Monday, July 16, 2018

Spotlighting disparities in resentencing of juve LWOP cases in Pennsylvania ... and and broader post-Miller challenges

The Philadelphia Inquirer has this effective new article headlined “Why are juvenile lifers from Philly getting radically different sentences from those in the rest of Pennsylvania?”. Here are excerpts:

While Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has attempted to create clear guidelines for that work, now that more than 300 juvenile lifers have been resentenced across 31 counties, the disparities are striking.

“It’s still very county-dependent, fact-dependent, and there are still a lot of politics involved,” said Brooke McCarthy, who has been tracking the results for the Philadelphia-based nonprofit Juvenile Law Center.  “If you look at the outcomes in Allegheny County, they are night and day from what we’re seeing in Philly.  That’s true in various counties: In Bucks County, one judge has been handling the sentencing, and she’s been particularly harsh. Different folks are handling the same facts differently.”

In Philadelphia, the average sentence for a juvenile lifer has been 31 years to life. In Bucks County, no one has received less than 40 years....

County by county, judges have disagreed about whether sentences on multiple homicides ought to run concurrently or be stacked consecutively.

A Lancaster County judge last year imposed consecutive 40-years-to-life sentences for Michael Lee Bourgeois, for killing his adoptive parents in 2001 with three accomplices.  And, in Allegheny County, a judge imposed three consecutive 25-to-life sentences on Donald Zoller, who killed three people when he was just 14; he won’t go before the parole board unless he lives to be 89.

But in Philadelphia, it’s been a different story. Jose Hernandez, convicted of killing four family members as a teen, received 45 years to life after the district attorney tried to offer him even less time.  And another juvenile lifer, Jorge Cintron Jr., was resentenced to 30 years to life for three murders; he could be released by age 47.

Judges have also differed when it comes to tacking on additional time for associated charges, such as robbery, conspiracy, or possession of a firearm....

According to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision last year, a juvenile must be found to be “permanently incorrigible” before a life sentence can be imposed.

Now, state appellate courts will have to weigh in on a slew of follow-up questions being lobbed from all across the commonwealth.  What comprises a de facto life sentence: Is 50 years too long?  Is it constitutional to stack consecutive sentences such that a juvenile who is not incorrigible has no hope of release?  What is a juvenile anyway — do 18-year-olds count?   And, what factors must judges consider in the resentencings, which are supposed to take into account the reduced culpability of an immature, impulsive youth, as well as his or her capacity for change?...

In Michigan, home to 360 teen lifers, the state has sought to reimpose life without parole in more than half of its cases. In Virginia, Renwick said, “the commonwealth has fought at every step to prevent” resentencings.  And in Illinois, which is working through the resentencings of about 100 juvenile lifers, Shobha Lakshmi Mahadev, a professor at the Children and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University School of Law, said the vast majority are being resentenced to 50 or 60 years in prison, many with no opportunity for early release.

Other states, such as Louisiana, have addressed the issue legislatively, by creating across-the-board parole eligibility — though in some jurisdictions that still means few, if any, lifers are actually being released.

“What these decisions have done is opened up this conversation and this question: How do you sentence a child or an adolescent? What our systems did before was just to treat kids as adults — and that is unconstitutional and, given what we know now, inappropriate,” Mahadev said.

July 16, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, July 13, 2018

"'Finding' a Way to Complete the Ring of Capital Jury Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this paper newly posted on SSRN and authored by Maria Kolar. Here is its abstract:

In the modern death penalty era in America, two findings have emerged as generally required before a murderer can be sentenced to death.  First, the decisionmaker must find that the murder was especially egregious, due to specific, statutorily-defined characteristics of the murder or the murderer — typically referred to as “aggravating circumstances.”  Second, the decisionmaker must find that any aggravating circumstances in the case “outweigh” any “mitigating circumstances,” i.e., anything that makes the crime or the defendant seem less deserving of death.  Remarkably, regarding the second finding (the weighing finding) it remains unclear who “the decisionmaker” must be and how convinced the decisionmaker must be — even though the Supreme Court held back in 2002, in Ring v. Arizona, that the Sixth Amendment mandates that the decisionmaker for the aggravating circumstance finding must be a jury and that the jury must be convinced “beyond a reasonable doubt.”

This Article asserts that Ring’s use of the word “fact” to describe the kind of determination that must be made by a jury has completely undermined the functional and elements-based approach of Ring.  This approach, properly understood, mandates that the Sixth Amendment jury requirement applies to any finding (not just “fact”) that is required for a death sentence.  This Article traces the Court’s use of the term “finding” in this context — from the beginning of the modern death penalty era in 1976, through Apprendi v. New Jersey in 2000, Ring in 2002, and Hurst v. Florida in 2016 — and asserts that the Apprendi Court’s use of the broader term “finding” in this arena is more faithful to the Sixth Amendment and to substantive state law.  This Article catalogs how state supreme courts and federal circuit courts overwhelmingly concluded (post-Ring) that the capital weighing finding is not subject to the Sixth Amendment, because it is not a “fact” under Ring — aided by the Court’s Eighth Amendment “death eligibility” doctrine, which misleadingly suggests that defendants become “eligible” for a death sentence based solely on the finding of an aggravating circumstance.

The Court’s broader approach in Hurst does provide some hope in this realm and has led to momentous changes in Delaware, Florida, and Alabama. And all but two states now insist that a jury make all the findings that are required for a death sentence under state law.  Nevertheless, while nearly 75% of the current thirty-one death penalty states require a weighing-type finding for a valid death sentence, almost 75% of these states still fail to require that this finding be made beyond a reasonable doubt, as the Sixth Amendment mandates.  There is still much work to be done.

July 13, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 12, 2018

AG Jeff Sessions "surges" federal war against synthetic opioids in select counties

This new press release from the US Justice Department, headed "Attorney General Jeff Sessions Announces the Formation of Operation Synthetic Opioid Surge (S.O.S.)," reports on a notable new federal front in the modern war on drugs. Here are the details (with my emphasis added):

Attorney General Jeff Sessions today announced Operation Synthetic Opioid Surge (S.O.S.), a new program that seeks to reduce the supply of deadly synthetic opioids in high impact areas and to identify wholesale distribution networks and international and domestic suppliers.

As part of Operation S.O.S., the Department will launch an enforcement surge in ten districts with some of the highest drug overdose death rates. Each participating United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) will choose a specific county and prosecute every readily provable case involving the distribution of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and other synthetic opioids, regardless of drug quantity. The surge will involve a coordinated DEA Special Operations Division operation to insure that leads from street-level cases are used to identify larger scale distributors. Operation S.O.S. was inspired by a promising initiative of the United States Attorney’s Office in the Middle District of Florida involving Manatee County, Florida.

"We at the Department of Justice are going to dismantle these deadly fentanyl distribution networks. Simply put, we will be tireless until we reduce the number of overdose deaths in this country. We are going to focus on some of the worst counties for opioid overdose deaths in the United States, working all cases until we have disrupted the supply of these deadly drugs," Attorney General Sessions said. "In 2016, synthetic opioids killed more Americans than any other kind of drug.  Three milligrams of fentanyl can be fatal — that's not even enough to cover up Lincoln's face on a penny. Our prosecutors in Manatee County, Florida have shown that prosecuting seemingly small synthetic opioids cases can have a big impact and save lives, and we want to replicate their success in the districts that need it most.  Operation S.O.S. — and the new prosecutors who will help carry it out — will help us put more traffickers behind bars and keep the American people safe from the threat of these deadly drugs."...

In Manatee County, a county just south of Tampa with a population of about 320,000, overdoses and deaths skyrocketed in 2015 (780 overdoses/84 opioid related deaths) and 2016 (1,287 overdoses/123 opioid related deaths). In summer of 2016, local law enforcement reported frequent, street-level distribution of fentanyl and carfentanil for the first time.

To combat this crisis, the Middle District of Florida committed to prosecuting every readily provable drug distribution case involving synthetic opioids in Manatee County regardless of drug quantity.  The effort resulted in the indictments of forty five traffickers of synthetic opioids.  Further, from the last six months of 2016 to the last six months of 2017, overdoses dropped by 77.1% and deaths dropped by 74.2%. Overall, the Manatee County Sheriff’s Office went from responding to 11 overdoses a day to an average now of less than one per day.

I am not at all keen on the idea of federalizing every small local drug case, but these reported data from Manatee County, Florida leads me to understand why AG Sessions might want to try to expand a program that he believes has proven distinctly effective. The Attorney General also delivered this speech in conjunction with the announcement of this new surge. Here is how he described the new initiative:

It’s called Operation Synthetic Opioid Surge — or S.O.S.

I am ordering our prosecutors in 10 districts with some of the highest overdose death rates—including this one—to systematically and relentlessly prosecute every synthetic opioid case. We can weaken these networks, reduce fentanyl availability, and save lives.

We are going to arrest, prosecute, and convict fentanyl dealers and we are going to put them in jail. When it comes to synthetic opioids, there is no such thing as a small case.

Three milligrams of fentanyl can be fatal. That’s equivalent a pinch of salt. It’s not even enough to cover up Lincoln’s face on a penny. Depending on the purity, you could fit more than 1,000 fatal doses of fentanyl in a teaspoon.

I want to be clear about this: we are not focusing on users, but on those supplying them with deadly drugs.

Manatee County, Florida shows that a united and determined effort, focusing on fentanyl dealers, can save lives. Your counterparts in the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the Middle District of Florida tried this strategy in Manatee County, which is just south of Tampa. Like many parts of this country, they had experienced massive increases in opioid deaths in 2015 and 2016.

In response, they began prosecuting synthetic opioid sales, regardless of the amount. They prosecuted 45 synthetic opioids traffickers—and deaths started to go down. From the first six months of 2016 to 2017, overdose deaths dropped by 22 percent. This past January, they had nearly a quarter fewer overdoses as the previous January. The Manatee County Sheriff’s Office went from responding to 11 overdoses a day to an average of one a day. Those are remarkable results.

As you implement this proven strategy, I am sending in reinforcements to help you. Last month, I sent more than 300 new AUSAs to districts across America .... It was the largest prosecutor surge in decades.

Today I am announcing that each of these ten districts where the drug crisis is worst will receive an additional prosecutor. As a former AUSA and U.S. Attorney myself, I know what you can do — and my expectations could not be higher. Our goal is to reduce crime, reduce fentanyl, and to reduce deaths, plain and simple. I believe that this new strategy and these additional prosecutors will have a significant impact.

July 12, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

US Sentencing Commission releases big new report detailing "inconsistently" applied federal mandatory minimum prior drug offense enhancement

851_coverThe United States Sentencing Commission today issued this big new report, titled "Application and Impact of 21 U.S.C. § 851: Enhanced Penalties for Federal Drug Trafficking Offenders," which examines the use and impact of the huge mandatory sentence increases for drug offenders who have a prior felony drug conviction (which are almost solely in the control of prosecutors and often called 851 enhancements).  A summary account of the 59-page report can be found on this USSC webpage and this two-page "Report-At-A-Glance" publication.  Here are highlights from the web account:

This publication examines the application and impact of the statutory penalty enhancement for federal drug trafficking offenders with a prior felony drug conviction (21 U.S.C. § 851). To trigger these enhanced penalties, a prosecutor must file an information providing notice of which prior convictions support the enhanced penalties.

Using fiscal year 2016 data, this publication provides comparisons between all offenders who appeared eligible for an 851 enhancement, offenders for whom an 851 information was filed, offenders for whom an 851 information was filed and later withdrawn, and offenders who remained subject to the 851 enhancement at sentencing.  The analysis builds on the Commission's 2011 report to Congress, in which the Commission recommended that Congress reassess the severity and scope of 851 enhancements.

Key Findings

Cases in which an 851 enhancement applied are rare.

  • The government filed an 851 information against 757 drug trafficking offenders, which represents just 12.3 percent of 6,153 offenders eligible for an 851 enhancement in fiscal year 2016.
  • The number of offenders is even smaller after considering cases in which the government withdrew the 851 information or made a motion for substantial assistance relief.  There were only 583 cases in which the 851 information was not withdrawn by the time of sentencing, and only 243 offenders (3.9% of eligible offenders) who ultimately remained subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum penalty.

The 851 enhancements were applied inconsistently, with wide geographic variations in the filing, withdrawal, and ultimate application of the 851 enhancements for eligible drug trafficking offenders.

  • In the majority of districts in fiscal year 2016, at least one-quarter of all drug trafficking offenders were eligible for an 851 enhancement.
  • There was, however, significant variation in the extent to which the enhanced penalties were sought against eligible offenders, ranging from five districts in which an 851 enhancement was sought against more than 50 percent of eligible drug trafficking offenders to 19 districts in which the enhancement was not sought against any of the eligible offenders.
  • Districts also varied significantly in the rate at which an 851 information was filed and later withdrawn.  Several of the districts with the highest rates of filing an 851 information also had among the lowest rates of withdrawal. Conversely, some districts have higher rates of withdrawal even where they appear to be more selective in filing an 851 information.

The 851 enhancements resulted in longer sentences for the relatively few drug offenders to which they apply.

  • In fiscal year 2016, offenders against whom an 851 information was filed received an average sentence that was over five years longer (61 months) than eligible offenders against whom the information was not filed (147 months compared to 86 months).
  • Offenders who remained subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing had average sentences of nearly 19 years (225 months), approximately ten years longer than the average sentence for offenders who received relief from an enhanced mandatory minimum penalty (107 months) and nearly 12 years longer than the average sentence for eligible offenders against whom the information was not filed (86 months).

While 851 enhancements had a significant impact on all racial groups, Black offenders were impacted most significantly.

  • Black offenders comprised the largest proportion of drug trafficking offenders (42.2%) eligible for an 851 enhancement in fiscal year 2016.
  • Black offenders constituted the majority (51.2%) of offenders against whom the government filed an information seeking an 851 enhancement, followed by White offenders (24.3%), Hispanic offenders (22.5%), and Other Race offenders (2.0%).
  • Such an information was filed against nearly 15 percent (14.9%) of Black offenders who were eligible to receive an 851 enhancement. This rate was higher than the rates for White offenders (11.4%), Other Race offenders (11.7%), and Hispanic offenders (9.4%).
  • The prevalence of Black offenders was even more pronounced for offenders who remained subject to an enhanced mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing, with Black offenders representing 57.9 percent of such offenders.

The is much to be drawn from and said about this data, but an important first-take summary is that this report proves yet again how mandatory minimums controlled by prosecutors can often operate to create rather than reduce sentencing disparities. And, disconcertingly, here is yet another report suggesting that black defendants face the hardest brunt of these disparities.

July 12, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, July 11, 2018

"Intellectual Disability, The Death Penalty, and Jurors"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper on SSRN authored by Emily Shaw, Nicholas Scurich and David Faigman. Here is its abstract:

In Atkins v. Virginia (2002), the United States Supreme Court held that intellectually disabled defendants cannot be sentenced to death; but since then, the Court has continued to grapple with how intellectual disability should be legally defined. Typically, however, it is jurors who determine whether a defendant is intellectually disabled and therefore categorically ineligible for the death penalty. Very little is known empirically about how jurors reason about and make these decisions.

This Article presents the results of a novel experiment in which venire jurors participated in an intellectual disability hearing and a capital sentencing hearing. The diagnosis of a court-appointed expert was experimentally manipulated (defendant is or is not intellectually disabled), as was the provision of information about the crime (present or absent). Jurors were considerably more likely to find the defendant not disabled when the expert opined that the defendant was not disabled.  They were also more likely to find the defendant not disabled when they learned about the details of the crime. Similarly, jurors were more likely to sentence the defendant to death after learning about the details of the crime, which increased perceptions of both the defendant’s blameworthiness and his mental ability.  These findings highlight the reality that jurors’ assessments of intellectual disability are influenced by crime information, contrary to pronouncements made by the United States Supreme Court, and they support the use of bifurcated disability proceedings, as some states have recently adopted.

July 11, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Tuesday, July 10, 2018

"The Trial Penalty: The Sixth Amendment Right To Trial on the Verge of Extinction and How To Save It"

The title of this post is the title of this extraordinary big new report released today by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Here is an overview of the 84-page report from the NACDL's website:

The ‘trial penalty’ refers to the substantial difference between the sentence offered in a plea offer prior to trial versus the sentence a defendant receives after trial. This penalty is now so severe and pervasive that it has virtually eliminated the constitutional right to a trial.  To avoid the penalty, accused persons must surrender many other fundamental rights which are essential to a fair justice system

This report is the product of more than two years of careful research and deliberation. In it, NACDL examines sentencing and other data underlying the fact that, after a 50 year decline, fewer than 3% of federal criminal cases result in a trial. With more than 97% of criminal cases being resolved by plea in a constitutional system predicated upon the Sixth Amendment right to a trial, the fact of imbalance and injustice in the system is self-evident.  The report identifies and exposes the underlying causes of the decline of the federal criminal trial and puts forth meaningful, achievable principles and recommendations to address this crisis. With its release, NACDL intends to launch a sustained effort to rein in the abuse of the trial penalty throughout federal and state criminal justice systems.  The Trial Penalty report, and the principles and recommendations it puts forward, seeks to save the right to a trial from extinction.

