Sunday, September 20, 2015

You be the federal judge: how long a prison term for peanut executives convicted of selling salmonella-tainted food?

In this prior post a few months ago, I highlighted that a peanut company executive convicted of selling salmonella-tainted food was facing an “unprecedented” federal life without parole sentence according to the recommended guideline sentencing range. The sentencing proceeding, as reported in this new AP piece, is slated to go forward this Monday. Here is context for answering the query in the title of this post:

A year after a federal jury convicted him of crimes behind a salmonella outbreak blamed for killing nine people and sickening hundreds more, former peanut executive Stewart Parnell returns to court facing possible imprisonment for the rest of his life.

A sentencing hearing was scheduled for Monday in Albany, Georgia, for the 61-year-old former owner of Peanut Corporation of America. Due in U.S. District Court with Parnell were two co-defendants — his brother and a plant manager — also found guilty in what experts called the first food-poisoning trial of American food processors.

Parnell was convicted Sept. 19, 2014, of knowingly shipping salmonella-tainted peanut butter from his plant in Blakely, Georgia, to Kellogg's and other customers who used it in products from packaged crackers to pet food. The jury also found Parnell and his brother, food broker Michael Parnell, guilty of faking results of lab tests intended to screen for salmonella.

The brothers were charged after a salmonella outbreak that sickened 714 Americans in 46 states was traced to Peanut Corporation's plant in Blakely, Georgia, in early 2009. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reported that nine people who ate tainted peanut butter died during the outbreak in 2008 and 2009, though it couldn't say for sure salmonella caused each death.

Federal investigators found a leaky roof, roaches and evidence of rodents, all ingredients for brewing salmonella. They also uncovered emails and records showing food confirmed by lab tests to contain salmonella was shipped to customers anyway. Other batches were never tested at all, but got shipped with fake lab records saying salmonella screenings were negative.

In a court order Friday, Judge W. Louis Sands noted Stewart Parnell faces a possible prison sentence of 9,636 months — which comes to 803 years. The U.S. Probation Office, which prepares pre-sentencing reports to help guide federal judges, recommended the stiff sentence based on the number of illnesses as well as estimates that the outbreak, which triggered one of the largest food recalls in U.S. history, cost Parnell's corporate customers $144 million.

The judge has the authority to impose a lighter sentence. Randy Napier, whose 80-year-old mother in Ohio died from salmonella poisoning after she ate contaminated peanut butter from Parnell's plant, said he plans to testify at the hearing and ask the judge to show little mercy. "We need to send a message to these food manufacturers," said Napier of Durham, North Carolina. "No one else should have to go through what we did, watching my mother die. I'm hoping to have closure. It's been six years of utter hell."

Attorneys in the case say voluminous testimony from victims seeking stiff sentences and defendants' relatives asking for leniency could push the sentencing proceedings into a second day Tuesday.

Parnell's attorneys insist locking him up for life would be too harsh. Even food-safety attorney Bill Marler, who represented many families of victims in the salmonella outbreak, has said life imprisonment would be "unprecedented."...

Michael Parnell, who was convicted on fewer counts than his brother, faces a recommended punishment of 19 to 24 years in prison. Co-defendant Mary Wilkerson, the Georgia plant's quality control manager, faces five years. She was convicted of obstruction of justice.

Three deaths linked to the outbreak occurred in Minnesota, two in Ohio, two in Virginia, one in Idaho and one in North Carolina.

Prior related post:

September 20, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7)

"Mass Incarceration Has Become the New Welfare"

The title of this post is headline of this interesting recent Atlantic commentary authored by Alex Lichenstein. It is, in part, a response to this major Altantic piece by Ta-Nehisi Coates, titled "The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration," but it has lots more too it.  Here are excerpts:

When Ta-Nehisi Coates says that America’s bloated and enormously expensive dependence on imprisonment has created a “social service program … for a whole class of people,” he hits the nail on the head.  Perhaps correctional expenditures — police, courts, jails, prisons, halfway houses, parole offices, and all the rest — are better classified as “welfare” expenditures.

Mass incarceration is not just (or even mainly) a response to crime, but rather a perverse form of social spending that uses state power to address a host of social problems at the back end, from poverty to drug addiction to misbehavior in school.  These are problems that voters, taxpayers, and politicians — especially white voters, taxpayers, and politicians — seem unwilling to address in any other way.  And even as this spending exacts a toll on those it targets, it confers economic benefits on others, creating employment in white rural areas, an enormous government-sponsored market in prison supplies, and cheap labor for businesses.  This is what the historian Mike Davis once called “carceral keynesianism.”

What created this system? Coates suggests that 50 years ago policymakers and pundits refused to heed — or willfully misread — Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s dire warnings about the dissolution of the “Negro family” and his rather inchoate “case for national action.” Rather than redressing the problem of racism and “Negro” poverty, instead they turned to the expansion of a criminal justice system in the name of “law and order.”  Although Coates is justifiably hard on Moynihan — for his sexism and faith in patriarchy, for his subsequent reactionary politics, and most of all for lacking the courage of his convictions — like the historian Daniel Geary, he sees the Moynihan of 1965 as a closet supporter of affirmative action.

But, in characteristic fashion, he goes beyond this, asking readers to think in new ways about disturbing phenomena that they may take for granted.  Bringing together Moynihan’s concerns about black family structure with the cold fact of mass incarceration produces a striking conclusion: Mass incarceration actually causes crime.  In its long-term impact on the black family, mass incarceration has many of the disintegrative effects that Moynihan attributed to slavery.  It certainly has a similar multigenerational impact; the children of imprisoned people have a much higher chance of themselves being incarcerated as adults....

The terrible failures of America’s criminal-justice system can actually, from a certain perspective, be seen as policy successes.  The high rate of recidivism suggests that prisons fail to rehabilitate those who are locked up.  Yet if two-thirds of parolees return to prison, perhaps it is because the economy offers them no jobs and the welfare state excludes them as ex-felons.  Their return to the social services provided by incarceration, from this angle, makes a degree of sense.  And the point of Coates’s essay is that these people the economy has no room for and the state is unwilling to care for are, as they have always been, disproportionately of African descent.... 

Coates is right: To reform criminal justice requires “reforming the institutional structure, the communities, and the politics that surround it.”  Mustering the requisite political and social resolve to make those changes may seem impossible.  But consider this: How would the nation react if one out of every four white men between the ages of 20 and 35 spent time in prison? 

September 20, 2015 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, September 18, 2015

Shouldn't former federal judge Mark Fuller now be federally prosecuted for perjury?

The question in the title of this post prompted by this new AP article, headlined "Judicial Conference says former federal judge's conduct was reprehensible, impeachable." Here are the details:

Judicial investigators told Congress this week that a former federal judge — arrested last year on a domestic violence charge — had demonstrated "reprehensible conduct" and there was evidence that he abused his wife several times and made false statements to the committee reviewing his behavior.

The Judicial Conference of the United States, in a report to Congress this week, said former U.S. District Judge Mark Fuller of Alabama brought disrepute to the federal judiciary and that his conduct might have warranted impeachment if he had not resigned this summer.  

In a letter to the House Judiciary Committee [which can be accessed here], the Judicial Conference noted Fuller's resignation, but said the severity of Fuller's misconduct and its finding of perjury led it to turn the information over to Congress for whatever action lawmakers deem necessary. "This certification may also serve as a public censure of Judge Fuller's reprehensible conduct, which has no doubt brought disrepute to the Judiciary and cannot constitute the 'good behavior' required of a federal judge," Judicial Conference Secretary James C. Duff wrote in a Sept. 11 letter to House Speaker John Boehner....

The Judicial Conference wrote that there was substantial evidence that the judge "physically abused Kelli Fuller at least eight times, both before and after they married, which included and culminated in the assault that took place on Aug. 9, 2014, in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in downtown Atlanta, Georgia." The conference wrote that Fuller denied under oath to the investigating committee that he ever hit, punched or kicked his wife, and that the investigating committee considered those to be false statements. The Judicial Conference also cited a separate incident, on which it did not elaborate, saying Fuller in 2010 made a false statement to the chief judge that caused a disruption in operations and a loss of public confidence in the court.

The House committee is not releasing the full report, which contains some sensitive victim information. Fuller was placed on leave after his arrest. In May, he announced that he was resigning effective Aug. 1. The Judicial Council of the U.S. 11th Circuit at the time said Fuller's actions might have warranted impeachment, but the reasons for the determination were not released until this week.

Fuller was appointed to the bench in 2002 by then-President George W. Bush. He is perhaps best known for presiding over the 2006 public corruption trial of former Alabama Gov. Don Siegelman and former HealthSouth CEO Richard Scrushy. 

As celebrity white-collar attorneys surely recall, in recent times a number of prominent public figures ranging from Barry Bonds to Roger Clemens to Marion Jones to 'Lil Kim to Scooter Libby have been federally prosecuted for alleged acts of perjury that seems far less serious and consequential than what the Judicial Conference has found former judge Mark Fuller committed.  Absent some prominent explanation for why a federal perjury prosecution would not be worthwhile in this setting, I will be mighty disappointed and a bit concerned if Fuller does not face sanctions for his apparent criminal behavior in this matter.  (Critically, I am not — at least not yet — asserting that Fuller should be imprisoned for his lying under oath to cover up his misbehavior and stay in his position as a federal judge.  But I am saying (former state DA prosecutor) Fuller ought to at least face federal criminal charges and be subject to the heat that comes with a formal federal prosecution.)

September 18, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15)

"Cuba to release 3,522 prisoners on the eve of Pope Francis’ visit; why can’t Obama do the same?"

PopeFrancisIsis-v2The provocative question in the title of this post is the title of this notable San Francisco Bay View commentary. Here is how it starts:

Just prior to the visit of Pope Francis to Cuba on Sept. 19, the Cuban government has announced the release of 3,522 people being held in the country’s jails.  This humanitarian gesture will include prisoners who are over 60 years of age, younger than 20, those with chronic illnesses, women and those who are close to their release dates.

Why couldn’t Obama follow the Cuban example before Pope Francis continues on his tour to the U.S. on Sept. 22?  The United States, which has the dubious distinction of having the largest per capita prison population in the world, is overflowing with people who are primarily incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, on drug charges, or being mentally ill and poor.  Of the 2.5 million people in jails and prisons in this country, a vastly disproportionate number are people of color.

As the Obama presidency winds down, with nothing to lose, he could do the right thing by releasing an equal percentage of the prison population as the Cubans did.  Now that would be a humanitarian gesture that a war torn world could appreciate and a gesture of peace with justice to the visiting Pope.  It would amount to the freedom of tens of thousands of people.

Though I am suspect of any accounting of Cuba's incarceration levels (or its propaganda about recent releases), the latest estimate of its imprisoned population is around 57,500.  Consequently, its release of more than 3,500 prisoners amounts to freeing more than 6% of its incarcerated population.  A comparable effort by President Obama, if we focus on the entire local, state and federal incarcerated US population, would require the release of more than 135,000 persons imprisoned in the United States. Even if Prez Obama only released 6% of the current federal prison population, he would still need to grant over 12,000 federal offenders their freedom to make a gesture for the Pope comparable to what Cuba is claiming it has done.

I am not expecting to Prez Obama (or any state's Governor) to make a mass clemency gesture like this for the Pope's visit to the US.  But, as this new NPR story highlights, there are a number of criminal justice reform advocates who are hopeful that, at the very least, the Pope's visit will help kick-start federal criminal justice reform efforts. The NPR piece is headlined "Pope's U.S. Visit Spurs Catholic Support For Criminal Justice Reform," and it highlights that the "Pope will visit a prison in Pennsylvania next week and ... and faith leaders are using the opportunity to press Congress for action."

Some prior related posts on Pope Francis and criminal justice reform:

September 18, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Prisons and prisoners, Religion, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Ohio judges pushing for "truth in plea bargaining"

My Columbus Disptach this morning has this notable new article about a notable new push for a new criminal procedure rule concerning plea bargaining practices here in the Buckeye state.  The article is headlined "Plea deals must reflect crime committed, judges demand," and here are excerpts:

Judge Michael P. Donnelly had seen enough by the time his spreadsheet of plea deals in sexual-assault cases reached nearly 200. In each case, the defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser crime that bore no factual resemblance to what occurred, allowing many to avoid sex-offender registration requirements.

Many rape cases involved pleas to aggravated assault, a crime involving serious bodily harm in which the defendant was provoked by the victim — a scenario common in a drunken bar fight but wildly inconsistent with rape. “It’s sidestepping the truth. It’s legal fiction, nothing more than a lie,” said Donnelly, a Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court judge. “No one can defend this process. There is no ethical defense.”

With Donnelly leading the charge for change, the Ohio Supreme Court — unless legislators object — could amend court rules to require charges in felony plea deals to be factually based — to reflect what actually occurred. “Ending the charade” would promote transparency and foster public accountability in the justice system, Donnelly said. “We can be allowing pleas to something that everyone knows didn’t happen.”

The court’s rules commission has advanced the proposal by moving to seek public comment on the changes in Criminal Rule 11 as part of the early steps of a lengthy process leading to approval or rejection. The Ohio Judicial Conference, which represents the state’s judges, is on board with the change, calling “often convenient” plea agreements “contrary to the objectives of the justice system.”

Advocates for sexual-assault victims also support the change, saying pleas to lesser, unrelated offenses leave victims’ trauma unacknowledged and victims feeling “like the justice system let them down.”

Criminal-defense lawyers oppose the change, saying that it would unfairly limit their options in representing criminal defendants and could increase the number of cases going to trial. “While (plea deals) may be factually incorrect, from a justice perspective it is the right thing to do,” said Ohio Public Defender Timothy Young. “We have punishments that are not proportional to everyone who commits a crime because not every crime, while of the same name, is of the same nature.”

Barry Wilford, public-policy co-director of the Ohio Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, said, “Truth in plea bargaining is an easily stated expression, but it begs the question, ‘What is the truth?’  ” Prosecutors and defense lawyers, with the ultimate approval of judges, “have to have some freedom, some negotiating room. ... There’s give and take by both sides. Each side has its objectives. The law should permit them that liberty,” Wilford said.

Donnelly’s study of 197 cases between 2008 and 2012 that resulted in plea agreements that he determined were not based on the facts represented only about 5 percent of the 3,700 sexual-assault cases handled in Cuyahoga County, an official said. “Sometimes, you take the sure thing to get someone off the street and hold them accountable,” said Joseph Frolik, spokesman for Prosecutor Timothy McGinty, who took office in 2013.

Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O’Brien agrees with Donnelly that plea deals “should resemble what the conduct was.” He and his assistants work to base plea agreements on the factual circumstances of cases and preserve sex-offender registration, often by using lesser and included “attempted” offenses, such as attempted rape, he said. “It’s been on everyone’s radar for a number of years. Anyone who has been doing it to an improper degree probably already has changed that practice,” O’Brien said.

Greene County Common Pleas Judge Stephen A. Wolaver leads the Ohio Supreme Court’s criminal-rules committee and believes truth-in-plea-agreements should be adopted to foster public confidence in courts. “If you are going to handle a case based on the fact a person committed a crime, transparency says they should have committed that crime. If there is no fact basis for a particular crime, the question is raised, ‘Was there actually justice?’  ” Wolaver asked.

September 18, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, September 17, 2015

Prez Candidate Bernie Sanders announces plan to restore federal parole and eliminate private prisons

Images (1)As reported in this new USA Today piece, headlined "Sanders seeks to ban private prisons," a US Senator on the presidential campaign trail has come out with a distinctive and ambitious criminal justice reform proposal. Here are the basics:

Sen. Bernie Sanders said he hopes to end the “private, for-profit prison racket” with the introduction Thursday of bills to ban private prisons, reinstate the federal parole system and eliminate quotas for the number of immigrants held in detention.

