Tuesday, December 22, 2015

"To forgive prisoners is divine — or as close as government gets"

The title of this post is the sub-headline of this notable new commentary published by the American Conservative and authored by Chase Madar under the main headline "The Case for Clemency."  I recommend the lengthy piece in full, and here are excerpts:

President Obama’s recent announcement that he would commute the sentences of 95 federal prisoners and fully pardon two others is welcome news.  So is a holiday press release from New York Governor Andrew Cuomo, who has hitherto been miserly with clemency, but will pardon nonviolent offenses committed by 16 and 17 year olds (who will continue to be automatically tried as adults, a harshness almost unique among the fifty states).  But we should see these gestures for what they are: small trickles of clemency where what is demanded is a rushing, roaring pipeline scaled to the globally unprecedented size of our prison population and incarceration rate. We need industrial-scale clemency.  Here is why and how....

At the federal level — which only accounts for about 12 percent of U.S. prisoners — mild sentencing reform has both bipartisan support and bipartisan resistance in the Senate.  Looking to the states, a much hyped “moment” of criminal-justice reform is more than countervailed by the deeply ingrained punitive habits of governors and legislatures across the land, from Massachusetts, whose liberal governor signed a tough “three strikes” law in 2012, to Louisiana, where Bobby Jindal upped penalties for heroin-related offenses.

Whether we admit it or not, we are in quite a spot: our hyper-incarceration is unprecedented in U.S. history.  Rectifying this will require changes in policing, a cutting back of what we criminalize, and serious revision of our sentences, which far outstrip their deterrent value.  Another part of the solution will have to be clemency on a massive scale: pardons, which all but expunge a criminal record; commutations, which shorten a prison sentence; parole; geriatric and compassionate release; and retroactive sentencing reform.

As of this writing, Obama has issued more commutations than any other president since Lyndon Johnson.  But the supply of imprisoned Americans is orders of magnitude greater than it was in Johnson’s day, and Obama has only granted pardons or commutations at the exceedingly stingy rate of one out of 136, in line with the steep plummet in clemency since World War II. The Department of Justice has promised to routinize clemency, issuing new guidelines for nonviolent offenders who have served 10 years already, but the results so far have been bonsai-scaled in comparison to the magnitude of the federal prison population....

So much for Washington, which despite much misty-eyed self-congratulation has not shown itself up to the task of scaling back our prison state.  Washington’s timidity means less than it first appears however: despite lazy media focus on the federal justice system, the real action is at the state level, which handles most policing, sentencing, and imprisoning.  Alas, here too the general trend has been towards greater stinginess with clemency. 

Take the example of Minnesota, a state that has, by U.S. standards, a low incarceration rate and arguably the most humane penal system in the country, with perhaps more in common with Denmark and Germany than with Texas and Louisiana.  Yet it says something that Mark Dayton, one of the most progressive governors in the country, has a more merciless default setting than virtually all of his executive predecessors from the mid-20th century.  Minnesota used to grant pardons and commutations by the barrelful: from 1940-89, the state granted 741 commutations and nearly 90 percent of all pardon applications.  Minnesota’s clemency process began to tighten in the 1970s, only to be choked off further in the 1980s. From 2000-10, the number of pardons plummeted. In the past quarter-century, Minnesota has not issued a single commutation.

The barriers to mercy are dug deeply into American politics and intellectual culture.  At the same time there is a rich tradition of clemency in this country, which can and should be tapped into.... Devotion to the Rule of Law has an ugly side in resentment of executive acts of mercy, at the level of practice and high theory.... Overall, the thrust of American legalism militates against executive clemency, which seems to many a kind of short circuit, a deus ex machina, an insult to the rule of law, smelling of elitism and monarchical whims....  (And it has to be said, occasionally this image of executive mercy as sleazy end-run around the justice system is correct: think of Bill Clinton granting a full pardon to felonious oil trader Marc Rich, whose ex-wife had been a major Democratic fundraiser.)

But in the face of this hostility to the pardon power there is a great counter-tradition of American clemency.  At the founding of the country, executive power was seen not as a violation of our self-image as a “nation of laws not men” but as a necessary and healthily legitimate part of any popular government. As Hamilton wrote in Federalist 74: “the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible fettered.”  Without pardon power, “justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel.”...

U.S. history turns out to be generously littered with acts of mass clemency.  In the 1930s, Mississippi Governor Mike Conner went to Parchman Farm, the state penitentiary, and held impromptu “mercy courts” that freed dozens of African-American prisoners, in an act that entered national folklore — as did Texas Governor Pat Neff’s pardon in 1925 of Huddie “Lead Belly” Ledbetter, who issued his clemency request in song.  In the 20th century, Governors Lee Cruce of Oklahoma, Winthrop Rockefeller of Arkansas, and Toney Anaya of New Mexico all commuted their states’ death rows down to zero upon leaving office.  Among presidents, according to political scientist P.S. Ruckman Jr’s excellent blog Pardon Power, Abraham Lincoln granted clemency every single month of his administration as an act of mercy and a canny political strategy.  Woodrow Wilson, though a teetotaler himself, pardoned hundreds convicted of booze-related infractions to signal his disapproval of Prohibition....

Reversing course on hyper-incarceration and clemency will be a generational project, and an Augean one at that. Judges and prosecutors are not the most self-effacing career group, and many would sooner eat their Civil Procedure books than admit error.... But for most people, clemency in cases of judicial and prosecutorial error is a no brainer: the law’s finality should not come at the expense of justice.   The type of clemency we need today, however, is to remedy a problem several orders of magnitude larger, admitting not legal or judicial error but political or legislative disaster.  A rushing, roaring clemency pipeline would be an explicit recognition that the various state and federal tough-on-crime policies, virtually all of which passed with broad bipartisan support, were dead wrong....

Our incarcerated population is also aging rapidly, and though older prisoners have far lower recidivism rates, few states are availing themselves of geriatric release. For instance, Virginia in 2012 granted geriatric release to less than 1 percent of about 800 prisoners eligible, according to the state parole board. Meanwhile, as the Virginian Pilot reported, “during the same period, 84 inmates died in state prisons.” Running high-security nursing homes is neither compassionate nor fiscally sound—another reason to restore and expand clemency.

What is needed is a restoration of the kind of clemency that was once the everyday norm in this country, expanded to meet the needs of our enormous 21st-century prison population.  There will surely be stentorian howling that industrial-scale clemency is the invasive hand of overweening government power.  These fault-finders ought to be reminded that our incarceration regime is on a scale rarely seen in human history: our only competitors are third-century BC “legalist” China; the late, off-the-rails Roman Empire; and the Soviet Union from 1930-55.  Routinized clemency on a grand scale will be necessary to tame this beast.

To say that mass incarceration is an issue best addressed by the legislature, not by the executive, is theoretically correct.  But procedural rectitude should not be taken to the point of sadism, ignoring the tens of thousands of harshly sentenced prisoners who are already stuck halfway through the penal snake’s digestive tract.  Besides, this would hardly be the first time that elected officials have used the pardon power as a tool to alter policy.  To give one more glorious example, on Christmas Day in 1912, Governor George Donaghey of Arkansas pardoned 360 state prisoners as a condemnation of the state’s brutal and corrupt “convict leasing” system, making national headlines and dealing a death blow to the corrupt practice.

The time is as ripe as it will ever be for industrial-scale clemency . Even with an 11 percent average increase in homicides in big American cities for 2015 so far (bringing the nation back to 2012 murder levels), violent crime is as low as it’s been since the early 1960s....  How we proceed with clemency is not just about how we treat thousands of prisoners..., it is about how we treat ourselves. According to Shakespeare’s most famous courtroom speech, mercy “blesseth him that gives and him that takes: ‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes the throned monarch better than his crown.” With an expansion of the pardon power, we have the opportunity to rule ourselves as monarchs, with all the magnanimity and grace that implies. Or we can remain a nation of vindictive jailers that lectures the rest of the world about freedom.

December 22, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, December 21, 2015

Astute review of factors killing the death penalty ... with a questionable final assessment

20151219_USD001_0The Economist has this lengthy new piece (as well as this intriguing graphic) about the modern administration of capital punishment in the United States headlined "Who killed the death penalty?: Many suspects are implicated in capital punishment’s ongoing demise. But one stands out."  I recommend the full piece; but, as explained below, I am put off a bit by its concluding statement.  First, here are extended excerpts along with the closing paragraph:

Exhibit A is the corpses. Or rather, the curious paucity of them: like the dog that didn’t bark in Sherlock Holmes, the bodies are increasingly failing to materialise. Only 28 prisoners have been executed in America in 2015, the lowest number since 1991. Next, consider the dwindling rate of death sentences — most striking in Texas, which accounts for more than a third of all executions since (after a hiatus) the Supreme Court reinstated the practice in 1976.  A ghoulish web page lists the inmates admitted to Texas’s death row.  Only two arrived in 2015, down from 11 the previous year.

There is circumstantial evidence, too: the political kind. Jeb Bush, a Republican presidential candidate — who, as governor of Florida, oversaw 21 executions — has acknowledged feeling “conflicted” about capital punishment.  Hillary Clinton, the Democratic frontrunner, said she “would breathe a sigh of relief” if it were scrapped.  Contrast that stance with her husband’s return to Arkansas, during his own campaign in 1992, for the controversial execution of a mentally impaired murderer.  Bernie Sanders, Mrs Clinton’s main rival, is a confirmed abolitionist.

The proof is overwhelming: capital punishment is dying. Statistically and politically, it is already mortally wounded, even as it staggers through an indeterminate — but probably brief — swansong.  Fairly soon, someone will be the last person to be executed in America.  The reasons for this decline themselves form a suspenseful tale of locked-room intrigue, unexpected twists and unusual suspects.  So, whodunnit?  Who killed the death penalty?

Where politicians follow, voters often lead.  Capital punishment is no longer a litmus test of political machismo because public enthusiasm for it is waning.  Most Americans still favour retaining it, but that majority is narrowing. And one critical constituency — the mystery’s first prime suspect — is especially sceptical: juries....

The widely available alternative of life without parole — which offers the certainty that a defendant can never be released — helps to explain that trend [of fewer jury-imposed death sentences].  So does the growing willingness of jurors, in their private deliberations, to weigh murderers’ backgrounds and mental illnesses; ditto the greater skill with which defence lawyers, generally better resourced and trained than in the past, muster that mitigating evidence. But the biggest reason, says Richard Dieter of the DPIC, is juries’ nervousness about imposing an irrevocable punishment.  Behind that anxiety stands another, unwilling participant in the death-penalty story: the swelling, well-publicised cadre of death-row exonerees....

Those mistakes implicate another suspect in the death penalty’s demise: prosecutors. The renegades who have botched capital cases — by suppressing evidence, rigging juries or concentrating on black defendants — have dragged it into disrepute.  But some responsible prosecutors have also contributed, by declining to seek death in the first place. They have been abetted by another unlikely group: victims’ relatives....

To avoid that protracted agony [of repeated capital appeals], says James Farren, district attorney of Randall County in Texas, “a healthy percentage” of families now ask prosecutors to eschew capital punishment. Mr Farren also fingers another key player in the death-penalty drama: the American taxpayer.  Capital cases are “a huge drain on resources”, spiralling costs that — especially given juries’ growing reluctance to pass a death sentence anyway — have helped to change the calculus about when to pursue one, Mr Farren says....

Even when the appeals are exhausted, enacting a death sentence has become almost insuperably difficult — because of an outlandish cameo by the pharmaceutical industry.  Obtaining small quantities of drugs for lethal injection, long the standard method, might seem an easy task in the world’s richest country; but export bans in Europe, American import rules and the decision by domestic firms to discontinue what were less-than-lucrative sales lines has strangled the supply....

Lethal injection was intended to be reassuringly bloodless, almost medicinal (as, once, was electrocution).  Should it become impractical, it is unclear whether Americans will stomach a reversion to gorier methods such as gassing and shooting: they are much less popular, according to polls.  The death penalty’s coup de grace may come in the form of an empty vial.

Or it may be judicial rather than pharmaceutical: performed in the Supreme Court, the most obvious suspect of all.  In an opinion issued in June, one of the left-leaning justices, Stephen Breyer, voiced his hunch that the death penalty’s time was up. He cited many longstanding failings: arbitrariness (its use varying widely by geography and defendants’ profiles); the delays; the questionable deterrent and retributive value; all those exonerations (Mr Breyer speculated that wrongful convictions were especially likely in capital cases, because of the pressure to solve them).  He concluded that the system could be fair or purposeful, but not both. Meanwhile Antonin Scalia, a conservative justice, recently said he would not be surprised to see the court strike capital punishment down.

Cue much lawyerly soothsaying about that prospect.  Yet the legal denouement is already in train: a joint enterprise between state courts, legislatures and governors.  Of the 19 states to have repealed the death penalty, seven have done so in the past nine years. Others have imposed moratoriums, formal or de facto, including, in 2015, Arkansas, Ohio, Oklahoma, Montana and Pennsylvania.  The number that execute people — six in 2015 — is small, and shrinking. (After their legislature repealed the death penalty in May, Nebraskans will vote in 2016 on reinstating it; but their state hasn’t executed anyone since 1997.)  These machinations may help to provoke a mortal blow from the Supreme Court. After all, the fewer states that apply the punishment, the more “unusual”, and therefore unconstitutional, it becomes.

Juries; exonerees; prosecutors, both incompetent and pragmatic; improving defence lawyers; stingy taxpayers; exhausted victims; media-savvy drugmakers: in the strange case of the death penalty, there is a superabundance of suspects. And, rather as in “Murder on the Orient Express”, in a way, they all did it. But in a deeper sense, all these are merely accomplices. In truth capital punishment is expiring because of its own contradictions.  As decades of litigation attest — and as the rest of the Western world has resolved — killing prisoners is fundamentally inconsistent with the precepts of a law-governed, civilised society.  In the final verdict, America’s death penalty has killed itself.

This article does an effective job summarizing how and why the death penalty in the US continues to be subject to attacks that could lead to its eventual demise.  But, even using just 2015 evidence, one could still build an argument that capital punishment has steady heartbeat in the United States.  Prez Obama's Justice Department sought and secured a federal death sentence against the Boston bomber in deep blue Massachusetts, while Gov Brown's Attorney General appealed and got reversed a judicial ruling threatening the largest state capital punishment system in deep blue California.  Meanwhile, officials in swing state Pennsylvania and activists in heartland Nebraska still (reasonably) think advocating for the death penalty makes for good politics.

Ultimately, I see 2016 as a make-or-break year for the future of the death penalty in the US.  If voters in Nebraska (and perhaps also California) vote for the death penalty's repeal, or if US voters elect a new Prez likely to appoint abolitionsit-minded judges and Justices, I will jump on the "death penalty is dying" bandwagon.  But, because actual voters rather than just elites still shape the direction of significant legal reforms in our democracy, I do not expect the death penalty to be truly dying until a significant majority of Americans share the legal elite's belief that "killing prisoners is fundamentally inconsistent with the precepts of a law-governed, civilised society."

It is these words at the end of this article that put me off because I continue to struggle with the notion that giving tens of thousands of lesser offenders life-without-parole prison sentences is somehow more "civilized" than giving a few of the very worst murderers a death sentence.  Though I respect and understand why abolitionists feel strongly that the death penalty is inconsistent with many American values they cherish, I find it problematic and troubling that so many abolitionists seem to have little respect and understanding for those who believe the death penalty vindicates legitimate values.  And, I think that the reduced use of the death penalty well-chronicled in this Economist article suggest reasons why, over time, it could become easier for supporters of the death penalty to show to voters that capital punishment will in the future only be used in the very worst cases involving no doubt about the guilt and the horrors of the murders committed.

December 21, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (13)

Federal judge enjoins Tennessee county's privatized probation system operating like debtors' prison

As reported in this local article, "Judge's order frees 13 held for not paying probation fees," a group of probationers got a holiday gift in the form of a significant federal judicial order preventing a locality for jailing low-level offenders for failing to pay fines or court costs. Here are the basics:

Heather Keller is looking forward to spending Christmas with her children after a federal judge's order set her free from the Rutherford County Detention Center Friday afternoon. A day earlier, a federal judge in Nashville granted an injunction that prevented officials and probation supervisors in Rutherford County from holding people in jail for certain violations or only because they could not pay fees. It also said that anyone being held for those reasons should be let go.

Keller, 35, was one of 13 inmates released from the jail in Murfreesboro who were held there because they could not pay fees to the private company contracted to oversee the Rutherford County misdemeanor probation system. The injunction that won Keller’s release was part of a lawsuit filed against Providence Community Corrections, which has changed its name to Pathways Community Corrections.