Former US District Judge John Gleeson authored a thoughtful Foreword to the report, and here are excerpts that also provide a partial account of what follows:

This report is a major contribution to the discussion of one of the most important issues in criminal justice today: the vanishing trial.  Once the centerpiece of our criminal justice ecosystem, the trial is now spotted so infrequently that if we don’t do something to bring it back, we will need to rethink many other features of our system that contribute to fair and just results only when trials occur in meaningful numbers.

The first task in solving a problem is identifying its causes, and this report nails that step.  Mandatory minimum sentencing provisions have played an important role in reducing our trial rate from more than 20% thirty years ago to 3% today.  Instead of using those blunt instruments for their intended purpose — to impose harsher punishments on a select group of the most culpable defendants — the Department of Justice got in the habit long ago of using them broadly to strong-arm guilty pleas, and to punish those who have the temerity to exercise their right to trial.  The Sentencing Guidelines also play an important role, providing excessively harsh sentencing ranges that frame plea discussions when mandatory sentences do not.  Finally, the report correctly finds that federal sentencing judges are complicit as well.  In too many cases, excessive trial penalties are the result of judges having internalized a cultural norm that when defendants “roll the dice” by “demanding” a trial, they either win big or lose big.  The same judges who will go along with a plea bargain that compromises a severe Guidelines range are too reticent to stray very far from the sentencing range after trial.

The report’s principles and recommendations will stimulate some much-needed discussion.  Today’s excessive trial penalties, it concludes, undermine the integrity of our criminal justice system.  Putting the government to its proof is a constitutional right, enshrined in the Sixth Amendment; no one should be required to gamble with years and often decades of their liberty to exercise it.  The report properly raises the “innocence problem,” that is, the fact that prosecutors have become so empowered to enlarge the delta between the sentencing outcome if the defendant pleads guilty and the outcome if he goes to trial and loses that even innocent defendants now plead guilty.  But there’s an even larger hypocrisy problem.  Our Constitution claims to protect the guilty as well, affording them a presumption of innocence and protecting them from punishment unless the government can prove them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  A system characterized by extravagant trial penalties produces guilty pleas in cases where the government cannot satisfy that burden, hollowing out those protections and producing effects no less pernicious than innocents pleading guilty.

The report’s recommendations range from the sweeping (ban those mandatory minimums) to the technical (eliminate the motion requirement for the third “acceptance” point), and include suggested modifications to the “relevant conduct” principle at the heart of the Guidelines, pre-plea disclosure requirements, “second looks” at lengthy sentences, and judicial oversight of plea discussions.  A particularly attractive recommendation would require judges sentencing a defendant who went to trial to pay greater attention to the sentences imposed on co-defendants who pled guilty; few things place today’s excessive trial penalty in sharper relief.

There is no such thing as a perfect criminal justice system. But a healthy one is constantly introspective, never complacent, always searching for injustices within and determined to address them.  The sentencing reform movement a generation ago disempowered judges and empowered prosecutors.  Federal prosecutors have used that power to make the trial penalty too severe, and the dramatic diminution in the federal trial rate is the result.  Our system is too opaque and too severe, and everyone in it — judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys — is losing the edge that trials once gave them.  Most important of all, a system without a critical mass of trials cannot deliver on our constitutional promises. Here’s hoping that this report will help us correct this problem before it is too late.

July 10, 2018 in Examples of "over-punishment", Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Eager for a "51 Imperfect Solutions" approach to a new wave of constitutional proportionality litigation (with broadside Harmelin attacks, too)

9780190866044Not long after Justice Anthony Kennedy announced his retirement, I authored a post hoping to germinate an idea with criminal justice reformers and litigants: "With Justice Kennedy retiring, overturning Harmelin should become a focal point for criminal justice reformers."  I am not especially optimistic that Judge Brett Kavanaugh, who has now been tapped as Justice Kennedy's replacement, will be chomping at the bit to reverse his old boss's troublesome Eighth Amendment work in Harmelin.  But I remain optimistic that a new generation of judges (including Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch) may be significantly more open these days to "refreshing" an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in order to put at least some limits on some extreme prison terms for some adult offenders.

With these thoughts swimming in my mental soup, an important new ingredient came to mind as a result of recent opportunities to talk with Sixth Circuit Judge Jeffrey Sutton about his terrific new Oxford University Press book titled "51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law." Here is how the book is described by Oxford:

When we think of constitutional law, we invariably think of the United States Supreme Court and the federal court system.  Yet much of our constitutional law is not made at the federal level.  In 51 Imperfect Solutions, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton argues that American Constitutional Law should account for the role of the state courts and state constitutions, together with the federal courts and the federal constitution, in protecting individual liberties.

The book tells four stories that arise in four different areas of constitutional law: equal protection; criminal procedure; privacy; and free speech and free exercise of religion.  Traditional accounts of these bedrock debates about the relationship of the individual to the state focus on decisions of the United States Supreme Court.  But these explanations tell just part of the story.  The book corrects this omission by looking at each issue — and some others as well — through the lens of many constitutions, not one constitution; of many courts, not one court; and of all American judges, not federal or state judges.  Taken together, the stories reveal a remarkably complex, nuanced, ever-changing federalist system, one that ought to make lawyers and litigants pause before reflexively assuming that the United States Supreme Court alone has all of the answers to the most vexing constitutional questions.

If there is a central conviction of the book, it's that an underappreciation of state constitutional law has hurt state and federal law and has undermined the appropriate balance between state and federal courts in protecting individual liberty.  In trying to correct this imbalance, the book also offers several ideas for reform.

I recommend Judge Sutton's book to all serious legal thinkers (and not-so- serious ones, too), and I mentioned to Judge Sutton that I viewed proportionality litigation around the Eighth Amendment and its state analogues to be another area full of dynamic (though often disconcerting) stories about the role of the state courts and state constitutions in a jurisprudential dialogue with federal courts.  Indeed, as some reader may recall, a little over five years ago I worked with folks at National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) to develop this 51 state resource in the form of a "collection of individual downloadable documents that summarize for each U.S. state the key doctrines and leading court rulings setting forth constitutional and statutory limits on lengthy imprisonment terms and other extreme (non-capital) sentences."

As states continue to work through the implications of Graham and Miller and Montgomery, I sense and surmise there is plenty of interesting constitutional litigation over the Eighth Amendment still on-going in state courts, and Judge Sutton's work has me wondering how much of that litigation also involves state constitutional proportionality claims pressed in addition to federal claims.  (A key theme in Judge Sutton's book is that lawyers always should, when available, be pressing state constitution claims on behalf of their client as well as federal claims.)  I know I am overdue on a pledge to be updating these NACDL state-by-state resources, and I would be especially eager to hear from any and all state defense lawyers about whether there has been considerable new proportionality jurisprudence in their jurisdictions in recent years.

As thew title of this post suggest, I think Judge Sutton's book can and should serve as a suggestion to all state criminal defense lawyers to keep pressing state constitutional claims.  Doing so could not only lead to important state-level rulings, but also provide still further ideas and energy to perhaps help the US Supreme Court see a reason to overrule or at least recast its ugly work in Harmelin.

July 10, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, July 09, 2018

Criminally exciting start to what will be first SCOTUS Term without Justice Kennedy in a looooooong time

The SCOTUS excitement today is thick, with Prez Trump promising to name his choice for replacing retiring Justice Anthony Kennedy at 9pm EDT tonight.  But hard-core SCOTUS geeks will also be excited to see the Court already making plans for the new Term via today's release of the argument calendar for the Court's October sitting.  More than a few notable criminal cases are on tap for the first two weeks of October (links descriptions from SCOTUSblog):

Scheduled for argument on Tuesday October 2:

Gundy v. United States: Whether the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act’s delegation of authority to the attorney general to issue regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 16913 violates the nondelegation doctrine.

Madison v. Alabama: (1) Whether, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ford v. Wainwright and Panetti v. Quarterman, a state may execute a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him with no memory of his commission of the capital offense; and (2) whether evolving standards of decency and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment bar the execution of a prisoner whose competency has been compromised by vascular dementia and multiple strokes causing severe cognitive dysfunction and a degenerative medical condition that prevents him from remembering the crime for which he was convicted or understanding the circumstances of his scheduled execution.

Scheduled for argument on Tuesday October 9:

Stokeling v. United States: Whether a state robbery offense that includes “as an element” the common law requirement of overcoming “victim resistance” is categorically a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), when the offense has been specifically interpreted by state appellate courts to require only slight force to overcome resistance.

United States v. Stitt & United States v. Sims:  Whether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as “burglary” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Besides being excited by this part of the docket for the first few weeks of the new SCOTUS  Term, I am intrigued by the reality that, for the first time in a very long time, advocates and court-watchers will no longer be trying to figure out how Justice Kennedy is going to vote on a particular issue.  Justice Kennedy has served on the Court for 30+ years, meaning that the last SCOTUS Term without his involvement was way back when Ronald Reagan was Prez, when the Soviet Union still existed, when the federal sentencing guidelines were still not quite operational, when Back to the Future II was still in development, and when Adele and Kevin Durant and Rory McIlroy and Cam Newton and Rihanna and Taylor Swift all had not yet even been born!

Of course, not having Justice Kennedy to figure out does not mean counting SCOTUS votes will necessarily get easier in criminal cases or others.  As I have stressed in prior posts, the Chief Justice and new Justice Gorsuch have been a bit unpredictable on the criminal side of the docket, and I think there could be similarly unpredictability from anyone of the short-listers that Prez Trump has been considering.  Indeed, as we await a name from Prez Trump, I would be eager to hear from readers if they think one or another of the short-listers will be particularly good (or particularly bad) on criminal cases.

I am about to head off-line for the afternoon, but I expect to blog some late tonight about whp Prez Trump taps and his or her record on criminal justice issues.  As of 3:15pm EDT, I am still expecting Judge Kavanaugh to be the pick.  But I suppose I will not be too surprised if Prez Trump surprises us tonight.

Prior posts on Justice Kennedy's retirement and the possible impact of his replacement:

July 9, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Top DC court holds that threat of deportation, combined with jail time, sufficient to trigger Sixth Amendment right to jury trial

With the excitement of the ending of the SCOTUS Term and a new opening on the Court, I failed to blog about a fascinating opinion handed down District Of Columbia Court of Appeals late last month. The start of the majority opinion in Jean-Baptiste Bado v. US, No. 12-Cm-1509 (DC Ct.App. June 21, 2018) (available here), sets out the essentials effectively:

Jean-Baptiste Bado appeals his conviction for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, after a bench trial, on the ground that he was denied the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.  The court, sitting en banc, is asked to decide whether the Sixth Amendment guarantees a right to a jury trial to an accused who faces the penalty of removal/deportation as a result of a criminal conviction for an offense that is punishable by incarceration for up to 180 days.  By itself, that period of incarceration does not puncture the six-month line past which an offense is deemed ― "serious" and jury-demandable.  We hold that the penalty of deportation, when viewed together with a maximum period of incarceration that does not exceed six months, overcomes the presumption that the offense is petty and triggers the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury. T he conviction is reversed and the case remanded for a jury trial. 

In addition to an extended majority opinion, Bado also brings two concurring opinions that work through the rationale for and implications of the consequence of removal serving to trigger the Sixth Amendment jury trial right.  And a lead dissent penned by Judge Fisher highlights these implications and concerns:

According to the majority, a citizen charged with misdemeanor sexual abuse of a child does not have a right to a jury trial, but a noncitizen charged with the very same offense does. This is a startling result, neither compelled nor justified by Supreme Court precedent.

July 9, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, July 08, 2018

Notable federal capital defendant claims his killing age (20) should make him ineligible for death penalty

The name Donald Fell is likely familiar to capital punishment followers: Fell was convicted and sentenced to death in federal court for the November 2000 abduction and slaying of Teresca King,but his initial conviction and sentence were thrown out after revelations of juror misconduct.  Prior to his retrial, his attorney's have brought a series of challenges to the federal death penalty.   This local article, headlined "Fell seeks to avoid death penalty based on age," reports on their latest filings:

Lawyers representing Donald Fell, who was charged in the 2000 homicide of a North Clarendon woman, are asking a federal judge to rule out the death penalty because Fell was 20 years old at the time of the alleged murder. A second trial is pending for Fell, 38, for the carjacking and kidnapping of 53-year-old Terry King.

Fell is accused of kidnapping King from the Rutland Shopping Plaza. Police said Fell and his friend, Robert Lee, took King to New York where she was bludgeoned to death. Fell was convicted of the crimes with which he’s now charged in 2005 and he was sentenced to the death penalty in 2006. However, Fell’s attorneys found evidence of juror misconduct and Fell’s conviction was overturned in 2014....

The motion by Fell’s attorneys, filed on Tuesday, referred to a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision from 2005 that found capital punishment is unconstitutional if the person convicted committed the crime before he or she was 18.  The motion, filed by San Francisco attorney Michael Burt, a member of Fell’s defense team, said the question of whether Fell was too young at the time he allegedly killed King had not been heard.

“Mr. Fell has had no opportunity to show that Roper‘s age-18 cutoff does not account for the current medical and scientific consensus that brain development is not completed by age 18, and that Mr. Fell’s particular development at age 20 is insufficient to justify capital punishment.  Simply put, his evidence will show that at the time of the offenses, Mr. Fell did not function as an adult with sufficient moral culpability for capital punishment,” the motion said.

Dr. James Garbarino also filed a brief discussing his findings working with young people dealing with severe violence.  He said doctors who had previously examined Fell found psychological problems but the science of brain development was not advanced enough at the time to recognize Fell’s problem was “developmental brain immaturity” from developmental delays.  “In the case of Donald Fell, his social history indicates he is just such an individual — growing up with much adversity, including psychological adversity such as experiences of parental rejection, and physical maltreatment, including physical traumas which may have resulted in insults to his brain,” Garbarino wrote....

The second half of the motion argued that society opposed the execution of young criminals. “Executing individuals barely old enough to vote or drink, unable to rent a car, unable to serve in Congress, and still in the throes of cognitive development — based upon now-disregarded views of culpability — undermines the Supreme Court’s commitment to dignity, and the possibility of rehabilitation and redemption,” the motion said.

Fell, through his attorneys, requested a hearing on the issue, followed by an order precluding the government from seeking the death penalty. Prosecutors have not yet responded to the 550-plus page motion.  Many of the exhibits in the motion were papers on the adolescent brain or court rulings on defendants who committed crimes while young, although only Kentucky was cited as banning the death penalty for someone younger than 21 rather than someone younger than 18.

Another motion, more than 1,100 pages long, was filed Tuesday seeking to stop prosecutors from having a mental health professional testify during the sentencing if Fell is convicted.

Prior related posts:

July 8, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5)

Friday, July 06, 2018

Notable District Judge struggles against mandatory minimums, especially stacked gun charges

This new Politico article, headlined "Manafort judge emerges as skeptic of long mandatory minimum sentences," reports on a notable federal judge expressing notable concerns with mandatory minimums.  Here are excerpts:

The judge overseeing former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort's looming trial on tax and bank fraud charges is known as a tough jurist, often snapping at attorneys for ignoring his directions and rebuking defendants he views as insufficiently contrite.  But, in recent years, U.S. District Judge T.S. Ellis has begun to direct his public ire at an unusual target for a Reagan-appointed judge: laws that impose lengthy mandatory minimum sentences judges have no authority to waive or reduce.

Ellis has complained directly to Congress about what he's called the "excessive" sentences required for some offenders. He's also publicly lamented the situation, as he did recently during a drug dealer's sentencing that took place in an Alexandria, Virginia courtroom packed with national media, high-powered prosecutors and others awaiting a key hearing in the case against Manafort.

"This situation presents me with something I have no discretion to change and the only thing I can do is express my displeasure," Ellis said last week as he sentenced Frederick Turner, 37, to a mandatory minimum of 40 years in prison for dealing methamphetamine.  "I chafe a bit at that, but I follow the law. If I thought it was blatantly immoral, I'd have to resign. It's wrong, but not immoral."  Ellis told Turner's lawyer that any relief for his client lies with Congress. "I think you're knocking on the wrong door for a remedy. The remedy is across the river," the judge said.

However, in another case, the 78-year-old judge is going even further.  In April, confronted by a 28-year-old armed robbery convict facing a mandatory minimum 82-year sentence, Ellis' frustration grew so intense that he balked at imposing what he called a "very severe" sentence.  Instead, the judge recruited a high-powered law firm to scour the law in search of some way to avoid imposing what is effectively a life sentence on Lamont Gaines, who was convicted of a string of robberies of 7-11 stores and a check-cashing business.