The Vermont independent, who is running for the Democratic presidential nomination, introduced the “Justice is not for Sale Act” with Democratic Reps. Raúl M. Grijalva of Arizona, Keith Ellison of Minnesota and Bobby L. Rush of Illinois. It would bar the federal government from contracting with private incarceration companies starting two years after passage.

“The profit motivation of private companies running prisons works at cross purposes with the goals of criminal justice,” Sanders said. “Criminal justice and public safety are without a doubt the responsibility of the citizens of our country, not private corporations. They should be carried out by those who answer to voters, not those who answer to investors.”...

Ellison said the private-prison industry spends millions each year lobbying for harsher sentencing laws and immigration policies that serve its bottom line. “Incarceration should be about rehabilitation and public safety, not profit,” he said.

The legislation would reinstate the federal parole system, abolished in 1984, and increase oversight of companies that provide banking and telephone services for inmates. It also would end the requirement that Immigration and Customs Enforcement maintain 34,000 detention beds.

Sanders said the bill represents only a piece of the major criminal justice reforms he believes are needed, but he’s convinced the issue can find bipartisan support. “Making sure that corporations are not profiteering from the incarceration of fellow Americans is an important step forward.”

The full text of the Justice is Not for Sale Act of 2015 can be accessed at this link, and it is a very interesting read. Perhaps not surprisingly, the media is so far focused on the provisions of the bill seeking to eliminate use of private prisons. But I think the provisions in the bill that are the most important and could be, by far, the most consequential are those that would reintroduce parole in the federal system.

September 17, 2015 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Lots of new data from BJS on prisoners and from USSC on federal sentencing

Sentencing and corrections data junkies have the opportunity for heavy dose of notable new data runs from two federal sources.  Both of these recently released reports have a number of interesting and important modern sentencing stories buried inside lots of notable new numbers:

From the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, "Prisoners in 2014"

From the US Sentencing Commission, "FY 2015 Third Quarterly Sentencing Data Report"

Importantly, the BJS prisoners document has data on only prison populations and thus does not include total incarcerated persons in the US because jail populations are not in the statistics.  With that important statistical reality in mind, here are some highlights identified by BJS concerning "Prisoners in 2014" that I found particularly noteworthy:

September 17, 2015 in Booker in district courts, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Notable Left/Right morality accounting of the "Truth about Mass Incarceration"

Cover_20150921_tocProviding the cover feature piece for the September 21 issue of The National Review, Stephanos Bibas has this notable new commentary reflecting on the political rhetoric and statistical realities that surround modern crime and punishment in the United States.  The piece is headlined "Truth about Mass Incarceration," and I highly recommend the piece in full.  Here is an except from heart of the commentary, as well as its closing paragraph:

So the stock liberal charges against “mass incarceration” simply don’t hold water.  There is no racist conspiracy, nor are we locking everyone up and throwing away the key.  Most prisoners are guilty of violent or property crimes that no orderly society can excuse.  Even those convicted of drug crimes have often been implicated in violence, as well as promoting addiction that destroys neighborhoods and lives.

But just because liberals are wrong does not mean the status quo is right.  Conservatives cannot reflexively jump from critiquing the Left’s preferred narrative to defending our astronomical incarceration rate and permanent second-class status for ex-cons.  The criminal-justice system and prisons are big-government institutions.  They are often manipulated by special interests such as prison guards’ unions, and they consume huge shares of most states’ budgets.  And cities’ avarice tempts police to arrest and jail too many people in order to collect fines, fees, tickets, and the like.  As the Department of Justice found in its report following the Michael Brown shooting in Missouri, “Ferguson’s law enforcement practices are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs.” That approach poisons the legitimacy of law enforcement, particularly in the eyes of poor and minority communities.

Conservatives also need to care more about ways to hold wrongdoers accountable while minimizing the damage punishment does to families and communities.  Punishment is coercion by the state, and it disrupts not only defendants’ lives but also their families and neighborhoods.  Contrary to the liberal critique, we need to punish and condemn crimes unequivocally, without excusing criminals or treating them as victims.  But we should be careful to do so in ways that reinforce rather than undercut conservative values, such as strengthening families and communities....

American criminal justice has drifted away from its moral roots. The Left has forgotten how to blame and punish, and too often the Right has forgotten how to forgive. Over-imprisonment is wrong, but not because wrongdoers are blameless victims of a white-supremacist conspiracy. It is wrong because state coercion excessively disrupts work, families, and communities, the building blocks of society, with too little benefit to show for it. Our strategies for deterring crime not only fail to work on short-sighted, impulsive criminals, but harden them into careerists. Criminals deserve punishment, but it is wise as well as humane to temper justice with mercy.

September 17, 2015 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

"The Meaning of 'Meaningful Appellate Review' in Capital Cases: Lessons from California"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Steven Shatz now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In Furman v. Georgia, the Supreme Court's seminal death penalty case, the Court held that the death penalty, as then administered, violated the Eighth Amendment because the penalty decision was so unguided and the imposition of the death penalty was so infrequent as to create an unconstitutional risk of arbitrariness.  The Court's remedy, developed in subsequent decisions, was to require the state legislatures to "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty" and the state courts to provide "meaningful appellate review" of death sentences.  In recent years, a number of scholars have addressed the genuine narrowing requirement with empirical research on particular state schemes.

Less attention has been paid to the appellate review requirement and, in particular to Pulley v. Harris, the Court's key case on the issue.  In Pulley, the Court held that comparative proportionality review of death sentences was not constitutionally required in a state's death penalty scheme unless that scheme was "so lacking in other checks on arbitrariness" that it could not otherwise pass constitutional muster.  The Court acknowledged, however, that some form of meaningful appellate review was required. Using California as an object lesson, this article examines both aspects of the Court's opinion: what would make a state scheme so lacking in checks on arbitrariness as to require comparative proportionality review; and what would constitute meaningful appellate review by a court which eschews comparative proportionality review.

The article argues that the California death penalty scheme is that scheme imagined in Pulley — a scheme with virtually no checks on arbitrariness, producing arbitrary sentences and arbitrary executions, and, therefore, a scheme where comparative proportionality should be required.  The article also argues that, in California, there is no meaningful review of death sentences at all — not once in 593 direct appeals in death penalty cases has the California Supreme Court set aside a death sentence on the ground that it was disproportionate, excessive or otherwise aberrant.  Although California is, in this respect, is a distinct outlier, it is not alone among the states in ignoring the Furman requirements. The lesson from California is that the Supreme Court's "meaningful review" of state schemes is long overdue.

September 17, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, September 16, 2015

Hoping (again) to hear criminal justice reform discussion during tonight's GOP debate

Regular readers know I am ever eager to have the national political conversation focus on criminal justice issues, and thus today I am giddy with pre-GOP-debate anticipation again.  As just explained via this new post over at Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform, the location and run-up to tonight's debate has me thinking that federal marijuana laws and policies could possibly get some attention.  In addition, as detailed in lots of prior posts linked below, there are plenty of other criminal justice topics that would merit attention as CNN tries to encourage a "real debate" among the GOP candidates on topics in which they have some real disagreements.

I am due to be off-line the rest of this afternoon, so this will be my last pre-debate post.  I will close it not only by linking to lots of my pre-debate questions from last month, but also by again encouraging readers to fill the comments with questions they would like to see asked of the candidates.

Some recent related posts:

September 16, 2015 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates | Permalink | Comments (6)

Oklahoma's top criminal court stays execution of Richard Glossip for two weeks

As reported in local news pieces here and here, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin late yesterday refused to delay today's scheduled execution of Richard Glossip amid concerns about his factual guilt.  But today the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals issued a stay of execution for death row inmate Richard Glossip. Here are the basics:

Just before 12 p.m. Wednesday, a stay has been granted for him until September 30. Late Tuesday afternoon, Gov. Mary Fallin said she will not grant Glossip a stay of execution. Just before 5 p.m. Tuesday, Glossip’s attorneys filed the appeal with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. It's their last avenue to stop the execution.

Court documents released on Wednesday stated that, "Due to Glossip's last minute filing, and in order for this court to give fair consideration to the materials included with his subsequent application for post-conviction relief, we hereby grant an emergency stay of execution for two weeks. The execution of Richard Eugene Glossip shall be reset, without further order, for September 30, 2015."

During a news conference on Wednesday, the Director of Oklahoma Department of Corrections said he does not know the reasons behind the stay, and that at this time, they are shutting down all procedures.

Prior related post:

September 16, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Attorney for Dylann Roof, Charleston church mass murderer, suggests plea to avoid death sentence

As reported in this local piece, headlined "Accused gunman in Charleston church shooting proposes guilty plea," a high-profile mass murderer is apparently prepared to cut a plea deal to try to avoid a state capital prosecution. Here are the details and context:

An attorney for the man accused of gunning down nine people at a historic black church in South Carolina said on Wednesday his client is willing to plead guilty to state murder charges if the move would spare him a death sentence.

A guilty plea by Dylann Roof, 21, in exchange for a sentence of life in prison without parole also would spare the victims' families and shooting survivors from the trauma of trial proceedings, attorney Bill McGuire said.

His remarks came during a hearing in Charleston over whether a judge will release 911 calls and police reports about the June 17 massacre during a Bible study meeting at Charleston's Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal church. Judge J.C. Nicholson in July blocked the release of investigative materials in the state's murder case against Roof, who is white, citing concerns about graphic photos of the crime scene and emergency calls that might have recorded the sounds of victims.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Nathan Williams, who is prosecuting Roof in federal court, said the families and survivors were "re-traumatized" every time they heard, saw or read something about the killings. He argued for the documents, including coroner's reports and witness statements, to remain sealed. "It may take years before people are ready to see that," Williams said.

Jay Bender, an attorney for news organizations challenging the gag order, asked the judge to review documents and photos to decide whether some could be released. Media outlets have argued that transparency ensures a defendant's right to a fair trial. "There is an alternative to the imposition of a cloak of secrecy over what has happened in Charleston," Bender said....

In addition to state murder charges, Roof faces 33 federal hate crime and weapons charges that also could result in a death sentence but federal prosecutors have not said if they will pursue that in their case. The federal charges are based on evidence that Roof targeted the black victims because of their race and "in order to interfere with their exercise of religion," U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch said.

A few prior related posts:

September 16, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Split en banc Third Circuit struggles through how to review and assess Alleyne error

A decade ago, way back in the early Blakely and Booker days, this blog covered lots of cases dealing with lots of Sixth Amendment sentencing problems and circuit court efforts to sort through all the problems. Anyone with a continued fondness for the legal challenges and debates of that era will want to be sure to find the time to read today's work by the full Third Circuit in US v. Lewis, No. 10-2931 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2015) (available here). I will provide the highlights via the first paragraph from each of the three opinions.

Here is the start of the plurality opinion in Lewis:

Jermel Lewis was sentenced for a crime with a seven-year mandatory minimum — brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence — notwithstanding the fact that a jury had not convicted him of that crime.  Instead, he had been convicted of the crime of using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, which has a five-year mandatory minimum. Lewis was never even indicted for the crime of brandishing.  In Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court held that this scenario, i.e., sentencing a defendant for an aggravated crime when he was indicted and tried only for a lesser crime, violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  133 S. Ct. 2151, 2163-64 (2013).  Even though that constitutional issue is settled, we still must address the issue of whether the error that transpired in this case was harmless. We conclude that the error was not harmless because it contributed to the sentence Lewis received.  Accordingly, we will vacate Lewis’s sentence and remand for resentencing.

Here is the start of the concurring opinion in Lewis:

Jermel Lewis was charged with and convicted of using or carrying a firearm, but was eventually sentenced on the basis of a different, aggravated crime.  Conviction of the aggravated crime would have required proof of an element unnecessary to a using or carrying offense: that Lewis had brandished a firearm.  Lewis’s indictment did not charge him with brandishing, nor did the jury find that he had committed that crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Yet Lewis was subjected to the enhanced mandatory minimum sentence required for brandishing.  I agree with the majority that this error demands resentencing; the new sentence should be based solely on the crime with which Lewis was actually charged and for which he was convicted.  But I would hold that this error was structural and therefore reversible if properly preserved.  Structural errors do not require a court to inquire into whether the error was harmless.

Here is the start of the dissenting opinion in Lewis:

The plurality finds that Jermel Lewis’s substantial rights were affected when he was sentenced to a seven-year mandatory minimum sentence for brandishing a weapon during a crime of violence, despite undisputed and overwhelming testimony that he pointed a gun at many people during a robbery.  Though what occurred below was error, in my view, for the reasons explained in Judge Smith’s concurring opinion, the error occurred both at trial and at sentencing.  So, upon a review of the uncontroverted evidence presented to the grand and petit juries, I would hold that the error was harmless.

September 16, 2015 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Recuenco and review of Blakely error, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

"The Literal Cost of Solitary Confinement: Why are prisoners forced to pay fines when they are put in isolation?"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable New Republic piece, and here is an excerpt:

The United Nations has determined that solitary confinement may amount to torture: It can destroy the mind, sometimes the spirit.  And yet many jails and prisons around the country have decided that this punishment alone is not harsh enough.  It’s not widely known, but inmates who are determined to have committed a disciplinary infraction are regularly subjected to fines that can range into the hundreds of dollars on top of weeks or months-long solitary sentences.  Both the psychological damage caused by extreme isolation and the financial burden of the jail debt can hang over these people once they’re released, often making re-entry into society nearly impossible.

“When the system is built on punishment, you find every chance you get to damage people more,” said Glenn Martin, who spent six years in New York state prisons and founded the criminal justice reform group JustLeadershipUSA.  “Unfortunately, prisons in America have evolved into places that are devoid of values such as rehabilitation, fairness and human dignity.”

Prison officials in at least six state systems have the authority to impose fines in addition to solitary for a single rule violation.  Wyoming charges up to $50, Georgia up to $100, Oregon as much as to $200.  Fees in the states of New York, Kansas, and South Dakota range between $5 and $20.  (Wyoming, New York State, Georgia, and Kansas dismiss fines once an inmate is released or put them on hold in case the person returns. South Dakota said it doesn’t use solitary confinement, but the ACLU contends that the state’s isolation policies fit the definition.)...

While some of the state disciplinary fees may sound insignificant, small fines can pile up fast.  They pile up on people who often were homeless or unemployed before they were incarcerated and will face the same situations upon release.  The ACLU of Kansas said inmates could easily rack up thousands of dollars of debt just from disciplinary fines....

For many inmates and their families, disciplinary fines accumulate on top of court and attorney fees, court-ordered restitution, and child support.  And around the country, inmates may be obligated to pay for a seemingly infinite number of additional charges. Some of those costs: drug and alcohol abuse treatment; medical, dental, and psychiatric services; vocational training; toilet paper, laundry, and clothing; phone and video calls, food from the jail store, booking fees, drug testing, and fingerprinting.  In some jurisdictions, inmates pay “room and board” for the time they spend in jail awaiting trial.  Ninety percent of local jails collect revenue from incarcerated people. Those inmates pay an average of $1,259 per person per year to local facilities, according to a recent study by the Vera Institute of Justice.

Prisoners can even be charged for trying to kill themselves.  “I’ve seen it multiple times,” said Elisabeth Owen, the managing director of the Prisoners’ Justice League of Colorado.  “Someone hangs themselves and then they get a medical bill for thousands of dollars.”

September 16, 2015 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Federal child porn downloaders complaining to judges about Jared Fogle's (too sweet?) plea deal

This local article from Indiana, headlined "Convicted sex offenders object to Fogle's proposed plea deal," reports that at least a couple of incarcerated federal child pornography offenders have written to a federal judge to complain about how federal prosecutors used their discretion to resolve sex offense charges against former Subway pitchman Jared Fogle. Here are the basics:

Sex offenders in prison right now around the country are writing the judge here in Indiana handling the Jared Fogle case, upset over his possible plea deal.

