Monday, April 02, 2018

"Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper now available via SSRN authored by Aziz Huq. Here is its abstract:

Algorithmic tools for predicting violence and criminality are increasingly used in policing, bail, and sentencing contexts.  Although some attention has been given to their procedural due process implications, how these instruments interact with the enduring and complex racial legacies of the criminal justice system is presently not well understood.

This Article analyzes the questions of racial equity raised by these new predictive instruments using two lenses: constitutional doctrine and emerging technical standards of “algorithmic fairness.”  I demonstrate that constitutional doctrine is poorly adapted to addressing the range of racial issues that potentially arise with algorithmic criminal justice.  Instead, I demonstrate that the difficult questions of racial equity in this domain are best framed and evaluated though certain, but not all, emerging technical standards of algorithmic fairness.

April 2, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, April 01, 2018

"The Intersection between Young Adult Sentencing and Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Josh Gupta-Kagan available on SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This Article connects two growing categories of academic literature and policy reform: arguments for treating young adults in the criminal justice system more leniently than older adults because of evidence showing brain development and maturation continue until the mid-twenties; and arguments calling for reducing mass incarceration and identifying various mechanisms to do so. These categories overlap, but research has not previously built in depth connections between the two.

Connecting the two bodies of literature helps identify and strengthen arguments for reform. First, changing charging, detention, and sentencing practices for young adults is one important tool to reduce mass incarceration. Young adults commit a disproportionate number of crimes. Because so many offenders are young adults, treating young adults less severely could have significant impacts on the number of individuals incarcerated.

Second, focusing on young adults responds to retributive arguments in defense of existing sentencing policies, especially for violent offenses. The mass incarceration literature shows that sentences for violent offenses explain much, if not most, of recent decades’ prison growth. Young adult violent offenders deserve punishment, but their youth mitigates their culpability and thus offers a response to retributive calls for long sentences.

Third, considering mass incarceration can add both urgency and new ideas to the growing debate about reforming sentencing of young adults. Such reforms have thus far been tentative, following well-grounded desires to test different alternative interventions for young adults. The mass incarceration literature adds an important consideration – the status quo demands prompt and far-reaching reform – and new ideas, such as prosecutorial charging guidelines that encompass defendants’ age.

April 1, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, March 29, 2018

"The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtors' Prison"

The title of this post is the title of this new article by Beth Colgan now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In recent years, the use of economic sanctions-statutory fines, surcharges, administrative fees, and restitution-has exploded in courts across the country.  Economic sanctions are imposed for violations as minor as jaywalking and as serious as homicide, and can range from a few dollars to millions.  When a person is unable to immediately pay off economic sanctions, "poverty penalties" are often imposed, including interest and collections fees and probation.  Failure to pay economic sanctions can result in serious consequences, including prohibitions on obtaining or suspensions of driver's and occupational licenses, restrictions on public benefits, and even incarceration.  Even when poverty penalties are not employed, an inability to pay off criminal debt means that the punishment imposed, even for very minor offenses, can effectively be perpetual. Desperate to avoid these repercussions, people go to extremes to pay. In an alarming number of cases people report having to forego basic necessities like food, housing, hygiene, or medicine, in order to pay what little they can, even if just a few dollars at a time.  These and countless other stories of people trapped in persistent debt are becoming ubiquitous, and have raised the specter that current practices amount to modern day debtors' prisons.

Constitutional challenges to such practices have primarily focused on the narrow window of the post-sentencing collections context, relying on a series of Fourteenth Amendment cases prohibiting the automatic conversion of economic sanctions to incarceration where a debtor has no meaningful ability to pay.  While these challenges can provide an important post hoc protection against the use of incarceration as a penalty for the failure to pay, they do not address the financial instability exacerbated by and ongoing threat of incarceration raised by debt from unmanageable economic sanctions.

A separate, albeit underdeveloped, constitutional provision that may be better suited to addressing the debtors' prison crisis lies in the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, which provides protection at sentencing.  To date, the United States Supreme Court has only determined that criminal and civil forfeitures constitute fines.  This Article examines the key concerns underlying those determinations, explicating the Court's interest in treating economic sanctions as fines where they are used by the government to punish-evidenced by a link to prohibited conduct or treatment of economic sanctions like other recognized forms of punishment-as well as the Court's desire that the Clause serve as a bulwark against the risk that the prosecutorial power will be abused due to the revenue generating capacity of economic sanctions.  Applying these core concerns supports the conclusion that common forms of economic sanction (including statutory fines, surcharges, administrative fees, and restitution) constitute fines for purposes of the Clause.

In addition, this Article examines the meaning of excessiveness, arguing that one's ability to pay is relevant to the question of whether a fine is constitutional.  The Court has adopted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause's gross disproportionality test for measuring excessiveness.  Attending to financial circumstances in the excessiveness inquiry is in harmony with key principles animating the proportionality doctrine: equality in sentencing, comparative proportionality between offenses of different seriousness, the expressive value of punishment, concern for the criminogenic effect of and other social harms caused by punishment, and the prohibition on punishments that unreasonably infringe on human dignity.

March 29, 2018 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, March 28, 2018

"What If Prosecutors Wanted to Keep People Out of Prison?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this lengthy New York Magazine article, which is primarily focused on Scott Colom, a 35-year-old district attorney in northeast Mississippi.  But the article also covers how Colom is part of a new focus on prosecutors within efforts to reform criminal justice systems.  Here are excerpts from a long article:

By mid-October, with the [2016] election a few weeks away, Colom knew he was gaining traction. Then a colleague sent him a text message complimenting his new TV commercial. “I was like, What are you talking about?” Television hadn’t fit into his budget. Later in the week, his aunt managed to record the ad on her DVR, and he watched it at her house. A voice at the end said it was paid for by a group called Mississippi Safety & Justice.

He looked it up online and discovered it was a PAC funded by liberal hedge-fund billionaire George Soros, who lives in Westchester County, New York. Bemused, Colom sought advice from consultants in Washington, D.C., who’d been helping him with marketing. They advised Colom to post photos and videos on his website for the PAC to borrow for future ads but warned him not to reach out to the group. Campaign-finance laws forbid direct contact between candidates and independent funders. Colom followed the advice, then went back to knocking on doors....

In the end, Mississippi Safety & Justice had spent $716,000 on the election, dwarfing both the $49,000 Allgood had raised and the $150,000 Colom collected himself. Allgood groused that the money had created an uneven playing field, and Colom himself is defensive about it, even now. But whatever the donation’s impact on the race, it put Colom at the center of a national experiment to remake the criminal-justice system.

For almost three decades, Soros has been quietly funding efforts to end the drug war and reduce the inmate population. Throughout the ’90s and 2000s, he was behind almost every state ballot initiative to legalize marijuana and has given millions in grants for liberal legal scholarship. It was Colom’s luck that in 2015 he’d adopted a new strategy: backing progressives in local elections, specifically DAs, who every day make decisions about whom to charge, with how serious of a crime; whether to engage in plea negotiations; how much prison time, if any, to recommend. In other words, unlike legislators, government lawyers have the power to push down incarceration rates with the stroke of a pen, or a word to a judge. Colom was one of his first test cases....

By the end of his first year in office, Colom had doubled, to 218, the number of defendants in the alternative sentencing program, where if you stay clean and get a job or go to school your charges will eventually be cleared. The scope of the program’s services has expanded too; the administrator, a former social worker, helps participants get into rehab, GED programs, and vocational training, and even arranges rides when necessary, since the area has no bus system.

While alternative sentencing isn’t revolutionary — there are similar programs across the country — it’s a scale model of what Colom has in mind when he dreams of a system built on different incentives. “What we’ve got to do is deal with the addiction that causes people to use drugs,” he says, musing that maybe prisons should be scored on how effectively they rehabilitate people, the way public schools are scored on student achievement. More immediately, Colom is strategizing with Tucker Carrington, a law professor who runs the University of Mississippi’s innocence project, to establish a conviction-review unit, as DAs in Brooklyn, Chicago, Dallas, and other metropolises have done.

March 28, 2018 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, March 27, 2018

SCOTUS day for considering rules for prison sentence modification based on changed guidelines

The US Supreme Court this morning hears oral argument in two cases involving application of 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2), which allows a federal judge to modify a federal prison term for a "defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission."  Here are links to the SCOTUSblog case pages and previews for both cases (the second preview I authored):

Hughes v. United States

Koons v. United States

Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of current federal prisoners might have their sentences directly impacted by these cases. Table 8 of the US Sentencing Commission's latest report on retroactive application of the reduction of the drug guidelines suggests that over 750 defendants may have been denied a reduced sentence based on the issue to be considered in Hughes and that nearly 3000 defendants may have been denied a reduced sentence based on the issue to be considered in Koons.  And, as always with criminal justice cases these days, I am especially interested to see if and how the new guy, Justice Gorsuch, approaches and frame the issue under consideration. 

March 27, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, March 26, 2018

High-profile New Jersey case highlights many challenges of sentencing drunk drivers who kill (and appellate review of sentences)

1360879220_amy-locane-bovenizer-lgThis local article, headlined "Former 'Melrose Place' actress to be re-sentenced -- again -- in fatal drunken crash," reports on yet another notable sentencing opinion from a high-profile state sentencing case. Here are the basics from the article, with the full opinion and follow-up thereafter:

Former "Melrose Place" actress Amy Locane who was convicted of killing a 60-year-old woman in a drunken 2010 crash will be re-sentenced -- for the second time. An appellate court ruling issued Friday lambasts the judge's lenient three-year sentence for Locane, calling it "striking."

"We expect our colleagues will agree that the sentence in this case, a hair's breath away from illegal, shocks the conscience," the appellate ruling states.

In August 2016, the state's Appellate Division ruled that the leniency granted by state Superior Court Judge Robert B. Reed in sentencing Locane in the Montgomery Township crash that killed Helene Seeman lacked enough explanation. Locane returned to court for resentencing on Jan. 17, 2017. Reed did not give her any additional jail time, angering the victim's family and leaving prosecutors bewildered.

It appears a three-judge appellate court panel is just as confused. "(Locane) went unpunished for the injuries inflicted upon Seeman, despite the fact she could have easily made alternative arrangements the night of the accident and could have easily avoided driving, was extremely intoxicated, and was engaging in risky maneuvers before the crash," the appellate ruling states. "That is an error we cannot correct."

Locane, who was driving with a blood-alcohol level three times the legal limit during the June 27, 2010, crash, was cleared of the manslaughter charge but found guilty of vehicular homicide and assault by auto.

Locane faced up to 15 years in prison. Reed imposed a sentence that was about a fifth of what she faced under the maximum penalty. He cited the former actress' two small children, including one with Crohn's disease, as a reason for the lenient sentence. Locane was out of prison in two-and-a-half years.

In a sit-down interview with NJ Advance Media in November, Locane said she hadn't touched alcohol since the crash. "I know Judge Reed went out on the limb for me and I'm not going to let him down," she said. "When someone sees the good in you like that and gives you a second chance, you don't want to disappoint them."

But Locane's fate this time around won't be up to Reed. "We are thus compelled to remand this matter for re-sentencing before a different judge," the appellate ruling says.

Locane's attorney, James Wronko, said the comments made by the appellate division about Reed "were simply unwarranted."

"Judge Reed is an excellent judge," he said. "We intend to file with the New Jersey Supreme Court to have them review the matter and then we'll proceed from there." Ironically, Wronko said, Locane was in Steinert High School in Hamilton speaking to students about the dangers of drinking and driving as the appellate court issued its ruling Friday morning.

Hard-core sentencing fans should take some time to check out the full opinion of the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division in NJ v. Locane, which runs 43 pages and is available at this link. Though a bit dense with Jersey-specific cites, this Locane opinion remarkably covers in various ways so many intricate issues of modern sentencing policy and practice.

Most fundamentally, this case highlights the challenging balance between offense and offender factors in sentencing, as the appellate court is concluding the trial court wrongfully downgraded the severity of the offense by being unduly moved my the defendant's remorse and rehabilitation. But is also, obviously, raises issue about the discretion of sentencing courts and review of that discretion on appeal. In addition, Sixth Amendment and double jeopardy issues arise in the Locane opinion. So too does the role of concurrent and consecutive sentencing, as well as punishment theory as it relates to sentencing drunk drivers (with a little hint to concerns about race, gender and class).  And the opinion's final paragraph highlights still other matters the opinion engages:

In the beginning of this opinion, we referred to the statements made by the victims during the State's presentation, pursuant to the Crime Victim's Bill of Rights, N.J.S.A. 52:4B36[n]. Their comments dovetailed the sentencing goals embodied in the Code, which in this case were not met. In Liepe, the defendant was sentenced to, in real time, life. In this case, defendant was sentenced to a NERA term of three years. The lack of uniformity is striking and in derogation of the Code.

Put slightly differently, anyone teaching a sentencing class might readily build a number of real interesting exam questions around this case and opinion.

March 26, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Friday, March 23, 2018

En banc Sixth Circuit rejects, with some dubitante, effort to extend Sixth Amendment right to counsel to preindictment plea negotiations

The Sixth Circuit this morning made my pile of weekend reading a bit longer and a bit more interesting by handing down an extended en banc ruling in Turner v. United States, No. 15-6060 (6th Cir. March 23, 2018) (available here), I which a lot of judges have lots to say about the reach of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The opinion for the Court explains the issue and the reason the result is 10-4 in favor of the government:

Appellant John Turner asks us to overrule nearly four decades of circuit precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to preindictment plea negotiations.  See United States v. Moody, 206 F.3d 609, 614– 15 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Sikora, 635 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1980)).  We decline to do so.  Our rule — copied word for word from the Supreme Court’s rule — is that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only “at or after the initiation of judicial criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Id. at 614 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (plurality opinion)); see also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984). The district court followed this rule, and we AFFIRM.

Notably, recent Trump appointee Judge Bush has a lengthy concurring opinion under the heading "DUBITANTE" which starts this way:

History sometimes reveals more import to words than they at first seem to have. And faithful adherence to the Constitution and its Amendments requires us to examine their terms as they were commonly understood when the text was adopted and ratified, rather than applying meaning derived years later that may weaken constitutional rights. This case calls for such an examination.

And the dissent authored by Judge Branch gets started this way:

The majority opinion declares itself bound by “four decades of circuit precedent holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to preindictment plea negotiations,” reciting as its basis for this rule language from the 1972 Supreme Court case, Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).  This reasoning misses the point of the case before us in several important ways.  By elevating general language to a static rule, it disregards the Supreme Court’s development across time of the law governing Sixth Amendment claims, particularly the Court’s practical recognition of the changing criminal justice system and its responsive jurisprudence extending the right to counsel to events before trial.  This reasoning also ignores the purpose of an en banc court — to determine whether existing circuit caselaw has failed to correctly understand or apply legal principles or Supreme Court precedent.  Finally and as ably explicated by Judge Bush’s historical analysis, relying on a rigid, mechanical approach closes the door to the apparent understanding of our Founders, including the authors of the Sixth Amendment, that Turner would have been recognized as an “accused.”

March 23, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, March 22, 2018

Noting how Ohio judges and prison officials are sparring over law seeking to reduce prison readmissions

This new AP article, headlined "Judges, Ohio prison system at odds over bed reduction plan," reports on an interesting new difficulty within on-going Buckeye state efforts to reduce the prison population. Here are excerpts:

Judges and the state prison system are at odds over a new law meant to lower Ohio's inmate population by limiting the amount of time behind bars for low-level offenders who commit minor probation violations. At issue is a mandate capping the amount of time judges can send offenders to prison for violations like missing counseling appointments or committing misdemeanors.  The law enacted last year is part of a broader effort to save money and reduce crime by lowering Ohio's inmate population.  It affects inmates convicted of non-violent crimes such as drug possession, theft and fraud.

Under the law, judges can send inmates to prison for only 90 days for the least serious felony and 180 days for the next most serious.  But some judges say the law is unclear and are sending offenders to prison for longer sentences, often a year or more, according to the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction.  Judges also contend that the short sentencing caps lessen the incentive for repeat offenders to follow probation rules at all.