The judge appointed Daniel Suleiman, a former aide to Attorney General Eric Holder, to come up with any argument that might help Gaines win a more lenient sentence. Suleiman, a partner at Covington & Burling, set on one possibility: a Supreme Court ruling in April that invalidated a law very similar to the one requiring the lengthy sentence for Gaines.  In a brief filed last month, Suleiman argued that the April decision has "direct application" to Gaines' case and "would permit this Court not to sentence Gaines to 82 years."

Federal prosecutors rejected that argument last week, insisting that the 82-year sentence is still required in the case. Assistant U.S. Attorneys Alexander Blanchard and Rebeca Bellows filed a brief urging Ellis to consider Gaines "real-world conduct" and reminding the judge that the defendant "endangered...victims' lives and instilled them with the fear they would be physically harmed."  Ellis has yet to signal whether he'll buy into the new argument to cut down the potential sentence in Gaines' case.

Ellis' current preoccupation with federal sentencing laws is not that the mandatory minimums for specific crimes are too harsh, but that in cases involving multiple charges the result can be unjust, resulting in decades of extra incarceration for a defendant who chooses to go to trial rather than plead guilty.  While prosecutors often settle for a guilty plea to a single serious charge, carrying, say, a 10-year minimum sentence, the government will pursue several such charges when a defendant goes to trial.  Federal law typically requires that sentences for crimes involving use of a gun run consecutively, a phenomenon often referred to as "stacking."...

In 2015, Ellis wrote to Congress about the "stacking" practice, calling it "grossly excessive and unjust." He said the law was supposed to cover felons who re-offended after leaving prison, but is being applied to those "who never had the chance to learn a lesson from the sentence imposed for the first conviction."

While efforts have been underway in Congress for years to ratchet back some of the mandatory sentences, the Trump administration's policy on the issue has been confusing. White House officials, including President Donald Trump's son-in-law and senior adviser Jared Kushner, have shown interest in criminal justice reform proposals.  However, Attorney General Jeff Sessions sent a letter to the Senate in February slamming a bipartisan bill that would limit the application of mandatory minimum sentences, including by reining in "stacking" of charges.  Sessions said the measure was ill-advised at a time when the U.S. is struggling with an epidemic of opioid abuse and deaths....

Back in 2015, though, Sessions said he believed changes to "stacking" were called for.  "I think the stacking issue is a problem....I would support reform on the stacking provisions," the Alabama senator said at a Judiciary Committee session on a similar reform bill that never passed....

Criminal justice reform advocates say Congress needs to step in and that laments like the one from Ellis last week underscore the urgency of the issue.  "The federal gun stacking law isn’t tough. It’s stupid. It’s irrational.  That’s why even conservative judges like Judge Ellis are urging Congress to fix it," said Kevin Ring of Families Against Mandatory Minimums. "It's a no-brainer."

July 6, 2018 in Examples of "over-punishment", Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, July 05, 2018

Interesting and intricate Ohio drug sentencing initiative poised to qualify for November 2018 ballot

As reported in this local Ohio article, supporters of "a proposal to reduce penalties for nonviolent drug crime offenders submitted hundreds of thousands of signatures on Wednesday to put the measure on the November ballot." Here is more about the remarkable initiative that seems likely to generate some interesting debate in the midst of a big election year in Ohio:

The "Neighborhood Safety, Drug Treatment and Rehabilitation" amendment is backed by a bipartisan coalition of community, law enforcement, faith and business leaders and groups. The Ohio Safe and Healthy Communities Campaign submitted 730,031 signatures Wednesday; 305,591 valid signatures of Ohio registered voters are needed to qualify for the ballot....

Under the drug treatment and rehabilitation amendment:

  • Possessing, obtaining or using a drug or drug paraphernalia would be a misdemeanor offense, with a maximum punishment of 180 days in jail and $1,000 fine. First and second offenses within a two-year period could only be punished with probation.
  • Convicted individuals could receive a half day credit against their sentence for each day or rehabilitative work or programming, up to 25 percent of the total sentence.
  • Individuals on probation for a felony offense would not be sent to prison for non-violent violations of that probation.
  • Individuals convicted of such crimes could petition a court to reclassify the offense as a misdemeanor, which could result in their release from prison.

The provisions would not apply to convictions for the sale, distribution or trafficking of drugs or to convictions for any drug offense that, based on volume or weight, are a first-, second- or third-degree felony.

Money saved from those affected by the amendment would be diverted to substance abuse programs (70 percent) and to crime victims services (30 percent.)

Among the many remarkable elements of the ballot initiative, which can be read in full at this link, is that it proposes a state constitutional amendment; voter approval would make it nearly impossible for the Ohio General Assembly to alter the amendment's terms without another initiative vote.  Here is how the summary of the amendment explains its goals at the outset:

This Amendment would add a new section 12 to Article XV of the Ohio Constitution to reduce the number of people in state prison for low-level, nonviolent drug possession or drug use offenses or for non-criminal probation violations and by providing sentence credits for participation in rehabilitative programs and to direct the savings achieved by such reductions in incarceration to drug treatment programs and other purposes.

I have already heard a few folks express support for the initiatives substantive goals but concerns about amending the Ohio Constitution to achieve those goals. Interesting times.

July 5, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, July 02, 2018

Might Justice Kennedy's retirement lead to defendants having stronger Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi and Blakely?

As hard core sentencing fans know, Justice Anthony Kennedy has been a long-standing opponent of the Sixth Amendment jury trial rights that were recognized for defendants in Apprendi v. New Jersey and expanded in Blakely v. Washington.  He was in the dissent in both of those cases, as well as in every subsequent non-capital case that ruling in favor of defendants regarding Sixth Amendment jury trials rights (e.g., BookerCunningham, Southern Union, Alleyne).   In his separate Cunningham dissent, Justice Kennedy lamented "the Court continu[ing] in a wrong and unfortunate direction in the cases following Apprendi v. New Jersey."  But with his impending departure, Justice Kennedy will no longer have any say in the Court's  direction in the cases following Apprendi v. New Jersey.

Critically, because Chief Justice Roberts has been a supporter of some (though not all) expanded applications of the Sixth Amendment as shown through his votes in Cunningham and Southern Union, the Court already has five Justices who have voted for extensions of Apprendi and Blakely in some settings without counting the possible (and likely?) sixth vote of the new Justice Neil Gorsuch.  Since the next new Justice is almost certain to be at least somewhat more supportive of Sixth Amendment jury trial rights than Justice Kennedy has been, it seems to me that coming SCOTUS Terms could well have seven possible votes for extending Apprendi and Blakely jury trial rights in some settings.  (Justice Breyer has never, sadly, really heeded Justice Scalia's advice that he "buy a ticket to Apprendi-land," and Justice Alito does not seem to want to be in any land that gives criminal defendants more rights.)

These issues come to mind in part because of this interesting "Petition of the Day" spotlighted by SCOTUSblog.  The petition was filed by the feds in United States v. Haymond, a case in which the defendant prevailed in the Tenth Circuit on an Apprendi-type claim after the district court revoked a ten-year term of supervised released and imposed five years of reimprisonment following a preponderance of the evidence finding that the defendant violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child pornography.  I am not sure fans of Apprendi and Blakely ought to be actively rooting for this case to be taken up by SCOTUS (in part because it is the feds appealing), but I am sure fans of Apprendi and Blakely should be welcoming a Court in which a new Justice more in the originalist mold of Justices Gorsuch and Scalia and Thomas will be replacing Justice Kennedy.

A few prior posts with thoughts on a post-Justice Kennedy Court:

July 2, 2018 in Blakely in the Supreme Court, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Notable Sixth Circuit panel reverses as procedurally unreasonable big upward variance in cocaine sentence based on opioid overdoses

On Friday, the Sixth Circuit handed down a notable new sentencing opinion in US v. Fleming, No. 17-3954 (6th Cir. June 29, 2018) (available here). The start of the opinion reviews its essentials:

Marcus Fleming was convicted of a cocaine offense, and the United States Sentencing Guidelines provided for a recommended sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment.  At his sentencing hearing, the district court doubled that.  It did so based in large part on a brief local news article that described a recent surge in drug overdose deaths, mostly due to powerful opioids like fentanyl.  Neither this article, nor the underlying Ohio state report on which it was based, was provided to the parties before the start of the sentencing hearing.  Nor was Fleming notified before the hearing that the district court planned to consider the article or the issues it addressed.  Because this procedure denied Fleming a meaningful opportunity to comment on information that led to a substantial increase in his sentence, the resulting sentence was procedurally unreasonable.

Here is small part of the Sixth Circuit panel's analysis:

Here, the district court’s reliance on information about mixed cocaine-opioid overdose deaths in the Cleveland.com article was a surprise, and that surprise was prejudicial to Fleming’s sentencing presentation. Therefore, Fleming’s sentence was rendered in a procedurally unreasonable manner.

The district court’s consideration of information about mixed cocaine-opioid overdose deaths was a surprise because, before the sentencing hearing, there was no indication that opioids were relevant to this case, let alone that they would play a prominent role. Fleming was convicted for possession of cocaine, not opioids.  Nothing in the record suggested that opioids were found in Fleming’s car, or that Fleming had ever sold or possessed opioids, or even that any cocaine Fleming sold had ever been mixed with opioids. Of course, opioids have been a topic of grave public concern in recent years, as their devastating and tragic effects have been felt across the country. But it was far from apparent that they were relevant to Fleming’s sentence for possession of cocaine.

This ruling strikes me as notable or at least two reasons beyond its substantive particulars: (1) one of jurists on Prez Trump's SCOTUS short list, Judge Raymond Kethledge, was one of the judges on this Fleming panel, and (2) this Cleveland.com report highlights that the erroneous sentencing judge has a history of unreasonably long sentences:

An Akron federal judge who has been criticized by a federal appeals court had a sentence reversed again on Friday -- this time because of his reliance on a cleveland.com article....

Adams has been removed from cases a few times in recent years and has been the target of criticism by the 6th Circuit.  Most recently, the appeals court removed him from a case involving two men arrested in Cleveland with more than 200 pounds of cocaine. Both prosecutors and defense attorneys in the case agreed to recommend prison sentences of about three years, but Adams gave them both 10 years and did not give any good reasons for the higher sentences, the 6th Circuit ruled.

July 2, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, July 01, 2018

With Justice Kennedy retiring, overturning Harmelin should become a focal point for criminal justice reformers

Afa20c10520c365bf6ac550a70c058e6There are lots of important Supreme Court precedents that lots of people will be discussing in the wake of Justice Anthony Kennedy's announced retirement from the Court.  Decisions like Roe v. Wade and Obergefell v. Hodges are, obviously, of great concern to a great many.  But for criminal justice reformers, there is one particular precedent, Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), that I think should become a focal point for aggressive advocacy seeking to overrule a lousy Eighth Amendment precedent.

Harmelin, as many know, was the Supreme Court's 1991 fractured decision that rejected an Eighth Amendment challenge to Michigan's imposition of a (1) mandatory (2) life without parole sentence for (3) mere possession of 672 grams of cocaine.  I have numerically labeled the three potent essentials of Harmelin, because each part has worked in modern times to functionally preclude any successful constitutional challenges to just about (1) any mandatory sentencing statutes or (2) any life without parole sentences or (3) any drug possession sentences.  (Thanks to the recent Graham and Miller rulings, some juvenile offenders have some (small) protection against some extreme sentences, but those Eighth Amendment rulings have not been of any help to older offenders.)

As discussed here a few months ago, in a terrific recent First Circuit opinion while denying rehearing en banc in United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, No. 12-2364 (1st Cir. Feb 27, 2018) (available here), Judge David Barron lamented how judges "have no choice but to approve mandatory 'forever' sentences ... so long as they can hypothesize a rational reason for the legislature to have thought that the underlying criminal conduct was as serious as the large quantity drug possession at issue in Harmelin."  In so doing, Judge Barron highlighted not only questionable elements of the Harmelin ruling, but also stressed the possible impact of "two lines of Supreme Court precedent that have developed since Harmelin was decided" (referring to Alleyne and Graham/Miller).  Though not quite calling for Harmelin to be overruled, Judge Barron, writing on behalf of the entire First Circuit, makes clear that he is urging SCOTUS to reconsider the "three-decades old, three-Justice concurrence in Harmelin."

The author of the key "three-Justice concurrence in Harmelin" was, of course, Justice Anthony Kennedy, and no other member of the current Court was serving when Harmelin was decided.  So, once Justice Kennedy's replacement is seated, it will be a whole new Court available to reconsider Harmelin without any existing member eager to make the case that Harmelin was right.  Moreover, as the retired Justice Stevens noted in this interesting 2010 speech about Harmelin, Chief Justice Roberts' concurrence in Graham could be read as an indication he might be open to a return to the more defendant-friendly Eighth Amendment approach as set forth in Solem.  And, as noted in this prior post, the newest Justice, Neil Gorsuch, is seemingly more often voting in favor of federal criminal defendants in contested cases than against them.   We know Justice Thomas does not like the Harmelin precedent, but that is because he does not think the Eighth Amendment limits the length of prison sentences at all.  And Justice Alito seems unlikely to want to expand the reach of the Eighth Amendment (though I have long believed he nearly signed on to Chief Justice Roberts' Graham concurrence).  We do not know who will be replacing Justice Kennedy, so we cannot yet make informed speculations about how he or she might vote on this issue.  But if Prez Trump picks someone in the mold of Justice Gorsuch, that could mean yet another Justice with an open mind on these kinds of issues.

Notably, the Justices have already decided to take up a case concerning the Eighth Amendment for next Term, Timbs v. Indiana.  Though that case only technically concerns "whether the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause is incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment," perhaps Justices engaged already by the topic of possibly excessive financial sanctions might want to give some more thought to possibly excessive prison punishments.  More to my main point, I sincerely think criminal defense lawyers and advocates should be trying regularly and persistently to "litigate against" each of the three potent essentials of Harmelin by arguing against the constitutionality of (1) extreme applications of mandatory sentences and/or (2) extreme applications of life without parole sentences and/or (3) extreme applications of drug possession sentences.  Shrewd arguments for those facing extreme sentences ought to include a claim of unconstitutionality even applying Harmelin, but also be sure to preserve a claim that Harmelin is no longer good law.

I am not confident the Court will be eager to reconsider Harmelin anytime soon, but very slim chances may have gone up just a little with Justice Kennedy's retirement.  And the best and really only chance to get Harmelin before the Court is to keep asking and asking and seeking and seeking and knocking and knocking.

July 1, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, June 30, 2018

"Supreme Irrelevance: The Court's Abdication in Criminal Procedure Jurisprudence"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Tonja Jacobi and Ross Berlin now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Criminal procedure is one of the Supreme Court’s most active areas of jurisprudence, but the Court’s rulings are largely irrelevant to the actual workings of the criminal justice system.  The Court’s irrelevance takes two forms: objectively, on the numbers, its jurisprudence fails to protect the vast majority of people affected by the criminal justice system; and in terms of salience, the Court has sidestepped the major challenges in the United States today relating to the criminal justice system.  These challenges include discrimination in stops and frisks, fatal police shootings, unconscionable plea deals, mass incarceration, and disproportionate execution of racial minorities.

For each major stage of a person’s interactions with the criminal justice system — search and seizure, plea-bargaining, and sentencing — the Court develops doctrines that protect only a tiny percentage of people.  This is because the Court focuses nearly all of its attention on the small fraction of cases implicating the exclusionary rule, trial rights, and the death penalty, and it ignores the bulk of real-world criminal procedure — searches and seizures that turn up no evidence of crime, plea bargains that occur outside of the courtroom, and the sentencing of convicts for terms of years — leaving constitutional rights unrecognized and constitutional violations unremedied.  Consistently, each issue the Supreme Court neglects has a disparate impact on traditionally disadvantaged racial minorities.  Together, this constitutes an abdication of the Court’s responsibility.

June 30, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 28, 2018

Some GVRs, summary reversal of the Ninth Cirucit and Justice Breyer dissenting to contend "the death penalty today lacks requisite reliability"

This lengthy final order list finishing up the current SCOTUS Term has its most exciting news for criminal justice fans from the single line  granting cert in Gamble v. United States so the Justices can reconsider the Double Jeopardy Clause's "dual-sovereignty doctrine" (discussed here).  But the order list also includes a number of GVR cases citing Carpenter and Rosales-Mireles and a number of notable summary reversals and statements concerning the denial of cert.   Of greatest interest to sentencing fans are:

 This per curiam summary reversal of the Ninth Circuit judgment in Sexton v. Beaudreaux, No. 17-1106 (which led to Justice Stephen Breyer dissenting without opinion).  Here is how the lengthy summary reversal starts:

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed a denial of federal habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. §2254, on the ground that the state court had unreasonably rejected respondent’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals’ decision ignored well-established principles. It did not consider reasonable grounds that could have supported the state court’s summary decision, and it analyzed respondent’s arguments without any meaningful deference to the state court. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari is granted, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

This dissent from the denial of certiorari in Jordan v. Mississippi authored by Justice Breyer (which did not garner any additional votes).  Here is how his lengthy dissent starts:

In my dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. ___ (2015), I described how the death penalty, as currently administered, suffers from unconscionably long delays, arbitrary application, and serious unreliability. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2).  I write to underline the ways in which the two cases currently before us illustrate the first two of these problems and to highlight additional evidence that has accumulated over the past three years suggesting that the death penalty today lacks “requisite reliability.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3).