In the letters — one from an inmate in Tucson, the other from an inmate in Florida — both talk about the time they are serving for distribution of child pornography.  One is serving a 40-year sentence, the other 16.5 years.

They are critical of Fogle's plea deal that could have him serve 5- to 12.5 years behind bars. They argue they are serving far more time for child pornography, and Fogle is also accused of having sex with underage girls.  Both asked for the judge to deny the plea deal.  Fogle's sentencing is set for November 19.

These two inmate letters make for fascinating reads and they can be accessed at this link. Among other stories, these letters provide an interesting perspective on how federal prosecutorial discretion can and does contribute to federal sentencing disparity and on how this disparity is perceived by those most impacted by it.  Notably, in a post last month I asked, Has Jared Fogle gotten a sweetheart plea deal and/or celebrity treatment for sex crimes?, and the question prompted a good comment dialogue.  Obviously, some federal child porn offenders think the answer to this question is obviously yes.

Prior related posts:

September 16, 2015 in Celebrity sentencings, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Who Pays? The True Cost of Incarceration on Family"

Download (1)The title of this post is the title of this new report based on research by a number of public policy groups.  Here is the executive summary:

For decades, individuals, families, and communities—especially low-income people and communities of color—have faced destabilizing and detrimental impacts as a result of our nation’s unfair criminal justice policies. The repercussions of these policies extend far beyond sentencing and incarceration, affecting the employment, education, housing, and health of individuals and their families for years to come. A unique contribution to the body of research, the study explores the ways in which women support their incarcerated loved ones, often jeopardizing their own stability. Our nation can no longer afford the devastating financial and familial costs of incarceration if we truly want to foster communities that are healthy, sustainable, and just.

As a result of this research, recommendations are made for three key categories of critical reforms necessary to change the criminal justice system and to help stabilize and support vulnerable families, communities, and formerly incarcerated individuals: Restructuring and Reinvesting, Removing Barriers, and Restoring Opportunities.

Restructuring and Reinvesting: Following the lead of states like California, all states need to restructure their policies to reduce the number of people in jails and prisons and the sentences they serve. The money saved from reducing incarceration rates should be used instead to reinvest in services that work, such as substance abuse programs and stable housing, which have proven to reduce recidivism rates. Additionally, sentencing needs to shift focus to accountability, safety, and healing the people involved rather than punishing those convicted of crimes.

Removing Barriers: Upon release, formerly incarcerated individuals face significant barriers accessing critical resources like housing and employment that they need to survive and move forward. Many are denied public benefits like food stamps and most are unable to pursue training or education that would provide improved opportunities for the future. Families also suffer under these restrictions and risk losing support as a result of their loved one’s conviction. These barriers must be removed in order to help individuals have a chance at success, particularly the many substantial financial obligations that devastate individuals and their families. On the flip side, when incarcerated people maintain contact with their family members on the outside, their likelihood of successful reunification and reentry increases, and their chances of recidivating are reduced. For most families the cost of maintaining contact is too great to bear and must be lowered if families are to stay intact. Removing cost and other barriers to contact is essential.

Restoring Opportunities: Focusing energy on investing and supporting formerly incarcerated individuals, their families, and the communities from which they come can restore their opportunities for a brighter future and the ability to participate in society at large. Savings from criminal justice reforms should be combined with general budget allocations and invested in job training and subsidized employment services, for example, to provide the foundation necessary to help individuals and their families succeed prior to system involvement and upon reentry.

Our nation’s criminal justice system has dramatic impacts on the lives of individuals who are incarcerated and the lives of those they touch. These effects wreak financial, physical, and emotional havoc on women, families, and communities, undermining potential for a better life. The true costs of our criminal justice system are complex, deeply rooted, and demand a closer look at the multiple impacts on individuals and families. When these costs are understood and acknowledged, it becomes clear that the system — and society more broadly — must change.

September 16, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Does Glossip case reveal Oklahoma's prosecutors as immoral and its judges lacking in moral fiber?

The qustion in the title of this post is prompted by this provocative Slate commentary authored by Robert J. Smith and G. Ben Cohen which is headlined "Groundhog Day Nightmare: Oklahoma is about to execute a man who is probably innocent." Here are excerpts from the piece, including sections with the forceful rhetoric parroted in the title of this post:

Oklahoma is set to execute Richard Glossip, despite grave doubts about his guilt. A chorus of people that includes Republican former Sen. Tom Coburn; Virgin Group CEO Richard Branson; and Barry Switzer, the beloved former Oklahoma Sooners football coach, has called for Oklahoma Gov. Mary Fallin to grant a stay of execution. If she does not, and if the Supreme Court does not step in, Glossip will be put to death Wednesday....

In 1997, Justin Sneed killed Barry Van Treese, a motel owner for whom both Sneed and Glossip worked. The police found Sneed’s fingerprints all over the bloody crime scene and in the victim’s vehicle. Sneed later confessed to the killing. The prosecution’s theory at Glossip’s trial was that Glossip pressured Sneed into murdering Van Treese. What evidence supported the state’s theory? Not much....

The prosecution gave him a sweetheart deal: In exchange for his testimony against Glossip, the state waived the death penalty. The problem is that the substance of Sneed’s testimony at trial was invented by the state....

It is bad enough that Sneed received a deal in exchange for his testimony. It is worse that the detective “educated” Sneed about Glossip being the mastermind. But what’s not only unforgivable, but downright immoral, is that the prosecution put forward the Glossip-as-mastermind theory in a capital case, with a man’s life on the line, when Sneed couldn’t even keep his story straight....

If Oklahoma proceeds with this execution, Glossip will not, unfortunately, be the only plausibly innocent man put to death....

Did Georgia execute an innocent man when it killed Troy Anthony Davis? Did Texas execute innocent men when it put Cameron Todd Willingham and Lester Bower to death? Will Oklahoma add to this tragic list if neither Gov. Fallin nor the Supreme Court stops the execution of Richard Glossip? We honestly do not know. And that’s the problem. How do we preserve the integrity of our justice system and our courts if we send condemned inmates to the lethal injection chamber with no more certainty of their guilt than a coin flip?

Given all that is known today about wrongful convictions, the fallibility of our criminal justice institutions, and their fallibility in identifying these potentially fatal errors, the question should not be Is this person innocent? but rather: Is this a case of uncertain guilt? Whatever principles the state seeks to uphold, whether it is the finality of its judgments or deference to juries or state courts, nothing trumps the risk of executing a person where there is some serious doubt as to his or her guilt.

In Richard Glossip’s case, there is more than “some” doubt.  There is lots of it. No physical evidence ties him to the crime.  There is no motive that withstands scrutiny. The detectives in the case engaged in tactics known to increase the likelihood of witnesses providing false statements.  And the state’s chief witness, Justin Sneed, was unreliable at best, with clear motives for lying. Few of us would buy a used car from Justin Sneed.  Are we prepared to stake the moral fiber of our justice system on his word?  If our answer is no, we must stop the execution of Richard Glossip. His life depends upon it, and so does the soul of our nation’s justice system.

I was a bit dismissive in this prior post of eleventh-hour innocence claims here given that Glossip was twice convicted and sentenced to death (his first conviction was reversed for procedural error). But I cannot help but wonder if my eagerness to question claims of innocence here is a result of my own desire to believe that Oklahoma prosecutors would not be immorally eager to condemn to death (twice) a man based on very weak evidence and that Oklahoma and federal courts would have had the moral fiber to intervene if there was real substance to the innocence claims.

That all said, absent "smoking gun" evidence to provide some more confidence in Glossip's guilt, I can understand why the abolitionist crowd has now garnered broad support for their claim that the Glossip execution should not go forward.  Still, I continue to be deeply troubled that a case which produced two jury convictions well over a decade ago, and which has been at the center of the national death penalty debate for nearly all of 2015, is  only now struggling at the very minute with what is the most fundamental and basic question in any and every criminal case.

Prior related post:

September 16, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Tuesday, September 15, 2015

"Here’s why Obama should pardon hundreds more women"

The title of this post is part of the headline of this recent Fusion commentary authored by Amy Ralston Povah. Here are excerpts:

After the fifth year in prison, each additional year begins to eat into the layers of your soul.  Parents pass away, friends drift off, spouses find someone else.  Children grow up, graduate, get married, have children of their own; holidays come and go, and when that 7th, 15th or 22nd year rolls around, you feel like your heart is being crushed.

I shared those emotions with the women I served time with at FCI Dublin, a correctional facility in northern California.  I was serving 24 years on a drug conspiracy charge, arrested for collecting bail money for my husband, who manufactured MDMA.  He was the kingpin, but he only received three years probation because he cooperated with the prosecutors.  I refused a plea bargain, and I got stuck in jail.

So when President Clinton commuted my sentence on July 7, 2000 — after I’d served 9 years and 3 months — I felt like I had won the lottery.  The prison compound erupted into cheers and marched me across the yard to the gate on the day I left.  And yet, it was a bittersweet victory.  While I was elated for myself, it was hard to walk away, knowing I would not see these women the next day, or possibly ever again.

I felt that mix of bittersweet emotions again this summer when President Obama commuted the sentences of 46 nonviolent drug offenders, more than any sitting president in the last 50 years.  It was the result of Clemency Project 2014, a federal initiative that encouraged over 35,000 prisoners to apply for clemency.  On one day, 42 men and four women were the lucky lottery winners chosen from a massive number of candidates....

Having served time with over a thousand women, I believe they are the hardest hit victims in the war on drugs.  Many women are indicted because they are merely a girlfriend or wife of a drug dealer, yet are not part of the inner circle and have limited information to plea bargain with.  Mandatory minimums are reserved for those who do not cut a deal with prosecutors.

Women are being overlooked by the Department of Justice as candidates worthy of a seat on that coveted commutation list.  Over the last 30 years, the female prison population has grown by over 800% while the male prison population grew 416% during the same timeframe.  More than half of the mothers in prison were the primary financial supporters of their children before they were incarcerated.  And the vast majority of women in federal prison were put there due to conspiracy laws that hold them equally culpable for the criminal actions of other co-defendants, often a spouse or boyfriend. In other words, many women are guilty by association.

There are hundreds of women sitting in federal prison on drug conspiracy charges who deserve clemency — most of them first offenders serving life without parole.  Alice Johnson is an accomplished playwright who has served 18 years on a life sentence for cocaine conspiracy and has the support of three members of Congress.  Josephine Ledezma has already served over 23 years and is still waiting to have her petition filed.  Sharanda Jones has served 15 years; filed for clemency in 2013 and has over 270,000 supporters on  Michelle West has served 22 years of a double life sentence, plus fifty years, in a case where the key witness was given immunity and never served a day for a murder he admitted to.

Some days, sitting in prison, you think life can’t get any worse.  And then another blow comes when 46 people receive clemency and your name is not on that list.  Many of the same women I said goodbye to in 2000 are still in prison, serving 30 years to life, even though, like myself, they were minor participants in a nonviolent drug conspiracy case.... But with a stroke of his pen, President Obama can help right the wrongs of the past and give these deserving women a second chance at life.  He should get started right away.

September 15, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Drug Offense Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Unequal Assistance of Counsel"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper by Peter Joy now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

There is now, and has always been, a double standard when it comes to the criminal justice system in the United States.  The system is stacked against you if you are a person of color or are poor, and is doubly unjust if you are both a person of color and poor.  The potential counterweight to such a system, a lawyer by one’s side, is unequal as well.  In reality, the right to counsel is a right to the unequal assistance of counsel in the United States.

The unequal treatment based on the color of one’s skin is reflected by the racial disparity throughout the criminal justice system in which minority racial groups are involved in the criminal justice system as suspects and defendants at rates greater than their proportion of the general population.  This is illustrated by the “driving while black” phenomenon in which law enforcement officers initiate traffic stops against persons of color and subject them to searches at a higher rate than whites, even though law enforcement is more likely to find contraband on white drivers than persons of color.

The Sixth Amendment promises the effective assistance of counsel to every person accused of a crime where incarceration is a possible punishment.  This guarantee suggests that everyone, rich and poor, is equal before the law.  But the reality of the criminal justice system is much different for the majority of those charged with crimes.  If one does not have the financial means to hire effective counsel, or is poor and not lucky enough to have a well-funded, effective public defender or appointed counsel, the defendant’s right to counsel is unequal.  This disparity is driven largely by the wealth of the accused and falls most harshly on people of color, who are twice as likely as whites to live in poverty and are accused of crimes at rates much higher than their proportion of the population.  As a result, class and race are largely determinative of the lawyer, and often the amount of justice one receives.

This article explores how unequal assistance of counsel contributes to unequal justice.  The article begins with a brief overview of racial disparities in the ways laws are enforced.  The initial step in the criminal justice system, whether the police stop someone, can lead to arrest, charges, and the need for a lawyer.  Next, it analyzes the systemic barriers to effective assistance of counsel at the state level, which is driven largely by excessive caseloads and an ineffective assistance of counsel standard that tolerates bad lawyering.  It concludes with strategies for achieving more effective assistance of counsel, which emphasize the ethical imperative to provide meaningful assistance of counsel, the importance of data collection by public defender systems, and systemic litigation that positions assistance of counsel claims prior to trials.

September 15, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Two very interesting (and very different) long reads about mass incarceration and drug dealing

I recently noticed two new (and very different) long-form commentary pieces that both ought to be of interest to deep thinkers about crime and punishment. Both defy easy summarization, so I will just provide links and the extended headline of the pieces and encourage readers in the comments to highlight important themes in either or both:

September 15, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 14, 2015

Montgomery wards: gearing up for SCOTUS juve LWOP retroactivity case

In four weeks, the US Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Montgomery v. Louisiana.  Here, via this SCOTUSblog posting and this official SCOTUS page, are the questions that the Justices will be considering in Montgomery:

Do we have jurisdiction to decide whether the Supreme Court of Louisiana correctly refused to give retroactive effect in this case to our decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. ____ (2012)?

Whether Miller v. Alabama adopts a new substantive rule that applies retroactively on collateral review to people condemned as juveniles to die in prison.

Because both of these questions engage many interesting, important and dynamic issues, I am planning to do a (lengthy?) series of posts about this case and the various arguments that have been presented to the Justices via amicus briefs (including one I filed thanks to the efforts of good folks at the Columbus offices of Jones Day).  As the title of this post reveals, I have decided to use "Montgomery wards" as the cheeky title for this coming series of posts.

Notably, as this new SCOTUSblog posting highlights, it would now appear that the Justices share my sense that the Montgomery case raises many interesting, important and dynamic issues because they have now scheduled additional argument time for the case.  Here are the basics via Lyle Denniston's SCOTUSblog report:

The Supreme Court on Monday added fifteen minutes to the argument schedule for its hearing October 13 on Montgomery v. Louisiana, a case that could decide which juveniles convicted of murder can take advantage of a 2012 decision limiting sentences of life without parole for minors.  The added time will allow a Court-appointed attorney to argue a question about the Court’s authority to actually rule on the legal issue in the case.

In March, the Justices agreed to hear the appeal of Henry Montgomery of Baton Rouge, who is seeking retroactive application of the Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama, which had all but eliminated states’ power to sentence youths to life without parole, as punishment for committing a murder when they were under the age of eighteen.  In taking on the case, however, the Court also added the question whether it has jurisdiction to review and rule on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision refusing to apply the Miller precedent to cases that had become final before June 25, 2012, when Miller was decided.   Louisiana had raised that issue in a filing in an earlier case on the juvenile sentencing question. 

