Thursday, September 7, 2017

"Drug War Reform: Criminal Justice, Recovery, and Holistic Community Alternatives"

The title of this post is the title of this article recently posted to SSRN authored by Joshua Horton. Here is its abstract:

This article investigates the issues and possible societal solutions to the Drug War, Opiate Epidemic, Mass Incarceration and other collateral consequences of current policies in three distinct parts. First, it discusses the DeFelonization of drug possession and the ramifications this would have nationally. Next, it addresses the influx of drug users into the community that are currently receiving little to no rehabilitation behind bars. This country will need to find a revenue source to fund a massive rehabilitation effort. It will come from marijuana legalization. And lastly, I investigate an up and coming approach to recovery called Recovery Community Organizations (RCO's). These entities incorporate an innovative, holistic bottom up approach, as opposed to the current top-down, massive, paternalistic governmental and criminal justice approach.

September 7, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Just how should California implement Prop 57's call for prison releases?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this local article headlined "Prop 57: Debate rages on about which inmates should be released early." Here are excerpts:

Ten months after California voters approved a proposition allowing thousands of prison inmates to apply for early release, a debate is still raging over who ought to be freed.

Proposition 57 left it to prison officials to clearly identify which crimes deemed nonviolent would qualify and how an inmate’s criminal history would affect eligibility. The public could weigh in during a 45-day comment period this summer — and boy, did they. More than 8,500 people threw in their two cents, in writing and at a public hearing in Sacramento last week. Now, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation is sorting through bulging email boxes and stacks of letters from crime victims, inmates, prosecutors and reformers.

Meanwhile, under emergency regulations, prison officials have already notified prosecutors across California of more than 1,800 inmates who have applied for early parole. No figures are available until later this month on the number of inmates whose applications have been denied, approved or have actually been released. But a snapshot of the situation in two urban counties in Northern California shows relatively few people are being granted early parole, though it is impossible to tell if the trend will continue....

Ken Scheidegger, legal director of the Sacramento-based Criminal Justice Foundation, ... opposed Proposition 57 and is concerned about the early releases. “People got the idea a few years ago that prisons were full of harmless people,” Scheidegger said. “That is a widespread popular misconception.”

But proponents note that Proposition 57 was the third time since 2012 that voters overwhelmingly opted to ease California’s tough-on-crime laws to enhance rehabilitation, stop the revolving door of crime and prevent federal courts from indiscriminately releasing inmates to reduce prison crowding. “Prop. 57 is not a ‘get out of jail free’ card,” said Benee Vejar, an organizer with the civil rights group Silicon Valley De-Bug. “It’s asking for an early parole hearing and another chance.”...

The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation has until Sept. 20th to develop the regulations, but it can ask for a 90-day extension. The debate over the Proposition 57 regulations is being fought along similar battle lines as the fight over the initiative itself.

Advocates, including Human Rights Watch, want prison officials to consider as many people as possible for early release. Law enforcement officials want to restrict who is eligible and change how the decisions are made. Both sides are calling for more rehabilitation programs. The state recently boosted the prison system’s rehab budget by $137 million. “We cannot repair the criminal justice system on the cheap,” said Rosen, the Santa Clara County district attorney. “If we want to improve the outcomes from prison, then we will need to change the experience of being in prison.”

The ... opponents’ chief complaint is that the initiative promised voters that only nonviolent inmates would be eligible for release. But under the existing regulations, certain violent offenders are eligible once they have completed their prison term for the violent felony, but are still serving time for a nonviolent felony they were also convicted of. The Legislative Analyst’s Office also raised questions about the provision. On the other hand, Proponents want to expand the pool of inmates. Currently, about 4,000 inmates with third strikes whose last offense was nonviolent are barred from applying for early parole. Yet according to the CDCR’s own public safety risk evaluations, nonviolent third-strikers are more than three times more likely to qualify as low risk than the currently eligible prisoners.

But opponents claim crime will rise under Proposition 57, a warning they have sounded since 2011 when Gov. Jerry Brown and the Legislature began scaling back the emphasis on incarceration in response to a federal court order about prison crowding and inhumane health care. Opponents point to the fact that violent crime in 2016 rose in the state — by 4.1 percent — unlike in the country as a whole. However, proponents note California’s violent crime rate remains comparable to levels seen in the late 1960s. And property crime was down 2.9 percent and remained lower than it was in 2010, before the reforms began....

Law enforcement officials also complain about the process. Among their concerns: Early parole applications are subject to a paper review, rather than a parole hearing; prosecutors only have 30 days to prepare a recommendation; only inmates may appeal the board’s decision; and police are cut out entirely. “My rank and file are on the front lines — they’re the ones who have to encounter these individuals once they’re on the streets,” San Jose police Chief Eddie Garcia said.

September 7, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, September 6, 2017

Two of the latest remarkable variations on sex offender panics

These two headlines and stories about concerns about sex offenders caught my eye this afternoon:

I find both of these article both stunning and sad, and the bill discussed in the second article would seem, if I understand it right, to raise some serious constitutional issues.

September 6, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (8)

"The History of the Original United States Sentencing Commission, 1985–1987"

the title of this post is the title of this exciting new article about a (never really old) piece of sentencing legal history that I find fascinating. This lengthy article is authored by Brent Newton and Dawinder Sidhu, and here is the abstract:

An eighteen-month period from the fall of 1985 to the spring of 1987 witnessed the most significant change to the federal criminal justice system in American history.  In those eighteen months, the United States Sentencing Commission, a new and novel independent agency in the federal judicial branch, developed sentencing guidelines for all federal judges during the same period when Congress was enacting new mandatory minimum statutory penalties that dramatically increased existing penalties for drug trafficking and firearms offenses.

This Article describes this founding era of structured federal sentencing, beginning with the Commission’s first meeting and ending with the transmittal of the initial Guidelines Manual to Congress on April 13, 1987, for its 180-day review period.  As the guidelines remain the “lodestone” of federal sentencing thirty years later, and as improving the criminal justice system continues to be an important national bipartisan aspiration, a thorough exploration of the history of the original Commission is both timely and important.

Parts II and III of this Article discuss the historical context in which the Commission was created, the key players (Commissioners and staff) during the Commission’s first eighteen months, and the initial policy decisions of the original Commission that are reflected in the Guidelines Manual and that still largely govern federal sentencing today, albeit in an “advisory” rather than a “mandatory” guidelines system. Finally, Part V offers some conclusions about the work of the original Commission.

September 6, 2017 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Encouraging new Brennan Center data on 2017 crime trends ... let the spinning begin

The Brennan Center for Justice has this notable new report titled simply "Crime in 2017: A Preliminary Analysis," and its first section starts this way: 

Based on new data collected from police departments in the 30 largest cities, this report finds that all measures of crime — overall crime, violent crime, and murder — are projected to decline in 2017. Indicators show that 2017 will have the second lowest rates of crime and violent crime since 1990.

These findings directly undercut any claim that the nation is experiencing a crime wave. In 2015 and 2016, overall crime rates remained stable, while murder and violent crime rose slightly. Now, in 2017, crime and murder are projected to decline again. This report’s main findings are explained below, and detailed in Figure 1, and in Tables 1 and 2:

• The overall crime rate in 2017 is projected to decrease slightly, by 1.8 percent. If this estimate holds, as it has in past analyses, 2017 will have the second lowest crime rate since 1990.

• The violent crime rate is projected to decrease slightly, by 0.6 percent, essentially remaining stable. This result is driven primarily by stabilization in Chicago and declines in Washington, D.C., two large cities that experienced increases in violence in recent years. The violent crime rate for this year is projected to be the second lowest since 1990 — about one percent above 2014’s violent crime rate.

• The 2017 murder rate is projected to be 2.5 percent lower than last year.  This year’s decline is driven primarily by decreases in Detroit (down 25.6 percent), Houston (down 20.5 percent), and New York (down 19.1 percent).  Chicago’s murder rate is also projected to fall, by 2.4 percent.  The 2017 murder rate is expected to be on par with that of 2009, well at the bottom of the historic post-1990 decline, yet still higher than the lowest recorded rate in 2013.  Notably, more than half the murder increase from 2014 to 2017 (55.6 percent) is attributable to two cities — Chicago and Baltimore.  This year’s decrease could indicate that the increases in 2015 and 2016 were short-term fluctuations in a longer-term downward trend.

• While crime is down this year, some cities are projected to experience localized increases. For example, Charlotte’s murder rate doubled in the first six months of 2017 relative to last year.

Before even starting to spin this new data, it bears emphasis that there could be developments in the last four months of 2017 that alter this prediction that crime will decline for the year.  But assuming these encouraging new crime numbers hold upon further developments and analysis, it will be interesting to watch different advocates making different claims about what a return to declining crimes means. I would certainly expect Prez Trump and AG Sessions to assert that their reversal of a variety of Obama era policies and practices is already having a positive impact, while advocates for progressive "smart on crime" reforms will surely claim that this data shows we can and should be able to continue to reduce prison populations and reduce crime at the same time.

Critically, whatever gets spun, these data are a cause for celebration and everyone should be rooting for the numbers to continue to trend in a positive direction in the months and years ahead.

September 6, 2017 in National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, September 5, 2017

A deep look at "tough on crime" responses to the opioid epidemic

German Lopez has this lengthy important new Vox piece under the headlined "The new war on drugs: Not every state is responding to the opioid epidemic with just public health policies." I recommend the piece in full, and this excerpt highlights its themes:

There has been much discussion of criminal justice reform in the past several years. And there has been a lot of talk about treating the opioid epidemic — the deadliest overdose crisis in US history — as a public health, not criminal justice, issue, unlike past drug crises. The cliché about the crisis, said by both Democrats and Republicans, is that “we can’t arrest our way out of the problem.”

Yet the rhetoric doesn’t tell the whole story. In my own investigation, I found at least 13 states, including Kentucky, that passed laws in recent years that stiffened penalties for opioids painkillers, heroin, or fentanyl — largely in response to the epidemic.  In sharp contrast to all the talk about criminal justice reform and public health, these laws risk sending even low-level, nonviolent drug offenders — many of whom are addicted to drugs and need help for that addiction — to prison for years or decades.

The facts show that the conventional narrative about the opioid epidemic and criminal justice reform is incomplete. Most states — including many of the states I found that passed new “tough on crime” laws in response to the opioid epidemic — have passed criminal justice reform at some level in the past several years.  And the rhetoric about drugs has undeniably changed a lot in recent years across both political parties.

But as the opioid epidemic continues to kill tens of thousands of people in the US each year, many state lawmakers have gone back to the old criminal justice playbook to fight the crisis — even as the empirical evidence remains clear that tougher prison sentences are not an effective means to stopping the epidemic.  The new laws are just one example.  Several states have also dusted off old laws to lock up more opioid users and dealers.

And that shows that for all the talk about reform, America’s instincts for the “tough on crime” approach are still very much here.

September 5, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

US Sentencing Commission releases big new analysis of Prez Obama's 2014 Clemency Initiative

I am excited to see that the US Sentencing Commission has this morning released this big new report titled simply "An Analysis of the Implementation of the 2014 Clemency Initiative." I hope to find the time in the coming days to dig into many of the report's particulars; for now, I can just reprint the text of this USSC overview page about the report and add a few comments:

Report Summary

This report analyzes the sentence commutations granted under the 2014 Clemency Initiative.  It provides data concerning the offenders who received a sentence commutation under the initiative and the offenses for which they were incarcerated.  It examines the extent of the sentence reductions resulting from the commutations and the conditions placed on commutations.  It also provides an analysis of the extent to which these offenders appear to have met the announced criteria for the initiative.  Finally, it provides an analysis of the number of offenders incarcerated at the time the initiative was announced who appear to have met the eligibility criteria for the initiative and the number of those offenders who received a sentence commutation.

Key Findings

The key findings of this report are:

  • President Obama made 1,928 grants of clemency during his presidency.  Of them, 1,716 were commutations of sentence, more commutations than any other President has granted.

  • Of the 1,928 grants of clemency that President Obama made, 1,696 were sentence commutations under the 2014 Clemency Initiative.

  • The commutations in sentence granted through the Clemency Initiative resulted in an average sentence reduction of 39.0 percent, or approximately 140 months.

  • Of the 1,696 offenders who received a commuted sentence under the Clemency Initiative, 86 (5.1%) met all the announced Clemency Initiative factors for consideration.

  • On April 24, 2014, there were 1,025 drug trafficking offenders incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons who appeared to meet all the announced Clemency Initiative factors.  Of them, 54 (5.3%) received clemency from President Obama.

  • By January 19, 2017, there were 2,687 drug trafficking offenders who had been incarcerated in the Federal Bureau of Prisons when the Clemency Initiative was announced and who appeared to meet all the announced Clemency Initiative factors. Of them, 92 (3.4%) received clemency from President Obama.

Back in 2014 when the clemency initiative was announced and certain criteria emphasized (basics here), I had an inkling that the criteria would end up both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. I figured Prez Obama would ultimately not want to grant clemency to everyone who met the criteria announced and also would want to grant clemency to some who did not meet all the criteria. That said, I am still surprised that only 5% of those prisoners who got clemency meet all the criteria and that only about 5% of those prisoners who met all the criteria get clemency. (Based on a quick scan of the USSC report, it seems the vast majority of those who got clemency had some criminal history, which put most of the recipients outside the stated DOJ criteria.)

These additional insights and data points from the USSC report highlight what really seemed to move a clemency applicant toward the front of the line:

A review of the offenders granted clemency under the Initiative shows that at some point the Clemency Initiative was limited to drug trafficking offenders, as all the offenders who received commutations under the Initiative had committed a drug trafficking offense.  This focus was not identified when the Initiative was announced and no formal public announcement was made later that the Initiative had been limited to drug trafficking offenders....