The suit was filed in October and accuses Rutherford County and PCC of working together to extort people on probation there by charging excessive fees. Many of the seven people named in the lawsuit rely on government assistance and have said in court testimony or documents that PCC's excessive fees leave them struggling to pay bills and facing extended probation terms because they cannot pay court costs.

It is a practice Alec Karakatsanis, attorney for the plaintiffs, likens to the operation of a debtors' prison. Karakatsanis said Sharp's order is only the beginning of possible probation reform in Rutherford County.

“We will fight to end permanently what we believe to be the rise of a modern debtors' prison system in which the poor and destitute are jailed and threatened with jail solely because of their inability to make monetary payments to a private company and their local government,” Karakatsanis said. “This is a very important ruling for impoverished people in Tennessee.”

The injunction was granted by Chief District Judge Kevin Sharp in Nashville. In addition to freeing these prisoners, Sharp also ordered PCC immediately stop the practice of violating probationers solely for non-payment of fees.

Keller was originally arrested for driving on a suspended license and since has been jailed twice for non-payment of probation fees, she said. “I’ve spent more time in jail for non-payment than the original charge,” Keller said.

And Sharp ordered Rutherford County Sheriff Robert Arnold to free any inmates held on violation of probation charges stemming solely from non-payment of fees and fines.

The federal district judge's 20-page injunction order in Rodriguez v. Providence Community Corrections is available for download here:  Download Opinion Granting Injunction

December 21, 2015 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, December 20, 2015

Michigan Supreme Court takes up punishing questions about lifetime sex offender registration

As reported in this local article, the "Michigan Supreme Court has agreed to look at the case of a man who’s on the sex offender list for life, although his conviction was erased nearly 20 years ago."  Here is more about the case and context:

The man was 19 when he was charged with kissing and groping a 12-year-old girl in Wayne County. He pleaded guilty, but his conviction was erased in 1997 after he completed three years of probation. A law gives breaks to young offenders who commit crimes but subsequently stay out of trouble. Nonetheless, he’s on the sex offender list.

In an order released Saturday, the Supreme Court said it will take up the appeal. The court wants lawyers to address several issues, including whether the registry in some cases violates the constitution as “cruel and unusual punishment.”

The man in the Wayne County case said his status on the registry has hurt his ability to work, affected his family life and caused depression. In 2012, a judge ordered his removal, but the state appeals court last year reversed that decision. “The central purpose of (the registry) is not intended to chastise, deter, or discipline. Rather, it is a remedial measure meant to protect the health, safety and welfare of the general public,” the appeals court said.

The Michigan Supreme Court's order in Michigan v. Telemoski is available at this link, and here are excerpts from it:

The parties shall include among the issues to be briefed: (1) whether the requirements of the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), MCL 28.721 et seq., amount to “punishment,” see People v Earl, 495 Mich 33 (2014); (2) whether the answer to that question is different when applied to the class of individuals who have successfully completed probation under the Holmes Youthful Trainee Act (HYTA), MCL 762.11 et seq.; (3) whether MCL 28.722(b) (defining HYTA status to be a “conviction” for purposes of SORA) provides the defendant constitutionally sufficient due process where the defendant is required to register pursuant to SORA as if he had been convicted of an offense, notwithstanding that upon successful completion of HYTA the court is required to “discharge the individual and dismiss the proceedings” without entering an order of conviction for the crime.... (6) whether it is cruel and/or unusual punishment to require the defendant to register under SORA, US Const, Am VIII; Const 1963, art 1, § 16.

The Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan and the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.

December 20, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (25)

Friday, December 18, 2015

Updating the bubbling lower-court vagueness mess six months after Johnson

Over at Casetext, Leah Litman has this effective and extensive new commentary (with lots of links) titled "Circuit Splits & Original Writs: What the Supreme Court must address — and now — in the wake of Johnson v. United States."  Here is how it gets started:

Johnson v. United States held that the “residual clause” of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) is unconstitutionally vague.  In a previous Casetext post, I described an emerging circuit split regarding whether the Supreme Court had “made” Johnson retroactive.  The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) — in particular title 28 section 2255(h)(2) — permits prisoners to file a second or successive petition for post-conviction review if the petition contains “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”  By early August, less than two months after Johnson, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits had issued conflicting opinions about whether the Supreme Court has “made” Johnson retroactive.

In the last four months, that circuit split has deepened.  And, as my prior post explained, the statutory restrictions on post-conviction review mean that the Supreme Court cannot review by way of a petition for certiorari the court of appeals’ determination to allow a second or successive petition for post-conviction relief to proceed. Under title 28 section 2244(b)(3)(E), “the grant or denial of an authorization by a court of appeals to file a second or successive application shall not … be the subject of a petition … for a writ of certiorari.”  So while the circuits disagree about whether the Supreme Court has “made” Johnson retroactive, the Supreme Court cannot resolve whether it has “made” Johnson retroactive in the traditional way, by granting certiorari to review one of the court of appeals’ decisions.

More troubling, it is has become prohibitively difficult for the Supreme Court to weigh in on the split by granting review in a case involving a first petition for post-conviction review because the United States is conceding that Johnson is retroactive.  The courts of appeals and district courts have uniformly (and rightly, in my view) agreed with the United States, granting prisoners’ “first” — that is, initial — petitions for post-conviction review in cases where prisoners were sentenced under ACCA’s residual clause.  And because no one is appealing these decisions — the government agrees Johnson is retroactive, and the decisions are favorable to prisoners — the Supreme Court will not be able to clarify whether Johnson is retroactive, or “make” Johnson retroactive, by granting certiorari in a case involving a “first” petition for post-conviction review.

In this post, I’ll highlight several circuit splits that have emerged in light of Johnson — about whether the decision is applicable to various provisions of the federal Sentencing Guidelines, and about whether the rule that Johnson announced has been made retroactive.  I’ll also argue that the Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to weigh in on whether it has made Johnson retroactive by way of one of the extraordinary writs it has the power to issue. The Court has on its docket at least two petitions seeking such non-traditional habeas relief, and it will consider the petitions some time in January.

In the six months since Johnson was decided, at least two circuit splits have emerged. One concerns whether other provisions, including the career offender Guideline of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, are also unconstitutionally vague.  There is also some uncertainty about whether various procedural hurdles — specifically retroactivity and procedural default — bar defendants from being resentenced.  The second circuit split concerns whether the Supreme Court has “made” the rule invalidating ACCA’s residual clause retroactive.

December 18, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, December 17, 2015

Justice Department urges SCOTUS to refuse to take up original suit about marijuana brought by neighbor states against Colorado

As discussed here by Rob Mikos over at my Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform blog, late yesterday the US Solicitor General filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court concerning the suit brought by Nebraska and Oklahoma against Colorado seeking various kinds of legal relief in the wake of Colorado's legalization of recreational marijuana.  Rob provides this basic background and summary of the filing:

Per its practice, SCOTUS had requested the SG’s input. The brief can be found via this link.  (To provide some background, the SG handles all litigation involving the United States before SCOTUS, and it also commonly files amicus briefs in SCOTUS cases in which the U.S. is not a party. The SG’s positions can be quite influential on the Court.)  For earlier postings on this case, see here, here and here.

In a nutshell, the SG argued that SCOTUS should refuse to exercise original jurisdiction over the action. Why? Perhaps most importantly, the SG suggested that the NE / OK suit didn’t fit the mold of cases over which SCOTUS had traditionally exercised original jurisdiction – namely, cases in which one state had directly harmed another. Importantly, the SG argued that CO hadn’t directly injured its neighboring states, e.g., by exporting marijuana or authorizing private citizens to do so.  Rather, any injury NE / OK have suffered is more directly traceable to the actions of private parties who buy marijuana in CO and then take it outside the state.

Because it focused on SCOTUS practice, the SG did not need to weigh in on the merits of the underlying action. But I think the argument the SG makes favors CO, if SCOTUS (or another court) ever had to decide the matter. After all, if CO is not directly responsible for the injury to NE / OK’s regulatory interests, it’s hard to see why CO could be held responsible for any injury to federal regulatory interests. In other words, if CO isn’t responsible for people using marijuana in NE / OK, then it arguably isn’t responsible for people using marijuana in CO either.

As the SG itself notes, even if SCOTUS declines original jurisdiction over the suit, NE / OK could still file it in a federal district court. Of course, it would have to overcome some daunting procedural hurdles there as well (e.g. ,standing), as noted in the SG brief.

I am hopeful I will have time in the coming days to closely analyze this SG amicus brief and to post some additional commentary at the Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform blog or here.  In the meantime, here is how the Discussion section of the SG's brief gets started:

The motion for leave to file a bill of complaint should be denied because this is not an appropriate case for the exercise of this Court’s original jurisdiction.  Entertaining the type of dispute at issue here — essentially that one State’s laws make it more likely that third parties will violate federal and state law in another State — would represent a substantial and unwarranted expansion of this Court’s original jurisdiction.

December 17, 2015 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

"Is the Solicitor General Playing a Shell Game With the Supreme Court Over Johnson Retroactivity?"

The title of this post is the title of this notable, lengthy commentary by Steve Vladeck over at PrawfsBlawg, which gets started this way:

I've already written a pair of posts about the very significant current conflict among the circuits over the retroactive effect of the Supreme Court's June 2015 in Johnson v. United States, and the extent to which the Court may need to use an application for extraordinary relief (perhaps including an "original" writ of habeas corpus) to resolve that split — given (1) the unavailability of certiorari to review denials of second-or-successive habeas petitions; (2) government's agreement that Johnson may be retroactively enforced; and (3) the one-year statute of limitations, which likely requires all Johnson-based claims to be filed by June 26, 2016.  And in my most recent post, I noted that the Solicitor General had already recommended denial of review in one case by reference to three pending "original" applications — perhaps hinting that it would support the Court's using one or all of those cases as a vehicle for settling the circuit split (and clarifying that Johnson is indeed retroactive).

Or not.

In the past week, the government has effectively mooted one of the three original cases (by completely reversing a position it had taken earlier in different litigation involving the same prisoner), and has filed briefs opposing extraordinary relief in the other two.  As I explain in the post that follows, these actions (and the arguments in the briefs) give rise at least to the appearance that, even though the Solicitor General agrees that Johnson is retroactive on the merits and should therefore be enforceable by federal prisoners through both original and second-or-successive applications for post-conviction relief, the government is perfectly content to run out the clock — and to not support efforts to have the Supreme Court so hold before next June's deadline. 

A few prior related posts:

December 17, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter | Permalink | Comments (1)

Curious Cato commentary attacks Obama Administration for failing to change prosecutorial charging policies that have been changed

As regular readers know, I have often bashed the Obama Administration for too much talk and too little action in the arena of criminal justice reform.  But because I always try to ground my criticisms in facts and to give credit to the Administration for its actions, I must call out as misinformed and misguided this new Cato commentary by  Nat Hentoff headlined "Obama Ignores Judge’s Plea for Justice Reform."

The Hentoff commentary properly notes that the "charging policies that federal prosecutors are forced to follow are the one area of criminal justice reform that the president of the United States has the authority to impose unilaterally." But the commentary suggests, wrongly in my view, that through the 2010 Holder memorandum (first discussed here) the Obama Administration failed to change federal charging policy for the better.  

In addition, and even more troublesome, the Hentoff commentary completely fails to mention the important 2013 Holder memorandum (first discussed here) and a 2014 Holder follow-up memo (discussed here) concerning charging of mandatory minimums and recidivist enhancements in federal drug cases.  Also, and not to be overlooked in the context of federal charging policies, the Obama Administration has been quite bold when issuing a series of major charging directives that encourage federal prosecutors largely to keep their noses out of state-level marijuana reform efforts.  Collectively, these major charging directives from the Obama Administration's Department of Justice to line prosecutors have marked a significant shift in charging policies, and various federal sentencing statistics suggest these changed DOJ charging policies have been having a significant impact on federal criminal justice outcomes. 

This all said, though I am troubled by the particulars in this Cato commentary, I see much merit in Hentoff's final critical sentence: "Obama continues to pay lip service to criminal justice reform by enacting half-hearted half-measures."  Though I believe the Obama Administration has actually been quite effective and astute in the modification of federal prosecutorial charging policies, I also believe that it has been far less effective and astute in moving forward with an array of other badly needed federal criminal justice reform efforts.

December 17, 2015 in Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, December 15, 2015

How many fundamental rights in the Bill of Rights can be uniquely regulated for adults under 21?

The answer to the question in the title of this post would seem to be "at least one" in light of an interesting ruling today by the Seventh Circuit in Horsley v. Trame, No. No. 14-2846 (7th Cir. Dec. 15, 2015) (available here). Here is the starting, ending and some in-between key passages from the panel decision:

Tempest Horsley’s application to possess an Illinois Firearm Owner’s Identification Card, commonly known as a “FOID card,” was returned to her as incomplete because she was over 18 but not yet 21 and her application did not contain a parent or guardian signature. Although she could have under Illinois law, she did not seek further review from the Director of the Illinois State Police. We disagree with Horsley that the Illinois statutory scheme violates her rights under the Second Amendment. Illinois does not impose a categorical ban on firearm possession for 18-to- 20-year-olds whose parents do not consent. Rather, when an applicant cannot obtain a parent or guardian signature, he or she may appeal to the Director for a FOID card, and the Director will make a determination. We conclude that this process for 18-to-20-year-olds is not unconstitutional, so we affirm the decision of the district court....

Horsley ... maintains that firearm possession by 18-to-20-year-olds falls within the scope of the Second Amendment. She emphasizes that persons over 18 can vote and serve in the military, get married without parental consent, and own land. Even though the age of majority was for many years 21, it is now 18, and so she argues that presentday 18-year-olds cannot be restricted from possessing firearms based on age alone. She points to historical evidence that she contends favors her position as well. The First Militia Act enacted by the United States Congress in 1792, for example, included 18-year-old men in the scope of those eligible for the militia. Because a minor could be a member of the militia and be armed, she reasons that the Second Amendment gives these persons a right to bear arms. We need not decide today whether 18-, 19-, and 20-year-olds are within the scope of the Second Amendment. Cf. Nat’l Rifle Ass’n, 700 F.3d 185 at 204-05 (also declining to resolve issue). Even if they are, our next step would be to turn to means-ends scrutiny of the regulation. Ezell, 651 F.3d at 703.... Significantly, although Horsley’s arguments treat the challenged statute as a categorical ban on firearm possession, the FOID Card Act does not in fact ban persons under 21 from having firearms without parent or guardian consent. Having a parent or guardian signature may speed up the process, but it is not a prerequisite to obtaining a FOID card in Illinois. Rather, a person for whom a parent’s signature is not available can appeal to the Director of the Illinois State Police [and any] denial is subject to judicial review....

The absence of a blanket ban makes the Illinois FOID Card Act much different from the blanket ban on firearm possession present in Heller. That there is not a categorical ban here also distinguishes this case from Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), to which Horsley points. There the Supreme Court struck down a “blanket provision” requiring the consent of a parent or person in loco parentis before an unmarried minor could have an abortion during her first 12 weeks of pregnancy unless necessary to preserve the mother’s life. Id. at 74....

The Illinois statute is substantially related to the achievement of the state’s interests. The goal of protecting public safety is supported by studies and data regarding persons under 21 and violent and gun crimes....  Trame also points to scholarly research on development through early adulthood that supports a conclusion that the Illinois FOID card application procedure for persons under 21 fits the state’s compelling interest in public safety....

We conclude that Illinois has shown a sufficient meansend relationship between the challenged statute and an important government interest.  Illinois’s decision to use parents as a first check on firearm possession by persons under 21 is reasonable.  The parent or guardian signature provision provides for an individualized assessment of the applicant’s fitness for possession of a firearm by a person likely to be in the best position to make such an evaluation. That signature also subjects the parent to liability for harm caused by firearm ownership.  The legislature could reasonably conclude that many persons under 21 would not have the financial ability to compensate a person injured in a firearms incident, and the signature provision in the Illinois statute provides a means for an additional source of income in that event.  If no parent or guardian is willing or able to sign the application, the Illinois statute provides that another person can make the individualized assessment — the Director of State Police.  The challenged provisions in the FOID Card Act are substantially related to the state’s important interests, and we do not find the law unconstitutional.

December 15, 2015 in Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (5)

NY Times debates " What Age Should Young Criminals Be Tried as Adults?"

The Room for Debate section of the New York Times has this new set of notable commentaries discussing the appropriate age for when an offender should (or should not be) brought into adult court for trial and sentencing. Here is the section's set up:

The governor of Connecticut has proposed raising the age juveniles can be tried as adults to 21 in attempts to keep more young people out of cycles of incarceration.  Michigan, one of few states that still charge 17-year-olds as adults, is also considering raising the age for eligibility of juvenile status to 18.  Is this a good idea?  What age is appropriate for young law-breakers to be tried as adults?