The state had counted on the law to decrease Ohio's inmate population by about 400 this year and as much as 1,100 next year, the prison system said.  Cynthia Mausser, the prison system's managing director of courts and community, noted that the longer such low-level offenders are "sitting in prison not becoming better people," the more time they spend "away from those pro-social programs and relationships and connections" that could help them... 

North Carolina put similar caps on certain probation violations in 2011 as part of changes to its sentencing laws. Colorado, Nevada and Tennessee have created stand-alone facilities for probation violators as alternatives to prison sentences, according to the National Conference of State Legislatures.

Ohio's prison system sent about 300 letters to judges in recent months alerting them that they went over the caps.  Prison officials don't have the authority to overrule judges, however, and so the longer sentences stayed in place. 

In southern Ohio, Robert Chambers violated his probation for a 2017 drug possession conviction in multiple ways, including admitted drug use and refusal to enter drug treatment, according to court records.  Chambers' attorney didn't return messages seeking comment.  Adams County Judge Brett Spencer finally sentenced Chambers to a year in prison, and was then singled out by the prison system for surpassing the three-month cap. "For not trying to become productive citizens, we give them a 75 percent bonus," Spencer said of the sentencing caps.

Mahoning County Judge John "Jack" Durkin said judges know it's better to focus on offenders' substance abuse problems, help them find jobs and complete their education. But at some point, especially after several violations, prison must be an option "to protect the public and punish the defendant," Durkin said.

March 22, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, March 21, 2018

Highlighting new DAs working on new sentence review efforts to address excessive punishments

This Marshall Project article, headlined "The DAs Who Want to Set the Guilty Free: ‘Sentence review units’ would revisit harsh punishments from the past," spotlights ways prosecutors are now reconsidering past prosecutorial punitiveness.  Here is an excerpt:

None of these conviction review units [created in DA offices] have undertaken the far more ambitious task of examining cases where the conviction might be sound but the punishment doesn’t fit the crime.  That would mean poking into the sentences sought by a previous generation of prosecutors whose reflexive stance, for decades, was often to seek maximum charges carrying hefty terms behind bars.  “It might open the floodgates to reviewing thousands of sentences,” said Steven A. Drizin, a law professor at Northwestern University and an expert on wrongful convictions who said he supports sentence reviews.

Despite the daunting undertaking, the idea is gaining traction.  In Philadelphia, where former civil-rights attorney and public defender Larry Krasner was recently sworn in as district attorney, staffers are making plans for a sentence review program, likely the first of its kind in the country.  Nationally, nearly two dozen newly elected prosecutors are working with an advocacy organization called Fair and Just Prosecution to implement their own sentencing-review procedures in the coming year, said Miriam Krinsky, the group’s executive director and a former longtime federal prosecutor.

Such a massive undertaking is, like many of the ambitions of this new breed of prosecutors, far easier said than done.  Normally, courts allow a prosecutor to seek re-sentencing only in limited circumstances, such as when new evidence arises or when legislators pass a new sentencing law that needs to be applied retroactively.  For example, Maryland in 2016 revised its mandatory minimum sentences, with a clause allowing judges to use those changes to reduce the time that then-current prisoners were serving.  Sometimes, a prisoner can be rewarded with a reduced sentence for cooperating in a police investigation. The compassionate release process also lets corrections agencies and courts reduce sentences retroactively, usually when the prisoner is gravely ill.  But there is no mechanism in many states for requesting a new sentence for a current inmate simply because a newly elected prosecutor says it’s in the best interest of justice....

In Philadelphia, Patricia Cummings, head of the conviction integrity unit, already has a workaround in mind.  She said a group within the DA's office focused on sentencing — which she would likely direct but that still needs staff and funding — could start by looking into first- or second-degree murder cases the office prosecuted in the past.  In Pennsylvania, a conviction on those charges automatically ends in a sentence of life in prison without parole. More than 5,000 of the state’s prisoners are currently serving these sentences, the second-highest number in the nation, and about half are from Philadelphia.  If the unit identifies a case where they believe the facts did not warrant such a harsh sentence, it would ask the trial court to throw out the original conviction and accept a guilty plea on a lesser charge of third-degree murder or manslaughter. Those charges carry much lighter sentences. “We’re still kicking this around,” said Cummings, who previously ran the conviction integrity unit in Dallas....

Another precedent can be found in Seattle, where prosecuting attorney Dan Satterberg has been giving people in prison second chances for the past decade.  He and his staff review old cases in which defendants were banished to life in prison for relatively minor crimes, often under the state’s three-strikes-you’re-out law.  They then sign onto clemency petitions for some of those prisoners.  Three of the 16 prisoners who were effectively “re-sentenced” this way have committed new crimes since getting released. But, Satterberg said, “there’s no way to avoid that other than to leave everyone in prison forever.”

“I think a prosecutor has a continuing obligation to justice, past the sentencing date,” said Satterberg. “We have to be willing to roll up our sleeves, look through the files of old cases, and really... compare them to our contemporary law and practice.”

Most states don’t have such a robust clemency system that prosecutors can use it as a kind of back-door re-sentencing program.  In Pennsylvania, for example, only eight life sentences have been shortened through commutation since 1995.  State law requires a pardons board to agree unanimously on any such decision. That means the mechanism will have to differ by state, said Krinsky, the head of the prosecutors’ group.  It may even require lobbying efforts to pass new legislation granting DAs the power to file a special motion for amending a sentence.

I am very pleased to hear of these developments, though I cannot resist noting that I urged them nearly a decade ago in at a symposium about prosecutorial discretion at Temple School of Law.  A reprinting of my remarks appear here as Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 429 (2010). Here is part of what I said back then:

I strongly believe that modem criminal justice systems ought to incorporate formally some type of prosecutor-driven safety valve on the back-end of the system, a straightforward and relatively simple way for prosecutors to be involved in assessing and publicly noting who may be among the [many thousands of] people currently incarcerated in the United States who they now think, after taking the time to take a sound, sober, and sensible second look, can be safely released from prison and returned to freedom.

I suppose I should enjoy being old enough to see some of my old ideas become new again.

March 21, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Two more SCOTUS wins for criminal defendants in Ayestas and Marinello

The Supreme Court this morning released two opinions in argued criminal justice cases: Ayestas v. Davis, No. 16–6795(S. Ct. March 21, 2018) (available here) and Marinello v. United States, No. 16-1144 (S. Ct. March 21, 2018) (available here). Here are the line-ups of the votes by the Justices and the start of each opinion for the Court:

Ayestas v. Davis:

ALITO, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.

Petitioner Carlos Ayestas, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in a Texas court, argues that he was wrongfully denied funding for investigative services needed to prove his entitlement to federal habeas relief.  Petitioner moved for funding under 18 U. S. C. §3599(f), which makes funds available if they are “reasonably necessary,” but petitioner’s motion was denied. We hold that the lower courts applied the wrong legal standard, and we therefore vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings.

Marinello v. United States:

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which ALITO, J., joined.

A clause in §7212(a) of the Internal Revenue Code makes it a felony “corruptly or by force” to “endeavo[r] to obstruct or imped[e] the due administration of this title.”26 U. S. C. §7212(a). The question here concerns the breadth of that statutory phrase. Does it cover virtually all governmental efforts to collect taxes? Or does it have a narrower scope? In our view, “due administration of [the Tax Code]” does not cover routine administrative procedures that are near-universally applied to all taxpayers, such as the ordinary processing of income tax returns. Rather, the clause as a whole refers to specific interference with targeted governmental tax-related proceedings, such as a particular investigation or audit.

A busy day means I am unlikely to have much time to obsess over these two relatively small wins for defendants, but I do have time to make a quick comment about the voting particulars. Specifically, I think it notable in Ayestas that a state capital defendant got a unanimous vote in his favor from the Court and that in Marinello, both the Chief and the newest Justices voted with the majority in favor of the defendant rather than with Justice Thomas's dissent.

March 21, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Tuesday, March 20, 2018

"Gender Disparities in Plea Bargaining"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article now available via SSRN authored by Carlos Berdejó.  Here is the abstract:

Across wide-ranging contexts, academic literature and the popular press have identified pervasive gender disparities favoring men over women in society.  One area in which gender disparities have conversely favored women is the criminal justice system.  Most of the empirical research examining gender disparities in criminal case outcomes has focused on judges’ sentencing decisions.  Few studies have assessed disparities in the steps leading up to a defendant’s conviction, where various actors make choices that constrain judges’ ultimate sentencing discretion.  This article addresses this gap by examining gender disparities in the plea-bargaining process.  The results presented in this article reveal significant gender disparities in this stage of the criminal justice system.

Female defendants are about twenty percent more likely than male defendants to have their principal initial charge dropped or reduced.  These gender disparities are greater in cases involving misdemeanors and low-level felonies. In cases involving serious felonies, male and female defendants achieve similar outcomes.  Defendants’ criminal histories also play a key role in mediating gender disparities.  While female defendants with no prior convictions receive charge reductions more often than male defendants with no prior convictions, male and female defendants with prior convictions are afforded similar treatment.  These patterns in gender disparities suggest that in these “low information” cases gender may be being used as a proxy for a defendant’s latent criminality and likelihood to recidivate.

Building upon these results and the existing literature documenting racial disparities in criminal case outcomes, the article explores the intersection of gender and race in determining disparities in the plea-bargaining process.  The results indicate that gender and racial disparities complement each other in a way that yields additive effects. The charge reduction rate for white female defendants is more than double that of black male defendants.  White male and black female defendants experience similar charge reduction rates, in-between those of white female and black male defendants.  Consistent with the pattern of gender disparities documented in the article, these inter-group disparities are greater in cases involving misdemeanor offenses and defendants with no prior convictions.

Prior related post:

March 20, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, March 19, 2018

"Informed Misdemeanor Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Jenny Roberts now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

There is no such thing as a low-stakes misdemeanor. The misdemeanor sentence itself, which can range from time served to up to twelve years in some jurisdictions, is often significant.  But the collateral consequences of such a conviction can be far worse, affecting a person’s work and home lives for decades, and sometimes for the rest of their lives. As a result of misdemeanor convictions, defendants can be fired from their jobs, barred from future employment in many fields, deported, evicted from public housing together with their entire family, and refused housing by private landlords.

Under most theories of punishment, a judge at sentencing does not simply look back to the crime and its circumstances but also looks forward at the defendant’s future.  Judges imposing sentences in misdemeanor cases should focus forward much more heavily than back, and should consider the collateral effects of a misdemeanor conviction on the defendant’s future.  Viewed through that more expansive lens, and given the broad discretion of judges in misdemeanor sentencing and lack of existing guidance for that discretion, the sentencing function of judges in misdemeanor cases is in serious need of study and reform.

This Article’s goal is two-fold.  First, it contextualizes judicial responsibility for misdemeanor sentencing in the realities of the lower criminal courts, where a number of structural and systemic barriers — including violations of the right to counsel and pressures on judges to move cases along rapidly — affect but do not excuse the way judges go about sentencing.  Second, the Article calls for judges to undertake “informed misdemeanor sentencing,” which draws on principles of proportionality and parsimony in determining the just sentence in a misdemeanor case.  Accordingly, judges should explicitly acknowledge the many serious collateral consequences an individual suffers after any penal sanction, and incorporate those into the sentencing process to ensure that punishment is proportionate.  In addition, judges should bring parsimony into the sentencing process by making more use of deferred adjudication as well as expungement and related mechanisms for mitigating the unintended effects of a misdemeanor conviction.

March 19, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Justice Sotomayor suggests "reconsideration of other sentencing practices in the life-without-parole context"

I noted in this prior post denial of cert in the closely-watched capital case of Hidalgo v. Arizona, and Justice Breyer's statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Hidalgo was not even the most interesting such statement on this morning's SCOTUS order list.  That honor goes to Justice Sotomayor's statement respecting the denial of certiorari in Campbell v. Ohio, which suggests importing more of the Eighth Amendment's procedural protections for the death penalty to life without parole sentencing. I recommend this four-page statement in full, and here are snippets:

Because of the parallels between a sentence of death and a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, the Court has drawn on certain Eighth Amendment requirements developed in the capital sentencing context to inform the life-without-parole sentencing context....

The “correspondence” between capital punishment andlife sentences, Miller, 567 U. S., at 475, might similarly require reconsideration of other sentencing practices in the life-without-parole context. As relevant here, the Eighth Amendment demands that capital sentencing schemes ensure “measured, consistent application and fairness to the accused,” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 111 (1982), with the purpose of avoiding “the arbitrary or irrational imposition of the death penalty,” Parker v. Dugger, 498 U. S. 308, 321 (1991). To that aim, “this Court has repeatedly emphasized that meaningful appellate review of death sentences promotes reliability and consistency.” Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 749 (1990)...

Our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence developed in the capital context calls into question whether a defendant should be condemned to die in prison without an appellate court having passed on whether that determination properly took account of his circumstances, was imposed as a result of bias, or was otherwise imposed in a “freakish manner.”  And our jurisprudence questions whether it is permissible that Campbell must now spend the rest of his days in prison without ever having had the opportunity to challenge why his trial judge chose the irrevocability of life without parole overthe hope of freedom after 20, 25, or 30 years.

March 19, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Three Justices join Justice Breyer questioning how Arizona's death penalty system operates

Many month ago, as highlighted here, the cert petition in Hidalgo v. Arizona generated considerable attention.  That matter ended today when the petition for a writ of certiorari was denied, along with this lengthy statement by Justice Breyer joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. I was expecting some Justices to say something really notable after all this build up, by the statement ends this way:

Although, in my view, the Arizona Supreme Court misapplied our precedent, I agree with the Court’s decision today to deny certiorari. In support of his Eighth Amendment challenge, the petitioner points to empirical evidence about Arizona’s capital sentence system that suggests about 98% of first-degree murder defendants in Arizona were eligible for the death penalty.  That evidence is unrebutted. It points to a possible constitutional problem.  And it was assumed to be true by the state courts below. Evidence of this kind warrants careful attention and evaluation. However, in this case, the opportunity to develop the record through an evidentiary hearing was denied. As a result, the record as it has come to us is limited and largely unexamined by experts and the courtsbelow in the first instance. We do not have evidence, for instance, as to the nature of the 866 cases (perhaps they implicate only a small number of aggravating factors).  Nor has it been fully explained whether and to what extent an empirical study would be relevant to resolving the constitutional question presented.  Capital defendantsmay have the opportunity to fully develop a record with the kind of empirical evidence that the petitioner points to here. And the issue presented in this petition will be better suited for certiorari with such a record.

Meh.

March 19, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Friday, March 16, 2018

New Philly DA puts forward new policies intended to "end mass incarceration and bring balance back to sentencing"

Web-larry-krasner-winner-1024-x-576This Slate article, headlined "Philadelphia’s New Top Prosecutor Is Rolling Out Wild, Unprecedented Criminal Justice Reforms," reports on the remarkable new policies put forward by the former defense attorney who is the newly elected Philly DA.  Here are highlights:

On Tuesday, Krasner issued a memo to his staff making official a wave of new policies he had announced his attorneys last month. The memo starts: “These policies are an effort to end mass incarceration and bring balance back to sentencing.”

The most significant and groundbreaking reform is how he has instructed assistant district attorneys to wield their most powerful tool: plea offers. Over 90 percent of criminal cases nationwide are decided in plea bargains, a system which has been broken beyond repair by mandatory minimum sentences and standardized prosecutorial excess. In an about-face from how these transactions typically work, Krasner’s 300 lawyers are to start many plea offers at the low end of sentencing guidelines. For most nonviolent and nonsexual crimes, or economic crimes below a $50,000 threshold, Krasner’s lawyers are now to offer defendants sentences below the bottom end of the state’s guidelines. So, for example, if a person with no prior convictions is accused of breaking into a store at night and emptying the cash register, he would normally face up to 14 months in jail. Under Krasner’s paradigm, he’ll be offered probation. If prosecutors want to use their discretion to deviate from these guidelines, say if a person has a particularly troubling rap sheet, Krasner must personally sign off.