Almost all Clemency Initiative offenders (95.3%) had been convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty.  Most (89.7%) were charged in such a way that the mandatory minimum penalty that applied in the case was ten years or longer.  Indeed, most of the Clemency Initiative offenders (88.2%) received a sentence of 20 years or longer, or life imprisonment.

In the end, then, it appears the 2014 Clemency Initiative turned out to be almost exclusively about identifying and reducing some sentences of some federal drug offenders subject to long mandatory prison terms. Somewhat disappointingly, this USSC report does not appear to speak to whether and how offenders who received clemency were distinct from the general federal prison population in case processing terms. My own rough research suggests that a great disproportion of those who got clemency were subject to extreme mandatory minimums because they opted to put the government to its burden of proof at trial rather than accept a plea deal. Also, if the goal ultimately was to remedy the worst applications of mandatory minimum sentences, it is not surprising that a lot of clemency recipients had some criminal history that would serve to both enhance the applicable mandatory minimum AND make an otherwise lower-level offender not eligible for statutory safety-valve relief from the mandatory term.

September 5, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

Lamenting a "liberal tilt in criminology"

John Paul Wright and Matt DeLisi have this provocative essay in the Summer 2017 issue of City Journal under the full headline "What Criminologists Don’t Say, and Why: Monopolized by the Left, academic research on crime gets almost everything wrong." Here are a few excerpts from what merits a full read by all criminal justice academics (and others):

Evidence of the liberal tilt in criminology is widespread.  Surveys show a 30:1 ratio of liberals to conservatives within the field, a spread comparable with that in other social sciences.  The largest group of criminologists self-identify as radical or “critical.”  These designations include many leftist intellectual orientations, from radical feminism to Marxism to postmodernism.  Themes of injustice, oppression, disparity, marginalization, economic and social justice, racial discrimination, and state-sanctioned violence dominate criminological teaching and scholarship, as represented in books with titles like Search and Destroy: African American Males in the Criminal Justice System, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness, and Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods Worse....

Walter Miller, one of the few mid-twentieth-century criminologists whose work was unapologetically conservative, suggested that ideology can turn “plausibility into ironclad certainty . . . conditional belief into ardent conviction . . . and reasoned advocate into the implacable zealot.”  When shared beliefs take hold, as they often do in the academic bubble in which most criminologists live, ideological assumptions about crime and criminals can “take the form of the sacred and inviolable dogma of the one true faith, the questioning of which is heresy, and the opposing of which is profoundly evil.”

Miller’s observations have proved prophetic.  Led by the work of Jonathan Haidt, a growing number of scholars now acknowledge that a lack of ideological diversity in the social sciences skews research in favor of leftist claims, which become the guiding principles of many fields, challenged only at the risk of harming one’s career.  Liberal assumptions go unchecked and tendentious claims of evidence become fact, while countervailing evidence doesn’t get published or faces much more rigorous scrutiny than the assertions that it challenges.

Liberal political values can shape and distort the research that criminologists do and the public positions that they take. Lee Ellis and Anthony Walsh surveyed several hundred criminologists and found that self-reported ideological perspective was strongly associated with the type of theory that the scholar most often advocated, with liberal criminologists primarily supporting theories that locate the causes of crime in social and economic deprivation.  Coauthor John Wright has recently collected data showing that political ideology predicts almost perfectly the policy positions of criminologists.  On issues ranging from gun control to capital punishment to three-strikes laws, liberal criminologists showed almost no variation in their beliefs. (Needless to say, they dislike guns, oppose punitive sentences, and vehemently object to the death penalty.)

 

Because I am a law professor and not a criminologist, I cannot speak directly to biases and their impactsin the ranks of criminologists.  But I think it notable that the authors note that other social sciences — and here I would assume law is included — also attract so many more liberals relative to conservatives.  I fear that, in any and every academic setting, this dramatic kind of political imbalance can and will always risk badly distorting the research, teaching and service of an academic department.

September 5, 2017 in Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (20)

Split Tenth Circuit panel finds mandatory five-year prison term for violation of supervised release itself violates Fifth and Sixth Amendments

I just saw that an interesting and  important constitutional procedure opinion was handed down by the Tenth Circuit last week in US v. Haymond, No. 16-5156 (10th Cir. Aug 31, 2017) (available here).  Here is how the panel's majority opinion gets started and some of the opinion's substantive analysis:

The district court revoked Andre Ralph Haymond’s supervised release based in part on a finding that Haymond knowingly possessed thirteen images of child pornography. The district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Haymond appeals and argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that he possessed child pornography, and that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) is unconstitutional because it violates his right to due process.

We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Haymond violated the conditions of his supervised release, but we agree that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) is unconstitutional because it strips the sentencing judge of discretion to impose punishment within the statutorily prescribed range, and it imposes heightened punishment on sex offenders based, not on their original crimes of conviction, but on new conduct for which they have not been convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we affirm the district court’s revocation of Haymond’s supervised release, but we vacate Haymond’s sentence and remand for resentencing....

We conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments because (1) it strips the sentencing judge of discretion to impose punishment within the statutorily prescribed range, and (2) it imposes heightened punishment on sex offenders expressly based, not on their original crimes of conviction, but on new conduct for which they have not been convicted by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt and for which they may be separately charged, convicted, and punished....

By requiring a mandatory term of reimprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) increases the minimum sentence to which a defendant may be subjected. For example, when Haymond was originally convicted by a jury, the sentencing judge was authorized to impose a term of imprisonment between zero and ten years.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(b)(2). After the judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, however, that Haymond had violated a particular condition of his supervised release, the mandatory provision in § 3583(k) required that Haymond be sentenced to a term of reincarceration of at least five years, up to a maximum term of life. This unquestionably increased the mandatory minimum sentence of incarceration to which he was exposed from no years to five years, yet the jury did not make the factual finding required to change his statutorily prescribed sentencing range. Instead, that finding was made by a judge by only a preponderance of the evidence. This violates the Sixth Amendment....

In Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000), the Supreme Court made clear that, in order to avoid serious constitutional concerns, revocation of supervised release must be viewed as punishment for the original crime of conviction, not as punishment for the violation of the conditions of supervised release....

Regardless of the nature or severity of the defendant’s original crime of conviction, § 3583(k) imposes a mandatory minimum five-year term of imprisonment for only those specific offenses enumerated, while all other violations are subject to the maximum terms set in § 3583(e)(3). By separating these crimes from other violations, § 3583(k) imposes a heightened penalty that must be viewed, at least in part, as punishment for the subsequent conduct — conduct for which the defendant has not been tried by a jury or found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  This, the Court has said, is not permitted. 

To be sure, the sentencing judge can and, according to the Sentencing Guidelines, should consider the severity of the conduct by which a defendant violated the conditions of his or her supervised release.  A more serious violation might well recommend a longer term of reimprisonment.  But, if we wish to maintain the premise that revocation of supervised release is a punishment for the original crime of conviction, Congress must set the authorized term of reimprisonment based on the severity of that original crime.

Notably, Judge Kelly dissents in part because he is (reasonably) concerned that the majority's reasoning might impact any and all judicial fact-finding supporting the revocation of supervised release:

Were the court correct [in its constitutional analysis], the problem it identifies seems like it would be true of all revocation proceedings: if a defendant is sentenced to any term of supervised release, the fact that the release can then be revoked and the defendant be sent back to prison for an additional term means that “the penalty to which a defendant may be subjected” has been increased based on facts not found by a jury. Id. (emphasis added).

In other words, unless either (a) all revocation proceedings must empanel juries for fact-finding (which the Supreme Court, with good reason, has told us is not the case) or (b) the revocation proceeding is treated as a new criminal prosecution (which the Supreme Court also has told us is not the case), it is hard to understand why under current precedent Booker would apply but Apprendi and Alleyne would not. While postrevocation penalties might be considered attributable to the original conviction, the revocation proceeding is neither part of that criminal prosecution nor is it a new criminal prosecution. See Johnson, 529 U.S. at 700....

[According to the majority], the distinction, apparently, is that the terms of revocation differ based on what kind of new crime the defendant committed. But I see no reason why Congress cannot make that distinction. As the Sentencing Guidelines explain, under the “breach of trust” theory applicable to the revocation of supervised release, “the nature of the conduct leading to the revocation [can] be considered in measuring the extent of the breach of trust.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7A3(b) (2016). In my view, Congress can determine that the commission of certain crimes constitutes a more serious breach of trust warranting a longer term of revocation. Doing so does not thereby make the revocation proceeding a new criminal prosecution....

Ultimately, we should not jump ahead of the Supreme Court when it has already spoken on this issue. Any tension between the supervised release scheme approved in Johnson and the rationale of the Apprendi / Booker line of cases is for the Supreme Court itself to resolve.

Ever since the Supreme Court got serious about applying its Apprendi doctrine to various sentencing determinations in cases like Blakely and Booker, I have thought the judicial fact-finding that takes place in federal supervised release proceedings were on constitutionally shaky grounds.  Or, to parrot Judge Kelly's final statment, I have long believed that there is significant tension between the supervised release scheme approved in Johnson and the rationale of the Apprendi / Booker line of cases.  But, in various settings, various lower federal courts have found various ways to uphold the judicial fact-finding involved in supervised release revocations — revocations that result in a significant number of federal defendants getting sent back to prison.  (This 2010 USSC report found that roughly 1/3 of all released federal prisoners get revoked and sent back to prison, and that 6% of the federal prison population are serving revocation terms.)

It will be very interest to watch if the Justice Department seeks en banc or SCOTUS review of this Tenth Circuit ruling.  I hope they will, in part because this case seems like it might just get SCOTUS to finally take a look at what its modern Fifth and Sixth Amendment doctrines should mean for supervised release revocation proceedings.

September 5, 2017 in Blakely Commentary and News, Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, September 4, 2017

"The Racial Politics of Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this notable paper authored by John Clegg and Adaner Usmani recently posted to SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Dominant accounts of America's punitive turn assume that black elected officials and their constituents resisted higher levels of imprisonment and policing.  We gather new data and find little support for this view.  Panel regressions and an analysis of federally-mandated redistricting suggest that black elected officials had a punitive impact on imprisonment and policing.  We corroborate this with public opinion and legislative data. Pooling 300,000 respondents to polls between 1955 and 2014, we find that blacks became substantially more punitive over this period, and were consistently more fearful of crime than whites.

The punitive impact of black elected officials at the state and federal level was concentrated at the height of public punitiveness.  In short, the racial politics of punishment are more complex than the conventional view allows.  We find evidence that black elected officials and the black public were more likely than whites to support non-punitive policies, but conclude that they were constrained by the context in which they sought remedies from crime.

September 4, 2017 in Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, September 3, 2017

A long-weekend review of some marijuana reform news and notes

A long weekend seems to provide a good excuse to review some recent posts of note from Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform. So here goes:

September 3, 2017 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Preparing for pot professing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Ohio Gov delays multiple executions while denying clemency for double murderer slated to die later this month

As noted and lamented in this recent Fair Punishment Project report, "Prisoners on Ohio’s Execution List Defined by Intellectual Impairment, Mental Illness, Trauma, and Young Age," as of the end of August 2017, Ohio had scheduled 26 executions to take place between now and 2020.  But as of the start of September 2017, thanks to the clemency/reprieve powers of Ohio Gov John Kasich and as detailed here, Ohio has only 18 executions scheduled to take place between now and 2020 with eight others being pushed back to 2021 and 2022.

The delaying of numerous execution was explained in this press release, which also notes that Gov Kasich has (unsurprisingly) denied clemency for a double murderer still scheduled to be executed on September 13:

Gov. John R. Kasich has denied a request for executive clemency from Gary Otte who was convicted in Cuyahoga County for the 1992 robbery and murder of 61 year-old Robert Wasikowski and 45 year-old Sharon Kostura at their respective apartments in Parma, OH.  The Governor’s decision follows the advice of the Ohio Parole Board, who on February 10, 2017, recommended against clemency for Otte by a vote of 11-0.

Additionally, in consultation with the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, the governor updated Ohio’s current execution schedule.  After the U.S. Supreme Court rejected claims by Ohio inmates that the state’s protocol was unconstitutional, allowing the execution of Ronald Phillips to proceed in July, the state reviewed the existing schedule to ensure Ohio would meet the goal of conducting court-ordered executions in a humane and professional manner.

Looking over the revised execution schedule, I surmise that the folks at the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction were not too keen on having to gear up for an execution scheduled nearly every month for the next two years and so they urged Gov Kasich to set a revised schedule that now has an execution taking place only, roughly, every other month through the next five years.

Notably, there are, as detailed here, another 123 persons on Ohio's death row in addition the the 26 with current execution date. That means that even if Ohio were to keep up the pace of six execution per year going forward after 2022, it would take until 2042 to carry out the sentences only of those currently condemned to die. That reality, in turn, lead me to start speculating about who might be governor of Ohio in a quarter century and whether she might be a proponent or opponent of capital punishment.

September 3, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Saturday, September 2, 2017

Anyone want to talk about Judge Richard Posner's sentencing legacy on his retirement day?

As reported here by the Chicago Tribune, one of the most prominent and best-known federal circuit judges suddenly decided to retire from the Seventh Circuit: "Judge Richard A. Posner, one of the nation's leading appellate judges, whose acerbic wit attracted an almost cultlike following within legal circles, is retiring after more than three decades with the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago." Here is more: 

Posner, 78, is stepping down effective Saturday, according to a news release Friday afternoon from the 7th Circuit. He was appointed to the court by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and served as its chief judge from 1993 to 2000.

Posner said in a statement he has written more than 3,300 opinions in his time on the bench and is "proud to have promoted a pragmatic approach to judging." He said he spent his career applying his view that "judicial opinions should be easy to understand and that judges should focus on the right and wrong in every case."

