Thursday, April 23, 2015

Senate finally votes on AG nominee and confirms Loretta Lynch by vote of 56 to 43

The GOP has finally succeeded in getting Attorney General Eric Holder out of his job by finally allowing the full Senate to vote on his nominated successor, Loretta Lynch.  This New York Times article provides more of the details, and starts this way:

After one of the nation’s most protracted cabinet-level confirmation delays, the Senate Thursday approved Loretta Lynch to be attorney general. She is the first African-American woman to hold the position.

Ms. Lynch, the United States attorney for the Eastern District of New York, was confirmed 56 to 43.

Her confirmation took longer than that for all but two other nominees for the office: Edward Meese III, who was nominated by President Ronald Reagan, and A. Mitchell Palmer, who was picked by President Woodrow Wilson, according to the Congressional Research Service.

Republicans have found themselves in a quandary for months. They longed to replace Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr., and they agreed that Ms. Lynch was qualified for the job. But they opposed her because Ms. Lynch defended President Obama’s executive actions on immigration.

What’s more, Senator Mitch McConnell, Republican of Kentucky and majority leader, had held up the nomination until the Senate voted on a human trafficking bill, a process that dragged on for weeks. The measure passed on Wednesday by a vote of 99 to 0. And some Republicans continued to strongly oppose Ms. Lynch. “We do not have to confirm someone to the highest law enforcement position in America if that someone has committed to denigrating Congress,” Senator Jeff Sessions, Republican of Alabama, said on the Senate floor Thursday. “We don’t need to be apologetic about it, colleagues.”

In the end several Republicans — to the surprise of many of their own colleagues — voted aye for Ms. Lynch, including Mr. McConnell.

Some conservative groups had called on Senate Republicans to block a vote on Ms. Lynch altogether because of her stance on the president’s immigration policies. Many Senate Republicans feared the party would face serious political repercussions if it blocked an African-American woman with strong credentials and enthusiastic support from many in law enforcement.

Opponents still forced a procedural vote before her final confirmation, an unusual requirement for such a high position. The nomination moved along easily, by a vote of 66 to 34.

April 23, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Tuesday, April 21, 2015

"Residual Impact: Resentencing Implications of Johnson v. United States’ Potential Ruling on ACCA’s Constitutionality"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new and timely paper concerning the potential impact of the Supreme Court case re-argued yesterday.  The piece is authored by Leah Litman, and here is the abstract:

This Essay examines the impact a favorable decision in Johnson v. United States could have at the various stages of post-conviction relief for three categories of prisoners -- prisoners whose convictions have not yet become final; prisoners whose convictions have become final but who have not yet filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief; and prisoners whose convictions have become final and who have already filed at least one petition seeking post-conviction relief.  In doing so, it offers a reading of the relevant cases and statutes that permits any defendant sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act to obtain relief based on a decision invalidating the residual clause.  It also highlights some under-explored statutes and doctrinal questions that courts will confront as they determine which prisoners should be resentenced in light of Johnson.

April 21, 2015 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

"What's the Matter with Cumulative Error?: Killing a Federal Claim in Order to Save It"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper concerning federal habeas review authored by Ryan Semerad now available via SSRN. (For the record, Ryan happens to be one of (many) wonderful students in my sentencing class this spring, but I am pretty sure he hd finished most of this article before I started polluting his mind.). Here is the abstract:

This Note investigates the inefficacy of cumulative error claims raised by state death row inmates in their federal habeas corpus petitions. It surveys modern federal habeas precedents giving rise to cumulative error claims, investigates the various circuit standards used in evaluating these claims, and concludes that these claims fail due to the confluence of vague historical precedent and increasingly restrictive federal habeas law. It recommends constructing a mandatory pre-federal habeas review procedure wherein claims of cumulative error are evaluated on the merits by all the stakeholders in the state criminal justice systems in order to ensure the integrity of that system and the reliability of criminal convictions and sentences. 

April 21, 2015 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

By 6-3 vote, SCOTUS finds Fourth Amendment violation from stop at start of federal drug prosecution

The US Supreme Court handed down a notable Fourth Amendment ruling this morning in Rodriguez v. US, No. 13-9972 (S. Ct. April 21, 2015) (available here).  Though not a sentencing case, I cannot help but wonder if some votes on the case were somewhat influenced by the federal drug war setting that raised the import and stakes for the Fourth Amendment issue brought to the Justices.  Here, for starters, is the start of this Court's opinion per Justice Ginsburg:

In Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405 (2005), this Court held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful traffic stop does not violate the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable seizures. This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop. We hold that a police stop exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitu­tion’s shield against unreasonable seizures.  A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, there­ fore, “become[s] unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission” of issuing a ticket for the violation. Id., at 407.  The Court so recog­nized in Caballes, and we adhere to the line drawn in that decision.

Notably, this federal criminal case started with a seemingly routine traffic stop based on a Nebraska driver veering to avoid a pothole and ended with a federal drug prosecution requiring the defendant to serve a mandatory minimum 5-year federal prison term for possessing 50 or more grams of meth with intent to distribute. I cannot help but think these contextual realities played some (perhaps unconscious) role in a majority of the Justices concluding that the extension of the traffic stop was unconstitutional with this kind of statement: "Highway and officer safety are interests different in kind from the Government’s endeavor to de­tect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular."

Here is how the primary dissent by Justice Thomas in Rodriguez gets started:

Ten years ago, we explained that “conducting a dog sniff [does] not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reason- able manner.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U. S. 405, 408 (2005).  The only question here is whether an officer executed a stop in a reasonable manner when he waited to conduct a dog sniff until after he had given the driver a written warning and a backup unit had arrived, bringing the overall duration of the stop to 29 minutes.  Because the stop was reasonably executed, no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.  The Court’s holding to the contrary cannot be reconciled with our decision in Caballes or a number of common police practices.  It was also unnecessary, as the officer possessed reasonable suspicion to continue to hold the driver to conduct the dog sniff.  I respectfully dissent.