“It’s the mirror of a lot of offices saying, ‘If you don’t ask for the max you’ve got to get my permission,’ ” says David Rudovsky, a prominent Philadelphia civil rights attorney. For longtime career prosecutors, this will take some getting used to. “You want to be sure your assistants are actually doing it,” Rudovsky says.

Krasner’s lawyers are also now to decline charges for marijuana possession, no matter the weight, effectively decriminalizing possession of the drug in the city for all nonfederal cases. Sex workers will not be charged with prostitution unless they have more than two priors, in which case they’ll be diverted to a specialized court. Retail theft under $500 is no longer a misdemeanor in the eyes of Philly prosecutors, but a summary offense—the lowest possible criminal charge. And when ADAs give probation charges they are to opt for the lower end of the possible spectrum. “Criminological studies show that most violations of probation occur within the first 12 months,” the memo reads, “Assuming that a defendant is violation free for 12 months, any remaining probation is simply excess baggage requiring unnecessary expenditure of funds for supervision.” When a person does break the rules of probation, minor infractions such as missing a PO meeting are not to be punished with jail time or probation revocation, and more serious infractions are to be disciplined with no more than two years in jail.

In a move that may have less impact on the lives of defendants, but is very on-brand for Kranser, prosecutors must now calculate the amount of money a sentence would cost before recommending it to a judge, and argue why the cost is justified. He estimates that it costs $115 a day, or $42,000 a year, to incarcerate one person. So, if a prosecutor seeks a three-year sentence, she must state, on the record, that it would cost taxpayers $126,000 and explain why she thinks this cost is justified. Krasner reminds his attorneys that the cost of one year of unnecessary incarceration “is in the range of the cost of one year’s salary for a beginning teacher, police officer, fire fighter, social worker, Assistant District Attorney, or addiction counselor.”

The policies memo is available at this link, and all sentencing fans will want to check out the entire document.

March 16, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (22)

Tuesday, March 13, 2018

"Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing"

The title of this post is the title of this new essay by Christopher Slobogin recently posted to SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Risk assessment — measuring an individual’s potential for offending — has long been an important aspect of criminal justice, especially in connection with sentencing, pretrial detention and police decision-making.  To aid in the risk assessment inquiry, a number of states have recently begun relying on statistically-derived algorithms called “risk assessment instruments” (RAIs).  RAIs are generally thought to be more accurate than the type of seat-of-the-pants risk assessment in which judges, parole boards and police officers have traditionally engaged.  But RAIs bring with them their own set of controversies.

In recognition of these concerns, this brief paper proposes three principles — the fit principle, the validity principle, and the fairness principle — that should govern risk assessment in criminal cases.  After providing examples of RAIs, it elaborates on how the principles would affect their use in sentencing and policing.  While space constraints preclude an analysis of pretrial detention, the discussion should make evident how the principles would work in that setting as well.

March 13, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, March 12, 2018

"A Touchy Subject: The Eleventh Circuit's Tug-of-War Over What Constitutes Violent 'Physical Force'"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Conrad Kahn and Danli Song now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In a prosecution for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, a pivotal question is whether an individual is subject to a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).  If an individual has three or more prior convictions that qualify as “violent felonies” or “serious drug offenses,” the ACCA increases his statutory range of imprisonment from zero-to-ten years to fifteen years to life.

Historically, a prior conviction could qualify as a “violent felony” if it satisfied at least one of the three “violent felony” clauses—the elements clause, the enumerated-offenses clause, or the catch-all residual clause.  But on June 26, 2015, the Supreme Court invalidated the residual clause in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (Johnson II).

Since Johnson II, substantial disagreements have emerged both within the Eleventh Circuit and among the other circuits regarding Johnson II’s reach and the proper application of the ACCA's elements clause.  This Article examines those disagreements, including three ways the Eleventh Circuit got it wrong — specifically, the court’s unusual conduct in ruling on requests to file second or successive post-conviction motions based on Johnson II and recent rulings on whether the Florida offenses of robbery and felony battery qualify as “violent felonies” under the elements clause.  This Article argues the ACCA’s elements-clause analysis should focus on the degree of force used in an act, and the Supreme Court should resolve these disagreements and provide guidance to the lower courts by reviewing whether one of these offenses satisfies the elements clause.

March 12, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (6)

Sunday, March 11, 2018

"'A Day Late and a Dollar Short': President Obama's Clemency Initiative 2014"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper by Paul Larkin now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

Over his last two years in office, President Barack Obama used his Article II Pardon Clause power to commute the sentences imposed on more than 1,700 drug offenders. In a 2017 law review article, he congratulated himself for reinvigorating the federal clemency process. His clemency initiative, however, was hardly the unqualified success that he claims.

Obama waited far too long before undertaking his effort. He should have started it in 2010, rather than in 2014.  That would have allowed the thousands of clemency decisions he made to be handled at a more reasonable pace and probably more accurately.  He also should have issued a general conditional commutation order rather than undertake a case-by-case re-examination of the sentence each clemency applicant received. That would have allowed district court judges, who are far better than any president could be at making sentencing decisions, to resentence each offender.  Finally, he should have reformed the clear structural defect in the federal clemency process.  The Department of Justice controls the clemency application process even though, as the agency that prosecuted every clemency applicant, the department suffers from an actual or apparent conflict of interest.  In sum, Obama could have done far more by doing far less or by doing something far different than by acting as the Resentencer-in-Chief.

March 11, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 10, 2018

Iowa Supreme Court issues latest major ruling on juve sentencing limits and process after Miller

As reported in this local article, the "Iowa Supreme Court on Friday offered guidance to judges for interpreting a 2015 law that lays out sentencing guidelines for juveniles convicted of murder."  Here is more from the press report about the latest in a series of rulings following up on the US Supreme Court's juve sentencing jurisprudence:

Some justices also signaled in concurring opinions that they believe rigid sentences for other crimes committed by juveniles should eventually be rolled back.

The court ruled Friday in a murder case in which Rene Zarate stabbed Jorge Ramos to death in 1999, when Zarate was 15.  Zarate, now 34, originally received a mandatory sentence of life without parole, but requested a resentencing hearing after a 2012 U.S. Supreme Court ruling prohibited such sentences for juveniles.  His new sentence makes him eligible for parole after 25 years, with credit for time served.

Zarate challenged his sentence as well as the constitutionality of a 2015 Iowa law that revised how juveniles who commit first-degree murder are sentenced. Under the law, the sentencing judge could choose from a variety of options including life without the possibility of parole, life with parole after a certain amount of the sentence is served, and life with the immediate possibility of parole.  The law further outlined 25 factors for the court to take into consideration when sentencing juveniles for murder.

In 2016, after that law was passed, the Iowa Supreme Court found that life sentences without parole are unconstitutional for juveniles.  But Friday's ruling was the first time the Iowa Supreme Court addressed the new law. A majority of justices said Friday that the guidelines laid out in the law are constitutional — except for the subsection that allowed for life sentences without parole....

They said judges must give juvenile offenders an individualized hearing taking the circumstances of the case into account, and must consider as mitigating factors things such as the offender's age at the time of the crime, family and home environment and the possibility for rehabilitation and change. But the district court judge who re-sentenced Zarate did so based on his belief that anyone that anyone who takes the life of another individual should spend a certain amount of time in prison, according to the opinion joined by four of the seven justices. "The sentencing judge allowed the nature of Zarate’s offense to taint his analysis by imposing a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment due to his belief that there should be a minimum term of imprisonment for anyone who commits murder, regardless of their age at the time of the offense," Justice Bruce Zager wrote in the majority opinion....

The court's remaining three justices issued separate concurrences urging the court to go further in striking down mandatory minimums for juveniles as unconstitutional. Justice Brent Appel, who authored the court's earlier opinion against life sentences without parole for juveniles, said it's time to re-examine the constitutionality of all mandatory minimum sentences for minors who commit crimes. "Instead of imposing mandatory minimums through an unreliable judicial guess, the constitutionally sound approach is to abolish mandatory minimum sentences on children and allow the parole board to make periodic judgments as to whether a child offender has demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation based on an observable track record," Appel wrote in his concurrence.

Justice Daryl Hecht, writing a concurrence joined by Justice David Wiggins, wrote that he believes mandatory minimums for juveniles are categorically prohibited by the Iowa Constitution. "Whether imposed by legislative mandate or by a sentencing court, the constitutional infirmity of mandatory minimum sentences for juvenile offenders is the same in my view," Hecht wrote.

The full opinion in Iowa v. Zarate, No. 15-2203 (Iowa Mar. 9, 2018), which rests much of its constitutional analysis on the Iowa Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment (rather than the US Constitution's Eighth Amendment), is available at this link.

March 10, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, March 08, 2018

You be the sentencing juror: what punishment for deadly drunk driving by Texas State college student?

UntitledThe question in the title of this post is prompted by this local article in Texas, headlined "‘I’m guilty’: Former Texas State student testifies in deadly DWI crash," which highlights that in the Lone Star State jurors are sometimes called to serve as primary sentencers in non-capital cases.   Here are some case particulars via the local press piece:

When Shana Elliott took the stand Thursday morning, she admitted: “I’m guilty.” Elliott, 22, says she was intoxicated and should not have been driving the evening of Aug. 2, 2016, after a day of tubing on the San Marcos River. “We decided to go float the river, we weren’t thinking ahead, we didn’t plan who was going to be driving,” Elliott said on the stand. “The float ended around 5 and that’s when nobody else was going to drive and I decided that I would.”

On that day, Elliott, who was 21 years old at the time, allegedly drove drunk and ran head-on into a car on State Highway 21 killing 23-year-old Fabian Guerrero Moreno and injuring his pregnant wife, Kristian Nicole Guerrero. Guerrero was five months pregnant. The unborn child did not survive.

Elliott says before the crash she dropped her friends off at their homes then decided to drive home herself. “It’s really blurry, I just remember as soon as the accident happened, I know that I made the worst decision ever.”

She says she got out of her car at the scene of the crash and ran to the other vehicle. “I just remember fighting, I wanted to go to make sure they were okay,” she said. “I’m sorry. I accept responsibility and I know what I did was wrong.”

At Elliott’s home, investigators found meth, heroin and a large bag of marijuana.  On the stand Elliott admitted to being addicted to heroin at one time, she said she smoked marijuana, but never did meth. She says after a previous arrest for drugs she had plans to sober up.

While Elliott was on the stand, prosecutors presented a large bottle of alcohol that was found at the crash site.  Elliott told the jury it was hers, adding it was full before she and her friends began floating the river.

Prosecutors also played recordings of phone calls Elliott made from jail. In one of the recordings, Elliott is talking with her boyfriend, speculating the other victims of the crash were part of the cartel. In another recording, Elliott can be heard joking and laughing with her friends about getting her eyebrows threaded in jail just four days after the crash.

Elliott’s grandmother Eleanor Brumley also took the stand Thursday morning. “She was determined to make something of herself,” said Brumley. “I’ve always been proud of her.” Brumley describes Elliot’s childhood as difficult. She says her father died of a heart attack and her stepdad was an alcoholic and was abusive mentally and emotionally. “Shana would deal with that and walk out the door with a smile on her face. She didn’t complain. She’s always thinking of everybody else,” said Brumley.

Elliott says she tried to deal with the abuse herself, but when she arrived at college she sought psychiatric help through a doctor at Texas State University.  She claims the doctor diagnosed her with depression, anxiety and slight PTSD stemming from her difficult childhood.

At the time of the crash, Elliott was a senior at Texas State University. Records show her blood alcohol content was .199 at the hospital.  On Monday, Elliott entered a plea of guilty for two counts of intoxication manslaughter and intoxication assault. The jury is expected to decide her punishment this week.

UPDATE: This local article reports on the jury's sentencing decision:

Shana Elliott, a former Texas State University student, was sentenced to seven years in prison Friday afternoon on each count in the deaths of a man and his unborn child.... Elliott, who pleaded guilty Monday, received seven years in prison each for two counts of intoxication manslaughter with a vehicle in the deaths of Fabian Guerrero-Moreno and his unborn child, who were killed in a drunk driving crash in August 2016.

March 8, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (22)

Highlighting that registries are not only for sex offenders in many states

This new Marshall Project piece, headlined "Convicted of a Drug Crime, Registered with Sex Offenders," focuses on the broad reach of the offender registry employed in Kansas and debate over its reform.  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts from the piece:

Lawmakers have long justified sex offender registries as a way to notify people about potentially dangerous neighbors or acquaintances, while critics say they fail to prevent crime and create a class of social outcasts.  Over the years, several states have expanded their registries to add perpetrators of other crimes, including kidnapping, assault, and murder.  Tennessee added animal abuse.  Utah added white collar crimes.  A few states considered but abandoned plans for hate crime and domestic abuse registries.  At least five states publicly display methamphetamine producers.

But Kansas went furthest, adding an array of lesser drug crimes; roughly 4,600 people in the state are now registered as drug offenders.  As deaths from opioids rise, some public officials have focused on addiction as a public health issue.  Kansas offers a different approach, as law enforcement officials argue that the registry helps keep track of people who may commit new offenses and cautions the public to avoid potentially dangerous areas and individuals.  At the same time, many registrants say it can be hard to move on when their pasts are just a click away for anyone to see.

The Kansas legislature is currently considering a bill proposed by the state’s sentencing commission that would remove drug offenders from the registry.  “It is a drain on resources with no science, studies, or data to justify it,” defense lawyer Jennifer Roth told lawmakers at an early February hearing.

The Kansas law, first passed in 2007, now requires anyone convicted of manufacturing, distributing, or possessing “with intent to distribute” drugs other than marijuana to remain on the registry for a minimum of 15 years (and a maximum of life, for multiple convictions.)  During that time, they must appear at their county sheriff’s office four times a year, as well as any time they move, get a new job, email address, vehicle, or tattoo.  Most of this information is online, searchable by name or neighborhood, and members of the public can sign up to be emailed when an offender moves in or starts work near them.  (In 2013, when businesses expressed fear of vigilantes targeting registrants at work, lawmakers removed employment addresses from the website.)  During the quarterly sheriff visits, they must pay $20 and have their picture retaken; if they work or go to school in another county, they must register there as well.  “Any time I get a new job, I have to say, ‘Sorry, I need time off’ in the first 72 hours,” said Juston Kerns, 35, arrested for involvement in the sale of methamphetamine in 2014.

A few years ago, Wesley Harden — convicted in 2008 of selling methamphetamine after he led police on a high-speed chase — was arrested and charged with “failure to register.” Harden, 35, showed up as required, but he’d recently failed to report a jet ski as a new vehicle.  He doesn’t know for sure how the authorities discovered the jet ski, but thinks it has to do with pictures he posted on Facebook.  Harden received three years of probation, but the punishment for failing to register can include prison time, even if the original conviction was handled without incarceration.  Last year, 38 people were sent to prison over their failure to register for drug crimes, and the Kansas Sentencing Commission estimates that removing drug crimes would save the state roughly a million dollars each year....

Many law enforcement officials support the registry on public safety grounds. “People who sell drugs, there tends to be dangerous activity that takes place around their residence,” said Ed Klumpp, a retired Topeka police chief who lobbies for law enforcement at the legislature and opposes the current bill. “If you’re raising children in the neighborhood, it’s good to know there is someone down the street convicted of selling or manufacturing, so maybe they won’t send the kids to get candy there on Halloween.”

In recent years, lawyers around the country have argued to increasing success that registration requirements are unconstitutional.  One county in Colorado recently took its registry offline after a judge found it to be cruel and unusual punishment. California recently passed a law allowing sex offenders to be removed from the registry after 10 to 20 years if they have not committed another serious or violent felony or sex crime.

But beyond the legal questions are practical ones.  Little is known about whether registries prevent crime, and University of Michigan law professor J.J. Prescott has speculated that they may even facilitate crimes that involve buyers and sellers.  “Imagine I move to a new city and I don't know where to find drugs,” he said.  “Oh, I can just look up people on the registry!”