Posner's biting and often brilliant written opinions as well as his unrelenting questioning from the bench have made him an icon of the court for years. Known as a conservative at the time of his appointment, Posner's views skewed more libertarian through the years, and he often came down in favor of more liberal issues such as gay marriage and abortion rights.

I consider sentencing another arena in which (now former) Judge Posner came to be more liberal over time.  And, in the sentencing universe, I will always think first of Judge Posner sparring with Judge Easterbrook over the impact of the Supreme Court's Blakely decision for the federal sentencing system in US v. Booker when that case was before the Seventh Circuit (that opinion is available at this link).

I suspect some other sentencing fans might have other thoughts about (now former) Judge Posner, especially practitioners within the Seventh Circuit. I would love to hear those thoughts in the comments.

September 2, 2017 in Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (13)

Friday, September 1, 2017

Two interesting and critical takes on AG Jeff Sessions' repeated statements about rising crime

These two recent commentaries take apart and generally take down statements by Attorney General Jeff Sessions about rising crime rates in the United States:

September 1, 2017 in National and State Crime Data | Permalink | Comments (9)

Federal district judge finds Colorado's Sex Offense Registration Act, as applied, amounts to unconstitutional punishment

A couple of helpful readers made sure I did not miss a notable extended opinion concerning application of Colorado's sex offender registration laws. The opinion in Millard v. Rankin, No. 1:13-cv-02406 (D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2017), which can be downloaded below, starts and ends this way:

Plaintiffs are registered sex offenders under the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq. In this civil action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 they seek declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that continuing enforcement of the requirements of SORA against them violates their rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant is the Director of the Colorado Bureau of Investigation (“CBI”), the state agency responsible for maintaining the centralized registry of sex offenders and providing information on a state web site....

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED that judgment shall enter declaring that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq., as applied to Plaintiffs David Millard, Eugene Knight, and Arturo Vega, violates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall enter declaring that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq., as applied to Plaintiff Arturo Vega, violates procedural due process requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; it is

FURTHER ORDERED that judgment shall enter declaring that the Colorado Sex Offender Registration Act, C.R.S. §§ 16-22-101, et seq., as applied to Plaintiffs David Millard, Eugene Knight, and Arturo Vega, violates substantive due process requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs as prevailing parties shall be entitled to an award reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the costs, to be determined by the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).

Download 20170831 Millard Ruling re Sex Offender Registry

September 1, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (11)

Thursday, August 31, 2017

Florida Supreme Court says Gov was within authority to remove prosecutor from capital cases

The Florida Supreme Court issues a ruling today in Ayala v. Scott, No. SC 17-653 (Fla Aug 31, 2017) (available here). Here is the start of the opinion and the some of its analysis section:

Aramis Donell Ayala, State Attorney for Florida’s Ninth Judicial Circuit, petitions this Court for a writ of quo warranto, challenging Governor Rick Scott’s authority under section 27.14(1), Florida Statutes (2016), to reassign the prosecution of death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth Circuit to Brad King, State Attorney for Florida’s Fifth Judicial Circuit. We have jurisdiction.  See article V, § 3(b)(8), Fla. Const.  For the reasons below, we deny Ayala’s petition....

Ayala argues that the Governor exceeded his authority under section 27.14 by reassigning death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth Circuit to King over her objection because article V, section 17, of the Florida Constitution makes Ayala “the prosecuting officer of all trial courts in [the Ninth] [C]ircuit.”  While quo warranto is the proper vehicle to challenge the Governor’s authority to reassign these cases to King, see Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 607 (Fla. 2008), Ayala is not entitled to relief because the Governor did not exceed his authority on the facts of this case....

[T]he executive orders reassigning the death-penalty eligible cases in the Ninth Circuit to King fall well “within the bounds” of the Governor’s “broad authority.”  Finch, 254 So. 2d at 204-05.  Far from being unreasoned or arbitrary, as required by section 27.14(1), the reassignments are predicated upon “good and sufficient reason,” namely Ayala’s blanket refusal to pursue the death penalty in any case despite Florida law establishing the death penalty as an appropriate sentence under certain circumstances. See generally § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2017).

Notwithstanding the Governor’s compliance with all of the requirements of section 27.14(1), however, Ayala and her amici urge this Court to invalidate the reassignment orders by viewing this case as a power struggle over prosecutorial discretion.  We decline the invitation because by effectively banning the death penalty in the Ninth Circuit — as opposed to making case-specific determinations as to whether the facts of each death-penalty eligible case justify seeking the death penalty — Ayala has exercised no discretion at all.  As New York’s high court cogently explained, “adopting a ‘blanket policy’ ” against the imposition of the death penalty is “in effect refusing to exercise discretion” and tantamount to a “functional[] veto” of state law authorizing prosecutors to pursue the death penalty in appropriate cases. Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E.2d 1002, 1007 (N.Y. 1997).

Two Justices dissented, and the dissenting opinion starts this way:

This case is about the independence of duly elected State Attorneys to make lawful decisions within their respective jurisdictions as to sentencing and allocation of their offices’ resources, free from interference by a Governor who disagrees with their decisions.  The issue before this Court is whether a duly elected State Attorney’s choice to forgo seeking one potential penalty in a class of criminal cases, in favor of seeking another penalty authorized by statute, constitutes “good and sufficient reason” for the Governor to exercise his removal power under section 27.14(1), Florida Statutes (2017).  I dissent because the State Attorney’s decision to prosecute first-degree murder cases but not seek the death penalty at this time does not provide a basis for the Governor to remove State Attorney Aramis Ayala.

August 31, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (13)

Thoughtful account of what to think about risk assessment tools

This new commentary at The Crime Report authored by Megan Stevenson, headlined simply "Is Crime Predictable?," provides an effectively measured discussion of the use of risk assessment tools in criminal justice decision-making. Here is how it starts and ends:

Should the increased use of computer-generated risk algorithms to determine criminal justice outcomes be cause for concern or celebration? This is a hard question to answer, but not for the reasons most people think.

Judges around the country are using computer-generated algorithms to predict the likelihood that a person will commit crime in the future. They use these predictions to help determine pretrial custody, sentence length, prison security-level, probation, parole, and post-release supervision.

Proponents argue that by replacing the ad-hoc and subjective assessments of judges with sophisticated risk assessment instruments, we can reduce incarceration without affecting public safety. Critics respond that they don’t want to live in a “Minority Report” state where people are punished for crimes before they are committed—particularly if risk assessments are biased against blacks.

Which side is right? It’s hard to answer because there is no single answer: The impacts that risk assessments have in practice depend crucially on how they are implemented. Risk assessments are tools — no more and no less. They can be used to increase incarceration or decrease incarceration. They can be used to increase racial disparities or decrease disparities.

They can be used to direct “high risk” people towards support and services or to punish them more harshly.They can be implemented in such a broad set of ways that thinking about them monolithically just doesn’t make sense....

We already live in a “Minority Report” state: the practice of grounding criminal justice decisions on predictions about future crime has been around a long time. The recent shift towards adopting risk assessment tools simply formalizes this process—and in doing so, provides an opportunity to shape what this process looks like.

Instead of embracing risk assessment wholeheartedly or condemning it without reserve, reformers should ask whether there is a particular implementation design by which risk assessment could advance the much-needed goals of reform.

UPDATE: I am pleased to see that this commentary has now been given a more fitting headline over at The Crime Report: "Risk Assessment: The Devil’s in the Details"

August 31, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Recommended reading, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Interesting accounting of effort by Michigan juve killer to get Miller resentencing relief even though he is parole eligible

I was intrigued to see this local Michigan story, headlined "Sides plea on re-sentencing of teen killer," discussing a courtroom debate over whether a juvenile killer long ago sentenced to life with parole should still be able to secure resentencing thanks to the Supreme Court's recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. I find the story intriguing not only because of an effort to expand the reach of Miller, but also because the murder victim's family is apparently supportive of the offender's effort to secure release nearly four decades after the crime:

Members of both families packed a courtroom Wednesday as lawyers argued for and against a re-sentencing for a man who killed a high school classmate in 1980. Relatives of Michael Johnson, serving a life sentence for murdering Sue Ellen Machemer, and relatives of Sue Ellen sat on the same side of the courtroom during his bid for re-sentencing. For years, the victim’s family, as well as Johnson’s, have supported his release from prison.

Johnson, 54, was 17 when he killed Sue Ellen, a 15-year-old classmate at Lakeshore High School, where they were both juniors. Johnson, who is in the Ionia Correctional Facility, did not appear at Wednesday’s hearing. His lawyer, Mary Chartier of Lansing, argued for a re-sentencing for Johnson, saying his life sentence, though parolable, is unconstitutional and invalid based on new information about the brain development and characteristics of juveniles. Also, because the Michigan Parole Board has not taken an interest in Johnson’s case, he has no meaningful opportunity for release, Chartier told Berrien County Trial Court Judge John Donahue.

Berrien Assistant Prosecutor Aaron Mead argued that the Parole Board’s action, or lack of, has nothing to do with the validity of the sentence, and that Johnson’s case would be better fought by suing the Parole Board. “Frankly, allowing somebody to back door the Parole Board by saying a sentence is invalid is a very bad precedent,” Mead told the judge at a hearing Wednesday on Johnson’s motion for a re-sentencing.

Donahue took the lawyers’ arguments under advisement and said he will rule in four to eight weeks whether Johnson should be re-sentenced.

Chartier said Johnson’s sentence is unconstitutional because it began when he was a juvenile. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment when applied to juveniles. Because the ruling is retroactive, courts are working through a number of first-degree murder cases involving juvenile offenders, and in some cases re-sentencing them.

Mead argues that Johnson’s case does not apply because he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and was sentenced by the late Judge Julian Hughes to life in prison with the possibility of parole. After serving 10 years, Johnson came into the parole board’s jurisdiction, but the board has never expressed interest in paroling him.

In 2010, Johnson lost on a motion to set aside his life prison sentence. Donahue, who hears Johnson’s motions because he is Hughes’ predecessor on the bench, rejected Johnson’s earlier argument that a change in Michigan Parole Board policies invalidated his sentence. Sue Ellen’s parents, Mel and Ellen Machemer, sat next to Johnson’s family in court, as they did during the hearing in 2010. The Machemers say they have gotten to know Johnson as an adult in prison, have forgiven him, and think it may be time for his release. His own family also supports him and says he has a place to live and a job waiting for him.

Chartier told the judge Wednesday that when Johnson’s file is looked at every five years, he gets a notice of “no interest” from the Parole Board and therefore has repeatedly been denied any meaningful opportunity for release. She said his sentence has been more harsh than that of juveniles convicted of first-degree murder because their cases now have to be reconsidered. “The Supreme Court says that juveniles must be offered some meaningful opportunity for release, and mere hope is not enough,” Chartier told the court. “The Supreme Court says juveniles are different, that wasn’t (considered) in Michael Johnson’s case. These rulings are retroactive, and he’s being denied the (high court’s) mandate for a meaningful opportunity for release.”

Chartier further argued that because Johnson’s sentence was life rather than a term of years, he is being treated in the same manner as someone sentenced to life without parole. She said someone sentenced to a term of years, when up for parole review, is told why if parole is not granted. “In his case, they don’t have to state a reason for not hearing it. He is a juvenile serving a life sentence. He’s gotten no guidance regarding what he needs to do to be released,” Chartier told Donahue....

Mead argued that a sentence can only be reviewed if it is determined to be invalid. Johnson was sentenced to parolable life for second-degree murder, a sentence that is valid, Mead told the court. He said the Supreme Court ruling regarding juveniles applied “only to non-parolable life, nothing else.” He said the Berrien County Trial Court cannot find the sentence invalid based on the Parole Board process. “Where do you draw the line regarding meaningful opportunity (for release)? You don’t draw it in this court,” Mead told Donahue. “Nobody has had the Parole Board answer for itself. The defendant is asking you to be a Super Parole Board. If prisoners say the Parole Board is the problem, then by all means hold them accountable.”

August 31, 2017 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, August 30, 2017

Recent items of note from the Collateral Consequences Resource Center

As regular readers know, I have made a habit of noting here some posts from the Collateral Consequences Resource Center because the topics covered there are so interesting and get so little attention in the mainstream media (or many other places in the blogosphere).  So are some recent posts of note from CCRC:

August 30, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Collateral consequences | Permalink | Comments (1)

More context for contemplating Prez Trump's pardon of Joe Arpaio

Yesterday I noticed two interesting pieces providing some context for Prez Trump's decision last week to make his first use of the clemency power a pardon for Joe Arpaio (basics here).  Here are their headlines, links and leads:

From CNN here, "This chart shows why Trump's pardon of Arpaio was so unusual":

It was an atypical pardon from an atypical president.  When President Donald Trump granted his very first pardon to Arizonan former sheriff Joe Arpaio, he bucked process and precedent by circumventing the Department of Justice's unit dedicated to making recommendations on such requests.  But he also bucked decades of precedent for how recent pardons have nearly always been granted: a majority have come in the last year of a president's term, they usually come in groups of a dozen or more and they cancel convictions averaging more than two decades old.

Trump's pardon of Arpaio marks one of the earliest pardons in a president's term and one of the only pardons granted alone, according to a CNN analysis of Department of Justice data ranging back nearly three decades. And we turned that data into a chart that shows how, historically, this pardon sticks out in all three major areas: numbers of years into a president's term, number of pardons issued at once and time since the conviction or sentencing.

From FiveThirtyEight here, "The Arpaio Pardon Has Plenty Of Precedents … That Got Other Presidents In Trouble":

Was President Trump’s pardon of former Sheriff Joe Arpaio, issued on a Friday night as a deadly hurricane barreled toward the Gulf Coast, unprecedented?  Or just unpopular?

Several political allies and foes immediately condemned the move as inappropriate and an insult to the justice system. But most of the criticized characteristics of Arpaio’s pardon have at least some parallels to previous ones. The number of controversial characteristics of the Arpaio pardon, however, is unusual and raises questions about the political fallout that Trump will face. The Arpaio pardon, in other words, does have historical precedents (as Trump said on Monday) — just not good ones.