Here are the contributions, with links via the commentary titles:

December 15, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Examining the crimmigration connections between sentencing and deportation

An important and timely new and growing speciality in the legal academy is "crimmigration," a label used to describe and analyze the intersections of criminal law and immigration law.  In that vein, I just came across this notable new paper by Jason Cade available via SSRN titled "Return of the JRAD," which looks closely at the particular intersection of sentencing decision-making and deportation consequences. Here is the abstract:

Ignacio Diaz Aguilar’s felony conviction for document forgery made him a priority for deportation and disqualified him from the possibility of discretionary relief from removal, despite apparently significant equities and mitigating factors.  And yet, when Federal District Court Judge Jack B. Weinstein sentenced Mr. Aguilar on August 14, 2015, he recommended that the government not deport Mr. Aguilar, even though no legal rules provided him with a route to that result.  This essay places Judge Weinstein’s recommendation in a broader context, explaining its importance within the modern deportation regime.  Statutory reforms and new agency practices have made criminal history the primary marker of noncitizen undesirability.  Even longtime lawful permanent residents with only minor convictions often cannot escape removal or make a case for discretionary relief.  As a result, the immigration system, as it works today, is in deep tension with the principle that under a humane system of justice the penalty should fit the crime.

Judge Weinstein’s sentencing order in Aguilar points the way to an important reform that would decrease the likelihood of disproportionate removals in cases that involve noncitizens with a criminal history.  A sentencing judge’s decision to recommend against deportation in criminal cases offers immigration authorities an efficient, reliable, and cost-effective means of assessing a noncitizen’s positive and negative equities and determining whether removal is an appropriate part of the total penalty for the noncitizen’s transgression.  In short, a sentencing judge’s recommendation against deportation could serve as a disproportionality rule of thumb, tempering and refining the role that criminal history plays in deportation decisions.  This essay makes the case that immigration authorities could rely on such recommendations -- as well as other forms of relief from all-out criminal punishment (e.g., pardons, expungements, and deferred adjudications) -- as signals that a noncitizen’s encounter with the criminal system presumptively should not lead to deportation.  To be sure, in some cases, that presumption should be overcome, particularly when the government can establish the noncitizen’s dangerousness or otherwise demonstrate social undesirability.  But deportation should be the exception, not the rule, in cases where the end result of the criminal process involves elimination or mitigation of the underlying criminal conviction. 

December 15, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, December 14, 2015

Reviewing and reflecting on persistent problems with the federal clemency process

The recent Washington Post article about criminal justice reform efforts during the second term of the Obama Administration (discussed here) hinted that we could expect to see Prez Obama grant a significant number of additional prison commutations in the coming weeks.  But this effective new Marshall Project piece by Bill Keller, headlined "The Bureaucracy of Mercy: Why hasn’t President Obama freed more prisoners? Maybe that’s the wrong question," reviews why federal clemency procedures and practices have been persistently disappointing for those who believe there is a need for much more than sporadic grants of executive mercy. I recommend the lengthy article in full, and here is how it starts and ends:

As the two presidents, one incoming and the other outgoing, shared a limo to the inauguration in January 2009, President Bush had some advice for President-elect Obama: “Announce a pardon policy early on, and stick to it.” Bush had been stunned by a final-days flood of appeals for clemency on behalf of friends and former colleagues convicted of federal crimes.

“I came to see a massive injustice in the system,” Bush recalled in his memoir, “Decision Points.” “If you had connections to the president, you could insert your case into the last-minute frenzy. Otherwise, you had to wait for the Justice Department to conduct a review and make a recommendation.”

As he approaches his own last-minute frenzy, President Obama has embraced criminal justice reform —especially the problem of over-incarceration — as a major cause of his administration.

“Over the course of this year, I’ve been talking to people all across the country about reforming our criminal justice system to be fairer, to be smarter, to be more effective,” he said in a speech in November.

And yet Obama’s clemency record so far — counting commutations and pardons — lags behind every recent president except George H.W. Bush, who had only a single term. On pardons, which give ex-inmates a better chance to get jobs, find housing, vote and generally live normal lives, Obama is the stingiest president since John Adams — 64 granted so far, fewer than three percent of the petitions filed....

But to many advocates of reform, the numbers miss the larger point: after navigating the multi-stage process of CP14, applicants still had to pass through the Department of Justice, where the main job is to lock people up, not let people out.  Between prosecutors and defenders, says David Patton, head of the Federal Defenders of New York, there is “a difference in role and perspective.” Prosecutors, he said, are “less able to see things through the eyes of our clients, or through the eyes of anyone other than the prosecutor.”

“In some sense, by recommending that a sentence be reduced you are taking a position that is, in all likelihood, contrary to what DOJ took at the sentencing proceeding,” he said.

Top officials at the Justice Department publicly discount the idea that the department’s culture is hostile to clemency. “We’re not the Department of Prosecutions,” Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates told The Washington Post in May.

Various clemency advocates have different suggestions for change: an independent commission; restoring a federal parole board, which was abolished in the 1980’s, and having it handle commutations; or plucking the pardon attorney’s office from the Department of Justice and locating it in the White House. What they all have in common is reducing the role of the Justice Department.  “I would want prosecutors to weigh in on every case,” said Rachel Barkow, a New York University law professor and member of the U.S. Sentencing commission. ”But I wouldn’t want them to be a veto point, where they could just make a case go away. And that’s what it is right now.”

Margaret Colgate Love, a clemency lawyer who spent 20 years in the Justice Department and was the department’s pardon attorney from 1990 to 1997, agreed: “It’s hopeless, you can’t reform it in the department.”

But Love argues that the focus on presidential clemency is misplaced. Intended as a remedy for individual cases of injustice, she says, executive clemency should not be a tool to reduce prison populations.

Other vehicles exist for more systemic reform, she notes. The U.S. Sentencing Commission, an independent agency of the judicial branch, has found 46,000 inmates eligible for earlier release by making new sentencing guidelines for certain drug crimes retroactive. A bill inching through Congress would do the same for some 6,500 people locked up during the national panic over crack cocaine.

Love says that when she hears speculation about moving thousands of people through the clemency process she wonders, “How could anybody who had half a brain imagine that clemency could be used to deal with even a thousand cases? It’s never been done.”

Her prescription is to empower the Bureau of Prisons to identify prisoners ready for commutation and take those cases directly to a judge. “Wardens know who ought to be out, and who not,” she said. “Why should we be putting the president in the position of vouching for a whole bunch of people who did pretty serious crimes, many of them, and have been in prison for many years?”

No one expects any of these reforms to be enacted in the year Obama has left. Which will give him something to pass on to his successor at the next inauguration.

December 14, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Sunday, December 13, 2015

Encouraging DUI alternative sentencing story from South Dakota

The AP this past week had this encouraging story about an alternative approach to drunk driving offenses headlined "States encouraged to mull South Dakota sobriety program." Here are excerpts:

Twice a day for three years, Chris Mexican has showed up at the county jail in Pierre to blow into a tube and prove he hasn't been drinking.  After several drunken driving convictions, it has allowed him to remain free and to become a better, more clearheaded father to his kids....

South Dakota's 24-7 sobriety program has helped curb drunken driving and domestic violence, and some incentives for states that adopt the model were included in the $305 billion transportation law that President Barack Obama signed [earlier this month].

The program offers those accused or convicted of an alcohol-related crime an alternative to jail.  The provision in the highway law, pushed by U.S. Sen. John Thune, creates an incentive grant totaling about $18 million over four years for states that implement the sobriety program.

It's akin to existing funds for states that have adopted seatbelt requirements or ignition interlock laws.  "This will give other states a chance to find out if it works as well," said U.S. Sen. Mike Rounds, who was South Dakota governor when the program began.  The new transportation law also allows states that implement a 24-7 program to avoid a penalty that routes construction funds to highway safety.

An independent study released in 2013 by the RAND Corp., a nonprofit think tank, found that South Dakota's program cut the rate of repeat DUI arrests at the county level by 12 percent and domestic violence arrests by 9 percent in its first five years.  "These are large reductions when you consider that we're talking about the community level," said Beau Kilmer, who conducted the study and continues to research the program.

Experts say incentive grants are an effective way to encourage states.  "When it's a federal law, the word spreads and other communities that are looking for solutions find out about it, so they're much more likely to adopt it themselves," said safety advocate Joan Claybrook, a former National Highway Traffic Safety Administration chief.

South Dakota started the practice in 2005.  Participants come to a site each morning and evening to blow into an alcohol breath test.  Those who live farther away or who have difficulty remaining sober wear alcohol-monitoring bracelets or have ignition interlock systems in their vehicles.  Over the past decade, nearly 40,000 people have participated in South Dakota's twice-daily program, compiling a pass rate of more than 99 percent.

North Dakota and Montana have started similar monitoring systems, and more states are running or planning pilot programs. South Dakota's attorney general, Marty Jackley, has also discussed the program with his counterparts in other states.  And West Virginia Attorney General Patrick Morrisey said South Dakota's "very positive" results warrant examination by his state, where a program would require legislative support.

December 13, 2015 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (3)

Top Massachusetts court decides due process now demands heightened proof standard for sex offender classification

A helpful reader alerted me to a notable new procedural ruling by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court this past week. In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 380316 v. Sex Offender Registry Board, SJC-11823 (Mass. Dec. 11, 2015) (available here), the top Massachusetts court decided that the preponderance standard of proof is inadequate for sex offender classification.  Here is how the opinion starts:

We are asked in this case to consider anew the standard of proof that the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB) must satisfy in order to classify a convicted sex offender under the provisions of the sex offender registry law, G. L. c. 6, §§ 178C-178Q.  The plaintiff, John Doe No. 380316 (Doe), is a convicted sex offender who was classified by a preponderance of the evidence as having a moderate risk of reoffense.  In Doe, Sex Offender Registry Bd. No. 972 v. Sex Offender Registry Bd., 428 Mass. 90, 91 (1998) (Doe No. 972), we held that SORB need only prove the appropriateness of a sex offender's risk classification by a preponderance of the evidence.  In light of amendments to the sex offender registry law and other developments since our decision in that case, however, Doe contends that the preponderance standard no longer adequately protects his due process rights.  We agree.  For the reasons stated below, we hold that SORB is constitutionally required to prove the appropriateness of an offender's risk classification by clear and convincing evidence.

December 13, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, December 12, 2015

"The Armed Career Criminal Act: Imprecise, Indeterminate, and Unconstitutional"

The title of this post is the title of this timely new piece authored by Michael Schearer and available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence enhancement for felons possessing a firearm who have previously been convicted three times of a “violent felony” or a “serious drug offense.” Despite this seemingly clear mandate, the statute has been embroiled in controversy for decades as judges struggle to determine what predicate crimes meet this standard.  The culmination of this battle resulted in the invalidation of the ACCA’s “residual clause” when the Supreme Court found that the clause violated due process in Johnson v. United States.  Nonetheless, the remaining provisions of the ACCA are still problematic.

For example, although burglary is a specifically enumerated offense that constitutes a violent felony, burglary convictions in some states have been held to be violent felonies while burglary convictions in other states have not. Likewise, offenses involving “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” have mired the courts in similar difficulties in determining whether the particular offensive qualifies as violent felony.  Perhaps most troublesome, a finding of juvenile delinquency can be considered a criminal conviction that subjects an individual to ACCA enhancement in a subsequent adult proceeding, despite the fact that juveniles do not have the right to a jury trial. This paper argues that the ACCA is imprecise, indeterminate, and insusceptible of principled and predictable interpretation.  Absent a wholesale modification by Congress, the substantive provisions of the ACCA examined in this paper ought to be held by the courts to be unconstitutional because they deprive defendants of due process.

December 12, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Victims' Rights At Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Friday, December 11, 2015

SCOTUS grants cert on permissible practices for police roadside tests and for prisoner litigation

As reported in this SCOTUSblog posting by Lyle Denniston, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review on four matters this afternoon including a set of cases "that could have a nationwide effect on the roadside actions of police officers."  Here are the details:

[T]he Supreme Court agreed on Friday to decide whether a blood or breath test for drunk driving can be made without a search warrant and whether, if there is no warrant, an individual can be charged with a crime for refusing to take such a test.  The Justices took on three cases raising the issue: two from North Dakota and one from Minnesota.

The Court also granted review of three other cases ... [including one involving] a dispute over whether a prison inmate is excused from attempting administrative remedies for a grievance if the prisoner believed, wrongly, that he had already done so (Ross v. Blake).

The drunk-driving cases provide the Court with something of a sequel to its ruling in 2013 in Missouri v. McNeely, which left the clear impression that, if police have enough time, they should get a warrant before taking a test of a suspected drunk driver.  The Court ruled that the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not always amount to an emergency situation that permits a DUI test without a warrant.

In North Dakota, state laws bars a person from driving in the state if he or she refuses to submit to a chemical test, of blood, breath or urine, to determine alcohol concentration.  It makes refusal to take such a test open to prosecution for a crime that carries the same punishment as a conviction for drunk-driving.   In Minnesota, state law makes it a crime to refuse an officer’s request to take a chemical test for alcohol in the blood, if the individual has been validly arrested for drunk driving.  The two cases involve either a blood or breath test.

Lawyers for the three men involved in the appeals said that the issues they were raising were coming up more frequently in the wake of the McNeely decision.  And they argued that the decisions by the state supreme courts in these cases conflict with the McNeely ruling.  The Supreme Court, at its private Conference on Friday, had thirteen cases on these issues, and chose the three from that list — all filed by the same attorneys.

December 11, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Prez candidate Donald Trump pledges (seemingly unconstitutional) death penalty mandate for cop killers

As reported in this article from The Hill, "Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump on Thursday vowed to issue an executive order to mandate the death penalty for anyone who kills a police officer."  Here is more:

“One of the first things I’d do in terms of executive order, if I win, will be to sign a strong, strong statement that would go out to the country, out to the world, anybody killing a police man, a police woman, a police officer, anybody killing a police officer, the death penalty is going to happen,” he said.

“We can’t let this go,” he added, speaking to a New Hampshire crowd alongside the New England Police Benevolent Association, shortly after the group voted to endorse Trump.

The outspoken businessman referenced the 2014 shooting of two New York City police officers in their squad car, which prompted significant outcry from some conservatives accusing President Obama of fostering resentment against police officers. “I want to let you know, the police and law enforcement in this country, I will never ever let them down,” he said. “The job they do and the job all you in this room do is second to none, and everyone in our country knows that.”

As most informed readers likely know, the Supreme Court back in 1976 first declared that a system of mandatory death sentencing was unconstitutional, and the Justices reaffirmed this "individualization" constitutional requirement in a number of subsequent ruling. But Justice Scalia has long complained about the Supreme Court finding such a limit in the Constitution, and it is certainly possible that a President Trump might be inclined to seek to live up to this campaign pledge by seeking to overturn prior SCOTUS precedent precluding any capital punishment mandates.

December 11, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Thursday, December 10, 2015

Shouldn't the Black Lives Matter movement focus a lot more on ensuring black voters are able to matter?

The question in the title of this post reflects my reaction to two stories I came across this morning.  First, as reported here, readers of The Crime Report in the site's "fifth annual survey of the most significant criminal justice news stories and developments ... [chose] the growing political profile of Black Lives Matter and related organizations as the major development of 2015."  Second, this new Intercept article reports that within "Florida’s black population, the rate of disenfranchisement is high, with nearly a quarter of African-Americans prohibited from voting."  This second piece is headlined "Thanks to Republicans, Nearly a Quarter of Florida's Black Citizens Can't Vote," and here is an excerpt:

Nationwide, nearly 6 million Americans are barred from voting due to felony convictions. Although most states restrict the voting rights of imprisoned felons, Iowa currently is the only one that joins Florida in imposing a lifelong disenfranchisement on ex-felons.  Until three weeks ago, Kentucky also had such a ban, but on the Tuesday before Thanksgiving the state’s outgoing Democratic governor issued an executive order restoring the voting rights of 140,000 nonviolent ex-felons in the state.  The incoming Republican governor has signaled that he may uphold the order.

Meanwhile, the scale of the problem in Florida appears to be growing. The 1.5 million figure dates from 2010; when Republican Gov. Rick Scott took office in 2011, he immediately rolled back a policy of his predecessor, Charlie Crist, who automatically restored the rights of many felony offenders who had completed their sentences.  Scott introduced new rules requiring that people convicted of nonviolent felonies wait five years before they can apply to have their civil rights restored; those convicted of violent and certain more serious felonies must wait seven years to apply.  Under Crist, tens of thousands of felons, on average, won back their right to vote each year. So far, Gov. Scott has restored the rights of just 1,866 ex-felons, while tens of thousands of former inmates are released each year, stripped of their voting rights. As the Scott administration has choked off the one existing channel for former felons seeking suffrage, anecdotal evidence suggests that wait times are getting longer for those petitioning the governor to restore their civil rights. ...