Evidence to support this theory is scant — and law enforcement leaders in Kansas say they have not encountered the problem — but at the February legislative hearing, Scott Schultz, the executive director of the Kansas Sentencing Commission, said he had learned of one registrant who found people at her door, looking to buy drugs.  They’d seen her address online. “I’ve called it, tongue in cheek, state-sponsored drug-dealing,” Schultz said, describing the registry as an “online shopping portal for meth and other drugs.”

March 8, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, March 07, 2018

"Plea Bargaining: From Patent Unfairness to Transparent Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper now appearing on SSRN authored by Mirko Bagaric, Julie Clarke and William Rininger. Here is its abstract:

The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented mass incarceration crisis.  It imprisons more of its citizens than any other country — and by a considerable margin.  It is now widely acknowledged that there is no community dividend stemming from an overly punitive sentencing system.  Over-incarceration does not make the community safer and diverts billions of dollars annually from productive social services, such as health and education.  Lawmakers have failed to find overarching solutions to this crisis. This Article proposes to change that paradigm by offering concrete reforms to a key failing of the sentencing system.

Emerging evidence suggests that one of the main reasons for the mass incarceration crisis relates to the dysfunctional plea bargaining process, in which the prosecution has the stronger negotiating power and often uses it to press for harsh penalties.  The reality is that most defendants in the United States do not receive a trial, let alone a fair one.  Their fate is determined by a negotiation with a prosecutor. More than ninety percent of all criminal matters in the United States are finalized in this manner.   There is a wide-ranging consensus that this process is flawed. It results in a large portion of defendants receiving harsher penalties than is commensurate with the seriousness of their offense. Sometimes it also leads to defendants who are innocent pleading guilty, in order to avoid the uncertainty of a trial.  The process is especially unfair on minority groups, with evidence establishing that African Americans in particular, receive harsher penalties than similarly situated white defendants.

This Article proposes reforms to the plea bargaining process that will demonstrably and profoundly reshape the framework for plea negotiations.  The central plank of the proposed reform is to shift more discretion and power from prosecutors, who invariably agitate for tougher sentences, into the hands of (impartial) sentencing judges.  This can be achieved by conferring a discount to offenders who plead guilty.  The size of the discount should be up to thirty percent.  A similar system already operates effectively in Australia.  In addition to this, defendants who plead guilty in circumstances when there is a weak prosecution case (and who are tenably innocent) should receive a discount of up to seventy-five percent.  This proposal would considerably reduce incarceration numbers in a way that does not compromise community safety and preserves the cost-saving benefits of the current plea bargaining process.  The reform will also reduce the discriminatory operation of the sentencing system against offenders who come from socially and economically deprived backgrounds.

March 7, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Another sad account of how US Bureau of Prisons administers compassionate release program

The Marshall Project and the New York Times have this lengthy new piece about the ugly administration of the federal compassionate release program by the US Bureau of Prisons. At the Marshall Project, the piece has this full headline summarizing its content: "Old, Sick and Dying in Shackles: 'Compassionate release' has bipartisan support as a way to reduce the federal prison population and save taxpayer money. New data shows that it’s rarely used." Here are excerpts:

Congress created compassionate release as a way to free certain inmates, such as the terminally ill, when it becomes “inequitable” to keep them in prison any longer.  Supporters view the program as a humanitarian measure and a sensible way to reduce health care costs for ailing, elderly inmates who pose little risk to public safety.  But despite urging from lawmakers of both parties, numerous advocacy groups and even the Bureau of Prisons’ own watchdog, prison officials use it only sparingly.

Officials deny or delay the vast majority of requests, including that of one of the oldest federal prisoners, who was 94, according to new federal data analyzed by The Marshall Project and The New York Times.  From 2013 to 2017, the Bureau of Prisons approved 6 percent of the 5,400 applications received, while 266 inmates who requested compassionate release died in custody. The bureau’s denials, a review of dozens of cases shows, often override the opinions of those closest to the prisoners, like their doctors and wardens.

Advocates for the program say the bureau, which oversees roughly 183,000 inmates, denies thousands of deserving applicants. About half of those who died after applying were convicted of nonviolent fraud or drug crimes. “It makes sense to release prisoners who present very little danger to society. It’s the humane thing to do, and it’s the fiscally responsible thing to do,” said Senator Brian Schatz of Hawaii, a Democrat. “The Bureau of Prisons has the theoretical authority to do this, but they basically do none of it.”

Case files show that prison officials reject many prisoners’ applications on the grounds that they pose a risk to public safety or that their crime was too serious to justify early release. In 2013, an inspector general reported that nearly 60 percent of inmates were denied based on the severity of their offense or criminal history. The United States Sentencing Commission has said that such considerations are better left to judges — but judges can rule on compassionate release requests only if the Bureau of Prisons approves them first.

Late last month, Schatz introduced legislation — co-sponsored with Senators Mike Lee of Utah, a Republican, and Patrick Leahy of Vermont, a Democrat — that would let prisoners petition the courts directly if the bureau denies or delays their requests.

Many are turned down for not meeting medical requirements. [Kevin] Zeich, who was serving 27 years for dealing methamphetamine, requested compassionate release three times, but was repeatedly told he was not sick enough. On his fourth try, his daughter, Kimberly Heraldez, finally received a phone call in March 2016 saying her father would soon be on a plane, headed to her home in California. Early the next morning, she was awakened by another call. Her father had died....

Compassionate release dates back to an overhaul of federal sentencing laws in the 1980s. While abolishing federal parole, Congress supplied a safety valve, giving judges the power to retroactively cut sentences short in “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances. But a court could do so only if the Bureau of Prisons filed a motion on an inmate’s behalf. For years, the agency approved only prisoners who were near death or completely debilitated. While nonmedical releases were permitted, an inspector general report found in 2013, not a single one was approved over a six-year period.

The report said the program should be expanded beyond terminal illness cases and used more frequently as a low-risk way to reduce overcrowding and health care spending. The Bureau of Prisons widened the criteria to explicitly include inmates over 65 and those who are the sole possible caregiver for a family member.  Then Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr., promoted the changes as part of his “Smart on Crime” initiative to “use our limited resources to house those who pose the greatest threat.

”But the bureau, which is part of the Justice Department, has yet to fully embrace those changes. Of those inmates who have applied for nonmedical reasons, 2 percent (50 cases) have been approved since 2013, according to an analysis of federal prison data.  And although overall approval numbers increased slightly between 2013 and 2015, they have since fallen.

At a 2016 sentencing commission hearing, Bureau of Prisons officials said they believed the program should not be used to reduce overcrowding.  And even the principal deputy assistant to Holder, Jonathan Wroblewski, said the program was not an “appropriate vehicle for a broad reduction” in the prison population.  “Every administration has taken the position that part of our responsibility is to ensure that public safety is not undermined,” he said.

After the hearing, the commission released new guidelines encouraging prison officials to determine only whether inmates fit the criteria for release — that is, if they are old enough, sick or disabled enough, or if they are the sole possible caregiver for someone on the outside. Whether the prisoner poses a risk to the public should be left to a judge to decide, the commission said.

Mark Inch, who was appointed director of the Bureau of Prisons by Attorney General Jeff Sessions last August, has made no public statements about the program. The bureau declined to make Inch available for an interview and did not respond to emailed questions.

As this article indicates, there are bills now pending in Congress that would in various ways address deficiencies in the current compassionate release mechanisms. This is on of many reasons I am hopeful (but not optimistic) that folks on both sides of the aisle in Congress will try hard in the coming weeks to get at least some form of prison reform legislation to Prez Trump's desk. A revised and expanded compassionate release mechanism could and should help hundreds, perhaps thousands, of federal prisoners, particularly those who have likely already served a very long time in federal prison and who pose little or no risk to public safety.

A few recent of many prior related posts:

March 7, 2018 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Lethal Rejection: An Empirical Analysis of the Astonishing Plunge in Death Sentences in the United States from Their Post-Furman Peak"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new paper by David McCord and Talia Roitberg Harmon now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The authors gathered information on 1665 death-eligible cases nationwide for three years at decade intervals: 1994, 2004, and 2014.  In 517 cases death sentences were imposed; in 311 cases sentencers spared the defendants from death sentences, and in 837 cases prosecutors spared defendants from death sentences.  The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explains the methodology for unearthing relevant data and preparing it for analysis.  Part II analyzes declines in death sentences due to decreasing death eligibility, that is, fewer murderers over time meeting the criteria that made death a sentencing option.  Four reasons are examined: fewer death-eligible murders, the United States Supreme Court’s exemptions of juveniles who were less than eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the murder, and persons with intellectual disability (known to the law as the “mentally retarded”); and the abolition of the death penalty in several states.  This Part concludes that about half of the decline in death sentences is attributable to decreased death-eligibility, mostly due to the steep decrease in the number of death-eligible murders.

Part III examines increasingly narrower perceptions of death-worthiness, that is, the evolution in attitudes among prosecutors and sentencers toward deeming fewer among the many death-eligible defendants worthy of death sentences.  This Part requires the most complicated analysis because unlike death-eligibility decisions, which are dictated by law, death-worthiness decisions emerge from an opaque brew of many factors, including, but not limited to, resource differentials among jurisdictions, prosecutorial attitudes, the wishes of the murder victim’s survivors, defense counsel performance, public opinion, and sentencer reactions.  But while death-worthiness decisions are often opaque in individual cases, each case generates empirical data from which patterns may be discerned. Part III uses such data to analyze ten questions and arrive at tentative answers:

• Did the advent of life-without-parole (hereinafter “LWOP”) reduce death sentences in jurisdictions where it was added as an option? (only in Texas)

• Did sentencers become more reluctant to return death sentences? (no)

• Were death sentences decreasingly imposed in less aggravated cases and increasingly imposed in more aggravated cases? (to some extent)

• Did presentation of greater numbers of mitigating factors conduce to fewer death sentences? (no)

• Did robbery during a murder became a less powerful aggravator? (yes)

• Did 18-to-20 year-olds benefit from a ripple effect from the exemption of juveniles? (yes)

• Did death sentences become less common in multiple perpetrator cases? (yes)

• Did low population counties increasingly drop out of death sentencing? (yes)

• Did low revenue counties increasingly drop out of death sentencing? (no) and

• Did a few traditionally high-volume death sentencing counties skew the figures by cutting back on the use of the death penalty due to local political factors? (yes)

March 7, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms, Detailed sentencing data, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Tuesday, March 06, 2018

Federal prosecutors seeking (way-below-guideline) sentence of 15 years for "Pharma Bro" Martin Shkreli

As reported in this new Reuters piece, "U.S. prosecutors on Tuesday said former drug company executive Martin Shkreli should spend at least 15 years in prison after being convicted of fraud, saying his lack of remorse and respect for the law justified a long time behind bars." Here is more, with a final point stressed for commentary:

The request by the Department of Justice came three days before Shkreli’s scheduled sentencing by U.S. District Judge Kiyo Matsumoto in Brooklyn federal court. Prosecutors called Shkreli “a man who stands before this court without any showing of genuine remorse, a man who has consistently chosen to put profit and the cultivation of a public image before all else, and a man who believes the ends always justify the means.”

Shkreli, 34, had requested a 12-to-18-month term following his conviction last August for lying to investors about the performance of his hedge funds MSMB Capital and MSMB Healthcare, and conspiring to manipulate the stock price of the drug company Retrophin Inc. Known as “Pharma Bro,” in part for his ability to attract attention, Shkreli is perhaps best known for raising the price of the anti-parasitic drug Daraprim by more than 5,000 percent in 2015, while serving as chief executive of Turing Pharmaceuticals, now called Vyera Pharmaceuticals....

Shkreli has been in jail since September, when Matsumoto revoked his bail after he offered social media followers $5,000 for a hair from former U.S. presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. On Monday, Matsumoto ordered Shkreli to forfeit $7.36 million of ill-gotten gains. She said he may be forced to give up assets such as a Picasso painting and a one-of-a-kind Wu-Tang Clan album if he cannot find the money....

In a letter to the judge last week, Shkreli said he accepted that he had made “serious mistakes,” but still considered himself “a good person with much potential.”

But prosecutors said that while in jail, Shkreli has privately expressed disdain for his conviction and the judicial process, providing further evidence he does not deserve mercy. It cited a January email conversation where Shkreli allegedly wrote “fuck the feds” and expressed hope for a big tax refund because only his “liquid money” was affected by the forfeiture. “Shkreli’s email communications confirm that any remorse he may express publicly is a carefully constructed facade,” prosecutors said.

A 15-year term is shorter than the minimum 27 years recommended under federal guidelines. Brafman has called that length “draconian and offensive.”

There is much in this story and in this high-profile sentencing that merits commentary, but I am especially struck by the decision by federal prosecutors to request a sentence here that is more than a decade below the advisory guideline range.  Recall that the May 2017 Sessions Memo said federal prosecutors "should in all cases seek a reasonable sentence under the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. In most cases, recommending a sentence within the advisory guideline range will be appropriate."  This high-profile case is still more proof that federal prosecutors recognize that the applicable federal sentencing guidelines for at least some fraud offenses are not reasonable and can be unreasonable extreme by more than a decade.

Prior related posts:

March 6, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, March 05, 2018

Making a fulsome case on the merits against sex offender registries

This morning, the US Supreme Court granted cert in Gundy v. US to consider whether Congress's delegation to the attorney general the power to issue regulations interpreting the federal Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act violates the nondelegation doctrine. That grant on that issue right has Con Law fans buzzing. But sentencing fans more interested in the substance of sex offender registries will want to check out this new commentary by Jesse Kelley in The Hill under the headline "The Sex Offender Registry: Vengeful, unconstitutional and due for full repeal." Here are excerpts:

The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that at least 95 percent of all state prisoners will be released from prison at some point. However, convicted sex-offenders almost exclusively face the vengeful, additional punishment of registration under the Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (SORNA).

Generally, under SORNA, an individual who is required to register as a sex offender must register at least once a year; report any change of address within as little as three days; produce vehicle information, a recent photograph and a DNA sample; and abide by stringent residency restrictions, which can force individuals out of urban areas, away from family and into unemployment.

SORNA violates our nation’s founding documents by singling out a specific category of offenders for unfair, unconstitutional punishment. While the Department of Justice cites public safety as its rationale for continuing to enforce the overreaching requirements of SORNA, the program has metastasized, defacing some of our most treasured rights: the right to due process, the right to be free from double jeopardy and the right to avoid cruel and unusual punishment.....

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the state’s version of SORNA violates juvenile offenders’ due process rights because the requirements of satisfying SORNA assume that a juvenile will commit some sex offense in the future without giving him or her the opportunity to challenge that assumption. Equity demands assigning this same ruling to adult reporting requirements.

Another element of due process known as “double jeopardy” appears in the Fifth Amendment and protects an individual from being prosecuted for the same offense twice. It also bars multiple punishments for the same crime. Individuals convicted of crimes who have faced incarceration and then must begin sex registry-reporting are certainly being punished repeatedly.

SORNA requirements punish ex-offenders by inflicting upon them tangible, secondary punishments, like the inability to qualify for housing and increased difficulties securing employment. These secondary punishments effectively banish ex-offenders to a modern leper colony by not only removing re-entry resources but also by affirmatively ostracizing those attempting to rebuild a life after incarceration.

In addition to violating double jeopardy, repeated punishments violate the Eighth Amendment by imposing cruel and unusual punishment. The government is prohibited from imposing a criminal sentence that is either vindictive or far too harsh for the crime committed. Incarceration is intended to be a punishment and a deterrence, so any subsequent punishment can only be vindictive. After incarceration, an ex-offender’s privacy is significantly diminished by the requirement to report one’s name, address, photo, employment status and provide a DNA sample.

Last fall, a federal judge found that the Colorado sex offender registry’s punitive impact outweighed any value it might have had in protecting the public and concluded that registration violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. As the judge specifically stated, “This ongoing imposition of a known and uncontrollable risk of public abuse of information from the sex offender registry, in the absence of any link to an objective risk to the public posed by each individual sex offender, has resulted in and continues to threaten [sex offenders] with punishment disproportionate to the offenses they committed.”