Recent prior related posts:

August 30, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (24)

New report spotlights concerns with background of 26 Ohio condemned scheduled for execution in coming months and years

In this post earlier this year, I reported on a significant report produced by the Fair Punishment Project (FPP) examining the background and case history of eight death row defendants in Arkansas who had approaching execution dates.  That March 2017 Arkansas report from FPP was titled "Prisoners on Arkansas’s Execution List Defined By Mental Illness, Intellectual Disability, and Bad Lawyering," and I am inclined to assert that the FPP report played a role in a few of these Arkansas defendants getting their executions stayed.

Now FPP has turned its eye to the Buckeye State now that Ohio has gotten its machinery of death operating again, and FPP's latest report here is titled "Prisoners on Ohio’s Execution List Defined by Intellectual Impairment, Mental Illness, Trauma, and Young Age." Here is how this report gets started:

On July 26, 2017, Ohio ended its three-year execution moratorium and put Ronald Phillips to death.  Phillips, 19 at the time he committed his crime, had the intellectual functioning of a juvenile, had a father who sexually abused him, and grew up a victim of and a witness to unspeakable physical abuse — information his trial lawyers never learned or presented to a jury.

Ohio intends to execute three more people in 2017 and then 23 more between 2018 and 2020.  We examined the cases of these 26 men, relying on available legal pleadings, court opinions, and where accessible, trial testimony.  We found that these men are among the most impaired and traumatized among us — a pattern replicated across America’s death rows.  At least 17 out of the 26 men experienced serious childhood trauma — horrifying instances of extensive physical and sexual abuse.  At least six men appear to suffer from a mental illness, and at least 11 have evidence of intellectual disability, borderline intellectual disability, or a cognitive impairment, including brain injury.  Three were under the age of 21 at the time they committed their offenses, a period during which an individual’s brain, especially the section related to impulse control and decision-making, is still underdeveloped.  Many of these men fall within several of these categories, which compounds the impairments.

We use the term “at least” because three of these men waived the presentation of mitigation at their trials.  And several had lawyers who conducted little to no investigation at both the trial and post-conviction phase or failed to seek the assistance of psychologists and other experts, despite the presence of familial mental illness, which is often hereditary. Therefore, in those cases, we know very little about existing impairments, even though execution dates are looming.

The Constitution mandates that the state restrict the use of the death penalty to only those “whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution,’” regardless of the severity of their crimes. The individuals identified here have been convicted of horrible crimes, and they must be held to account.  But the evidence suggests that Ohio has not met its constitutional obligation.  It is instead planning to execute nearly two dozen individuals with substantial impairments, rather than reserving the punishment for those with the greatest culpability.

Below, we describe some of the stories we uncovered while researching these 26 Ohio cases.  We have grouped them by category of impairment which includes serious trauma, mental illness and intellectual disability, and youth.  These distinctions, however, are artificial — many of these men have heartbreaking stories falling within multiple categories. For each example of a debilitating impairment, we could have included many other equally terrifying stories about those facing a sentence of death.

August 30, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (14)

"Local Democracy, Community Adjudication, and Criminal Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay authored by Laura Appleman now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Many of our criminal justice woes can be traced to the loss of the community’s decisionmaking ability in adjudicating crime and punishment.  American normative theories of democracy and democratic deliberation have always included the participation of the community as part of our system of criminal justice.  This type of democratic localism is essential for the proper functioning of the criminal system because the criminal justice principles embodying substantive constitutional norms can only be defined through community interactions at the local level.  Accordingly, returning the community to its proper role in deciding punishment for wrongdoers would both improve criminal process and return us to fundamental criminal justice ideals.

August 30, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, August 29, 2017

In wake of Marcellus Williams stay and inquiry, broader reflections on innocence and racial dynamics in capital punishment's administration

As reported in this post last week, just before Marcellus Williams was to be put to death for the 1998 murder of a former newspaper reporter, Missouri Gov Eric Greitens issued a stay of execution and appointed a Board of Inquiry to explore his claims of innocence.  With that case obviously fresh in mind, this week has brought these two related commentaries:

Here, respectively, are the final paragraphs of each piece:

This will not be the first time that we have executed a man despite real doubts about the case. So long as we have the death penalty, it will not be the last.

Racist death penalty statutes must be the first to go. Exercising meaningful, impactful leadership, Gov. Greitens can and should, start with Missouri’s.

August 29, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Third Circuit panel rejects various challenges to severe stash-house sting sentence

A helpful reader made sure that I did not miss yesterday's dynamic discussion by a Third Circuit panel of a set of defense challenges to yet another severe sentence resulting from a stash-house sting.  The start of the majority opinion in US v. Washington, No. 16-2795 (3d Cir. Aug. 28, 2017) (available here), highlights why these cases are so notable:

Defendant-appellant Askia Washington was ensnared by a “stash house reverse sting” operation — one which hit many of the by-now-familiar beats.  Acting on what appeared to be insider information from a drug courier, Washington and his three co-conspirators planned to rob a Philadelphia property where they thought 10 kilograms of cocaine were being stored for distribution.  But as they discovered on the day of the robbery, the “stash house” was a trap set by law enforcement.  Their “courier” was an undercover federal agent with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”), which had developed the scenario from the ground up.  The cocaine did not exist.

Under federal law on conspiracy and attempt, the government could, and did, prosecute the crew as if fantasy had been reality.  Washington, the sole member to take his chances at trial, was convicted by a jury of two Hobbs Act robbery charges and two drug charges (18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) and 21 U.S.C. § 846), although he was acquitted on a gun charge.

Developed by the ATF in the 1980s to combat a rise in professional robbery crews targeting stash houses, reverse sting operations have grown increasingly controversial over the years, even as they have grown safer and more refined.  For one, they empower law enforcement to craft offenses out of whole cloth, often corresponding to statutory offense thresholds.  Here, the entirely fictitious 10 kilograms of cocaine triggered a very real 20-year mandatory minimum for Washington, contributing to a total sentence of 264 months in prison — far more than even the ringleader of the conspiracy received.  For another, and as Washington claimed on multiple occasions before the District Court — and now again on appeal — people of color are allegedly swept up in the stings in disproportionate numbers.

These elements of controversy are bound up in the three claims Washington now raises on appeal.  Two are constitutional claims: Washington challenges his conviction and sentence by arguing that the use of the statutory mandatory minimum term violated his rights to due process, and he also alleges that the attorney who represented him at trial rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance.  While stash-house reverse stings can raise constitutional concerns, the use of a mandatory minimum sentence on these particular facts did not deprive Washington of his right to due process.  And while this is the rare case where a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was properly raised on direct appeal instead of through a collateral attack, Washington has not shown prejudice sufficient to call into doubt the integrity of his trial.  We thus conclude that both constitutional claims are without merit.

A lengthy and nuanced discussion by the majority follows, and largely concludes that the stash-house sting in this case was, in essence, "good enough for government work."  Judge McKee penned a lengthy partial dissent focused on sentencing issues that has a conclusion including these paragraphs:

This case is the latest illustration of why federal courts across the country continue to find the government’s reliance on phony stash-house sting operations disturbing.  As I have explained, these cases raise serious issues of fairness while destroying the fundamental relationship between culpability and punishment that is so important to sentencing.  The conduct being sanctioned is the direct result of the government’s initiative rather than the defendant’s.

I reiterate that it is exceedingly difficult to conclude that Congress ever considered that mandatory minimum sentences would apply here.  Nevertheless, it just may be that the ultimate systematic resolution of this very troublesome approach to sentencing will have to await clarification by Congress, the Sentencing Commission,or the U.S. Supreme Court.  Meanwhile, it is worth echoing my colleagues’ caution: The Government’s success today should not be interpreted as a clue that “all such prosecutions will share the same fate” in the future.

August 29, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, August 28, 2017

In latest speech, AG Sessions talks up the changed policies of the Trump Administration

Attorney General Jeff Sessions gave this speech today at a conference of the National Fraternal Order of Police.  Regular readers are familiar with various themes that have become common in the speeches of AG, but these excerpts still seemed worth spotlighting:

Several months ago now, we changed the charging policy for our federal prosecutors, trusting them once again and directing them to return to charging the most serious, readily provable offense.

In July, we reinstituted our equitable sharing program, ensuring that criminals will not be permitted to profit from their crimes.  As President Trump knows well, civil asset forfeiture is a key tool that helps law enforcement defund organized crime, take back ill-gotten gains, and prevent new crimes from being committed, and it weakens the criminals and the cartels.  Civil asset forfeiture takes the material support of the criminals and instead makes it the material support of law enforcement.  In departments across this country, funds that were once used to take lives are now being used to save lives.

Since these changes, we have seen a 23 percent increase in the number of criminals charged with unlawful possession of a firearm.  The Department has convicted more than 1,200 members of gangs, cartels, and their subsidiaries, since the beginning of the year....

Helping law enforcement do their jobs, helping the police get better, and celebrating the noble, honorable, essential and challenging work of our law enforcement communities will always be a top priority of President Trump and this Department of Justice.  We will always seek to affirm the critical role of policeoffers in our society and we will not participate in anything that would give comfort to radicals who promote agendas that preach hostility rather than respect for police.

President Trump is serious about this mission.  He is doing all he can to restore law and order and support our police across America.  And that is why, today, I am here to announce that President Trump is issuing an executive order that will make it easier to protect yourselves and your communities. H e is rescinding restrictions from the prior administration that limited your agencies' ability to get equipment through federal programs, including life saving gear like Kevlar vests and helmets and first responder and rescue equipment like what they’re using in Texas right now.

Some of these programs, like the Department of Defense's 1033 program that Congress signed into law more than 25 years ago, have recycled more than $5.4 billion in used gear and equipment that taxpayers had already purchased, and made it available for your agencies to repurpose it in the fight against terrorism, crime, and disaster relief. Equipment like helicopters and armored vehicles are also vitally important to emergency and disaster response efforts.

One sheriff told me earlier this year about how, due to the prior administration's restrictions, the federal government made his department return an armored vehicle that can change the dynamics of an active shooter situation.  These are the types of helmets and gear that stopped a bullet and saved the life of an officer during the Orlando nightclub shooting.  This is the type of equipment officers needed when they pursued and ultimately killed terrorists in San Bernardino.  Studies have shown this equipment reduces crime rates, reduces the number of assaults against police officers, and reduces the number of complaints against police officers.

Those restrictions went too far.  We will not put superficial concerns above public safety. All you need to do is turn on a tv right now to see that for Houstonians this isn’t about appearances, its about getting the job done and getting everyone to safety.

The executive order the President will sign today will ensure that you can get the lifesaving gear that you need to do your job and send a strong message that we will not allow criminal activity, violence, and lawlessness to become the new normal.  And we will save taxpayer money in the meantime.

August 28, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Lots of commentary and criticism in wake of Prez Trump's Arpaio pardon

There has been no shortage of commentary and criticism of Prez Trump's decision on Friday to make his first use of the clemency power a pardon for Joe Arpaio (basics here). Here is a not-quite-random, not-so-systematic sampling of stories and commentaries:

In accord with a lot of the commentary here, I am troubled by how Prez Trump first decided to use his historic clemency powers.  But, as this Guardian piece usefully highlights, many recent presidents have used their clemency authority in ways seemingly motivated unduly by political commitments rather than purely by concerns about justice and mercy.  I want to believe that the current President is capable and eager to have concerns about justice and mercy impact at least some of his future clemency decisions, but his track record on this front and others certainly does not inspire optimism.

August 28, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (35)

"Less Is More: How Reducing Probation Populations Can Improve Outcomes"

Download (3)The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper emerging from the Executive Session on Community Corrections at the Harvard Kennedy School.  Here is the paper's introduction:

This paper will argue that, similar to the growth in prisons that has resulted in our current state of mass incarceration, the tremendous growth in probation supervision in the United States over the past several decades should be reversed, and the entire system of probation significantly downsized.  Specifically, we argue here that while the number of people on probation supervision in the U.S. has declined over the past several years (as have the number of people incarcerated and crime rates), that decline should not only be sustained but significantly increased, with a goal of reducing the number of people under probation supervision by 50 percent over 10 years.  We then discuss New York City as an example of a jurisdiction that has successfully done this.

In many respects, the rationale for this argument mirrors the argument against mass incarceration.  In most jurisdictions, probation is a punitive system that attempts to elicit compliance from individuals primarily through the imposition of conditions, fines, and fees that in many cases cannot be met (Corbett, 2015; Klingele, 2013).  This is not only a poor use of scarce resources; it contributes to a revolving door in which individuals who cannot meet those obligations cycle back and forth between probation and incarceration without necessarily improving public safety.  In fact, the cycle of incarceration and supervision can actually threaten public safety, and it certainly has harmful and farreaching consequences for those who are caught up in it, including job loss, disconnection from family, and housing instability (Council of Economic Advisers, 2015).  Given this, along with national and local data and examples that clearly demonstrate that reducing “mass probation” can go hand in hand with a reduction in the number of people incarcerated and ongoing declines in national and local crime, it begs the question of why so many jurisdictions continue to promulgate this punitive approach.

Because probation is the most severely underfunded and the least politically powerful of all criminal justice agencies, there is no likelihood of any massive infusion of new resources into the field.  Thus, the limited resources saved from this downsizing may be used to invest in community-based programs that provide employment, substance abuse, and mental health treatment to the remaining population — those that pose the highest public safety risk — as a way to significantly reduce that risk and avoid unnecessary monitoring and supervision.  A portion of these savings should also substitute for the rampant use of probation fees used throughout the U.S. as a way to pay for a structurally underfunded system.  These fees are unjust, counter-productive, and antithetical to the legitimacy of any system of justice (Martin, Smith, and Still, 2017).

