality of sentences through history: the Rehabilitative Era

As explained here, I am "celebrating" the official publication of my new article titled "Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness, and Finality for Sentences" (which is available in full via this SSRN link) through a series of posts exploring sentence finality doctrines and practice.  As explained in this prior post, a central theme of my piece is that different conceptual, policy, and practical considerations are implicated when a defendant seeks only review and reconsideration of his final sentence and does not challenge his underlying conviction.  

As explained in this prior post discussing Founding Era realities, my theme is developed descriptively in the first part of my article as I showcase (perhaps too briefly) how the forms and functions of different punishment systems throughout US history provide different frameworks for the legal and practical relationship between conviction finality and sentence finality.  In this post, I will reprint my article's observations about the dynamics of conviction and sentence finality during the so-called Rehabilitative Era stretching from the mid 19th Century to the latter part of the 20th Century.  During this period, prisons were constructed from coast to coast as American criminal justice systems nationwide embraced rehabilitation as the central punishment concern, and a highly discretionary “medical” model came to dominate criminal sentencing procedures and practices.  This punishment model, as explained here, had a considerable impact on sentence finality and its relationship to conviction finality:

This rehabilitative model of sentencing and corrections was avowedly disinterested and arguably disdainful of sentencing finality, at least with respect to the traditional sentences of prison and probation.  After a sentencing judge had imposed a prison term, which sometimes would be set in a range as broad as one year to life, prison and parole officials were expected and instructed to consistently review offenders’ behavior in prison to determine if and when they should be released to the community.  All imprisoned defendants would have regular parole hearings at which time their sentence terms were, formally and functionally, subject to review and reconsideration by corrections officials. Even after officials decided to set free a prisoner on parole, or if a defendant was sentenced to probation rather than prison in the first instance, correctional supervisors still kept close watch on offenders to assess their behavior in the community again with an eye toward reviewing and modifying sanctions as needed to fit the needs of the offender and society. Release on parole or probation was never really a final sentencing disposition: government officials readily could and often would revoke parole or probation to remand those who misbehaved in the community back to prison.

Significantly, this rehabilitative model of sentencing and corrections with its fundamental disaffinity for treating any sentencing term as final was still dominant in the 1960s when courts and scholars began earnestly discussing the importance of treating criminal judgments as final.  This historical reality should inform consideration of this period’s debate over the finality of criminal judgments in two critical ways: (1) because it was widely understood (and still well-accepted) that all sentences were indeterminate and subject to review and reconsideration by corrections officials, advocates stressing the importance of treating criminal judgments as final were necessarily focused only on the finality of criminal convictions; and (2) any problems or harms resulting from giving too much weight to the interests of finality for criminal convictions were necessarily mitigated by parole mechanisms which allowed reconsideration of any and all criminal sentences that might later be considered unfit or unfair based on subsequent legal or social developments.

Prior posts in this series:

May 14, 2014 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Recommended reading, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (12) | TrackBack (0)

How do we reconcile Senator Jeff Sessions' vocal support for the FSA and strong opposition to the SSA?

SessionsThere are many interesting claims and notable contentions in the letter sent by Senators Grassley, Cornyn and Sessions to their colleagues explaining their opposition to the Smarter Sentencing Act (first reported here).  Most notable, I think, are the essential ideas set out at the start and end of the letter: despite a decades-long federal drug war that has grown the size of the federal government and has long included severe mandatory minimums prison terms, we still find ourselves in the midst of a "historic heroin epidemic" which apparently calls for "redoubling our efforts." I believe that the sensible response to ineffective federal government drug policies and practices would be to consider changing some of these policies and practices, not "redoubling our efforts" (and thereby redoubling the size of an apparently ineffective federal government bureaucracy).

But, as the question in the title of this post suggests, I am now especially wondering how Senator Jeff Sessions, who was a vocal supporter of Congress's decision in 2010 to reduce crack mandatory minimum sentences through the Fair Sentencing Act, has now signed on to a letter forcefully opposing a proposal to reduce other drug mandatory minimum sentences through the Smarter Sentencing Act.   Notably, in this March 2010 statement, Senator Sessions stated that he has "long believed that we need to bring greater balance and fairness to our drug sentencing laws" and that the FSA's change to crack mandatory minimums will "achieve needed fairness without impeding our ability to combat drug violence and protect victims." In his words, the FSA's reforms to crack mandatory minimums "strengthen our justice system."

But now, four years later, Senator Sessions has signed on to a letter opposing the Smarter Sentencing Act which claims that this proposal to "reduce sentences for drug traffickers would not only put more dangerous criminals back on the streets sooner, but it would send the message that the United States government lacks the will or is not serious about combatting drug crimes." This letter also asserts that "lower mandatory minimum sentences mean increased crime and more victims."

Critically, the SSA changes federal drugs sentencing laws significantly more than the FSA: the SSA cuts the minimum prison terms for all drug offenses rather than just increasing the amount of one drug needed to trigger existing mandatory prison terms as did the FSA.  Consequently, one can have a principled basis to have supported the FSA's reduction of crack sentences (as did nearly every member of Congress when the FSA passed) and to now oppose the SSA's proposed reduction of all federal drug sentences.  However, back in  2010, Senator Sessions recognized and vocally stated that reducing some federal drug sentences would actually "strengthen our justice system" by helping to "achieve needed fairness without impeding our ability to combat drug violence and protect victims."  I believe (like a majority of the Senate Judiciary Committee) that the SSA would likewise "strengthen our justice system," but Senator Sessions now seem to think it will "mean increased crime and more victims."

Some prior posts about the SSA and debates over federal sentencing reform:

May 14, 2014 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12) | TrackBack (0)

Another week with lots of marijuana developments covered at MLP&R

Continuing a recent tradition of a mid-week review of activities on marijuana law and policy fronts, here is a round up of recent notable posts from Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform:

May 14, 2014 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack (0)