Here is how a distinct dissent by Justice Alito in Rodriguez gets started:

This is an unnecessary, impractical, and arbitrary decision.  It addresses a purely hypothetical question: whether the traffic stop in this case would be unreasonable if the police officer, prior to leading a drug-sniffing dog around the exterior of petitioner’s car, did not already have reasonable suspicion that the car contained drugs.  In fact, however, the police officer did have reasonable suspicion, and, as a result, the officer was justified in detaining the occupants for the short period of time (seven or eight minutes) that is at issue.

April 21, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

Monday, April 20, 2015

Anyone have predictions for the penalty phase of the Boston Marathon bombing trial?

As highlighted by this new AP article, headlined "Bombing trial enters penalty phase amid life or death debate,"the real legal intrigue surrounding the capital trial of the Boston Marathon bombing is about to begin:

The guilt phase of Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev's trial was considered a slam dunk for prosecutors, especially after his lawyers bluntly admitted during opening statements that he participated in the deadly 2013 attack. But the outcome of the next phase of the trial is much more difficult to predict. The same jury must decide whether Tsarnaev, 21, should be put to death or spend the rest of his life in prison. The penalty phase begins Tuesday in U.S. District Court.

Debate over whether Tsarnaev should get the death penalty intensified recently after the parents of Martin Richard, an 8-year-old boy who was killed in the bombings, urged federal authorities to consider taking death off the table in exchange for Tsarnaev spending the rest of his life in prison and giving up his rights to appeal....

A married couple who lost limbs in the attack also asked the U.S. Justice Department not to pursue the death penalty. "If there is anyone who deserves the ultimate punishment, it is the defendant. However, we must overcome the impulse for vengeance," Jessica Kensky and Patrick Downes said in a statement to the Globe Sunday....

Others have said they favor the death penalty for Tsarnaev. Liz Norden, whose two adult sons each lost a leg in the bombings, said nothing short of execution is warranted. "He destroyed so many families that day," she said. "I want the ultimate justice."

Legal experts differ on whether the pleas from victims will persuade the federal government to drop its bid for the death penalty. "If the Justice Department seriously takes into consideration the feelings of the family members in this case, they have every justification to take death off the table," said Robert Dunham, executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center.

But New York Law School professor Robert Blecker said the Justice Department has to consider the larger question of denouncing terrorism. "They'll go forward with it. It will not change the decision. Denunciation is a legitimate purpose," Blecker said....

During the penalty phase, the defense will continue to portray Tsarnaev's brother, Tamerlan, 26, as a domineering follower of radical Islam who convinced his then 19-year-old brother that America had to be punished for its wars in Muslim countries. Tamerlan died four days after the bombings when he was shot during a firefight with police and run over by Dzhokhar during a getaway attempt.

Prosecutors are expected to emphasize the brutality of the bombings by calling more survivors to testify. During the first phase, several survivors testified about devastating injuries, including lost limbs....

If even one juror votes against the death penalty, Tsarnaev will get a life sentence.

April 20, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

"Local Cook County Prosecutors To Focus On Treatment Over Prison For Small-Time Drug Cases"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable local news story emerging today from Chicago.  Here are the details:

Cook County prosecutors were set to announce major changes in how they prosecute low-level drug cases, including sending more nonviolent drug offenders to treatment, rather than prison.

State’s Attorney Anita Alvarez was scheduled to announce reforms to how her office handles minor drug cases, including dismissal of all future misdemeanor marijuana cases. The move also is expected to cover how prosecutors handle cases involving small amounts of other drugs; including ecstasy, cocaine, and heroin. The program would be focused on defendants with less than three arrests or citations for misdemeanor drug charges.

The announcement comes on April 20, also known as “4-20” day, in reference to a term used by marijuana smokers as slang for “lighting up,” but officials said the timing of the announcement and the date were only coincidental.

Alvarez was expected to detail the new drug prosecution strategy Monday morning, as part of an effort to keep nonviolent repeat drug offenders out of jail, and instead treat such cases as a public health issue. A spokeswoman for Alvarez’s office said, defendants currently facing a Class 4 felony drug possession charge could be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison, and a $25,000 fine. Her proposed changes to drug prosecutions would mean those same defendants would be sent to treatment programs instead of prison.

The move could free up prosecutor and law enforcement resources. In Cook County, such Class 4 felony drug cases made up 25 percent of all felony prosecutions last year. It was not immediately clear when the reforms would go into effect, but the changes would not affect pending cases already in the system.

April 20, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Sunday, April 19, 2015

After mistrial and plea deal, prominent accused child molestor in Delaware gets probation sentence

As noted in this recent post, there has been considerable controversy in California over a state judge earlier this month sentencing a teenager who pleaded guilty to a single child sex offense to "only" 10 years of imprisonment, a term well below the applicable 25-year mandatory minimum statutory sentencing term.  (Bill Otis here at Crime & Consequences also complained about the judge's sentencing decision California case).  With that recent case in mind, a notable contrast in context and outcomes emerges from this child sex offense story from Delaware.  Here are the dynamic details (with a few bits of the story highlighted for subsequent comment):

Eric Bodenweiser — once a standardbearer of the Sussex County tea party, described by voter after voter in 2012 as a trustworthy Christian man — was sentenced to one year of probation Friday for committing two acts of unlawful sexual contact against a young boy in the 1980s.  A judge sentenced Bodenweiser to a year in prison, but suspended it in lieu of the probation term.  If Bodenweiser obeys the conditions of probation, he will not return to confinement. He must also register as a Tier 1 sex offender....

The sentence for Bodenweiser, 56, of Georgetown closes a scandalous chapter in Sussex politics.  But for his indictment on more than 100 sex offenses in October 2012, Bodenweiser would likely be a state senator today, and not a sex offender.  He had handily beaten an incumbent Republican senator in the September 2012 GOP primary in a district Democrats weren't likely to win.  Days before his arrest, he abandoned his campaign.

Bodenweiser pleaded not guilty, and after a weeks-long trial in 2014, a jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on any one of 15 counts prosecutors brought in front of them.  After the mistrial, Bodenweiser convinced Bradley any fair retrial would have to happen outside Sussex County because of the case's intense publicity and news coverage.