August 28, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Helpful new Sentencing Project fact sheet on "Private Prisons in the United States"

The fine folks at The Sentencing Project have this fine new two-page fact sheet providing state-by-state data on the use of private prisons.  Here is some of the text that accompanies the charts in the publication:

Private prisons in the United States incarcerated 126,272 people in 2015, representing 8% of the total state and federal prison population.  Since 2000, the number of people housed in private prisons has increased 45%.

States show significant variation in their use of private correctional facilities.  For example, New Mexico and Montana incarcerate over 40% of their prison populations in private facilities, while states such as Illinois and New York do not employ for-profit prisons.

Data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) show that in 2015, 28 states and the federal government incarcerated people in private facilities run by corporations including GEO Group, Core Civic (formerly Corrections Corporation of America), and Management and Training Corporation.

According to BJS data, 21 of the states with private prison contracts incarcerate more than 500 people in for-profit prisons.  Texas, the first state to adopt private prisons in 1985, incarcerated the largest number of people under state jurisdiction, 14,293.

Since 2000, the number of people in private prisons has increased 45%, compared to an overall rise in the prison population of 10%. In five states, the private prison population has increased 100% or more during this period.  The federal prison system experienced a 125% increase in use of private prisons since 2000 reaching 34,934 people in private facilities in 2015.

Despite the significant growth in private prisons since 2000, the number of people housed in these facilities has declined 8% since reaching a national peak population of 137,220 in 2012.  Since 2000 six states — Arkansas, Kentucky, Maine, Michigan, Utah and Wisconsin — have eliminated their use of private prisons due to concerns about safety and cost-cutting.  An additional six states saw reductions of 40% or more in the use of private prisons during this period.

August 28, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, August 27, 2017

SCOTUS fills out Fall docket with little prisoner lawsuit fee-award case

As reported here by Amy Howe via SCOTUSblog, the Supreme Court this past Friday issued an unusual mid-summer cert grant a full month before their usual late September "long conference."  Here are the basics:

[I]n a relatively unusual summer order, the justices [on August 25] added a new case, involving the interpretation of a federal law governing the award of attorney’s fees to prisoners who prevail in civil rights cases, to their docket for the fall.   [This] grant came in a case filed by an Illinois prisoner, Charles Murphy, who was awarded over $300,000 after he prevailed in a lawsuit alleging that corrections officers had badly beaten him, causing permanent damage to his eye.  A provision in the Prison Litigation Reform Act indicates that, when a prisoner like Murphy is awarded money in a civil rights lawsuit, “a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendants.”  The dispute now before the Supreme Court centers on exactly what the phrase “not to exceed 25 percent” means: Does 25 percent of the money awarded to the prisoner have to go toward his attorney’s fees, before the defendants must also contribute to the fees, or can the district court require a smaller portion of the attorney’s fees to come out of the prisoner’s award?

In Murphy’s case, the district court awarded attorney’s fees of approximately $108,000. It ordered Murphy to pay 10 percent of his award — approximately $30,000 — to his attorney, with the roughly $78,000 remaining to come from the corrections officers. But on appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling on the attorney’s fees award.  It interpreted the phrase “not to exceed 25 percent” to mean that 25 percent of the prisoner’s award was required to go to attorney’s fees; under this construction, the corrections officials would have to pitch in only if the prisoners’ attorneys were still owed money after that.  The court of appeals therefore ordered Murphy to contribute approximately $77,000 (rather than roughly $30,000) of his award to his attorneys; this left corrections officials on the hook for only approximately $31,000 (rather than the $78,000 that they owed under the district court’s order).

Murphy took his case to the Supreme Court, where he urged the justices to step in and resolve a conflict between the 7th Circuit’s interpretation and those of several other circuits that would give district courts discretion to decide how much of a prisoner’s award should go to his attorneys.  The 7th Circuit’s rule, he argued, “leaves prisoners whose constitutional rights have been violated with smaller net recoveries than Congress intended them to receive.”

Opposing review, the corrections officers ... effectively conceded that the courts of appeals are divided on how to interpret the phrase “not to exceed 25 percent.”  But, they emphasized, the conflict is not as widespread as Murphy suggests, because only two courts of appeals “have squarely held that the PLRA gives district courts discretion to choose any portion of the judgment up to 25% to apply to a fee award.”  And in any event, they added, the issue arises relatively rarely, because virtually no prisoners in PLRA cases are even represented by attorneys, much less prevail and receive money damages....

The [SCOTUS] calendar for October arguments is full, bolstered by two cases in which the justices are hearing oral arguments for the second time and two other cases — involving the Trump administration’s “travel ban” and a challenge to Wisconsin’s redistricting maps — that are being argued earlier than they might normally have been. But the court still has 12 days of arguments (for a total of up to 24 arguments) to fill in the November and December sittings, with only 17 hours’ worth of arguments before today’s grant.  [This] grant should allow Murphy’s case to be briefed in time for oral argument in December, bringing the total of November and December arguments to 18.

Though I suppose it is useful for SCOTUS to settle a circuit split on this little fee issue, I find it more than a bit intriguing and ultimately frustrating that a rare dispute over how much a prisoner must pay his lawyer is now going to get more SCOTUS attention than far-more-common disputes over, say, how much time a juve offender can gets under Graham and Miller Eighth Amendment precedents or whether and how guideline enhancements based on acquitted conduct may be problematic in some cases given Apprendi/Booker Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  It seems a clear circuit split on a little issue that impacts a handful of prisoners still has a better chance of garnering SCOTUS review than challenging sentencing issues that can impact thousands of cases every year.

August 27, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

"The Use and Abuse of Mutual-Support Programs in Drug Courts"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Sara Gordon now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

There is a large gap between what we know about the disease of addiction and its appropriate treatment, and the treatment received by individuals who are ordered into treatment as a condition of participation in drug court.  Most medical professionals are not appropriately trained about addiction and most addiction treatment providers do not have the education and training necessary to provide appropriate evidence-based services to individuals who are referred by drug courts for addiction treatment.

This disconnect between our understanding of addiction and available addiction treatment has wide reaching impact for individuals who attempt to receive medical care for addiction in this country, as well as for those individuals who are compelled by a drug court to receive that treatment.  Instead of receiving evidence-based treatment, most drug court participants are referred to mutual-support groups and programs based largely or entirely on 12-step principles.  Mutual-support groups, while well-intentioned and helpful as a supplement to evidence-based addiction treatment, are not a substitute for scientifically valid addiction treatment and should not constitute the primary form of medical assistance received by drug court participants.

This Article argues that drug and other specialty courts can be part of the transformation of the public perception of addiction, as well as the integration of addiction treatment into mainstream medicine by incorporating and endorsing evidence-based strategies for the treatment of addiction, including psychosocial and pharmacological treatments.  Moreover, by adopting these treatments more readily and providing more opportunities for drug court participants to receive evidence-based treatment, drug courts can dramatically improve treatment outcomes for participants.

August 27, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Will deadly protests impact high-profile sentencing in India? Should they?

A classic hypothetical question for hard-core fans of a strictly utilitarian approach to punishment is whether they should and would be inclined to go easy or even release a guilty criminal in order to avoid possible harms being threatened by an angry mob.  (The even harder variation is whether they would punish an innocent person to mollify a mob.)  I bring this up because, as reported in this Reuters article, concerns about mob violence are now not hypothetical in the northern part of India.  The article is headlined "After deadly protests, Indian states in lockdown for 'godman's' rape sentencing," and here are excerpts:

India is deploying thousands of riot police and shutting down internet services in two northern states, as it prepares for the sentencing on Monday of a self-styled ’godman’ whose followers went on the rampage after he was convicted of rape on Friday.

Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh’s cult Dera Sacha Sauda has a vast rural following in Punjab and Haryana states, where frenzied mobs burned down gas stations and train stations and torched vehicles after a local court found him guilty of raping two women in a 2002 case.  At least 38 people were killed and more than 200 injured in the violence in Haryana, officials said, drawing sharp criticism for the state government run by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The case has also highlighted the Indian heartland’s fascination with spiritual gurus, who enjoy immense political clout for their ability to mobilize millions of followers frustrated by the shortcomings of the state.  Security forces have cordoned off a jail in Rohtak city, 70 km (44 miles) from New Delhi, where Singh - also known as the guru of bling for the clothes he wears in the movies he has starred in - is being held.

The judge who convicted Singh will hold a special hearing inside the prison in Rohtak around 2.30 pm local time (0900 GMT) on Monday to decide the punishment, in a move that officials hope will prevent his followers from gathering in the streets like they did on Friday. Singh faces a minimum of seven years in prison.

The town of Sirsa, home to Dera’s headquarters, is already under lockdown, BS Sandhu, Haryana’s police chief, told Reuters. School and colleges have been ordered shut, the government said....

In godman Singh’s two films, “Messenger of God” and its sequel, there are sequences in which he fights off villains and tosses burning motorbikes into the air. In his spiritual avatar, Singh dresses in plain white traditional clothes, giving sermons or planting trees. In the movies he dons bejeweled costumes, rides motorbikes and sends bad guys flying.

The Haryana government has faced severe criticism from opposition Congress and a state court for failing to stop the rioting and vandalism. Singh, whose verified Twitter profile calls him a saint, philanthropist, sportsman, actor, singer, movie director, writer, lyricists, and autobiographer, has been photographed with senior BJP leaders including Haryana chief minister Manohar Lal Khattar....

Singh's conviction in a rape case is the latest in a series of cases involving spiritual leaders who have been accused of sexually abusing followers, amassing untaxed money and finding favor with politicians. Besides the rape charges, he is also under investigation over allegations that he convinced 400 of his male followers to undergo castration, allegations he denies.

August 27, 2017 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentencing around the world | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, August 26, 2017

Split en banc Eleventh Circuit concludes Florida felony battery is "crime of violence" under FSG

A remarkable amount of energy and (digital?) link has been spent assessing and reviewing what criminal history counts or does not count as a crime of violence under various provisions of federal sentencing law.  That amount grew that much more on Friday with the release of an 67-page en banc ruling by the Eleventh Circuit in US v. Vail-Bailon, No. 15-10351 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) (available here). This opening paragraph by the majority provides the basics:

This appeal requires us to decide whether Florida felony battery is a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon was convicted in 2014 of illegally reentering the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b)(1), after having been deported following a conviction for felony battery under Florida Statute § 784.041.  Based on Vail-Bailon’s felony battery conviction, the district court imposed a sentencing enhancement that applies when a defendant has been deported after committing a crime of violence as defined by the applicable Guidelines provision. Vail-Bailon appealed his sentence, arguing that a Florida felony battery conviction does not qualify as a crime of violence. A divided panel of this Court agreed with Vail-Bailon, and vacated his sentence. See United States v. Vail-Bailon, 838 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2016), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (11th Cir. Nov. 21, 2016). Our full Court granted the Government’s petition to rehear the case en banc, and we now hold that Florida felony battery does categorically qualify as a crime of violence under § 2L1.2 of the Guidelines. Thus, we affirm and reinstate Vail-Bailon’s sentence.

The majority thereafter needs 30 pages to explain its "crime of violence" conclusions, and the dissenters need more than 30 to explain why they think the majority got this wrong. The lead dissent gets started this way:

If, while walking down the street, you tap a jogger on the shoulder and the tap startles him, causing him to trip, hit his head, and suffer a concussion, have you committed a violent act?  Most would say no.  But if you punch the jogger and the punch causes him to fall, hit his head, and suffer a concussion, you have undoubtedly committed a violent act. The difference between a non-violent and violent act, then, is the degree of force used. 

August 26, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (8)

Friday, August 25, 2017

As he had hinted, Prez Trump decides to make his first use of the clemency power a pardon for Joe Arpaio

As reported here by Politico, "President Donald Trump pardoned attorney former Sheriff Joe Arpaio on Friday."  Here is more:

Arpaio had been convicted of federal contempt. The outspoken immigration opponent has long backed Trump. The president teased a pardon during a campaign rally in Phoenix on Tuesday. The White House cited a lifetime of public service in announcing Apraio's pardon.

I cannot yet find any official White House statement about this action, but I will update this post if and when one appears.

A few prior related posts:

UPDATE: This Reuters piece provides more context on the pardon as well as reaction thereto. Commentor Joe helpfully noticed that the official White House statement appears on the ABC News Twitter feed, and as of early Saturday morning I cannot yet find that statement on the White House website.

August 25, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (24)

"Jeff Sessions Should Be Screaming Bloody Murder About a Potential Joe Arpaio Pardon"

The title of this post is the headline of this interesting Reason commentary authored by Mike Riggs.  Here are excerpts:

President Donald Trump did not pardon former Maricopa County Sheriff Joe Arpaio at his Arizona rally on Tuesday, but CNN reports that the paperwork and accompanying talking points are ready.  Should he pardon Arpaio at some point in the near future, it would be both completely legal and an affront to everything his attorney general supposedly holds dear.

"One of the talking points is that Arpaio served his country for 50 years in the military, the Drug Enforcement Administration and as Arizona's Maricopa County sheriff," CNN's Kaitlan Collins reports, "and that it is not appropriate to send him to prison for 'enforcing the law' and 'working to keep people safe.'"  Arpaio is not facing six months behind bars for "enforcing the law" or "working to keep people safe," any more than drug dealers are sentenced to prison for "making people happy."  Arpaio disregarded a judge's order and was convicted of felony contempt of court.  He did the crime, by his own logic and that of the U.S. Attorney General, and he should now do some time.

But if Trump decides to spare the 85-year-old Arpaio six months of incarceration — we won't know until October if he'll actually serve any time behind bars — he has that power. Yes, it would signal a break with historical precedent, but that's really the only constraint on executive clemency....