More than 50 years after Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Florida is still a place where in a typical public setting — a grocery store or a city block — a sizable portion of the citizens you walk among are likely to be quietly enduring the state’s lifelong disenfranchisement. In neighborhoods like heavily black Parramore, an even larger number of residents will be unable to vote. And Walker says that in his congregation, those who can vote are outnumbered by those who cannot.

“We’ve had older clients call us and say I want to be able to vote again before I die,” said Mathew Higbee, the founding partner of Higbee & Associates, a law firm that helps ex-felons restore their civil rights. “And we say, ‘Right now it’s going to be a six- to 10-year wait before they’ll even look at it,’ and the person says: ‘I’m not sure I’m going to live that long so I’m not even going to try.’”

The Scott administration has asserted that the governor uses the right to vote as an incentive to encourage former offenders to stay out of trouble. “Gov. Scott feels that convicted felons need to have an opportunity to show they can be law-abiding members of society before those rights are restored,” a spokesperson said during the 2012 election season. Yet ex-felons who have stayed clear of the law for more than a decade told me that their petitions to Florida’s clemency board have gone unanswered or have become stalled in a bewildering bureaucracy plagued with a backlog of nearly 11,000 pending applications for civil rights restoration. So far this year, the state has approved only 315 applications. The former felons I spoke with hold little faith in the clemency process. And, perhaps more than anything else, they express a feeling of having been being forgotten by virtually every element of political life in America. (Gov. Scott’s office did not respond to a list of emailed questions.)

I view the 2008 and 2012 election results as dramatic proof that minority populations garner significant political power and can have maximum political and social impact when they turn out in large numbers to vote.  As the title of this post suggests, I think the BLM movemen could and would have the most long-term political and social impact if it were to aggressively challenge felon disenfranchisement laws and other formal and informal barriers to people of color voting in very large numbers in every election.

December 10, 2015 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (13)

Tuesday, December 08, 2015

"The Path to Exoneration"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper available via SSRN authored by Jon Gould and Richard Leo. Here is the abstract:

This article is the first systematic empirical study of how the American criminal justice system discovers and responds to factual error based on actual innocence.  The study analyzes a data set of 260 cases of wrongful conviction of the innocent and 200 near misses (i.e., dismissals and acquittals involving an innocent defendant) to better understand the sources of and bases for exoneration; who is responsible for, as well as who opposes, exoneration; the statistical correlates of exoneration; and the primary methods and mechanisms involved in the path to exoneration.

This study leads to several findings.  First, wrongful convictions are difficult to reverse in the absence of dispositive evidence of innocence. The vast majority of exonerations relied on one or two bases, and even then most required DNA evidence.  Second, the adversarial nature of the criminal justice system continues from the trial level to subsequent efforts to exonerate the innocent.  Police and prosecutors maintain their roles, infrequently playing a central part in investigating or advocating for exoneration and serving as the largest combined source of opposition to exonerations.  Finally, exonerations take a long time, even longer when based on DNA evidence, which appears to be the primary basis for clearing defendants.

After examining these findings, the authors advocate for the following changes in the United States criminal justice system: 1) police and prosecutors must take a more active role in the review and reversal of factually erroneous convictions; 2) additional juridical proceedings are needed for the wrongly convicted to prove their innocence even after conviction; 3) efforts must be made to prevent wrongful convictions at the front end because the resources for freeing the wrongly convicted are so limited and the path to exoneration following conviction is filled with formidable challenges.

December 8, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Kentucky gov issues hundreds of pardons and a few commutations on way out of office

As reported in this local piece, outgoing Kentucky Governor "Steve Beshear Monday night granted 201 pardons and six commutations to people sentenced for a range of offenses, including 10 women sentenced for violent crimes they committed after suffering years of domestic violence."  Here is more:

Throughout his eight years in office, the Democratic governor said he received more than 3,400 requests for pardons that were reviewed over several months by him and his staff. “I spent many long days weighing the merits and circumstances of individual cases before making my final decisions,” Beshear said in a statement. “The pardon authority afforded me by Section 77 of the Kentucky Constitution isn’t something I take lightly. We are talking about action that impacts the lives of so many individuals.”

Beshear noted that his predecessor, Republican Ernie Fletcher, received more than 1,000 pardon requests and granted just over 100 pardons during his four years in office.

Of the commutations of sentence or full pardons to 10 women who suffered domestic violence, Beshear said, “These 10 women — some of whom are currently incarcerated and some of whom have already been released from institutions — were recommended to me for consideration for full pardons after an extensive joint review by the Department for Public Advocacy and the Kentucky Domestic Violence Association. After further review of those files, I determined that some of the pardon requests should be granted, while others merited a commutation of sentence.”...

Beshear, a former attorney general, also pardoned several individuals convicted of drug offenses. He said their requests “described with candor their mistakes with drugs and highlighted their efforts to stay sober and become productive members of their communities.”

Beshear added: “Throughout my administration, I have worked tirelessly with legislative leaders, local officials and advocates to wipe out the tragic impacts that substance abuse and addiction have had on the people of the commonwealth.

“A significant part of that strategy has been a focus on treatment to help these individuals have a fighting chance at staying clean and turning their lives around. After carefully considering the details of each of these cases, I am convinced that these individuals deserve a second chance at life with a clean record.”

December 8, 2015 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Why Has The Death Penalty Grown Increasingly Rare?"

The title of this post is the headline of this extended NPR piece reported by Nina Totenberg. (She also has this companion shorter piece headlined "As Supreme Court Upholds Death Penalty, Number Of Executions Plummets.") Here is how the big segment gets started: 

The last execution scheduled in the U.S. for the year is set for Tuesday in Georgia.  But capital punishment has gown rare in America, to the point of near extinction.

Even though polls show that 60 percent of the public still supports the death penalty, and even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld it as constitutional, the number of executions this year so far is almost the same as the number of fatalities from lightning strikes — 27 executions versus 26 deaths by lightning.

It's an ironic statistic.  When the Supreme Court briefly banned the death penalty in 1972, it did so, in part, because, as Justice Potter Stewart put it, capital punishment was being imposed so randomly and "freakishly" that it was like being "struck by lightning."  Four years later, the court would revive the death penalty, but with new limitations aimed at reserving it for the so-called worst of the worst.

Few could have imagined the trajectory the death penalty would follow in the years after.  The number of executions soared in the 1990s — hitting a high of 98 in 1999 and ultimately totaling more than 1,400 — but tailed off dramatically after 2000.  With just one more execution set for this year, the current year's total will be the smallest number in almost 25 years.

While the death penalty remains the law in 31 states, that figure is misleading.  In many of the 31, capital punishment has largely fallen into disuse.  In four states, the governor has put a moratorium on the death penalty, and in 17 there's an executive or judicial hold on executions because of botched procedures or problems in obtaining drugs that courts and legislatures have approved for lethal injection.

December 8, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Monday, December 07, 2015

"Are debtors' prisons returning?"

The title of this post is the headline of this recent lengthy CNN commentary authored by Van Jones and Jessica Jackson. Here are excerpts:

Debtors' prison is supposed to be illegal in the United States. But in too many American cities, it has made a shocking return.  This [past] week, a bipartisan group of leaders, and a few A-list celebrities, gathered at the White House to do something about it.

The problem: Faced with ballooning costs of America's massive incarceration industry, local jurisdictions have started billing people for time they spend behind bars.  They are also charging them for electronic supervision services. Not to mention DNA collection, juries and constitutionally mandated public defenders.

The trouble here is obvious: Recently incarcerated people often do not have jobs.  Therefore, they cannot possibly keep up with an increasingly aggressive list of fees and fines.

So believe it or not: Cities are throwing them BACK into jail -- for not being able to pay!  From Detroit to Dallas, America's criminal justice system is trapping poor people in a perpetual cycle of prisons and poverty....

On top of the stated fees and fines, many jurisdictions are adopting practices employed by shady payday lenders, not public safety agencies.  For example, Washington state charges a 12% interest rate on all its criminal debt.  Florida adds a 40% fee that goes into the pockets of a private collections agency.  And in Arizona, an 83% surcharge turns a $500 fee into a $915 bill.  A portion of those proceeds go to finance electoral campaigns, creating a strong incentive to preserve the status quo.

One study revealed that most people with a felony conviction can expect to be saddled with an average $11,000 in debt.  In total, about 10 million Americans collectively owe more than $50 billion in outstanding fines and fees. Repaying this debt would be challenging for the average American family, half of whom would have trouble finding $400 on short notice.  But for those already struggling to get on their feet after prison, the debt from fees and fines often carry carries with it an air of impossibility.

The current system has dire consequences for millions of Americans that can be permanently debilitating and perpetuates a cycle of poverty and incarceration.  Failure to pay fines can result in lost income, depressed credit ratings, housing instability, suspended drivers' licenses, arrest warrants, loss of Social Security benefits or further incarceration.  These consequences can permanently affect an individual's life and reduce the ability ever to get his or her life back on track.

The system is not supposed to work this way.  A Supreme Court ruling in 1983 prohibited putting people in prison for failure to pay their fines and fees without an indigency hearing.  And yet at least 15 states have found ways to ignore this mandate.  They have made this a standard practice....

The Sunlight Foundation is supporting the collection of data so we can understand the scope of the problem and how we can better address the issue.  The Laura and John Arnold Foundation is funding a comprehensive research and litigation-based approach to reform.  And #cut50 is dedicated to highlighting this injustice and amplifying leadership from around the country.

Together, we can roll back these policies that ultimately have little to do with public safety.  Our challenge strikes at the heart of our criminal justice system: Are we a nation of second chances, or will we sit by and watch a perpetual punishment machine run wild?  Let us ensure our elected representatives and government agencies live up to the highest values of our society.

This ABC News column authored by Lz Ganderson, headlined "To Be Poor, Black and Jailed," discusses similar issues and concerns.

December 7, 2015 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, December 06, 2015

Supreme Court takes up Montana case to resolve applicability of Sixth Amendment speedy trial right to sentencing

The major matter among the cases that the Supreme Court decided to take up on Friday concerns the authority of the Puerto Rican government to deal with its debt crisis.  But as this post from Lyle Denniston at SCOTUSblog notes, the undercard cert grants are still noteworthy:

The Court granted review in three other cases on Friday, involving: the application of the constitutional right to a speedy trial to a follow-up sentencing proceeding (Betterman v. Montana); a definition of when a government contractor has filed false reimbursement claims under the False Claims Act (questions 2 and 3 in Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar); and a claim for attorney’s fees for an employer when the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission does not carry out its assigned duties before a lawsuit is filed (CRST Van Expedited v. EEOC). Those cases, too, are likely to be argued in March.

The cert petition in Betterman is available at this link, and here is how it presents the question:

Whether the Sixth Amendment’s Speedy Trial Clause applies to the sentencing phase of a criminal prosecution, protecting a criminal defendant from inordinate delay in final disposition of his case.

This question has divided lower courts, but I am not so sure having it answered either way will really impact sentencing practices much. Defendants can, and regularly do, waive and forfeit Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights so having such a right apply at sentencing may not practically lead to much more than just some more formal waiver practices. Conversely, defendants surely have some residual Fifth Amendment Due Process right not to suffer too much prejudice from excessive delays before sentencing, so defendant already have and will continue to have some procedural protections in this arena even without the Sixth Amendment getting involved.

That all said, it is always exciting and interesting when SCOTUS takes up a constitutional sentencing issue that has split both state and federal courts. And there could be some "sleeper" elements emerging in this case through briefing and argument that could make it a bigger deal. And, if nothing else, the case has the benefit of a cool party name that will keep me humming one of my (many) favorite Pearl Jam songs.

December 6, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Can and will Prez Obama effectively help get a federal sentencing reform bill to his desk?

Justice-refThe question in the title of this post is prompted by this recent Washington Post report, headlined "Obama convenes meeting on criminal justice reform to buoy bipartisanship," discussing a meeting Prez Obama convened with congressional leaders to talk about how to turn reform bills into new sentencing laws. Here the details:

President Obama convened a meeting of more than a dozen congressional Republicans and Democrats Thursday, in an effort to bolster a fragile bipartisan coalition working to reform the criminal justice system.

The House and Senate have been working to craft legislation to reduce mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, as well as to revamp aspects of federal incarceration. The Senate Judiciary Committee passed a comprehensive bill on a bipartisan 15-5 vote in October; the House Judiciary Committee has passed five separate measures by voice vote in recent weeks.

But there are a few major differences between the two chambers’ approaches. Most significantly, one of the House bills — the Criminal Code Improvement Act — would require prosecutors in cases as wide-ranging as food tainting and corporate pollution to prove that defendants “knew, or had reason to believe, the conduct was unlawful,” otherwise known as “mens rea.”

That measure has angered many Democrats, who argue that it could block criminal prosecution of some corporate entities — including those owned by Koch Industries, which has helped mobilize conservative support for the overall reform effort. Obama specifically asked lawmakers to remove the provision, according to individuals familiar with the meeting, though House Republicans argued that it was a critical component for conservatives.

“We believe that invites a lot of controversy and delay into our agreement, and the House feels just the opposite,” said Senate Minority Whip Richard J. Durbin (D-Ill.), who attended the White House meeting and co-authored the Senate criminal justice bill.

Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.), another co-author of the bill, said that while “nothing was decided” in the more than hour-and-a-half session, he was “very optimistic” after participating in it. “I think it was all a very positive, bipartisan, bicameral, executive, legislative meeting,” Cornyn said, adding that although “there was not consensus” on that issue, there might be a way to work it out in a conference between the two chambers. “But I think part of the message was, ‘Let’s take the things where there is consensus, get that done.’ ”

A spokeswoman for House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) declined to comment on the meeting. She noted that the House panel has passed bills on issues including modifying sentencing guidelines and eliminating statutes in the U.S. Code that subject violators to criminal penalties for trivial conduct. The committee will take up measures on prisons, civil asset forfeiture, and criminal procedures and policing in the coming weeks, she added.

Durbin said “we have a good chance” of passing legislation in early 2016, so lawmakers can work out their differences “and send it to the president before midpoint of next year.”

Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), who helped craft the Senate bill and also met with the president, said the meeting was less about “the path forward” than how to get the two competing proposals brought up for floor votes in the House and Senate.

Obama also pressed for specific numbers on how many individuals would benefit overall from the two proposals, people familiar with the meeting said, because the proposals introduce new sentences even as they reduce some mandatory minimums.

Senator Durbin's comments reinforce my understand that there is a good chance that the full House and Senate will likely vote in January or February on the various reform bills that have already passed the Judiciary Committees. Such votes would pave the way for harmonizing efforts on the bills and perhaps enactment sometime in Spring 2016. I think the commnts coming after this meanign from not only Senator Durbin but also Senator Cronyn lead me to have continued (tempered) optimism that this will get done in some form before Prez Obama leaves the Oval Office.

That all said, the dispute over menas rea reform could throw a wrench into this process, as could various other political developments. Especially if the legislative process drags into the summer, I think whomever emerges as a GOP leader through the primary season could end up having an impact on the sentencing reform debate. In addition, as both the title and contents of this post suggests, Prez Obama also is a critical and complicated figure in all this. Cajoling Congress effectively could help keep the legislative process, but too much advocacy or criticism on sentencing issues coming from the White House could upset an already delicate political balance in this arena.

December 6, 2015 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Saturday, December 05, 2015

Have conservatives been "manipulated" and "duped" by abolitionists to oppose the death penalty?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by statements in the final paragraph of this lengthy American Thinker commentary authored Aaron J. Veselenak and headlined "Some Reading for Conservatives Who Oppose the Death Penalty."  I recommend the full piece, and here is how it starts and ends:

In recent years, opponents of capital punishment have leveled key criticisms against conservatives, claiming major hypocrisy in their continued approval of society's most serious criminal sanction.  One claim is that conservative support for the death penalty violates the most central tenet of conservatism — that of limited government.  How can conservatives, they ask, in their suspicion of and disdain for large, powerful government, advocate use of the greatest governmental power of all, the taking of life?  Contradiction — indeed, hypocrisy — is said to exist.

This charge is faulty, even bogus.  Unfortunately, this and other equally faulty charges have resonated with certain members of the conservative movement, among them state and federal lawmakers.

Why is the above claim so faulty, in fact lacking of substance?  The answer lies in the fact that conservatives are not anarchists.  Yes, conservatives do believe in very limited size and power of government.  However, that does not mean they abandon the most basic functions of government, chief among them protection of the people through military and police powers.  Or a court and penal system to further provide safety and administer justice....