Prosecutors struggled, meanwhile, to keep the victim out of trouble.  The man, who was in middle school when Bodenweiser was in his early 20s, lost his temper more than once on the stand under caustic questioning from Bodenweiser's attorney, Joe Hurley.  And after the first trial ended, he was charged by Delaware State Police with a gun offense.

But before a second trial began, Bodenweiser accepted a plea offer from prosecutors on March 18, pleading no contest to two less serious crimes with the knowledge it meant a guilty verdict.

The victim, now in his late 30s, testified that repeated sexual advances and assaults by Bodenweiser affected him deeply.  "I couldn't understand why it kept happening and why he wanted me to do these things," the man said last year in court.  "I thought something was wrong with me." He came forward after years of silence, he testified, because he was alarmed Bodenweiser was about to win the election.

At his trial, Bodenweiser was charged with but ultimately not convicted of raping the victim, forcing him to take part in complete sex acts.  That, though, is not what he pleaded no contest to in March; his pleas were for the lesser offenses of unlawful sexual contact, of "touching the genitalia" of the boy, as prosecutor John Donahue said in court.

Bodenweiser took the stand at trial to deny exposing the boy to anything more salacious than an occasional glimpse of pornography.  His pastor, though, testified that in the fall of 2012, Bodenweiser told him "there's something there, there," in the context of discussing the accusations. Hurley fought hard, court records show, to have the pastor's testimony excluded from trial.

In my discussion of the California sex offense sentencing case over at Crime & Consequences, I stressed that I am generally more concerned about prosecutorial discretion than judicial discretion because of how opaque and consequential prosecutorial discretion can be.  In this case, I cannot help but wonder if politics played a role in the timing of the prosecutorial decision to indict a up-and-coming outsider politician for over 100 sex offenses that allegedly took place 25 years earlier.  Notably, the defendant had his political career ruined just by the prosecutorial decision to indict on so many salacious charges.

Despite his career being ruined just by the charges, the defendant here exercised his right to require the prosecution to prove up its case in a public trial.  Once a public open trial was required, prosecutors apparently decided only to seek to prove up 15 of the 100+ alleged offenses, which makes me further question the evidentiary basis for the 100+ charges in the initial indictment.  And even with only its 15 strongest charges now in play, the prosecutors could not convince a jury that the defendant as guilty of a single charged offense.

Thereafter, perhaps because prosecutors finally realized how weak their case was now that it was subject to public review and scrutiny, prosecutors decided they could be content with the defendant getting sentenced to probation for what they previously alleged was 100+ sex offenders.  But still eager to have this defendant forever officially branded a sex offender, the prosecutors sought to cut the defendant a deal he could apparently thought unwise to refuse.

I am not asserting that state prosecutors here did anything wrong in the way they handled this notable child sex offense case. What I am saying is that I would like a whole lot more information about how and why state prosecutors did what they did.  But, to my knowledge, there are no ready means for me or anyone else in the general public to get more information or understanding about what may have (and have not) influences prosecutorial decision-making in this matter.

April 19, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Friday, April 17, 2015

Parent of Boston bombers' young victims: "To end the anguish, drop the death penalty"

Richard-right1The title of this post is drawn from the headline of this remarkable new Boston Globe commentary authored by Bill and Denise Richard, parents of 8-year-old Martin who was one of three people killed in the April 2013 explosions at the marathon's finish line. The full piece is a must read, and I will quote it all here to help ensure these victims' voices get heard in full:

The past two years have been the most trying of our lives. Our family has grieved, buried our young son, battled injuries, and endured numerous surgeries — all while trying to rebuild lives that will never be the same. We sat in the courtroom, day after day, bearing witness to overwhelming evidence that included graphic video and photographs, replicated bombs, and even the clothes our son wore his last day alive. We are eternally grateful for the courage and life-saving measures of first responders, Boston Police, the Boston Fire Department, and good Samaritans on April 15, 2013. We also thank the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, the Department of Justice, and the Massachusetts US Attorney’s Office for leaving no stone unturned during the investigation and trial.

But now that the tireless and committed prosecution team has ensured that justice will be served, we urge the Department of Justice to bring the case to a close. We are in favor of and would support the Department of Justice in taking the death penalty off the table in exchange for the defendant spending the rest of his life in prison without any possibility of release and waiving all of his rights to appeal.

We understand all too well the heinousness and brutality of the crimes committed. We were there. We lived it. The defendant murdered our 8-year-old son, maimed our 7-year-old daughter, and stole part of our soul. We know that the government has its reasons for seeking the death penalty, but the continued pursuit of that punishment could bring years of appeals and prolong reliving the most painful day of our lives. We hope our two remaining children do not have to grow up with the lingering, painful reminder of what the defendant took from them, which years of appeals would undoubtedly bring.

For us, the story of Marathon Monday 2013 should not be defined by the actions or beliefs of the defendant, but by the resiliency of the human spirit and the rallying cries of this great city. We can never replace what was taken from us, but we can continue to get up every morning and fight another day. As long as the defendant is in the spotlight, we have no choice but to live a story told on his terms, not ours. The minute the defendant fades from our newspapers and TV screens is the minute we begin the process of rebuilding our lives and our family.

This is a deeply personal issue and we can speak only for ourselves. However, it is clear that peace of mind was taken not just from us, but from all Americans. We honor those who were lost and wish continued strength for all those who were injured. We believe that now is the time to turn the page, end the anguish, and look toward a better future — for us, for Boston, and for the country.

April 17, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack

Thursday, April 16, 2015

Notable defendant gets 10 years after 10th DWI in Texas as part of plea deal

Dent_hero_1500This story from the Dallas Morning News tells the remarkable story of a remarkable defendant with a remarkable inability to stop drinking and driving.  The piece is headlined "Author Jim Dent gets 10-year prison sentence after 10th DWI," and here are the basics:

Best-selling author Jim Dent was sentenced Wednesday to 10 years in state prison as part of a plea deal with Collin County prosecutors. The author of such books as The Junction Boys and Manziel Mania had pleaded guilty in November 2013 to two driving while intoxicated charges – his ninth and 10th such convictions that spanned more than three decades and four states.