Instead of the usual one hour of argument time, the Court in the Montgomery case will hear seventy-five minutes.  The time will be divided this way: the Court-appointed attorney, Richard Bernstein of Washington, D.C., will have fifteen minutes to argue against the Court’s jurisdiction, Montgomery’s attorney will have fifteen minutes to argue both points, an attorney from the office of the U.S. Solicitor General will have fifteen minutes to argue both issues, and a lawyer for the state of Louisiana will have thirty minutes of time to argue both questions.  The order also said that Bernstein and Montgomery’s lawyer will be allowed to save time for rebuttal.

The federal government, in a brief filed by the Solicitor General, supported Montgomery’s plea to apply Miller retroactively and argued that the Court does have jurisdiction to decide that question.  The brief noted that there are twenty-seven inmates in federal prisons whose sentences could be affected by the retroactivity issue.

September 14, 2015 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Is a capital case the right kind of vehicle for SCOTUS to consider solitary confinement?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new New York Times piece by Adam Liptak headlined "Virginia Has Solitary Confinement Case, if Justices Want It." Here are excerpts:

The Supreme Court seems eager to hear a case on the constitutionality of a distinctively American form of punishment: prolonged solitary confinement. “Years on end of near total isolation exact a terrible price,” Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote in a concurrence in a case in June. Justice Stephen G. Breyer echoed the point in a dissent in a case later that month.

An appeal from Virginia materialized almost immediately. Now the justices must weigh whether it has the right features — whether it is, in legal jargon, a good vehicle — to serve as the basis for a major decision on extended solitary confinement, which much of the world considers torture.

On the plus side, the case asks the sort of focused and incremental question that the justices often find attractive: May states automatically put all death row inmates in solitary confinement?

Last week, Mark R. Herring, Virginia’s attorney general, filed a brief urging the court to turn down the appeal. It is, he said, the wrong vehicle to address “the broader concerns recently voiced by Justices Kennedy and Breyer.” For starters, Mr. Herring wrote, “the case is likely to become moot before it can be decided.” That is because the state intends to execute the inmate who brought the challenge, Alfredo R. Prieto, on Oct. 1.

More generally, Mr. Herring wrote, Virginia is the wrong state in which to examine the issue of prolonged solitary confinement on death row because its capital justice system is exceptionally efficient. Inmates in other states can spend decades in solitary confinement, he wrote, but Virginia generally executes condemned inmates seven to 10 years after their convictions.

Mr. Prieto has been on death row for about seven years. But that was enough isolation, he told the justices, to have caused him mental agony. In a 2013 deposition, the warden of the prison where Mr. Prieto is serving his sentence seemed to concede the inhumanity of solitary confinement. “There is real importance to getting out and being with other people, I agree, and not being 24/7 in a cell,” said the warden, Keith Davis. “We, as humans, we don’t survive very well that way with lack of human contact.”

Later that year, a federal trial judge ruled in Mr. Prieto’s favor. “He must spend almost all of his time alone,” deprived of contact even with fellow prisoners, the judge, Leonie M. Brinkema, wrote. In theory, family members could visit on weekends in a room with a glass partition. “In actuality,” she said, “no one ever comes.”

Mr. Prieto, she said, “has not engaged in any of the behaviors that would normally support placement in segregated confinement,” and was “by all accounts a model prisoner.” On the other hand, he has a chilling criminal record. Mr. Prieto was on California’s death row for the 1990 rape and murder of a 15-year-old girl when, in 2005, DNA evidence linked him to a 1988 rape and double murder in Virginia. He was extradited to Virginia and found guilty....

In March, a divided three-judge panel of the federal appeals court in Virginia reversed Judge Brinkema’s ruling, though even the majority said the state’s approach was harsh. “Of course,” Judge Diana Gribbon Motz wrote for the majority, “the Supreme Court could prescribe more rigorous judicial review.”

Last week, Mr. Herring, the state’s attorney general, urged the Supreme Court to defer to prison officials in the case, Prieto v. Clarke, No. 15-31. “Death row offenders are sui generis,” he wrote. “States are entitled to make the judgment that death-sentenced offenders, as a class, should be confined in maximum-security conditions.”...

In June, Justice Kennedy lamented that “the condition in which prisoners are kept simply has not been a matter of sufficient public inquiry or interest.” That seemed to change over the summer. In July, President Obama ordered the Justice Department to review the use of solitary confinement in federal facilities....

This month, California settled a lawsuit brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights by agreeing to cut back sharply on solitary confinement. The next day, a group representing the nation’s corrections officials called for “efforts to limit or end extended isolation.”

Things are changing even in Virginia, perhaps as a consequence of Mr. Pietro’s lawsuit. In a sworn statement filed last month in a different case, Mr. Clarke, the corrections official, said death row inmates can now watch television and play games like chess or checkers with up to three other condemned prisoners for an hour a day. They can also have weekly “contact visits” with family members. These can include “one brief kiss, a handshake and/or an embrace.”

Plans are afoot, Mr. Clarke added, for an outdoor recreation yard that will allow small groups of death row inmates to play basketball and exercise together. It should be completed by the end of October, not long after Mr. Prieto’s scheduled execution.

Regular readers likely know that I believe and often lament that capital cases often get too much attention from the Supreme Court (and others) relative to other cases involving much less serious crimes and much more sympathetic offenders. Nevertheless, as this piece notes, Virginia's blanket policy of putting all death-row defendants in solitary might make this case an appropriate (and certainly interesting) setting for a foray into what the Eighth Amendment might say these days about extreme forms of imprisonment.

September 14, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Prisons and prisoners, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Is the death penalty on "life support" or about to have a quickened pulse?

NptuDCEThe question in the title of this post is prompted by this huge new USA Today article headlined "Courts, states put death penalty on life support." Here are some excerpts from the lengthy article that is well-told in multiple chapters:

If there is such a thing as a lock for the death penalty, the case against Daniel Higgins appeared to be just that. Already sought for sexually assaulting a child, Higgins killed Sheriff's Sgt. Michael Naylor last October with a point-blank shot to the head, making him the only deputy slain in the department's 130-year history. "I wanted him dead," Sheriff Gary Painter says of the murderer.

But Naylor's widow, Denise Davis, said she couldn't bear the likely rounds of appeals that could stretch on for decades.  Higgins was allowed to plead guilty and was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.  The death penalty in America may be living on borrowed time.

The emotional and financial toll of prosecuting a single capital case to its conclusion, along with the increased availability of life without parole and continuing court challenges to execution methods, have made the ultimate punishment more elusive than at any time since its reinstatement in 1976.

Prosecutors, judges and juries also are being influenced by capital punishment's myriad afflictions: racial and ethnic discrimination, geographic disparities, decades spent on death row and glaring mistakes that have exonerated 155 prisoners in the last 42 years.

Those trends may be squeezing the life out of the death penalty.  That doesn't even take into account the added burden of legal clashes, legislative repeals, and problems finding and administering drugs for lethal injections.

The Supreme Court in June upheld a controversial form of lethal injection by the narrowest of margins, thereby giving Oklahoma the green light to reschedule three executions.  But courts in many states continue to wrestle with that issue, and the justices have four more death penalty cases on their docket this fall challenging the roles of Kansas juries, Florida judges and Georgia prosecutors....

Still, the Supreme Court has twice upheld the constitutionality of lethal injection, first in 2008 and again in June, when the justices ruled 5-4 that Oklahoma can use a sedative involved in three botched executions last year.  Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the majority, said challengers could not suggest a better alternative.

The ruling gave impetus to states such as Alabama and Mississippi seeking to jump-start executions after a hiatus of several years.  But it also rejuvenated legal efforts by groups opposed to the death penalty, who continue to fight against lethal injection protocols in several states....

Several states took the high court's ruling as a reason to rejuvenate the death penalty. Missouri wasted little time resuming executions, putting David Zink to death two weeks later, on July 14.  Texas, by far the nation's leader in executions with 528 since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976, followed suit with an execution in August and has six more on tap this year.

States from Florida to Montana that have not killed anyone for several years are in court, seeking to rejuvenate dormant death penalties.  Some states are establishing backup methods in case lethal injections become impossible.  Eight permit electrocution, three allow gas chambers, three allow hanging, and two would use firing squads -- as Utah did in 2010 and 2013....

Nebraska this year became the first "red" state to ban capital punishment.  That law faces potential repeal in 2016 if death penalty proponents can put it to a vote.  The attention Nebraska received overshadowed near-misses in Delaware, where Rep. Sean Lynn says the death penalty is applied in discriminatory fashion, and Montana, where Rep. David Moore says the costs are proving to be unaffordable....

The debate over lethal injection has energized legislatures as well as courts and corrections departments.  North Carolina and Arkansas, two Southern states seeking to rejuvenate their dormant death penalties, approved laws this year that impose secrecy on the source of lethal injection drugs.  Arkansas recently purchased a new supply of drugs.

The problem for the legal system is that it's more of a medical issue.  Some drugs, such as sodium thiopental and pentobarbital, no longer can be obtained from European drug makers.  That has sent states scurrying to compounding pharmacists, where the drugs they get are not subject to Food and Drug Administration regulation.

But those pharmacists aren't pleased.  Its trade group in March discouraged members from "participating in the preparation, dispensing or distribution of compounded medications for use in legally authorized executions."  A week later, the American Pharmacists Association called executions "fundamentally contrary to the role of pharmacists as providers of health care."

I would recommend this USA Today article to anyone looking for an effective up-to-date account of the current state of the death penalty in the United States. But while the piece details all the notable barriers and hurdles in the way of continued use of the death penalty and execution, it does not fully note that the Glossip case could well have removed enough legalistic barriers to allow traditional "death belt" states and a few others to conduct multiple executions in the coming months.

Notably, this Death Penalty Information Center scheduled execution page details nine serious execution dates in five different states for the month of October. If all (or even most) of these executions get carried out without any unusual difficulties or Supreme Court intervention, I suspect additional states will feel emboldened to try a bit harder to get its death machinery up-and-running again in 2016.  And especially if Ohio can get the drugs it needs to conduct executions, I think 2016 could see a significant uptick in nationwide executions.

Especially with a death penalty referendum on the ballot in Nebraska and a presidential election season in full swing, I think 2016 will be an especially interesting and important year for the future of the death penalty in the United States.  Though it is certainly possible to look at recent developments to predict the coming demise of capital punishment, the death penalty in the United States has historically found ways to stay alive and kicking.

September 14, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

"How Obama can use his clemency power to help reverse racism"

The title of this post is the headline of this provocative new MSNBC commentary authored Mark Osler and Nkechi Taifa. Here are excerpts:

In the remaining months of his second term, President Barack Obama has the chance to deliver justice for thousands of people given overly-harsh sentences for drug crimes.  The White House is probably now contemplating the next batch of clemency grants, which is expected in October.

It is likely that the vast majority of those whose sentences would be shortened will be African American. That is as it should be given that past laws and policies, as well as prosecutors and presidents, have tilted the criminal justice system disproportionately against them.

On average, blacks face unequal treatment at each stage of the criminal justice system. They are stopped and arrested more frequently than others; they are less likely to receive favorable terms on bail; and they are more likely to be victims of prosecutorial misconduct. Blacks are more likely to accept unfair plea bargains and be sentenced to rigid, lengthy mandatory minimums, or even death.  Race mattered when blacks were disproportionately targeted, imprisoned, and sentenced beyond the bounds of reason.  Race should also matter in providing relief via clemency today.

Despite the facially neutral nature of current laws that do not intentionally discriminate, disparate treatment is nevertheless sewn into the structural fabric of institutions, allowing bias to occur without direct action by a specific person.

Today’s racism is subtle and structurally embedded in many police departments, prosecutor offices, and courtrooms.  It is found in laws that look fair, but nevertheless have a racially discriminatory impact.  For example, from 1986 through 2010, the federal sentencing guidelines and the primary federal narcotics statute mandated the same sentence for five grams of crack as they did for 500 grams of powder cocaine....

Moreover, we know that even now prosecutors use the law unfairly to punish black defendants.  Writing in the Daily Beast, Jay Michaelson reports that 95% of elected prosecutors are white, and that those prosecutors disproportionately use mandatory minimum sentences to incarcerate black defendants for longer periods of time than similarly situated whites.  Again, there is seldom a “smoking gun” tying white prosecutors to specific acts of racism.  But there is a growing consensus that the system is flawed and structurally biased against blacks.

The number of African-Americans jailed under these laws and policies soared in the past few decades.  Yet previous presidents predominantly used their power to pardon to benefit high profile white men, including Vice President Dick Cheney’s former chief of staff, Scooter Libby, and Clinton donor and financier Marc Rich.  Indeed, President George W. Bush used the pardon power 200 times, but fewer than 16 of those were granted to black petitioners who have traditionally been unconnected to money, power and influence....

As the president’s clemency program accelerates over the 16 months remaining in his second and final term, we hope that he will look at the impact race has played in meting out unjust sentences.  We hope that he will broadly consider those who are worthy of a shortened sentence and a lengthened term of freedom and responsibility.  And we hope that among this group will be multitudes of eligible black men and women who will be able to be reunited with families and communities.  This does not reflect a racial bias.  It simply reflects the gut-wrenching reality of those disproportionately over-sentenced in the first place.

September 14, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, September 13, 2015

Alabama Chief Justice laments mandatory LWOP drug sentence for 76-year-old offender

As reported in this AP article, "Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore says the case of a 76-year-man sentenced to life without parole for a drug offense shows the need to change sentencing laws."  Here is more about the notable separate opinion authored by the top jurist of the the Cotton State:

Moore issued a special writing Friday as the Supreme Court refused to overturn the case of Lee Carroll Brooker. "I believe Brooker's sentence is excessive and unjustified," Moore wrote.

Brooker lived with his son in Houston County, and court documents show police found a marijuana-growing operation there during a search in 2013. The elderly man was convicted of drug trafficking last year, and a judge sentenced him to life without parole because of past robbery convictions in Florida. His son was also convicted. Moore writes that the life-without-parole sentence for a non-violent drug offense shows "grave flaws" in Alabama's sentencing system.

"A trial court should have the discretion to impose a less severe sentence than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole," Moore added. "I urge the legislature to revisit that statutory sentencing scheme to determine whether it serves an appropriate purpose."

The full opinion by Chief Justice Moore is available at this link.

September 13, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

New gossip about claim of innocence in Glossip

As reported in this New York Times article, the condemned murderer whose name was atop the case in which the Supreme Court recently upheld Oklahoma's approach to lethal injection now has supporters raising questions anew about his factual guilt.  The piece is headlined "Oklahoma Inmate the Focus of Renewed Attention as Execution Date Nears," and here are excerpts:

Richard E. Glossip was at the center of a major Supreme Court case this year, arguing along with two other men on Oklahoma’s death row that the state’s choice of lethal injection drugs could cause unconstitutional suffering. The court rejected that claim in a 5­4 decision in June, clearing the way for Oklahoma to resume executions. Mr. Glossip’s is the first; he is scheduled to die on Wednesday.

Now Mr. Glossip, 52, is again a focus of attention, this time over whether he is guilty of the arranged murder in 1997 of the owner of a run­down motel he was managing. Mr. Glossip’s supporters call his case a striking example of a repeating pattern in American capital punishment, in which a defendant receives inadequate legal representation early on and then, many years later, only as execution nears, higher­powered lawyers and civil rights groups become involved, raising important new issues at the 11th hour, when it may be too late.

Mr. Glossip has won the fervent backing of Sister Helen Prejean, the antideath­penalty campaigner; the actress Susan Sarandon, who played Sister Helen in the film “Dead Man Walking”; and a new legal team, working pro bono, which says his conviction was marred by poor lawyering and unreliable, police-­coached testimony.