As Clarence Darrow famously said, “You can only protect your liberties in this world by protecting the other man's freedom. You can only be free if I am free.” Protecting the constitutional rights of everyone, even those convicted of sex offenses, is of the upmost importance for protecting our freedom. Therefore, both legislators — by way of developing and amending laws — and judges — via hearing arguments and creating case law — must re-examine SORNA in order to preserve liberty and uphold the Constitution.

March 5, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (9)

SCOTUS grants cert on structural SORNA issue and Justice Sotomayor dissents in capital case with IAC issues

The Supreme Court has been mulling over a number of cases that would, if cert were granted, be of great interest to sentencing fans. But the Justices, via today's new SCOTUS order list, did not grant (or deny) cert on any blockbusters. Here is the SCOTUSblog accounting of what sentencing fans did get today:

The second grant is Gundy v. US, but only limited to the fourth question presented by the petition: whether Congress's delegation of power to the attorney general to issue regulations interpreting the Sex Offender Notification and Registration Act violates the nondelegation doctrine....

The non-delegation challenge to SORNA is (1) more plausible than most non-delegation challenges because of the criminal context; but (2) would be the first non-delegation challenge that has prevailed at the Court in a very long time. And it would blast a giant hole in SORNA.

Justice Sotomayor dissented from the denial of review in Wessinger v. Vannoy, a capital case involving an attorney's duties to conduct a mitigation investigation when the court has denied funds for expert assistance.

Justice Sotomayor's solo dissent in Wessinger ends this way:

The Court’s denial of certiorari here belies the “bedrock principle in our justice system” that a defendant has a right to effective assistance of trial counsel, and undermines the protections this Court has recognized are necessary to protect that right. Martinez, 566 U.S., at 12. Indeed, the investigation of mitigation evidence and its presentation at sentencing are crucial to maintaining the integrity of capital proceedings.  The layers of ineffective assistance of counsel that Wessinger received constitute precisely the type of error that warrants relief under this Court’s precedent.  Yet, Wessinger will remain on death row without a jury ever considering the significant mitigation evidence that is now apparent. Because that outcome is contrary to precedent and deeply unjust and unfair, I dissent from the denial of certiorari.

March 5, 2018 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Sixth Amendment Sentencing after Hurst"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Carissa Byrne Hessick and William Berry available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The Supreme Court’s 2016 decision in Hurst v. Florida, which struck down Florida’s capital sentencing scheme, altered the Court’s Sixth Amendment sentencing doctrine. That doctrine has undergone several important changes since it was first recognized.  At times the doctrine has expanded—invalidating sentencing practices across the country — and at times it has contracted — allowing restrictions on judicial sentencing discretion based on findings that are not submitted to a jury. Hurst represents another expansion of the doctrine.  Although the precise scope of the decision is unclear, the most sensible reading of Hurst suggests that any finding required before a judge may impose a higher sentence must be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.  This reading invalidates several state capital sentencing systems and several non-capital systems, and it would require dramatic changes to federal sentencing as well.

March 5, 2018 in Blakely in the Supreme Court, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, March 01, 2018

"Wrong Turn on the Ex Post Facto Clause"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Paul Reingold and Kimberly Thomas now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The Ex Post Facto Clause bars any increase in punishment after the commission of a crime.  But deciding what constitutes an increase in punishment can be tricky.  At the front end of a criminal case, where new or amended criminal laws might lengthen prisoners’ sentences if applied retroactively, courts have routinely struck down such changes under the Ex Post Facto Clause.  At the back end, however, where new or amended parole laws or policies might lengthen prisoners’ sentences in exactly the same way if applied retroactively, courts have used a different standard and upheld the changes under the Ex Post Facto Clause.  Because the harm is identical and lies at the core of what the Ex Post Facto Clause is supposed to protect against, we think the asymmetry is mistaken.

Parole is an integral part of punishment: it determines how much time people will serve on their sentences.  Until the 21st century, black-letter law forbade even modest parole changes that were adverse to prisoners.  If a change in the parole regime might lead to longer sentences, then courts insisted that the change be applied prospectively only.  Over the last two decades, relying on language in two US Supreme Court parole cases decided in 1995 and 2000, the lower courts have shifted parole–ex post facto doctrine by 180 degrees.  Prisoners can no longer prevail even when the change in the state parole regime is almost certain to lead to significantly longer sentences.

In the context of parole, the courts have repudiated past doctrine and strayed far from the purposes of the Ex Post Facto Clause.  In this article, we review the history, show how the current case law is misguided and illogical, and put forward a new framework that would restore the Ex Post Facto Clause to its rightful place.

March 1, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (4)

Will strong religious liberty advocates rally for Mennonite investigator jailed for refusing to testify in Colorado capital case?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this remarkable story from the Denver Post headlined "Mennonite investigator sent to jail after refusing to testify in Robert Ray death penalty hearing: Lawyer for Greta Lindecrantz says she is being punished for long-standing religious beliefs." Here are the basics:

A 67-year-old Mennonite woman spent a second day in the Arapahoe County jail Tuesday after she refused to testify for the prosecution in a death penalty case. Greta Lindecrantz on Tuesday morning was found in contempt of court after she told District Judge Michelle Amico she would not answer questions in the witness stand because of her religious beliefs. Lindecrantz has been called to testify on behalf of the prosecution in an appeals hearing for Robert Ray, who was sentenced to death in 2009 for ordering the murder of Javad Marshall-Fields and Vivian Wolfe, who were witnesses in another murder case.

Lindecrantz worked as an investigator for Ray’s defense team, but those attorneys have not called her as a witness. However, the prosecution wants to question her about her work during the investigation and original trial, said her attorney, Mari Newman. All of her work already is a part of the official court record and there really is no reason for her to take the stand again, she said.

Lindecrantz sat in the courtroom wearing an orange jumpsuit with her hands shackled as Newman argued that she should be released because she is being punished by the courts for religious beliefs. Testifying would go against her moral and religious views, Newman said. “Imprisonment has not been effective,” Newman said. “It will not be effective tomorrow.”

But Amico said she had made her decision and was sticking to it. She told Newman she could appeal to a higher court. Until then, Lindecrantz would go back to jail. “It was a difficult decision for the court to make (Monday),” Amico said. Newman had asked for a lesser punishment, but Amico responded, “How would less punishment be effective? I’ve imposed jail and she’s still refusing to testify.”

After the hearing, Newman gathered on the courthouse lawn with Lindecrantz’s husband, Dave Sidwell, and supporters from the metro area’s two Mennonite congregations. “She has a fundamental religious belief against the killing of other human beings and specifically against state-sanctioned killing in the form of the death penalty,” Newman said. “She has refused to testify as a witness called by the prosecution — and the reason, the one and only reason she’s refused to testify, is because to do so would violate her firmly held religious beliefs against the death penalty.”

Because of her religious conviction, Lindecrantz has two choices — stay in jail or abandon her faith, Newman said. On Monday night, Lindecratz was in a cell with nine women, some of whom were sick all night because they were detoxing from drugs. Lindecrantz is old enough to be those women’s mothers, she said. “For the court to imprison her until she is broken, until her will is broken, and she abandons her faith and her view that she cannot participate in state-sanctioned killing is an abomination,” Newman said.

Sidwell, who also is a Mennonite, said he supported his wife’s stand, saying they both were adamantly opposed to the death penalty. “She’s not going to change her mind,” Sidwell said. “It’s, to me, a pointless pursuit.”

The Rev. Vern Rempel, pastor of Beloved Community Mennonite Church in Englewood, said he counseled Lindecrantz over the weekend about what she would do when called to the stand Monday morning. Those discussions included figuring out a way that Lindecrantz could comply with the courts without betraying her religious conviction. On Sunday, the congregation gathered around Lindecrantz to pray over the decision. “On Sunday, she said she had clarity and was ready to do this,” he said. “Really, we felt the strength of her commitment.”

Mennonite opposition to the death penalty dates to 1525, Rempel said. “This is not something that is not a mood of Greta’s,” he said. “Or a fancy. Or something she’s making up. It has been a lifetime commitment for her.”

While Lindecrantz is spending her second night in jail, the legal drama has been playing since Jan. 20, when Newman first filed a motion in an attempt to keep her client off the witness stand. But Amico repeatedly denied the motion, saying in an order written on Feb. 16 that allowing people to refuse to participate in death penalty cases on religious grounds would disrupt the justice system. Religious-based capital defense teams would be able to refuse to follow proceedings, rules and laws based on those grounds, Amico wrote. It would create an “absurd and unworkable result” for death penalty cases in Colorado.

Because of the politics involved, I am inclined to guess that the folks who eager to support, on religious liberty grounds, those resisting laws restricting displays of religious items on public lands or laws concerning certain medical procedures will not be quite as quick to get behind this particular form of legal resistance based on sincere religious beliefs. (And, by the same political token, I suspect those usually critical of legal resistance based on religious liberty claims may not be so critical of the claim in this setting.)

March 1, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Religion, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

"The Politics of Prosecution: Examining the Policymaking Role of Prosecutors"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Abhinav Sekhri. Here is the abstract:

This short paper focuses on prosecutors in the federal setting and contributes to this growing field of scholarship.  Through the lens of Prosecutorial Agreements in the sphere of corporate criminal liability, I demonstrate that prosecutors engage in important policy making exercises.  I argue that this analysis helps better understand the constrains in which prosecutorial discretion is exercises, and here I suggest how such an analysis offers a more nuanced reading of the prosecutorial charging practices in corporate crime over the last two decades.  I conclude by suggesting that examining the policymaking potential of prosecutors merits great attention today, as the importance of these actors within the criminal justice system is being appreciated beyond legal spheres.

March 1, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, February 28, 2018

"Pharma Bro" Martin Shkreli, facing decades under guidelines, seeks prison sentence of 12-18 months

As reported in this Reuters article, "Martin Shkreli, the former drug company executive convicted of defrauding investors in two hedge funds he ran, has asked a federal judge to sentence him to 12 months to 18 months in prison, much less than suggested federal guidelines."  Here is more:

Shkreli, 34, has been in jail since September, when U.S. District Judge Kiyo Matsumoto revoked his bail after he offered a $5,000 bounty for a strand of Hillary Clinton’s hair in a Facebook post.  Matsumoto is scheduled to sentence him on March 9.

Shkreli’s lawyers said in a court filing on Tuesday that a sentence of 27 years or more calculated using federal guidelines would be “draconian and offensive.” The filing included a letter from Shkreli, asking the judge for leniency.  “I accept the fact that I made serious mistakes, but I still believe that I am a good person with much potential,” he said.

In addition to the prison sentence, they proposed Shkreli complete 2,000 hours of community service and undergo court-mandated therapy....

Shkreli, nicknamed “Pharma Bro,” raised the price of anti-infection drug Daraprim by over 5,000 percent in 2015 while he was chief executive officer of Turing Pharmaceuticals.  A jury found him guilty last August of unrelated securities fraud charges.  They determined that he lied to investors about the performance of his hedge funds, MSMB Capital and MSMB Healthcare.  He also was found guilty of conspiring to manipulate the stock price of a drug company he founded, Retrophin Inc.

Shkreli’s investors eventually came out ahead after he paid them in shares of Retrophin, and in some cases through settlement agreements and consulting contracts with the company, according to testimony at trial.  However, Matsumoto ruled Monday that he would still be held responsible for defrauding investors out of millions of dollars, because he secured their investments through fraud.

Shkreli’s lawyers said in the filing that he made mistakes when communicating with his investors not because he wanted to steal from them, but because he “could not bring himself to admit failure.”  They also tried to counter the view that Shkreli was the “greedy Pharma Bro.” They pointed to his work at Retrophin to develop a drug for a rare childhood degenerative disease called PKAN that was used to treat some patients in Cyprus, as well as online relationships he has maintained with patients.  Even the controversial Daraprim price hike was meant to fund research into rare diseases, they said.

The filing included dozens of letters supporting Shkreli, including from family members and a former Turing employee who praised his “altruistic passion.”

Prior related post:

February 28, 2018 in Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Entire First Circuit urges Supreme Court to revisit Harmelin's limits on Eighth Amendment challenges to extreme adult prison sentence

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the remarkable opinion emerging yesterday from the First Circuit in the form of a very lengthy concurrence in the denial of rehearing en banc in United States v. Rivera-Ruperto, No. 12-2364 (1st Cir. Feb 27, 2018) (available here). Last year I noted the panel opinion in this case in this post titled "Extended dissent laments First Circuit panel's rejection of Eighth Amendment attack on 160-year sentence for stash house participant."  Interestingly, this time around all the First Circuit judges seem to be on the same page, deciding they lack authority to find Wendell Rivera-Ruperto's extreme sentence unconstitutional, but urging the Supreme Court to revisit the precedent they see as standing improperly in their way.

Judge Barron's lengthy opinion is a must-read for Eighth Amendment fans, and it defies ready summary.  To begin, Judge Barron explains why the analytical framework set by Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) would lead him to "find that Rivera's mandatory, more-than-century-long sentence was grossly disproportionate and thus in violation of the Eighth Amendment."  But, continues Judge Barron, judges must further consider Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), and "the Harmelin concurrence controls the outcome here, and ... does so by limiting our inquiry to a consideration of only Solem's first criterion."  And, according to Judge Barron, ultimately judges "have no choice but to approve mandatory 'forever' sentences under § 924(c) so long as they can hypothesize a rational reason for the legislature to have thought that the underlying criminal conduct was as serious as the large quantity drug possession at issue in Harmelin." 

After intricate analysis of these and other Eighth Amendment and related precedents, this remarkable opinion (which, again, was joined by all the First Circuit judges), concludes this way:

Rivera faces the longest and most unforgiving possible prison sentence for conduct that, though serious, is not of the most serious kind.  He does so not because the legislature had authorized its imposition and a judge had then considered all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and determined that this sentence was appropriate.  He does so only because Congress has been deemed to have made a blanket judgment that even an offender like Rivera -- who has no prior criminal record and whose series of related crimes resulted in no harm to an identifiable victim -- should have no hope of ever living free.  And he does so even though virtually every comparable jurisdiction punishes comparable criminal conduct less harshly, and even though the federal government itself punishes nearly the same or seemingly worse conduct more leniently.

Almost three decades have now passed since the concurring Justices in Harmelin concluded, without reference to real-world comparative benchmarks, that the Eighth Amendment afforded the Michigan legislature the scope to try out what at the time was viewed as a permissible sentencing experiment to address a newly concerning crime problem.  In those intervening decades, virtually no jurisdiction has been willing to replicate that state's experiment.  In fact, even the state that the Harmelin concurrence permitted to try it has abandoned it.  And yet the Harmelin concurrence still controls.

In my view, a consequence as grave as the one that Harmelin requires in a case like this should have the imprimatur of more than only a nearly three-decade old, three-Justice concurrence. I thus urge the Supreme Court to consider whether the Eighth Amendment permits, at least in a case such as this, the mandatory stacking of sentences under § 924(c) that -- due to their cumulative length -- necessarily results in the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole.

February 28, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, February 27, 2018

SCOTUS finally resolves Jennings v. Rodriguez, ruling Ninth Circuit erred when deciding detained aliens have a statutory right to periodic bond hearings

The Supreme Court granted cert in Jennings v. Rodriguez nearly two years ago, but the case got set for re-argument this Term and now has finally resulted in an opinion concerning certain procedural rights for detailed aliens.  The full Jennings opinion is lengthy and intricate, and the opinion for the Court authored by Justice Alito sets up the discussion this way:

In this case we are asked to interpret three provisions of U.S. immigration law that authorize the Government to detain aliens in the course of immigration proceedings.  All parties appear to agree that the text of these provisions, when read most naturally, does not give detained aliens the right to periodic bond hearings during the course of their detention.  But by relying on the constitutional-avoidance canon of statutory interpretation, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that detained aliens have a statutory right to periodic bond hearings under the provisions at issue.