June 28, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

SCOTUS grants cert to reconsider Double Jeopardy Clause's "dual-sovereignty doctrine"

This lengthy final order list finishing up the current SCOTUS Term includes lots of little items that will be of interest to sentencing fans, and one big item that could be really interesting for criminal law.  That big item is a cert grant in Gamble v. United States, which presents only this question: "Whether the Court should overrule the 'separate sovereigns' exception to the Double Jeopardy Clause." Here is how the Gamble cert petition's introduction starts:

The Fifth Amendment enshrines a promise that “No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy” “for the same offence.”  Yet Terance Martez Gamble has been subjected to exactly that: two convictions, and two sentences, for the single offense of being a felon in possession of a firearm.  As a result of the duplicative conviction, he must spend three additional years of his life behind bars.  The Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits that result.

The so-called dual-sovereignty doctrine has been around since the 1950s, but both Justices Ginsburg and Thomas have called for giving it another look in light of changed criminal justice realities. I am very excited SCOTUS is now taking up this issue and I will be the first (but surely not the last) to say I hope SCOTUS is willing to Gamble with abolishing the Double Jeopardy Clause's dual-sovereignty doctrine.

June 28, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (20)

Wednesday, June 27, 2018

"The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining"

the title of this post is the title of this notable new article available via SSRN authored by Andrew Manuel Crespo. Here is its abstract:

The American criminal justice system is a system of pleas.  Few who know it well think it is working.  And yet, identifying plausible strategies for law reform proves challenging, given the widely held scholarly assumption that plea bargaining operates “beyond the shadow of the law.”  That assumption holds true with respect to substantive and constitutional criminal law — the two most studied bodies of law in the criminal justice system — neither of which significantly regulates prosecutorial power.  The assumption is misguided, however, insofar as it fails to account for a third body of law — the subconstitutional law of criminal procedure—that regulates and often establishes the very mechanisms by which prosecutorial plea bargaining power is both generated and deployed.

These hidden regulatory levers are neither theoretical nor abstract.  Rather, they exist in strikingly varied forms across our pluralist criminal justice system.  This Article excavates these unexamined legal frameworks, conceptualizes their regulatory potential, highlights their heterogeneity across jurisdictions, and exposes the institutional actors most frequently responsible for their content.  In so doing, it opens up not only new scholarly terrain but also new potential pathways to criminal justice reform.

June 27, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 26, 2018

So how was it decided Reality Winner should get 63 months for leaking classified information? Does it seem about right?

The questions in the title of this post are prompted by this news out of the federal criminal justice system via the New York Times: "Reality L. Winner, a former Air Force linguist who was the first person prosecuted by the Trump administration on charges of leaking classified information, pleaded guilty on Tuesday as part of an agreement with prosecutors that calls for a sentence of 63 months in prison." Here is more of the particulars and some context:

Ms. Winner, who entered her plea in Federal District Court in Augusta, Ga., was arrested last June and accused of sharing a classified report about Russian interference in the 2016 election with the news media. Ms. Winner, who is now 26, has been jailed since her arrest and wore an orange prison jumpsuit and white sneakers to the hearing. Her decision to plead guilty to one felony count allows the government both to avoid a complex trial that had been scheduled for October and to notch a victory in the Trump administration’s aggressive pursuit of leakers.

“All of my actions I did willfully, meaning I did so of my own free will,” Ms. Winner told Chief Judge J. Randal Hall on Tuesday. Throughout the hearing, Ms. Winner kept her hands behind her back while she answered questions about whether she understood the terms of the plea deal.

Ms. Winner, who was honorably discharged from the Air Force in 2016, was working as a contractor for the National Security Agency when she obtained a copy of a report that described hacks by a Russian intelligence service against local election officials and a company that sold software related to voter registration. The Intercept, an online news outlet that a prosecutor said Ms. Winner admired, published a copy of the top secret report shortly before Ms. Winner’s arrest was made public. The report described two cyberattacks by Russia’s military intelligence unit, the G.R.U. — one in August against a company that sells voter registration-related software and another, a few days before the election, against 122 local election officials.

At a detention hearing last year, the prosecutor, Jennifer G. Solari, said that Ms. Winner had been “mad about some things she had seen in the media, and she wanted to set the facts right.”...

Once rare, leak cases have become much more common in the 21st century, in part because of such electronic trails. Depending on how they are counted, the Obama administration brought nine or 10 leak-related prosecutions — about twice as many as were brought under all previous presidencies combined.

The Justice Department prosecuted Ms. Winner under the Espionage Act, a World War I-era law that criminalizes the unauthorized disclosure of national-security secrets that could be used to harm the United States or aid a foreign adversary. Ms. Winner’s prosecution galvanized transparency advocates, who mounted a publicity campaign in her support that even included a billboard in Augusta, the east Georgia city where Ms. Winner lived at the time of her arrest. They were particularly infuriated by a judge’s ruling that she be held until her trial....

Ms. Winner is the second person known to have reached a plea agreement with the Trump administration to resolve a leak prosecution. A former F.B.I. agent, Terry J. Albury, pleaded guilty in April, but prosecutors in that case have signaled that they will ask that he serve 46 to 57 months in prison.

The Justice Department has brought at least two other leak-related cases under the Trump administration.  Earlier this month, James Wolfe, a former Senate Intelligence Committee staffer, was arrested and charged with lying to the F.B.I. about his contacts with reporters, including a Times reporter with whom he had a personal relationship and whose phone records the department secretly seized, during a leak investigation; Mr. Wolfe has not been charged with leaking classified information, however.  He has pleaded not guilty.  Also this month, Joshua A. Schulte, a former C.I.A. software engineer, with charged with violating the Espionage Act and other laws based on accusations that he sent a stolen archive of documents and electronic tools related to the agency’s hacking operations to WikiLkeas, which dubbed them the Vault 7 leak. Mr. Schulte had already been facing child pornography charges.

A judge must still decide whether to approve her sentence after reviewing a report that prosecutors will present.  But prosecutors’ recommendation of more than five years in prison — followed by three years of supervised release — was unusually harsh for a leak case.  For most of American history, people accused of leaking to the news media were not prosecuted at all.  In the flurry of cases that have arisen during the 21st century, most convicted defendants were sentenced to one to three-and-a-half years.

One — Chelsea Manning, who was convicted at a military court-martial for sending large archives of military and diplomatic documents to WikiLeaks — was sentenced to 35 years in prison, but served only about seven years because President Barack Obama commuted the remainder of her sentence.

As this article suggests, there is not a lot of history of sentences for these kinds of leaks, and arguably the Chelsea Manning case sets a notable benchmark for how high a sentence might go for this kind of illegal leaking. But there are lots of ways to distinguish Manning and Winner, and Winner still seems to be getting a sentence considerably more severe than most modern leakers. That said, if one believes that deterrence considerations are especially important and perhaps effective in this setting, perhaps it is particularly justifiable for federal prosecutors to try to throw the book at the few high-profile leakers who get convicted.

Notably, as this article notes, a federal judge has to decide whether to accept this particular plea deal with its built-in sentence of 63 months.  Comments are welcome concerning whether the judge out to have some pause about doing so.

June 26, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

"For Justice and Decarceration, Enact Second-Look Sentencing"

The title of this post is the headline of this new commentary authored by Steven Zeidman in the Gotham Gazette. Here are excerpts:

Regardless what one thinks of presidential pardons, we should reflect upon a simple truth — convictions and sentences meted out at one point might not be appropriate decades later.  That is especially true for many people currently serving life or massive prison sentences.

Many have argued for sentence commutations for specific classifications of people. In recent years, the Supreme Court has recognized that judges sentencing young people, even for violent crimes, must consider lack of maturity, impulsivity, and the inherent potential for change, and so reformers are asking courts to resentence those serving long prison terms for crimes committed when they were young. Many people advocate for medical parole or compassionate release for the elderly and infirm.  Others focus on people deemed to be low-level, non-violent drug offenders.

At the heart of the problem, however, are all the people serving draconian sentences for crimes committed when they were adults and who are not, at least not yet, suffering from any debilitating illness or in any other “special” category. In fact, it is the “normalcy” of so many cases that highlights the issue we must confront....

Last year, the venerable American Law Institute, a non-governmental organization of judges, lawyers and academics, approved the first-ever revisions to the historic Model Penal Code.  The MPC, taught in virtually every law school, was developed in 1962 to introduce uniformity and coherence to the myriad criminal codes in the 50 states, and serves as a model across the country.  The update to the Code took more than 15 years to complete and yielded a comprehensive 700-page report.

The ALI focused specifically on sentencing in order to address the decades of punitiveness that led to the current state of mass incarceration, made all the more shameful by the significant racial disparities in American jails and prisons. One recommendation in particular addresses the epidemic of 2.2 million people behind bars. The Code now calls for state legislatures to enact a “second look” provision; to create a mechanism to reexamine a person’s sentence after 15 years no matter the crime of conviction or how long the original sentence. If the original sentence remains unchanged, it would be revisited every ten years thereafter.

While many will sound the alarm for “truth-in-sentencing” or the need for finality, the second-look provision asks a very basic question — are the purposes of sentencing better served by a sentence modification or by adhering to the original sentence imposed many years earlier? The commentary to the Code cites a host of utilitarian reasons why long sentences should not be frozen in time, suggesting that “governments should be especially cautious” and act with “a profound sense of humility” when depriving people of their freedom for most of their adult lives.

The commentary notes further that new developments might show that old sentences are no longer empirically valid, as current risk assessment methods claim to be better at predicting risk of recidivism than those previously used. Similarly, new rehabilitative approaches might be discovered for people who at the time of their sentencing were thought resistant to change.

The second-look provision is bold and unprecedented — to actually redress the past 50 years of mass incarceration requires nothing less, as most proposed criminal justice solutions and reforms are prospective and have no impact on those people currently in prison. Further, executive clemency in the form of sentence commutation has also proven to be of limited utility as Presidents and Governors are loath to exercise this power to any serious and meaningful degree.

Second-look allows for mid-course correction if warranted by some measure of changed circumstances -- major changes in the offender, his family situation, the crime victim, or the community — that merit a different sentence.  It is consistent with the growth of restorative justice that seeks to move away from the punishment paradigm of the last several decades.  Second-look also allows the sentencing determination to be made in a calmer atmosphere than existed at the time of the original sentencing, so that any notoriety, outside pressure, or inflamed passions may have abated.

Bills have been introduced in the New York State Legislature regarding parole eligibility for people who are least 55 years old and have served at least 15 years of their sentence, and while the devil may be in the details, they are not insurmountable.  There will be costs associated with establishing second-look processes but money will ultimately be saved as more people are sent home.  Releasing people from prison is often controversial and even one crime committed by a releasee can threaten to shut down any second-look process, so there must be carefully constructed guidelines, created by myriad stakeholders, to ensure the independence of the decision-makers, and that all decisions are consistent, defensible, and transparent.

Mass incarceration is not just about unnecessarily incarcerating masses of people.  It is about unnecessarily keeping masses of people in prison for decades.  A sentence once imposed is not thereby automatically rendered, just, fair and appropriate in perpetuity.  Ultimately, second-look mechanisms are meant to recognize and value the possibility of change and transformation, and to intervene when drastically long sentences are indefensible.

Regular readers should know that I am a big fan of second-look sentencing mechanisms, so I am a fan of this commentary even though it does not fully engage with the reality that second-look provisions in the new MPC are only critical because of the MPC's advocacy for abolishing parole mechanisms. Parole mechanisms (as well as robust use of clemency powers) served for the bulk of the 20th Century to help address many of the problems identified in this commentary. That said, I would favor a world with both a well-structured parole mechanism and second-look sentence provisions so that both the executive branch (via parole) and the judicial branch (via resentencings) can and will review the propriety and necessity of a sentence over time.

I have written about a number of second-look concerns and related issues in a a number of article through the years, and here is just a sampling of these writings:

June 26, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Terrific new Boston University Law Review symposium on "Misdemeanor Machinery"

BULR-headerI recently received in this mail a hard-copy version of the May 2018 issue of the Boston University Law Review devoted entirely to examining misdemeanors in the US criminal justice system. The full title of the symposium, which had a live component late last year, was "Misdemeanor Machinery: The Hidden Heart of the American Criminal Justice System," and the article all looks terrific.  This Editors' Foreword sets the tone:

Misdemeanor courts across the nation churn through millions of cases each year. Misdemeanors are understudied by scholars and underreported by the media. While these cases may be less significant than felonies in the eyes of the public, they have far-reaching consequences in the lives of individual defendants.  Collateral consequences often far outstrip criminal sanctions and affect defendants’ housing, employment, education, and status in the United States.  As Professor Malcolm M. Feeley aptly put it, “the process is the punishment.”

Periodically, attention is drawn to the misdemeanor courts. This tends to occur in times of discontent and unrest.  Historically, reform efforts have largely been short-lived or entirely unsuccessful.  But in the wake of public attention to misdemeanor practices in Ferguson, Missouri, the time is ripe for reform.

A dedicated group of scholars met at Boston University School of Law to explore the misdemeanor machinery on November 3-4, 2017.  The conference featured both scholars and practitioners seeking to define “misdemeanor,” empirically analyze the misdemeanor system in the United States, explore the ramifications of misdemeanor charges, identify ethical concerns, and propose meaningful reform.  The pieces in this Symposium Issue represent each of these perspectives and offer thoughtful next steps for research and reform.

And here are links to all the pieces:

How To Think About Criminal Court Reform by Malcom Feeley

The Scale of Misdemeanor Justice by Megan Stevenson and Sandra Mayson

The Innocence Movement and Misdemeanors by Jenny Roberts

The History of Misdemeanor Bail by Shima Baughman

The Prosecutor’s Client Problem by Irene Joe

Curbing Collateral Punishment in the Big Data Age: How Lawyers and Advocates Can Use Criminal Record Sealing Statutes To Protect Privacy and the Presumption of Innocence by Jenn Borchetta

Proportionality and Other Misdemeanor Myths by Eisha Jain

Toward Misdemeanor Justice: Lessons from New York City by Greg Berman and Julian Adler

Errors in Misdemeanor Adjudication by Samuel Gross

June 26, 2018 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, June 25, 2018

Questioning the use of actuarial risk assessment tools at sentencing

Erin Collins has this notable new commentary at The Crime Report under the headline "The Perils of 'Off-Label Sentencing'." I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

Current criminal justice reform efforts are risk-obsessed.  Actuarial risk assessment tools, which claim to predict the risk that an individual will commit, or be arrested for, criminal activity, dominate discussions about how to reform policing, bail, and corrections decisions.  And recently, risk-based reforms have entered a new arena: sentencing....  Actuarial sentencing has gained the support of many practitioners, academics, and prominent organizations, including the National Center for State Courts and the American Law Institute. [see Model Penal Code: Sentencing § 6B.09]

This enthusiasm is, at first blush, understandable: actuarial sentencing seems to have only promise and no peril. It allows judges to identify those who pose a low risk of recidivism and divert them from prison.  Society thus avoids the financial cost of unnecessarily incarcerating low-risk individuals.

And yet, this enthusiasm for actuarial sentencing ignores a seemingly crucial point: actuarial risk assessment tools were not developed for sentencing purposes.  In fact, the social scientists who developed the most popular risk assessment tools specified that they were not designed to determine the severity of a sentence, including whether or not to incarcerate someone.  Actuarial sentencing is, in short, an “off-label” application of actuarial risk assessment information.

As we know from the medical context, the fact that a use is “off-label” does not necessarily mean it is ill-advised or ineffective. And, indeed, many contend that actuarial sentencing is a simple matter of using data gleaned in one area of criminal justice and applying it to another.  If we know how to predict recidivism, why not use that information broadly? Isn’t this a prime example of an approach that is smart — rather than tough — on crime?

As I contend in my article, Punishing Risk, which is forthcoming in the Georgetown Law Journal this fall, the practice of actuarial sentencing is not that simple, nor is it wise. In fact, using actuarial information in this “off-label” way can cause an equally unintended consequence: it can justify more, not less, incarceration — and for reasons that undermine the fairness and integrity of our criminal justice system.

The actuarial risk assessment tools that are being integrated into sentencing decisions, such as the Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) tool, and the Level of Services Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), were designed to assist corrections officers with a specific task: how to administer punishment in a way that advances rehabilitation.  They are intended to be used after a judge has announced the sentence.  They are based on the Risk-Need-Responsivity principle, according to which recidivism risk is identified so that it can be reduced through programming, treatment and security classifications that are responsive to the individual’s “criminogenic needs” (recidivism risk factors that can be changed).