Conservatives jumping on the anti-­death penalty bandwagon in recent years need to rethink their position.  They have been manipulated — duped by the seemingly sound and logical statements of death penalty opponents.  Deeper reflection demonstrates these claims to be very shallow and without merit.

Perhaps because I hang out and interact with a number of pretty bright people with an array of views on an array of criminal justice topics, I am disinclined to believe that conservatives who oppose the death penalty are being convinced by "very shallow" claims or are subject to being manipulated or duped by death penalty opponents.  Nor do I think one need to be drawn in by appeals to anarchy or libertarianism to have conservative-based concerns about the operation of modern death penalty in the United States.

Rather, I think one readily can embrace a strong belief/commitment to a government focused on the "protection of the people through military and police powers [and] a court and penal system to further provide safety and administer justice" while still voicing considerable disaffinity for the modern death penalty.  This disaffinity would be based on the (seemingly conservative) perspective that the governments often, even when trying really hard to be effective in its core functions, far too often end up doing more harm than good (and at an excessive cost to taxpayers).  Even apart from concerns about government dysfunction showcases by wrongful convictions (which I assume trouble conservatives as much if not more than liberals), the governmental mess we have recently seen in Oklahoma with the mixing up of execution drugs or states previously relying on unqualified executioners or even evidence of racial disparities in capitl application could all seemingly provide a principled basis for principled conservatives to conclude the government (especially state governments) ought not still be in the business of killing its killers.

December 5, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12)

Friday, December 04, 2015

"The Injustice of the Plea-Bargain System"

The title of this post is the headline of this op-ed authored by Lucian Dervan and appearing in today's Wall Street Journal. Here are excerpts:

The House Judiciary Committee introduced five bills this year in a bipartisan effort to reform America’s criminal-justice system.  With incarceration rates in the U.S. five to 10 times higher than in Western Europe and other democracies, the bills aim to provide sensible reforms such as rewriting mandatory-sentencing statutes.  Yet none directly addresses plea bargaining, a practice that induces too many defendants to plead guilty to avoid what has come to be known as the trial penalty....

Even in cases without mandatory sentences, it is common for sentences handed down after trial to be far more severe than those offered to induce guilty pleas.  This “trial penalty” is weighed by thousands of defendants each day when considering whether to accept a plea offer.

A 2013 Human Rights Watch study found that the average federal drug sentence for defendants who proceeded to trial in 2012 was three times longer — an increase of 10 years — than for defendants who pleaded guilty.  In that study, a federal judge in New York described the sentences defendants face if they reject plea offers as “so excessively severe, they take your breath away.”  Not surprisingly, the great majority of convictions come from guilty pleas.  According to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, over 97% of convictions in the federal system arise from guilty pleas; state systems aren’t far behind at about 95%.

There are numerous documented cases of innocent defendants pleading guilty, including well-known examples such as Brian Banks.  In 2002, at the age of 17, Mr. Banks was wrongly accused of rape yet chose a plea bargain with a maximum sentence of seven years in prison.  If he rejected the offer and lost at trial, he faced 40 years to life in prison.  He took the deal and falsely confessed.  In 2012, after definitive evidence of his innocence came to light, a California court reversed the conviction.

The Supreme Court established the constitutionality of plea bargaining in Brady v. United States (1970).  But the court warned that it would have “serious doubts” if the “encouragement of guilty pleas by offers of leniency substantially increased the likelihood that defendants, advised by competent counsel, would falsely condemn themselves.”  Sadly, the trial penalty has done just that.

December 4, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12)

Arkansas state judge strikes down portion of state execution law aimed at keep drug suppliers secret

As reported in this AP article, an "Arkansas judge struck down a portion of the state's execution law that keeps secret the source of drugs it uses, saying Thursday that drug suppliers do not have a constitutional right to be free from criticism." Here is more about the ruling and its context:

Pulaski County Circuit Judge Wendell Griffen sided with death row inmates who challenged a law passed by lawmakers this year that prevents disclosure about the drugs that are used in executions. The judge also ordered the state to disclose drug details, including the makers and suppliers, by noon Friday. "It is common knowledge that capital punishment is not universally popular," Griffen wrote. "That reality is not a legitimate reason to shield the entities that manufacture, supply, distribute, and sell lethal injection drugs from public knowledge."

Judd Deere, a spokesman for Arkansas Attorney General Leslie Rutledge, said late Thursday that the office had filed notice of appeal with the state Supreme Court. Rutledge also asked for an immediate stay of Griffen's order. "Attorney General Rutledge has a duty to defend the State's lethal injection statute and disagrees with Judge Griffen's order," Deere wrote in an emailed statement.

In the filing for an immediate stay, attorneys for the office noted that states with secrecy laws regarding executions have generally won challenges to those laws. They believe Arkansas' law is less stringent than many of those.

In his ruling, Griffen noted that a federal judge in Ohio last month granted a protective order to allow that state to maintain secrecy about the drugs, but he said that court erred because it accepted "what it acknowledged as no proof of 'a single known threat'" as an indicator that disclosing a state's source for drugs would pose an undue burden on that state....

The Arkansas Supreme Court put on hold executions for eight inmates until the inmates' lawsuit challenging the state's execution protocol and secrecy law could be heard.

Under the execution secrecy law, the Department of Correction has withheld the manufacturer and distributor of midazolam, vecuronium bromide and potassium chloride obtained last year, as well as other information. Midazolam, a sedative, gained notoriety after being used during executions that took longer than expected last year in Arizona, Ohio and Oklahoma. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the drug's use in executions in June. Earlier this year, The Associated Press identified three pharmaceutical companies that likely made Arkansas' execution drugs; each company said it objects to its drugs being used that way.

The inmates argued that the secrecy law is unconstitutional. They want information on the drugs' makers and suppliers to determine whether they could lead to cruel and unusual punishment. They also argued the secrecy law violates a settlement in an earlier lawsuit that guaranteed inmates would be given the information. The state has said the agreement is not a binding contract.

Griffen noted in his ruling that an attorney for the state said Arkansas' suppliers "covertly sold" the drugs to the state despite directives from the pharmaceutical companies that they should not be sold for use in executions. He said the admission, "whether inadvertent of not," was important because it shows the state could abide by the contract and still obtain drugs....

Griffen noted that Arkansas has a law outlining humane euthanization practices for animals. "The court rejects the notion that domestic pets and livestock in Arkansas have the right to die free of unjustifiable or prolonged pain, but that the constitutional guarantee against 'cruel or unusual punishment' found in the Arkansas Constitution allows people who commit murders to be put to death as if they have no entitlement to such right," he wrote.

Arkansas last executed an inmate in 2005.

December 4, 2015 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, December 03, 2015

"The government is abusing mandatory minimums: How law enforcement is ruining a generation of Americans"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy Salon article authored by Daniel Denvir.  Here are excerpts: 

The Obama administration has called for the criminal justice system to be reformed and for the population of our enormous prison system to be reduced, encouraging reform efforts in Congress and pledging to speed up a moribund clemency process so that people serving unjustly harsh sentences can be freed.  The Department of Justice has taken a lead role, forcing local police departments to clean house and, under former Attorney General Eric Holder, pledging to restrict federal prosecutors’ use of harsh mandatory minimums....

There is growing concern, however, that federal prosecutors in the 94 U.S. Attorneys’ Offices nationwide are implementing Holder’s directives unevenly — or even resisting implementation entirely.  David Patton and Jon Sands, co-chairs of the Federal Defender Legislative Committee, wrote in a recent letter to House Judiciary Committee leadership that “there is widespread disregard of DOJ policy among line federal prosecutors about when to trigger those severe enhancements.  And the enhancements are regularly used for no other reason than to force people to waive their trial rights.”

 851 enhancements double five- and ten-year mandatory minimum drug sentence for offenders with one prior “felony” drug conviction, and impose a life without parole sentence for offenders with two drug priors facing a ten-year sentence.  What counts as a so-called felony, however, is remarkably broad [and] it can include state convictions so minor that they did not result in jail time. It can even include state misdemeanors...

Steve Cook, the president of the National Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys ... is leading a campaign against sentencing reform legislation in Congress, and he disagrees that prosecutors use 851s to coerce cooperation. “One of the criticisms I hear frequently from commentators is prosecutors want these mandatory minimums and 851s so they can strong arm guilty pleas. Well, that isn’t the case,” Cook said. “851s, those were designed to put recidivists in prison for longer.”

There is evidence, however, to suggest that that is often precisely how they are used. Judge Gleeson detailed one such instance in a 2013 opinion protesting his own sentencing of Lulzim Kupa, and the prosecutorial abuse of mandatory minimums more generally. Based on more than five kilograms of cocaine alone, Kupa faced a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. But Kupa had two prior marijuana trafficking convictions.  If prosecutors so decided, they would trigger life without parole upon conviction.

On March 5, 2013, prosecutors offered Kupa a plea deal.  The government would withdraw the 10-year mandatory minimum and instead recommend a sentence of between 110-137 months.  With good time credits, Kupa could serve seven years and ten months, Gleeson wrote.  But Kupa had just one day to think the agreement over, and he didn’t accept it.  And so prosecutors twisted the screws tighter, filing the 851 information detailing his two prior marijuana convictions. Unless prosecutors withdrew the notice, he would be automatically sentenced to life without parole upon conviction. “Just like that, a defendant for whom the government, only ten days earlier, was willing to recommend an effective sentence of less than eight years was looking at life in prison without the possibility of parole,” wrote Gleeson.

December 3, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Fourth Circuit to consider en banc whether it can consider new claims from federal prisoner with wrong old LWOP sentence in Surratt

In this post a few months ago, I noted the lengthy split Fourth Circuit panel ruling in US v. Surratt, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. July 31, 2015) (available here), in which a majority of the panel decided it could not consider a challenge to a wrongful LWOP sentence for a federal drug defendant.  As the majority put it: "We are not unsympathetic to his claim; like the dissent, we recognize the gravity of a life sentence.  However, Congress has the power to define the scope of the writ of habeas corpus, and Congress has exercised that power here to narrowly limit the circumstances in which a § 2241 petition may be brought. Surratt’s petition does not present one of the permitted circumstances. Accordingly, we agree that the district court lacked jurisdiction under § 2255(e) to consider Surratt’s § 2241 petition and affirm the judgment below."

Now, thanks to a helpful reader, I have learned that yesterday the full Fourth Circuit decided via this order to now hear the Surratt case en banc.   For anyone interested in federal habeas law, this now become a must-watch case. 

December 3, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Federal statutory sentencing reform not going to happen until 2016 ... if at all

This TPM DC report, headlined "Criminal Justice Reform Is Quickly Running Out Of Time," provides a Capitol Hill update that confirms what I had heard from another source: the full Congress is unlikely this year to get to the criminal justice reform bills that have made it through the House and Senate Judiciary committees. And, as the TPC article goes on to explain, the enduring GOP uncertainty on this front combine with a Prez campaign to perhaps diminish the prospects that any reform gets done anytime soon:

It was supposed to be the rare bipartisan bright spot in the Senate, but a crowded legislative calendar and the looming election year are endangering the last best hope for criminal justice reform while President Obama is still in office. With roughly three weeks left until the holidays, the Senate is prioritizing passing a tax extenders bill, a reconciliation package to defund Obamacare and Planned Parenthood, a transportation bill, and legislation to fund the government. That means time has run out for criminal justice reform in this calendar year.

"No chance it can be done between now and Christmas," Judiciary Chairman Chuck Grassley (R-IA) said Monday evening as he darted off the Senate floor clutching his list of the Republican senators he still intended to convince to sign onto his bill, his handwritten notes scrawled underneath each of their names.

Advocates and outside observers have long anticipated that the best chance for passage of criminal justice reform would be before the practical realities of electoral politics intruded in 2016. With the remainder of the year taken up by other matters, reformers will have to wait until the Senate gavels back in in the new year, in the midst of presidential primary season.

The prospects of pushing forward with the Senate bill just as the Republican presidential primary in particular is in full swing -- with the expected tough-on-crime appeals to the conservative base -- is daunting. Primary season is hardly the time for the Republicans back in Washington to be giving up on the well-honed GOP attack lines on crime and pushing forward a progressive new position on incarceration....

Grassley and supporters are now running short on time to get their bill on the floor especially if Republican frontrunner Donald Trump stays on top. Trump's attempts to tie illegal immigration and criminality have prompted fellow Republican presidential candidates to follow suite. In a race to out-flank one another, the GOP contenders have backed away from the new wave of conservative thinking on criminal justice reform and reverted to echoing the talking points that were cornerstones of the party in the 1980s and 1990s. Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) voted against the criminal justice reform bill in committee in October even as he once billed himself as a pro-reform Republican....

While momentum had been building for the Senate's criminal justice reform bill, there are still deep divisions in the Republican Party to contend with. The tug of war is between traditional tough-on-crime Republicans who believe reductions in sentences would lead to a spike in crime and a new generation of conservatives who see an economic argument for reducing mandatory minimums and slashing the costs associated with incarceration.

Grassley and other sponsors like Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) are working to convince senators like Cory Gardner (R-CO), Shelley Moore-Capito (R-WV) and Steve Daines (R-MT) to sign on, but there are some outspoken opponents who may prove to be immovable. “I think the bill needs more work. I think it needs to be connected with the reality of criminal justice and crime in America," said Jeff Sessions (R-AL) "I would not favor bringing it up and just zipping it through. A number of members in our conference, I think share those concerns.” Freshman Sen. Tom Cotton (R-AR) replied "no comment" when TPM asked him about his position. Former Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch (R-UT) said he was concerned the bill would "let out a lot of people who don’t deserve to be let out [of prison.]"

While Democratic sponsors of the bill are publicly optimistic that the legislation can get a vote on the floor even in an election year, Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI) admits the lack of GOP unity does put the legislation in some jeopardy. Republican leadership will want to ensure they have buy in from most of their conference if they are going to risk bringing the bill up in an election year and giving President Barack Obama a domestic legislative victory. “I think this is an issue that needs to be wrangled out on the Republican side so the Republicans on the bill need their own leadership to get it some votes," Whitehouse says. "It's not unanimous so the Jeff Sessions and people like that would be out of the floor pushing back the same way they did on the committee."

Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) says he's familiar with the process of selling criminal justice reform to a skeptical audience. Tillis was speaker of the North Carolina House when the legislature passed the Justice Reinvestment Act, which made back-end reforms to reduce recidivism. "I know that a lot of people get concerned with it," Tillis said. “It’s not really a soft on crime bill. It is the typical arguments that get used for these sorts of things, but I think the more that we educate people, the broader base of support we will get for it."

Tillis recognizes, however, that the problem is that on the campaign trail, candidates don't have time to explain complicated or new policy proposals. “If candidates on either side of the aisle exploits it for what it is not, yeah it could slow things down," Tillis said." You only get to operate in 15 and 30 second soundbites, and you cannot explain the merits of this bill in that time frame so yeah going on into the early primaries, it could be difficult and they have to stake themselves out.”

I am not yet giving up all hope that Prez Obama could get to sign a federal sentencing reform bill before he leaves office. But, as I have long been saying, an array of political, policy and practical challenges lead me always to be mostly pessimistic about the prospects of significant congressional action on this front.

December 3, 2015 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, December 02, 2015

"The Promises and Perils of Evidence-Based Corrections"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Cecelia Klingele and now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Public beliefs about the best way to respond to crime change over time, and have been doing so at a rapid pace in recent years.  After more than forty years of ever more severe penal policies, the punitive sentiment that fueled the growth of mass incarceration in the United States appears to be softening. Across the country, prison growth has slowed and, in some places, has even reversed.  Many new laws and policies have enabled this change. The most prominent of these implement or reflect what have been called "evidence-based practices" designed to reduce prison populations and their associated fiscal and human costs.  These practices "which broadly include the use of actuarial risk assessment tools, the development of deterrence-based sanctioning programs, and the adoption of new supervision techniques" are based on criminological research about "what works" to reduce convicted individuals' odds of committing future crimes.

Because evidence-based practices focus on reducing crime and recidivism, they are usually promoted as progressive tools for making the criminal justice system more humane. And while many have the potential to do just that, evidence-based practices are not inherently benign with respect to their effect on mass incarceration and the breadth of the penal state.  In their reliance on aggregate data and classification, many such practices have as much in common with the "new penology" that enabled mass incarceration as with the neorehabilitationism they are ordinarily thought to represent.

Without denying the contribution that such practices are making to current reform efforts, this Article seeks to highlight the unintended ways in which evidence-based tools could be used to expand, rather than reduce, state correctional control over justice-involved individuals. It explains what evidence-based practices are, why they have gained traction, and how they fit into existing paradigms for understanding the role of the criminal justice system in the lives of those subject to its control.  Finally, it calls on policymakers and practitioners to implement these practices in ways that ensure they are used to improve the quality and fairness of the criminal justice system and not to reinforce the institutional constructs that have sustained the growth of the penal state.