If anyone in Trump's orbit should be discouraging him from pardonning Arpaio, it's Sessions.  When Pres. Bill Clinton pardoned financier Marc Rich in the final hours of his presidency, Rich had not even stood trial.  He fled the U.S. in 1983 after being indicted for trading with Iran during the hostage crisis, and spent the rest of his life living comfortably abroad.  During his absence, Rich's family in the U.S. funneled more than a million dollars to the Democratic National Committee, the senatorial campaign of Hillary Clinton, and the Clinton Presidential Library.  When Clinton eventually pardoned him at the behest of Israel's government, the prosecutors who worked to indict Rich were understandably furious, as were many members of Congress.

"From what I've seen, based on the law of bribery in the United States, if a person takes a thing of value for himself or for another person that influences their decision in a matter of their official capacity, then that could be a criminal offense,'' Sen. Jeff Sessions told the New York Times in 2001.  One might think Sessions would feel similarly about the current president rewarding a campaign surrogate with a Get Out of Jail Free card.

Sessions also objected to the clemency initiative, which Obama launched in 2014 and continued through the end of his second term.  This was the most systematic attempt to heal the wounds of a stupid war since President Jimmy Carter pardoned men who evaded the draft for Vietnam.  Sessions, however, declared Obama's efforts to shorten insanely long drug sentences a betrayal of the American justice system.  "To unilaterally determine that a sentence was unjustified simply because the president disagrees with the underlying criminal justice policy is a thumb in the eye of the law enforcement officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, court and prison personnel who put time and resources into these cases," Sessions said in 2014.

Just a month ago, Sessions said he was committed to holding law-breaking cops accountable.  "Just as I'm committed to defending law enforcement who lawfully have to use deadly force to defend themselves while engaged in their work," he told the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives, "I will also use the power of the office I'm entrusted with to hold any officer responsible who violates the law."

If Arpaio is an exception to Sessions' position on executive clemency and holding criminal cops accountable, I can't wait to hear his explanation.

A few prior related posts:

August 25, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Supreme Court of Wyoming continues to interpret Graham and Miller broadly

A helpful colleague made sure I did not miss an interesting opinion handed down yesterday by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Sam v. Wyoming, No. S-16-0168 (Wy. Aug. 24, 2017) (available here), involving the Supreme Court's juve sentencing jurisprudence.  Here are concluding passages from the majority opinion ruling for the defendant in Sam:

Mr. Sam argues that his consecutive sentences of a minimum of 52 years, with release possible when he is 70 years old, is unconstitutional....

In Bear Cloud III, we analyzed the United States Supreme Court case law leading up to Miller and concluded that the prohibition of life without parole sentences required a “‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” 2014 WY 113, ¶ 21, 334 P.3d at 139 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75, 130 S.Ct. at 2030). And we held that “‘[t]he prospect of geriatric release . . . does not provide a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate the maturity and rehabilitation required to obtain release and reenter society as required by Graham . . . .’” Bear Cloud III, 2014 WY 113, ¶ 34, 334 P.3d at 142 (quoting State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 (Iowa 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   Since then, the United States Supreme Court has confirmed that the release for juveniles contemplated by the Roper, Graham, and Miller courts should allow them “hope for some years of life outside prison walls . . . .” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736-37. We held in Mr. Bear Cloud’s case that his sentence of a minimum of 45 years, with possible release when he is 61, was the functional equivalent of life without parole. Bear Cloud III, 2014 WY 113, ¶¶ 11, 33, 334 P.3d at 136, 142. In this case, the sentencing court has made the determination that Mr. Sam is not one of the juvenile offenders whose crime reflects irreparable corruption. An aggregated minimum sentence exceeding the 45/61 standard is the functional equivalent of life without parole and violates Bear Cloud III and Miller and its progeny. The sentence imposed on Mr. Sam of a minimum 52 years with possible release at age 70 clearly exceeds that. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions to the sentencing court to sentence Mr. Sam within the confines set forth in Bear Cloud III.

A dissenting justice in Sam took a distinct view, and here are conclusing passages from the dissenting opinion:

Mr. Sam did not act from impulse, immaturity, or at the invitation or inducement of others.  He intentionally prepared for his crimes, baited the victims into an ambush, committed multiple aggravated assaults on numerous victims, and culminated the spree with an execution-style murder.  Proportionality requires that those factors be considered in his sentence, as well as the remote possibility of rehabilitation.

The U.S. Supreme Court has not defined a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”  Nothing in any Supreme Court decision suggests that a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release” must be the same for every defendant.  To the contrary, the proportionality required by the Eighth Amendment indicates that a more mature defendant who commits multiple crimes including murder should receive a lengthier sentence than someone who is less mature or commits only one crime.

In this case, the district court did all it was required to do in sentencing Mr. Sam.  It conducted a thorough individualized sentencing hearing and considered multiple times Mr. Sam’s youthful factors, family history, and participation in the crime as required by Miller and Bear Cloud III. It crafted a sentence it felt was appropriate based upon all of these factors, and it believed this sentence did not constitute a de facto life sentence.  It concluded that Mr. Sam deserved a longer sentence than if he had only committed the murder, or the murder and one additional aggravated assault.

The majority remands this case to the district court to impose an aggregate sentence of something less than the 45 years that was rejected in Bear Cloud III, concluding that Mr. Sam’s sentence denies him any meaningful opportunity for release before he is “geriatric.”  I disagree.  If Mr. Sam is motivated by the possibility of parole and comports himself well while in prison he will receive credit for “good time” under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-420 (LexisNexis 2017) and Department of Corrections rules.  He will then be eligible for parole on the last of his sentences at about age 61.  I do not agree that release at that age deprives Mr. Sam of all meaningful portions of life.

August 25, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (4)

Florida completes (historic?) execution 30 years after double murder

As reported in this local article, headlined "In a first, Florida executes a white defendant for killing a black victim," a demographically notable execution was carried out late yesterday.  Here are the details:

For the first time in 18 months, Florida carried out a death sentence, killing Mark James Asay as final punishment for two 1987 murders in Jacksonville and making Asay the first white man ever executed in the state for killing a black victim. Asay was pronounced dead at 6:22 p.m. Thursday. He was 53.

The execution began at Florida State Prison after the U.S. Supreme Court, without comment, denied Asay’s final appeal. At 6:10 p.m., a curtain lifted between the death chamber and a room for witnesses. The lighting flickered, and the air-conditioning was turned off, making for an eerie quiet. “Mr. Asay, do you have a final statement?” a guard asked. “No, sir,” he replied. “I do not.”...

Asay’s chest moved up and down, and then it stopped. The guard shook Asay’s shoulders, then stood back. Eight minutes later, a doctor emerged.

The state executed Asay because a jury found him guilty of killing Robert Lee Booker and Robert McDowell minutes apart in Jacksonville’s Springfield neighborhood. The jury recommended he be put to death by a vote of 9 to 3. The U.S. Supreme Court later ruled that death sentencing system unconstitutional, and though the Florida Supreme Court now requires unanimous jury decisions, the new standard applies only to cases going back to 2002.

Asay’s attorneys said the best argument for stopping the execution would have been to say that 2002 is an arbitrary date, and because the death sentence vote wasn’t unanimous, he should be resentenced. Asay refused to let them make that argument, attorney Marty McClain said, instead asking them to argue he wasn’t guilty of murdering Booker, the black man.

When Asay was arrested, his arms bore white supremacist tattoos, and witnesses said he referred to one of the victims by the N-word. Frank Booker, Robert Booker’s brother, said Thursday afternoon that “we’ve been waiting for this since 1987, and that’s a long time. I feel a lot of pressure and anxiety will be off me, and I’ll be able to continue in life, I think, a lot more peaceful because this was something that touched a lot of us really, really deep. I know he feels sorry now, but he should’ve thought about that in ’87 when he did what he did. He did it. All the evidence pointed that way.”

Asay’s brother and another friend who were with him the night of the killings testified that the three were drinking and looking for sex. While his brother was talking to Booker, Asay used racial slurs. He then shot Booker in the stomach and fled. The men then hired McDowell, who was dressed as a woman and using the name Renee Torres, to perform oral sex, according to their testimony. Asay then shot and killed McDowell. One of the witnesses said Asay killed McDowell because he felt ripped off. A jailhouse informant later said Asay referred to McDowell using a derogatory word for gay men.

Asay admitted this week to News4Jax that he killed McDowell, who was white. The race of Asay’s victims matters because a racist motive can help prove a murder is cruel, calculated and premeditated, and worthy of execution.

The execution of Asay included the use of two drugs never before used in Florida: potassium acetate, which was used by accident in an Oklahoma execution in 2015, and etomidate, which had never been used anywhere for an execution. States that still carry out the death penalty have struggled to acquire the necessary drugs for lethal injection and have started changing their cocktails. Asay’s lawyers argued that the new injection mixture would violate his constitutional right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment. On Thursday afternoon, a corrections official handed out packets about how the new injection process would work, but she wouldn’t answer questions about how the state chose the drugs.

Since Asay’s trial in 1988, Duval County has led the state in handing down death sentences, with Assistant State Attorney Bernie de la Rionda getting more death sentences than almost any prosecutor in the country. Asay’s execution was the first of de la Rionda’s death sentences to be carried out.

As hinted in the title of this post, I am not sure I want to use the label "historic" to describe the fact that a southern state has carried out the execution of a white murderer who had a black victim. At the same time, I do think it worth noting that this murderer was actually sentenced to death for his crime way back in the 1980s, and thus this execution might be deemed historic simply because it took three decades for Florida to be able to carry out his sentence. Also historic, in some sense, is an execution based on a a non-unanimous jury death recommendation, which will not be possible any longer.

August 25, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (11)

Thursday, August 24, 2017

"Procedures for Proportionate Sentences: The Next Wave of Eighth Amendment Noncapital Litigation"

The title of this post is the title of this notable paper recently posted to SSRN and authored by Sarah French Russell and Tracy Denholtz. Here I the abstract:

With its 2010 decision in Graham v. Florida, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time placed categorical Eighth Amendment limits on noncapital sentences.  Graham prohibits life-without-parole sentences for juveniles in nonhomicide cases and requires states to provide these juveniles with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”  In 2012, in Miller v. Alabama, the Court again set a categorical Eighth Amendment limit — prohibiting mandatory life-without-parole sentences for all juveniles and requiring sentencers to give mitigating effect to youth-related factors when juveniles face life-without-parole sentences.

Following Graham and Miller, 23 states have enacted statutes responding to the decisions and there has been extensive litigation nationwide.  The first wave of litigation has largely focused on the scope of the Court’s categorical holdings, with lower courts considering questions such as: How long is a “life” sentence?  Which crimes are “nonhomicides?”  Do the decisions apply retroactively?

A new wave of litigation is beginning to examine what procedures are required to ensure proportionate sentences under the Eighth Amendment.  Across the country, states are using a range of approaches.  In providing a “second look” for juveniles, some states are simply using existing parole systems, whereas other states have reformed their parole practices for juveniles or created special mechanisms for sentencing review through the courts. With respect to sentencing procedures, some states have adopted special procedures for serious juvenile cases.  Other states have provided little guidance to sentencing courts.

In the past several years, many individuals have been sentenced or resentenced under Miller, and parole boards have started holding hearings in some states. W ith these sentencing and second look proceedings underway, advocates have started to challenge the procedures that states are using.  Are state parole boards in fact providing a “meaningful opportunity” for release to juveniles based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation?  Are courts conducting sentencing hearings in compliance with Miller’s mandates?

Eighth Amendment capital litigation has often focused on the procedures governing capital cases, and much can be accomplished by pushing for better procedures in the noncapital sentencing context.  With hope, reforms to parole and sentencing processes for juveniles will not only improve outcomes for juveniles but will also lead to better procedures and outcomes for adults.  Yet at the same time, advocates should not abandon efforts to push for further substantive Eighth Amendment limits on sentences — not only for children but for adults.

August 24, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

California Supreme Court seems to clear way for resumption of executions after resolving Prop 66 challenges against capital defendant

As reported in this local article, the "California Supreme Court on Thursday upheld a ballot measure narrowly approved by voters to change the state's dysfunctional death penalty system and speed up executions."  Here is more on the ruling and its context from this press account:

The highly anticipated ruling concerned Proposition 66, a push to "mend not end" capital punishment in California. The measure aimed to expedite death sentences in part by setting a five-year deadline on court appeals by condemned inmates. With two of the seven justices dissenting, the state Supreme Court said the five-year deadline was advisory, not mandatory — a point that supporters of the measure had conceded during oral arguments....

Condemned inmates in California currently languish for decades and are more likely to die of natural causes than from lethal injection. There are nearly 750 inmates on death row and only 13 have been executed since 1978 — the last in 2006. It now takes up to five years for death row inmates to get an attorney, and it can take upward of 25 years to exhaust appeals.

Proposition 66 would expand the pool of appellate lawyers handling capital cases and allow lower level state courts — not just the California Supreme Court — to hear appeals.

Death penalty opponents agreed with Proposition 66 backers that the current system was broken, but they argued that the measure would lead to the appointment of incompetent attorneys and overwhelm courts. The result: Insufficient review that could send innocent people to their deaths. Arguments before a divided California Supreme Court in June focused on whether the measure's five-year deadline to hear appeals was realistic and enforceable. Supporters of the measure surprised observers when they conceded the time limit was not mandatory but more of a guideline....

The measure — approved by 51 percent of voters — was designed by prosecutors to revamp the appeals process so the "worst of the worst" murderers are actually executed. Under the measure, more lawyers would have to take death penalty appeals, and they would be assigned almost immediately after sentencing. It would shift one type of appeal focused on newly discovered evidence or alleging misconduct by jurors or prosecutors to trial court judges. With 380 death penalty appeals now pending, there was concern from some legal observers that the state's high court would be overwhelmed trying to meet the deadline imposed by the measure and would hardly hear other cases of merit.