Sentencing judges, in contrast, do not administer punishment but rather determine how much punishment is due.  In doing so, they may use actuarial risk predictions to advance whatever punishment purpose they deem appropriate.  While they may decide to divert a low-risk individual from prison in order to increase their rehabilitative possibilities, they may also decide to sentence a high-risk individual more harshly — not because doing so will increase her prospects of rehabilitation, but because it will increase public safety....

The tools measure risk based on a range of characteristics that are anathema to a principled sentencing inquiry, such as gender, education and employment history, and family criminality. Perhaps consideration of these factors makes sense if the predictive output is used to administer punishment in a way that is culturally competent and individualized.

But in the sentencing context, it allows the judge to punish someone more harshly based on a compilation of characteristics that are inherently personal and wholly non-culpable, and often replicate racial biases that pervade other areas of the criminal justice system.  In other words, actuarial sentencing allows judges to defy the well-established tenet that we punish someone for what they did, not who they are....

Incorporating these tools into sentencing conflates recidivism risk, broadly defined, with risk to public safety. If we want to reduce our reliance on public safety, we must refine—rather than expand — the risk that counts for sentencing purposes.

Some of many prior related posts with links to articles and commentary on risk assessment tools:

June 25, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Can we predict how federal immigration crackdowns will impact the modern drug war?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this USA Today piece headlined "DOJ: Trump's immigration crackdown 'diverting' resources from drug cases." Here are excerpts:

Federal prosecutors warned they were diverting resources from drug-smuggling cases in southern California to handle the flood of immigration charges brought on by the Trump administration’s border crackdown, records obtained by USA TODAY show.

Days after Attorney General Jeff Sessions instructed prosecutors to bring charges against anyone who enters the United States illegally, a Justice Department supervisor in San Diego sent an email to border authorities warning that immigration cases “will occupy substantially more of our resources.”  He wrote that the U.S. Attorney’s Office there was “diverting staff, both support and attorneys, accordingly.”...

Sessions last month ordered federal prosecutors along the southwest border to bring criminal charges against every adult caught entering the United States illegally, a “zero tolerance” push meant to deter migrants. Those cases typically are seldom more than symbolic — most of the people who are charged are sentenced to no additional jail time and a $10 fee — but they have served as the legal basis for separating thousands of children from their parents at the border.

The border crackdown has produced a high-speed assembly line of minor cases in federal courts from California to Texas, more than doubling the caseloads there.  This month alone, USA TODAY identified more than 4,100 migrants who were charged with minor crimes after crossing into the United States from Mexico.

Kelly Thornton, a spokeswoman for the U.S. Attorney’s Office, said in a statement that the Justice Department “has given our district the necessary resources -- including 10 additional prosecutor positions plus at least five Department of Defense attorneys -- to prosecute all of these crimes.”  She said the number of smuggling cases prosecuted there is on track to go up this year.  Still, there are signs that border authorities are seeking to prosecute drug smugglers in state courts instead, even though the possible sentences typically are harsher in the federal system.

The District Attorney’s office in San Diego said Friday that the number of cases submitted to them by border authorities had more than doubled since the administration started its border crackdown.  Spokeswoman Tanya Sierra said Homeland Security agents referred 96 drug cases to the office between May 21 and June 21, compared to 47 over the same period last year.  Most of the cases involved more than a kilogram of drugs, Sierra said.

Meanwhile, the number of people charged in federal court has dropped since the start of the administration’s zero-tolerance push, said Reuben Cahn, the chief federal public defender in San Diego....

USA TODAY examined 2,598 written judgments in border-crossing cases filed in federal courts along the border since mid-May.  In nearly 70 percent of those cases, migrants pleaded guilty and immediately received a sentence of time served, meaning they would spend no additional time in jail.  Another 13 percent were sentenced to unsupervised probation, including a condition that they not illegally re-enter the United States.  In both cases, that meant they would immediately be returned to immigration officials to be processed for deportation, leaving them in essentially the same position as if they had not been prosecuted.

This newspaper analysis highlights just some ripple effects of any significant change in federal prosecutorial priorities: with more resources developed to federal immigration cases, there may be fewer federal drug cases brought; but more cases may be handed over to state authorities.  And, in various settings involving non-citizen subject, the results of state or federal prosecution may be impacted by the fact that deportation will follow any conviction.

June 25, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, June 24, 2018

Remarkable tale of how uncertain criminal laws and their enforcement can produce extraordinary punishment inequities

I understand concerns about the potential for sentencing disparities that can arise from broad judicial discretion, but I have always noticed how many significant inequities can result from many other aspects of criminal case processing.  In this recent post, I flagged this new remarkable series produced by Florida newspapers documenting how prosecutors are responsible for locking up defendants of different races for much different periods.  And this morning my local newspaper has this remarkable story, headlined "Two bath-salts prosecutions lead to far different results," reporting on two similar defendants in Ohio getting remarkably different outcomes: one walking free and the other sentenced to 35 years in prison!  Here are the details:

Both men operated retail stores within blocks of each other in the Short North area. Both were arrested in 2012 and charged with selling bath salts, a synthetic hallucinogen.  One walked free, his case dismissed by a Franklin County judge.  The other, whose case was assigned to a different judge, was convicted and sentenced to 35 years in prison, with no chance for parole....

For Soleiman Mobarak, the man sent to prison, “it’s just a matter of bad timing and bad luck,” said his attorney, Robert Behal. “Hopefully, our system is better than that, where it’s not a matter of luck whether you get 35 years or zero.”

At one point, Mobarak, 35, was set free. In July 2015, 13 months after he was sent to prison, the Franklin County Court of Appeals overturned his conviction.  A three-judge panel ruled that selling and possessing bath salts and other designer drugs known as controlled-substance analogs was not a crime in Ohio when undercover investigators purchased them from Mobarak at his East 5th Avenue convenience store in May, June and July 2012.

Common Pleas Judge Laurel Beatty Blunt had reached a similar conclusion when she dismissed a bath-salts case against Thomas C. Smith in February 2014.  The appeals court upheld Beatty Blunt’s ruling in December 2014.  Smith, 63, who owned three shops on North High Street, and Mobarak both were swept up in a sting operation conducted by the Franklin County Drug Task Force, which was targeting the sale of synthetic designer drugs.

In both cases, the appeals court found that controlled-substance analogs, including bath salts, didn’t become illegal until the Ohio legislature included them in the criminal drug-offense statutes through a bill that took effect Dec. 20, 2012.  The Franklin County Prosecutors Office appealed those decisions to the Ohio Supreme Court. 

The Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal of Smith’s case in October 2015, which put an end to any efforts to prosecute him....  But before the Supreme Court got around to making a decision on the Mobarak appeal, the 12th District Court of Appeals ruled in a Warren County case that controlled-substance analogs were illegal in Ohio as of October 2011.  When that ruling was appealed to the Supreme Court, the justices had two pending cases in which appeals courts had reached conflicting opinions about the issue.  The justices chose to hear the cases, and in December 2016 they agreed with the 12th District court — controlled-substance analogs were criminalized in October 2011, before the sales made by Mobarak and the Warren County defendant.

Franklin County prosecutors filed a motion asking the trial court to revoke Mobarak’s bond and return him prison to complete his sentence.  The judge who sentenced Mobarak, Pat Sheeran, had since retired. His replacement, Judge Jeffrey Brown, inherited the case. June 12, after months of court filings, Brown issued what appeared to be a reluctant ruling.  Twice in his 38-page decision, Brown wrote that he was “troubled” by Mobarak’s situation. “The court’s hands are tied, however,” by the Supreme Court ruling, he wrote. “This court has no authority to modify the sentence ... Mobarak must begin to serve the remainder of his sentence.”

Had the conflicting case from Warren County not intervened, the Supreme Court presumably would have declined to hear the Mobarak case, just as it had done with Smith, Behal said.  Mobarak, like Smith, would be a free man.  “The passage of time created disparate results, and that’s tough to take,” Behal said.

Prosecutor Ron O’Brien has a different view of the fates of the two defendants.  “It’s unfortunate that Smith evaded responsibility just because of timing, but that does not mean Mobarak should evade responsibility,” O’Brien said. “Mobarak shouldn’t benefit from what was a wrong decision from the beginning.  Everybody knew how bad bath salts were, including the people who were selling them.  They were just playing games with the classifications.  Luckily, the Supreme Court finally straightened it out.”

June 24, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

Friday, June 22, 2018

"Gideon Incarcerated: Access to Counsel in Pre-Trial Detention"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Johanna Kalb now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

As the population of incarcerated persons has swelled in local, state, and federal facilities around the country, the infrastructure supporting the attorney-client relationship is under increasing stress.  The result is an array of new cases about the difficulties of lawyering in jails and prisons.  These cases challenge the lack of private space for legal visits, reductions in visiting hours, remote carceral placements, interference with legal mail, and monitoring of legal phone calls and legal email.  Despite (or perhaps because of) these mounting challenges, many courts have become less receptive to Sixth Amendment claims from people behind bars, putting the right to counsel at risk.

This Article traces the hidden ways in which mass incarceration has worked to degrade the right to counsel, both in fact and in law, for incarcerated criminal defendants.  It then proposes possibilities for reinvigorating the Sixth Amendment’s protections for incarcerated defendants, through intersecting strategies for regulation and structural litigation, with the ultimate goal of breaking our national reliance on pretrial detention.  Building on a 50-state survey of the jail standards governing the attorney-client relationship, the Article illustrates how the Sixth Amendment’s protections are currently understood by those who must facilitate them, and then proposes a new litigation strategy to catalyze reform.

June 22, 2018 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

SCOTUS rules 5-4 to extend Fourth Amendment protections to cell-site records in Carpenter

The Supreme Court this morning handed down the biggest criminal case of its concluding Term, Carpenter v. US, No. 16-402 (S. Ct. June 22, 2018) (available here). Though I will leave it to Fourth Amendment experts to unpack the majority opinion (authored by Chief Justice Roberts and joined by all the more liberal Justices) and all the separate dissenting opinions (there are four), my first-cut sense is that this is a "big but narrow" win for criminal defendants and privacy advocates.  Here are a few key passages from the majority opinion leading me to that conclusion:

Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI.  The location information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search....

We therefore decline to extend Smith and Miller to the collection of CSLI.  Given the unique nature of cell phone location information, the fact that the Government obtained the information from a third party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection. The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site records was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

* * *

Our decision today is a narrow one.  We do not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or “tower dumps” (a download of information on all the devices that connected to a particular cell site during a particular interval).  We do not disturb the application of Smith and Miller or call into question conventional surveillance techniques and tools, such as security cameras.  Nor do we address other business records that might incidentally reveal location information.  Further, our opinion does not consider other collection techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.  As Justice Frankfurter noted when considering new innovations in airplanes and radios, the Court must tread carefully in such cases, to ensure that we do not “embarrass the future.”  Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944).

June 22, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

SCOTUS rules 5-4 against finding Double Jeopardy Clause limits prosecutors over severed trials

The Supreme Court this morning handed down Currier v. Virginia, No. 16-1358 (S. Ct. June 22, 2018) (available here), dealing with the reach of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Here is how Justice Gorsuch's lead opinion gets started (ending with a question that the Court answers "no"):

About to face trial, Michael Currier worried the prosecution would introduce prejudicial but probative evidence against him on one count that could infect the jury’s deliberations on others. To address the problem, he agreed to sever the charges and hold two trials instead of one.  But after the first trial finished, Mr. Currier turned around and argued that proceeding with the second would violate his right against double jeopardy.  All of which raises the question: can a defendant who agrees to have the charges against him considered in two trials later successfully argue that the second trial offends the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause?

The dissent authored by Justice Ginsburg and joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, starts this way:

Michael Nelson Currier was charged in Virginia state court with (1) breaking and entering, (2) grand larceny, and (3) possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. All three charges arose out of the same criminal episode.  Under Virginia practice, unless the prosecutor and the defendant otherwise agree, a trial court must sever a charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon from other charges that do not require proof of a prior conviction.  Virginia maintains this practice recognizing that evidence of a prior criminal conviction, other than on the offense for which the defendant is being tried, can be highly prejudicial in jury trials.

After trial for breaking and entering and grand larceny, the jury acquitted Currier of both charges.  The prosecutor then chose to proceed against Currier on the severed felon-in-possession charge.  Currier objected to the second trial on double jeopardy grounds.  He argued that the jury acquittals of breaking and entering and grand larceny established definitively and with finality that he had not participated in the alleged criminal episode.  Invoking the issue-preclusion component of the double jeopardy ban, Currier urged that in a second trial, the Commonwealth could not introduce evidence of his alleged involvement in breaking and entering and grand larceny, charges on which he had been acquitted.  He further maintained that without allowing the prosecution a second chance to prove breaking and entering and grand larceny, the evidence would be insufficient to warrant conviction of the felon-in-possession charge.

I would hold that Currier’s acquiescence in severance of the felon-in-possession charge does not prevent him from raising a plea of issue preclusion based on the jury acquittals of breaking and entering and grand larceny.

June 22, 2018 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Fourth Circuit affirms ruling that DC sniper Lee Malvo entitled to resentencing due to Miller and Montgomery

Last year, as reported in this prior post, a US District Judge concluded that infamous sniper Lee Boyd Malvo was entitled to re-sentencing as a consequence of Supreme Court rulings precluding mandatory life sentences for juvenile murderers.  Yesterday, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision in a unanimous panel ruling in Malvo v. Mathena, No. 17-6746 (4th Cir. June 21, 2018) (available here). This ruling gets started this way: 

In Virginia in 2004, a defendant convicted of capital murder, who was at least 16 years old at the time of his crime, would be punished by either death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, unless the judge suspended his sentence.  After a Virginia jury convicted Lee Boyd Malvo of two counts of capital murder based on homicides that he committed in 2002 when he was 17 years old, it declined to recommend the death penalty, and he was instead sentenced in 2004 to two terms of life imprisonment without parole, in accordance with Virginia law.  Thereafter, Malvo, again seeking to avoid the death penalty, pleaded guilty in another Virginia jurisdiction to one count of capital murder and one count of attempted capital murder — both of which he also committed when 17 years old — and received two additional terms of life imprisonment without parole.

After Malvo was sentenced in those cases, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions relating to the sentencing of defendants who committed serious crimes when under the age of 18.  It held that such defendants cannot be sentenced to death; that they cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole unless they committed a homicide offense that reflected their permanent incorrigibility; and that these rules relating to juvenile sentencing are to be applied retroactively, meaning that sentences that were legal when imposed must be vacated if they were imposed in violation of the Court’s new rules.  See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).

In these habeas cases filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, we conclude that even though Malvo’s life-without-parole sentences were fully legal when imposed, they must now be vacated because the retroactive constitutional rules for sentencing juveniles adopted subsequent to Malvo’s sentencings were not satisfied during his sentencings.  Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order vacating Malvo’s four terms of life imprisonment without parole and remanding for resentencing to determine (1) whether Malvo qualifies as one of the rare juvenile offenders who may, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole because his “crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” or (2) whether those crimes instead “reflect the transient immaturity of youth,” in which case he must receive a sentence short of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.

June 22, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, June 21, 2018

Fascinating accounting of prosecutorial role in considerable racial disparity in Florida sentencing

Back in 2016, as highlighted in this post, the Sarasota Herald-Tribune published an extraordinary series of articles in examining disparities in Florida's sentencing system under the heading "Bias on the Bench."  The paper now, working with the Florida Times-Union, has this new remarkable series under the headline "Influence & Injustice: An Investigation Into The Power Of Prosecutors."  Here is part of the lead article:

Academics and judges argue that prosecutors are the most powerful players in the criminal justice system and most to blame for bias.  But at 34 and just three years out of law school in 2016, was Bustamante really responsible for locking up black defendants for nearly quadruple the time of whites?

The Herald-Tribune and Times-Union set out to answer this question by measuring the influence of other players in the criminal justice system on cases prosecuted by Bustamante.  Those players include two powerful judges she appeared before; her former boss, Angela Corey — regarded as one of the toughest state attorneys in the nation; the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, which heavily polices minority communities; and residents of the city’s black neighborhoods, notorious for gun violence....

Reporters and editors spent at least 500 hours over three months opening more than 3,500 felony drug cases by hand.  The result is a first-of-its-kind spreadsheet tracking Bustamante and 22 other prosecutors based on the race of defendants, points scored under Florida’s sentencing guidelines, time spent behind bars and other factors such as possession of guns or resisting arrest.

From these records, the newspapers created two sentencing indexes: one that measures leniency and another that calculates harsh punishment.  Those indexes reveal that 43 percent of white drug defendants in Duval County were shown some sort of leniency in 2015 and 2016.  That rate falls to 27 percent for blacks.