December 2, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, December 01, 2015

Using SCOTUS Johnson ruling, Boston Bomber argues for vacating some convictions and death sentence

Regular readers know that I have given considerable attention to the import and potential impact of the Supreme Court's summer ruling that a key clause of the federal Armed Career Criminal Act violated "the Constitution’s prohibition of vague criminal laws" in Johnson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).   But even from my ivory tower perch, I had not considered that the Johnson ruling might provide a basis for a high-profile federal capital defendant to seek to undo his death sentence.  But, as this FoxNews article details, just such an argument was made today in Boston:

Lawyers representing Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev sought Tuesday to spare him from the death penalty, citing a Supreme Court ruling they say taints half of the charges of which he was convicted.

Tsarnaev, now 22, was sentenced to death in June after being convicted of working with his brother to plant pressure cooker bombs at the 2013 race's finish line in an attack that killed three and injured hundreds.  But his attorneys say prosecutors were able to pile on more severe charges using a 1984 federal law that was partly invalidated by the high court this summer, and that without those enhanced charges, Tsarnaev may have gotten a more lenient sentence. They are pushing for a new penalty phase trial, and want it held outside of Boston.  "The loss of those convictions would mean that a penalty trial should be held as to all counts," attorney William Fick argued.

Tsarnaev's attorneys argued some 15 of the 30 charges came under an enhanced sentencing policy they say was invalidated by a U.S. Supreme Court decision from earlier this year.  In that case, Johnson vs. United States, the court ruled 8-1 held that the term "violent felony" as it applies to a 1984 law allowing for harsher prison terms in certain cases is unconstitutionally vague.  The defense argued that the number and nature of those charges likely influenced jurors when they decided Tsarnaev deserved the death penalty....

Former Assistant U.S. Attorney Andrew McCarthy, who prosecuted the terrorists who bombed the World Trade Center in 1993, said the Tsarnaev team is off-base in trying to apply the Johnson case.  In that case, the Supreme Court had ruled "violent felony" was a vague term in certain instances, such as extortion, where violence may or may not be involved. Tsarnaev's use of a bomb left no gray area, he said. "It is a frivolous argument," McCarthy told Fox News. "There is no such thing as "passive" deployment of a bomb, which is innately a destructive device."

December 1, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (4)

Split Ohio Supreme Court reverses death sentence based on statutory "independent evaluation"

As reported in this Reuters piece, a "man who beat a female neighbor to death with a baseball bat when he was a teenager had a troubled family background and childhood of drug and alcohol abuse and should not have been sentenced to death, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled on Tuesday.'  Here is more about the notable capital ruling and some reactions thereto:

The court in a 4-3 decision vacated the death sentence of Rayshawn Johnson, who was 19 years old when he killed Shanon Marks in 1997 in a Cincinnati neighborhood.... "The sentence of death imposed by the trial court is not appropriate in this case," Justice Paul Pfeifer wrote for the majority.

Johnson had been sentenced to death twice in the killing, most recently in 2012 after a federal court set aside the initial sentence, ruling that jurors should have been allowed to consider his difficult childhood at a sentencing hearing.

“I think the message is that courts need to give meaningful consideration to the mitigation that is presented on behalf of clients.  His life story, all of those things, the negative influences… the significant trauma … comes back later in life in unfortunate ways,” said Ohio Public Defender Timothy Young, whose office represents Johnson....

"What's kind of mindboggling about this decision is that -- I have to be careful because we have rules not to criticize judges so I'm not going to do that.  But what is frustrating, and this poor family, my god, we went through basically two trials already," Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney Joseph Deters told reporters.

The lengthy ruling in Ohio v. Johnson, No. 2015-Ohio-4903 (Ohio Dec. 1, 2015), is available at this link, and here is a key pargraph from the start of the majority opinion:

In 2011, the state conducted a new mitigation hearing. A new judge presided over the hearing, and 12 new jurors recommended a sentence of death. The trial court again imposed a death sentence, and we now review Johnson’s direct appeal as of right from that sentence. We find that there were no significant procedural defects in the new mitigation hearing, but, pursuant to our independent evaluation of the sentence under R.C. 2929.05(A), we determine that the aggravating circumstances in this case do not outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt the mitigating factors. We accordingly vacate the sentence of death and remand the cause to the trial court for resentencing consistent with R.C. 2929.06.

December 1, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

"Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Alexandra Natapoff and available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Hundreds of exonerations have made DNA a kind of poster child for the innocence movement and the demand for more accurate evidence in criminal cases.  But most wrongful convictions are not simply the result of evidentiary mistakes. In the marketplace of plea bargaining, convictions are the result of numerous inputs — a defendant’s criminal record, prosecutorial bargaining habits, the size of the trial penalty, whether the defendant is out on bail — that have nothing to do with the accuracy of the evidence.  The bargained nature of these convictions means that accurate evidence is just one piece — and not always the most important piece — of the larger negotiation process that establishes guilt.

We might say that the plea process is structurally tolerant of inaccuracy, precisely because it transforms accuracy into a commodity that may be traded and negotiated away in exchange for agreement.  This is a recipe for wrongful conviction.  The innocence movement, for example, has uncovered numerous cases where innocent defendants pled guilty to homicide and rape in order to avoid the death penalty.  The pressures to plead are likewise pervasive in the misdemeanor system, in which thousands of people are rushed through assembly-line processes and routinely plead guilty to minor crimes of which they are demonstrably innocent.  Ultimately, we should recognize plea bargaining as a source of wrongful conviction in its own right, and add it to the canonical list of wrongful conviction sources such as mistaken eyewitness testimony, lying informants, and bad forensics.

December 1, 2015 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Monday, November 30, 2015

Notable SCOTUS dissent from cert denial in habeas case from Sixth Circuit

This morning the Supreme Court came back to work after a few weeks on argument hiatus, and its first formal action was to release this order list full of cert denials and no grants of review in any new cases. There was this one notable dissent from the denial of cert in the habeas case of Rapelje v. Blackston authored by Justice Scalia and joined by Justices Thomas and Alito. Here is how the three-page dissent starts and ends:

A criminal defendant “shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const., Amdt. 6.  We have held that this right entitles the accused to cross-examine witnesses who testify at trial, and to exclude certain out-of-court statements that the defendant did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50–51 (2004); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 315–317 (1974).  We have never held — nor would the verb “to confront” support the holding—that confrontation includes the right to admit out-ofcourt statements into evidence.  Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit held not only that the Confrontation Clause guarantees the right to admit such evidence but that our cases have “clearly established” as much.  We should grant certiorari and summarily reverse....

There may well be a plausible argument why the recantations [offered by the defendant] ought to have been admitted under state law.  See Mich. Rule Evid. 806.  But nothing in our precedents clearly establishes their admissibility as a matter of federal constitutional law.  AEDPA “provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this Court’s precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error.”  White v. Woodall, 572 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 11).  By framing the confrontation right at a high level of generality (making it the right “to impeach the credibility of an adverse witness”), the Sixth Circuit in effect “transform[ed] . . . [an] imaginative extension of existing case law into ‘clearly established’” law.  Jackson, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 7). That will not do.

The Sixth Circuit seems to have acquired a taste for disregarding AEDPA.  E.g., Woods v. Donald, 575 U. S. ___ (2015) (per curiam); White v. Woodall, supra; Burt v. Titlow, 571 U. S. ___ (2013); Metrish v. Lancaster, 569 U. S. ___ (2013); Howes v. Fields, 565 U. S. ___ (2012).  We should grant certiorari to discourage this appetite.

November 30, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (15)

Detailing how Ohio prosecutors, armed with LWOP options, are migrating away from capital charges

19271024-largeThis recent local article, headlined "Eluding death: Ohio prosecutors charge far fewer capital murder cases," spotlights the role that local prosecutors are playing in changing the death penalty landscape in the Buckeye State. Here are excerpts:

Prosecutors across Ohio are changing the way they charge suspected killers.  They are indicting far fewer with the death penalty and pushing more sentences of life in prison without parole.

The number of capital murder indictments filed across the state since 2010 has plummeted by 77 percent, as just 19 have been brought this year. During the same time period, the number of inmates sentenced to life without parole has spiked 92 percent, according to a Plain Dealer examination of state prison records and other public documents.

The Ohio numbers mirror a national trend involving the death penalty.  Legal experts cited the high costs of taking a capital case to trial.  They also said decades of appeals make the death penalty extremely burdensome on the criminal justice system and traumatic for victims' families....

As the death penalty in Ohio sits stalled in a moratorium over the drugs used in executions, the emerging trends of how prosecutors handle aggravated murder cases offer insight into the way justice is meted out in Ohio courtrooms. "We simply are not charging people with the death penalty like we once did," said Michael Benza, a senior instructor of law at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law....

Since late 2012, when Prosecutor Timothy J. McGinty took office, five men have been indicted on death-penalty charges. But there were 75 cases that met the criteria for the penalty, according to prosecutors' records. That means McGinty's office pushed the death penalty in less than 7 percent of the possible cases....  Compare McGinty's record to his predecessor, Bill Mason: From 2009 through much of 2012, Mason's office indicted 89 death-penalty cases out of a possible 114 that met the requirements for the charge, or 78 percent, according to prosecutors' records.

McGinty told The Plain Dealer that he believes in the death penalty when going after the worst of the worst. "The death penalty used in the correct case — a case that leaves no doubt — is, I believe, a strong deterrent to crime," McGinty said. "But the endless appeals process has undermined the death penalty.  In every case, I have to ask, 'Are we going to survive this?'  We have to take a case to a judge and jury and then face 25 years of appeals.  Is it fair to families of victims?  Is it fair putting them through a quarter century of appeals?'

Since taking office, McGinty has used an internal office review committee to examine whether the death penalty is justified in each case brought to his office.  Specifically, the panel looks at whether the crime fits the letter and spirit of the law, whether a reasonable jury would return a guilty verdict and whether it would be worth the resources to spend decades fighting the appeals. Based on the panel's recommendation and the family's wishes, McGinty makes the decision.

Life in prison without parole became an option to jurors in death-penalty cases in 1995.  Ten years later, state lawmakers made it possible for prosecutors to seek the life-without-parole sentence in other murder cases.  Years later, the trends have become quite clear.

* Death-penalty indictments dropped 77 percent, going from 81 in 2010 to 19 this year, according to records from the Ohio Public Defender's Office.

* The number of felons convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole has jumped 92 percent, going from 283 in January 2010 to 544 in October, according to state prison records.  The inmates make up about 1 percent of the 50,370 inmates in the system.

* It costs $22,836 a year to house an inmate in Ohio.  Since there are 544 serving sentences of life without parole, that means the total dollar amount for the group is $12.4 million a year.  Because many are under the age of 35, the costs will grow for years to come.

But counties and the state also bear major costs in death-penalty trials. The trials can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars prosecuting and defending complex cases at trial — and much more during the appeals process. Ohioans to Stop Executions cited a study by WHIO-TV in Dayton that found it costs $3 million to execute a person in Ohio — from arrest to death. By comparison, the television station found, it costs $1 million to keep an inmate in prison for the rest of his or her life....

For years, Ohio Public Defender Tim Young has pushed the sentence of life without parole.  "It is a good thing as an alternative to the death penalty for a myriad of reasons," Young said. "There's closure for the family, and it is cheaper to put a person in prison for life than litigating the case for 15 to 20 years. At the end of the day, it's a good thing for our society."

Others disagree.  "Yes, life without parole is the lesser of two evils, but we have to be careful of applauding these sentences," said Ashley Nellis, the senior researcher at the Sentencing Project, a Washington, D.C., group that seeks criminal justice reform.  "It would be wrong to simply toss them away and forget about them."

Nellis said she is not opposed to sending the most violent convicts to prison for life.  But she believes that their cases should be reviewed.  "These people should not be kicked to the curb," she said. "Life in prison is a death sentence, without the execution."  If there is enough evidence that shows the inmates have grown and matured behind bars, Nellis said, then they should receive consideration before the parole board or judge.

November 30, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, November 29, 2015

Hawaii Supreme Court refuses to exempt recidivist enhancement from Apprendi mandates

A helpful reader alerted me to a notable ruling last week by the Hawaii Supreme Court rejecting broad application of Apprendi's prior conviction exception. Hawaii v. Auld, No. SCWC-13-0002894 (Haw. Nov. 24, 2015) (available here), which discusses Alleyne and Almendarez-Torres at length, is a must-read for all hard-core Apprendi fans. It concludes this way:

We hold that, under article I, sections 5 and 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution, the State must allege the predicate prior conviction(s) in a charging instrument in order to sentence the defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence as a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.5.  We further hold that, as a matter of state law, Apprendi’s “fact of prior conviction” exception does not apply to repeat offender sentencing under HRS § 706-606.5, and that a jury is required to find that the defendant’s prior conviction(s) have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt to trigger the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence under that statute.  As these new rules result from the express overruling of prior appellate precedent holding that the Apprendi rule did not apply to mandatory minimum sentencing and that notice of repeat offender sentencing did not need to be given in a charging instrument, they are given prospective effect only.

November 29, 2015 in Almendarez-Torres and the prior conviction exception, Blakely in the States, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Pollard, parole and the possibilities for potent sentencing reform

Writing at Salon, Daniel Denvir has this interesting and useful take on the recent release of convicted spy Jonathan Pollard. Here is the full headline of this piece: "People are celebrating this spy’s release from prison. Here’s what they should be doing instead. Jonathan Pollard sold intel to Israel. 30 years later, he's free. But thousands of others have no chance of parole." Here are excerpts:

Last Friday, something extraordinary happened: Jonathan Pollard, a Naval intelligence analyst sentenced to life in prison for extensively spying for Israel, was released from federal prison on parole 30 years after his arrest. Most coverage, now and in recent decades, has focused on the campaign waged by Israeli and Jewish-American leaders to free him, and the vehement opposition mounted by American intelligence figures.

The real scandal, however, is that most federal prisoners, including drug offenders make up nearly half of a federal prison population of nearly 200,000, have no chance at parole. Pollard’s crime was incredibly serious, and many drug offenders who committed crimes orders of magnitude less harmful are serving harsh mandatory minimums of 5, 10 and 20 years, if not life — all without the possibility of parole.

Pollard’s release has been covered in the context of national security intrigue. In fact, his parole reflects a quirk in federal sentencing law: He had a shot at parole because he committed his crime before parole eligibility was abolished for all those convicted of committing a federal crime on or after November 1, 1987, amidst a wave of tough-on-crime politicking.

Pollard is a true anomaly. According to a 2014 Congressional Research Service report, roughly 3 percent of federal prisoners are eligible for parole. When Pollard finally speaks to the media—he is reportedly not allowed to under the conditions of his parole—it would be good of him to express some solidarity with the far less dangerous fellow federal inmates he left behind.

The abolition of federal parole, and its sharp limitation or elimination in many states, has, like the introduction of harsh mandatory minimum sentences, been a major driver of this country’s extraordinary prison population boom. From 1988 to 2012, the average time federal inmates served rose from 17.9 to 37.5 months, according to The Pew Charitable Trusts. The federal prison population rose during that same period from 49,928 inmates to 217,815....

Releasing Pollard was not a bad thing. Few people deserve punishment without end. We punish most every crime far too harshly in the United States, which is how we came to construct a system of human punishment unmatched by any nation on earth. But Pollard’s crimes were extremely serious. Compare his crimes to those committed by Alton Mills, who is serving a life without parole sentence after being convicted of couriering crack because of two prior, extremely minor, drug possession convictions. Mills’ family misses him too. And desperately so.

It’s not just a federal problem but also a matter for the states, where the bulk of American prisoners are incarcerated. Fourteen states joined the federal government in eliminating or severely restricting parole, according to a Marshall Project investigation.

“In the early 1990s, the New York state board voted to parole more than 60 percent of those eligible. That rate then went into a two-decade decline, dipping below 20 percent in 2010,” the investigation found. “In many states, parole boards are so deeply cautious about releasing prisoners who could come back to haunt them that they release only a small fraction of those eligible — and almost none who have committed violent offenses, even those who pose little danger and whom a judge clearly intended to go free.”

Sen. Bernie Sanders, a Democratic candidate for president, has introduced legislation that would reestablish federal parole. Most media attention has been focused on bill provisions banning private prisons. But reestablishing parole would be far more consequential. (The Clinton campaign did not respond to requests for comment.)

Way back in 2009 in this Symposium article published in the Florida Law Review, I made the claim that model modern sentencing reforms should include parole mechanisms because "parole boards possess both the effective legal tools and an ideal institutional perspective to reduce incarceration rates and mitigate extreme punishments." I therefore agree wholeheartedly agree with the suggetion in Denvir's piece that reinstituting robust parole mechanisms and opportunities in many sentencing systems would provide a truly potent path for future sentencing reforms.