In a drumbeat of media appearances, Mr. Glossip’s supporters are calling on Gov. Mary Fallin of Oklahoma to delay his execution for 60 days while they explore what they say is important new evidence that they released on Friday and will discuss in a news conference in Oklahoma City on Monday.

The victim, Barry Van Treese, was beaten to death with a baseball bat in a room at the Best Budget Inn in Oklahoma City, a motel that he owned and Mr. Glossip managed. Justin Sneed, a 19-­year-­old drifter with an eighth­grade education whom Mr. Glossip allowed to stay at the motel in return for maintenance work, admitted to the murder and is serving life without parole.

Mr. Sneed testified that Mr. Glossip had told him to kill Mr. Van Treese in return for thousands of dollars in motel receipts. Prosecutors said Mr. Glossip was a cunning figure who feared he was about to be fired for mismanagement and stealing motel revenues, and persuaded Mr. Sneed to commit the crime....

Mr. Glossip’s appeals to the state and federal Supreme Court have been exhausted. His last hope is for Governor Fallin, a Republican, to stay his execution while his lawyers work to persuade a judge, or the state board of pardon and parole, that significant new evidence warrants a new hearing or clemency. “We are seriously racing against time, as you can imagine,” said one of those lawyers, Donald R. Knight, from Colorado. “We’re trying to do work that should have been done by trial lawyers a long time ago.”

But Governor Fallin has rejected calls to intervene. “His actions directly led to the brutal murder of a husband and a father of seven children,” she said last month in a statement about Mr. Glossip, stressing that he had been convicted in two jury trials and lost multiple appeals. “The state of Oklahoma is prepared to hold him accountable for his crimes and move forward with his scheduled execution.”

Barry C. Scheck, co­director of the Innocence Project in New York, said there were serious “residual doubts” about Mr. Glossip’s guilt. A number of cases in which those sentenced to death were later exonerated, he said, had similarly relied on witnesses who benefited from testimony.

Mr. Glossip was first found guilty and sentenced to death in 1998, but a state appeals court ordered a retrial because his defense lawyers had failed to cross­-examine or investigate witnesses effectively. He was again convicted and condemned in 2004, and the courts did not find evidence of deficiencies that would require a new appeal. But Mr. Knight said the new team had identified weaknesses with that second defense as well. By all accounts, Mr. Glossip’s behavior on the day after the murder hurt his case....

The Glossip case reflects a common problem in capital punishment, Mr. Scheck said: a poor defense in the initial trial, which then limits the legal options in later appeals. “What frequently happens in these capital cases is that the really good lawyers only get involved at the end, when it’s too late,” Mr. Scheck said.

Mr. Van Treese’s family is convinced of Mr. Glossip’s guilt and has thanked the governor for standing firm. “Execution of Richard Glossip will not bring Barry back or lessen the empty hole left in the lives of those who loved Barry,” family members said in a statement this week to The Tulsa World. “What it does provide is a sense that justice has been served.”

I use the term gossip in the title of this post in part because I find less than compelling the development of new contentions about innocence a full two decades after the crime was committed given that the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death twice by two different juries. I certainly recognize that juries can get guilt/innocence determinations wrong, but I am ever hopeful it is highly unlikely that a two different juries would both get this critical determination unanimously wrong.

In addition, Mr. Glossip's supporters had to reasonably expect he would have a serious execution date in 2015, and he has not had his death sentence carried out already only because of Oklahoma's difficulties with its lethal injection plans. And, based on the tenor of the the Supreme Court oral argument in Glossip back in April, it should have been especially obvious that Oklahoma would likely have its machinery of death up and running again pretty soon. I find it troublesome that, despite all this extra time to conduct whatever additional investigation might now unearth new concerns about guilt, defense attorneys now assert they need another 60 days to make a more forceful showing of innocence.

September 13, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (8)

Saturday, September 12, 2015

Federal judge finds unconstitutional Missouri's operation of its sex-offender civil commitment program

As reported in this local piece, headlined "U.S. judge rules handling of state's sexual predator program is unconstitutional," a federal judge issued late friday a significant ruling concerning Missouri's sex offender laws.  Here are the details:

In an awaited ruling from the federal bench, U.S. District Judge Audrey G. Fleissig ruled late Friday afternoon that Missouri’s sexually violent predator law is constitutional, but not how it’s applied.  The judge wrote that there is a “pervasive sense of hopelessness” at the Department of Mental Health’s Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services, or SORTS program, because patients aren’t being properly released.

With help from the state attorney general’s office, SORTS is indefinitely committing about 200 people to treatment in the belief that they might reoffend.  The program has been praised and criticized since it began in 1999.  Before the trial started in April, nobody had completed treatment and been allowed to live outside of secure SORTS facilities in Fulton or Farmington.  They entered the program after completing prison sentences for sex crimes.

“The overwhelming evidence at trial — much of which came from Defendants’ own experts — did establish that the SORTS civil commitment program suffers from systemic failures regarding risk assessment and release that have resulted in the continued confinement of individuals who no longer meet the criteria for commitment, in violation of the Due Process Clause,” Fleissig wrote in her ruling.

“The Constitution,” the judge added, “does not allow (Missouri officials) to impose lifetime detention on individuals who have completed their prison sentences and who no longer pose a danger to the public, no matter how heinous their past conduct.”  Those issues will be addressed soon in the remedy portion of the trial.  A hearing will be held Sept. 29.

“I can’t believe it, man,” said John Van Orden, 55, who lived in the Springfield, Mo., area before being committed to SORTS in 2005.  “It’s hard to describe after all that we have been through here.  Finally, we get some light at the end of the tunnel.”  The class-action lawsuit began in 2009.

Eric Selig, a lead attorney for the plaintiffs, said Friday: “We hope to work with the attorney general’s office and the Department of Mental Health to fix the program and start releasing the people who have successfully completed treatment, which is what the statute is all about.”...

Gov. Jay Nixon, a Democrat, has supported the program as a needed public safety tool.  He has said judges weigh annual reports to determine when patients deserve to be released. And the Legislature, now Republican-controlled, adds a layer of oversight, scrutinizing the program’s budget.  Plaintiffs’ attorneys attempted to punch holes in these positions and others during the eight-day federal bench trial that ended here April 30.

The judge agreed. In her ruling, she said the state of Missouri has not:

  • Performed annual reviews in accordance with the Sexually Violent Predator Act.
  • Properly implemented any program to ensure the least restrictive environment.
  • Implemented release procedures, including director authorization for releases, in the manner required by the law.

At the center of the case in Missouri — and other states struggling with similar laws — was the question of whether SORTS facilities genuinely rehabilitate sex offenders, or are merely an extra layer of punishment outside of the prison system.  In June, a federal judge in Minnesota ruled that indefinitely committing sex offenders is unconstitutional.

While the Missouri Attorney General’s Office argued at trial that progress is being made in treatment, plaintiffs’ attorneys harped on the fact that no patient had been released back into society.  They used the state’s own witness to point out a sense of hopelessness among staff and patients, who already have completed prison sentences before being detained indefinitely for treatment.

Plaintiffs’ attorneys sifted through hundreds of thousands of pages of the program’s documents, including a memo from the former chief of operations who wrote in 2009 that 16 patients could be moved to the St. Louis Psychiatric Rehabilitation Center, a less restrictive facility at 5300 Arsenal Street. In the memo, Alan Blake wrote that the top five of those 16 patients could be moved “today” and “easily” pass a test that shows they can live close to neighbors without harm.  “The rest may need greater support/treatment, but don’t represent a risk to the community in terms of compliance and appreciation of their situation,” Blake added.  “The setting would likely enhance their treatment and provide motivation.”  The memo went on to say that a few of the patients would even make good employees or peer counselors at the St. Louis rehab center.

Testimony in the federal case showed that those details — ones that seemed to show favorable patient progress — weren’t included in the annual reports to courts that make the ultimate decision about release.  With the addition of 20 SORTS patients a year and nobody being released, plaintiffs’ attorneys pressed the issue of reforming the program and developing a fast track to a nursing home for elderly and infirm patients. At least 17 patients have died in the program, including one who was well into his 80s.

The full 60-page trial court ruling in this matter can be accessed at this link.

September 12, 2015 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

"Punitive Compensation"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new paper by Cortney Lollar now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Criminal restitution is a core component of punishment. In its current form, this remedy rarely serves restitution’s traditional aim of disgorging a defendant’s ill-gotten gains. Instead, courts use this monetary award not only to compensate crime victims for intangible losses, but also to punish the defendant for the moral blameworthiness of her criminal action. Because the remedy does not fit into the definition of what most consider “restitution,” this Article advocates for the adoption of a new, additional designation for this prototypically punitive remedy: punitive compensation.

Unlike restitution, courts measure punitive compensation by a victim’s losses, not a defendant’s unlawful gains. Punitive compensation acknowledges the critical element of moral blameworthiness present in the current remedy. Given this component of moral blameworthiness, this Article concludes the jury should determine how much compensation to impose on a particular criminal defendant.

The jury is the preferable fact-finder both because jurors represent the conscience of the community, and because the Sixth Amendment jury trial right compels this result. Nevertheless, many scholars and legislators remain reluctant to permit juries to determine the financial award in a particular criminal case. Courts and lawmakers share a common misperception that juries make arbitrary, erratic, and irrational decisions, especially in the context of deciding criminal punishments and punitive damages, both of which overlap conceptually with punitive compensation.

In debunking this narrative, this Article relies on empirical studies comparing judge and jury decision-making and concludes that juries are the more fitting fact-finder to determine the amount of punitive compensation to impose in a given case. Although anchoring biases, difficulties in predicting the duration and degree of a crime victim’s future emotional response, and poorly written jury instructions challenge juries, each of these impediments can be counteracted through thoughtful and conscientious systemic responses.

September 12, 2015 in Blakely Commentary and News, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, September 11, 2015

Is Arkansas about to jump back seriously into execution business?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this recent local article from the Natural State, headlined "Dates to die set for 8 inmates: State resuming executions; first two scheduled for Oct. 21." Here are the details:

After nearly a decade since an Arkansas inmate was put to death, Gov. Asa Hutchinson on Wednesday announced the execution dates for eight. Barring intervention from a court, the state will first mete out capital punishment, by lethal injection, to convicted murderers Bruce Ward and Don Davis. They have the earliest of the execution dates, Oct. 21.

Hutchinson said he expects the execution dates to be challenged in court, but he thinks the eight offenders have gotten "finality" in their cases and have exhausted all of their standard appeals.

Hutchinson spokesman J.R. Davis said the governor is "fulfilling" a duty of his office by setting the dates. "It's not something he takes lightly at all," J.R. Davis said. "But these crimes were heinous, and they were sentenced to death because of these crimes. He will carry those out."

Jeff Rosenzweig, an attorney for the eight men, said he will seek a court injunction to delay the executions. He noted that a lawsuit filed in June seeking disclosure of the source of the drugs used in executions is still pending. Act 1096, which was passed during this year's legislative session, prohibits the Arkansas Department of Correction from disclosing the source of the execution drugs, but Rosenzweig said his clients have a right to know who made the drugs. "There are some very serious issues, starting with the fact that the state wants to hide what drugs they're using or where they got them from. They want to hide that," Rosenzweig said. Divulging that information "tells us if it's a legitimate supplier or some fly-by-night operation. If it's a fly-by-night operation, it's torture."...

A combination of legal challenges and a lack of availability of lethal-injection drugs has halted executions in Arkansas for nearly a decade. The state's last execution was that of Eric Nance in November 2005. Nance was convicted of the 1993 murder of 18-year-old Julie Heath of Malvern. He was put to death using a three-drug cocktail of phenobarbital, potassium chloride and a paralytic agent.

As of Wednesday, a Department of Correction spokesman said, there were 26 other inmates on death row.

The eight executions will occur in pairs, J.R. Davis said, because "it's more efficient to do two on one date." He and Judd Deere, a spokesman for Arkansas Attorney General Leslie Rutledge, said all eight have exhausted their appeals....

The eight men whose execution dates are now set are challenging in Pulaski County Circuit Court the legitimacy of the state's death-penalty laws.

In 2013, then-Arkansas Attorney General Dustin McDaniel's office reached a settlement with the men, promising to disclose the source of the drugs that would be used in their executions. Act 1096 barred the release of that information, so Rosenzweig and other attorneys sued.

Rosenzweig conceded that several similar challenges have failed in federal courts across the country but said none of those challenges involved a pre-existing agreement between the prisoners and the state to share that information. Rosenzweig argues that his clients have a right to make sure the execution drugs come from a reputable source so that the risk of pain during the executions can be minimized.  "We have a situation that the other states didn't have ... it's very different from us wandering into the court and saying 'Tell me this!' We're dealing with a commitment, a contract, an agreement made by the state," Rosenzweig said. "This has ramifications far beyond executions."

Until recently, state officials had difficulties obtaining lethal-injection drugs. In 2011, the state handed over its supply of the execution drug sodium thiopental to federal drug agents after the state's prison department got the drug from a wholesaler operating out of a driving school in London. In June, the state obtained potassium chloride, vecuronium bromide and midazolam at a cost of $24,226.40.

Midazolam's effectiveness as a sedative in executions has been questioned after some botched executions, including that of Clayton Lockett, who struggled and convulsed for 43 minutes during his April 2014 execution in Oklahoma. In June, the U.S. Supreme Court, rejected claims that Oklahoma's use of midazolam violated death-row inmates' Eighth Amendment rights, and ruled that midazolam could continue to be used in executions.

On Aug. 6, the Arkansas Department of Correction formalized its policies and procedures for carrying out executions. On Sept. 1, Rutledge asked that the governor schedule the executions.

September 11, 2015 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Dignity and the Eighth Amendment: A New Approach to Challenging Solitary Confinement "

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Issue Brief authored by Laura Rovner released today by the American Constitution Society for Law and Policy. Here are excerpts from the start of the brief (with footnotes omitted:  

Solitary confinement irreparably harms people.  For those who have endured long-term isolation, it is not an overstatement to describe it as a living death: “Time descends in your cell like the lid of a coffin in which you lie and watch it as it slowly closes over you. When you neither move nor think in your cell, you are awash in pure nothingness. . . . Solitary confinement in prison can alter the ontological makeup of a stone.”  U.S. Supreme Court Justice Samuel Miller, who was a physician as well as a lawyer, recognized the harms of solitary confinement as far back as 1890....

[I]t was more than a century ago, as Justice Kennedy recently reminded us, that the Supreme Court first recognized the harm solitary confinement causes and nearly declared it unconstitutional.  Yet, despite this unequivocal condemnation of solitary confinement by the nation’s highest court, over the course of the century that followed — and especially the last three decades — most states and the federal government have significantly increased their use of penal isolation.  Today, conservative estimates place the number of people in solitary confinement at over 100,000.  And they are there largely with the blessing of the federal courts.

While the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment appears to provide mechanisms to challenge the use of long-term solitary confinement, the way the federal courts have interpreted the amendment in the past two decades has rendered judicial review virtually meaningless, resulting in an unprecedented number of people being held in conditions of extreme solitary confinement.  Part I of this Issue Brief examines the nature of solitary confinement and how it developed in the U.S.  Part II discusses (in broad outlines) the current jurisprudence of Eighth Amendment solitary confinement litigation.  Finally, Part III offers some reasons for optimism going forward and one promising path to achieving meaningful reforms through constitutional challenges to the practice.