When it comes to punitive sentences, the trend flips.  Fifteen percent of blacks received severe sentences, according to the index.  That compares to 10 percent of whites.

June 21, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Split Michigan Supreme Court rejects Sixth Amendment challenge to state's new juve LWOP statute

Ruling 4-2, the Michigan Supreme Court issued a lengthy opinion yesterday upholding the procedures of its new juvenile sentencing statute.  The majority opinion in Michigan v. Skinner, No. 152448 (Mich. June 20, 2018) (available here), gets started this way:

At issue here is whether MCL 769.25 violates the Sixth Amendment because it allows the decision whether to impose a sentence of life without parole to be made by a judge, rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  We hold that MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth Amendment because neither the statute nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead, life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone.  Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Skinner and affirm the part of Hyatt that held that “[a] judge, not a jury, must determine whether to impose a life-without-parole sentence or a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25.”  People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368, 415; 891 NW2d 549 (2016).  However, we reverse the part of Hyatt that adopted a heightened standard of review for life-without-parole sentences imposed under MCL 769.25 and that remanded this case to the trial court for it to “decide whether defendant Hyatt is the truly rare juvenile mentioned in [Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012)] who is incorrigible and incapable of reform.” Hyatt, 316 Mich App at 429. No such explicit finding is required.  Finally, we remand both of these cases to the Court of Appeals for it to review defendants’ sentences under the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

The dissenting opinion gets started this way:

There is much in the majority opinion with which I agree.  For example, I agree that if MCL 769.25 can reasonably be construed in a constitutional manner, we should so construe it.  And I generally agree with the majority’s discussion of the applicable legal principles.  But I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that there are two reasonable ways of interpreting MCL 769.25, one of which is constitutional.  Reading the statute as “murder-plus” would violate the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), and its progeny.  And I disagree with the majority that reading the statute as “murder-minus” cures all its constitutional deficiencies. In my view, reading the statute as murder-minus renders it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US ___; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). Read either way, MCL 769.25 suffers from a constitutional deficiency.

June 21, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Blakely in the States, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Wednesday, June 20, 2018

"Fourth Amendment Constraints on the Technological Monitoring of Convicted Sex Offenders"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Ben McJunkin and J.J. Prescott.  Here is its abstract:

More than forty U.S. states currently track at least some of their convicted sex offenders using GPS devices.  Many offenders will be monitored for life.  The burdens and expense of living indefinitely under constant technological monitoring have been well documented, but most commentators have assumed that these burdens were of no constitutional moment because states have characterized such surveillance as “civil” in character — and courts have seemed to agree.

In 2015, however, the Supreme Court decided in Grady v. North Carolina that attaching a GPS monitoring device to a person was a Fourth Amendment search, notwithstanding the ostensibly civil character of the surveillance.  Grady left open the question whether the search — and the state’s technological monitoring program more generally — was constitutionally reasonable.  This Essay considers the doctrine and theory of Fourth Amendment reasonableness as it applies to both current and envisioned sex offender monitoring technologies to evaluate whether the Fourth Amendment may serve as an effective check on post-release monitoring regimes.

June 20, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (3)

Split Second Circuit panel reverses lengthy child porn sentence for second time; dissent notes "sentence is barbaric without being all that unusual"

I do not tend to blog much any more about circuit opinions conducting reasonableness review because, now more than a decade since the Supreme Court ensured reasonableness review would be very deferential thanks to Rita, Gall and Kimbrough, few circuit sentencing opinions break any new ground.  But though a Second Circuit panel opinion yesterday, US v. Sawyer, No. 15-2276 (2d Cir. June 19, 2018) (available here), does not break new ground, it still struck me as blogworthy for both the majority opinion and the dissent.

The majority opinion in Sawyer is well summarized by the preamble to the opinion: 

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York (D’Agostino, J.) imposing a sentence of 300 months of imprisonment for the offenses of producing child pornography and receiving child pornography. This court previously vacated as substantively unreasonable a sentence of 360 months of imprisonment for the same offenses, identifying specific deficiencies in the district court’s analysis. The district court did not sufficiently address those deficiencies on remand and suggested that it would have difficulty putting aside its previously-expressed views.

The key factor that appears to have driven the original panel opinion and this second reversal was the "the district court’s failure to give sufficient downward weight to the effect of the severe sexual abuse Sawyer endured at home throughout his childhood."  Tellingly, even at the second sentencing, the district court stressed that the guidelines called for 80 years in prison(!), suggesting no "failure to afford sufficient weight to the way [the defendant was] raised in determining [his] sentence, looking at the fact that [the original sentence] departed by 50 years from the [80 year] guideline range."  In this way in this case,  we can and should see how extreme guideline ranges can persistently distort a district court's sentencing decision-making even after a circuit court has concluded that the district court failed to comply with the requirements of the first time around 3553(a).

Beyond noticing the impact and import of broken guidelines even in a case in which everyone agrees they should not be followed, the Sawyer case struck me as blogworthy because of a (casual?) line in the dissenting opinion by Judge Jacobs. Here is the context for the line quoted in the title to this post, with my emphasis added:

In decrying the 25-year sentence, the majority opinion observes (fairly) that this case is not the most heinous or egregious on record.  At the same time, however, this is not a case such as United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2010), or United States v. Brown, 843 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 2016), in which decades of imprisonment were imposed solely for looking at images created by others, and in which any harm to a child was inflicted at one or more removes. This defendant was hands-on.  He produced the pornography, and he used a 4-year-old and a 6-year-old to do it.  For these acts, a 25-year sentence is not a shocking departure from sentences routinely imposed in federal courts for comparable offenses — especially considering that the mandatory minimum is fifteen.  The sentence is barbaric without being all that unusual.

I appreciate the candor and yet remain stunned by Judge Jacobs stating simply that the defendant's sentence here is "barbaric" but yet not "all that unusual" and thus ought to be affirmed despite the obligation of circuit courts to review sentences for their reasonableness in light of the requirements of 3553(a).

June 20, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, June 19, 2018

SCOTUSblog reviews of SCOTUS work in Rosales-Mireles and Chavez-Meza

When I get some more time to re-read the opinions and to think more about their possible echoes, I may do some additional commentary concerning the Supreme Court's sentencing work yesterday in Rosales-Mireles v. United States, No. 16–9493 (S. Ct. June 18, 2018) (available here), and Chavez-Meza v. United States, No. 17–5639 (S. Ct. June 18, 2018) (available here).  In the meantime, the SCOTUSblog folks have up an "Opinion analysis" for each case:

June 19, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Georgia Supreme Court rules individual has essentially no procedural rights before being placed on state's child abuse registry

I saw yesterday a notable ruling by the Georgia Supreme Court in Georgia Department of Human Services v. Steiner, No. S18A0281 (Ga. June 18, 2018)(available here).  As I read the case, a 13-year-old's written statement that an older individual (age 52) hugged her and twice "started to hump me a way a dog would" led to his placement on the Georgia child abuse registry.  Upon getting a subsequent notice of his placement on the registry, Steiner challenged the (lack of) procedures on various grounds, and prevailed in lower courts. But on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, Steiner loses and the majority opinion gets started this way:

The Georgia Department of Human Services, Division of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”) appeals from the decision of the Lamar County Superior Court finding that Georgia’s central child abuse registry is unconstitutional, both on its face and as applied to appellee Christopher Steiner.  The trial court also found that DFCS failed to prove that Steiner committed an act of child abuse by a preponderance of the evidence as required to maintain Steiner’s listing in the registry.  This Court granted DFCS’s application for discretionary review. 

We hold that Steiner failed to demonstrate a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest sufficient to trigger the due process protections that he claims were violated by operation of the registry, and because the Act was constitutionally applied to Steiner, he lacks standing to bring his facial challenge on that ground.  We further hold that the child abuse registry is not criminal in nature, and that the superior court therefore erred in finding it to be so.  And because an abuse investigator’s determination about whether a report of child abuse is supported by the evidence is not a judicial function, the superior court erred in finding that the statute requiring the investigator to report such cases to DFCS for inclusion in the child abuse registry violates the separation of powers provision of the Georgia Constitution.  Finally, because at least “some evidence” supported the administrative hearing officer’s conclusion that DFCS had proved an act of child abuse as defined for purposes of the child abuse registry, the superior court erred in reversing the administrative law court.  We reverse.

June 19, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

"Whether the Bright-line Cut-off Rule and the Adversarial Expert Explanation of Adaptive Functioning Exacerbates Capital Juror Comprehension of the Intellectual Disability"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper on SSRN authored by Leona Deborah Jochnowitz.  Here is its abstract:

This paper examines a sample of Capital Jury Project (CJP 1) cases with available trial transcripts in which jurors were presented with mitigating intellectual disability evidence and may have been confused by issues of proof, definitions, and extralegal factors.  It tests the hypothesis that jurors’ receptivity to mitigating intellectual disability (ID) was limited by their difficulties with the adversarial mental proof and clinical definitions needed to establish it.  Further the juror decision-making may have been obscured by distractions from extralegal factors, unrelated to the evidence like premature decision-making and heuristic shortcuts, pro-death bias, and racial prejudice.  It also examines whether the bright line cut-off rule, followed in some sample states prior to the Supreme Court decision in Hall v. Florida (2014), exacerbated jurors’ understanding of the disability, and encouraged popular stereotypes and misconceptions about intellectual disability.

In Kentucky, a state with the bright line cut-off rule, at the time these cases were decided, jurors were confused about a range of IQ scores and intellectual declines during developmental years. “IQ was perhaps not above what we consider a moron? I think they were contending that he had an IQ of 70 or 76 or so, had been tested as high as the 80s I recall.” (CJP KY death case #531, juror #725).  Even in non-bright line sample States like South Carolina, with no ID exemption at the time, jurors misunderstood the range of numerical IQ evidence. The study concludes that juror assessment of intellectual disability (ID) is variable.  Some jurors view ID as a more “organic” sympathetic disorder than other mental disorders, and they seem to understand it in practical, lay terms.  Yet, capital juror decision making is marred by extra-legal factors that impair consideration of the mitigating evidence.

The study concludes that juror misunderstanding regarding mitigating evidence has stubbornly persisted throughout the history of the Capital Jury Project and arises from shortcomings in human cognition which impede jurors’ moral consideration of intellectual disability evidence.  In light of these flaws, it may be impossible to avoid the unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual disability will be executed.  This study suggests that mildly intellectually disabled persons were indeed executed because jurors misunderstood the ID evidence and were persuaded by extralegal racial biases and premature decision making.

June 19, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, June 18, 2018

Split SCOTUS outcomes for federal defendants: a plain error win in Rosales-Mireles and an explanation loss in Chavez-Meza

The Supreme Court has handed down this morning its last two sentencing cases, Rosales-Mireles v. United States and Chavez-Meza v. United States, and they are split decisions in every sense. 

In Rosales-Mireles v. United States, No. 16–9493 (S. Ct. June 18, 2018) (available here), Justice Sotomayor writes for the Court ruling in favor of the federal defendant, with Justice Thomas writing the chief dissent joined by Justice Alito.  In Chavez-Meza v. United States, No. 17–5639 (S. Ct. June 18, 2018) (available here), Justice Breyer writes for the Court ruling in favor of the federal government, with Justice Kennedy writing the chief dissent joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor.

Here is the Court's opening paragraph in Rosales-Mireles:

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides that a court of appeals may consider errors that are plain and affect substantial rights, even though they are raised for the first time on appeal.  This case concerns the bounds of that discretion, and whether a miscalculation of the United States Sentencing Guidelines range, that has been determined to be plain and to affect a defendant’s substantial rights, calls for a court of appeals to exercise its discretion under Rule 52(b) to vacate the defendant’s sentence.  The Court holds that such an error will in the ordinary case, as here, seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, and thus will warrant relief.

Here is the Court's opening paragraph in Chavez-Meza:

This case concerns a criminal drug offender originally sentenced in accordance with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  Subsequently, the Sentencing Commission lowered the applicable Guidelines sentencing range; the offender asked for a sentence reduction in light of the lowered range; and the District Judge reduced his original sentence from 135 months’ imprisonment to 114 months’.  The offender, believing he should have obtained a yet greater reduction, argues that the District Judge did not adequately explain why he imposed a sentence of 114 months rather than a lower sentence.  The Court of Appeals held that the judge’s explanation was adequate.  And we agree with the Court of Appeals.

As regular readers should now come to expect, sentencing cases have a way of producing notable voting patters. Criminal defendants and defense attorneys should be intrigued and encouraged by that both Chief Justice Roberts and the new Justice Gorsuch signed on to the majority opinion in Rosales-Mireles. But defendants and defense attorneys surely will also be troubled that the Chief along with Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were all willing to embrace the "close enough for government work" approach in Chavez-Meza.

June 18, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

SCOTUS finally grants cert on new cases, including two criminal justice cases

Last Monday, because the Supreme Court issued an order list and opinions with little of interest for criminal justice fans, I sought to keep up my end-of-Term excitement by blogging here about the five remaining SCOTUS criminal cases to be decided in this coming weeks.  Some of those cases are likely to be decided today or later list week, but we already have something exciting from the Justices via this new order list granting cert on five new cases, including two criminal cases (links and descriptions via SCOTUSblog):

Garza v. Idaho: "Whether the 'presumption of prejudice' recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega applies when a criminal defendant instructs his trial counsel to file a notice of appeal but trial counsel decides not to do so because the defendant’s plea agreement included an appeal waiver."

Timbs v. Indiana: "Whether the Eighth Amendment’s excessive fines clause is incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment."

The order list also includes a short dissent from the denial of cert in a Florida capital cases in which Justice Sotomayor laments yet again the Court's failure to take up a claim that Florida's jury instructions "impermissibly diminished the jurors’ sense of responsibility as to the ultimate determination of death, in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320 (1985)."

Especially during a time in which financial sanctions are (finally) getting a lot more attention and there is a ever-growing libertarian/conservative concern about fines and forfeitures, the Timbs case if very interesting and is now my favorite "what to watch" case going into the next Term.

UPDATE: Over at Crime & Consequences here, Kent Scheidegger has a bit of an early preview of Garza in a post titled "Clients, Lawyers, and Appeals."  And this second C&C post, titled "Excessive Fines and Incorporation," takes a quick look at Timbs.

MORE:  SCOTUSblog has more on Timbs and Garza (and the other grants) in this post by Amy Howe.

June 18, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Saturday, June 16, 2018

Paul Manifort has bail revoked ... and has not (yet) gotten rescued from jail by Prez Trump's clemency pen

As detailed in this CNN piece, a very prominent federal defendant grew the number of Americans incarcerated yesterday when he had his bail revoked and was taken immediately to jail:

Former Trump campaign chairman Paul Manafort will await his trial for foreign lobbying charges from jail.  Two weeks after special counsel Robert Mueller's prosecutors dropped new accusations of witness tampering on him, US District Judge Amy Berman Jackson on Friday revoked Manafort's bail, which had allowed him to live in his Alexandria, Virginia, apartment under house arrest.

The order marked an end to almost eight months of attempts by Manafort to lighten his house arrest restrictions after he was charged and pleaded not guilty to foreign lobbying violations. "The harm in this case is harm to the administration of justice and harm to the integrity of the court's system," Berman Jackson told Manafort in court.

The judge emphasized to Manafort how she could not make enough rulings to keep him from speaking improperly with witnesses, after he had used multiple text messaging apps and called a potential witness on an Italian cellphone.  "This is not middle school. I can't take his cellphone," she said of Manafort.  "I thought about this long and hard, Mr. Manafort. I have no appetite for this."

Manafort also entered a not guilty plea to two additional charges levied against him last week, of witness tampering and conspiracy to obstruct justice. In total, he faces seven criminal charges in DC federal court. Three US marshals led Manafort out of the packed courtroom into the prisoner holding area immediately after the judge's ruling. He was not placed in handcuffs. Before he disappeared through the door, he turned toward his wife and supporters and gave a stilted wave.

Minutes later, a marshal returned to give Manafort's wife, Kathleen, still standing in the courtroom's front row, his wallet, belt and the burgundy tie he wore Friday. Court marshals held Manafort in the bowels of the courthouse for several hours following the hearing as they considered how to keep him protected from other inmates behind bars. He arrived about 8 p.m. at the Northern Neck Regional Jail in Warsaw, Virginia, 90 miles south of Washington.

In a tweet, President Donald Trump said the decision to revoke Manafort's bail was "tough," although he referred to it as a "sentence."

I cannot help but recall in this context the decision by Prez George W. Bush, made just under 11 years ago as reported here, to commute the entire prison sentence of I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby to spare him from having to serve his 30 month prison term after his conviction in the CIA leak case.  Notably, Prez Bush's clemency grant came down just a few hours after the DC Circuit refused to allow Libby to remain free on bail during the appeal of his conviction and sentence.  In other words, as soon as Libby was subject to spending even an hour incarcerated, Prez Bush was moved to act to keep him free.  Paul Manafort, notably, has not (yet) gotten the presidential consideration as he has now already spent one (of likely many) nights in jail without even yet having been convicted of anything.  