The full ruling in Biggs v. Brown runs 121 pages and is available at this link. I hope to have time to read and perhaps comment further on the opinion in the days ahead, and in the meantime here is how the opinion for the court begins:

In the November 2016 election California voters approved Proposition 66, the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016. (Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) § 1.) The measure’s various provisions are intended to facilitate the enforcement of judgments and achieve cost savings in capital cases. Petitioner Ron Briggs seeks writ relief from this court, challenging the constitutionality of certain aspects of the proposition.  Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General Xavier Becerra, and the Judicial Council of California oppose the petition as respondents.  They are joined by intervener Californians to Mend, Not End, the Death Penalty, a campaign committee representing the proponents of the initiative. The issues raised are of sufficient public importance to justify the exercise of our original jurisdiction in the interest of a prompt resolution. (Legislature v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 492, 500.)

Petitioner asserts four grounds for relief.  He claims Proposition 66 (1) embraces more than one subject, as prohibited by the California Constitution; (2) interferes with the jurisdiction of California courts to hear original petitions for habeas corpus relief; (3) violates equal protection principles by treating capital prisoners differently from other prisoners with respect to successive habeas corpus petitions; and (4) runs afoul of the separation of powers doctrine by materially impairing the courts’ ability to resolve capital appeals and habeas corpus petitions, and to manage their dockets in general.

Petitioner’s constitutional challenges do not warrant relief.  However, we hold that in order to avoid serious separation of powers problems, provisions of Proposition 66 that appear to impose strict deadlines on the resolution of judicial proceedings must be deemed directive rather than mandatory.

August 24, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

"Criminal Injustice: Alec Karakatsanis puts 'human caging' and 'wealth-based detention' in America on trial"

The title of this post is the headline of this extended profile in the latest issue of Harvard Magazine. Here is an excerpt:

Alex Karakatsanis [has been] honored for his work at both Civil Rights Corps (CRC), a legal nonprofit that he founded in 2016, and Equal Justice Under Law (EJUL), a legal nonprofit that he co-founded with law-school friend Phil Telfeyan J.D. ’08 in early 2014. (He had left EJUL the month before to found CRC; Telfeyan still runs EJUL.) With his small band of colleagues — CRC just hired its tenth staff member — Karakatsanis, now 33, has swashbuckled around the country, partnering with local legal nonprofits and community groups to file lawsuits challenging egregious forms of such “human caging” across the balkanized constellation of local authorities in which the vast majority of American criminal procedure plays out each day.

Though he had clerked in Alabama, served as a federal public defender there, and practiced as a lawyer with the District of Columbia’s storied Public Defender Service (PDS), co-founding EJUL was Karakatsanis’s first foray into tackling what he calls “the American criminal system” more broadly.  (He’s observed that “if you say things like ‘the criminal justice system,’ people might get the sense that you’re talking about a system that does justice.”)

For a year and a half after he and Telfeyan founded EJUL in early 2014 with their seed grant, the two of them worked out of their Washington, D.C., apartments. Karakatsanis often used his bed and a small standing desk next to it as his workspace. Juliana Ratner, J.D. ’17, who first met Karakatsanis when they worked together at PDS, recalls that she “used to joke to him: ‘Do these cities that you’re suing know that it’s one man in a bed?’ ”

Their challenges to date have focused on the jailing of poor people for failing to pay municipal fines and fees, and the jailing of poor criminal defendants who cannot afford to pay the bail amounts that would allow them to be released from jail before trial. In challenging these two forms of what CRC and other groups have termed “wealth-based detention,” Karakatsanis and his colleagues have launched two frontal assaults at a broader system of criminal punishment that keeps 2.3 million people locked away from the rest of society.  It may sound amazing to attack something so Goliath-like with the organizational equivalent of sticks and stones. But so far, at least, they are winning.

August 24, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, August 23, 2017

Federal district judge finds due process problems with Indiana's forfeiture procedures

As reported in this local article, a "federal judge has issued an order that partially halts the police seizure of vehicles in Indiana drug cases and other related crimes, calling the seizure of vehicles before an official forfeiture action unconstitutional." Here are the basics and the context of the ruling:

U.S. District Chief Judge Jane Magnus-Stinson ruled that Indiana's forfeiture law violates the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. "The Court concludes that the statutory provisions allowing for the seizure and retention of vehicles without providing an opportunity for an individual to challenge the pre-forfeiture deprivation are unconstitutional," Stinson ruled

The order comes as the Indiana legislature reexamines the state's forfeiture laws in an interim study committee. Under Indiana law, law enforcement can hold a vehicle for up to six months. If the state decides to file a forfeiture claim against the vehicle within the first 180 days, the vehicle is held indefinitely until the case is concluded, which can often be several additional months, according to court documents. ​

The full 35-page opinion in this matter is available at this link, and it gets started this way:

This matter involves a challenge to Indiana’s civil forfeiture statute, specifically as it applies to the seizure and pre-forfeiture retention of vehicles.  Plaintiff Leroy Washington, on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs, contends that Indiana’s statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.  Mr. Washington argues that the statute allows law enforcement officers to seize and hold vehicles based on an officer’s probable cause determination for up to six months without judicial oversight and without allowing individuals the opportunity to challenge that seizure and deprivation -- in other words without a post-seizure, pre-forfeiture hearing. In his Motion for Summary Judgment, Mr. Washington requests a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the statute.  For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Indiana Code Section 34-24-1-1(a)(1), as read in conjunction with the statutory provisions of the same chapter, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court therefore permanently enjoins Defendants from enforcing that statutory provision.

August 23, 2017 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Can a General Conquer the Federal Prison System?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this new extended Marshall Project piece looking at the challenges facing the newly appointed head of the federal Bureau of Prisons. Here is how it gets started:

The federal Bureau of Prisons faces a sea of troubles: Escalating medical costs, a prison population with little access to job training programs or computers, an institutional culture averse to change. In steps Mark S. Inch, the retired two-star general selected by Attorney General Jeff Sessions last month to run the Bureau of Prisons.

Inch retired from the Army in May after more than three decades in the military, mostly as a police officer. While some prison advocates are wary of a leader from an organization disgraced by the abuses at Abu Ghraib, others say a military man may have the courage and discipline to move a stodgy federal prison system toward reforms that have been stalled for years.

“He would provide strong leadership, demand accountability, transparency, and I believe he would be a general who has the ability to think outside the box,” said federal prison consultant Jack Donson, who does not know Inch but worked for the Bureau of Prisons for more than two decades.

In a statement after appointing Inch, Sessions called the retired general “uniquely qualified” because of his policing background and his time overseeing Army Corrections over the past two years.  He replaces Thomas Kane, a 40-year veteran of the federal prison system who had been acting director since early 2016.

The Bureau of Prisons houses more than 187,000 inmates and employs more than 39,000 workers spread out across 122 correctional facilities, six regional offices, a headquarters, two training centers, and 25 residential reentry management offices.  The BOP also has contracts with 11 private prisons.

Outside the military, not much is known about Inch, especially among those who have worked in the federal prison system, prisoner advocates and corrections officials.  Will Inch be an ally for better prisoner education? Will he limit the amount of time prisoners are held in isolation?  Will he rely on controversial for-profit prisons to house new inmates?Inch hasn’t said.

Prisoner advocacy groups have asked Justice officials if any hearings will be held to examine Inch’s background and priorities.  They were told no.

August 23, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, August 22, 2017

Missouri Gov halts scheduled execution and appoints Board of Inquiry to investigate innocence claim

As reported in this local article, today just "before Marcellus Williams was to be put to death for the 1998 murder of a former newspaper reporter, Gov. Eric Greitens issued a stay of execution and appointed a board to look into the case." Here is why:

“A sentence of death is the ultimate, permanent punishment,” Greitens said in a statement Tuesday afternoon. “To carry out the death penalty, the people of Missouri must have confidence in the judgment of guilt. In light of new information, I am appointing a Board of Inquiry in this case.”

Williams’ attorneys have been pleading for a stay, arguing that Missouri was on the verge of executing the wrong person. Williams, 48, was sentenced to death in 2001 for killing Felicia Gayle, who had been a reporter with the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Gayle was stabbed 43 times with a butcher knife in her home. Williams was scheduled to be executed in 2015, but the Missouri Supreme Court stayed his lethal injection, allowing him time to obtain new DNA testing.

DNA testing of the murder weapon, conducted in 2016 and using technology that was not available at the time of the killing, shows Williams is not a match for the male DNA found on the murder weapon.

The Missouri Supreme Court last week turned down his attorneys’ attempt to have the execution stopped. The court did not provide a reason....

Greitens said he would appoint a five-member board that will include retired judges and have the power to subpoena evidence and compel witnesses to testify. The board will look into the case and make a recommendation to the governor as to whether Williams should be executed or have his death sentence commuted....

A spokeswoman for Attorney General Josh Hawley told The Washington Post this week that based on “non-DNA evidence in this case our office is confident in Marcellus Williams’ guilt and plans to move forward.” Among the other evidence cited by Hawley’s office is testimony by Williams’ former cellmate and an ex-girlfriend implicating him in the murder. Some of the victim’s belongings were found in a car Williams drove the day she was killed.

Opponents of the death penalty say Williams’ case should help fuel the push to end the practice in Missouri. “Marcellus Williams’ case is a classic example of the inherent injustice of the death penalty system,” said Zeke Johnson, senior director of programs at Amnesty International USA, “and why it should be altogether abolished.”

Williams was set to face lethal injection at 6 p.m. Tuesday if not for the governor’s order 

Gov. Greitens' full two-page statement is available at this link.

August 22, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (14)

Considering clemency echoes of a possible Arpaio pardon as Prez Trump's first

This new Daily Beast piece, headlined "Donald Trump May Circumvent the Usual Process to Pardon Sheriff Joe Arpaio," provides some notable quotes from notable federal clemency excerpts in reaction to Prez Trump's indication that he is considering a pardon for a high-profile law enforcement official. Here are excerpts:

President Donald Trump has learned about his power to issue pardons.  And in the last week, White House aides have suggested that he use his first one on a controversial choice: Sheriff Joe Arpaio, the schismatic Arizona lawman convicted of contempt of court.

In recent days, speculation has mounted that Trump will follow through on this suggestion at a campaign rally in Phoenix on Tuesday.  Should he do so, it will be a unique moment in modern presidential politics.  Trump will have given the first pardon of his presidency to someone for what appears to be purely political reasons and he will have done so without going through the normal review process.

The possibility has left some clemency advocates feeling a little queasy. “There are literally hundreds of no-name people we’ve never heard of, who will never been in the newspaper, who are not cause célèbres, who have had applications waiting and waiting and waiting,” said P.S. Ruckman, political science professor at Northern Illinois University. “They’re sick to their stomach right now reading about Arpaio getting a potential pardon, that’s breaking their heart.”

Like George W. Bush and Barack Obama before him, Trump has proven stingy with the pardon power granted to the president.  And that’s probably a generous way to put it.  Two hundred days into his presidency, he has yet to pardon anyone.  This isn’t unprecedented. It took Obama more than 600 days to issue a pardon.  He nearly broke the record for fewest pardons, though he granted more clemencies than any other president by shortening the sentences of more than a thousand people....

Ruckman said that most American presidents started pardoning people in their first month in office, and kept pardoning at a regular clip through their administrations.  The drop-off in pardons is a relatively new change.  And while high-profile grants of clemency to political allies get the most press — think Bush’s commutation of Scooter Libby’s sentence or Bill Clinton’s pardon of Democratic mega-donor Marc Rich — the vast majority of people who get pardoned never become household names....

Were Trump to give his first pardon to Arpaio, who endorsed him during the Republican presidential primary, Ruckman argues that it would undercut the populist message from the campaign.  “It would give people the sense that only famous people, cause célèbres, and connected people are going to get pardons from Trump,” Ruckman said.

Sam Morison, an attorney who worked in the Justice Department’s pardon office for more than a decade, predicted Trump will pardon Arpaio when he goes to Arizona, though he added that it would send a terrible message. “He hasn’t even been sentenced yet, he’s just been convicted,” Morison said.  “And he’s not contrite, he doesn’t accept responsibility — quite the opposite. So in that sense, it’s very unusual.  And the only reason he’s getting any traction at all is that he’s a well-known political figure. So it is special pleading of the worst kind.”

Prior related post:

UPDATE: This local report on a speech Tuesday night by Prez Trump provides the latest news on this front via its headline: "Trump didn't pardon Joe Arpaio in Phoenix — but hints that he will."

August 22, 2017 in Celebrity sentencings, Clemency and Pardons, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Looking at US prison history while charting "How to End Mass Incarceration"

The quoted title of this post is the headline of this lengthy Jacobin commentary authored by Roger Lancaster, which starts with an extended review of prison history in the United States.  I recommend the full piece, and here is a how it gets started:

The United States has not always been the world’s leading jailer, the only affluent democracy to make “incapacitation” its criminal justice system’s goal.  Once upon a time, it fashioned itself as the very model of what Michel Foucault called “the disciplinary society.”  That is, it took an enlightened approach to punishment, progressively tethering it to rehabilitative ideals.  Today, it is a carceral state, plain and simple.  It posts the highest incarceration rate in the world — as well as the highest violent crime rate among high-income countries.

Politicians, reporters, and activists from across the political spectrum have analyzed the ongoing crisis of mass incarceration.  Their accounts sometimes depict our current plight as an expression of puritanism, as an extension of slavery or Jim Crow, or as an exigency of capitalism.  But these approaches fail to address the question that ought to be foremost in front of us: what was the nature of the punitive turn that pushed the US off the path of reform and turned its correctional system into a rogue institution?

While the state-sanctioned brutality that now marks the American criminal justice system has motivated many activists to call for the complete abolition of prisons, we must begin with a clearer understanding of the complex institutional shifts that created and reproduce the phenomenon of mass incarceration.  Only then will we be able to see a clear path out of the current impasse.