November 29, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, November 26, 2015

So thankful for federal judges encouraging prosecutors to reconsider extreme sentence... but...

I wish that such reconsideration of extreme sentences were more the norm than the exception in our modern era of mass incarceration.  The notable new judicial trend for which I am thankful was discussed earlier this week in this Wall Street Journal article headlined "Persuasive Judges Win Reduced Sentences for Some Convicts: Federal prosecutors agree to do-overs in a handful of cases, another sign of shifting attitudes about punishment."  Here are excerpts:

Francois Holloway became a free man this year three decades earlier than planned, thanks to a well-placed ally. U.S. District Judge John Gleeson in Brooklyn, N.Y., who put Mr. Holloway away in 1996 for participating in armed carjackings, had lobbied prosecutors for years to reduce Mr. Holloway’s 57-year sentence.

Federal trial judges have little leeway in sentencing when prosecutors trigger mandatory-minimum laws that set floors for punishment, and they have few means of revisiting closed cases, unless new evidence comes to light or a major legal error was committed. But they can be persuasive.  Federal prosecutors have agreed in recent years to sentence reductions in a handful of cases, most after public pressure from judges.

Such do-overs are another sign of shifting attitudes about punishment and growing bipartisan support for criminal justice policies that emphasize rehabilitation.  The practice does have its detractors, who say such relief should come from the White House in the form of commutations and pardons, not from the courthouse.

So far, the cases have tended to involve defendants who rejected plea deals, lost at trial and received prison terms several times larger than they would have if they had they pleaded guilty, sometimes called a “trial penalty.” Mr. Holloway balked at a deal that would have sent him to prison for about 11 years. He ended up receiving a mandatory minimum of 45 years because one of his co-assailants brandished a gun during the three carjackings. He earned the balance for stealing the vehicles, per federal sentencing guidelines that were binding on Judge Gleeson at the time....

After Mr. Holloway lost his appeal, he turned to a federal law frequently used by federal prisoners to challenge their sentences as excessive or to show that their lawyers were ineffective to the point of depriving them of their rights. At the urging of Judge Gleeson, the U.S. attorney’s office in Brooklyn last year withdrew its opposition to Mr. Holloway’s petition, citing his “extraordinary” record while in prison, as well as the responses of Mr. Holloway’s victims, who supported his early release. Attorney General Loretta Lynch headed the U.S. attorney’s office at the time.  Judge Gleeson vacated two of Mr. Holloway’s convictions and resentenced him to time served. “Prosecutors are almost never criticized for being aggressive,” he wrote in a July 2014 ruling lauding Ms. Lynch’s move. “Doing justice can be much harder.”

U.S. attorneys have accepted reduced punishments “where prosecutors, the court and victims have agreed that a sentence is unjust,” but such cases are rare, said Melanie Newman, a spokeswoman for Ms. Lynch. “The government nearly always seeks to preserve the finality of sentences where there is no legal flaw,” Ms. Newman said.

Harlan Protass, a partner at Clayman & Rosenberg LLP who represented Mr. Holloway, said the case has become a model for taking a second look at sentences.  Mr. Protass and Sam Sheldon, a partner at Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP in Washington, D.C., hope to establish a law-school clinic with the mission of persuading the government to allow new sentence hearings and reduced prison terms for certain offenders....

In another New York case, Randy Washington, a crack-cocaine dealer from the Bronx convicted of armed robbery, found a friend in his sentencing judge, who last year admonished prosecutors to consider whether the 52-year mandatory-minimum prison sentence Mr. Washington faced was “worthy of the public’s trust and confidence.” His punishment later was cut in half.

Prosecutors in Oklahoma agreed this year to allow an Army National Guard veteran sentenced to life for cocaine smuggling to leave prison after serving nearly three decades.  In Atlanta, the government shortened from life to 25 years the sentence of a man convicted of cocaine distribution.  Meanwhile, prosecutors in Montana dismissed several gun and drug counts against a medical-marijuana grower, lopping off 80 years of an 85-year mandatory sentence....

Some federal prosecutors have declined requests by federal judges for shorter sentences.  In Philadelphia, U.S. District Judge Jan DuBois recently implored prosecutors for a penalty that “better serves the interests of justice” in the case of Tyrone Trader, who was convicted for his role as a street-level dealer in a cocaine-trafficking conspiracy...  Mr. Trader received a mandatory life sentence under federal law, after the Justice Department filed a notice with the court showing Mr. Trader had prior felony drug convictions.  The other street-level dealers who took pleas have been released from prison, Judge DuBois noted, adding that the average federal sentence for murder was less than 23 years in fiscal 2014.  “It is difficult to see how a sentence of life imprisonment in Trader’s case is just,” Judge DuBois wrote in an August ruling.

U.S. Attorney Zane David Memeger said in a statement that the government carefully considers each case before making charging decisions and that there was “no basis” for reducing Mr. Trader’s sentence.

November 26, 2015 in Examples of "over-punishment", Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

So thankful for federal sentencing reform moving ahead in Congress... but...

this recent article from the New York Times highlights why I will not celebrate the reform movement's accomplishments until a bill is being signed by the President.  The article, headlined "Rare White House Accord With Koch Brothers on Sentencing Frays," details what has become more controversial elements of bipartisan criminal justice reform efforts.  Here are excerpts:

For more than a year, a rare coalition of liberal groups and libertarian­minded conservatives has joined the Obama administration in pushing for the most significant liberalization of America’s criminal justice laws since the beginning of the drug war.  That effort has had perhaps no ally more important than Koch Industries, the conglomerate owned by a pair of brothers who are well­known conservative billionaires.

Now, as Congress works to turn those goals into legislation, that joint effort is facing its most significant test — over a House bill that Koch Industries says would make the criminal justice system fairer, but that the Justice Department says would make it significantly harder to prosecute corporate polluters, producers of tainted food and other white­collar criminals.

The tension among the unlikely allies emerged over the last week as the House Judiciary Committee, with bipartisan support, approved a package of bills intended to simplify the criminal code and reduce unnecessarily severe sentences. One of those bills — which has been supported by Koch Industries, libertarians and business groups — would make wholesale changes to certain federal criminal laws, requiring prosecutors to prove that suspects “knew, or had reason to believe, the conduct was unlawful,” and did not simply unknowingly violate the law.

Many laws already carry such a requirement — known as “mens rea” — but Congress left it out of many others, and libertarian groups say that has made it too easy to unknowingly violate obscure laws.  Some environmentalists argue, however, that the real motive of Charles Koch, the philanthropist and the company chairman, in supporting the legislation is to block federal regulators from pursuing potential criminal actions against his family’s network of industrial and energy companies, a charge the company denies.

If the bill passes, the result will be clear, said Melanie Newman, the Justice Department spokeswoman. “Countless defendants who caused harm would escape criminal liability by arguing that they did not know their conduct was illegal” she said.

The debate over the bill, sponsored by Representative Jim Sensenbrenner, Republican of Wisconsin, has become particularly complicated for House Democrats, who have been warned that its passage would be essential for obtaining support from Republicans for a larger package of criminal justice bills.  Many liberal Democrats see this session of Congress as a rare chance to address what they see as significant unfairness in the criminal justice system.  Many of them feel that anything that jeopardizes that opportunity, like trying to block Mr. Sensenbrenner’s bill, is not worth doing.  Two liberal members of the Judiciary Committee, Representatives John Conyers Jr. of Michigan and Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas, were co­sponsors of the bill.

Mr. Conyers, in a statement on Tuesday, said he supported the bill, which the Judiciary Committee approved by voice vote last week, because outside parties had raised “a number of concerns about inadequate, and sometimes completely absent, intent requirements for federal criminal offenses.”  But he said he was committed to finding a way to address the Justice Department’s concern....

“There are some groups on the left that mistrust the people who have put this proposal forward,” said John G. Malcolm, who served in the Justice Department’s criminal division during the Bush administration.  He now works at the Heritage Foundation, a conservative research center, where he has aggressively pushed for the change in the mens rea provisions.  “It is an unfair and unwarranted characterization,” he added.

Koch Industries and conservative groups have some important liberal allies on the matter, including the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Norman L. Reimer, the organization’s executive director, said it was not surprising the Justice Department opposed the legislation. “D.O.J. is always up in arms over anything that looks like they’d have to do their jobs,” he said.  If the Justice Department’s job was harder in some cases, he said, that would be a good thing. For example, he cited a case in which prosecutors charged a fisherman with violating federal accounting laws by tossing undersized fish overboard. (Koch Industries made a major donation to the defense lawyers’ group last year.)

November 26, 2015 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, November 25, 2015

Notable Ninth Circuit panel squabble over computer-search supervised release condition

Yesterday, a split Ninth Circuit panel rejected a defendant's claim that a computer-search condition in his supervised release terms was clearly unreasonable.  The majority opinion in US v. Bare, No. 14-10475 (9th Cir. Nov. 24, 2015) (available here), found adequate the government's contention that, since "Bare kept paper records of his illicit firearms pawn business," if officers were permitted to search "only paper records — but not computers — [it] might enable Bare to evade discovery of recidivist activity by switching his records into an electronic format."  Judge Kozinski dissent starts this way:

Persons on supervised release may have diminished expectations of privacy, but they have privacy rights nonetheless. Moreover, Congress has instructed us to adopt conditions of supervised release that impose “no greater deprivation of libertythan is reasonablynecessary” to achieve the goals of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).  The majority today disregards this command by allowing probation officers to search defendant’s computer at anytime, for any reason or no reason, even though defendant did not use a computer to carry out his crime, and (so far as we know) did not even own a computer when he committed the offense.

The majority’s rationale, that defendant’s crime could be committed with the help of a computer, is no limitation at all.  Pretty much any federal crime can be committed by using a computer in some way — to maintain records, to case the premises using Google Street View or to track down accomplices, methods and supplies necessary for committing the crime.  If a hypothesis about how the crime might have been committed is a sufficient justification for imposing a supervised release condition, then any condition can be justified by supposing that the crime could be committed in a way that’s different from the method employed by the defendant.  I cannot subscribe to such a broad and amorphous standard.

November 25, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, November 23, 2015

US District Judge Bennett finds legal limit to giving retroactive effect to new lower federal drug sentencing guidelines

Regular readers know that US District Judge Mark Bennett regularly produces thoughtful and thorough opinions on an array of cutting-edge federal sentencing issues.  The latest Judge Bennett opus arrived today via US  v. Feauto, No. CR 12-3046-MWB (D. Iowa Nov. 23, 2015) (available for download below).  As this start to the Feauto opinion reveals (with lengthy footnotes left out and breaks added), Judge Bennett's latest work likely means a not-so-happy Thanksgiving week for at least on federal defendant:

Before me for consideration is defendant Randy Feauto’s eligibility for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) in light of Amendment 782, the “All Drugs Minus Two Amendment,” to the United States Sentencing Guidelines.  The parties and the Federal Defender for the Northern and Southern Districts of Iowa, as invited amicus curie, argue that a defendant subject to a mandatory minimum sentence who previously received a “substantial assistance” reduction below that mandatory minimum can be resentenced pursuant to Amendment 782 without regard to the mandatory minimum.  That position was originally music to my ears, because I have consistently — and vehemently — disagreed with the harshness of most mandatory minimum sentences.  In fact, in most of the over 1,000 congressionally-mandated mandatory minimum sentences that I have imposed over the past twenty-two years, I have stated on the record that they were unjust and too harsh.  I would often inform or remind defendants and their families and supporters in the courtroom that reform of mandatory minimum sentencing must come from the legislative branch of our federal government — Congress.

So it is with significant irony, but consistent with my view that only Congress has the authority to waive mandatory minimum sentences (with the exception of substantial assistance motions, pursuant to § 3553(e) and FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b), and “safety valve” eligibility, pursuant to § 3553(f)), that I disagree with the parties’ argument that the Sentencing Commission has the authority to use Amendment 782, or any other amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, to “nullify” a mandatory minimum sentence established by Congress.  For the reasons set forth below, my understanding is that only Congress itself, not the Sentencing Commission or the Judicial Branch, has that power.  Consequently, the proper net effect of Amendment 782, applied either retroactively or prospectively, is that it can only reduce the sentence of a defendant who originally received a reduction for substantial assistance if he had no mandatory minimum or both his original guideline sentence and his amended guideline sentence are above his mandatory minimum.  Feauto is not such a defendant.

I fully recognize that, like the vast majority of mandatory minimum sentences themselves, this construction leads to a harsh result, but fidelity to the rule of law and principles of non-delegation and separation of powers trumps any personal views on the harshness of federal sentencing.  As discussed below, the construction urged by the parties and amicus creates an Alice In Wonderland like scenario in which the retroactive application of Amendment 782 opens a rabbit hole that Feauto, instead of Alice, falls through and receives a lower sentence in Wonderland than if he were originally sentenced today for his crime with the application of post-Amendment 782.  Surely, this Mad Tea Party scenario creates the very kind of unwarranted disparity the guidelines were intended to avoid.

Download Feauto.Final Opinion.final.112315

November 23, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, November 21, 2015

Convicted spy Jonathan Pollard released as rare federal offender with parole conditions to challenge

Though parole was formally ended for all federal offenses three decades ago through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, offenders convicted for crimes committed before that time still are eligible for parole release.  As reported in this article, headlined "Lawyers Contest Pollard’s Parole Conditions," a controversial offender was released on parole under controversial conditions. Here are the basics:

Jonathan Pollard was released from prison Friday after 30 years behind bars for spying for Israel, and his lawyers immediately went to court to challenge tough parole conditions seemingly designed to ensure he doesn’t spill any U.S. military secrets he might have left.

The 61-year-old former Navy intelligence analyst was set free in the middle of the night from a medium-security federal prison in Butner, N.C., after being paroled from a life sentence that had turned him into a continual source of tension between the U.S. and Israel.

Under the rules of his release, he must wear a GPS unit to transmit his whereabouts at all times, allow the installation of monitoring equipment on any computers he uses at work or at home, and agree to periodic, unannounced inspections of those machines.

“The notion that, having fought for and finally obtained his release after serving 30 years in prison, Mr. Pollard will now disclose stale, 30-year-old information to anyone is preposterous,” his lawyers, Eliot Lauer and Jacques Semmelman, said in a statement....

Despite parole requirements that he not leave the U.S. without government permission for the next five years, Pollard has expressed a desire to renounce his American citizenship and move to Israel, where he is seen by some as a national hero. The White House has come out against the request.

U.S. intelligence officials have long argued that Pollard, who pleaded guilty in 1986 to conspiracy to commit espionage, did severe damage to the United States during the Cold War by giving away an enormous volume of military intelligence secrets that some suspect wound up in Soviet hands. His defenders have contended that his punishment was overly harsh for helping a close U.S. ally.

The prosecutor who handled the case, former U.S. Attorney Joseph DiGenova, said it is legitimate for the government to be concerned that Pollard might still have secrets to tell.

Pollard’s lawyers submitted a statement from former U.S. national security adviser Robert McFarlane dismissing such fears. “To the extent Mr. Pollard even recalls any classified information, it would date back 30 years or more, and would have no value to anyone today,” he said.

November 21, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (7)

Thursday, November 19, 2015

Capital defense lawyers in Utah seek to depose all county prosecutors to make constitutional case against death penalty

This local story from Utah, headlined "Murder defense to depose all of state's top prosecutors," reports on the latest defense approach to putting a bee in the state's capital punishment bonnet in the Beehive State. Here are the interesting details:

The defense in a 2010 murder case plans to schedule depositions with all of Utah’s 29 county prosecutors and other state law enforcement representatives possibly including Utah Attorney General Sean Reyes as part of its bid to overturn a death penalty ruling in the case. Attorneys Gary Pendleton and Mary Corporan announced their plans on Wednesday to seek testimonies from anyone in the state who decides whether the death penalty should be applied in a criminal case. The issue forms part of their arguments that the death penalty is unconstitutional and applied inequitably.

The pair represent Bloomington Hills resident Brandon Perry Smith, 34, who is accused of killing 20-year-old Jerrica Christensen two weeks before Christmas 2010 in a brutal downtown incident.   Pendleton told 5th District Judge G. Michael Westfall that he and Corporan have investigated how many death penalty-eligible cases since 1992 have actually ended up with a suspect being referred to death row. They determined that the prosecution seeks the death penalty in fewer than 3 percent of eligible cases, with most cases leading to a life in prison sentence instead, Pendleton said.