June 16, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

"Disclosing Prosecutorial Misconduct"

I just came across this article authored by Jason Kreag available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Prosecutorial misconduct in the form of Brady violations continues to plague the criminal justice system.  Brady misconduct represents a fundamental breakdown in the adversarial process, denying defendants a fair trial and undermining the legitimacy of the system.  Commentators have responded by proposing a range of reforms to increase Brady compliance going forward.  Yet these reforms have largely ignored the need to remedy the harms from past Brady violations.  Furthermore, these proposals focus almost entirely on the harms defendants face from prosecutors’ Brady misconduct, ignoring the harms victims, jurors, witnesses, and others endure.

This Article proposes a new remedy to supplement the current responses to Brady misconduct: the Brady Violation Disclosure Letter.  It proposes sending a concise letter documenting the misconduct to the relevant stakeholders who participated in the initial trial that was corrupted by a Brady violation.  This disclosure is a partial remedy for the range of harms Brady violations create.  It also promises to increase Brady compliance and to promote transparency in a criminal justice system that is increasingly opaque. Importantly, this proposal can be implemented immediately without adopting new rules or statutes and without expanding Brady’s exiting constitutional protections.

June 16, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 14, 2018

Sixth Circuit panel struggles to figure out Tennessee law to assess Miller challenge in high-profile case

As reported in this local article, headlined "While considering Cyntoia Brown's case, appeals court scrutinizes conflicting sentencing laws," an interesting federal circuit panel struggled during oral argument today to sort through applicable state sentencing law in an interesting Eighth Amendment habeas case. Here are the details:

A federal appeals court seems poised to consult the Tennessee Supreme Court before they rule on the case of Cyntoia Brown, a Nashville woman serving a life sentence in prison for a murder she committed at 16.  Brown's attorneys this year appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, arguing her life sentence was unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that giving juveniles life sentences without parole was cruel and unusual in most cases.

Brown, now 30, has been locked up since 2004, when she was convicted of shooting 43-year-old Nashville real estate agent Johnny Allen. Allen had picked her up at an East Nashville fast food restaurant and drove her to his home.  Prosecutors said she committed a cold blooded murder, then robbed Allen before she fled with his car. Advocates for Brown say she was a victim of child sex trafficking who feared for her life, and that her age and fetal alcohol syndrome made it impossible for her to consider the full ramifications of her actions.

Attorneys representing the state have argued the 2012 ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court does not apply in Brown's case because she is not serving a true life sentence. They cite parts of Tennessee law that suggest Brown could be eligible for release after 51 years behind bars.  The three-judge panel in Cincinnati suggested at multiple points that if she was serving a 51-year sentence, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling might not apply.

But Brown's attorneys pushed back, citing another section of the law that says "there shall be no release eligibility" for offenders convicted of first degree murder, like she was. Thorny questions on sentencing law in Tennessee dominated the debate on both sides of the oral arguments Thursday morning, which lasted less than an hour....

At multiple points, the judges read directly from contradictory passages in Tennessee code, as they tried to decipher what portions applied to Brown's case. They suggested that they might seek clarification from the Tennessee Supreme Court before moving forward.  Judge Joan L. Larsen, who was appointed by President Donald Trump, asked multiple questions about the proper way to do so.

Judge Amul Thapar, another Trump appointee, aggressively questioned the argument from state attorneys that case law had established a way to cherry pick parts of Tennessee sentencing law to apply to Brown while ignoring other parts. Thapar rubbed his face and shook his head while questioning attorneys on dueling sections of the law. "We're trying to guess what Tennessee is doing here," Thapar said, later adding, "The way I read this statute is that she's got life without the possibility of parole."

The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has already sided with the state on this issue, saying that Brown's sentence is not entirely for life.  But Brown's attorneys say the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued a conflicting ruling.

Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, who was appointed by former President George W. Bush, said she couldn't believe a Tennessee court hadn't issued a definitive ruling on the appropriate reading of the sentencing law.  Gibbons said Brown's case "raises some interesting, tricky issues."

If the panel does ask the Tennessee Supreme Court to clarify sentencing in this case, that court could decide whether or not it would offer an answer. The appeals court would then take the response into consideration while ruling on the broader case.  "Can we certify that to the Tennessee Supreme Court and ask them?" Thapar said.  "If they're ever going to answer one question that's the one to answer."...

The judges did not address the argument from Brown's attorneys that she should not be held responsible for a premeditated murder at 16 because fetal alcohol syndrome had slowed her mental development.

The pending federal appeal is one of multiple tracks Brown's attorneys are pursuing in their high-profile attempt to get her out of prison.  Brown also is asking Gov. Bill Haslam for clemency; the state parole board made conflicting recommendations to the governor after a hearing in May. Brown's previous appeals have been denied.  But a surge of interest from news outlets, celebrities and national legal groups has galvanized efforts that are unusual for a case like hers.

Brown was featured in the documentary "Me Facing Life: Cyntoia's Story" by filmmaker Dan Birman. In 2016, a joint reporting project on juvenile sentencing laws by the USA TODAY NETWORK - Tennessee, Dan H. Birman Productions and "Independent Lens" explored Brown's trial and conviction in depth.  Then, in 2017, celebrities including Rihanna and Kim Kardashian West called for Brown's release, dramatically increasing the scrutiny of the case.  On social media, the hashtag #FreeCyntoiaBrown went viral.

June 14, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 13, 2018

"The Impact of Proposition 47 on Crime and Recidivism"

ImagesThe title of this post is the title of this notable new report from the Public Policy Institute of California. Here is the report's conclusion:

Proposition 47 continues to be the subject of much debate.  The reform — which reduced penalties for certain lower-level drug and property offenses — has undoubtedly played a significant role in California’s recent efforts to prioritize the state’s prison and jail space for higher-level offenders. Prison and jail incarceration levels declined substantially under Prop 47.  We also observe sudden drops in arrests and jail bookings.

The reduced reliance on incarceration raised concerns among some observers about Prop 47’s impact on public safety. We find no convincing evidence that violent crime increased as a result of Prop 47.  Though there has been a recent uptick in violent crime, this trend appears to have started prior to the reform. Additional factors unrelated to criminal activity — a change by the FBI in 2014 that expanded the definition of rape, and significant under-reporting of violent crimes from 2008 to 2014 by the LAPD — contributed to the observed increase.  Excluding violent crime data from the LAPD shows that recent increases in violent crime rates in California were comparable to those of similar states.

Our analysis does find some evidence of Prop 47’s impact on property crime rates, which went up immediately after the law was implemented.  This increase has been primarily driven by larceny thefts, particularly thefts from motor vehicles and shoplifting.  We find the increase in the larceny theft rate in California to be nearly 9 percent higher than that of similar states. In 2016, reported shoplifting decreased notably, but we do not see signs of a reduction in thefts from motor vehicles. Considering the high costs of incarceration in California, this highlights the need for alternative crime-reducing strategies, consistent with our earlier research assessing the impact of realignment on crime (see Lofstrom and Raphael 2013).

The policy goals of Prop 47 are to reduce contact with the criminal justice system and to reduce recidivism for lower-level drug and property offenders.  Our analysis, using detailed data from 12 California counties, shows declines in jail bookings as well as rearrest and reconviction rates under Prop 47.  We find the policy change reduced jail bookings for Prop 47 offenses by more than one-third.  Prop 47 also lowered the number of people booked into jail by nearly 50,000 in these counties during the year following its passage.

Lower rearrest rates for individuals released after serving sentences for Prop 47 offenses were driven by a reduction in rearrests for drug possession, while lower reconviction rates were driven by a drop in reconvictions for both Prop 47 property and drug offenses.  We find evidence that Prop 47 reduced both arrests by law enforcement and convictions resulting from prosecutions by district attorneys.  Reduced levels of correctional contact — which may allow for better continuity of employment and improved family and community stability — could be a factor in these lower recidivism rates.  However, given the sudden and noticeable decline in arrests after the reform, we are not able to separate the effects of Prop 47 on individual reoffending behavior from its effects on the practices of criminal justice agencies.

Prop 47 aimed to reduce recidivism rates by shifting resources from incarceration to mental health and substance-use treatment for lower-level drug and property offenders.  This redirection of state correctional savings to treatment interventions has only recently been allocated, and thus our recidivism analysis does not capture individuals released after the implementation of these programs.  A complete assessment of the impacts of Prop 47 will need to account for how increased interventions may affect crime, criminal justice contact, and recidivism, as well as responses by law enforcement to the reform.

Substantial reductions in reoffending as a result of the treatment programs funded by Prop 47 savings seem unlikely as this funding represents a very small share of corrections spending in California.  However, the initiative offers opportunities for local agencies to create or expand promising programs.  It also requires that these programs be objectively evaluated, in hopes of identifying and scaling up successful interventions. As local agencies and the state learn more about which programs are effective in reducing recidivism, Prop 47 could provide a path toward the use of more cost-effective, evidence-based strategies within the criminal justice system.

One of several far-reaching corrections reforms, Prop 47 further decreased California’s reliance on incarceration: the state’s incarceration rate is now at levels not seen since the early 1990s.  Importantly, crime rates remain historically low, comparable to those in the 1960s.  While research so far has not revealed convincing evidence that violent crime has risen as a result of reforms, some property crimes have increased.  And though Prop 47 reduced recidivism rates for lower-level drug and property offenses, it is not clear to what extent this is driven by reduced reoffending, as law enforcement and prosecutorial changes likely contributed to the declines.  To counteract the increases in property crimes like shoplifting and thefts from motor vehicles — and to improve reentry outcomes of released offenders — policymakers and practitioners will need to work together to identify effective programs and policies that will reduce recidivism and maintain public safety

June 13, 2018 in National and State Crime Data, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 12, 2018

Spotlighting lower-court divides over AEDPA's savings clause and consideration of sentencing errors

At the intersection of hard-core habeas and sentencing issues is whether the so-called savings clause of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act can be used by a federal prisoner to get federal court to hear a claim of sentencing error.  The Fourth Circuit yesterday, via this order, refused to reconsider en banc its pro-access ruling on this matter in US v. Wheeler, and two judges wrote separately to spotlight what is at stake.  First, a "Statement of Circuit Judge Agee respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc" starts this way:

The issues in this case are of significant national importance and are best considered by the Supreme Court at the earliest possible date in order to resolve an existing circuit split that the panel decision broadens even farther.  Because of the potential that the case may become moot if Wheeler is released from incarceration in October 2019, as projected, I have not requested a poll of the Court upon the petition for rehearing en banc in order to expedite the path for the Government to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

The opinion in this case casts 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) in a way that rewrites the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) — a valid congressional act that falls squarely within Congress’ power to define the scope of the writ.  As a consequence, federal prisoners who are detained in this Circuit pursuant to a valid and final criminal judgment may evade the careful limitations placed by Congress upon the writ of habeas corpus in § 2255(h) and, most likely, § 2255(f) as well.  These prisoners may now file § 2241 petitions challenging their sentences whenever circuit court precedent changes, so long as a given majority decides the change created a fundamental sentencing defect. Among the circuits that have addressed the question of the reach of the § 2255(e) saving clause, we stand alone in this most expansive view.

Only two circuits permit a sentencing-based claim to proceed via the saving clause: the Sixth and Seventh.  Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591 (6th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013).  The opinion here relies on these cases in error, however, because none gives the expansive reference to “fundamental defect” that is put forth here. In short, even those few circuits that have opened the saving clause portal to sentencing-based claims have only opened it wide enough to allow for a claim that the prisoner is being, or at some point will be, detained by the warden beyond the time legally authorized by Congress for his offense of conviction.

Second, a "Statement of Judge Thacker on Petition for Rehearing En Banc" starts this way:

When this court decided United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc), and rendered it retroactive in Miller v. United States, 735 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 2013), it became clear that the mandatory minimum for Gerald Wheeler’s sentence was double what it should have been.  But Wheeler was left with a conundrum -- how could he test the legality of his detention?  He had already filed a direct appeal and motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and he could not meet the requirements to file a second or successive motion because his mandatory minimum was not increased by a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court.  See § 2255(h)(2).  Yet he was nonetheless sentenced under the mistaken understanding that ten years was as low as the sentencing court could go. Indeed, that was precisely the sentence he received.  The district court recognized this sentence was “harsh,” but believed that its “hands [we]re . . . tied.” J.A. 85.

The savings clause, set forth in § 2255(e), allows a court to entertain a traditional § 2241 petition for habeas corpus if “the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.”  This circuit, see In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000), as well as nine other circuits, interpret the savings clause to provide an opportunity for prisoners to demonstrate they are being held under an erroneous application or interpretation of statutory law.  Two circuits, however, read the clause so narrowly that the savings clause may only be satisfied under the limited circumstances when the sentencing court is unavailable, “practical considerations” prevent the prisoner from filing a motion to vacate, or a prisoner’s claim concerns “the execution of his sentence.” McCarthan v. Director of Goodwill Indus., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092–93 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 587–88 (10th Cir. 2011).

To adopt the minority view and deny Wheeler the chance to test the legality of his detention under the circumstances at hand would fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s pronouncement that “the privilege of habeas corpus entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to ‘the erroneous application or interpretation’ of relevant law.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 779 (2008) (quoting INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 302 (2001)).

I am inclined to predict that this issue, if not this case, will be taken up by SCOTUS relatively soon. But I have said this and been wrong before, so maybe I will be blogging in six months saying, "Hey, I was wrong." But I don’t know that I'll ever admit that, but I'll find some kind of an excuse for why my SCOTUS prediction was off.

June 12, 2018 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, June 11, 2018

"Trump asks for clemency names and lists promptly arrive at White House"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new article in the Washington Examiner.  Here are excerpts (with one line stressed for commentary):

President Trump told reporters Friday that he wanted to give clemency to more people treated unfairly by the legal system, particularly cases involving people like Alice Johnson, who he released from a life sentence for drug dealing at the request of Kim Kardashian West.  "I want to do people that are unfairly treated like an Alice," he said before boarding a Marine helicopter on the South Lawn of the White House. Hours later, lists of additional names were hand-delivered to the West Wing.

White House counsel Don McGahn and presidential adviser and son-in-law Jared Kushner sat down for separate meetings with a right-leaning policy advocate who handed them lists of dozens of inmates serving long sentences, according to a person involved in the discussions.

McGahn invited the advocate about a week earlier, requesting names, and seemed to react favorably to the case of Chris Young, a 30-year-old from Tennessee with a life sentence since age 22 for a drug conspiracy, the source said. The sentencing judge called Young's penalty "way out of whack," but said he had no choice.

Young’s name was supplied to the advocate by his attorney Brittany Barnett, who also represented Johnson. Dozens of additional names were supplied by the CAN-DO Foundation, which championed Johnson, as well as Families Against Mandatory Minimums. Topping a list of 20 marijuana inmates assembled by CAN-DO were Michael Pelletier and John Knock, who are serving life sentences for smuggling marijuana and unsuccessfully requested clemency from former President Barack Obama.

Pelletier, a paralyzed inmate, received a life sentence for smuggling pot from Canada into Maine, jurisdictions where the drug is now legal or soon will be. Knock’s sentence inspired his sister Beth Curtis to create the advocacy website LifeforPot.com documenting similar cases. "I will die in prison if President Trump does not commute my sentence," Pelletier recently told the Washington Examiner. "Sometimes, I wonder if I'm dead already because I'm living in hell.”

A list of 17 women and six men prepared by CAN-DO was topped by drug-conspiracy convict Michelle West and mail-fraud inmate Connie Farris, women who recently expressed optimism about Trump’s clemency moves, saying they hoped to rejoin their families....

The advocate who brought lists to the White House received the impression that officials may be considering setting up an internal clemency commission to circumvent or supplement the work of the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon Attorney.

In his remarks Friday morning, Trump claimed he was reviewing 3,000 names of clemency aspirants and invited football players who claim unfairness in the legal system to submit more names.  It’s unclear if Trump actually has a list of 3,000 names.  It’s possible he was referring to the about 3,000 clemency applications — for pardons and commutations combined — that the Office of the Pardon Attorney received during his administration.  But the OPA, which clemency advocates consider slow and biased, has about 11,000 open cases that rolled over from Obama.

Although Trump referred to a clemency-reviewing “committee” on Friday, a White House official said that clemency petitions currently are being reviewed through the standard process, featuring the pardon attorney's office. There's some indication that's the case. Before Trump issued his second pardon to former Navy sailor Kristian Saucier, for example, the OPA abruptly reopened Saucier's case and sent him a detailed personal questionnaire.

“The White House will continue to review pardons and make decisions on a rolling basis,” the official said. “The White House and the Department of Justice receives thousands of clemency applications per year. The Office of the Pardon Attorney at the Department of Justice and the Deputy Attorney General review these applications in order to make recommendations to the White House on potential pardons."...