Under the constitutional-avoidance canon, when statutory language is susceptible of multiple interpretations, a court may shun an interpretation that raises serious constitutional doubts and instead may adopt an alternative that avoids those problems.  But a court relying on that canon still must interpret the statute, not rewrite it.  Because the Court of Appeals in this case adopted implausible constructions of the three immigration provisions at issue, we reverse its judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I believe the context and content of the majority's ruling likely mean the Jennings decision will not have many big implications outside the immigration detention setting. But Justice Breyer's lengthy dissenting opinion discusses bail and due process more broadly, and his closing sentiments highlights why a ruling the other way in Jennings might have been significant for a broad array of criminal defendants:

The relevant constitutional language, purposes, history, traditions, context, and case law, taken together, make it likely that, where confinement of the noncitizens before us is prolonged (presumptively longer than six months), bail proceedings are constitutionally required.  Given this serious constitutional problem, I would interpret the statutory provisions before us as authorizing bail.  Their language permits that reading, it furthers their basic purposes, and it is consistent with the history, tradition, and constitutional values associated with bail proceedings.  I believe that those bail proceedings should take place in accordance with customary rules of procedure and burdens of proof rather than the special rules that the Ninth Circuit imposed.

The bail questions before us are technical but at heart they are simple.  We need only recall the words of the Declaration of Independence, in particular its insistence that all men and women have “certain unalienable Rights,” and that among them is the right to “Liberty.”  We need merely remember that the Constitution’s Due Process Clause protects each person’s liberty from arbitrary deprivation.  And we need just keep in mind the fact that, since Blackstone’s time and long before, liberty has included the right of a confined person to seek release on bail.  It is neither technical nor unusually difficult to read the words of these statutes as consistent with this basic right.  I would find it far more difficult, indeed, I would find it alarming, to believe that Congress wrote these statutory words in order to put thousands of individuals at risk of lengthy confinement all within the United States but all without hope of bail.  I would read the statutory words as consistent with, indeed as requiring protection of, the basic right to seek bail.

February 27, 2018 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, February 26, 2018

At just what level of Dante's Inferno does modern ACCA jurisprudence reside?

Dante_s_inferno_by_somnium_maris-d68js14The silly question in the title of this post is my silly reaction to a not-so-silly ruling from a Fourth Circuit panel today flagged for me by a helpful reader.  I will get to that ruling in a minute, but first I must spotlight this website's helpful explanation of the circles of hell set forth in Dante's Inferno:

The Levels of Hell

In Dante's Inferno, Hell is described as having 9 different levels, or circles, each lower than the last.  As one descends into the depths of hell, he comes closer to the 9th circle where Satan himself resides.  Each level of hell is reserved for different types of sinners, and different punishments are inflicted on the damned depending on the nature and severity of their sin.  The greater their sin, the lower the level to which they are condemned to spend eternity.

Notably, the "seventh level of hell is reserved for those who are guilty of violence, whether it be against themselves, property, nature, or other people."  I suppose that would be the fitting level for locating the modern federal court jurisprudence over application of the Armed Career Criminal Act because what is typically debated within this jurisprudence is whether a defendant's prior conviction qualities as a "violent felony." 

But, in referencing Dante's Inferno, I am really thinking about federal criminal practitioners and federal judges who must feel like they are dropping through various levels of hell as they sort through various intricate precedents to try to figure out what is and what is not a "violent felony" for ACCA purposes.  Last week I noted here a big split Fifth Circuit en banc ruling holding that Texas burglary convictions do not serve as predicates for the Armed Career Criminal Act.  Today, it is a Fourth Circuit panel ruling that has my ACCA head hurting; US v. Middleton, No. 16-7556 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 2018) (available here), gets started this way:

Jarnaro Carlos Middleton was sentenced as an armed career criminal pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  Middleton challenges the district court’s determination that his prior conviction for South Carolina involuntary manslaughter qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA.  Due to the idiosyncrasies of the Supreme Court’s “categorical approach,” the ultimate issue in this case is whether selling alcohol to a minor involves the requisite use of violent force.  We conclude that it does not and reverse.

Critically, there is no suggestion in this opinion that Jarnaro Carlos Middleton's conviction for involuntary manslaughter had anything to do with selling alcohol to a minor.  But a 1992 opinion of the Court of Appeals of South Carolina upholds an involuntary manslaughter conviction involving selling alcohol to a minor, and that fact ends up shaping whether Jarnaro Carlos Middleton faces a 15-year statutory mandatory minimum or a 10-year statutory mandatory maximum for the federal crime of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Somewhere Franz Kafka (as well as Dante Alighieri) is blushing.  And if the realities of the majority opinion does not whet your ACCA appetite, Middleton comes with a partial concurrence that starts this way:

The majority concludes that a conviction for South Carolina involuntary manslaughter does not categorically qualify as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).  While I agree with that conclusion, I hesitate to join the majority’s analysis.  In my view, our recent decisions in In re Irby, 858 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 2017), and United States v. Reid, 861 F.3d 523 (4th Cir. 2017), undermine the majority’s reasoning that South Carolina involuntary manslaughter can be committed with de minimis force and by simply causing injury without using force.  Nevertheless, I would hold that South Carolina involuntary manslaughter cannot be an ACCA predicate because, although the ACCA force clause requires a higher degree of mens rea than recklessness, an individual can be convicted of involuntary manslaughter in South Carolina based on reckless conduct.  Therefore, while I write separately as to Part II.B, I concur in part and concur in the judgment reversing the denial of habeas relief.

Natch.

February 26, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

SCOTUS takes up Alabama case concerning competency to be executed while again turning away post-Hurst capital challenges

The US Supreme Court issued this order list this morning, and capital punishment followers will find a few SCOTUS cert decisions of note.  First, the Court granted certiorari in Madison v. Alabama, No. 17-7505, and the docket number here is quite important because Vernon Madison had two notable cert petitions pending: Madison v. Alabama, 17-7505, which was granted raises asked whether Alabama may "execute a prisoner whose mental disability leaves him without memory of his commission of the capital offense?";  Madison v. Alabama, 17-7535, which was denied raised the issue of whether Alabama could move forward with the execution of a defendant whose death sentence result from the state's now-abolished practice of judicial override.

The death sentencing procedural issue that the Supreme Court decided not to take up in Vernon Madison's case is, of course, yet another off-shoot of what I have long called the "post-Hurst hydra."  After the Supreme Court in Hurst v. Florida declared Florida's death penalty procedures violative of the Sixth Amendment, I coined the term term "post-Hurst hydra" to describe the multi-headed, snake-like litigation destined to develop in various ways in various courts as state and federal judges tried to make sense of just what Hurst must mean for past, present and future capital cases.  I am further reminded of that hydra because today's SCOTUS order list concluded with two short dissents from the denial of certiorari authored by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor in two Florida capital cases.  Justice Sotomayor's dissent is a bit longer and joined by Justice Ginsburg and includes these passages:

Dale Middleton and Randy Tundidor were sentenced to death under a Florida capital sentencing scheme that this Court has since declared unconstitutional.  See Hurst v. Florida, 577 U. S. ___ (2016).  Relying on the unanimity of the juries’ recommendations of death, the Florida Supreme Court post-Hurst declined to disturb the petitioners’ death sentences, reasoning that the unanimity ensured that jurors had made the necessary findings of fact under Hurst.  By doing so, the Florida Supreme Court effectively transformed the pre-Hurst jury recommendations into binding findings of fact with respect to the petitioners’ death sentences.

Having so concluded, the Florida Supreme Court continually refuses to grapple with the Eighth Amendment implications of that holding.  If those then-advisory jury findings are now binding and sufficient to satisfy Hurst, petitioners contend that their sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because the jury instructions in their cases repeatedly emphasized the nonbinding, advisory nature of the jurors’ role and that the judge was the final decisionmaker.  This Court has unequivocally held “that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death rests elsewhere.” Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U. S. 320, 328–329 (1985).

February 26, 2018 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, February 25, 2018

What a difference a DA can make: new Philly District Attorney taking new approach to juve lifer resentencings

This recent local article, headlined "Why Philly DA Krasner could let 180+ juvenile lifers out of prison early," reports on the impact the recently elected Philadelphia prosecutor is having local cases demanding resentencing in the wake of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment ruling in Miller. Here are the details:

Philadelphia has sentenced more teens to life in prison with no chance of parole than any other jurisdiction in the world — and that meant it had the largest number to resentence after the U.S. Supreme Court two years ago ruled that its 2012 ban on mandatory life-without-parole sentences for minors must be applied retroactively.

As of this week, 127 out of approximately 315 juvenile lifers from Philadelphia have been resentenced. For those whose cases are still in process, the election of District Attorney Larry Krasner appears to have immediately and dramatically changed the outlook.

It means new deals are already on the table for 17 who had rejected offers made under the previous District Attorney’s Office, which mostly stuck close to current state sentencing guidelines that set minimums at 35 years to life for first-degree murder and 30 to life for second-degree murder. The latest offers make all but two of the lifers eligible for parole right away; it would also keep them all on parole for life. Some set minimums as low as 21 years for first-degree murder.

As for the remaining resentencings, Krasner said he intends to consider each case individually. Rather than relying on the sentencing guidelines, he said he would look to the historical, national and international context that has made Pennsylvania second in the nation in imposing life-without-parole sentences. “We are being consistent as we do our duty, which is to consider all these unique factors in resentencing,” he said. “It’s worth bearing in mind that Pennsylvania is an extreme outlier in excessive sentencing, and the United States is an extreme outlier in excessive sentencing.”

What’s unclear, however, is whether a Philadelphia judge will sign off on those agreements. At a recent status hearing, Common Pleas Judge Kathryn Streeter-Lewis, who is in charge of approving agreements in juvenile-lifer cases, asked the district attorney to submit briefs defending the deals’ legality in light of precedent-setting rulings by Pennsylvania’s appellate courts in the case of Qu’eed Batts, an Easton man who was 14 when he participated in a gang-related execution. In his case, the court acknowledged each judge has discretion to craft individualized minimum sentences, but said “sentencing courts should be guided” by current state law. “I understand that there is a different administration,” she said, but added, “Some of these [offers] are very much below the guidelines the decision required. … I’m going to need some reasons.”

One such case involved Avery Talmadge, who’s been locked up 22 years and was offered a time-served deal that — in a departure from past practice for the District Attorney’s Office — contemplates whether the original conviction was even appropriate. “The case was a street fight that turned into a shooting,” Assistant District Attorney Chesley Lightsey told Streeter-Lewis. “The [DAO’s internal resentencing] committee believes this is closer to a third-degree, though it was a first-degree conviction.” She said he also had an excellent prison record, reflecting the Supreme Court’s underlying rationale that kids, while impulsive and immature, also have a great capacity for rehabilitation.

Bradley Bridge of the Defender Association, which represents many of the lifers, believes the new offers will withstand judicial scrutiny — and that of the public. Krasner, he said, “sees the dangers of overincarceration and has come up with a meaningful solution.  He has reevaluated offers and, consistent with the protection of the public, has recognized that new offers can take into account to a more significant degree the juvenile’s growth while in prison.”...

Krasner said offers he’s approved so far have included minimums ranging between 40 years and just under 20 years.  He declined to specify a floor for minimum sentences. “I see no arbitrary number. We are approaching this the way the Anglo-American court system has approached these for centuries: on a case-by-case basis.”

February 25, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Friday, February 23, 2018

Interesting sentencing details as former Trump campaign official Rick Gates pleads guilty and faces significant prison time

In this post from October following their indictment, I highlighted that former campaign officials for Prez Trump, Paul Manifort and Rick Gates, could be facing very significant prison terms in light of the charges and potentially applicable sentencing guidelines. Today, as reported here by BuzzFeed News, "Rick Gates, a former Trump campaign aide and longtime associate of former Trump campaign chair Paul Manafort, pleaded guilty on Friday in the criminal case brought by special counsel Robert Mueller's office." And the BuzzFeed News report includes these interesting legal and practical sentencing particulars:

The two counts in the new criminal information each have a maximum penalty of five years in jail. According to Gates' plea agreement with the special counsel's office, he faces an estimated sentencing guidelines range of between 57 and 71 months in jail and a fine between $20,000 and $200,000; those numbers could change when the guidelines range is ultimately calculated, the judge noted.

Gates' lawyer Thomas Green told the judge that he reserved the right to argue for a lower sentence based on Gates' "disproportionate conduct" as compared to Manafort. Gates has agreed to cooperate with the special counsel's office. If prosecutors determine he has "provided substantial assistance," they have agreed to file a motion asking for a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines range. When Gates is sentenced, the government will dismiss the remaining counts in the original indictment as well as the new charges filed in Virginia.

As part of the plea deal, Gates agreed to delay his sentencing to give him time to cooperate. Asked how far out into the future the judge should set a deadline for the government to update the court on the status of the case, special counsel prosecutor Andrew Weissmann suggested three to four months. US District Judge Amy Berman Jackson set a deadline for a status report for May 14.

Gates spoke little during the plea hearing. He and Green declined to speak with reporters after the hearing as he exited the courthouse and got into a car.  He'll remain free pending sentencing, albeit subject to continued GPS monitoring and certain limits on his ability to travel beyond his home city of Richmond, Virginia.  He also had to agree to forfeit certain assets if he fled or failed to show up to court.

The folks at Lawfare have Gates's superseding criminal information and plea agreement now posted at this link. That agreement explains the ways in which the parties determine that "the applicable Guidelines Offense Level will be at least 25" which means the "estimated Sentencing Guidelines range is 57 months to 71." The plea agreement also speaks to potential departure arguments this way:

Your client agrees that, solely for the purposes of calculating the applicable range under the Sentencing Guidelines, a downward departure from the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above is not warranted, subject to the paragraphs regarding cooperation below and the argument that the Guidelines do not adequately reflect the defendant's role in the offense.  Accordingly, you will not seek any departure or adjustment to the Estimated Guidelines Range set forth above, nor suggest that the Court consider such a departure or adjustment for any other reason other than those Specified above.  Your client also reserves the right to disagree with the Estimated Guideline Range calculated by the Office.  However, your client understands and acknowledges that the Estimated Guidelines Range agreed to by the Office is not binding on the Probation Office or the Court.  Should the Court or Probation Office determine that a different guidelines range is applicable, your client will not be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea on that basis, and the Government and your client will still be bound by this Agreement.

February 23, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12)

Thursday, February 22, 2018

"A Pound of Flesh: The Criminalization of Private Debt"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new big ACLU report. Here part of its executive summary:

An estimated 77 million Americans — one in three adults — have a debt that has been turned over to a private collection agency. Thousands of these debtors are arrested and jailed each year because they owe money. Millions more are threatened with jail. The debts owed can be as small as a few dollars and can involve every kind of consumer debt, from car payments to utility bills to student loans to medical fees.  These trends devastate communities across the country as unmanageable debt and household financial crisis become ubiquitous, and they impact Black and Latino communities most harshly due to longstanding racial and ethnic gaps in poverty and wealth.

Debtors’ prisons were abolished by Congress in 1833 and are thought to be a relic of the Dickensian past.  In reality, private debt collectors — empowered by the courts and prosecutors’ offices — are using the criminal justice system to punish debtors and terrorize them into paying even when a debt is in dispute or when a debtor has no ability to pay.

The criminalization of private debt happens when judges, at the request of collection agencies, issue arrest warrants for people who failed to appear in court to deal with unpaid civil debt judgments. In many cases, the debtors were unaware they were sued or had not received notice to show up in court.  Tens of thousands of these warrants are issued annually, but the total number is unknown because states and local courts do not typically track these orders as a category of arrest warrants.

In a review of court records, the ACLU examined more than 1,000 cases in which civil court judges issued arrest warrants for debtors, sometimes to collect amounts as small as $28.  These cases took place in 26 states — Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin — and Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands.

Even without arrest warrants, the mere threat of jail can be effective in extracting payment — even if that threat is legally unfounded. In the case of debts involving bounced checks, private collection companies now have contracts with more than 200 district attorneys’ offices that allow them to use the prosecutor’s seal and signature on repayment demand letters.  It’s estimated that more than 1 million consumers each year receive such letters threatening criminal prosecution and jail time if they do not pay up.  But review of company practices has documented that letters often falsely misrepresent the threat of prosecution as a means of coercing payments from unknowing consumers.