“Why is the death penalty not being sought in those cases but it is being sought in this case?” he asked. “I think we have to call as witnesses the charging authorities who were in positions of authority to make the charging decisions at the time the (state’s other) cases were filed either as capital cases — aggravated murder cases — or not,” Corporan said....  Pendleton’s question amounts to a challenge about whether anyone should be sentenced to death unless everyone who could legally be sentenced to death receives that ultimate penalty....

The death penalty has since been allowed on a state-by-state basis, and Utah established eight aggravating circumstances to define death penalty cases. “Over the years, we have now come to 22 or 23 aggravators,” Pendleton said, adding that at one time Utah had more than any other state.  “Even though we supposedly have a statute that narrows the class, … (in) only 3 percent of (those cases) is the state seeking the death penalty and they’re not seeking the death penalty based upon any articulable standard,” Pendleton said. “It’s completely arbitrary. … The state can’t articulate and won’t articulate on what basis they are making that selection and deciding that this is a death-worthy case. They’re not doing it based on the statute.”...

Pendleton and Corporan initially asked Westfall to schedule a three-day hearing in Smith’s case that would require the presence of all the affected prosecutors from across the state, but Westfall said he feared such a hearing would create a devastating delay for the case because of the difficulty of coordinating everyone’s schedules as well as problems for the other attorneys’ caseloads. “We’re talking about a real domino effect,” he said.

Shaum suggested deposing each affected prosecutor individually would be more practical, even though Corporan and Westfall conceded that to do so will still likely create significant delays in trial scheduling, especially with the holiday season approaching.  With the attorneys’ agreement, Westfall scheduled a review hearing for Feb. 3 to check the progress of the depositions.

Christensen’s mother, Ellen Hensley, has previously expressed concerns about the length of the court process and held a candlelight vigil at the courthouse on the last anniversary of her daughter’s death to call for swifter justice for the victims of crimes. Westfall expressed apparent awareness of her concerns, reminding the attorneys that “I also think that we need to keep in mind that we’ve got some victims’ family members in this case that I think are also entitled to try to see if we can get this case resolved. … I am still concerned about moving this case along and making sure that we get a decision as soon as possible.”

“I’m concerned about providing adequate representation on all the legal issues,” Pendleton replied, adding that the depositions will be “only the tip of the iceberg” in his motion to have the death penalty declared unconstitutional, but that they will be the only real evidence issue before moving to legal arguments.

November 19, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12)

Vermont killer makes broadside constitutional attack on federal death penalty prior to capital retrial

As reported in this local AP article, headlined "Fell’s lawyers challenge death penalty law," a notable killer is now making a notable argument to preclude capital punishment's application at his retrial. Here are the details:

A Vermont man facing the federal death penalty for the 2000 killing of a woman abducted from outside a Rutland supermarket is asking a judge to declare the death penalty law unconstitutional, court documents say.  In documents filed in federal court Monday, attorneys for Donald Fell argue the federal death penalty is unreliable, arbitrary and adds “unconscionably long” delays in cases.  “Most places within the United States have abandoned its use under evolving standards of decency,” the attorneys say.

They contend that U.S. Supreme Court justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg earlier this year “issued a clarion call for reconsideration of the constitutionality of the death penalty.”  It also noted that the Connecticut Supreme Court, relying largely on Breyer and Ginsburg’s arguments, found that state’s death penalty unconstitutional. “Mr. Fell asks this Court to (rule)... that the federal death penalty, in and of itself, constitutes a legally prohibited cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments,” his filing said.

Fell, 35, was convicted and sentenced to death in 2005 for the 2000 killing of Terry King, a 53-year-old North Clarendon grandmother who was abducted in Rutland and later killed.  A judge last year ordered a new trial for Fell because of juror misconduct during the original trial.  The trial is scheduled for next fall.

U.S. Attorney Eric Miller said his office would respond to the defense filings at the appropriate time. Vermont has no state death penalty; Fell was sentenced to death under federal law.  In 2002, the judge then hearing the case declared the federal death penalty unconstitutional.  But two years later, an appeals court overturned that ruling, allowing the trial to go forward.

Robert Dunham, executive director of the Death Penalty Information Center, said a decade’s worth of data has accumulated showing the legal problems with the federal death penalty since the ruling allowing Fell’s case to go forward.... “You can expect going forward that there will be constitutional challenges of this type filed in most, if not all, federal capital prosecutions,” Dunham said.

I share the view that defendants will be making this kind of categorical constitutional argument against the death penalty this will be made in most federal capital prosecutions, and I would go even further to assert that it may now be pretty close to obligatory for defense attorneys to make some form of this argument in any and every capital case. In light of the comments by Justices Breyer and Ginsburg in Glossip, and the risk of having an argument considered waived if not brought as soon as possible, I would think most capital defense attorneys would feel duty-bound to at least raise this kind of argument in order at leas to preserve it for future high court consideration.

November 19, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Wednesday, November 18, 2015

Local Arkansas judge accused of soliciting sex from defendants to reduce sanctions

As reported in this local article, headlined "Panel accuses judge of lenient rulings for sexual favors, other violations," a local judge in Arkansas is accused of reaching some new lows in judicial misconduct. Here are just some of the sorted details:

A Cross County district judge was accused by a state disciplinary panel Tuesday of multiple violations of the judicial code involving a wide range of offenses, including lenient rulings for sexual favors from younger male offenders, possessing child pornography and verbal abuse of people in his courtroom.

The Judicial Discipline and Disability Commission announced that it filed formal charges against District Judge Joseph Boeckmann Jr. of Wynne, whom it alleged violated 14 judicial ethics rules, including abuse of office and breaking state law.

The commission's director, David Sachar, said Boeckmann has 30 days to respond to the allegations, which were the result of a 14-month investigation.  The case could then go to a public trial before the nine-member commission. Boeckmann did not return calls placed to his office.  The judge's attorney, Jeff Rosenzweig, offered this statement: "We are going to file a response denying the allegations, and we'll be fighting the charges in front of the commission."

Depending on its findings, the commission can issue letters of discipline, ranging from caution to reprimand.  The panel also can ask the Arkansas Supreme Court to suspend or remove Boeckmann from the bench. Sachar said the commission also handed over information to a state prosecutor, but he declined to identify the prosecutor.

Boeckmann was first elected to the part-time judicial position in 2008 and took the bench in 2009.  He is not seeking re-election.  The investigation began with the Department of Human Services' Adult Protective Services Division, after an investigator fielded a complaint against a woman working for Wynne Elder Care LLC.

Eventually, the DHS investigation led the judicial commission to conduct its own investigation, in which it found unidentified witnesses who claimed to have seen pornography on the judge's computer that involved "prepubescent males," according to the complaint....

Boeckmann is accused of "awarding community service to certain litigants based on gender," the complaint said, in which the judge offered "substitutionary sentences" to young men.  Those sentences often involved picking up cans on the side of the road or at the judge's Wynne residence, Tuesday's complaint said.

"Boeckmann would photograph the buttocks of the men as they were bending to retrieve the garbage," the complaint stated.  "Multiple male litigants have been photographed. ... Boeckmann maintained these photographs of male litigants' buttocks in his home for his personal use," the complaint said.

The complaint stated that Boeckmann's "method of operation" was to seek out young white men, mostly between the ages of 18 and 35, who had criminal or traffic citations in his court. During meet-ups for "trash pickup," Boeckmann is accused of soliciting "sexual relations" from the men in exchange for reductions in court costs and fees, according to the commission's investigation.

On Tuesday, Sachar said he was unable to say how many men were involved or how many court fees were waived as a result, but he said his staff had pored over thousands of pages of court and financial documents.  

One witness, identified only as "A.A.," was in jail for several days in 2001 when his girlfriend approached Boeckmann, then an attorney, for help, and Boeckmann asked if "A.A. was good looking," the complaint stated.  Through 2011, A.A. worked for Boeckmann and was involved in a sexual relationship with him, the complaint said, and even had a room at Boeckmann's home. In that time, Boeckmann bought A.A. two vehicles and a boat, the complaint said. He also paid rent and utilities for A.A.'s family, and engaged in "spankings" with A.A. whenever A.A. got into trouble, the complaint stated.

I sincerely hope, if these disgraceful allegations are true, that this judge will be facing some serious criminal charges.

November 18, 2015 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Is it appropriate for condemned's lawyers to give up capital fight at 11th hour?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this extended Dallas Morning News article headlined "Condemned man’s lawyers stop helping, cite ‘false hope’." Here is the start and end of the story involving a murderer scheduled to be executed today in Texas:

From his cell on death row, Raphael Holiday drafted letter after desperate letter to lawyers who represent the condemned. He begged for their help to plead for mercy from Gov. Greg Abbott, to try any last-ditch legal maneuvers that might stave off his impending execution.

Holiday’s appointed lawyers had told him that fighting to stop his punishment was futile, and they wouldn’t do it. The 36-year-old thought he’d be left to walk to the death chamber with no lawyer at his side.

Less than a month before his execution — scheduled for Wednesday — Holiday secured help. Austin attorney Gretchen Sween agreed to ask the court to find new lawyers willing to try to keep him from dying. But Holiday’s federally appointed lawyers — the ones who said they would do no more to help him — are opposing their client’s attempts to replace them.

Now, just hours before he is set to face lethal injection for burning to death three children, including his own daughter, Holiday is awaiting word from the U.S. Supreme Court on his latest request for help.

Lawyers James “Wes” Volberding and Seth Kretzer said they worked diligently to find new evidence on which to base additional appeals for Holiday, but that none exists. Seeking clemency from Abbott, a staunch death penalty supporter, would be pointless, they say. The two contend they are exercising professional judgment and doing what’s best for their client.

“We decided that it was inappropriate to file [a petition for clemency] and give false hope to a poor man on death row expecting clemency that we knew was never going to come,” Volberding said in a telephone interview.

But others say the law under which death row lawyers are appointed doesn’t allow that kind of discretion. It requires attorneys to make every possible effort to save a client’s life, if that’s what the inmate wants. “This seems unconscionable,” said Stephen Bright, president and senior counsel of the Southern Center for Human Rights and a teacher at Yale Law School. “Lawyers are often in a position of representing people for whom the legal issues are not particularly strong, but nevertheless they have a duty to make every legal argument they can.”

So far, appeals courts have sided with Volberding and Kretzer. Last Thursday, the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals denied a motion to have them replaced. On Monday, Sween appealed to the Supreme Court.

Holiday was convicted of intentionally setting fire to his wife’s home near College Station in September 2000, killing her three little girls. He forced the children’s grandmother to douse the home in gasoline. After igniting the fumes, Holiday watched from outside as flames engulfed the couch where authorities later found the corpses of 7-year-old Tierra Lynch, 5-year-old Jasmine DuPaul and 1-year-old Justice Holiday huddled together. Volberding and Kretzer were appointed in February 2011 to represent Holiday in his federal appeals. They filed a 286-page petition in federal court, alleging dozens of mistakes in Holiday’s case, ranging from assertions that he was intellectually disabled to charges that clemency is so rarely granted in Texas that the process has become meaningless.... In decades of practicing, Bright said he had never seen a case like Holiday’s in which appointed lawyers so vociferously fought to keep a death row inmate from retaining a different attorney. In some cases, he said, new lawyers have discovered evidence others overlooked pointing to an inmate’s innocence or showing people’s intellectual disabilities made them incompetent for execution. “Most people don’t get executed for crimes they committed,” Bright said. “They get executed for mistakes their lawyers made.”

November 18, 2015 in Death Penalty Reforms, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, November 17, 2015

Terrific original reporting by The Crime Report on challenging extreme policing bordering on entrapment

Regular readers know I am a big fan of all the criminal justice reporting work done at The Crime Report (TCR), and a new two-part series authored by Adam Wisnieski at TCR showcases why.  In these two extended pieces, TCR highlights the extraordinary examples of extreme stings and the limited willingness of courts to police the work of police and prosecutors in this arena:

Here is an excerpt from the first of these two important pieces:

A TCR investigation found 126 motions to dismiss a case on the grounds of “outrageous government conduct” filed during an 18-month period between 2014 and August 2015. In those 126 cases, only seven were initially successful.  Three of those were overturned on appeal, and an appeal on the fourth is still pending — though it is expected to be denied.

In the rare occurrences where a claim of “outrageous government conduct” is successful, something profound happens: police behavior changes. In one instance this year, the motion’s success directly led to a law enforcement agency changing policy on undercover sting operations involving prostitution. (More on this below.)

Nevertheless, the motion’s lack of success raises troubling questions for the future of American law enforcement.  Legal scholars and critical judges say the near-overwhelming failure of courts to rule aggressive police behavior is “outrageous” when such motions arise has created a climate in which such behavior is likely to increase — while eroding the power of the judicial branch to check the government when it overreaches and, by implication, threatening Americans’ constitutionally enshrined right to due process.

November 17, 2015 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, November 16, 2015

Should SCOTUS deal with Johnson retroactivity through an original habeas petition?

The question in the title of this post should get habeas and/or sentencing geeks like me really excited, and I apologize in advance to everyone else.  But the question is on my mind and has me excited after reading this terrific (and lengthy) new PrawfBlawg post by Steve Vladeck titled "How an Obscure SCOTUS Procedure Can Solve AEDPA's Retroactivity Catch-22 (and a Growing Circuit Split)." The full post is today's must read for habeas and/or sentencing geeks, but the start and end of the effort should whet geeky appetites:

Thanks to Montgomery v. Louisiana, the retroactivity of new Supreme Court decisions is already an important part of the Court's current Term.  But as I explain in the post that follows, a new application pending before the Justices, In re Butler, raises a far more important retroactivity question, one that is already the subject of a 5-3 (and growing) circuit split, one that has an ever-shortening clock, and, most significantly, one that may only be definitively answerable if the Court does something it hasn't done in 90 years — issue an "original" writ of habeas corpus.

To unpack this dense but significant topic, Part I flags the origins of the problem — the restrictions on second-or-successive applications for post-conviction relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and the Supreme Court's fractured 2001 interpretation of those provisions in Tyler v. Cain.  Part II turns to the current circuit split, which involves whether the Court's June decision in Johnson v. United States, which invalidated a provision of the Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA), can be retroactively enforced in second-or-successive petitions.  Part III explains why that circuit split can't be resolved by the Supreme Court via certiorari — and why, instead, the best way for the Court to take up the Johnson question is through an "original" writ of habeas corpus in a case like Butler.  Finally, Part IV argues that the Court should use Butler not just to answer the Johnson question, but also to resolve the debate over Tyler, lest this exact same scenario repeat itself after the next Johnson-like ruling....

In a paper I wrote in 2011, I argued that there's actually a value in preserving the obscurity of the Supreme Court's original habeas jurisdiction — and that, if original writs became common, they'd lose their utility as a safety valve, since Congress would presumably also think to take away that authority as part of future jurisdiction-stripping initiatives.  But there's a difference between elusive remedies and illusory ones.  For two decades, we have labored under the fiction that AEDPA's gatekeeper provisions don't raise serious constitutional problems entirely because of this safety valve.  If, as a result of disuse, it turns out that the safety valve is sealed shut, then we can no longer dodge those constitutional questions.  Thus, although we may be in the midst of a perfect storm for retroactivity, a case like Butler may actually be the perfect vehicle for the Justices to remind themselves about their original habeas authority — and, in the process, to issue an opinion that dramatically reduces the need for such relief in future retroactivity cases.

November 16, 2015 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Risk, Race, & Recidivism: Predictive Bias and Disparate Impact"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new and timely empirical paper by Jennifer Skeem and Christopher Lowenkamp now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

One way to unwind mass incarceration without compromising public safety is to use risk assessment instruments in sentencing and corrections.  These instruments figure prominently in current reforms, but controversy has begun to swirl around their use.  The principal concern is that benefits in crime control will be offset by costs in social justice — a disparate and adverse effect on racial minorities and the poor.  Based on a sample of 34,794 federal offenders, we empirically examine the relationships among race (Black vs. White), actuarial risk assessment (the Post Conviction Risk Assessment [PCRA]), and re-arrest (for any/violent crime).

First, application of well-established principles of psychological science revealed no real evidence of test bias for the PCRA — the instrument strongly predicts re-arrest for both Black and White offenders and a given score has essentially the same meaning — i.e., same probability of recidivism — across groups. Second, Black offenders obtain modestly higher average scores on the PCRA than White offenders (d = .43; appx. 27% non-overlap in groups’ scores).  So some applications of the PCRA could create disparate impact — which is defined by moral rather than empirical criteria.  Third, most (69%) of the racial difference in PCRA scores is attributable to criminal history — which strongly predicts recidivism for both groups and is embedded in sentencing guidelines.  Finally, criminal history is not a proxy for race — instead, it fully mediates the otherwise weak relationship between race and re-arrest.  Data may be more helpful than rhetoric, if the goal is to improve practice at this opportune moment in history.

November 16, 2015 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)