September 11, 2015 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (7)

DOJ files amicus brief in PA Supreme Court supporting prosepctive "constructive denial of counsel claims"

As reported in this press release, the US "Department of Justice has filed an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Adam Kuren, et al. v. Luzerne County, et al.," a case concerning local county's public defense structure.  Here is more about the case and the filing via the press release:

The class action asserts that the public defense system in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, is so underfunded and poorly staffed that the attorneys appointed to represent indigent adults accused of committing criminal acts are attorneys in name only.  The department’s brief focuses solely on the question of whether indigent defendants can bring a civil claim alleging a constructive denial of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  This brief represents the department’s first filing to address constructive denial of counsel in a state’s highest court.

“For too many public defenders, crushing caseloads and scarce resources make it impossible to adequately represent clients who need and deserve assistance in legal matters,” said Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch.  “The Constitution of the United States guarantees adequate counsel for indigent defendants, and the Department of Justice is committed to ensuring that right is met.”

“This brief recognizes the importance of the right to counsel as fundamental to a fair criminal justice process,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta, head of the Civil Rights Division.  “The Civil Rights Division will continue to ensure that this essential right is protected.”...

In Kuren, the plaintiffs allege that their Sixth Amendment right to counsel has been violated by the failure of the county to provide adequate resources to the Luzerne County Office of the Public Defender (OPD).  According to the plaintiffs, due to the overwhelming volume of work, OPD lawyers are unable to engage in many of the basic functions of representation, including conferring with clients in a meaningful way prior to critical stages of their legal proceedings, reviewing client files, conducting discovery, engaging in motion practice, conducting factual investigations or devoting the time necessary to prepare for hearings, trials and appeals.  The plaintiffs claim that the conditions are systemic and so egregious that although a lawyer may technically be appointed to represent them, they will be constructively denied their right to counsel.

In its amicus brief, the department asserts that, “the Sixth Amendment right to counsel requires more than the mere appointment of a member of the bar.” Additionally, the amicus brief goes on to explain that the right of indigent criminal defendants to an attorney may be violated by the government’s “actual denial of counsel or by a constructive denial of counsel.” A civil action to remedy such violations is viable when traditional markers of representation such as “timely and confidential consultation with clients, appropriate investigation, and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution’s case” are systemically absent or compromised and when substantial structural limitations “such as a severe lack of resources, unreasonably high workloads, or critical understaffing of public defender offices” result in such absence or limited representation.

This notable DOJ amicus brief is available at this link.

September 11, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 10, 2015

Is Donald Trump's bluster hurting the cause of federal sentencing reform?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this notable lengthy new TPM piece sent to me by a helpful reader and headlined "How Donald Trump Threatens To Blow Up Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform." Here are excerpts:    

A long-awaited, hard-fought criminal justice reform push is coming to Washington this fall, with lawmakers of both parties making progress on legislation to curb mass incarceration. But after spending years convincing lawmakers that tackling the issue of mass incarceration would not make America more dangerous or put their political careers in jeopardy, advocates are now watching with growing dread as the GOP primary veers back toward the usual tough on crime rhetoric.

Just a few months ago, reformers were celebrating that most of the 2016 GOP pack had signaled that, at least in theory, they supported retooling America's justice system. But, as has been the case with so many other sensitive issues, the entrance of Donald Trump has changed the dynamic. Now instead of talking about criminal justice reform, the GOP primary contenders are warning of a supposed nationwide crime spike, touting the mandatory-minimums in "Kate’s Law," and lobbing “soft on crime" accusations.

“I’m concerned about the impact on the push for justice reform because we’re expecting a bill at some point this month,” Jason Pye, director of Justice Reform at the conservative FreedomWorks, told TPM. “I’m concerned about the impact of the rhetoric on that.”

Trump may not solely be to blame for the shift in tone. But in interviews with TPM before his entrance in to the race, justice reform advocates expressed cautious optimism that the GOP field had more or less coalesced around curbing mass incarceration, and they believed it was unlikely to become a flashpoint in the primary.

Trump may have conflated the issue, they now contend, by linking illegal immigration and violent crime, thus prompting many of his rivals to take harder lines, too. Coupled with warnings of a summer crime spike, the campaign trail has taken a turn back to the ‘90s, with candidates falling into old patterns of invoking crime fears to rile their constituencies.

“For the most part these candidates aren’t talking about these issues right now, it’s largely focused one person and we know who that person is, for better or for worse,” said Pye of FreedomWorks, the major DC advocacy outfit with Tea Party roots that plays an important role in pushing criminal justice reform from the right....

Last week, Trump released an ad attacking former Gov. Jeb Bush that critics said echoed the notorious Willie Horton ad that Bush's father used against Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential race.  The ad flashes the mugshots of undocumented immigrants charged or convicted of murder over Jeb Bush's infamous immigration is an "act of love" comments, and ends with placards saying "Love? Forget Love. It's Time Get Tough!" Bush's spokesperson responded by calling Trump a "soft on crime liberal."

“They look like tweedledum and tweedle dumber in terms of this very retro style of exploiting these old arguments,” liberal justice reform leader Van Jones said in an interview with TPM last week, referring to the Trump and Bush spat.

Meanwhile, conservatives have taken a harsh line on Black Lives Matter, a movement that includes calls for overhauling law enforcement and justice policies. Led by Fox News, conservatives have accused the protest movement, without basis, of inciting violence against police officers.  Trump accused Black Lives Matter this week of "looking for trouble” and suggested they were being "catered to" by Democrats.

The rhetoric has spread beyond Trump, which is of particular concern to criminal justice reform advocates. A few high-profile police deaths have prompted candidates like Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker (R) to blame the Obama administration for, as Walker put it, “a tendency to use law enforcement as a scapegoat.” New Jersey Gov. Chris Christie (R) has called for the return of stop and frisk, vowed to crack down on marijuana legalization, and blamed “liberal-leaning mayors and cities” and their “lax criminal justice policies” for the stabbing death of a former intern in Washington, D.C.

“There are two things that are troubling,” said Inimai Chettiar, director of Justice at the Brennan Center. “One, that people are saying that there is a crime wave now and they’re implying that crime is going to be going up as a permanent trajectory -- which is wrong -- and that second people are blaming criminal justice policies and particularly policing policies for this.”...

Already, balancing the various concerns of those interest groups was a delicate dance for lawmakers hammering out federal legislation.  But heated campaign claims -- be it about Black Lives Matter, undocumented immigrants or police fatalities -- isn’t helping to smooth over tensions....

Nevertheless, Senate advocates for reform insist legislative progress can be made despite the campaign trail rhetoric. “There’s been heated rhetoric for decades around justice reform,” said Ben Marter, a spokesman for Sen. Dick Durbin (D-IL), who is involved in crafting the anticipated compromise bill.  “But the senators negotiating this legislation have put their partisan differences aside to negotiate a solution in good faith.”

Likewise, advocates are hopeful the most ardent justice reformers in the GOP field will resist relying on such language.  “I would get worried if suddenly other candidates less desperate and flailing than Governor Bush started jumping on that bandwagon,” Jones said.

But the proposal known as Kate’s Law shows how easily legislative progress can be undercut by the kind of the knee-jerk reactions to sensationalized tragedies that contributed to the creation of mass incarceration policies in the first place. The legislation, inspired by Steinle's murder, would impose mandatory sentencing minimums on undocumented immigrants who return to U.S. after being deported and, according to Families Against Mandatory Minimums, would add nearly 60,000 people to the federal prison population.

Trump has made Steinle’s murder a focal point of his campaign (despite the desires of her family), and conservative media have fanned the flames. Cruz -- who has previously touted his interest in criminal justice reform -- has embraced the measure, while other candidates have also expressed support. So far, cooler heads in Congress have prevented Kate’s Law from gaining traction there. “Watching Kate’s Law unfold is like watching history repeat itself,” FAMM government affairs counsel Molly Gill told TPM, comparing it to 1986 drug overdose by college basketball star Len Bias that led to federal mandatory drug sentencing. “We’ve come a long way in the last 30 years in our understand of crime and recidivism and using evidence-based approaches. But a lot of times we’re still legislating like that never happened."

​For years, criminal justice reformers have labored to convince politicians that dismantling ‘80s and ‘90s era crime legislation -- through cutbacks on mandatory minimums or softening of drug laws -- will not making them look “soft on crime.” The best proof they had was the success of a number of state lawmakers -- especially in red states -- in curbing mass incarceration without facing political consequences. They have also had to do this working within a tenuous coalition balancing competing priorities. “With consensus around criminal justice reform from both sides of the aisle that hasn’t been seen for a generation, it would be a shame for presidential candidates to undermine this by exploiting negative imagery and stereotypes for mere political gain,” said Janai Nelson, associate director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, in a statement to TPM.

September 10, 2015 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Prez Obama makes a new (and a renewed) nomination to the US Sentencing Commission

Late yesterday, as detailed in this official press release, "President Obama nominated Judge Richard Franklin Boulware II and Judge Charles R. Breyer to serve on the United States Sentencing Commission." Hard-core sentencing fans know that Judge Breyer has been serving on the USSC since 2013, so his nomination is really just a reappointment, but Judge Boulware brings new blood to this commission, and here is his bio from the White House Press release:

Judge Richard Franklin Boulware II is a United States District Judge for the District of Nevada, a position he has held since June 2014.  Prior to his appointment to the bench, he worked at the Federal Public Defender’s Office in Las Vegas from 2007 to 2014, where he served as the lead attorney on complex white-collar cases from 2010 to 2014. From 2003 to 2007, he was a trial attorney at the Federal Defenders of New York.  Judge Boulware began his legal career as a law clerk to the Honorable Denise Cote of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York from 2002 to 2003.  He received his J.D. in 2002 from Columbia Law School and his A.B. cum laude in 1993 from Harvard College.

In addition to being excited that Prez Obama has nominated a new judge and a former federal public defender to serving on the Commission, I am now hoping that Judge Boulware's appointment could mean future USSC conferences might get slated for Las Vegas.

Jokes aside, because the USSC has been short of commissioners during a very busy time for federal sentencing reform, I am glad Prez Obama has finally moved to fill one of the open spots on the Commission. I sincerely hope Judge Boulware secures a speedy confirmation and that Prez Obama soon nominates another commissioner as well.

September 10, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Validity of Pennsylvania Gov halting of death executions considered by state Supreme Court

As reported in this new AP piece, "Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Wolf's lawyers defended his use of death row reprieves to achieve a moratorium on executions, a promise he made on the campaign trail, while prosecutors challenged its constitutionality at a hearing Thursday before the state Supreme Court." Here is more on the hearing:

The lead attorney for Wolf, whose 7-month-old strategy has angered prosecutors and energized death penalty foes, said the only legal question is whether the governor has authority to issue reprieves.  "The answer is clearly 'yes,'" said H. Geoffrey Moulton Jr., a deputy in the governor's Office of General Counsel.  Moulton acknowledged that Wolf cannot suspend the death penalty but said he can grant temporary reprieves without having to explain his reasons.

A top lawyer for the Philadelphia district attorney's office, which filed a court challenge days after Wolf announced his plan, said the governor is improperly using reprieves by tying them to an overdue report from a legislative task force on capital punishment. "We're waiting for something to be satisfactorily addressed that can never be addressed at all," said Hugh Burns, chief of the office's appeals unit.

"You don't know that," Justice Max Baer interjected.  "We don't have the report."

All five justices quizzed the lawyers.  Justices Debra Todd and J. Michael Eakin questioned whether Wolf's strategy is technically a moratorium or merely a series of individual reprieves.  "He announced a moratorium, not a reprieve," Eakin said.

The case before the state's highest court case revolves around condemned prisoner Terrance Williams, whose scheduled March execution for the tire-iron beating death of another Philadelphia man more than 30 years ago was canceled by the first of three reprieves that Wolf's office says he has granted since February....

Wolf said he intends to continue granting reprieves until the Pennsylvania Task Force and Advisory Committee on Capital Punishment makes its recommendations and they are "satisfactorily addressed."

Some prior related posts:

September 10, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Notable collective makes plans for "smart on crime" criminal code reform in Ohio

My local Columbus Dispatch has this new Ohio criminal justice reform story headlined, "Statehouse leaders push for shorter prison sentences, reducing prison population."  Here are the (still a bit fuzzy) details concerning what is afoot in the Buckeye state:

Ohio officials are undertaking a sweeping reform of the state’s criminal justice code, potentially resulting in shorter prison sentences and fewer people going to prison for non-violent drug crimes.

An unusual bipartisan coalition, including top legislative leaders, tax reformer Grover Norquist, an American Civil Liberties Union official, and Piper Kerman, author of Orange is the New Black: My Year in a Women's Prison, announced plans today to overhaul Ohio’s lengthy and cumbersome criminal code top-to-bottom.

“No one is here to say today that criminals should not be punished. We are here to say that not all crimes or criminals are created equal,” Senate President Keith Faber, R-Celina, said at a Statehouse press conference. “This is not about being hard or soft on crime. It’s about being smart on crime.”

No specifics were announced. Exactly how the criminal code will be overhauled will be up to the 24-member Ohio Criminal Justice Recodification Committee appointed by the legislature. Faber said he told the committee to “swing for the fences” when it comes to big picture reform ideas. But he balked when asked about two specific areas: revising parole standards for current inmates and marijuana legalization.

The consensus of speakers was that the reform goals are reducing the prison population by incarcerating fewer non-violent drug offenders and people with mental health issues, eliminating mandatory, flat sentences, and removing barriers for ex-offenders to return to society....

Speaker after speaker criticized the burdensome incarceration rate in Ohio and the U.S., the highest in the world. “Locking people in cages is extreme and dehumanizing,” said Allison Holcomb, head of the ACLU’s national Smart Justice program. “This is the top priority for us.”

Norquist, president of the conservative Americans for Tax Reform, said he views reform from more of an economic standpoint. “We have too many people in prison and not the right people in prison,” he said. That is costing taxpayers far too much, he said.

Kerman, now living in Columbus, came to public attention as author of her real-life story that led to the Netflix series, Orange is the New Black. “I’m fairly confident I’m the only person up here with a felony,” Kerman said opening her remarks. Following her release from a Connecticut prison on a drug-related money laundering charge, she became an advocate for sentencing and parole reform. She is teaching writing to inmates at two Ohio prisons.

Faber said the recodification committee, which is chaired by Auglaize County Common Pleas Judge Fred Pepple, does not have a specific deadline for completing its work. The final recommendations must be passed by the General Assembly.

September 10, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

New Justice Department sound and fury about white-collar prosecutions signifying....?

The interrupted question in the title of this post is my first-cut reaction and uncertainty in response to this front-page New York Times report on new Justice Department guidance concerning white-collar prosecutions.  The NYTimes piece is headlined "Justice Department Sets Sights on Wall Street Executives," and here are excerpts:

Stung by years of criticism that it has coddled Wall Street criminals, the Justice Department issued new policies on Wednesday that prioritize the prosecution of individual employees — not just their companies — and put pressure on corporations to turn over evidence against their executives.

The new rules, issued in a memo to federal prosecutors nationwide [which can be accessed here], are the first major policy announcement by Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch since she took office in April. The memo is a tacit acknowledgment of criticism that despite securing record fines from major corporations, the Justice Department under President Obama has punished few executives involved in the housing crisis, the financial meltdown and corporate scandals.

“Corporations can only commit crimes through flesh-and-blood people,” Sally Q. Yates, the deputy attorney general and the author of the memo, said in an interview on Wednesday. “It’s only fair that the people who are responsible for committing those crimes be held accountable. The public needs to have confidence that there is one system of justice and it applies equally regardless of whether that crime occurs on a street corner or in a boardroom.” Photo

Though limited in reach, the memo could erase some barriers to prosecuting corporate employees and inject new life into these high-profile investigations. The Justice Department often targets companies themselves and turns its eyes toward individuals only after negotiating a corporate settlement. In many cases, that means the offending employees go unpunished.