But Dent fled to Mexico rather than attend his sentencing hearing at the McKinney courthouse in February 2014. He said he spent a year south of the border before hitting rock bottom and deciding to return to the states. He was arrested crossing the border into San Diego in late January and transported to Collin County in February to face the charges.

Dent worked as a sports writer covering the Dallas Cowboys for more than a decade for the Fort Worth Star-Telegram and the Dallas Times Herald. In 1991, he quit the newspaper business and became a nationally syndicated radio talk show host. He also started writing books. His status in sports circles and his bigger than life personality paved the way for his access to big names and exclusive events.

Because of the plea agreement, Thursday’s previously scheduled sentencing hearing was canceled as was the testimony from several witnesses. Instead, Dent appeared on video from the Collin County jail before District Judge James Fry for his sentencing. The video jail appearances are routine in cases that have been previously settled and save the county the costs of transporting inmates from the jail to the courthouse....

As part of the plea deal, Dent was sentenced to the previously agreed upon eight years in prison on the DWI charge from October 2012 in Allen. In that instance, Dent’s ex-girlfriend called police because Dent was trying to force her out of her car. He then rammed her car into her neighbor’s garage door with his F150 pickup. He was also sentenced to the maximum penalty of 10 years for the DWI charge from May 2013. In that case, a passer-by reported Dent driving recklessly in Allen before stopping at a Walgreens. Police were waiting for Dent when he came out of the store carrying a case of beer and a bottle of wine.

Because he skipped out on his sentencing hearing, Dent was also charged with two counts of bail jumping and failure to appear. He pleaded guilty Wednesday to both third-degree felony charges and was sentenced to the maximum 10 years in prison. All four prison sentences will be served at the same time. Dent will also get credit for time served.

As part of the plea agreement, prosecutors were able to declare Dent’s vehicle as a deadly weapon in both DWI charges. That finding means Dent will be required to serve at least half of his prison sentence before he is eligible for parole. Dent still has a DWI charge pending in Williamson County after he failed to appear for sentencing. In that case, Dent crashed into a tollbooth along State Highway 45 in Austin. He also has an active warrant in Garland County, Ark., for failing to comply with court orders after his DWI conviction there in 2007.

Dent’s drunken driving convictions date back to 1983 and include convictions in Arkansas, Oklahoma and Nevada as well as the Texas counties of Denton, Dallas, Brazos, Williamson and Collin. His court records over the years include multiple references for failing to appear in court, violating provisions for community supervision and continuing to drink alcohol. He drove while his driver’s license was suspended. And on several occasions, the only thing that kept him from driving drunk was the court-ordered ignition interlock device that prevented his vehicle from starting when it detected alcohol on his breath. Bonds were revoked, he got re-arrested and he posted new bonds....

In a jail interview last week, Dent said he was an alcoholic. He also declared he’d had his last drink before crossing the border. This will be his third entry in the state prison system. Dent was previously sentenced to eight years in prison after violating probation on a felony DWI charge out of Brazos County. He served nearly 22 months before being paroled. He was re-incarcerated for another three months after violating the terms of his parole.

Dent’s 10 convictions stood out largely because they came during his successful book career. But he’s far from alone. More than 1.1 million people were arrested across the country on charges of driving while intoxicated in 2013, according to the latest FBI crime statistics.

For an even fuller account of this defendant's life and times, the Dallas Morning News recently published this profile headlined "Jim Dent: The man, his books and the bottle."

April 16, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Wednesday, April 15, 2015

"Database Infamia: Exit from the Sex Offender Registries"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Wayne Logan available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Since originating in the early-mid 1990s, sex offender registration and community notification laws have swept the country, now affecting the lives of hundreds of thousands of individuals. The laws require that individuals provide, update and at least annually verify personal identifying information, which governments make publicly available via the Internet and other means.  Typically retrospective in their reach, and sweeping in their breadth, the laws can target individuals for their lifetimes, imposing multiple hardships.

This symposium contribution surveys the extent to which states now afford registrants an opportunity to secure relief from registration and community notification and examines the important legal and policy ramifications of the limited exit options made available.

April 15, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Canadian Supreme Court declares gun mandatory minimums unconstitutional

A helpful reader alerted me to a notable sentencing ruling from our northern neighbor reported in this press account headlined "Supreme Court quashes mandatory minimum sentences for gun crimes: Court upholds Ontario ruling that struck down mandatory minimum sentences of 3 and 5 years." Here are the basics:

The Supreme Court of Canada dealt the Harper government's tough-on-crime agenda a serious blow Tuesday by striking down a law requiring mandatory minimum sentences for crimes involving prohibited guns. The 6-3 ruling, penned by Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, said the statute was unconstitutional as it upheld a 2013 Ontario Court of Appeal ruling that labelled the law cruel and unusual.

The ruling said the mandatory minimum sentence could ensnare people with "little or no moral fault" and who pose "little or no danger to the public." It cited as an example a person who inherits a firearm and does not immediately get a license for the weapon. "As the Court of Appeal concluded, there exists a 'cavernous disconnect' between the severity of the licensing-type offence and the mandatory minimum three-year term of imprisonment," McLachlin wrote for the majority.

Justice Minister Peter MacKay said in a statement that the government will review the decision to determine "next steps towards protecting Canadians from gun crime and ensuring that our laws remain responsive."...

Liberal Leader Justin Trudeau said there is a place for mandatory minimums in certain situations, noting that past Liberal governments have introduced them for "extreme crimes."

"But I think the over-use of them that the Supreme Court has highlighted, by this Conservative government, isn't necessarily doing a service to Canadians, both by not necessarily keeping us that much safer and also wasting large amount of taxpayers dollars on unnecessary court challenges," he told reporters in Oakville.

Keeping Canadians safe is cited by the government as the reason for its tough sentencing laws. McLachlin took aim at that justification in her ruling. "The government has not established that mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment act as a deterrent against gun-related crimes," she wrote. "Empirical evidence suggests that mandatory minimum sentences do not, in fact, deter crimes."

The court was deciding two appeals involving mandatory minimum sentences for gun crimes brought by the Ontario and federal attorneys general. The top court upheld the appeal court's quashing of both the three-year mandatory minimum for a first offence of possessing a loaded prohibited gun, as well as the five-year minimum for a second offence.