February 22, 2018 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Florida Supreme Court finds that state's Miller fix statute to death with Eighth Amendment problems has Alleyne Sixth Amendment problem

The Florida Supreme Court issues an interesting ruling today dealing with juvenile sentencing in Williams v. Florida, No. SC17-506 (Fla. Feb 22, 2018) (available here). Here are the basics from the start of the ruling: 

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Williams v. State (Williams II), 211 So. 3d 1070 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017).  In its decision, the Fifth District ruled upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:

DOES ALLEYNE V. UNITED STATES, 570 U.S. 99, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013), REQUIRE THE JURY AND NOT THE TRIAL COURT TO MAKE THE FACTUAL FINDING UNDER SECTION 775.082(1)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES (2016), AS TO WHETHER A JUVENILE OFFENDER ACTUALLY KILLED, INTENDED TO KILL, OR ATTEMPTED TO KILL THE VICTIM?

Id. at 1073. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we hold that Alleyne requires a jury to make the factual finding, but conclude that Alleyne violations are subject to harmless error review. Where the error cannot be deemed harmless, the proper remedy is to resentence the juvenile offender pursuant to section 775.082(1)(b)2., Florida Statutes (2016).

As the opinion goes on to explain, the statute here was passed when Florida had to comply with the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment Miller ruling precluding mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile murderers.  The statute provides that a finding that "a juvenile offender actually killed, intended to kill, or attempted to kill the victim leads to a minimum forty-year sentence with a sentence review after twenty-five years — whereas a finding that the offender did not actually kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill the victim results in there being no minimum sentence and a sentence review after fifteen years."

The Florida Supreme Court was unanimous here in concluding that this statute has to comply with Alleyne's Sixth Amendment ruling that jury trial rights extend to any fact that raises a binding minimum sentence.  Hard-core sentencing proceduralists might still want to check out the Court's discussion, especially because there is an interesting partial dissent that starts this way:

I agree with the majority that under Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), the factual findings provided for in section 775.082(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2016), must be made by the jury and that the absence of such jury findings in this case requires reversal of the sentence imposed under section 775.082(1)(b)1. and resentencing in the trial court.  But I dissent from the majority’s direction regarding the remand, which requires imposition of the less severe sanction available under the statute.  Because the issue of the remedy on remand has not been briefed in this case, I would simply direct remand for resentencing rather than preclude jury proceedings that might result in imposition of the more severe sentence under the statute.

February 22, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

"These guidelines exist in some kind of middle universe that I don't understand..."

1204504745fullresThe title of this post is one of my (many) favorite lines appearing in this Supreme Court oral argument transcript from yesterday's proceedings in Rosales-Mireles v. United States.  The case addresses whether a (small) guideline error will usually satisfy the plain error standard for correction of an error raised only on appeal, and I highly recommend that sentencing fans read the entire transcript.  There are too many amusing and interesting flourishes throughout the transcript to cover them all here, but this one little passage from early in the second part of the argument that provides a flavor of the overall direction of Justices' approach to this case:

JUSTICE KAGAN:  Mr. Ellis [Assistant to the Solicitor General arguing for the prosecution], Justice Gorsuch, when he was a judge, wrote this opinion which I'm sure you've read many times, and I just want to quote one sentence from it and then ask you what you think about it because he basically, you know, suggests why you maybe lose.

This rev up to a question from Justice Kagan is only one of many part of the transcript that leads me to think basically, you know, the government is going to lose this case. Evan Lee in his SCOTUSblog preview of the Rosales-Mireles argument highlighted effectively why this case is sure to be an up hill climb for the government, and little in this transcript suggests otherwise.

I have not yet noted who spoke the line I have used in this title of this post, and I suppose at this point it would be fun to encourage readers to guess.  I suspect hard-core Court watchers with sentencing affinity may readily be able to figure out who said this, but arguably any and every Justice (and any and every judges and any and every practitioner) sometimes feels that, post-Booker, the guidelines exist in some kind of "middle universe." 

At the risk of making inappropriate suggestions, I do think the Justice who spoke this particular line might be able to engender a special kind of new fandom if in the future he were to suggest that the federal sentencing guidelines "exist in some kind of Middle Earth." With a single line, J.R.R. Tolkien fans might start showing up at US Sentencing Commission hearings as well as giving this Justice the kinds of adoration some colleagues get. And then my students will finally understand why I often walk around clutching the US Sentencing Guidelines Manual saying "My Precious."

UPDATE: I see that Evan Lee now has this "Argument analysis" up at SCOTUSblog under the heading "Justices hint at categorical approach to correcting forfeited Sentencing Guidelines errors." Here is how it starts:

Sometimes, an appellate court uses oral argument to help it decide who ought to win.  Other times, the justices know who will win, and oral argument becomes an opportunity for the judges to use counsel as a sounding board as to how the opinion should be written. W ednesday’s Supreme Court oral argument in Rosales-Mireles v. United States had the earmarks of the latter.

February 22, 2018 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Wednesday, February 21, 2018

SCOTUS issues opinions on fees for prisoner suits and the impact of guilty pleas

The Supreme Court this morning handed down four new opinions in argued cases, and these two should be of interest to criminal justice fans:

Murphy v. Smith: "GORSUCH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined." From the start and end of the opinion for the Court:

This is a case about how much prevailing prisoners must pay their lawyers. When a prisoner wins a civil rights suit and the district court awards fees to the prisoner’s attorney, a federal statute says that “a portion of the [prisoner’s] judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney’s fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney’s fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.” 42 U. S. C. §1997e(d)(2). Whatever else you might make of this, the first sentence pretty clearly tells us that the prisoner has to pay some part of the attorney’s fee award before financial responsibility shifts to the defendant. But how much is enough? Does the first sentence allow the district court discretion to take any amount it wishes from the plaintiff ’s judgment to pay the attorney, from 25% down to a penny? Or does the first sentence instead mean that the court must pay the attorney’s entire fee award from the plaintiff ’s judgment until it reaches the 25% cap and only then turn to the defendant? ....

At the end of the day, what may have begun as a close race turns out to have a clear winner. Now with a view of the full field of textual, contextual, and precedential evidence, we think the interpretation the court of appeals adopted prevails. In cases governed by §1997e(d), we hold that district courts must apply as much of the judgment as necessary, up to 25%, to satisfy an award of attorney’s fees.

Class v. United States: "BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which KENNEDY and THOMAS, JJ., joined."  From the start of the opinion for the Court:

Does a guilty plea bar a criminal defendant from later appealing his conviction on the ground that the statute of conviction violates the Constitution?  In our view, a guilty plea by itself does not bar that appeal.

For a host of reasons, Class is much more consequential, and I hope to find some time to blog more about the opinion in the days ahead. In the meantime, I welcome comments on both the substance and division of the Justices in this latest SCOTUS activity.

February 21, 2018 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

Split en banc Fifth Circuit holds that Texas burglary convictions do not serve as predicates for federal Armed Career Criminal Act

I long ago gave up trying to keep up with all the intricate litigation and jurisprudence in circuit courts dealing with predicate offenses that can trigger the severe mandatory minimum sentences of the Armed Career Criminal Act.  But every so often, a big ACCA ruling comes down the pike, and today is one of those days as an en banc Fifth Circuit, splitting 8-7, has decided Texas burglary convictions cannot serve as an ACCA predicate.  The majority ruling by Judge Higginbotham in US v. Herrold, No. 14-11317 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 2018)  (available for download below), gets off to this interesting start and then summarizes its holding 30+ pages later:

Three decades ago, Congress set the courts upon a new course for the sentencing of federal defendants, moving away from a long-in-place system that gave wide discretion to federal judges to impose sentences from nigh no prison time to effective life sentences.

But this discretion was not so wide in practice as in appearance — the judge’s sentence gave way when the prisoner left the court for prison.  The total time served by the prisoner was on his arrival determined in the main by a parole commission.  The commission determined release dates, and in a rough and crude way — relative to the work of the Sentencing Commission — anticipated the system now in place by using a scoring system that looked in part to a defendant’s criminal history.  In response to charges from the Left of disparate and from the Right of anemic sentencing, and thus with the support of both ends of the political spectrum, Congress shifted the focus to a defendant’s individual circumstances on the one hand and mandatory minimum sentences tailored to particular crimes on the other.  With much work from its newly erected Sentencing Commission, nourished by reflection, essential empirical study, and judges tasked with applying its regulations, this reform effort appears to now be understood by bench and bar, enjoying a measure of well-earned credibility.  Yet its relatively calibrated system of adjustments struggles with rifle-shot statutory efforts deploying an indeterminate calculus for identification of repetitive, sentence-enhancing conduct that add on to the sentence produced by the guidelines, such as the Armed Career Criminal Act. In setting a federal criminal sentence the district judge looks, in part, to both the number and type of a defendant’s prior convictions, a task complicated by the statute’s effort to draw on criminal conduct bearing differing labels and boundaries set by the various states.  Today, we continue to refine our efforts....

To summarize, the burglary provisions encoded in Texas Penal Code §§ 30.02(a)(1) and (3) are indivisible. Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a)(3) is nongeneric because it criminalizes entry and subsequent intent formation rather than entry with intent to commit a crime.  For these reasons, Herrold’s ACCA sentence enhancement cannot stand. We VACATE and REMAND to the district court to resentence him in accordance with our decision today. 

A lengthy dissent authored by Judge Haynes provides a succinct account of why this ruling is a big deal (and could be SCOTUS bound):

The majority opinion upends years of well-settled law. Just over a year ago, this court confirmed that Texas Penal Code § 30.02(a) is a divisible statute, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.  United States v. Uribe, 838 F.3d 667 (5th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1359 (2017). The effect of the majority opinion, in addition to unsettling established precedent, is to render all burglary convictions in the second-most populous state in the country nullities as far as the ACCA is concerned.  That is no small thing. In just a single year, Texans reported 152,444 burglaries, all of which now escape the ACCA’s reach. See TEX. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, CRIME IN TEXAS 2015 6 (2015), http://www.dps.texas.gov/crimereports/15/citCh2.pdf.  From this misguided determination, I respectfully dissent.

Download Herrold slip op

February 20, 2018 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Notable account of a notable juror whose note had a notable impact on a scheduled Ohio execution

Prior posts here and here discussed a letter from a former juror in an Ohio capital case that prompted Governor John Kasich to grant a reprieve based on mitigating evidence that the juror said would have changed his vote at the penalty phase.  This story is told in full form in this new local article, headlined "This man stopped a Cincinnati killer's execution. Here's why he did it." Here are excerpts:

Ross Geiger isn’t some kind of activist when it comes to the death penalty. He’s never organized a candlelight vigil or stood outside a prison protesting an execution. He wants to be clear about that. “Everybody thinks I’m a crusader or something,” Geiger said. “They think I have no sympathy for the victims. That’s just not true.”

Yet Geiger did something last week that anti-death penalty activists rarely do. He stopped an execution. Earlier this year, the Loveland man wrote a letter to Gov. John Kasich because he was worried about the case of Raymond Tibbetts, a Cincinnati man who beat to death his wife, Sue Crawford, and stabbed to death his landlord, Fred Hicks, on the same day in 1997.

Geiger’s letter carried weight with Kasich, who delayed Tibbetts’ Feb. 13 execution until at least October, because Geiger served on the jury that convicted Tibbetts and recommended his death sentence....

Records related to Tibbetts’ clemency case with the parole board showed far more detail about Tibbetts’ background than was presented at the trial, Geiger said. He’d been abused as a child, put into foster care as a toddler and endured years of abuse and neglect, along with his siblings, the records showed.

At the trial, the jurors heard from a psychiatrist who’d examined Tibbetts, but no other witnesses. No family members. No other mental health professionals. None of the people Geiger found in the clemency paperwork. “I was astounded by the amount of material that was available (for the trial) that I never saw,” Geiger said. “There was an obvious breakdown in the system.”

The more he thought about it, Geiger said, the more upset he got. “The state had a duty to give me access to the information I needed to make the best decision I could,” he said. “It’s like if you have to take a big test, but you were deprived of the textbook.”

Geiger thought a long time about what he should do. He’s not a rabble rouser by nature. He’s raised two kids in suburban Cincinnati and works in the financial world. He considers himself a libertarian and said he was a rock-solid Republican at the time of the trial. He said he’s not opposed to the death penalty and he doesn’t believe he’s second-guessing the decision he made as Juror No. 2 in Tibbetts’ case. Given what he knew at the time, he said, the decision he made was correct.

But now he believes there is more he should have known. “I don’t really view it as changing my mind because the information wasn’t available at the time I was asked to make the decision,” Geiger said. “Based on the information available now, I don’t think justice was served in the case of Tibbetts.”

The appeals courts did not agree. A divided U.S. 6th Circuit panel ruled against Tibbetts, concluding any evidence the jurors didn’t hear would have been insufficient to change their minds about Tibbetts’ “moral culpability for such a brutal and horrific crime.” Prosecutors also have dismissed Geiger’s concerns. They say trials can’t be retried over and over every time a juror has second thoughts about a decision.

Kasich isn’t necessarily convinced, either. His reprieve gives the parole board time to reconsider clemency, but guarantees nothing. The execution still is set for Oct. 17.

Asked how he’d feel if Tibbetts died on that day, Geiger struggled to answer. He said he believes he did his job 20 years ago at the trial, and he believes he’s doing the right thing now by speaking up. “My motivation in writing that letter wasn’t to save an individual’s life,” Geiger said. “My prime motivation was to point out the errors.

“If we are going to trust the state to be our agents to execute people, then the state has a duty to get it right.”

Prior related posts:

February 20, 2018 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, February 19, 2018

Spotlighting disparities in jail stays over unpaid court fines in Pennsylvania

A helpful reader made sure I saw this impressive piece of reporting from the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette under the headline "Modern-day debtors’ prisons? The system that sends Pennsylvanians to jail over unpaid court costs and fines."  I have probably not given as much attention here as I should to reporting and complaints about persons being incarcerated for failure to pay certain fines and fees, and this story caught my attention in its discussion of disparities in how judges justify sending folks to jail for failures to pay.  Here is an excerpt for that discussion:

U.S. Supreme Court and state court precedents forbid the government from locking up defendants too poor to pay.  District judges are supposed to jail only defendants who can afford to pay but “willfully” do not.  “The Constitution is very clear, the law is very clear, you cannot be jailed for failing to pay when you can’t pay,” said David Harris, a professor at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law.

But data show that is not always what happens.

People picked up on warrants for not paying court fees are brought before a district judge, who can hold an immediate payment determination hearing or postpone the proceeding. If the hearing is delayed, the district judge can set an amount that must be paid as collateral in order to allow the defendant to go free; that is supposed to ensure that the defendant will return for the hearing.  In many cases, that collateral equals the total payments owed.  Defendants who do not pay can be jailed until the first business day after 72 hours have passed.

District judges must fill out a Determination of Collateral form indicating why collateral is necessary and why the defendant can afford to pay it.

A Pittsburgh Post-Gazette review of more than 4,500 cases covering everyone jailed in 2016 in Pennsylvania for failure to post collateral (about 2,500 individuals) shows that in fewer than one in five cases, district judges appear to meet the standard in explaining why payment can be made.  They use statements such as “defendant has bank account” or “defendant has been working” or “gainfully employed.”

But in over 10 percent of cases involving more than 200 people, the district judges’ explanations for why a defendant can pay collateral seem to indicate just the opposite — that they don’t have the wherewithal.  Among the rationales: “defendant has no income; “defendant is homeless unable to pay; and “defendant has been evicted.”

The data show the system for meting out jail stays over unpaid court fines is wildly inconsistent among the state’s 67 counties and varies from one district judge to another....

The ACLU has been taking up cases around the state where it believes the law is not being followed in regard to payment determination hearings. It also has reached out to judges and district judges in an effort to make systemic changes.  “[M]any judges on both the courts of Common Pleas and magisterial district courts fundamentally misunderstand what constitutes a defendant’s ability to pay,” Andrew Christy, an ACLU of Pennsylvania attorney wrote regarding payment determination hearings last year for a legal publication.  A “lack of clear and uniform standards on what constitutes ability to pay” has been problematic and has driven the system to be unconstitutional, he wrote.