The memo, a copy of which was provided to The New York Times, tells civil and criminal investigators to focus on individual employees from the beginning. In settlement negotiations, companies will not be able to obtain credit for cooperating with the government unless they identify employees and turn over evidence against them, “regardless of their position, status or seniority.” Credit for cooperation can save companies billions of dollars in fines and mean the difference between a civil settlement and a criminal charge....

But in many ways, the new rules are an exercise in public messaging, substantive in some respects but symbolic in others. Because the memo lays out guidelines, not laws, its effect will be determined largely by how Justice Department officials interpret it. And several of the points in the memo merely codify policy that is already in place.

“It’s a good memo, but it states what should have been the policy for years,” said Brandon L. Garrett, a University of Virginia law professor and the author of the book “Too Big to Jail: How Prosecutors Compromise With Corporations.” “And without more resources, how are prosecutors going to know whether companies are still burying information about their employees?”

It is also unknown whether the rules will encourage companies to turn in their executives, but Ms. Yates said the Justice Department would not allow companies to foist the blame onto low-level officials. “We’re not going to be accepting a company’s cooperation when they just offer up the vice president in charge of going to jail,” she said.

Under Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., the Justice Department faced repeated criticism from Congress and consumer advocates that it treated corporate executives leniently. After the 2008 financial crisis, no top Wall Street executives went to prison, highlighting a disparity in how prosecutors treat corporate leaders and typical criminals. Although prosecutors did collect billions of dollars in fines from big banks like JPMorgan Chase and Citigroup, critics dismissed those cases as hollow victories.

Justice Department officials have defended their record fighting corporate crime, saying that it can be nearly impossible to charge top executives who insulate themselves from direct involvement in wrongdoing. Ms. Yates’s memo acknowledges “substantial challenges unique to pursuing individuals for corporate misdeeds,” but it says that the difficulty in targeting high-level officials is precisely why the Justice Department needs a stronger plan for investigating them....

Ms. Yates, a career prosecutor, has established herself in the first months of her tenure as the department’s most vocal advocate for tackling white-collar crime. She foreshadowed plans for the new policy in a February speech to state attorneys general, in which she declared that “even imposing unprecedented financial penalties on the institutions whose conduct led to the financial crisis is not a substitute for holding individuals within those institutions personally accountable.”...

While the idea of white-collar investigations may conjure images of raids of corporate offices by federal agents, the reality is much different. When suspected of wrongdoing, large companies typically hire lawyers to conduct internal investigations and turn their findings over to the Justice Department. Those conclusions form the basis for settlement discussions, and they are likely to take on greater significance now that companies will be expected to name names....

Still, even if the Justice Department’s effort succeeds, it will not automatically put more executives behind bars. Mr. Garrett, the University of Virginia law professor, analyzed the cases in which corporate employees had been charged. More than half, he said, were spared jail time.

I am going to need to read the new Yates memo a few times before I will have any sense of whether and how this new guidance to federal prosecutors is likely to really "move the needle" with respect to white-collar prosecutions. But, in part because my white-collar expertise and experience is at the sentencing stage after an individual has been charged and convicted of a federal economic crime, I am not sure I will ever be able to see clearly from the very back-end of the federal criminal process how much this memo could alter what typically happens at the very front-end of the federal criminal process in the corporate crime world.

In turn, I would be grateful to receive (in the comments or off-line) input from persons with more experience than me on the front-end of corporate criminal investigations about whether this Yates memo signifies much or not so much in the white-collar world. If nothing else, I suspect the Yates memo will prompt many "client alert memos" from big corporate law firms to their corporate clients, and perhaps what those client alerts say about the Yates memo could matter as much as what the Yates memo itself says.

UPDATE: At this link one can now find the text of the big speech Deputy Attorney General Sally Quillian Yates delivered today at New York University School of Law concerning DOJ's "New Policy on Individual Liability in Matters of Corporate Wrongdoing."  White-collar practitioners will want to read the speech in full, and here is one thematic paragraph from the heart of the text:

But regardless of how challenging it may be to make a case against individuals in a corporate fraud case, it’s our responsibility at the Department of Justice to overcome these challenges and do everything we can to develop the evidence and bring these cases.  The public expects and demands this accountability.  Americans should never believe, even incorrectly, that one’s criminal activity will go unpunished simply because it was committed on behalf of a corporation.  We could be doing a bang-up job in every facet of the department’s operations — we could be bringing all the right cases and making all the right decisions.  But if the citizens of this country don’t have confidence that the criminal justice system operates fairly and applies equally — regardless of who commits the crime or where it is committed — then we’re in trouble.

September 10, 2015 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Notable passages showing Bill Otis sometimes agrees with criminal defense perspectives

I make Crime & Consequences a daily read because all the blog's contributors consistently make forceful and interesting points about crime and punishment.  Though I disagree with some perspectives (and especially some of the rhetorical flourishes) expressed at C&C, I especially appreciate efforts made by the C&C commentators to be thoughtful and forthright in expressing their views.  And, especially because I sometimes use this space to take on contentions made by Bill Otis, a few passages in a couple of recent posts have made me eager to spotlight Bill's embrace of positions (and funding commitments) typically associated with criminal defense attorneys rather than prosecutors.

For one example, on the topic of offender rehabilitation, Bill a few weeks ago had this post titled "Rehab Flops" noting this recent study about programming that made significant investment in employment-focused prisoner re-entry programs but resulted in "program group members [being] no less likely to have been convicted of a crime or incarcerated than control group members."  In reaction, Bill made these notable points (with my emphasis added):

First, genuine rehabilitation cannot come from a government program. It has to come from the inmate's heart. Once he decides he wants to change the way he deals with the world, he has a chance. Until then, he doesn't. The government is simply not wise enough to know how to make the fundamental change true rehabilitation requires, and I (for one) wouldn't want a government powerful enough to try.

Second, we should nonetheless increase our spending on rehab. The chances are low but the stakes are high. Almost every prisoner returns to civil society.  For his sake and for ours, every effort should be made to give him the best shot we can, even knowing the chances are poor.

For another example, on the topic of defense representation, Bill yesterday had this this post titled "Shocking Report: Defense Lawyers Find that Defense Lawyers Should Get More Money" noting the new NACDL report on federal indigent criminal defense discussed here.  Notwithstanding the snarky title of his post, Bill added this commentary that should warm the hearts of the authors of this report:

How to put an honest assessment of this "report?"  It's true.
Sorry to disappoint those waiting for the acid to be poured, but indigent defense counsel actually do deserve better pay and more resources.  (So do federal prosecutors, but that's another post).
I was an AUSA for 18 years, and it was my experience that federal defenders are underpaid for the quality of work they do.  They may be significantly underpaid....
Temperament varied quite a bit.  Some were there to insure the client got his rights protected and the government got put to its proof.  Some were there because they thought of the client as the Little Guy, the man who never had much of a chance in life.  Some were there because they had been fighting with authority figures since fifth grade.  And some were there because they thought you, the prosecutor, were a poorly disguised Nazi, and were happy to let you know it in every single court appearance.
Still, for whatever the attitude, the quality of representation ranged from plainly adequate to outstanding. They put in long hours.  In private practice, they would have made much more.
There is an unpleasant truth that we, as taxpayers, need to understand:  Justice isn't cheap.  This applies to the death penalty, incarceration, (attempts at) rehabilitation, and salaries for prosecutors and defenders.  If you want quality, sooner or later you have to pay for it.
The NACDL is right.  It's time to increase the compensation of defense lawyers.   

September 10, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

"No Reason to Blame Liberals (or, the Unbearable Lightness of Perversity Arguments); Review of the First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America, by Naomi Murakawa"

The title of this post is the title of this new review by Margo Schlanger available via SSRN discussing a provocative book about the American political left's role in mass incarceration.  Here is the abstract:

This is a review of The First Civil Right: How Liberals Built Prison America, by political scientist Naomi Murakawa.  Murakawa takes as her target a conventional wisdom that explains the rise of mass incarceration as a victory of Republican law-and-order over Democratic civil rights.  Rather, she argues, starting right in her subtitle, “liberals built prison America.”  It was liberals, she claims, who “established a law-and-order mandate: build a better carceral state, one strong enough to control racial violence in the streets and regimented enough to control racial bias in criminal justice administration.”  Her major point along these lines is that the liberal preoccupation with using fair, non-racist procedures has contributed importantly to the growth of the carceral state, taming reform urges, entrenching the punitive regime.  This argument sounds in perversity — on Murakawa’s account, liberalism’s attempt to improve racial justice using procedural tools not only fails, it is counter-productive, entrenching and worsening the system’s inequities.

The review critiques Murakawa's focus on federal crime policy as missing the more important state and local dynamics.  In addition, it argues that Murakawa's perversity argument is essentially aesthetic — that she adduces only post-hoc/propter-hoc kind of evidence that the liberal proceduralism she highlights has accompanied the ballooning of the incarcerated population.  That is far from enough to convict generations of liberals — many though not all of whom decried overincarceration, as well as the unfair procedures that accompanied it — of the charge that they “built prison America.”

Prior related posts:

September 10, 2015 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, September 9, 2015

Examining death penalty developments in distinct death penalty states

The death penalty is subject to plenty of attention and scrutiny nationwide and especially in states that have traditionally carried out the most executions like Texas and Oklahoma.  But, I have noticed in the last few weeks some headline-making developments and/or notable commentary concerning capital punishment procedures and practices in a lot of distinct states with distinct death penalty histories. Going alphabetically by state, here is a round-up of some of the recent media pieces that have caught my eye:

California:  "Is Southern California the New Deep South?: Los Angeles County has sentenced more people to death than five Southern states combined."

Colorado: "After Aurora and Denver verdicts, Colorado mulls death penalty again: High-profile murder trials jump start death penalty debate in Colorado"

Delaware: "Judge blasts Delaware death penalty case

Missouri: "In the Execution Business, Missouri Is Surging: Defense lawyers call it a crisis; the state says it’s just doing its job."

Nebraska: "Back on the Agenda: Nebraska’s Death Penalty A grassroots effort aims to restore what the legislature just ended."

Pennsylvania: "End Pennsylvania’s limbo over death penalty"

September 9, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (9)

"Federal Indigent Defense 2015: The Independence Imperative"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new report released today by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Here is a summary of the reports contents via excepts from this NACDL news release:

After over 18 months of study, more than 130 individuals interviewed (including federal judges, federal defenders, Criminal Justice Act (CJA) panel attorneys, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) personnel, and others, representing 49 states and all federal judicial circuits), hundreds of documents reviewed, and surveys conducted, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) today officially releases a major report — Federal Indigent Defense 2015: The Independence Imperative.  The report, adopted by NACDL's Board of Directors at its recent annual meeting, reflects the significant work of NACDL's Task Force on Federal Indigent Defense and offers "Seven Fundamentals of a Robust Federal Indigent Defense System," which are set forth below.

The Task Force was directed to examine broadly the federal indigent defense system, covering the entire manner in which the federal indigent defense system operates.  That said, over the past few years, several troubling developments in the administration of the nation's federal indigent defense system have highlighted its lack of independence. From the severe funding cuts and resulting systemic damage during sequestration in the fall of 2013 to the AO's demotion of the Defender Services Office from a "distinct high-level office" within the AO to its placement as one of the judiciary's many "Program Services," like Probation and Pretrial Services or Judiciary Data and Analysis, to the ways in which the lack of independence has played a key role in preventing federal defenders and panel attorneys from appointment to aid clients as part of a historic clemency effort undertaken by NACDL and others, the report documents the deficiencies of the current system.

The report also focuses the day-to-day adverse consequences of a system that is wholly at odds with the very first principle of the American Bar Association's Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System — "The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and payment of defense counsel, is independent."  The report details that many panel lawyers are forced to endure long delays to receive payment for their services and often face arbitrary cuts at the hands of judicial officers whose decisions need not be explained and cannot be challenged. The report also explores concerns regarding the methods by which counsel appointments are made in individual cases, as well as those inherent in appointments to serve on CJA panels, among other matters.

As explained by NACDL President E.G. "Gerry" Morris, "At his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice John Roberts explained that the role of a judge is like an umpire, ‘to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat.' This important report reveals that in today's federal indigent defense system, the umpire is doing far more than that. And we all know that umpires should not be deciding how, when, and under what circumstances players get paid or on which team they play."

NACDL Executive Director Norman L. Reimer said: "While there is much to be admired in the federal indigent defense system, its operation — unlike the prosecutorial function — under the structure of the judiciary, together with the seismic events of recent years — sequestration, demotion, and the clemency initiative, make a compelling case for greater independence."

NACDL's Seven Principles of a Robust Federal Indigent Defense System:

  • Control over federal indigent defense services must be insulated from judicial interference.
  • The federal indigent defense system must be adequately funded.
  • Indigent defense counsel must have the requisite expertise to provide representation consistent with the best practices in the legal profession.
  • Training for indigent defense counsel must be comprehensive, ongoing, and readily available.
  • Decisions regarding vouchers (i.e., payment to panel attorneys) must be made promptly by an entity outside of judicial control.
  • The federal indigent defense system must include greater transparency.
  • A comprehensive, independent review of the CJA program must address the serious concerns discussed in this report.

September 9, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Noting federal prison reforms possible without statutory changes

A helpful reader alerted me to this notable Forbes article by Walter Pavlo which highlights ways the federal prison population could be lowered without waiting for whatever Congress might (or still might not) end up doing to reform federal sentencing statutes.  The piece is headlined "Prison Reform Is All The Rage, But A Real Opportunity For Change Might Be Missed," and here are excerpts:

Many past U.S. Congress’s have drafted criminal reform bills, only to have them lay dormant in committee.  Traditionally, the press releases and sound-bites have only provided false hope to those serving time.  The SAFE Act is the most recent and has received some positive press but lacks significant sponsorship in Congress.  Then there’s the Smarter Sentencing Act and the Second Chance Reauthorization Act that has recently lost some momentum.  There are others, but none worth mentioning....

There are many ways to use existing legislation and policies to reduce populations that need more focus and advocacy.  First, we need to allow more old and sick inmates to go home under compassionate release programs by crediting “earned” good conduct time towards program eligibility.  Second, rather than building new prisons, the federal government should divert the funding to build out of the Residential Reentry Centers (RRC) infrastructure and allow for more direct community placement designations, which was the true intent of the Second Chance Act under 18 USC 3624.  Next, early deportation options should also be explored for those who are in the U.S. illegally.

We have a problem of aging, sick inmates in the federal prison system.  There are currently six (6) major medical facilities that offer treatments for inmates for various ailments ranging from dialysis to chemotherapy.  It’s expensive with some estimates being as high as $57,000 per year per inmate.  The recidivism studies show far lower rates of recidivism for elderly offenders.

Halfway house, RRCs, offer a chance for inmates to serve the remainder of their time in the community working in a regular job, integrating with their family and learning skills. According to [Jack] Donson [a retired BOP employee], the BOP has the statutory authority to place offenders directly in halfway house at any time because the Federal Courts have made clear that RRC’s are penal or correctional facilities within the meaning of the applicable statues.  “Having a person in a community correctional treatment program including a job and integrating with their family is far better than any program the BOP could ever offer and inmate.”  So an RRC is basically a prison where inmates serve their debt to society … except that it would be MORE beneficial to most everyone....

While we wait for the next prison reform bill, let’s hope it is a comprehensive Omnibus Crime bill with both front end and back end (retroactive) measures that can be quickly implemented with a simultaneous build out of the RRC infrastructure. Congressmen and senators would do us all a service by putting pressure on the Department of Justice to use the existing policies and laws to begin changing prisons now.

September 9, 2015 in Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, September 8, 2015

"The Pointless Banishment of Sex Offenders"

The title of this post is the headline of this New York Times editorial in today's paper.  Here are excerpts:

It’s a chilling image: the sex predator skulking in the shadows of a swing set, waiting to snatch a vulnerable child.