The Ontario and federal governments argued that the minimums do not breach the charter protection against cruel and unusual punishment. The new sentencing rules were enacted in 2008 as part of a sweeping omnibus bill introduced by the federal Conservatives.

The full ruling from the Supreme Court of Canada is available at this link.

April 15, 2015 in Gun policy and sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Second Amendment issues, Sentences Reconsidered, Sentencing around the world, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

"Trending Now: The Use of Social Media Websites in Public Shaming Punishments"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing new piece authored by Lauren Michelle Goldman now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This Note proposes that a social media shaming sanction might be an effective addition to the menu of public shaming punishments the judiciary already offers.  Section II of this Note lays the foundation of shaming punishments in America, giving an overview of their history and development.  Section III discusses the Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Gementera, in which the court upheld a modern-day public shaming punishment, as well as other select cases that have upheld public shaming punishments that involve print media.

Section IV outlines the current scholarly debate surrounding the use of public shaming punishments.  Section V gives an overview of the presence of social media and Internet usage in today’s society, discusses a new trend among parents in which parents have begun to utilize social media to punish their children, and evaluates public shaming punishments via social media websites from the vantage point of various criminal law theories.  Finally, Section VI advocates for the inclusion of online social media public shaming punishments into the judiciary’s already expansive list of sentencing options, but with some limitations and guidelines.

April 15, 2015 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Tuesday, April 14, 2015

Interesting recent Buckeye death penalty headlines (despite extended extended moratorium)

After Ohio Governor (and future GOP Prez candidate?) John Kasich and other executive officials put off all Ohio executions for the entire 2015 calendar year, I figured Ohio would not be make all that much death penalty news until at least 2016.  But, as these recent local headlines help highlight, an executive branch moratorium on executions does not stop others from taking about the death penalty in the Buckeye state:

April 14, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Tough (and record-long) sentences for cheating Atlanta school administrators

Images (7)As reported in this lengthy USA Today article, "3 in Atlanta cheating scandal to serve 7 years prison," today was final sentencing day in a high-profile and seemingly unique state white-collar criminal case from Georgia.  Here are the details (with my emphasis added):

In a testy courtroom Tuesday, a judge presided over the sentencing of 10 former Atlanta public school educators convicted of participating in a widespread conspiracy to cheat on state tests, telling three defendants that they would serve seven years in prison.

Despite the contentions from Sharon Davis-Williams' and Tamara Cotman's lawyers that they had maintained their innocence and are first offenders, Judge Jerry Baxter of Fulton County Superior Court said that each is being sentenced to 20 years in prison, will serve 7 years of incarceration with the balance as probation and also must do 2,000 hours of community service and pay a $25,000 fine.

"She's convicted, and she's at the top of the food chain," Baxter said of Davis-Williams, who along with Cotman and Michael Pitts were regional directors in the city's school system during one of the country's largest cheating scandals. "Your client ran numerous fine educators out. She non-renewed them."

Pitts received the same sentence and also was sentenced to five years, to run concurrently, on a charge of influencing a witness. The sentences were higher than prosecutors' recommendations.

Although Baxter initially did not want to consider the top administrators as first offenders, he decided to allow that status for all 10. That will allow each to have their convictions erased upon completion of their sentences.

Two of those convicted, former testing coordinator Donald Bullock and former teacher Pamela Cleveland, decided to take a plea deal that prosecutors had offered. Cleveland became the only one of the former educators to elude jail time.

Any deals required an acceptance of responsibility from the former educators, District Attorney Paul Howard said. Bullock, who took the deal before Tuesday's hearing, was sentenced to five years probation, will serve six months in jail on weekends, give 1,500 hours of community service and pay a $5,000 fine.

Cleveland, who apologized in court, was sentenced to five years probation including one year 7 p.m.-to-7-a.m. home confinement, 1,000 hours of community service and a $1,000 fine. Prosecutors took into consideration her elderly parents, so she will be able to serve her home confinement at their house or any hospital where either might be a patient.

Bullock also will apologize and both waived their right to appeal. All were sentenced Tuesday after the judge in the case gave them extra time to negotiate deals with prosecutors.

The former educators' community service will be served at Atlanta's jail teaching inmates, some of whom are the victims of the problems in Atlanta's school system, Baxter said. "I think there were hundreds, thousands of children who were harmed," the judge said. "That's what gets lost in all of this."

Some of the defendants' lawyers pushed back at the expectation of a deal being reached, causing Baxter to cut them off and say he was ready to deliver his sentences immediately. He had delayed sentencing after learning that Howard had been talking to defense attorneys and thought the case could be resolved with sentencing deals. "I just wanted them to get a taste of it," Baxter said of the sentences he had in mind after he quickly delivered Davis-Williams' and Cotman's punishment. "Apparently, that didn't quite move them."

In an exchange with Pitts' lawyer, Baxter said he was worried that some of those convicted were more remorseful that they were caught than they were about cheating young students out of an education. "They should have rose up and said no," the judge said of pressure to alter standardized test scores. "They didn't, and here we are."

The former educators were convicted April 1 on a racketeering charge. Some faced additional charges. They had been accused of falsifying test results to collect bonuses or keep their jobs in Atlanta Public Schools. In all, 35 educators were indicted in 2013 on charges including racketeering, making false statements and theft. Many pleaded guilty and some testified at the trial.

A state investigation found that as far back as 2005, educators fed answers to students or erased and changed answers on tests after they were turned in. Evidence of cheating was found in 44 schools with nearly 180 educators involved, and teachers who tried to report it were threatened with retaliation.

This is fascinating stuff both with respect to sentencing procedure and sentencing outcomes, especially because it seems that the failure to show remorse and waive rights to appeal explains the length of the various sentences as much, if not more, than the actual criminal conduct.  Wowsa (and perhaps the basis for some interesting future appeal issues).

As the title to this post indicates, I would guess these sentences are harshest ever given to cheating school administrators.  That said, it does seem the behavior here was maybe the worst, long-running examples of school cheating ever prosecuted criminally.