In many cases, the district judge offers rationales that the ACLU claims do not pass legal muster as to why a defendant should be able to post collateral.  The explanations include that the defendant’s family can pay; that the defendant receives public benefits; or that they have spent money on other expenses, such as tattoos.  “Has money for cigarettes, cell phone and to drink in bars,” read one form.  “Has cell phone, smokes cigarettes and has an I pad [sic],” read another.

February 19, 2018 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, February 18, 2018

Is Henry Montgomery of Montgomery v. Louisiana perhaps on the verge of a parole grant? UPDATE: NO by 2-1 vote by parole board

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new commentary by Jody Kent Lavy, executive director of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, who write about a high-profile defendant soon to be considered for parole at age 71. Here are excerpts:

Henry Montgomery has been incarcerated in Louisiana prisons since he was 17 years old, and today he is 71.   He was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole when he was only a child, for the impulsive shooting of a sheriff's deputy decades ago.

As a result, he has missed a lifetime’s worth of events, learning, and relationships.  The United States Supreme Court ruled two years ago in his case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, that it is unconstitutional to impose a life-without-parole sentence on the vast majority of youth — a sentence the United States alone imposes on its children.  Still, Montgomery remains incarcerated, and will finally see the parole board just days from now....

And although Montgomery’s case has become emblematic of the fight to end the brutal practice of sentencing children to life without parole (and to other extreme sentences), Montgomery is not yet free.  Prosecutors in Louisiana are fighting his freedom, despite the U.S. Supreme Court ruling his sentence unconstitutional, along with such sentences for all youth whose crimes reflect “transient immaturity” rather than “irreparable corruption” — a trait I cannot imagine any child possessing, given where they are developmentally.  But it certainly isn’t true of Montgomery, whom I was fortunate to meet last year.  He is a soft-spoken, gentle man who has tried to make the most of his time in prison by coaching boxing, silk-screening, and serving as a mentor.

While Montgomery and his supporters look forward to his hearing Monday, there is a sea change afoot, just about everywhere but Louisiana, where prosecutors are seeking to reimpose life-without-parole sentences on approximately one-third of those given relief by Montgomery.  Meanwhile, in the rest of the country, hundreds of individuals like Henry Montgomery have come home over the past two years because of the court’s ruling and over a thousand have been resentenced to lesser terms.  States across the nation are abandoning life without parole at a remarkable rate.  And the sky has not fallen.

Few of us make decisions today like we did when we were 15, 16, or 17.  Our brains, not just our bodies, matured.  A growing number of courts, legislatures, prosecutors, and parole boards understand this.  And still, Montgomery — a gentle man, guilty of a crime for which he deserved to be held accountable in ways which reflected his age and life experiences — sits in prison.

UPDATE: This local article, headlined "Board denies parole to man who served 50 plus years after killing deputy when he was juvenile," reports the results of Henry Montgomery's parole hearing this morning. It starts this way:

The Louisiana parole board on Monday morning denied freedom to 71-year-old Henry Montgomery, whose case was central in a Supreme Court decision about juvenile offenders sentenced to life in prison without parole.

The three-member Louisiana Board of Pardons and Committee on Parole voted 2 to 1 to deny parole to Montgomery, who was convicted of first-degree murder in the 1963 shooting of an East Baton Rouge Sheriff's deputy.

"This is a parole hearing, it's not a sentencing hearing," said James Kuhn, the chairman of the parole panel. "I don't know what the victim would want, but he's a law enforcement officer. ... One of the things that society demands is that everyone abide by the rule of law and when you don't, there are consequences."

Kuhn and parole board member Kenneth Loftin, who both voted against Montgomery's parole, primarily cited the fact that Montgomery only completed two classes during his 54 years in prison.

However, Montgomery's lawyer, Keith Nordyke, argued that his client had received a waiver saying he could not complete his GED, and many classes were not available to inmates serving life during the first few decades of his time in prison.

February 18, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (7)

Saturday, February 17, 2018

Should jail inmates face tougher sentencing for applauding charged cop killer as he was brought into jail?

A helpful reader alerted me to this interesting AP story, headlined "Jail inmates applaud career criminal accused of killing Chicago police commander, may face reprisals," that provides the basis for the question that is the title of this post.  Here are the particulars:

Five Cook County Jail inmates who applauded as the man charged with the fatal shooting of a Chicago police commander was led by their cell could face reprisals for their actions, a jail official said Friday.

Cara Smith, the chief policy officer for Sheriff Tom Dart, said a security video shows them clapping as suspect Shomari Legghette was being led past a crowded holding cell on Thursday after his first court appearance.  The inmates were in the holding cell awaiting action on their cases.  Legghette is charged with first-degree murder in Tuesday's shooting death of Commander Paul Bauer.

She said the five inmates were transferred overnight from Chicago to a jail in southern Illinois, where it will be more difficult for family and friends to visit them while they are in custody.

The jail also is forwarding to prosecutors the video and reports of the incident Thursday afternoon so they can use the information if the inmates are convicted, she said. "The conduct that those detainees engaged in was disgraceful... and speaks to their character," Smith said.  "We feel it should be considered by prosecutors in connection with their sentencing."  The video could be a "factor of aggravation" considered by a judge in sentencing.

But Steve Greenberg, a prominent Chicago defense attorney, said there is no way the inmates should be penalized for what he said is a clear exercise of their right to free speech.  "These inmates ... no matter how vile or disgusting you may think their expression is, they have an absolute right under the First Amendment to express those feelings and it is a violation of their rights as citizens to penalize them or consider that as aggravation," said Greenberg, who is not representing any of the men.

The video was taken moments after the 44-year-old Legghette appeared in court on charges of first-degree murder of a peace officer, armed violence, unlawful use of a weapon by a felon and possession of a controlled substance.

Police say they wanted to question Legghette Tuesday when he took off running and Bauer pursued him on foot. He caught Legghette near the James R. Thompson Center, a government building, where the two struggled and Legghette fell down the stairs.  Bauer either fell or ran after him to a landing where, Legghette, wearing a bullet proof vest and armed with a semi-automatic handgun, allegedly shot the 53-year-old Bauer six times.

February 17, 2018 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (21)

Wednesday, February 14, 2018

"Reentry Court Research: An Overview of Findings from the National Institute of Justice’s Evaluation of Second Chance Act Adult Reentry Courts"

The title of this post is the title of this new report on findings about eight programs that received funding and technical assistance from the Bureau of Justice Assistance under the Second Chance Act of 2007.  Here is part of the report's abstract:

Background: There are myriad challenges associated with the reentry of formerly incarcerated individuals, coupled with a dearth of rigorous research examining reentry courts. It is well known that formerly incarcerated individuals face overwhelming obstacles, such as limited occupational or educational experiences to prepare them for employment, drug and alcohol addictions, mental and physical health challenges, strained family relations, and limited opportunities due to the stigma of a criminal record.  Reentry courts seek to address these challenges by assessing the individuals for risks and needs; linking them to appropriate community-based services; and overseeing the treatment process through ongoing court oversight, probation or parole supervision, and case management.  Under the Second Chance Act (SCA) of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-199), the Bureau of Justice Assistance funded reentry programs including the eight sites participating in this National Institute of Justice Evaluation of SCA Adult Reentry Courts.  This document provides a summary overview of the evaluation and complements three annual reports that provide more detailed information on the program processes and populations, research methods, and findings....

Results: Results were mixed across sites.  One site consistently demonstrated positive outcomes across the interview, recidivism, and cost analyses with the reentry court successfully delivering more substance abuse treatment and other services than what was received by the comparison group.  In addition, reentry court participants out-performed the comparison group in reduced recidivism (re-arrests and re-conviction) and reincarceration (revocation and time in jail or prison).  Two sites had neutral, trending toward positive, results with reduced participant re-arrests but with other outcomes (such as convictions and re-incarceration) not significantly different between the participants and the comparison group.  Two other sites had mixed results (e.g., participants had significantly fewer re-arrests but significantly increased re-incarceration) and two had negative results (e.g., participants had significantly more re-arrests and incarceration while other outcomes were no different between groups).  Cost findings were similarly mixed with two sites experiencing cost savings due mainly to lower recidivism costs and fewer victimization costs for reentry court participants ($2,512 and $6,710 saved per participant) and the remainder experiencing loss (ranging from just over -$1,000 to almost -$17,000 loss per participant). The research protocol and process evaluation findings are documented in three annual project reports; research caveats include a lack of detailed treatment service data. Also, reentry court program investment costs are described, but the comparison of cost estimates is limited to outcomes and does not include net benefits based on investment in non-reentry court case processing in the comparison group.

Conclusions: Key processes that set the one site with positive outcomes apart from the other sites was the high level of consistency and intensity of substance abuse treatment, wraparound services for multiple criminogenic needs, high intensity supervision, as well as an increased use of praise from the judge along with other incentives and sanctions.  In addition, the eligibility criteria for this site required that participants have a substance use disorder with risk levels ranging from moderate to high (based on their local risk assessment with a three point scale that ranged from low to high).  In contrast, other site eligibility criteria did not require a substance use disorder and participant risk levels were mostly high to very high (depending on the assessment tool used and their specific scoring and risk category criteria).  It is possible that the sites with less positive results did not have the appropriate level and type of services consistently available to best serve the varying risk levels of their participants.

This detailed report reinforces yet again the conclusion I often, somewhat depressingly, reach when looking at careful research on an important topic: many of our most pressing criminal justice problems are really complicated and lack simple solutions.

February 14, 2018 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 12, 2018

Interesting tales of a local grand jury that decided some drug cases were not as criminal as a ham sandwich

This recent local article from Arizona, headlined "Tucson grand jurors rebel against drug prosecutions," provides an interesting report on some interesting work by a local grand jury.  Here are highlights:

You may have heard that saying: If prosecutors want to, they could get a grand jury to indict a ham sandwich. It’s a knock on how much control prosecutors hold over the grand juries to whom they give evidence for possible indictments.

The 269th Pima County Grand Jury could not be controlled like that.  That 16-member grand jury met from July to October last year, one of two county grand juries meeting twice a week in Tucson at the time.  But this one was led by a criminal-defense attorney and populated by freethinkers who took to heart their role as “conscience of the community.”

They went so far as to decline to indict people even though there was enough evidence to show probable cause, foreman Natman Schaye and others told me. That, in essence, is grand-jury nullification — not carrying out the law because, in the jury’s opinion, it is unjust.  “There were cases where we felt like, maybe there’s probable cause, but this is not something that we believe should result in a felony,” Schaye said.

Rick Myers, a well-known Tucsonan who is a member of the Arizona Board of Regents, also was on the Notorious 269th. What bothered him was the many cases of small quantities of drugs that were charged as Class 4 felonies, as state law dictates. He said he began making a distinction between what’s actually a “crime” and what’s “breaking the law.”

The reason, another grand juror, Jodi Kautz, said was: They were presented with possession cases involving drug amounts as tiny as 2/100th of a gram, a trace amount. “We left every day frustrated, and frustrated for society,” Myers said. “There’s a whole lot of people getting charged for things that are not hurting other people.” As a grand juror, he said, “You want to not just be a rubber stamp. You want to do what’s right.”...

Deputy County Attorney Malena Acosta, who runs the grand juries, and Thomas Weaver, the chief criminal deputy, told me the number of drug cases is a function of the number of arrests by police. “We respond to what comes through the door,” Weaver said. “If we’re getting more cases presented to us, then there will be more cases charged.”

He also noted that a significant proportion, maybe half, of the cases brought to them are never brought to a grand jury, because of problems with the cases. And it’s not as if the prosecutors have a choice on how to charge the possession cases involving any drug except marijuana.  Meth, cocaine, heroin — whatever someone has, and however much, that will earn them a class 4 felony.  Marijuana possession can be treated as a misdemeanor.

LaWall explained her thinking on charging decisions: “If police officers bring us cases, and the evidence is there, we make our decisions based on legal reasoning. If the evidence proves a crime was committed, we have an ethical obligation to follow the law.”  She also noted that her office has created various programs that are alternatives to prison for drug offenders, but they occur after they are convicted, so they’d have to be charged to take part.

As to the grand jurors’ decision to reject some cases with adequate evidence, Acosta said that really isn’t their place.  They take an oath to follow the law before taking their seats, she said. “If somebody has a particular agenda, I suppose they can go to the Legislature and say, ‘We don’t like this law, maybe you should change it.’ But the grand jury isn’t the place for that kind of activity,” she said.

Joel Feinman was happy to hear of grand jurors exercising their usually unused muscles.  The Pima County public defender has been compiling data on the steadily growing number of felony cases and drug prosecutions in an effort to reduce jail stays and prison sentences.  His most stunning discovery concerned the amount of drugs possessed by those charged in the 725 felony drug cases his office has received in the last five months.  The median amount in all those cases, he said, was 0.496 of a gram.  “Felony filings are at an all-time high, felony drug filings are at an all-time high — and are a plurality of the cases — and the median amount is half a sugar packet,” he said.

That’s what bothered some of the grand jurors of the Notorious 269th.  “The drugs are the ones that bug me,” said Myers, the regent. “I feel like we have a puritanical view of even a minuscule amount of drugs.” Said Schaye: “It’s tremendously frustrating. We put far too many people in prison, and it does no good.”... “We all took it extremely seriously, because these are people’s lives. A felony really screws you over.”

February 12, 2018 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, February 11, 2018

California judge rejects state efforts to limit reach of new parole eligibility rules approved by voters via Proposition 57

As reported in this AP piece, "California must consider earlier parole for potentially thousands of sex offenders, maybe even those convicted of pimping children, a state judge said Friday." Here is more about a notable ruling about a notable effort to limit the reach of a notable ballot initiative:

Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Allen Sumner preliminarily ordered prison officials to rewrite part of the regulations for Proposition 57.  The 2016 ballot measure allows consideration of earlier parole for most state prison inmates, but Gov. Jerry Brown promised voters all sex offenders would be excluded.

That goes too far, Sumner said in rejecting Deputy Attorney General Maria Chan's argument that the ballot measure gave state officials broad discretion to exclude any class of offenders whose release might harm public safety. "If the voters had intended to exclude all registered sex offenders from early parole consideration under Proposition 57, they presumably would have said so," Sumner said.

He said the scope of exclusions should be narrowed to only those now serving time for a violent sex offense. And he said the Corrections Department must better define what falls into that category. The judge said those who already served their time for a sex crime, even a violent one, and now are imprisoned for a different crime should be eligible for early release.

The language in Prop. 57 "left way too much wiggle room," opening the door to Sumner's ruling, said Mark Zahner, chief executive of the California District Attorneys Association that opposed the initiative. "There's a great danger of truly violent people being released early and people who commit, in this case, sex offenses that involve violence being released early."

The Governor's Office declined comment. Corrections officials did not respond to repeated requests for comment or say whether they plan to appeal. They also did not provide an estimate of how many offenders might be affected.

The ruling Friday could allow earlier parole for more than half of the 20,000 sex offenders now serving time, said Janice Bellucci, a Sacramento attorney and president of California Reform Sex Offender Laws. Her lawsuit on behalf of sex offenders argued that the rules conflict with the ballot measure's language and voters' intent in approving Proposition 57. Bellucci argued the measure requires earlier parole consideration for any sex crime not on the state's narrow list of 23 violent felonies, which includes murder, kidnapping and forcible rape.

That could allow earlier parole for those convicted of raping a drugged or unconscious victim, intimately touching someone unlawfully restrained, incest, pimping a minor, indecent exposure and possessing child pornography. The judge said corrections officials can make the case for excluding those offenders as they rewrite the regulations, but Bellucci said she will sue again if officials go too far.

The full 18-page ruling discussed here is available at this link.  Here is a key paragraph from the opinion's conclusion: 

Under Proposition 57, “Any person convicted of a nonviolent felony offense . . . shall be eligible for parole consideration after completing the full term for his or her primary offense.”  CDCR adopted regulations defining the term “nonviolent offender” to exclude anyone required to register under section 290, regardless of their current commitment offense.  CDCR’s overbroad definition must thus be set aside.

February 11, 2018 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)