August 22, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Johnson & Johnson the latest drug company to balk about its drugs being used in lethal injection protocol

This notable new Wall Street Journal article reports on a notable new company expressing concern about an execution protocol. The piece is headlined "Johnson & Johnson Wades Into Death Penalty Debate For First Time: J&J’s Janssen Pharmaceuticals protests use of its drug in a lethal injection."  Here is how the piece gets started:

A Johnson & Johnson company opposes plans by Florida authorities to use one of its drugs in a coming execution, marking the first time the world’s largest pharmaceutical manufacturer has waded into the death-penalty debate.

Earlier this year, Florida amended its lethal-injection protocol to include etomidate, an anesthetic agent that has never been used in executions, after exhausting its supply of the sedative midazolam.  Florida authorities are slated to use the updated protocol for the first time on Thursday in the execution of Mark Asay, who was sentenced to death for the 1987 killings of Robert Lee Booker and Robert McDowell in Jacksonville, Fla.

Scientists at Johnson & Johnson’s Janssen Pharmaceuticals NV created etomidate in the 1960s.  The company never distributed the drug in North America and divested the rest of the business in 2016.  But the company protested on Monday Florida’s plan to use etomidate to render death-row inmates unconscious before injecting them with a paralytic agent and a third drug to stop their hearts.  “We do not support the use of our medicines for indications that have not been approved by regulatory authorities,” a Janssen spokesman said in an email.  “We do not condone the use of our medicines in lethal injections for capital punishment.”

No Johnson & Johnson drugs have been used so far in executions, according to Reprieve, an international-rights group that opposes the death penalty.  At least eight companies make etomidate. Florida, like many states, keeps the identity of its suppliers secret.

August 22, 2017 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

"In Defense of Substantial Sentencing Discretion"

The title of this post is the title of this new article posted on SSRN authored by Antje du Bois-Pedain. Here is the abstract:

This article develops an ideal of sentencing discretion as consisting in sufficient dispositional flexibility for the trial judge to set, on behalf of the polity, reasonable terms for the continuance of relations with the offender in view of his crime. This ideal requires trial judges to have what may be termed “substantial” sentencing discretion: discretion that is exercised with direct reference to the values and goals penal sanctions are expected to serve, and where it is this quality of value-based engagement that provides the justification for the decision.  The article engages with empirical research into sentencing that helps us address the strength of the case for and against substantial sentencing discretion, and ultimately defends substantial sentencing discretion on functional as well as ethical-political grounds.

August 22, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, August 21, 2017

NACDL and FAMM launch "State Clemency Project"

Site_logosThis new NACDL press release reports on an exciting new project that provides another example of new and important state-level criminal justice and sentencing work afoot these days.  Here are the details:

The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and Families Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM), with support from the Foundation for Criminal Justice (FCJ), announce today a major state-focused clemency initiative, the NACDL/FAMM State Clemency Project, a program designed to help to recruit, train, and provide resource support to pro bono attorneys who will assist state prisoners to submit petitions to have their sentences commuted.  Outreach has already begun to several governors' offices across the nation.  And Governor Cuomo of New York has just announced a partnership with the NACDL/FAMM State Clemency Project to develop the necessary processes and procedures to enable volunteer lawyers through the project to help prisoners seeking clemency pursuant to the Governor's initiative. The Project will provide logistical support for the governor's initiative, among other ways, by recruiting and training volunteer lawyers to help prisoners apply for clemency.

"We are committed to provide training and resource support to volunteer lawyers to facilitate a process through which applicants can have access to counsel who can expeditiously submit a petition that makes the case for a second chance," said NACDL Executive Director Norman L. Reimer.  "We want the executive authority to see clearly that many offenders have learned from past mistakes and are ready to safely and productively return home."

"Those individuals who have worked hard to rehabilitate themselves and take responsibility for their mistakes deserve a chance to get out of the penalty box.  Their families, communities, and state will be better off with their release," said FAMM President Kevin Ring.  "We're excited to work with NACDL and Governor Cuomo on this important initiative and we look forward to partnering in other states."

"NACDL is proud to build on its experience as a Clemency Project 2014 founding partner in order to make this state-level clemency project a success," said NACDL President Rick Jones. "As a New York City defense attorney, I am especially pleased that Governor Cuomo is taking the lead in this effort.  Our goal is to provide many hundreds of applicants with qualified counsel who will submit first-rate petitions.  And our hope is that other Governors will launch their own programs, and we pledge to support them. It is long past time to recognize that people can change and that redemption is possible. This program recognizes that fundamental truth."

This project brings NACDL's and FAMM's collective experience as partners of the federal-level Clemency Project 2014 (CP 2014), to state-level clemency efforts. CP 2014, a partnership that also included the American Bar Association, American Civil Liberties Union and the Federal Public and Community Defenders, provided pro bono legal assistance to prisoners seeking to have their sentences commuted under specific criteria set by the White House.

Similarly the NACDL/FAMM State Clemency Project will focus on training lawyers to identify eligible prisoners based on criteria provided participating state executives.  Project staff will work with state agencies to devise the most efficient way to connect applicants to volunteers, provide essential applicant information, and submit well-crafted petitions.  The Project will have a state-based focus that will respond to the criteria for articulated by each governor or state clemency authority, and will rely heavily upon local attorneys, law firms and law clinics.

This link provides the press release from Gov. Cuomo's offices stating "Governor Andrew M. Cuomo today announced a first-in-the-nation partnership between a state and a coalition of legal organizations to expand New York's pro bono clemency program."  And more information about the NACDL/FAMM State Clemency Project with instructions on how to sign up to volunteer can be found here at the project website.  

Kudos to NACDL and FAMM and others involved in this project for building on the wisdom and successes achieved through the federal Clemency Project 2014.  Despite facing an array of challenges, CP14 ended up playing a huge role in helping secure clemency relief for many hundreds of federal prisons.  It would be amazing if this new project can achieve similar successes in a number of states in the months and years ahead.  (For those interested in a review of some recent federal clemency developments, the most recent issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter has a group of articles curated by Professor Mark Osler looking broadly at Prez Obama's overall clemency initiative.) 

August 21, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Reviewing recent chapters of the long-running US "war on drugs"

The Guardian has this lengthy new article on federal drug crime policies headlined "How Jeff Sessions and Donald Trump have restarted the war on drugs."  I find the headline frustrating because the federal government never really ended the "war on drugs" so it is misguided to suggest something that never stopped has been restarted.  That lingo notwithstanding, the extended piece provides a useful primer on recent drug war developments during the Obama and Trump era, and here are excerpts:

Barack Obama’s attorney general, Eric Holder, [in 2013] was pushing through a set of “smart on crime” reforms that included directing federal prosecutors to avoid triggering mandatory minimum sentences when dealing with lower-level, nonviolent drug offenders.  For many years research and advocacy groups had opposed mandatory minimum sentences as cripplingly expensive, marked by racial disparities and of dubious value for crime prevention. But the laws were still on the books and the federal prison population continued to grow.

Holder was announcing that federal prosecutors were being instructed to use minimum sentences in fewer, and more serious, cases. Central to this push for change, said America’s first black attorney general, was the evidence that America’s harsh drug enforcement had fallen more heavily on African Americans....

In May [2017], Sessions reversed his predecessor’s initiative, claiming, without evidence, that Holder’s sentencing changes had led to America’s sudden 10.8% increase in murders in 2015.... What is so striking about the move by Sessions and the Trump administration is that it is at odds with much thinking across the globe about the war on drugs, including among leaders in Latin America.  Ever since 2011 when Juan Manuel Santos, as the president of Colombia, declared that the war on drugs had failed, a growing international consensus has been forming on the need for a new conversation to discuss the violence, bloodshed and ruined lives that followed in the wake of the war on drugs – whether in Colombia, Mexico or America.

The change in direction in the US has come at a time when America has been also seeing an increasing number of states liberalizing laws on the consumption and sale of marijuana.  Into this evolving international and national context has stepped Sessions, with a very different approach.  The new attorney general and his initiatives represent a huge setback for advocates who have worked for decades to build bipartisan agreement that America’s war on drugs had been a failure and it was time to reverse the damage....

For decades, reciting law and order slogans has been the path of least resistance for politicians -- and the policymakers who sign such harsh legislation have not been held responsible for its consequences. “I am unaware of any legislator who has gotten into political trouble for codifying a simple-minded slogan or soundbite that pushes up the incarceration rate with no effect on crime,” says Bobby Scott, an African American Democratic congressman from Virginia who has been fighting for a better approach to criminal justice since he was first elected in 1993. “I am aware of many politicians who voted for intelligent, research-based initiatives that reduce crime and save money, and because they’re labeled ‘soft on crime’ they get in political trouble.”

In recent years, driven by the enormous price tag of mass incarceration for taxpayers, reforming America’s criminal justice system has become a bipartisan effort, with the Republican mega-donor Koch brothers and the advocacy group Right on Crime supporting the cause, and conservative states like Texas leading the way on reducing their prison populations.  Rick Perry, the former Texas governor who now serves as Trump’s energy secretary, was one of the many Republicans who signed on to these reforms. “After 40 years of the war on drugs, I can’t change what happened in the past,” he said at the World Economic Forum in 2014. “What I can do as the governor of the second largest state in the nation is to implement policies that start us toward a decriminalization and keeps people from going to prison and destroying their lives, and that’s what we’ve done.”... “

You are never going to win the war on drugs. Drugs won,” Koch Industries executive Mark Holden told reporters in Colorado in June, expressing frustration at Sessions’ return to war on drugs policies and rhetoric. “Illegal drug usage is at the same or higher levels now than it was when we started the war on drugs,” Holden, who leads the Koch criminal justice reform efforts, told the Guardian. “We need to go to a different approach.”

Sessions’ rollback of Holder’s sentencing reforms has been hailed by some law enforcement groups, and the Justice Department has also defended Sessions’ changes by pointing to his backing from people “actually on the front lines dealing with violent criminals on a daily basis”.  Among Sessions’ supporters in law enforcement are the Fraternal Order of Police (the nation’s most prominent police union), the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, and the National Association of Assistant US Attorneys, which represents the frontline federal prosecutors whom Holder had tried to rein in.

Larry Leiser, the national association’s president, says that many federal prosecutors believe that tough mandatory minimum sentences are a crucial tool in convincing lower-level drug defendants to cooperate with the government when it’s prosecuting the higher-ups involved with the criminal activity.  “The tools we have [to tackle drugs and violence] are the tools that Congress has created for us, Leiser says. “We’re just trying to hold on to the ones we’ve got.”

“Some organizations and people like to make these drug traffickers the victims. What about the people whose lives they kill and the lives they destroy?” Leiser asks. “We’ve lost our way on this issue; we’ve failed to focus on the victims.”...  Leiser and Patrick O’Carroll, the executive director of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association, both say they believe the Obama administration’s modest criminal justice reforms are connected to 2015’s increase in murders. “If you have less drugs in the marketplace, there are less people dying and fighting over the drugs, and you’re going to have less murders,” Leiser says.

August 21, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, August 20, 2017

Eleventh Circuit upholds a 57-year sentence for federal juve offender for non-homicide crimes based in part of possibility of good-time credits

I just came across the interesting opinion handed down late last week by an Eleventh Circuit panel in US v. Mathurin, No. 14-12239 (11th Cir. Aug. 18, 2017) (available here), which rejects an Eighth Amendment challenge (and other challenges) to a 685-month sentence imposed for multiple armed robbery and carjacking crimes committed by the defendant just before he reached age 18.  The underlying facts and the sentencing dynamics in Mathurin are interesting, in part because an older defendant would have gotten a 300-year(!) prison sentence based on many applicable consecutive mandatory-minimum terms that went with the convictions in this case.  The defendant argued that his long prison term was still a functional LWOP term that violated the Supreme Court's Graham Eighth Amendment ruling, and the Eleventh Circuit had a lot of interesting things to say in response.  Here are snippets:

For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that Graham does apply to a non-parolable term-of-years sentence that extends beyond a defendant’s expected life span.  Applying Graham to a term-of-years sentence, however, then gives rise to another question: how does one measure the life expectancy of an individual....  [I]n resolving this case, we do not need to decide whether Defendant’s granular approach to calculating life expectancy should carry the day for purposes of a Graham analysis because even assuming the accuracy of his proffered lower life expectancy for black males in their mid-twenties, as opposed to the life expectancy of all males in their mid-twenties, we conclude that Defendant’s Graham challenge fails....

[A]lthough there is no parole for federal sentences, Defendant has it within his power to shorten his sentence by earning good-time credit. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624, Defendant can earn up to 54 days of credit towards his sentence for each year he serves in prison, “subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, [he] has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations.” 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). The Government has calculated that if Defendant earns the maximum good-time credit available, Defendant can reduce his total sentence by over 7 years and be released when he is 67 years old.  Defendant has never disputed this calculation. Earning this credit means that Defendant would serve a remaining sentence of about 43.4 years, which is more than five years shorter than his own proffered life span for black males and almost ten years shorter than the projected life span for all males his age.  Thus, Defendant’s sentence provides him with a realistic opportunity to obtain release before the end of his life, as required by Graham.

It is true that Defendant may not receive all of the above good-time credit if he misbehaves and thereby forfeits some of that credit.  But it is totally within Defendant’s own power to shorten the sentence imposed.  Graham does not require that a sentence “guarantee eventual freedom to a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 75.  It just requires that the offender have a chance to show that he has earned the right to be given a second chance at liberty.

August 20, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (25)

A late-summer review of some marijuana reform news and notes

In this post about a month ago, I set out a midsummer review of posts from Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform.  A month later, I figure it is a good time to provide a late-summer review via this abridged set of links to some MLP&R postings: 

August 20, 2017 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues | Permalink | Comments (1)