April 14, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12) | TrackBack

Senator Grassley again expresses interest in talking about federal criminal justice reform

Senator Charles Grassley is right now arguably the most significant and most important player in all on-going debates over federal sentencing and criminal justice reform.  As Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Grassley can (and seems eager to) block the advancement of any and every federal criminal justice reform bill that he does not personally favor.  

Consequently, even if the vast majority of Senators strongly support significant reforms to federal mandatory minimum sentencing provisions or to federal marijuana provisions, Senator Grassley can ensure— at least until 2017, and perhaps after that if the GOP retains control of the Senate — that federal reform bills do not even get a committee hearing, let alone a committee vote.   Indeed, even if the vast majority of 300 million Americans, and even if the vast majority of the 718,215 Iowans who voted for Senator Grassley in 2010, would strongly favor a reform bill, the bill is likely DOA if Senator Grassley himself is not keen on the bill's particulars.  Frustratingly, that is how our democracy now functions.

Bill Otis, whom I believe has Senator Grassley's ear and with whom he shares many sentencing views, predicted after the 2014 election that Senator Grassley's position as Judiciary Chair all but ensured that there would be almost no chance of significant federal sentencing reform until at least 2017.  But this new piece in Roll Call, headlined "Grassley Resistant to Criminal Justice Overhaul, but Says He’s Willing to Talk,"  provides at least of glimmer of hope that this old Senate dog might be open to some new sentencing tricks.  Here is an excerpt:

Grassley has made no bones about his passionate opposition to reducing mandatory minimum prison sentences, as proposed by Republican Sen. Mike Lee of Utah and Senate Minority Whip Richard J. Durbin of Illinois in the so-called Smarter Sentencing Act (S 1410). On the floor, Grassley has called rolling back such fixed sentences “dangerous,” “ill-conceived” and “indefensible.” Last year, he tried to gut a version of the bipartisan bill, which the Obama administration backs, with an amendment in committee.

Even so, Grassley told CQ Roll Call that he’s ready to start looking for common ground with the bill’s supporters. What’s been missing, he adds, is an invitation — from Obama, from the senators sponsoring the bill, from their staffs — from anyone willing to start a conversation. “First of all, nobody’s asked me even though for three months, including my speech last week, I said I would be glad to meet people about what we could possibly do because I’m open to some reform,” Grassley says.

Juvenile justice is among his top legislative priorities, and he has said he plans to co-sponsor a bill with Rhode Island Democrat Sheldon Whitehouse to reauthorize the 1974 Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act. That law has not been reauthorized since 2002.

Grassley says he thinks there could be some reductions in mandatory minimums, but at the same time he wants to see increases in minimum sentences in other areas, such as child pornography and white-collar crime. He has also cited the need to prevent abuses in the forfeiture of civil assets, and to ensure that offenders receive fair representation. “It may just be time” to start criminal justice talks, Grassley says.

Long story short: anyone and everyone seriously interested in the passage of federal criminal justice reform anytime soon would be wise to invest considerable time and energy figuring out exactly what Senator Grassley is now willing to talk about.  Notably, as stressed in this prior post, Senator Grassley recently penned a strong commentary extolling the importance of transparency and accountability in the federal criminal justice system, and I urge advocates to highlight for Senator Grassley and others how statutory mandatory minimums and other laws that empower and enhance federal prosecutorial overreaches significantly undermine these important goals.

A few prior related recent posts:

April 14, 2015 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

"Lex Mitior: Converse of Ex Post Facto and Window into Criminal Desert"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting and timely new piece on SSRN authored by Peter Westen. Here is the abstract:

In 2009 New Mexico prospectively repealed the death penalty. Three years later in 2012, New Mexico prosecuted a defendant for a capital murder that was committed before repeal, and it sought to subject him to the death penalty. If state prosecutors had prevailed with the jury, they would have secured the very kind of sentence — death — that state officials had been lauded in Europe for outlawing three years earlier.

A prosecution like New Mexico’s could never occur in Europe, and not merely because Europe has long outlawed the death penalty.  It could never occur because, in contrast to the law of most American jurisdictions, European states embrace a doctrine known as “lex mitior” (“the milder law”).  The latter doctrine is a counterpart to the ex post facto prohibition.  Both doctrines both concern retroactivity in criminal law, but they are the converse of one another.

The ex post facto doctrine prohibits retroactivity by prohibiting the state from prosecuting persons under criminal statutes that either retroactively criminalize conduct that was hitherto lawful or retroactively increase penalties for conduct that, while unlawful all along, was hitherto punishable less severely.  In contrast, lex mitior mandates retroactivity by mandating that criminal defendants receive the retroactive benefits of repealing statutes that either decriminalize conduct altogether or reduce punishments for it. After surveying laws in the United States regarding the retroactive effect of ameliorative repeals, the author addresses whether punishing offenders under harsher laws that obtained at the time of their conduct can serve consequentialist and/or retributive purposes of punishment.  He concludes that, although doing can be morally justified under limited circumstances, typically it is not — a conclusion that bears upon lex mitior’s proper scope, whether it consists of a binding norm (as it is among European nations), a nonconstitutional norm (as it presently is within the United States), or, when legislative intent is uncertain, a function of the rule of lenity.

April 14, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sentencing around the world, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Sunday, April 12, 2015

"Defending the Jury: Crime, Community, and the Constitution"

9781107650930The title of this post is the title of this notable new book authored by Professor Laura Appleman. Here is a brief description of the book via the publisher's website:

This book sets forth a new approach to twenty-first-century criminal justice and punishment, one that fully involves the community, providing a better way to make our criminal process more transparent and inclusive.  Using the prism of the Sixth Amendment community jury trial, this book offers fresh and much-needed ways to incorporate the citizenry into the procedures of criminal justice, thereby resulting in greater investment and satisfaction in the system.  It exposes the various challenges the American criminal justice system faces because of its ongoing failure to integrate the community's voice. Ultimately, the people's right to participate in the criminal justice system through the criminal jury — a right that is all too often overlooked — is essential to truly legitimizing the criminal process and ensuring its democratic nature.