Amy Povah, the leader of the CAN-Do Foundation, said she’s pleased with Trump’s recent emphasis on clemency. So far, Trump has issued two prison commutations and five pardons, but the quickening pace is giving aspirants hope. “I have always felt that President Trump would be interested in clemency if he understood the fundamental problem with the Office of the Pardon Attorney being controlled by DOJ,” Povah said. “It's a conflict of interest for DOJ to have final say, which is why some of the best cases never made it to the White House during the Obama administration, like Alice Johnson.”

Margaret Love, who served as U.S. pardon attorney between 1990 and 1997, said she’s also optimistic. “It’s great news that the president may be interested in considering additional cases involving harsh prison sentences,” Love told the Washington Examiner. “President Obama’s clemency program was a good start but he left many deserving cases behind.”

As regular readers may recall, way back in 2010, I urged Prez Obama to structurally change the federal clemency system in this this law review article titled "Turning Hope-and-Change Talk Into Clemency Action for Nonviolent Drug Offenders."  I that article I suggested, as a number of commentators have, that the President set up some kind of "Clemency Commission" that would be apart from the work and workings of the Justice Department.  It seems that Prez Obama did not really heed my clemency commission advice (though he ended up doing some good clemency work at the very tail end of his Presidency).  Here is hoping maybe Prez Trump will engineer some needed structural changes. 

A few of many recent related posts about recent Trumpian clemency activity:

June 11, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

SCOTUS keeps us waiting on remaining big (and little) criminal justice cases

The Supreme Court issued a new order list and opinions in four argued cases this morning, but this activity carried little of interest for criminal justice fans.  There were no grants of certiorari on the order list, though there were, unsurprisingly, a handful of cases in which the judgment was "vacated, and the case is remanded ... for further consideration in light of Hughes v. United States."  Hughes, readers should recall, was the case decided last week (discussed here and here) in which the Court embraced a broadened interpretation of who is eligible for sentence modification under retroactive guideline reductions in certain plea settings.

Lacking a new SCOTUS case to review, I figured it might be useful to review the still-pending SCOTUS cases that should be of interest to criminal justice fans.  SCOTUSblog is reporting that the Court has already announced an added decision day for this coming Thursday, so some of these cases might be decided before the end of this week.  And all should be resolved over the next few weeks.  I believe there are a total of 21 SCOTUS cases outstanding, with these on the criminal side of the docket (links and descriptions via SCOTUSblog):

Carpenter v. United States: Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cellphone records revealing the location and movements of a cellphone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by the Fourth Amendment.

Currier v. Virginia: Whether a defendant who consents to severance of multiple charges into sequential trials loses his right under the double jeopardy clause to the issue-preclusive effect of an acquittal.

Rosales-Mireles v. United States: Whether, in order to meet the standard for plain error review set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. Olano that "[t]he Court of Appeals should correct a plain forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,’” it is necessary, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit required, that the error be one that “would shock the conscience of the common man, serve as a powerful indictment against our system of justice, or seriously call into question the competence or integrity of the district judge.”

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, Florida: Whether the existence of probable cause defeats a First Amendment retaliatory-arrest claim as a matter of law.

Chavez-Meza v. United States: Whether, when a district court decides not to grant a proportional sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), it must provide some explanation for its decision when the reasons are not otherwise apparent from the record, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th, 8th, 9th and 11th Circuits have held, or whether it can issue its decision without any explanation so long as it is issued on a preprinted form order containing the boilerplate language providing that the court has “tak[en] into account the policy statement set forth in 18 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 and the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), to the extent that they are applicable,” as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 5th and 10th Circuits have held.

So, roughly speaking, about a quarter of the cases still on the docket involve criminal justice matters.  The real big one of this bunch, of course, is Carpenter; that case has been identified as a potential Fourth Amendment "game changer" even before a cert petition was filed in this case nearly two years ago.  And if sentencing fans are looking for a "sleeper" among this quintet, I am inclined to nominate Chavez-Meza.  Though I am not expecting or predicting a major opinion in Chavez-Meza, the Justices could directly or indirectly jolt federal sentencing procedure and practice if it happened to say something consequential about the preferred form or substance of sentencing explanations for district courts.  (Notably, I might be inclined to predict something significant in Chavez-Meza if Justice Gorsuch was involved in this case, but on this one he is recused because the case comes from the Tenth Circuit.)

June 11, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, June 10, 2018

Former US Pardon Attorney explains why "Trump’s pardons are really not out of the ordinary"

Margaret Colgate Love, who served as U.S. pardon attorney from 1990 to 1997, has this terrific recent Washington Post piece headlined "Trump’s pardons really aren’t out of the ordinary." Here is how it starts and ends:

President Trump’s newfound enthusiasm for his pardon power has evoked consternation among his critics, in part because he appears to have bypassed the Justice Department’s pardon advisory program.  But having managed that program for almost a decade during the first Bush and Clinton administrations, and represented applicants for pardon and sentence commutation in the 20 years since, I find much of this criticism unwarranted.

There is nothing surprising or necessarily alarming about Trump’s embrace of this broad executive power — even if it has been unconventional.  His grants to date, at least as he explains them, represent a classic and justifiable use of the pardon power to draw attention to injustice and inefficiency in the law.  While many may disagree with the president’s choices, each of them speaks to some widely acknowledged dysfunction in the criminal-justice system.

Moreover, each of his grants has some precedent in recent pardon practice. His most recent grant, to Alice Marie Johnson, a woman serving a life sentence for involvement in drug trafficking, carries on President Barack Obama’s program of sentence commutations. Even his pardon of former Maricopa County, Ariz., sheriff Joe Arpaio last summer echoes President Ronald Reagan’s decision to fulfill a campaign promise by preemptivelypardoning two FBI officials who had approved illegal surveillance of domestic terrorists.

In sum, Trump’s grants to date send a message that business as usual in the criminal-justice system will not be tolerated.  That is how the pardon power was designed to work by the framers of the Constitution.

But while Trump’s pardons are hardly unique, the process that produced them is troublesome.  Trump appears to be relying exclusively on random, unofficial sources of information and advice to select the lucky beneficiaries of his official mercy.  This makes a mockery of the pardon power’s historical operation as part of the justice system, manifested by its administration by the Justice Department since the Civil War.  President Bill Clinton similarly avoided the ordinary pardon review process at the end of his presidency, depriving his grants of legitimacy and threatening long-term damage to his reputation....

As a [reform] model, the federal government might consider Delaware’s clemency system, in which an official board chaired by the lieutenant governor serves as gatekeeper to the governor’s pardon power. This board and its small staff have produced hundreds of recommendations each year, mostly accepted by the governor.  Significantly, the Delaware attorney general’s role is strictly one of an advocate.

While the president’s pardoning options could not be limited without a constitutional amendment, the many practical and political virtues of a Delaware-like management system should encourage presidential compliance.  Congress might even offer a record-sealing benefit for cases that go through the regular process, as South Dakota’s legislature did several years ago after hundreds of “secret” gubernatorial pardons came to light.  This would not only lend greater credibility to specific grants but could also allow pardons to play a more effective role in regulating the operation of the justice system and encouraging law reform.

There are many reasons to be guardedly grateful that Trump has taken an interest in this time-honored constitutional power.  But now we must encourage him to use it more responsibly for the benefit of those who have no friends in high places, if not for the benefit of his own legacy.

A few of many recent related posts about recent Trumpian clemency activity:

June 10, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, June 08, 2018

ACLU brings novel lawsuit against Kansas DA for failing to disclose diversion options to defendants

Late last year, the ACLU of Kansas last year produced this report titled "Choosing Incarceration" lamenting that prosecutors in Kansas often sought incarceration over available diversion programs.  Now, as details in this press release, the ACLU has taken its complaints to court:

The American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Kansas filed a lawsuit today on behalf of a faith-based organization against a county prosecutor for failing to implement diversion programs in accordance with Kansas law and for pursuing the expensive and disproportionately harsh prosecution of individuals posing minimal community risks.

The lawsuit was filed today in the Kansas Supreme Court against Montgomery County Attorney Larry Markle. At a time when Kansas prisons have swelled beyond capacity, costing taxpayers millions of dollars, Markle and Montgomery County drastically underutilize diversion compared to the national and state average, despite the fact that diversion programs that allow defendants to seek incarceration alternatives such as treatment, community service, or restitution have proven financial and social benefits.

“These programs are essential to establish a rehabilitative rather than punitive criminal justice system,” said Somil Trivedi, staff attorney with the ACLU’s Trone Center for Justice. “Ignoring the legal requirements to provide notice to defendants of the existence of these programs, and to not discuss these options with those who qualify, is against the law. We’re taking action in Kansas to send a message to prosecutors that it’s their obligation to uphold the law and serve their community, not just rack up as many convictions as they can.”

Markle’s failure to follow Kansas diversion law negatively impacted the work the Kansas Crossroads Foundation, a faith-based organization that provides drug rehabilitation and economic development services to Wilson and Montgomery County defendants convicted of drug offenses. Since many KCF clients were likely not given the opportunity to apply for diversion, KCF has had to divert critical resources away from rehabilitation programs to conduct jail counseling sessions and help defendants comply with the terms of their probation or parole....

Following efforts in New Orleans and Orange County, California, today’s lawsuit is the third the ACLU has filed against active district attorneys since October as a part of nationwide efforts to reform prosecutorial practices nationwide.

The complain in his matter is available at this link.  

June 8, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, June 06, 2018

Reviewing the Supreme Court's work in sentence modification cases of Hughes and Koons

So much of interest has already happened this week, I almost forgot that on Monday the Supreme Court resolved two of the most notable sentencing cases on its docket this Term.  (Sentencing fans still have Rosales-Mireles v. United States on plain error review of sentencing errors and Chavez-Meza v. United States on required sentencing explanations to keep our interest the next few Mondays.)  Helpfully, I have seen on line a few reviews and round-ups of Hughes and Koons, and I figured it would be useful to link here:

June 6, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 05, 2018

"Open Roads and Overflowing Jails: Addressing High Rates of Rural Pretrial Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new report authored by Marc Levin and Michael Haugen. Here is its executive summary:

The axiom that a person is considered innocent of a criminal act until he or she has been proven guilty is a bedrock principle of the American criminal justice system.  Yet in many jurisdictions, it appears to have been forgotten. The pretrial population of defendants has significantly increased — particularly in rural areas of the country. Jails in smaller jurisdictions are responsible for an outsized share of jail population growth.  Indeed, from 1970 to 2014, jail populations grew by almost sevenfold in small counties but only threefold in large counties.

This paper explores why this growth may have occurred and makes numerous recommendations to reduce pretrial populations, particularly in rural America.  The first place to start is by reducing the number of offenses carrying the potential for arrest and jail time — the overcriminalization of our society must be reversed.  The next step is to restore our historical commitment to individual liberty and the presumption of innocence by following these five guiding principles of pretrial justice policy:

•  There should be a presumption of pretrial release without conditions or cash bond, grounded in the American maxim that people are innocent until proven guilty.

•  Conditions of release, if any, should be the least restrictive to ensure public safety and appearance at trial.

•  Courts — after due process — should have the authority to deny bail in the most serious cases involving highly dangerous defendants after determining that a compelling government interest exists and there are no possible conditions under which the defendant could be released that would reasonably protect public safety and ensure re-appearance.

•  The burden should be on the state to prove the need for conditions of release or denial of bond in an adversarial proceeding where the accused is present.

•  Individual judicial consideration should be required for each accused.

For a host of reasons, ranging from limited resources to dispersed populations, addressing pretrial incarceration in rural areas is a particularly complex undertaking.  Also, there are many moving parts to implementing changes in a deliberate manner that produce sustainable results without unintended consequences.  Ultimately, as rural communities across the country take many different paths to addressing the meteoric rise in rural pretrial incarceration over the last few decades, they must not lose sight of the destination: a constitutional system that produces greater public safety with less collateral damage.

June 5, 2018 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Guest post: "The Eleventh Circuit’s Take On Handling The Wave of Dimaya-Related Litigation"

6a00d83451574769e201b7c9134b4d970b-320wiA helpful reader alerted me to an order recently issued by the Eleventh Circuit concerning how it wished to handle prisoner litigation in the wake of the Supreme Court's big recent Dimaya vagueness ruling.  In response, I reached out to the academic rock-star who comes to mind in conjunction with federal habeas litigation, Leah Litman, as she was kind enough to write up this terrific guest post:

In the wake of Sessions v. Dimaya, at least one court of appeals has changed its practice from the post-Johnson days, and happily so.  Even better, that court is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.

By way of background: Dimaya, like Johnson before it, immediately precipitated a wave of resentencing requests by prisoners seeing to have their sentences corrected in light of the decision. Some of these prisoners were sentenced under statutes that incorporate section 16(b); others were sentenced under statutes that merely resemble section 16(b) (sometimes resembling section 16(b) in every possible way, such as section 924(c)).  Some of these prisoners are seeking to file their first section 2255 motion; others seeking permission to file a second or successive section 2255 motion. 

In a post for the Harvard Law Review blog, I wrote about some of the obstacles that prisoners in these situations will face.  Prisoners seeking to file second or successive 2255 motions face significantly more obstacles than prisoners seeking to file their initial section 2255 motions.  For example, prisoners seeking to file second or successive 2255 motions have to obtain authorization from a court of appeals before they can file in the district court.  And to obtain that authorization, prisoners have to show not only that the decision on which they are relying is retroactive, but that the Supreme Court has made it retroactive.  By contrast, prisoners seeking to file their initial section 2255 motions have to show only that the decision on which they are relying is retroactive.   

In the post-Johnson litigation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit adopted an approach under which it would adjudicate all section 2255 motions relying on Johnson.  It maintained that approach even after the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Welch to decide whether Johnson is retroactive (the Court likely granted certiorari in Welch just to make Johnson retroactive).  It also maintained that same approach after the Court granted certiorari in Beckles to decide whether an analogous provision in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines was also unconstitutionally void for vagueness.

The Eleventh Circuit’s case-management decision was fairly high stakes, as I explained in this essay in the Northwestern Law Review with Shakeer Rahman and in this Take Care post with Lark Turner.  For one thing, processing defendant’s initial section 2255 motions would push defendants’ cases toward second or successive 2255 motions, at which the obstacles to recovery would be greater.  Processing so many section 2255 motions in short order also risked losing cases in the fray, particularly given that defendants have no constitutional right to counsel in their section 2255 motions.  Moreover, the Eleventh Circuit had also interpreted section 2244 to require it to dismiss any claim in a second or successive 2255 motion that had been presented in a previous petition.   The Eleventh Circuit’s practice was also contrary to the other circuits:  In In re Embry, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a decision by Judge Sutton, explained why holding cases in abeyance of Beckles made the most sense.  Other courts of appeals did the same.

In the wake of Dimaya, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has brought its practices into line with other circuits.  The Eleventh Circuit issued an order (“General Order 43”) in which it ordered all second or successive 2255 motions involving section 924(c) to be held in abeyance for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Ovalles v. United States.  The Eleventh Circuit took Ovalles en banc to decide whether section 924(c) is unconstitutionally void for vagueness in light of Dimaya (the court ordered briefing on whether courts must use the categorical approach to interpret section 924(c), but General Order 43 recognizes the court will decide the constitutionality of section 924(c) as part of the case).   Thus, Ovalles is to Dimaya as Beckles was to Johnson:  Both cases will or would decide whether an analogous provision is unconstitutionally vague in light of the preceding Supreme Court decision.  But whereas the Eleventh Circuit refused to hold cases in abeyance for Beckles, it is doing so for Ovalles.

I am not exactly optimistic that the Eleventh Circuit is going to invalidate section 924(c) in light of Dimaya.  I think the Eleventh Circuit is likely to hold that courts need not use the categorical approach when interpreting section 924(c), and distinguish section 924(c) from 16(b) on that basis.

Nonetheless, I think a rare kudos is appropriate here for the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in General Order 43.  By electing to hold cases for Ovalles, the Eleventh Circuit is avoiding unnecessary duplication in litigation, which would waste everyone’s (the courts, public defenders, and litigants) time.  It is also avoiding generating a slew of unfavorable precedents for defendants:  In the wake of Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit disposed of many Guidelines cases by holding that the defendant’s prior convictions qualified as violent felonies under the enumerated offense or element of force clauses, even assuming the Guideline’s residual clause was vague.   Doing so ensured that the court’s decisions would be insulated from having to go through another round of review in the event the Supreme Court ultimately held the Guideline unconstitutionally vague.  But it also generated a ton of unfavorable precedent to the defendants, without argument and even without full briefing, given that that is how courts of appeals dispose of requests to file second or successive motions.  By changing course and holding cases for Ovalles, the Eleventh Circuit is avoiding repeating the same error.  And that’s something, these days.

June 5, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)