Over the past two decades, that scenario has led to a wave of laws around the country restricting where people convicted of sex offenses may live — in many cases, no closer than 2,500 feet from schools, playgrounds, parks or other areas where children gather. In some places, these “predator-free zones” put an entire town or county off limits, sometimes for life, even for those whose offenses had nothing to do with children.

Protecting children from sexual abuse is, of course, a paramount concern.  But there is not a single piece of evidence that these laws actually do that.  For one thing, the vast majority of child sexual abuse is committed not by strangers but by acquaintances or relatives. And residency laws drive tens of thousands of people to the fringes of society, forcing them to live in motels, out of cars or under bridges.  The laws apply to many and sometimes all sex offenders, regardless of whether they were convicted for molesting a child or for public urination.

Lately, judges have been pushing back.  So far in 2015, state supreme courts in California, Massachusetts and New York have struck down residency laws....  The United States Supreme Court has not yet weighed in on residency restrictions, although a 2003 ruling upholding mandatory registration for sex offenders suggested that such laws may violate the Constitution.

It is understandable to want to do everything possible to protect children from being abused.  But not all people who have been convicted of sex offenses pose a risk to children, if they pose any risk at all . Blanket residency-restriction laws disregard that reality — and the merits of an individualized approach to risk assessment — in favor of a comforting mirage of safety.

September 8, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15)

Highlighting headwinds for federal sentencing reform in coming critical period

Over at Crime & Consequences, Bill Otis has this extended new post headlined "The Biggest Obstacles Right Now to Sentencing 'Reform'."  The post provides a five-point account of recent developments enhancing the (always uphill) battle for significant federal sentencing reform, and here is how the post gets started:

From late spring through about the end of July, it was my sense that some kind of fairly significant sentencing "reform" bill was going to make more headway in this Congress than in the last, and conceivably could pass. More members of the majority party had expressed an openness to it than we had seen in the last Congress.

Probably the first sign of trouble was when the sentencing "reform" bill that had been promised before the August recess never showed up. I expect that one (or several) will show up now, but their content and their prospects for passage seem diminished from what they had been just six weeks ago.

As a former DOJ political appointee, Bill Otis has long been much more of an inside-the-Beltway player than I ever will ever be, and I surmise he still has considerable connections with establishment GOP leaders in Congress.  Consequently, his latest prognostications here strike me as important as we all anticipate Senator Charles Grassley unveiling, perhaps as early as today as previewed here, a (big?) new sentencing reform bill that may be the one most likely to have a real chance to get to the President's desk in some form.

Even though Bill's sentencing analysis is sometime subject to sharp criticism (as recently noted here), I think his posts about sentencing reform arguments and prospects alway provide a useful reminder of how many different kinds of political and policy arguments can be made against changing the status-quo of tough-and-tougher sentencing.  Most fundamentally, when crime is in decline, Bill and others will be quick to say we should not risk changing what seems to be working; when crime seems to be spiking, Bill and others will be quick to say we should not risk going soft now.

Some prior related posts:

September 8, 2015 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Two notable new papers about plea bargaining procedures and practices

Practitioners know that the vast majority of criminal convictions are the results of plea deals.  But it has taken some time for formal legal jurisprudence and especially legal scholarship to catch up to this reality.  Fortunately, a lot of smart folks are starting to pay a lot more attention to plea dynamics, and these two notable new papers on SSRN reflect these realities:

Plea Bargaining's Baselines by Josh Bowers

Abstract: In this symposium essay, I examine the Court’s unwillingness to take seriously the issue of coercion as it applies to plea-bargaining practice.  It is not so much that the Court has ignored coercion entirely.  Rather, it has framed the inquiry in a legalistic manner that has made immaterial the kinds of considerations we might think most relevant to the evaluation.  The Court has refused to ask qualitative questions about felt pressure, prosecutorial motivation, or the risk or reality of excessive punishment. All that matters is legal permissibility.  A prosecutor may compel a defendant to plead guilty as long as she uses only code law to do so.  In this way, the Court’s coercion baseline is legalistic — it is defined by what the prosecutor is legally entitled to pursue.

Recently, however, the Court has shifted its constitutional focus from code law. In a series of right-to-counsel cases, it has redefined prevailing plea-bargaining practice as the benchmark.  This amounts to an emerging extra-legalistic baseline, defined not by code law but rather by the parties’ efforts to circumvent it.  Of course, the Court did not mean to alter coercion’s landscape and almost certainly will not do so.  My intention is to demonstrate only that the doctrinal building blocks are in place for the adoption of a better baseline — a proportionality baseline.  I defend this alternative extra-legalistic baseline and even prescribe a practical methodology for its discovery.  And, notably, my preferred approach is not without precedent.  The Court has applied analogously extra-legalistic baselines to claims of coercion in other constitutional contexts.

Training for Bargaining by Jenny Roberts and Ronald Wright

Abstract: While plea bargaining dominates the practice of criminal law, preparation for trial remains central to defense attorneys’ training.  Negotiation is still peripheral to that training. Defense lawyers enter practice with little exposure to negotiation techniques and strategies in the plea bargaining context, the most significant skills they use every day.

Empirical research on plea negotiations has concentrated on outcomes of negotiations rather than the process itself.  Our multi-phase field study examines the negotiation techniques that attorneys use during plea bargaining, as well as their preparation and training for negotiation.  This Article explores the data on the training aspects of our research.  It then discusses implications of the failure to train for bargaining by noting a variety of areas where training might improve case outcomes for defendants.

Surveys, interviews, and training agenda confirm our intuition about the lack of training for bargaining: Public defenders receive far less training in negotiation skills and strategies than they do in trial techniques.  Some defenders receive some limited training on negotiation skills in addition to trial skills, particularly when they first enter their offices. The topic of negotiation, however, almost disappears from the agenda for later training, even as trial skills remain front and center.

Leaders in public defender offices allow this training gap to continue when they view negotiation as more an art than a science, and not susceptible to rigorous analysis or systematic training.  The position that negotiation cannot be taught is demonstrably false and theoretically naïve.  Formal negotiation learning has proven effective in actual negotiations.  Negotiation theory also offers more concrete and comprehensive insights about sound practices than one can find in case law related to constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel, court rules and state statutes, or professional standards.

September 8, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, September 7, 2015

Lots of interesting criminal-justice reading for the long weekend

As I enjoy the tail end of a lovely holiday weekend, I will seek to honor laborers by here labroing to assemble links to a number of recent criminal-justice articles and commentaries from various media outlets.  Each of these pieces could merit its own separate post, but I am content today to throw them all together (in no particular order) with a hope that readers might flag whichever of the pieces they think justify special attention:

September 7, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

"The New Peonage"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Tamar Birckhead now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Although the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution formally abolished slavery and involuntary servitude in 1865, the text created an exception for the punishment for crimes “whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.”  Two years later, Congress passed The Anti-Peonage Act in an attempt to prohibit the practice of coerced labor for debt.  Yet, in the wake of the Civil War, Southern states innovated ways to impose peonage but avoid violations of the law, including criminal surety statutes that allowed employers to pay the court fines for indigent misdemeanants charged with minor offenses, in exchange for a commitment to work.  Surplus from these payments padded public coffers (as well as the pockets of court officials), and when workers’ debt records were subsequently “lost” or there was an allegation of breach, surety contracts were extended and workers became further indebted to local planters and merchants.  Several decades later, the U.S. Supreme Court in Bailey v. Alabama (1911) and U.S. v. Reynolds (1914) invalidated laws criminalizing simple contractual breaches, which Southern states had used to skirt the general provisions of the Anti-Peonage Act.  Yet, these decisions ultimately had little impact on the “ever-turning wheel of servitude,” and the practice persisted under alternative forms until after World War II.

This Article, the Author’s third on the disproportionate representation of low-income children in the U.S. juvenile justice system, examines the phenomenon of what the Author calls “the new peonage.”  It argues that the reconfiguration of the South’s judicial system after the Civil War, which entrapped blacks in a perpetual cycle of coerced labor, has direct parallels to the two-tiered system of justice that exists in our juvenile and criminal courtrooms of today.  Across the U.S. even seemingly minor criminal charges trigger an array of fees, court costs, and assessments that can create insurmountable debt burdens for already-struggling families.  Likewise, parents who fall behind on their child support payments face the risk of incarceration, and upon release from jail, they must pay off the arrears that accrued, which hinders the process of reentry.  Compounding such scenarios, criminal justice debt can lead to driver’s license suspension, bank account or wage garnishment, extended supervision until debts are paid, additional court appearances or warrants related to debt collection and nonpayment, and extra fines and interest for late payment.  When low-income parents face such collateral consequences, the very act of meeting the economic and emotional needs of one’s children becomes a formidable challenge, the failure of which can trigger the intervention of Child Protective Services, potential neglect allegations, and further court hearings and fees.  For youth in the juvenile court system, mandatory fees impose a burden that increases the risk of recidivism. In short, for families caught within the state’s debt-enforcement regime, the threat of punishment is an ever-present specter, and incarceration always looms. Ironically, rather than having court fees serve as a straightforward revenue source for the state, this hidden regressive tax requires an extensive infrastructure to turn court and correctional officials into collection agents, burdening the system and interfering with the proper administration of justice.  Moreover, states frequently divert court fees and assessments to projects that have little connection to the judicial system.

This Article is the first to analyze the ways in which the contemporary justice tax has the same societal impact as post-Civil War peonage: both function to maintain an economic caste system.  The Article opens with two case profiles to illustrate the legal analysis in narrative form, followed by several others presented throughout the piece.  The Article then chronicles the legal history of peonage from the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment through the early twentieth century.  It establishes the parallels to the present-day criminal justice system, in which courts incarcerate or re-incarcerate those who cannot pay, including juveniles.  It argues that Supreme Court decisions intended to end the use of debtors’ prisons ultimately had limited impact.  The Article concludes with proposals for legislative and public policy reform of the new peonage, including data collection and impact analysis of fines, restitution, and user fees; ending incarceration and extended supervision for non-willful failure to pay; and establishing the right to counsel in nonpayment hearings.

September 7, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, September 6, 2015

Ohio queue of condemned keeps growing as state struggles with its death machinery

This new AP article, headlined "Ohio Death Row Quandary: 2 Dozen Executions, No Lethal Drugs," highlights the distinctive problem Ohio now has with the administration of capital punishment. Here are the details: 

The state now has two dozen condemned killers with firm execution dates, but with four months before the first one, it still doesn't have the lethal drugs it needs to carry them out. The state's inability to find drugs has death penalty opponents calling for the end of capital punishment in Ohio. Supporters say the state needs to keep looking or find alternatives to provide justice for killings that are in some cases decades old.

"Rather than frustrate that process it would seem to me their goal ought to be to carry out that process," said Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O'Brien, who's contacted the prisons department, the attorney general and the governor's office for updates on their progress finding drugs. One option he'd like Ohio to consider: nitrogen gas, approved by Oklahoma in April as an execution alternative.

On Jan. 21, the state is scheduled to execute Ronald Phillips for raping and killing his girlfriend's 3-year-old daughter in Akron in 1993. The Department of Rehabilitation and Correction "continues to seek all legal means to obtain the drugs necessary to carry out court-ordered executions," said spokeswoman JoEllen Smith, using the same statement the agency has offered for months. "This process has included multiple options."

On Wednesday, the Ohio Supreme Court set a March 2017 date for Gary Otte of Cleveland for the shooting deaths of two people in a 1992 robbery spree. The remaining executions are scheduled clear into 2019.

The state hasn't executed anyone since January 2014, when condemned killer Dennis McGuire gasped and snorted repeatedly during a 26-minute procedure with a then untried two-drug method. Ohio abandoned that method in favor of other drugs it now can't find. Like other states, Ohio has struggled to obtain drugs as pharmaceutical companies discontinued the medications traditionally used by states or put them off limits for executions.

The state's latest attempt, to obtain a federal import license to buy drugs from overseas, ran into a roadblock when the FDA informed Ohio such actions are illegal because the drugs in question aren't FDA-approved.

That's the kind of thing that happens when dates are set without drugs on hand, said Tim Young, the state public defender. "That continual setting of dates seems to bring to bear unfortunate pressure to drive the choices with untested drugs, untested processes," he said.

Gov. John Kasich said other states won't give Ohio their drugs and lawsuits may tie up attempts to import approved drugs. But he said there's still time before the January execution. "I want to continue forward with the death penalty, but if I don't have the drugs it becomes very difficult," Kasich said.

Ohio appears to have the most killers with execution dates because of the state's system for scheduling them. Texas, which still leads the nation in the number of executions annually, sets dates a maximum of 90 days out. Missouri, which has a similar system, has a maximum 60-day window which extends up to 120 days next year.

September 6, 2015 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Digging deeply into the back-end of criminal justice systems

Regular readers are accustomed to seeing my praise in this space for Margaret Love's commentary about the federal clemency process and for the commentary and coverage of a range of back-end criminal justice issues at the Collateral Consequences Resource Center. These new posts at CCRC provide yet more support for my view that any and everyone interested in the so-called "back-end" of American criminal justice systems should be reading everything Margaret Love has to say and all the posts at CCRC:

September 6, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Connecticut prosecutors seek reconsideration of retroactive abolition of death sentences

This Reuters article, headlined "Prosecutors seek to re-argue case that ended Connecticut death penalty," reports on a notable (and seemingly long-shot) motion filed late last week in the Connecticut Supreme Court.  Here are the details:

Connecticut prosecutors asked the state Supreme Court on Friday to reconsider its recent decision on a narrow vote to end the state's death penalty, a clerk for the state Supreme Court said.

Prosecutors late Friday filed a motion asking the justices to allow them to re-argue the case in which justices called the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment and concluded that it "no longer comports with contemporary standards of decency."  The ruling, on a 4-3 vote, added Connecticut to the growing list of states backing away from the death penalty, including Nebraska and Maryland most recently.  Thirty-one states have the death penalty.

Prosecutors on Friday also asked the court to strike from the record a concurring opinion about racial bias in capital cases they said was barred as merely advisory, the clerk said.  In the opinion, Justices Flemming Norcott and Andrew McDonald wrote that racial and ethnic discrimination had "permeated the breadth of this state's experience with capital charging and sentencing decisions."

Prosecutors want to present new arguments in response to the majority opinions, including the rarity of executions in Connecticut, the delay in imposing death sentences and the danger of executing the innocent, the clerk said.

"The Division of Criminal Justice recognizes the complex legal and policy issues that the court confronted in this crucially important case," Chief State's Attorney Kevin Kane wrote in the motion.  "The process that the majority followed in reaching its conclusion deprived the division of the opportunity to address the concerns that drove the results and led the majority unaided by the time-tested adversarial process to inaccurate assumptions and errors of law," he wrote....

Connecticut in 2012 abolished capital punishment for future crimes but allowed the death penalty to be imposed for crimes previously committed. The current debate leaves 11 death row inmates in limbo.

I would guess that these sorts of motions for reargument in the Connecticut Supreme Court are almost never granted. But, as long-time readers know, death penalty cases can and often lead to some unusual legal developments.

Prior related posts:

September 6, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, September 4, 2015

Are you ready for some college football ... and highlights from Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform

I have plans to watch a lot of college football over the long weekend, which culminates Monday night with my Ohio State Buckeyes beginning their national championship defense at Virginia Tech.

I assume a lot of college students also plan to watch a lot of football, and some recent research reported via this post at Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform indicates that college students are now more likely to be smoking marijuana than to be smoking cigarettes when they are taking study breaks.  With that terrible segue, here are some more recent posts of note from Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform:

September 4, 2015 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues | Permalink | Comments (3)