Slate provides a helpful discussion of the book in this piece titled "No Deal: Should prosecutors be forced to have their plea bargains approved by juries?". Here is how the Slate piece starts:

One of the most reliably shocking facts about the American justice system is that 97 percent of criminal convictions are the result of plea bargain negotiations — and that jury trials, which many people think of as our society’s primary vehicle for determining a defendant’s guilt or innocence, have become vanishingly rare.

Why are plea deals so common?  Because a guilty verdict at trial tends to result in a much longer prison sentence than what a defendant can get if he or she agrees to a plea agreement.  For many people, this means admitting guilt on some but not all of the charges brought against them and waiving their right to a jury trial in exchange for a shorter sentence.  In many cases, this is an irresistible option, especially because, as the late Harvard Law School professor William Stuntz explained in his landmark book, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, the sheer number of laws on the books makes it possible for prosecutors to charge people with so many crimes that the risk of going to trial and being convicted of all of them — as opposed to copping to just one or two — carries an unfathomable penalty.

There’s no question that the plea bargaining process allows our criminal justice system to function more efficiently than it would otherwise.  But critics see it as a coercive end run around the rights of the accused — especially the poor, who can’t afford lawyers and must rely on overworked public defenders to represent them — as well as a tool for overzealous prosecutors who prioritize winning over seeing justice done.  One of these critics is Laura Appleman, a professor at the Willamette University College of Law, and in her new book, Defending the Jury: Crime, Community, and the Constitution, she proposes an intriguing and original solution to the plea bargaining problem: Instead of letting prosecutors and defense attorneys hammer out plea deals behind closed doors and then get them rubber-stamped by judges, we should introduce regular people into the process — by convening a “plea jury.”

April 12, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10) | TrackBack

Considering one defendant getting a second look due to Miller retroactivity

10juvenile-1-master675One big reason I believe the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment ruling in Miller v. Alabama ought to be fully retroactive is because doing so will not be any kind of windfall for juve murderers given a mandatory LWOP.  Rather, as this new New York Times article highlights, all that Miller retroactivity entails is that an offender get a new sentencing hearing in which a judge will consider whether an LWOP sentence was truly justified in light of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the full history and characteristics of the defendant.  The article, headlined "A Murderer at 14, Then a Lifer, Now a Man Pondering a Future," merits a full read, and here is a teaser from the start of the piece:

Adolfo Davis admits he was a swaggering thug by the age of 14 as he roamed and dealt drugs with a South Side gang.

He also describes a childhood of emotional and physical deprivation: a mother fixated on crack, an absent father, a grandmother’s overflowing and chaotic apartment.

From the age of 6 or 7, he often had to buy his own food or go hungry, so he collected cans, pumped gas for tips and shoplifted. At 10, he went to juvenile hall for wresting $3 worth of food stamps and 75 cents from a girl. At 12, he fell in with the Gangster Disciples. “I loved them, they protected me, they were my family,” Mr. Davis said in a recent interview.

At 14, in 1990, he was out with two gang members when they robbed a rival drug house and shot the occupants, leaving two dead.  Now 38, he has spent the last 24 years in prison on a mandatory sentence of life without parole.

But his future will be reconsidered in a new sentencing hearing here on Monday. It is one of the first such proceedings in Illinois to result from the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Miller v. Alabama that juvenile murderers should not be subject to mandatory life without parole....

The 2012 decision did not say whether the new rules should apply retroactively, to cases long closed. Since then, state and lower federal courts have disagreed, creating drastic differences for prisoners depending on where they live.

Ten states, including Illinois, are applying the standard to pre­2012 cases and have started the process of resentencing. Four states — Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota and Pennsylvania, with about 1,130 prisoners who could be affected — have declined to make the ruling retroactive.  The Supreme Court is expected to clarify the issue next fall, when it hears the appeal of a convict in Louisiana....

Here and around the country, victim rights groups have strongly opposed the reopening of past sentences.  “The families of the victims will suffer the most,” said Jennifer Bishop-Jenkins, a co­founder and board member of the National Organization of Victims of Juvenile Murderers.

She became a champion of victim rights 25 years ago when her pregnant sister and her sister’s husband were murdered in Winnetka, Ill., by a 16­-year-old who received a mandatory life sentence. “When I started thinking of the possibility that we’d have to go back to court, I couldn’t sleep for four months,” she said.  “Our mother was devastated.”

A new sentencing hearing in that case is scheduled for this month. While Ms. Bishop­-Jenkins feels confident that the killer, because of the particulars of his acts, will have the life sentence renewed, she noted that the transcript of his original sentencing hearing was missing and that key witnesses were dead or gone. 

Re­creating a fair sentencing process is often impossible in old cases, she said, and there are ample existing ways to pursue what seem to be unwarranted life sentences, such as executive clemency or other petitions.

Mr. Davis’s supporters said they had not been able to find any relatives of the two murder victims in his case; none have come forward to comment on his resentencing....

Before the hearing on Monday, Mr. Davis’s lawyers — Patricia Soung of the Loyola Law School in Los Angeles and Rachel Steinback, a lawyer with the civil rights law firm Loevy & Loevy in Chicago — prepared a sentencing memo calling for his release because of his remorse, his growth and his mentoring of others while in prison.

The Cook County prosecutors have not prepared a written statement, but they are expected to argue for a new life sentence.  Opposing the 2012 clemency bid, the prosecutors said young Adolfo had been “an active and willing participant in the murders” and “was not simply a naïve child being led astray by older friends.”...

The two sides will present their cases orally before Judge Angela Petrone of the Cook County Circuit Court.  During or after the hearing, the judge could order anything from a new life term to an immediate release for time served.

April 12, 2015 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Friday, April 10, 2015

Controversy surrounding California judge who sentenced 19-year-old child rapist way below mandatory minimum 25-year-term

As reported in this lengthy CNN piece, headlined "California judge faces recall try over sentence in child rape case," a judge's decision to impose only a 10-year prison term on a child rapist is causing a big stir in Los Angeles. Here are some of the details:

Three county supervisors in California announced Thursday a campaign to recall a judge who sentenced a man to 10 years in prison -- instead of the state mandatory minimum of 25 years -- for sodomizing a 3-year-old girl who is a relative.

At the center of the controversy is Orange County Judge M. Marc Kelly who, according to transcripts of a February court proceeding, was moved by the plea for leniency by the mother of the defendant. The judge expressed "some real concerns" about the state's minimum sentence of 25 years to life in prison for a child sodomy conviction and about "whether or not the punishment is disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability in this particular case," according to a transcript of the February proceeding.

"I have not done this before, but I have concerns regarding or not this punishment as prescribed would fall into the arena of cruel and unusual punishment and have constitutional ramifications under the Eighth Amendment," the judge said in February, according to the transcript. "I know this is a very rare situation. It doesn't come up very often."... [An] account of [the April 3] sentencing quoted the judge as saying the mandatory sentence would be appropriate in most circumstances, but "in looking at the facts of ... (the) case, the manner in which this offense was committed is not typical of a predatory, violent brutal sodomy of a child case," Kelly said. The judge noted that the defendant "almost immediately" stopped and "realized the wrongfulness of his act," according to the newspaper.

"Although serious and despicable, this does not compare to a situation where a pedophilic child predator preys on an innocent child," the judge said, according to the newspaper. "There was no violence or callous disregard for (the victim's) well-being."

Three Orange County supervisors held a press conference Thursday to announce the campaign to collect 90,829 signatures needed to hold a recall election of Kelly. They were Orange County Board of Supervisors Chairman Todd Spitzer, County Supervisor and Vice Chairwoman Lisa Bartlett and Supervisor Shawn Nelson. ...

Spitzer said he was responding to "a huge community outcry" against the judge's sentence and his comments from the bench. "We as a community spoke on behalf of the victim today, the 3-year-old child," Spitzer said. "If it was a stranger, the mom would have thrown the book at the guy. The family cares about the perpetrator. It's a family member," Spitzer said. "The victim is related to the perpetrator, and that is what is so difficult here."

But Spitzer said the judge didn't follow state law. "We don't want a judge that legislates from the bench," Spitzer said. "It's just unfathomable that the judge would try to describe what is a brutal sodomy," Spitzer added. "Sodomy of a 3-year-old child is a brutal, violent act in itself."...

Orange County District Tony Rackauckas has called the sentence "illegal," and his office will appeal it, said his chief of staff, Susan Kang Schroeder. "We believe that his decision, his sentencing was illegal because there was a mandatory minimum set up by statute by the legislature," Schroeder said. "We're doing what the people of Orange County have asked us to do. We're going to fight through the courts."...

The June crime occurred in the garage of the family home in Santa Ana, where the defendant, then 19, was playing video games, prosecutors said. CNN is not identifying any family members so the victim can remain anonymous. The defendant also made the victim touch his penis, and he covered the girl's mouth while the mother called out to her, prosecutors said....

"As a 19-year-old, defendant appears to be mentally immature and sexually inexperienced. It is difficult to explain away defendant's actions, however, as sexual frustration," prosecutors said in court papers. "All things considered, defendant appeared to be a relatively normal 19-year-old, aside from the crime of which he is convicted." But the defendant "poses a great danger to society and probably will for the majority of his life," prosecutors added.

During the February court proceeding, a statement by the mother was read aloud to the court by her husband, according to the transcript. "While a mother's love is nothing less than unconditional, I am clearly aware of the gravity of my son's actions and the inevitable discipline that he must now confront," the mother's statement said. "It has been not only extremely difficult, but utterly devastating for me and my family to fully come to terms with the events that took place."

The mother said she hadn't had the strength or courage yet "to directly talk" to her son about the crime, but she said her son "has allowed God into his heart and has committed himself to God's guidance." Her son "is not a bad person," and she asked for forgiveness for his "transgressions and for the opportunity to have a second chance at liberty," the husband told the judge, summarizing his wife's statement.

The judge remarked about the rarity of the mother's plea. "I have never had a situation before like this where a mother is the mother of the victim of the crime and the mother of the defendant who was convicted of the crime," the judge said. "It's very rare in these situations. So I know it must be very difficult for you."

Defense attorney Erfan Puthawala said his client never denied his responsibility "for the heinous act he committed" and, in fact, cooperated with investigators. "He made a statement essentially incriminating himself, which he did not have to do," the attorney said.

"He expressed remorse for the actions he took and the mistake he made. He understands that a momentary lapse has had lifelong ramifications for his sister the victim, for his family, and for himself," Puthawala added. "It is important to note that (my client) is not a pedophile, he is not a sexual deviant, he is not a sexually violent predator, and he poses a low risk of recidivism." Those findings came from an independently appointed psychologist who wrote a report to assist the judge in sentencing, Puthawala said.

Intriguingly, the judge at the center of this controversial sentencing was a senior local prosecutors for more than a decade before he became a member of the state judiciary. Perhaps because of that history, this judge perhaps though the prosecutor who charged this case likely had some discretion not to charge an offense that carried a 25-year mandatory minimum and thus perhaps he thought he should have some discretion not to sentence based on the mandatory minimum. Based on this case description, too, I wonder if this judge found that some of the Eighth Amendment themes stressed by the Supreme Court in Graham and Miller had some applicability in this setting because the defendant was only 19.

April 10, 2015 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Penalty phase in Boston Marathon bombing capital trial scheduled to start April 21

As reported in this NBC News piece, the "penalty phase in the federal trial of convicted Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev will begin on April 21, a judge ordered Friday." Here is more:

The jury has been asked to come to court next week — on April 14 — to receive a brief set of instructions. This year's Boston Marathon will be held on April 20. "The defendant has requested that the penalty phase commence in approximately two weeks so as to, among other things, allow the defendant additional time to resolve outstanding logistical issues with a number of potential witnesses. It is not uncommon for there to be a brief recess between phases in a capital case," Judge George O'Toole said in the order.

Tsarnaev, 21, was convicted for his role in the April 15, 2013, twin bombings that killed three people and injured 260 others at the Boston Marathon — the worst terror attacks on American soil since 9/11. A jury found him guilty Wednesday on all 30 criminal counts. Seventeen of the 30 counts carry the possibility of the death penalty.

This related NBC News piece has some interesting poll data reported under the headline "Americans Divided Over Death For Boston Bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, Poll Finds."

Recent related post:

April 10, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack