Wednesday, May 24, 2017

"Ambition and Fruition in Federal Criminal Law: A Case Study"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting and timely new paper by Lauren Ouziel now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

This Article explores a recurrent puzzle in federal criminal law: why do the outcomes of a law — who ultimately gets prosecuted, and for what conduct — diverge, sometimes markedly, from lawmakers’ and enforcers’ aims?  This disconnect between law’s ambition and fruition is particularly salient in federal drug enforcement, which has focused on capturing the most high-value offenders — large scale traffickers, violent dealers, and the worst recidivists — yet has imprisoned large numbers of offenders outside these categories.  In this respect, federal drug enforcement is a case study in the ambition/fruition divide.

Among the divide’s contributing factors, I focus here on organizational dynamics in enforcement: the pressures and incentives among and within the organizations that collectively comprise the federal drug enforcement enterprise.  These pressures and incentives operate along three vectors: between the enforcers and the enforced; across and within federal enforcement institutions; and between federal and local enforcers.  Together, they create a system that stymies focus on the most culpable even as it makes apprehending them a principal aim.  This insight carries important implications for reform, both within drug enforcement and outside it.  Changing who, and how many, we prosecute requires attention not only to laws, but also the lower-visibility spaces in which enforcement patterns take root.  In the new political landscape, these lower-visibility spaces are federal criminal justice reform’s next frontier.

May 24, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

"The Effects of Racial Profiling, Taste-Based Discrimination, and Enforcer Liability on Crime"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper by Murat Mungan now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The literature contains ambiguous findings as to whether statistical discrimination, e.g. in the form of racial profiling, causes a reduction in deterrence.  These analyses, however, assume that enforcers' incentives are exogenously fixed.  This article demonstrates that when the costs and benefits faced by officers in enforcing the law are endogenously determined, statistical discrimination as well as taste-based discrimination lead to an increase in criminal activity.  Moreover, the negative effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination.

This suggests, contrary to the impression created by the existing literature, that statistical discrimination is not only harmful, but, may be even more detrimental than taste-based discrimination.  Thus, for purposes of maximizing deterrence, the recent focus in empirical research on identifying taste-based discrimination as opposed to statistical discrimination may be misplaced.  A superior approach may be to identify whether any type of racial discrimination takes place in the enforcement of laws, and to provide enforcers with incentives to minimize the impact of their discriminatory behavior.

May 23, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tales of marijuana reform as sentencing reform from California after Prop 64

This recent AP article, headlined "California’s legal pot law helps reduce, erase convictions," serves as a reminder and reinforcement of my tendency to look at marijuana reform as often a kind of sentencing reform. The AP article reports on some interesting case-processing realities in the wake of new provisions in California law created by the state's 2016 marijuana legalization initiative, Prop 64. Here are some details:

Jay Schlauch’s conviction for peddling pot haunted him for nearly a quarter century. The felony prevented him from landing jobs, gave his wife doubts about tying the knot and cast a shadow over his typically sunny outlook on life.

So when an opportunity arose to reduce his record to a misdemeanor under the voter-approved law that legalized recreational marijuana last year, Schlauch wasted little time getting to court. “Why should I be lumped in with, you know, murderers and rapists and people who really deserve to get a felony?” he asked.

This lesser-known provision of Proposition 64 allows some convicts to wipe their rap sheets clean and offers hope for people with past convictions who are seeking work or loans. Past crimes can also pose a deportation threat for some convicts.

It’s hard to say how many people have benefited, but more than 2,500 requests were filed to reduce convictions or sentences, according to partial state figures reported through March. The figures do not yet include data from more than half of counties from the first quarter of the year. While the state does not tally the outcomes of those requests, prosecutors said they have not fought most petitions.

Marijuana legalization advocates, such as the Drug Policy Alliance, have held free legal clinics to help convicts get their records changed. Lawyers who specialize in pot defense have noted a steady flow of interest from new and former clients.

Attorney Bruce Margolin said he got two to three cases a week, many of them decades old.... Since the passage of Proposition 64, he’s gotten convicts out of prison, spared others time behind bars and successfully knocked felonies down to misdemeanors.

But he’s also encountered a lot of confusion about the law that went into effect immediately in November. “They were totally unprepared,” he said of judges and prosecutors in courts he’s appeared in throughout the state. “It’s amazing. You would have thought they should have had seminars to get them up to speed so we don’t have to go through the process of arguing things that are obvious, but we’re still getting that.”

That has not been the case in San Diego, where prosecutors watched polls trending in favor of marijuana legalization and moved proactively to prevent chaos, said Rachel Solov, chief of the collaborative courts division of the district attorney’s office. They learned lessons from the 2014 passage of Proposition 47, which reduced several nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors.

Prosecutors in the county researched which convicts serving time or probation were eligible for sentence reductions and notified the public defender’s office so they could quickly get into court. Many were freed immediately, Solov said. “Whether we agree with the law or not, our job is to enforce it,” Solov said. “It’s the right thing to do. If someone’s in custody and they shouldn’t be in custody anymore, we have an obligation to address that.”

San Diego County led the state with the most number of petitions reported in the first two months after the law was passed. It has reduced sentences or convictions in nearly 400 cases, Solov said.

In Mendocino County, where pot farming is big business and violent crimes are often tied to the crop, District Attorney C. David Eyster said he fights any case not eligible for a reduction, such as applicants with a major felony in their past, a sex offense or two previous convictions for the same crime.

May 23, 2017 in Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 22, 2017

Minnesota Supreme Court upholds consecutive sentences adding up to 90 years before parole eligibility for juve killer of three

Via this new commentary criticizing the opinion, I just learned of this notable ruling handed down last week by the Minnesota Supreme Court concerning the application of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment rulings in Miller and Montgomery. The commentary provides a helpful summary of the ruling and the concerns it might engender for those eager for Miller to have a broad reach:

In 2010, at the age of 16, Mahdi Hassan Ali committed a terrible crime in Minneapolis.  During the course of a store robbery, Ali shot and killed three people.  He was tried as an adult, and a jury found him guilty of two counts of felony murder and one count of first-degree murder.  On the felony murder convictions, the Hennepin County District Court sentenced Ali to two consecutive life sentences with the possibility of release on each after 30 years; on the first-degree murder conviction, Ali was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of release....

In light of Miller [decided in 2012], the Minnesota Supreme Court overturned Ali’s sentence of mandatory life imprisonment and remanded the case back to the Hennepin County District Court for a new sentence.  On Jan. 6, 2016, Ali was sentenced to three consecutive sentences of life imprisonment with the possibility of release on each after 30 years. The sentences render Ali ineligible for release until he is 106 years old.

Shortly after the district court’s decision, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a new opinion in Montgomery vs. Louisiana, which offered fresh insight into the Miller ruling. Montgomery explained that the court intended Miller to bar all sentences of life without parole, not just mandatory ones, for any but the rarest of juvenile offenders who were permanently incorrigible and unable ever to be reformed....

Notwithstanding these decisions, the Minnesota Supreme Court filed an opinion last week upholding Ali’s sentences of three consecutive life terms.  In an opinion authored by the newly elected Justice Natalie Hudson, the Minnesota court decided that Miller and Montgomery apply only to single sentences of life without parole, refusing to extend the principles articulated in Miller and Montgomery to consecutive sentences that have the same effect.

Rather than requiring a special hearing to determine Ali’s prospects for reform, as Montgomery requires for sentences of life imprisonment without parole, the court decided that consecutive life sentences require no such hearing, even when they will likely result in a juvenile offender’s being imprisoned until death.

Last week’s opinion from the Minnesota Supreme Court will offer state prosecutors a new tool when seeking to imprison children for the duration of their natural lives.  For juvenile offenders convicted of serious offenses, prosecutors will seek lengthy consecutive sentences rather than seeking sentences of life imprisonment without parole.  Under the opinion, this tack will obviate the need for a hearing to determine whether the juvenile is amenable to reform, regardless of the length of the child’s sentence.

Like the author of this commentary, I am troubled whenever it seems courts are embracing formal rather than functional considerations to limit the reach of the Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing proportionality rules set forth in Graham and Miller and Montgomery.  Still, for reasons the majority opinion in this Ali case stresses, I can understand why many courts have in various settings given constitutional significance in Eighth Amendment analysis to the fact that a defendant has been sentenced to an extreme term for multiple serious crimes rather than just one. Notably, the US Supreme Court has never formally addressed just how multiple-offense, consecutive sentencing should be analyzed under the Eighth Amendment, and this Minnesota case serves to highlight how this is one of a number of Graham and Miller and Montgomery application issues challenging lower courts nationwide.

May 22, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (20)

"Sentencing Synthetic Cannabinoid Offenders: 'No Cognizable Basis'"

The title of this post is the title of this short notable piece by Brad Gershel now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Application of the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines (“Guidelines”) to smokable synthetic cannabinoids (“SSC”) produces distinct but familiar inequities in the criminal justice system.  Calling to mind the crack-to-cocaine disparity that belied the rights of countless defendants, the federal government has yet to rectify a Guidelines rule that was promulgated without scientific basis or empirical support.  As prosecutions for SSC accelerate — and in the absence of swift and meaningful reform — federal courts will continue to sentence defendants via a base-offense range that was never justified.

May 22, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

California struggles over whether all sex offenders can be excluded from Prop 57 parole reforms aimed at non-violent offenders

This new Los Angeles Times article, headlined "Debate over sex offenders moves to court as California undertakes prison parole overhaul," provides an updated on the legal and policy issues surrounding sex offenders in the wake of a California ballot initiative intended to help non-violent offenders get an earlier chance for parole. Here are excerpts:

Los Angeles-based nonprofit is claiming California prison officials have undermined last fall’s ballot measure to overhaul the state’s parole process by excluding sex offenders from consideration for early release. The Alliance for Constitutional Sex Offense Laws, which advocates for the rights of those convicted of sex crimes and their families, says the exemption — written into newly released guidelines to implement Proposition 57 — “impermissibly restricts and impairs the scope” of the initiative.

Those regulations were released in March and won initial approval from state regulators a month later. But the original ballot measure did not exclude inmates convicted of sex crimes from the chance of getting an earlier hearing before the state parole board.

The group filed the lawsuit in late April against the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and its director, Scott Kernan. It argues the new rules are unconstitutional and it asks a judge to order corrections officials to withdraw and repeal them, according to the complaint filed in Sacramento County.

“We want the benefits of Proposition 57 to be provided to people who have been convicted of ‘non-violent’ sex offenses,” said attorney Janice Bellucci, who is representing the alliance and an inmate who brought the case forward. “It is a basic rule of law that regulations cannot be broader than the law that they are implementing.”...

Debate over the treatment of sex offenders under Proposition 57 has simmered since last fall’s campaign season. But at that point, the outcry came from law enforcement officials and prosecutors who argued they did not want to see the ballot measure’s benefits extended to rapists and child molesters.

The sweeping initiative, approved by 65% of voters, gave new power to the State Board of Parole Hearings to grant early release to prisoners whose primary sentences are for crimes not designated as “violent” under California law. It also provided new ways for all inmates to earn time credits toward their sentences for good behavior and for enrolling in certain career, rehabilitation and education programs.

Opponents of Proposition 57 warned that the list of crimes under the violent felony penal code was short and porous, inspiring efforts in the Legislature this session to expand the definition of what constitutes a violent crime under state law. In his January budget proposal, Gov. Jerry Brown attempted to address those concerns, directing the state corrections department to exclude all sex offenders from early parole consideration. The department’s new parole guidelines are expected to receive final approval in the fall after a public comment period. Changes to how inmates can earn credits, which can help reduce their sentences, are already underway, while the new parole eligibility requirements won’t take effect until July.

But the advocacy group that filed the lawsuit wants the state agency to revise its rules. It contends that there was plenty of public debate over sex offenders during the Proposition 57 campaign — and that even then, voters passed the measure.... The lawsuit alleges the new exclusion applies to a whole class of nonviolent offenders, including people charged with crimes where there was no sexual contact with a victim.

As of Dec. 31, the number of inmates in California prisons who would have to register as sex offenders upon release stood at 22,455, less than 20% of the population housed at state prisons. Nearly 18,000 were designated as “violent” offenders, while more than 4,521 were considered “nonviolent,” according to state corrections officials.

Bellucci said those cases could include a diverse group of offenders. In theory, she said, the new regulations could unfairly penalize an 18-year-old convicted of public indecency for streaking in high school, or a 16-year-old sentenced for child pornography after distributing nude photos of herself. “Anybody who has been convicted of a violent offense, like rape, Prop. 57 doesn’t apply to them,” Bellucci said. “We are talking about nonviolent offenses, which includes these non-contact offenses.”

I would be shocked to learn that California has any teenage streakers or sexters imprisoned for lengthy periods now hoping to get early parole. I suspect the more realistic example of the sex offender who might claim to be non-violent and seek early parole are California variations on offenders like Jared Fogle or Anthony Weiner, i.e., older men involved with child pornography or perhaps other kinds of sexual activity with underage persons.  It will be interesting to see if the California courts allow of prohibit these kinds of offenders from being excluded from the reforms of Prop 57.

May 22, 2017 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Sunday, May 21, 2017

"Fighting Fines & Fees: Borrowing from Consumer Law to Combat Criminal Justice Debt Abuses"

The title of this post is the title of this notable paper authored by Neil Sobol and now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Although media and academic sources often describe mass incarceration as the primary challenge facing the American criminal justice system, the imposition of criminal justice debt may be a more pervasive problem.  On March 14, 2016, the Department of Justice (DOJ) requested that state chief justices forward a letter to all judges in their jurisdictions describing the constitutional violations associated with the illegal assessment and enforcement of fines and fees.  The DOJ’s concerns include the incarceration of indigent individuals without determining whether the failure to pay is willful and the use of bail practices that result in impoverished defendants remaining in jail merely because they are unable to afford bail.

Criminal justice debt, also known as legal financial obligations (LFOs), impacts not only those incarcerated but also millions of others who receive economic sanctions for low-level offenses, including misdemeanors and ordinance violations. LFOs, which include bail, fines, and fees, are imposed at every stage in the justice process, including pre-conviction, sentencing, incarceration, and post-release supervision.

For those who are unable to pay criminal justice debt, “poverty penalties” are often added in the form of charges for interest, payment plans, late payments, and collection.  As incarceration rates and local budgetary concerns have increased, so too has the imposition of LFOs. Moreover, while authorities are trying to reduce incarceration, criminal justice debt may become an even greater concern, as one popular alternative is decriminalization and the imposition of monetary charges.

Often the financial charges are unrelated to the traditional notions of punishment or protection of public safety and instead, reflect a desire to maximize revenue collection. Many municipalities outsource services to private probation companies and collectors, which are often unsupervised and use collection procedures not authorized for private parties.  Moreover, new technologies allow for additional collection abuses.

To date, states and municipalities have been ineffective in preventing abuses associated with criminal justice debt. Relying on the approach used for consumer debt collection, I propose a federal solution.  The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) provide the foundation for a federal framework for addressing problems with the collection of consumer debts. I contend that the justifications that supported the federal statutory and administrative solution for consumer debts are at least as significant, if not greater, for a similar framework to combat abusive criminal justice debt practices.

Not only do individuals with criminal justice debt encounter the same abuses and consequences that consumer debtors face — including harassment, negative credit reports, and the adverse impact on financing and employment prospects — but they also face denial of welfare benefits, suspension of driver’s’ licenses, arrest, and incarceration.  In practice, the imposition of criminal justice debt reflects actual discrimination and creates distrust in the system. Accordingly, I advocate the adoption of a federal act and the use of the DOJ to coordinate enforcement and outreach activities to attack abuses in the collection of criminal justice debt.

May 21, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Reactions to Sessions Memo on DOJ charging/sentencing policies keep on coming

I highlighted in this post and this post some of the early reactions to the new charging and sentencing memorandum released earlier this month by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (basics here). Reactions in various forms and formats just keep on coming, so here I will highlight a few more from various authors and outlets that struck me as worth noting:

From CNN here, "State AGs to Sessions: Rescind criminal charging guidance"

From Crime & Consequences here, "Restoration of Honesty: Jeff Sessions' Charging Instructions"

From The Crime Report here, "Memo to Sessions: Why Treatment for Drug Addiction Makes More Sense Than Prison"

From The Federalist here, "Sessions Has Neither The Authority Nor The Evidence To Pursue A New Drug War"

From Law360 here, "Sessions Memo Could Create Friction In Plea Negotiations"

From the New York Daily News here, "The true toughness Jeff Sessions must show"

From the New York Law Journal here, "The Sessions Memo: Back to the Past?"

Prior recent related posts: 

UPDATE: A helpful reader pointed out this Washington Post commentary from a former US Attorney headlined "Jeff Sessions to federal prosecutors: I don’t trust you." It starts this way:

Last week Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced policy changes directing federal prosecutors to charge people suspected of crime with the “most serious, readily provable offense” available in every federal case.  In doing so, he promised that prosecutors would be “un-handcuffed and not micromanaged from Washington.”

That justification is laughable.  In actuality, the announcement demonstrates a stunning lack of faith in the decisions of line-level prosecutors.  It imposes — rather than removes — the handcuffs for prosecutors, returning us to the policy of the 1990s and 2000s, when incarceration and corrections spending spiked without a measurable impact on drug use or public safety.

May 21, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, May 19, 2017

"An Empirical Assessment of Georgia's Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Standard to Determine Intellectual Disability in Capital Cases"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Lauren Sudeall Lucas now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme Court held that execution of people with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. In doing so, the Court explicitly left to the states the question of which procedures would be used to identify such defendants as exempt from the death penalty.  More than a decade before Atkins, Georgia was the first state to bar execution of people with intellectual disability.  Yet, of the states that continue to impose the death penalty as a punishment for capital murder, Georgia is the only state that requires capital defendants to prove their intellectual disability beyond a reasonable doubt at the guilt phase of the trial to be legally exempted from execution.

This article is the first to provide an empirical assessment of Georgia’s “guilty but mentally retarded” (GBMR) statute, including its beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof.  In doing so, it fills a critical gap not only in the scholarly literature on the subject, but also for those who continue to litigate the issue.  Its analysis reveals that no defendant facing the death penalty in Georgia has ever received a GBMR verdict for malice murder from a jury in the statute’s nearly thirty-year existence.  Prior to Atkins, only one capital defendant had ever received a GBMR jury verdict at trial, in a felony-murder case, by meeting this extremely high standard of proof, thus exempting herself from the death penalty.

The absence of any successful GBMR jury verdict in a malice murder case and the absence of any successful GBMR verdict in any capital case post-Atkins, in combination with Georgia’s lone status in imposing such a procedure, all contribute to the argument that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, and the jury’s decision regarding intellectual disability in the guilt phase create, in the words of the Court, an “unacceptable risk” that capital defendants with intellectual disability will be executed in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

May 19, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 18, 2017

Highlighting how the Sessions Memo may have particular impact for drug trafficking cases in certain districts

News2-2-Graph-SentencingWith thanks to commenter Daniel for the tip, I just saw this notable local article from New Mexico providing a notable local perspective on the potential impact of the new Sessions federal charging/sentencing memo.  The article is headlined "Two Steps Back: How Jeff Sessions’ memo on federal prosecutions could take New Mexico back to a harsher era," and here are excerpts:

A directive from newly appointed US Attorney General Jeff Sessions instructing prosecutors to seek the most severe charges available threatens to stunt recent progress toward less federal prison time for low-level drug offenders in New Mexico, defense lawyers and drug policy reform advocates tell SFR.

“Drug mule” cases make up many of the drug crimes prosecuted in federal court in New Mexico, federal public defender John Butcher says. Some low-level drug runners who get caught mid-shipment are apprehended in Albuquerque, the first overnight stop on Amtrak’s Southwest Chief train from Los Angeles to Chicago. Others are picked up throughout the federally designated “High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area,” which runs east from Farmington down to Santa Fe and into Albuquerque before blanketing most of the southern border from Roswell on. The vast majority of federal drug charges in the state are for trafficking. Possession and brokering drug deals comprise a smaller percentage of crimes.

Drug mule cases, most often involving nonviolent and low-level drug offenders, were among those singled out in a memo issued by former attorney general Eric Holder in August 2013. It encouraged prosecutors not to charge such people with crimes that could trigger stiffer mandatory minimum sentences, which prevent judges from sentencing defendants to prison for fewer than a predetermined number of years. For example, since 1986, federal law has mandated that a person convicted of holding five kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute be sentenced to a minimum of 10 years in prison for a first offense.

Holder asked prosecutors to back off. If somebody was arrested with five kilograms of cocaine, but was not an organizer, did not have deep ties to criminal groups and wasn’t carrying a gun or another indicator of violent intent, prosecutors were asked not to charge that person with the quantity that would have triggered the 10 years. Data from the US Sentencing Commission suggests that some federal prosecutors in New Mexico may have heeded Holder’s directive. It shows that the percentage of sentenced federal drug offenders who received mandatory minimums immediately dropped from 42 percent in 2013 to 25 percent in 2014, and even fell to 20 percent in 2015, the most recent year for which information is available. That’s about half the figure from 2006, the first year the commission began tracking this data. The decrease came even as the number of people prosecuted for trafficking rose from an average of 586 between 2010 and 2012—before the Holder directive—and 646 between 2014 and 2016.

But Sessions has now directed prosecutors to reverse course. The new attorney general wants federal prosecutors to seek the most serious and readily provable charge against all defendants—regardless of circumstance. “This is going to go after the low-level minimum participants with minor records, because they’re the ones who were getting breaks [under Holder],” Butcher tells SFR. “Breaks” didn’t mean that low-level runners weren’t being charged or sentenced to prison after 2013, he says. But in some cases, they weren’t getting the book thrown at them. Butcher suggests the new policy will have an outsized effect in New Mexico, with its relatively higher number of trafficking cases involving nonviolent offenders....

Since 2013, Santa Fe’s Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion (LEAD) program, wherein police work with case managers and the local district attorney to enroll low-level offenders in treatment programs, has served as a national example for non-punitive approaches to drug use.  District Attorney Marco Serna doesn’t think there’s much overlap between those who would qualify for LEAD and those who could be charged with a federal drug crime, but he acknowledges that the city’s approach stands in contrast to Sessions’ hardline.  “For nonviolent crimes, we have our own state and local statutes, and luckily I get to influence how we handle it in the first district,” Serna says. “And we won’t be taking that approach.”

Prior recent related posts: 

UPDATE: I just saw this notable new New York Times article which drills even deeper into the impact of the Holder Memo by identifying a number of low-level federal drug offenders who seemingly benefited from more lenient charging practices.  The piece is headlined "5 Years, or 20? How Sessions’ Get-Tough Order Would Extend Prison Stays." and it is interesting to see the cases profiled in the article and even more interesting to consider whether the offenders in the article might have been able, even if charged with more serious offenses, been able to avoid the application of a mandatory minimum sentence through the statutory safety valve or through providing cooperation.

May 18, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, May 17, 2017

Terrific effort to sort out "How Many Drug Offenders Benefited From the Holder Memo That Sessions Rescinded?"

In this post earlier this week, I talked through the challenge of figuring out the import and impact of the new Sessions Memo on federal charging/sentencing by stressing  uncertainty concerning the impact of various charging memos released by former Attorney General Eric Holder.   Jacob Sullum is carrying forward this effort quite effectively this morning in this terrific new Reason posting asking "How Many Drug Offenders Benefited From the Holder Memo That Sessions Rescinded?".   Here are highlights:

For critics of the war on drugs and supporters of sentencing reform, the policy shift that Attorney General Jeff Sessions announced last Friday is definitely a change for the worse. But it's not clear exactly how bad the consequences will be, partly because the impact of the policy he reversed, which was aimed at shielding low-level, nonviolent drug offenders from mandatory minimum sentences, is hard to pin down.

Sessions rescinded a 2013 memo in which Attorney General Eric Holder encouraged federal prosecutors to refrain from specifying the amount of drugs in cases involving nonviolent defendants without leadership roles, significant criminal histories, or significant ties to large-scale drug trafficking organizations. Since mandatory minimums are tied to drug weight, omitting that detail avoids triggering them.

Numbers that the Justice Department cited last year suggest Holder's directive, which was the heart of his Smart on Crime Initiative, had a substantial effect on the percentage of federal drug offenders facing mandatory minimums. According to data from the U.S. Sentencing Commission (USSC), the share of federal drug offenders subject to mandatory minimums has fallen steadily since Holder's memo, from 62 percent in fiscal year 2013 to less than 45 percent in fiscal year 2016. If the percentage had remained the same, more than 10,000 additional drug offenders would have fallen into that category during this period.

"The promise of Smart on Crime is showing impressive results," Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates said last year, citing the USSC numbers through fiscal year 2015. "Federal prosecutors are consistently using their discretion to focus our federal resources on the most serious cases and to ensure that we reserve harsh mandatory minimum sentence for the most dangerous offenders."

Counterintuitively, however, the defendants whom the USSC describes as "drug offenders receiving mandatory minimums" include drug offenders who did not actually receive mandatory minimums. Many of them were convicted under provisions that call for mandatory minimums yet escaped those penalties because they offered "substantial assistance" or qualified for the statutory "safety valve."

Paul Hofer, a policy analyst at Federal Public and Community Defenders, took those other forms of relief into account in a 2013 estimate of the Holder memo's possible impact.... Hofer's analysis suggests that the vast majority of drug offenders who seem to have benefited from the 2013 memo—thousands each year—did not actually receive shorter sentences as a result of the policy change.

Then again, the benefits of Holder's memo may extend beyond the federal defendants who avoided mandatory minimums. By encouraging prosecutors to focus their efforts on the most serious drug offenders, Holder may have indirectly reduced punishment by allowing some people to avoid federal charges altogether. That instruction may help explain why the total number of federal drug cases fell from 25,000 in fiscal year 2013 to 21,387 in fiscal year 2016, a 14 percent drop.

As Molly Gill, director of federal legislative affairs at Families Against Mandatory Minimums, points out, there is some evidence that federal prosecutors did try to focus on the most serious cases: During the same period, the share of defendants benefiting from the safety valve (which excludes high-level and violent offenders) fell from 24 percent to 13 percent. "With the directive not to slam low-level drug defendants," says University of California at Irvine criminologist Mona Lynch, "there was likely some shift toward bringing more serious cases and simply passing on smaller, street-dealing type of cases."

Sessions is now telling federal prosecutors to pursue the most serious provable charges against drug offenders (and other federal defendants) unless they believe an exception to that policy is warranted, in which case they have to seek permission from their supervisors and justify the decision in writing. Although Sessions argues that the new default rule will produce more uniform results, Lynch thinks it could have the opposite effect.

"The big question is whether he has the power to roll back time and change the prevailing legal culture that has tempered the 'drug war' mentality of the 1990s in many federal jurisdictions," says Lynch, who studied the behavior of federal prosecutors for her 2016 book Hard Bargains: The Coercive Power of Drug Laws in Federal Court. "Even under a more stringent set of charging policies…U.S. attorneys have considerable discretion as to what cases to bring….This policy may only increase the divide between jurisdictions that collectively eschew aggressive federal drug prosecutions and those that dive back into the harsh practices of an older era. This would result in even more geographic disparity in federal justice outcomes, a longstanding concern of Congress and of the U.S. Sentencing Commission."

Prior recent related posts: 

May 17, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

Is it unconstitutional for a state to allow judges to increase sentences because a felony was committed by someone illegally present in the US who had been previously deported?

The question in the title of this post could be an issue before state (and federal?) judges in Tennessee shortly, because a new state sentencing provision to this effect is on the desk of the Governor of the Volunteer State.   This local article, headlined "Bill gives TN judges more power in sentencing, experts say law is unconstitutional," explains:

State lawmakers are keeping an eye on the clock as time ticks down for Gov. Bill Haslam to act on a bill granting state judges new sentencing authority. The bill allows judges to add more time to a felony sentence if a defendant is in the country illegally. Right now the state of Arizona is involved in a legal battle over a similar issue.

Tennessee lawmakers say this bill would be a hard deterrent against crime. Immigration advocates say it's a burden on local governments that will drive a wedge between the community and the legal system. Haslam has three options when it comes to the sentencing enhancement bill before his desk. He can sign it, veto the bill or allow it to pass into law without his signature.

Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law professor Stewart Harris believes whether it's signed or not, this bill might not be around for long. "My initial reaction is that it's probably unconstitutional,” said Harris.

According to Harris, the U.S. Constitution governs America's immigration laws, not states. That's one reason states don't typically pass immigration laws. "Should California have one set of rules and Massachusetts another? What about all the landlocked states, should they have their own rules as well? That’s why Congress has authority over immigration,” explained Harris.

State Sen. Becky Duncan Massey of Knoxville believes this bill isn't an immigration issue. "The courts are going to decide if something is constitutional or not if it's challenged. I don't believe this really has to do with immigration, it has to do with crime,” said Massey.

Massey says residence is already a factor when considering a person's bond. She believes judges should have all the information about a defendant available to them before sentencing. "They’re already going to jail, they have committed a crime, they've been convicted of a crime and this is just a factor along with another factor determining how long the sentence is,” she said....

This bill passed the House and Senate on May 9. The governor has 10 working days to take action or allow it to pass without his signature.

Though I am not an expert on immigration law or preemption, I am inclined to believe this kind of law is constitutional. I can see a range of reasonable constitutional and policy arguments against this proposed amendment of Tennessee's sentencing laws, but the fact that the provision appear to apply to those in the country illegally AFTER a previous deportation would seem to foster an argument that the law is more like punishing someone based on a certain type of prior criminal history rather than just based on alienage.  But nobody should hold me to that too-quick and relatively uniformed assessment, and everybody should use the comments to help be get better informed on the question in the title of this post.

May 16, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

"The Problem with Inference for Juvenile Defendants"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Jenny Carroll recently posted to SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Much of criminal law relies on proof by inference.  In criminal law, fact finders untangle not only what happened, but why it happened.  It is answering the “why” question that places an act and its result on the legal spectrum of liability. To reach that answer, the fact finder must engage in an interpretive act, considering not only what can be seen or heard, but the significance of that testimony or physical evidence in real world contexts — the world in which they occurred but also the fact finder’s own world.

Recent developments in neuroscience suggest that in the context of juvenile defendants, this moment of interpretation is fraught with particular risks. The emergence of fMRI technology has provided significant insights into adolescent brain development and its effect on adolescent thought processes.  As a result, scientists (and courts) recognize that adolescent actors are more likely to engage in risky behavior, fail to properly comprehend long term consequences and over value reward. In short, science has proven what most long suspected: kids think and react differently than do adults.

Although criminal law has long accounted for this difference procedurally — most evidently in the creation of an independent juvenile justice system – there has been little exploration of its significance in the realm of substantive criminal law.  This Article argues that what is known of adolescent brain development suggests that adult fact finders are poorly positioned to accurately assess a juvenile defendant’s state of mind, because adults lack the perspective of those whose actions and words they seek to interpret — juvenile defendants.  Rather than asking fact finders to perform the impossible task of placing themselves in the adolescent’s mind, substantive criminal law should instead acknowledge the difference in perspective and permit evidentiary presentation and jury instructions akin to defenses that rely on the defendant’s actual, as opposed to imagined, perspective.

May 16, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, May 15, 2017

Senator Rand Paul criticizes new Sessions Memo while promising to reintroduce Justice Safety Valve Act

In this new CNN commentary, headlined "Rand Paul: Sessions' sentencing plan would ruin lives," Senator Rand Paul provides a lengthy criticism of the new charging and sentencing memorandum released late last week by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (basics here).  Here are a few excerpts:

The attorney general on Friday made an unfortunate announcement that will impact the lives of millions of Americans: he issued new instructions for prosecutors to charge suspects with the most serious provable offenses, "those that carry the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences."

Mandatory minimum sentences have unfairly and disproportionately incarcerated a generation of minorities. Eric Holder, the attorney general under President Obama, issued guidelines to U.S. Attorneys that they should refrain from seeking long sentences for nonviolent drug offenders.

I agreed with him then and still do. In fact, I'm the author of a bipartisan bill with Senator Leahy to change the law on this matter. Until we pass that bill, though, the discretion on enforcement -- and the lives of many young drug offenders -- lies with the current attorney general.

The attorney general's new guidelines, a reversal of a policy that was working, will accentuate the injustice in our criminal justice system. We should be treating our nation's drug epidemic for what it is -- a public health crisis, not an excuse to send people to prison and turn a mistake into a tragedy.

And make no mistake, the lives of many drug offenders are ruined the day they receive that long sentence the attorney general wants them to have....

I want to go the opposite way from the attorney general. That's why I've partnered with Senator Leahy and once again will be reintroducing the Justice Safety Valve Act. This isn't about legalizing drugs. It is about making the punishment more fitting and not ruining more lives.

The legislation is short and simple. It amends current law to grant judges authority to impose a sentence below a statutory mandatory minimum. In other words, we are not repealing mandatory minimums on the books -- we are merely allowing a judge to issue a sentence below a mandatory minimum if certain requirements are met.

We need this legislation because while there is an existing safety valve in current law, it is very limited. It has a strict five-part test, and only about 23% of all drug offenders qualified for the safety valve.... Each case should be judged on its own merits. Mandatory minimums prevent this from happening.

Mandatory minimum sentencing has done little to address the very real problem of drug abuse while also doing great damage by destroying so many lives, and most Americans now realize it.... Pew Research found that 67% of Americans want drug offenders to get treatment, not prison, and over 60% want an end to mandatory minimum sentences.

I urge the attorney general to reconsider his recent action. But even more importantly, I urge my colleagues to consider bipartisan legislation to fix this problem in the law where it should be handled. Congress can end this injustice, and I look forward to leading this fight for justice.

I am quite pleased to see Senator Paul astutely use the new Sessions Memo to justify reintroduction and a renewed campaign for his elegant Justice Safety Valve Act (JSVA).  For a host of reasons, most notably simplicity, the JSVA has long been my favorite piece of proposed legislation to deal with the problems created by mandatory minimum sentencing statutes.   Along with Harlan Protess back in 2013, as detailed here, I even took to the pages of the Wall Street Journal to urge then President Obama to throw his support behind the JSVA. 

Given that Prez Obama never expressed support for the JSVA and that this bill never even got a vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee when under control by Democrats, I am not optimistic that the Sessions Memo will be enough to seriously enhance the JSVA's passage prospects.  But I am encouraged to see Senator Paul continuing to be an active and vocal and effective pace-setter for reform of federal mandatory minimum sentencing provisions and practices.

May 15, 2017 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

One last chance to RSVP for "Behind the Bench: The Past, Present, and Future of Federal Sentencing"

FSRAs mentioned in this prior post, I will be attending this exciting afternoon event, titled "Behind the Bench: The Past, Present, and Future of Federal Sentencing," which is taking place this Wednesday (5/17) in Washington DC.  I considered the event quite timely when I posted about it last week, but the discussions generated by Attorney General Jeff Sessions new charging memo for federal prosecutors only serves to add an extra-timely dimension to the topics to be discussed.

As mentioned before, this event emerges from a thoughtful and provocative federal sentencing reform proposal put forward by current Acting US Sentencing Commission Chair Judge William Pryor (in part because that he graciously allowed this proposal to published in the Federal Sentencing Reporter).  Through my work with FSR, I played a small  role in getting this event off the ground, and here is the event's description from this webpage where one can register to attend:

Thirty years ago, the U.S. Sentencing Commission established the first-ever set of federal sentencing guidelines. Those initial Guidelines received a chilly reception as more than 200 federal judges found them unconstitutional.  Although the Supreme Court’s United States v. Booker decision in 2005 upheld the basic structure of the Guidelines, it recast them as “effectively advisory” to allow judges to continue applying the Guidelines consistent with new Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.

The Booker ruling stated Congress was free to devise a different system moving forward.  More than a dozen years and nearly a million federal sentences later, Congress has yet to act despite diverse criticisms of the Supreme Court’s advisory sentencing scheme.  This spotlights an enduring question: What is the proper relationship between the legislative and judicial branches in determining sentencing policy?

On May 17, please join the Charles Koch Institute, the Federal Sentencing Reporter, and the Law & Economics Center at George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School as we explore this question and discuss how we can learn from the past to improve present and future federal sentencing policy.

KEYNOTE SPEAKER: Judge William H. Pryor

MODERATED DISCUSSION: Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa and Judge Patti B. Saris

MODERATOR: Vikrant P. Reddy

Date: May 17

Time: 12:00 pm - 2:45 pm

I have been told that there is still a little bit of the limited space available, so folks interested in attending what ought to be a very interesting afternoon of federal sentencing discussion should still be sure to register via this webpage ASAP.

May 15, 2017 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

The challenge of taking stock of impact of Holder Memos to gauge possible impact of new Sessions Memo

As reported and reviewed a bit here, Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued on Friday this important new charging and sentencing memorandum to direct the work of federal prosecutors.  As I stated in my first post about what will be known as the Sessions Memo, I think this is a very big deal in terms of both the substantive instructions and enforcement tone being set for federal prosecutors by the new Attorney General.

But just how big a deal is the Sessions Momo?  This is a critical question that really cannot be answered for years, and all the nuanced particulars involved here cannot be unpacked in a single blog post.  But I still thought it might be useful this morning to explain what I see as the challenge of figuring out how big a deal the Sessions Memo really is.  And part of that story relates, as the title of this post suggests, to the uncertainty that must still attend any assessment of the impact and import of different charging memos released by former Attorney General Eric Holder.

To begin, I think nearly everyone who follows modern crime and punishment generally accepts what John Pfaff has been stressing for a decade concerning the impact and import of prosecutors on the severity of our criminal justice system and the size of our prison populations.  At the risk of oversimplification, Pfaff has effectively highlighted that how prosecutors do their work matters so much practically to who goes into prison and for how long.  Consequently, new DOJ instructions about how federal prosecutors must do their work would seem to be a very big deal.  (Of course, Pfaff also stresses that the federal criminal justice system prosecutes and imprisons less than 10% of all those subject to prosecution throughout the US, so there is necessarily some ceiling on how much new guidance toward federal prosecutors will impact the nation as a whole.)

Because prosecutors matter a lot, federal prosecutorial policies matter a lot.  But just how much?  Notably, former Attorney General Eric Holder issued at least three significant guidance memos to federal prosecutions: a first one in May 2010 allowing more charging/sentencing discretion, a second one in Aug 2013 urging less use of certain mandatory minimums, and a third one in Sept 2014 cautioning again using certain charges to induce a plea in drug cases.  Arguably, the May 2010 general charging/sentencing memo was the most consequential and far-reaching of AG Holder's instructions to federal prosecutors.  But if you look at the basic data assembled in this NBC News discussion of the Sessions Memo, federal prosecutorial charging practices did not appear to change all that much until after AG Holder in Aug 2013 really delivered aggressively and consistently the message that DOJ was now taking a much different approach to drug cases and others.

In some subsequent posts, I hope to unpack more fully the data on federal prosecutorial practices in the Obama years under AG Holder's guidance.  For now, my goal was to highlight that we did not see a massive sea change in federal prosecutions or sentences as soon as AG Holder first announced new guidance in May 2010.  (I also must note for those eager to praise Prez Obama and AG Holder for their reform efforts, note how Holder was not so quick off the dole.  AG Sessions set forth his policy by May of his first year in office; AG Holder took until May of his second year in charge.)  Importantly, it seems it was really only when AG Holder fully doubled down, in speeches and policy directives and other actions, on charting a much different prosecutorial path starting in August 2013 that the numbers in the federal system saw some real significant movement.  I hope to discuss that movement and its meaning in coming posts as well.

So, after a lot of words, my message here is stay tuned:  stay tuned to this blog for some coming number crunching about the Holder legacy and Sessions course change, and also stay tuned to see how AG Sessions and others inside DOJ and other parts of the Trump Administration follow up on this initial memo.  What follows may prove to be much more important than what we have seen so far.

Prior recent related posts: 

May 15, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, May 14, 2017

Notable review of Colorado's recent experiences and concerns with polygraph testing of sex offenders

The Denver Post has this interesting article about the monitoring and testing of sex offenders in the Centennial State.  The piece is headlined "Colorado’s pricey polygraph testing of sex offenders under fire as critics target accuracy, expense: Psychologist calls state’s $5 million polygraph program 'grossly excessive' as state legislature examines cost."  Here are some excerpts from the extended piece:

Colorado has spent more than $5 million to administer polygraphs on convicted sex offenders over the last seven years despite concerns that the tests are so unreliable they can’t be used as evidence during civil or criminal trials.

Polygraphs help officials decide which prisoners convicted of sex offenses are suited for release from prison by probing their sexual history, attitudes about their crimes and whether they are committing new offenses.  They also guide how offenders on parole or probation are supervised.  “The polygraph really gives useful information,” said Lenny Woodson, administrator for the Colorado Department of Corrections’ Sex Offender Treatment and Monitoring Program. “And we’ve made it clear in our standards that it isn’t to be used in isolation. We’re using as many avenues as possible to make treatment decisions.”

But a bipartisan cross-section of legislators and a retired judge have joined with offenders and their families to question the validity of the tests.  They contend too much weight is placed on what they argue is little more than junk science.  Flawed polygraphs can complicate efforts for low-risk sex offenders to get paroled and lead to new restrictions for parolees or probationers, critics say.  Failure to take the tests can lead to sanctions, including eventual revocation to prison.

Studies show that up to 70 percent of U.S. states polygraph sex offenders, but experts have testified that Colorado uses the tests aggressively, even polygraphing juvenile offenders for consensual sexting.  Critics contend an entrenched and profitable cottage industry, rife with conflicts of interests, has grown up around polygraphing sex offenders in Colorado.  “To me, there is no question that it borders on a scam,” said Senate President pro tem Jerry Sonnenberg, R-Sterling.  “We incentivize the people who give the polygraph tests to have inconclusive results so an offender has to go back and pay for another one on a more regular basis.”

Colorado’s polygraphing is “grossly excessive,” said Deirdre D’Orazio, a psychologist who serves as an expert on a high-risk sex-offender task force in California, during testimony in federal court in Denver in 2015.  D’Orazio led a team of consultants that issued a report for the Colorado department of corrections in 2013 blasting how it manages sex offenders and how it uses polygraphs.  She returned to the state to testify for Howard Alt, then 51, who a decade earlier was convicted for having sex with a 15-year-old girl and possessing nude computer images of teenage girls.

After his release from prison, Alt had taken 28 polygraphs, often with competing results.  The treatment provider that tested Alt had a “fiduciary incentive conflict” to fail him, D’Orazio said.  The firm was “making money on outcomes that are not in the offender client’s favor” by requiring him to pay for more tests and treatment, she said.

A deceptive finding on one sex-history polygraph had prompted supervision officials to bar Alt, a former software developer, from accepting a job that would raise his salary from $60,000 to $200,000 annually.  Months later, the polygrapher found Alt to be truthful on the same questions even though he did not change his answers, showing the sanction against him was unwarranted, D’Orazio said.  “It is not a scientifically valid procedure,” D’Orazio testified.  “It has a high false-positive rate, which means misclassifying people who are telling the truth as being deceitful. So there is a lot of controversy about using the polygraph in high-stakes decisions.”...

The state of Colorado, relying on court fees paid by those convicted of sex crimes, picks up the tab of the polygraphs for those who are in prison and also often for the indigent who are out on parole or probation.  But when the state fund that pays for the tests runs out of money, parolees and probationers who don’t have the money to pay for them risk running afoul of their supervision requirements.  Revocation to prison can occur for refusing to take the polygraphs, defense lawyers say....

In addition to the legislators, C. Dennis Maes, former chief judge of Pueblo District Court, has criticized the use of polygraphs in Colorado.  He has written to the chief judges of all judicial districts in the state and to Nancy Rice, chief justice of the Colorado Supreme Court, urging a halt to polygraphing sex offenders, pointing out the results can’t be admitted as evidence during civil or criminal trails.  After his retirement, he represented a sex offender on probation, and was shocked when the results of his polygraph were admitted as evidence during a court hearing.

“The Constitution applies to everyone,” Maes said.  “It doesn’t apply to everyone except sex offenders.  The Constitution was designed to protect those that might be the most easily attacked by the government, even sex offenders.  You don’t see polygraphs in any other area of the law.  You can be the most prolific bad-check writer ever and you don’t have to take them, but you do if you’re a sex offender.”

The Denver Post has this companion article headlined "Professional polygrapher holds position of power on state’s sex-offender treatment board: Jeff Jenks’ firm will receive $1.9 million to test sex offenders in Colorado prisons as he sits on the Colorado Sex Offender Management Board"

May 14, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7)

"Dismissals as Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Anna Roberts available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

More than a third of our states have given judges a little-known power to dismiss prosecutions, not because of legal or factual insufficiency, but for the sake of justice.  Whether phrased as dismissals “in furtherance of justice” or dismissals of “de minimis” prosecutions, these exercises of judicial power teach two important lessons.

First, judges exercising these dismissals are rebutting the common notion that in the face of over-criminalization and over-incarceration they are powerless to do more than rubberstamp prosecutorial decision-making.  In individual cases, they push back against some of the most problematic aspects of our criminal justice system: its size, harshness, and bias.

Second, these cases converge on shared principles of justice.  These principles conjure a vision of a very different criminal justice system: one in which an alleged criminal act is viewed not in isolation, but within a broader context that includes the apparent motivations for it, and the state’s role in and response to it.  There is no logical reason to confine these principles to this procedural context, and the Article urges their broader consideration.

May 14, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Some more notable reactions to the Sessions Memo

I highlighted in this prior post some first-cut reactions to the new charging and sentencing memorandum released yesterday by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (basics here). Now I will highlight a few more I have seen:

From NBC News here, "Attorney General Sessions Charts Course Back to Long Drug Sentences"

From BuzzFeed News here, "Former Federal Judges Say Sessions’ New Policy Will Take Power Away From The Courts"

Also from BuzzFeed News here, "Republicans And Democrats Are Blasting The "Dumb On Crime" Sessions Order For Tougher Sentencing"

From the Wall Street Journal here, "As Jeff Sessions Pushes for Tougher Drug Sentences, Previous Policy Gets Mixed Grades"

From the Washington Examiner here, "Former US attorneys hate Jeff Sessions' memo on tougher sentences"

Prior recent related posts: 

May 14, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Saturday, May 13, 2017

Former LA Sheriff gets three years in federal prison after obstruction convictions connected to corruption scandal involving county jails

This Los Angeles Times article, headlined "Ex-L.A. County Sheriff Lee Baca sentenced to three years in prison in jail corruption scandal," effectively reports on the final federal sentence handed down late yesterday to a high-profile former law enforcement official. Notably, as discussed below, the defendant here had a much more lenient plea deal rejected, was nearly acquitted at a trial, and ultimately got a prison term 50% longer than what prosecutors recommended.  Here are the details:

Former Los Angeles County Sheriff Lee Baca, once a towering, respected figure in policing, was sentenced Friday to three years in federal prison for his role in a scheme to obstruct an FBI investigation of abuses in county jails, marking an end to a corruption scandal that has roiled the Sheriff’s Department for several years.

U.S. District Judge Percy Anderson announced Baca’s fate in a downtown courtroom filled with loyal supporters on one side and the FBI agents and prosecutors who ensnared him on the other. Baca, 74 and suffering from the early stages of Alzheimer’s disease, showed no emotion as the decision was read. Before issuing the sentence, Anderson, who has dealt unsparingly with the former sheriff throughout his legal battle and last year threw out a plea deal that would have sent Baca to prison for no more than six months, unleashed a scathing rebuke of the man who ran one of the nation’s largest law enforcement agencies for 15 years.

Excoriating Baca’s refusal to accept responsibility for having overseen and condoned the obstruction ploy carried out by subordinates, the judge portrayed him as a man driven by his desire to protect his own reputation and maintain control over the Sheriff’s Department. “Your actions embarrass the thousands of men and women [in the department] who put their lives on the line every day,” Anderson said to Baca. “They were a gross abuse of the trust the public placed in you.”

The prison term, Anderson added, should serve as a deterrent to other public servants. “Blind obedience to a corrupt culture has serious consequences,” he said. “No person, no matter how powerful, no matter his or her title, is above the law.”

Baca was ordered to surrender to federal prison officials by July 25. Although he is expected to ask to remain free on bail while he pursues an appeal, it is an open question whether he will be allowed to do so. Anderson denied the same request from Baca’s second in command, former Undersheriff Paul Tanaka, who was forced to begin his five-year sentence....

In going after Baca, a team of prosecutors headed by Assistant U.S. Atty. Brandon Fox meticulously worked its way up the department’s ranks, charging lower-level figures and members of Baca’s command staff before bringing charges of obstruction of justice, conspiracy and lying against the sheriff himself.

He is the ninth person to be convicted and sentenced to prison as part of what Fox convinced several juries was a cunning conspiracy to interfere with FBI agents as they worked to gather evidence for a grand jury investigation into allegations of widespread abuse by deputies working in county jails run by the sheriff’s department. A 10th conspirator, former sheriff’s Capt. William “Tom” Carey, pleaded guilty in a deal with prosecutors and testified against Baca. Carey is scheduled to be sentenced later this month. Several other deputies were convicted in a series of trials for beating inmates or helping to cover up the abuse....

Baca’s attorney, Nathan Hochman, nearly won Baca an acquittal at a trial late last year by hammering the government for the scarcity of hard evidence tying Baca directly to the obstruction plan. That proceeding ended in a mistrial when the jury deadlocked with all but one juror voting to acquit Baca. For the second trial, however, Fox revamped his case and Anderson issued a string of rulings that hamstrung Hochman. All along, Hochman argued that while Baca was upset by the FBI investigation, he never authorized anything illegal. Tanaka, he said, was the ringleader who carried out the obstruction without Baca’s knowledge.

In giving Baca three years in prison, Anderson struck a middle ground of sorts. Federal sentencing guidelines called for a term of 41 to 51 months. Under normal circumstances, the government would have urged Anderson to come down within that range, Fox wrote in court filings.

But Baca’s age, his diagnosis last year with Alzheimer’s and medical experts’ expectation that his mind will have deteriorated badly within a few years were legitimate mitigating factors in determining his punishment, Fox said. “The interests of justice will not be served by defendant spending many years behind bars in a severely impaired state,” the prosecutor wrote. He recommended that Baca be sentenced to two years in prison.

Hochman, meanwhile, urged Anderson in court papers and again on Friday to spare Baca any time in prison, saying he should instead be confined to his home for a period of time and perform community service. In a lengthy last-ditch bid for leniency, Hochman reviewed Baca’s nearly five decades of service in the sheriff’s department, saying he served “with distinction and honor.”

The true measure of the man, Hochman insisted, was seen in the the education programs he started as sheriff for inmates and at-risk youth. Hochman submitted to Anderson letters from a few hundred of Baca’s supporters, including former Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger and several local religious leaders. The inevitable toll from Alzheimer’s was another reason to spare him prison, Hochman said. “This diagnosis is a sentence of its own. It is a sentence that will leave him a mere shell of his former self and one that will rob him of the memories of his life,” he wrote in a court filing.

Anderson rejected out of hand the idea that Baca should avoid time in prison. He acknowledged Baca’s lengthy record as a public servant, but said it made his crimes more perplexing. "Mr. Baca's criminal conduct is so at odds with the public image he carefully crafted,” Anderson said. Like old B-movies, "you seem to have your own version of the good cop/bad cop routine … that allowed you to keep your hands clean but did not make you any less culpable.”

While the two-year sentence suggested by the government was not enough in Anderson’s eyes, the judge said he did take Baca’s failing health and career into account. Absent those factors, he said he would have imposed on Baca the same five-year sentence he gave Tanaka.

The sentence deepens the stain already imprinted on Baca’s legacy and the reputation he enjoyed as one of the nation’s most visible and respected reformers in law enforcement. While quirky to the point of being enigmatic, Baca was seen as a champion of progressive ideas, including the need for police to build strong ties to minority communities. He stepped down in 2014 with the department engulfed in the jail scandal.

May 13, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, May 12, 2017

Some notable first-cut reactions to the Sessions Memo

The Hill already has two articles reporting on some notable reactions to the new Sessions Memo.  The reactions are not surprising, but they are still interesting:

Obama AG slams Sessions for shift to harsher sentencing

GOP senator: Sessions's push for tougher sentences highlights 'injustice'

Eric Holder is the AG referenced in the headline of the first article, and Senator Rand Paul is the one referenced in the headline of the second one. Senators Mike Lee and Tom Cotton also are quoted in the second article, and long time readers of this blog can likely guess the nature of their takes on the Sessions Memo.

Last but certainly not least, Bill Otis has reactions here at Crime & Consequences under the heading "Jeff Sessions Returns DOJ to Sound Charging Policy." Here are choice excerpts (emphasis in original):

This has been reported as "new" guidance, but it's not. It's the return of the "most serious readily provable" standard that governed charging policy during most of my 18-year tenure in the US Attorney's Office, a tenure that ended last century. The policy continued during the George W. Bush Administration.

It was right then and it's right now. It amounts to telling prosecutors to charge what the defendant actually did. This is so obviously correct -- aligning the allegations with the facts -- that I have a hard time seeing any serious objection to it.

It does allow exceptions -- that is, in practice, more lenient charging -- in unusual cases. That too seems obviously correct, together with the Attorney General's caveat that such cases must, indeed, be out of the heartland, and the reasons for leniency should be documented and approved by a more senior AUSA or the USA himself. This prevents inattentive, inexperienced or irresolute AUSA's from doing their own thing (or being bullrushed by an aggressive or smooth-talking defense lawyer).

On its face, this policy is not that much of a change from the one Eric Holder adopted, but there is an important change in emphasis and purpose....

It will be attacked by the Left as likely to produce longer sentences. That's probably so. However, there is a ready mechanism by which such sentences can be avoided: Mr. Nicey might consider quitting the smack business and getting a normal job like everybody else. I'm just not a partisan of the notion that it's always the public that has to change. Instead, in both practical and moral senses, we'll be better off when we insist that it's the criminal who has to change. We don't need less serious charging. We need less crime.

Criminals make choices. We should give them enhanced incentives to make better ones, for them and for us. The Attorney General's directive does just that.

Prior recent related post: 

May 12, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (28)

Misreporting of the Sessions Memo and the challenge of nuance in prosecutorial charging policies

I have already had the pleasure of speaking with a couple of thoughtful members of the media about the new charging and sentencing memorandum released today by Attorney General Jeff Sessions (basics here), and those conversations have already reinforced my sense of how challenging it is to fully and fairly assess the import and impact of the "Sessions Memo" in our modern sound-bite world. But while I can understand and sympathize with media members struggling to fully understand and contextualize the Sessions Memo, I felt compelled to blog my frustration with media efforts like this one from the New York Daily News that in their headline and lead get the basic story fundamentally wrong:  

Attorney General demands prosecutors seek max sentences for drug offenders

Attorney General Jeff Sessions is taking the war on drugs nuclear, ordering federal prosecutors across the country to pursue the longest prison sentences possible for drug offenders and others in a reversal of Obama-era policies.

This is just flat out wrong, as the very text of paragraph four of the short Sessions Memo makes plain (with my emphasis added): "prosecutors must disclose to the sentencing court all facts that impact the sentencing guidelines or mandatory minimum sentences, and should in all cases seek a reasonable sentence under the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553."

I think it fair (though still an incomplete short-hand) to talk about the Sessions Memo demanding prosecutors to seek tougher or harsher or longer sentences, but it is dangerously wrong to assert that the Sessions memo requires pursuit of "max sentences" or "the longest prison sentences possible."  Indeed, it seems that AG Sessions very much believes that his Memo actually provides even "more play in the joints" than pre-Holder era prosecutorial guidelines.  This is evidence by the text of this speech he gave today in New York talking about his new memo, which includes these excerpts:

Charging and sentencing recommendations are bedrock responsibilities for any federal prosecutor.  And I trust our prosecutors in the field to make good judgements.  They deserve to be unhandcuffed and not micro-managed from Washington.   Rather, they must be permitted to apply the law to the facts of each investigation.  Let's be clear, we are enforcing the laws Congress passed – that is both our fundamental mission and constitutional duty.

Going forward, I have empowered our prosecutors to charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense.  It means we are going to meet our responsibility to enforce the law with judgment and fairness.  It is simply the right and moral thing to do.  But it is important to note that unlike previous charging memoranda, I have given our prosecutors discretion to avoid sentences that would result in an injustice.

Prior recent related post: 

May 12, 2017 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

AG Sessions issues new tougher charging and sentencing guidelines to federal prosecutors

As reported in this official Justice Department press release, "Attorney General Jeff Sessions today issued the attached memorandum [available here] establishing charging and sentencing policies for the Department of Justice." The press release further reports:

This policy was formulated after extensive consultation with Assistant U.S. Attorneys at both the trial and appellate level, as well as U.S. Attorneys and Main Justice Attorneys. It ensures that the Department enforces the law fairly and consistently, advances public safety and promotes respect for our legal system.

Attorney General Sessions will issue further remarks on the new policy later this morning.

This memorandum is relative short and to the point, and here is some of its key language:

Charging and sentencing recommendations are crucial responsibilities for any federal prosecutor.  The directives I am setting forth below are simple but important.  They place great confidence in our prosecutors and supervisors to apply them in a thoughtful and disciplined manner, with the goal of achieving just and consistent results in federal cases.

First, it is a core principle that prosecutors should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense. This policy affirms our responsibility to enforce the law, is moral and just, and produces consistency.  This policy fully utilizes the tools Congress has given us.  By definition, the most serious offenses are those that carry the most substantial guidelines sentence, including mandatory minimum sentences.

There will be circumstances in which good judgment would lead a prosecutor to conclude that a strict application of the above charging policy is not warranted.  In that case, prosecutors should carefully consider whether an exception may be justified.  Consistent with longstanding Department of Justice policy, any decision to vary from the policy must be approved by a United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General, or a supervisor designated by the United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General, and the reasons must be documented in the file.

Second, prosecutors must disclose to the sentencing court all facts that impact the sentencing guidelines or mandatory minimum sentences, and should in all cases seek a reasonable sentence under the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553.  In most cases, recommending a sentence within the advisory guideline range will be appropriate. Recommendations for sentencing departures or variances require supervisory approval, and the reasoning must be documented in the file.

This AP article about this new AG Sessions' memo provides this brief and effective account of what these directions change:

The directive rescinds guidance by Sessions’ Democratic predecessor, Eric Holder, who told prosecutors they could in some cases leave drug quantities out of charging documents so as not to trigger long sentences. Holder’s 2013 initiative, known as “Smart on Crime,” was aimed at encouraging shorter sentences for nonviolent drug offenders and preserving Justice Department resources for more serious and violent criminals.

Though Holder did say that prosecutors ordinarily should charge the most serious offense, he instructed them to do an “individualized assessment” of the defendant’s conduct. And he outlined exceptions for not pursuing mandatory minimum sentences, including if a defendant’s crime does not involve violence or if the person doesn’t have a leadership role in a criminal organization.

This development is a very big deal, although it is not especially surprising and the thousands of federal prosecutors who implement this policy around the nation will ultimately determine how dramatically federal charging and sentencing practices change in the months and years ahead.  (And one interesting point for the historical record: the AG Sessions charging and sentencing memo is dated May 10, but it would seem the brouhaha over the Comey firing delayed its official public release.)

Prior recent related post: 

May 12, 2017 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, May 11, 2017

Interesting report on plea realities impacting severity of sentences for sex trafficking offenses in Massachusetts

I just saw this recent Boston Herald article, headlined "Special Report: Sex traffickers evading tough prison sentences," which highlights the ways and reasons why a new Massachusetts law designed to toughen sentencing outcomes for certain sex offenders may not get consistently applied due to plea practices and related case-processing dynamics.  Here are excerpts:

Accused pimps and sex traffickers who could face decades behind bars under state law are often being allowed to plead down to less time and reduced charges, with more than half of convictions netting minimum sentences or less, according to a Herald review.

The softer sentencing patterns identified by a Herald survey of cases prosecuted by the attorney general and the state’s 11 district attorneys come five years after lawmakers passed a much-ballyhooed sex-trafficking law billed as a get-tough measure on criminals driving the sex trade.  But prosecutors and victim advocates say the sentences highlight the long-standing challenge in bringing complex cases reliant on vulnerable and sometimes reluctant victims.

The law called for sentences of five to 20 years for those convicted of trafficking, and up to life for those who prostitute minors.  But a Herald review of 32 trafficking cases statewide found 21 defendants in a position to serve the minimum five-year sentence or less, with three getting outright probation.  At least 18 times defendants took pleas to reduced charges — avoiding a human-trafficking conviction entirely. The average sentence of all reviewed cases fell between four and five-and-a-half years.  That’s a rate state Sen. Mark Montigny, the bill’s chief sponsor, slammed as “abysmal” — and exactly what he was trying to avoid when he drafted the law.

“Never once in my career have I put a mandatory minimum in a bill, but in trafficking of children, I put one in because I didn’t want to see plea-bargaining down,” said Montigny, who decried what he called a “societal ignorance” around the seriousness of the sex trade. “It’s unbelievable. … Not much has changed. And I’m so disappointed in that.”...

Prosecutors have been able to secure some long sentences under the new law.  Tyshaun McGhee and Sidney McGee, the first defendants convicted under the statute, got sentences of 10-to-15 and 10-to-12 years, respectively, after a Suffolk County jury found them guilty.  Ryan Duntin, who plead guilty in 2015, got a 10-year sentence.

But prosecutors defended their handling of the pleaded, low-sentence cases, noting they face a web of challenges. Frightened witnesses are often battling intense trauma or substance abuse, and sometimes are reluctant to go to trial, which makes scoring a jury conviction difficult.  Other times authorities have initially brought trafficking charges against girlfriends of the pimps, known as “bottoms,” who help recruit and intimidate victims.  But they sometimes are also seen as exploited victims themselves, leading prosecutors to later bring reduced charges.

Other circumstances have played a role. In Suffolk County, one accused trafficker pleaded to receive a four- to five-year sentence after one of his alleged victims died of an overdose before trial, dealing a blow to the case. In Bristol County, prosecutors said they were forced to dismiss one case because the victim wouldn’t cooperate.

Prosecutors are also wary of forcing victims, especially minors, to take the stand and risk re-traumatizing them, said Jake Wark, a spokesman for Suffolk District Attorney Daniel F. Conley. “When you’ve got victims terrified about what might come up when they take the stand ... and they’re on board with a guilty plea and we can get a 10-year or an eight-year sentence, that’s a successful prosecution,” Wark said....

Stephanie Clark, executive director of Amirah, an advocacy group that works with and houses trafficking victims, said she wasn’t surprised traffickers are getting softer sentences, given that cases hinge on victims who may back out.

May 11, 2017 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

"A Contextual Approach to Harmless Error Review"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Justin Murray and now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Harmless error review is profoundly important, but arguably broken, in the form that courts currently employ it in criminal cases. One significant reason for this brokenness lies in the dissonance between the reductionism of modern harmless error methodology and the diverse normative ambitions of criminal procedure. Nearly all harmless error rules used by courts today focus exclusively on whether the procedural error under review affected the result of a judicial proceeding. I refer to these rules as “result-based harmless error review.” The singular preoccupation of result-based harmless error review with the outputs of criminal processes stands in marked contrast with criminal procedure’s broader ethical vision, which also encompasses non-result-related interests such as providing defendants with space for autonomous decisionmaking, enforcing compliance with nondiscrimination norms, and making transparent the inner workings of criminal justice.

The vast scholarship relating to result-based harmless error review, though deeply critical of its current role in the administration of justice, has not put forward an alternative method of harmless error review that courts might realistically consider using. Commentators in this area have devoted much of their energy toward persuading courts to exempt large swaths of criminal procedure from harmless error review entirely and thus to require automatic reversal for errors involving exempted rules. Instead, courts have done just the opposite by subjecting an ever-expanding list of errors to harmless error review, and there is no reason to think this trend will abate in the foreseeable future.

I attempt in this Article to chart a different course. My proposal, called “contextual harmless error review,” has two essential features. First, it would assess harm in relation to the constellation of interests served by the particular procedural rule that was infringed and would not, as under existing law, automatically confine the harmless error inquiry to estimating the error’s effect on the outcome. Second, contextual harmless error review would examine whether the error harmed the interests identified in the first step of the analysis to a degree substantial enough to justify reversal.

May 11, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

Eleventh Circuit rejects effort to attack Alabama's lethal injection by suggesting hanging or firing squad as alternative execution methods

As reported in this local article, "condemned inmate Anthony Boyd asked the state of Alabama to carry out his execution by either hanging him or putting him in front of a firing squad. But the federal appeals court in Atlanta on Tuesday rejected Boyd’s request and cleared the way for his execution by lethal injection."  The Eleventh Circuit's lengthy ruling in Boyd v. Warden, No. 15-14971 (11th Cir. May 9, 2017) (available here), gets started this way:

It is by now clear in capital cases that a plaintiff seeking to challenge a state’s method of execution under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution must plausibly plead, and ultimately prove, that there is an alternative method of execution that is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces the substantial risk of pain posed by the state’s planned method of execution.  Appellant Anthony Boyd, an Alabama death row inmate, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his federal civil rights lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Alabama’s lethal injection protocol.  Boyd filed this lawsuit pursuant to Section 1983, alleging, among other things, that Alabama’s new lethal injection protocol, which substituted midazolam hydrochloride for pentobarbital as the first of three drugs, violates his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.  Notably, however, he did not allege that execution by a lethal injection protocol generally is unconstitutional.  Currently, Alabama law provides inmates sentenced to death with a choice between two methods of execution: lethal injection or electrocution. Instead of identifying an alternative method of lethal injection that would be feasible, readily implemented, and substantially less risky than the midazolam protocol or opting for death by electrocution, however, Boyd alleged that Alabama should execute him by hanging or firing squad.

The district court determined that Boyd had failed to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment because Boyd’s proposed alternative methods of execution -- firing squad and hanging -- are not authorized methods of execution under Alabama law and, therefore, are neither feasible nor readily implementable by that state.  It further held that Boyd’s remaining claims challenging Alabama’s execution protocol, the execution facilities, and the state’s decision to keep certain information about the protocol secret were time-barred by the statute of limitations.  Finally, the district court ruled that amending these claims would be futile and dismissed Boyd’s complaint.

We agree with the district court that Boyd has not come close to pleading sufficient facts to render it plausible that hanging and firing squad are feasible, readily implemented methods of execution for Alabama that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain.  The Alabama legislature is free to choose any method of execution that it deems appropriate, subject only to the constraints of the United States Constitution.  But Boyd has not alleged that either lethal injection in all forms or death by electrocution poses an unconstitutional risk of pain.  Having authorized two unchallenged methods of execution, Alabama is under no constitutional obligation to experiment with execution by hanging or firing squad.  We also agree that Boyd’s remaining claims were filed well beyond the two-year statute of limitations governing § 1983 claims in Alabama.  Accordingly, we affirm.

May 11, 2017 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 09, 2017

New buzz about AG Sessions considering new tougher charging guidance for federal prosecutors

I had the great honor and privilege tp speak earlier today to a terrific group of judges, along with a terrific lawyer from the US Sentencing Commissions, about federal sentencing trends and developments.  We started the discussion with a particular focus on drug cases, and I mentioned that I was expecting to see new, probably tougher, charging guidelines emerging from the Department of Justice under its new leadership.  This new Washington Post article, headlined "Sessions weighs return to harsher punishments for low-level drug crimes," suggests my informed speculation here may quite soon be reality. Here are excerpts from the piece:

Attorney General Jeff Sessions is reviewing policy changes set in place by the Obama administration that eliminated harsh punishments for low-level drug crimes and could direct federal prosecutors to again charge drug offenders with crimes carrying the most severe penalties, according to U.S. officials.

The change, if adopted, would overturn a memo by then-Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. that instructed prosecutors to avoid charging low-level defendants with drug offenses that would trigger severe mandatory minimum sentences. Only defendants who met certain criteria, such as not belonging to a large-scale drug trafficking organization, a gang or a cartel, qualified for the lesser charges under Holder’s instructions.

If new charging instructions are implemented, it would mark the first significant move by the Trump administration to bring back the drug war’s toughest practices — methods that had fallen out of favor in recent years as critics pointed to damaging effects of mass incarceration.

“As the Attorney General has consistently said, we are reviewing all Department of Justice policies to focus on keeping Americans safe and will be issuing further guidance and support to our prosecutors executing this priority — including an updated memorandum on charging for all criminal cases,” Ian Prior, a department spokesman, in a statement to The Washington Post.

Sessions has recently peppered his speeches to law enforcement groups throughout the country with tough-on-crime rhetoric and urged Justice Department lawyers to prosecute more drug and gun cases.

The attorney general is considering having his prosecutors bring the most severe charges against drug traffickers, whether they are low-level defendants or not, according to officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations. Sessions also may allow prosecutors to use more “enhancements” to make sentences even longer. Under what’s referred to as “Section 851” of the Controlled Substances Act, defendants charged with a federal drug, firearm or immigration crime may face enhancements if they have previously been convicted of a felony drug offense.

Holder told his prosecutors four years ago that they should stop using enhancements except in certain cases — such as when the defendant was involved in the use or threat of violence — in an effort, he said, to make punishments more fairly fit the crime.

Holder’s changes came in August 2013 during a growing push among lawmakers and civil rights groups to roll back the strict charging and sentencing policies created in the 1980s and 1990s at the height of the war on drugs. Sen. Rand Paul (R-Ky.) was one of the sponsors of bipartisan criminal-justice legislation that would have reduced some of the mandatory minimum sentences for gun and drug crimes — a bill that Sessions opposed and helped derail....

The Holder memo was also supported by many of the U.S. attorneys in the Obama administration. But some prosecutors across the country fought Holder’s broad effort to eliminate mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain drug offenders, saying it damaged their ability to build cases from the ground up against major drug organizations.

As I noted in this post a few months ago, the new Attorney General has already issued directives that lead me to suspect that we would be seeing a formal new "Sessions Memo" that seeks to remove some of the "play in the joints" that former AG Eric Holder introduced through prior charging memorandum issued back in 2010 and 2013. Indeed, I have been a bit surprised we have not yet seen new directives from AG Sessions yet in this arena, and this new Post article leads me to suspect a Sessions Memo could be coming out any day now.

UPDATE:  This New York Times article, headlined "Sessions to Toughen Rules on Prosecuting Drug Crimes," suggests that new charging guidance from AG Sessions could be released any day now.  Here is a key paragraph from the article that provides additional context for this important coming federal criminal justice development:

Current and former government officials have said for weeks that Mr. Sessions’s new policy could come at any time. They said Tuesday that they expected to see it finalized shortly, and Mr. Sessions himself has foreshadowed the announcement this year, calling for a return to tougher federal charging policies in speeches and issuing memos telling prosecutors to anticipate policy shifts.

May 9, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, May 08, 2017

A lethal Ohio procedural question: are there any formal rules on when new circuit judges are to be involved in pending en banc matters?

The question in the title of this post came to mind this morning in the wake of the news that, as discussed here, two of President Trump's latest judicial nominees are slated to fill open slots on the Sixth Circuit: Justice Joan L. Larsen and John K. Bush.   As noted here a few months ago, Prez Trump's very first circuit court nomination was also to the Sixth Circuit via the naming of Judge Amul Thapar.  Assuming relatively swift and successful confirmations, the Sixth Circuit could have three new judges within the next few months.

Meanwhile, as regular readers may recall from this post, also scheduled to take place in the next few months in the Sixth Circuit is the rehearing en banc the State of Ohio's appeal of a lower court stay issued earlier this year which blocked Ohio from using its latest three-drug protocol to execute condemned murderers.  The Sixth Circuit has scheduled oral argument on these matters for June 14, and the full court will probably try to issue a ruling in the matter not too long thereafter given that Ohio has a long-postponed execution now scheduled for July 26.

I am inclined to guess that Judge Thapar — who has already coasted through his confirmation hearing — will be a member of the Sixth Circuit by the time of the en banc oral argument in June.  Given that Justice Gorsuch at SCOTUS has apparently been fully participating in cases in which oral argument took place after the time he joined the Court, I would further guess that everyone will think Judge Thapar can and should fully participate in the Sixth Circuit's en banc consideration of Ohio's lethal injection protocol if he is there in time for oral argument.

But what should happen if Justice Larsen and/or Mr. Bush are both confirmed in, say, late June.  Could they and should they be involved in the consideration of these lethal Ohio matters?   Adding to the potential intrigue and head-counting is the fact that I believe Judge David McKeague is technically now still an active judge, but will be only until his successor if confirmed. Arguably, Judge KcKeague should not be part of the en banc decision-making once and whenever Justice Larsen gets confirmed to the Sixth Circuit.

Perhaps the Sixth Circuit has some clear rules on these kinds of en banc transition issues, and I would welcome any and all input from knowing en banc mavens.  In addition, it is quite possible that there are sufficient votes currently on the Sixth Circuit one way or the other to make these transition issues relatively inconsequential to the outcome in this important en banc case.  Still, when it comes to review of lethal injection protocols or just about anything else dealing with the death penalty, it does not seem that anything ever really becomes inconsequential.  

(In addition, and surely not to be overlooked as the buzz over another SCOTUS retirement grows, if and when Judge Thapar and Justice Larsen join the Sixth Circuit, this court will have three of the remaining 20 persons from Prez Trump's SCOTUS short lists.  This fact alone makes anything the Sixth Circuit does in the coming months even that much more interesting.)

Prior recent related posts:

May 8, 2017 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Sunday, May 07, 2017

Reflecting on decreasing death sentences and increasing life sentences

The Washington Post has this "trendy" article headlined "The steady decline of America’s death rows," which reviews some of the latest notable numbers about death sentences and executions and also throws in a paragraph about life sentences based on this week's new Sentencing Project report on the topic (discussed here).  Here are excerpts:

Capital punishment in the United States is slowly and steadily declining, a fact most visible in the plummeting number of death penalties carried out each year.  In 1999, the country executed 98 inmates, a modern record for a single year.  In 2016, there were 20 executions nationwide, the lowest annual total in a quarter-century.

Death sentences also sharply declined. Fewer states that have the death penalty as a sentencing option are carrying out executions, a trend that has continued despite two U.S. Supreme Court rulings in the past decade upholding lethal injection practices. States that would otherwise carry out executions have found themselves stymied by court orders, other legal uncertainty, logistical issues or an ongoing shortage of deadly drugs. Fewer states have it on the books than did a decade ago, and some that do retain the practice have declared moratoriums or otherwise stopped executions without formally declaring an outright ban....

Another way to see the changing nature of the American death penalty: The gradual decline of death row populations. At the death penalty’s modern peak around the turn of the century, death rows housed more than 3,500 inmates. That number is falling, and it has been falling for some time. New Justice Department data show that death-row populations shrank in 2015, marking the 15th consecutive year with a decline.

There were 2,881 inmates on state and federal death rows in 2015, the last year for which the Justice Department has nationwide data available. That was down 61 from the year before.  States carried out 28 death penalties in 2015, but nearly three times as many inmates — 82 — were removed from death rows “by means other than execution,” the Justice Department’s report states. (Another 49 inmates arrived on death row in 2015.)

In some cases, inmates left death row after being cleared of the crimes for which they were sentenced. Five people sentenced to death were exonerated in 2015, according to the National Registry of Exonerations, a project of the University of Michigan Law School and the Northwestern University School of Law. Other inmates died of other causes before their executions could occur. In Alabama, three inmates died of natural causes in 2015 and a fourth hanged himself that year inside a prison infirmary, according to corrections officials and local media reports. North Carolina officials say one death-row inmate died of natural causes that year, another was resentenced to life without parole and a third had his death sentence vacated and a new trial ordered. Death sentences were thrown out in some cases. Four death-row inmates in Maryland had their sentences commuted to life in prison without parole in 2015, a decision made by then-Gov. Martin O’Malley after that state formally abolished the death penalty....

Another shift also has occurred: The number of people sentenced to life in prison has ballooned, reaching an all-time high last year, according to a report released this week from the Sentencing Project. The report states that more than 161,000 people were serving life sentences last year, with another 44,000 people serving what are called “virtual life sentences,” defined as long-term imprisonment effectively extending through the end of a person’s life. Similar to overall prison populations, people of color are disproportionately represented; black people account for nearly half of the life or virtual-life sentences tallied in the report.

Long-time readers likely know that these numbers provide one of the primary reasons why I have long worried that some criminal justice reforms advocates worry far too much about capital punishment and worry far too little about extreme prison sentences.  The fact that there are seven times as many persons serving life sentence as are on death row leads me to believe that nearly any and every concern raised about death sentencing may well be a problem of far greater magnitude with respect to lifers.

Most critically for those concerned about proportionate sentencing, every one of the almost 3000 persons on death row is an adult who was convicted of some form of aggravated murder and had a chance to argue to a jury for a lesser sentence.  But, according to the Sentencing Project data, nearly "12,000 people have been sentenced to life or virtual life for crimes committed as juveniles" and over "17,000 individuals with [some kind of life sentence] have been convicted of nonviolent crimes" and a significant percentage of lifers were subject to a mandatory sentencing scheme that required imposition of a severe prison sentence without any input by a jury or a judge.  

Though I fully understand why the death penalty has so much salience for both advocates and the general public, I still wish some portion of the extraordinary attention and energy always given to capital punishment might be redirected toward lifer laws, policies and practices.  

May 7, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (5)

Notable new Atlantic series "on efforts across the United States to move beyond the age of mass incarceration"

JusticeBUG_1As announced via this article a few day ago, headlined "Imagining the Presence of Justice," there is a notable new project from The Atlantic which aspires "to cover the evolution of criminal justice in America with a heightened focus on the different systems and approaches developing all over the nation." Here is more on how The Atlantic sets ups its plans followed by links to three early notable pieces in the series:

Over the past several decades, America has seen a startling divergence between crime and punishment.  While crime rates dropped steadily from the dramatic peaks of the 1990s, the nation’s incarceration rates continued just as steadily to grow.  And so, despite containing only 5 percent of the world’s population, the United States came to hold a quarter of the world’s prisoners.

We’ve covered this divergence extensively in the print and digital pages of The Atlantic, from Ta-Nehisi Coates’s landmark story on the rise of the carceral state and the devastation it wreaked on black families to Inimai Chettiar’s exploration of the many causes of the decline in crime.  Among the findings that emerge most clearly from this robust, sad literature is that the factors driving both aspects of the divergence — the fall in crime, the increasing spread of punishment — are highly complex.  Despite dawning awareness of the deep social and economic costs of mass incarceration, no one-size-fits-all solution exists to change this picture.  Rolling back mass incarceration while protecting public safety will require a legion of efforts in thousands of prosecutors’ offices, police departments, parole boards, and legislative chambers.  "What we have is not a system at all,” as Fordham University’s John Pfaff told The Atlantic's Matt Ford, "but a patchwork of competing bureaucracies with different constituencies, different incentives, who oftentimes might have similar political ideologies, but very different goals and very different pressures on them.”...

In collaboration with reporters across the country, we’ll highlight local initiatives that merit national attention, and talk with experts about where and how lessons from states and municipalities can be applied more broadly.  We’ll look at where the carceral state has spread beyond merely responding to crime, examine the time people spend behind bars without having been convicted, and explore how cities can depend on police to collect fines and fees from their poorest residents to make up for too little tax revenue.

The title of the project comes from Martin Luther King Jr., who included the phrase in his famous letter from Birmingham jail.  That context is worth understanding for the challenge the letter poses to us today, as America struggles to reconcile the need for public safety with the moral imperative of justice....  From his cell, King wrote the famous letter that would cleave the nation’s understanding of “law and order” right in half, arguing that the observance of an unjust law violates the moral order.  "An individual who breaks a law that conscience tells him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for law,” he wrote.  He castigated "the white moderate, who is more devoted to ‘order' than to justice; who prefers a negative peace, which is the absence of tension, to a positive peace, which is the presence of justice."

Three (somewhat sentencing-related) piece from the series:

May 7, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, May 05, 2017

"Mass Monitoring"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Avlana Eisenberg and now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Business is booming for criminal justice monitoring technology: these days “ankle bracelet” refers as often to an electronic monitor as to jewelry.  Indeed, the explosive growth of electronic monitoring (“EM”) for criminal justice purposes — a phenomenon which this Article terms “mass monitoring” — is among the most overlooked features of the otherwise well-known phenomenon of mass incarceration.

This Article addresses the fundamental question of whether EM is punishment.  It finds that the origins and history of EM as a progressive alternative to incarceration — a punitive sanction — support characterization of EM as punitive, and that EM comports with the goals of dominant punishment theories.  Yet new uses of EM have complicated this narrative.  The Article draws attention to the expansion of EM both as a substitute for incarceration and as an added sanction, highlighting the analytic importance of what it terms the “substitution/addition distinction.”  The Article argues that, as a punitive sanction, EM can be justified when used as a substitute for incarceration, but that its use as an added sanction may result in excessive punishment and raises significant constitutional and policy concerns.

The Article’s findings have crucial implications for hotly contested questions over whether monitoring can be imposed retroactively and whether pretrial house arrest plus monitoring (which resembles the post-conviction use of monitoring as a substitute for incarceration) should count toward time served.  The Article provides a framework for addressing these questions and, at the same time, offers practical policy guidance that will enable courts and policymakers to ensure that EM programs are genuinely a cost-saving, progressive substitute for incarceration rather than another destructive expansion of government control.

May 5, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, May 04, 2017

"The Use of Risk Assessment at Sentencing: Implications for Research and Policy"

The title of this post is the title of this paper authored by Jordan Hyatt and Steven Chanenson recently posted to SSRN. Here is the abstract:

At-sentencing risk assessments are predictions of an individual’s statistically likely future criminal conduct.  These assessments can be derived from a number of methodologies ranging from unstructured clinical judgment to advanced statistical and actuarial processes.  Some assessments consider only correlates of criminal recidivism, while others also take into account criminogenic needs.  Assessments of this nature have long been used to classify defendants for treatment and supervision within prisons and on community supervision, but they have only relatively recently begun to be used — or considered for use — during the sentencing process.  This shift in application has raised substantial practical and policy challenges and questions.

This paper, supported by the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Assistance, directly addresses these issues and provides information and examples from a range of jurisdictions, including some which have integrated at-sentencing risk assessment programs in place or are in the process of doing so.  Derived from a survey of judges, as well as a series of interviews with stakeholders from across the nation, opportunities for future research and planning to guide the cautious engagement with at-sentencing risk assessment are identified.

May 4, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

South Carolina Supreme Court rejects constitutional challenge to juve sex offender's mandatory lifetime registration/monitoring

Yesterday the South Carolina Supreme Court handed down an opinion in In the Interest of Justin B., No. 27716 (S. Ct. May 3, 2017) (available here), unanimously rejecting the contention that "mandatory imposition of lifetime registration and electronic monitoring on juveniles is unconstitutional."  The relatively short opinion is a bit curious because, after reviewing a bunch of previous rulings in which it had "upheld the constitutionality of the mandatory lifetime sex offender registry requirement with electronic monitoring for adults and juveniles," the opinion does not discuss Graham or Miller but does confront and reject the juvenile's assertion that the constitutional analysis should "yield a different result under the reasoning of Roper v. Simmons."

Roper is, indisputably, a relevant precedent if and when a juvenile offender is arguing against mandatory imposition of lifetime registration and electronic monitoring.  But, in my view, the more recent precedents of Graham and Miller are even more critical and central to mounting an Eighth Amendment argument against any mandatory lifetime sanction for a juvenile offender. (As noted in this prior post, more than five years ago the Ohio Supreme Court relied heavily on Graham to find unconstitutional a mandatory lifetime registration requirement for juvenile sex offenders.)

In the end, I do not think engagement with Graham and Miller would have made any real difference to the South Carolina Supreme Court.  As this conclusion to the opinion highlights, that court has long deemed registration and monitoring to be civil non-punitive provisions that are not really subject to traditional constitutional limits on punishment:

The requirement that adults and juveniles who commit criminal sexual conduct must register as a sex offender and wear an electronic monitor is not a punitive measure, and the requirement bears a rational relationship to the Legislature's purpose in the Sex Offender Registry Act to protect our citizens — including children — from repeat sex offenders.  The requirement, therefore, is not unconstitutional.  If the requirement that juvenile sex offenders must register and must wear an electronic monitor is in need of change, that decision is to be made by the Legislature — not the courts.  The decision of the family court to follow the mandatory, statutory requirement to impose lifetime sex offender registration and electronic monitoring on Justin B. is AFFIRMED

May 4, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (16)

Wednesday, May 03, 2017

PBS Frontline covers the impact of Miller via "Second Chance Kids"

Pbs-frontline-merged-logoAs detailed via this posting, the PBS series Frontline premiered a new documentary last night titled Second Chance Kids. Here is a kind of preview from the posting:

What happens when prisoners convicted of murder as teenagers are given the chance to re-enter society? In the wake of Miller v. Alabama — the 2012 Supreme Court ruling that found mandatory life sentences without the chance of parole for juveniles unconstitutional — some 2,000 offenders across the country are hoping to find out.

With unique access, the new FRONTLINE documentary, Second Chance Kids, follows the cases of two of the first juvenile lifers in the country to seek parole following the landmark ruling — including Anthony Rolon of Massachusetts.

At age 17, Rolon stabbed 20-year-old Bobby Botelho to death. He was given life without parole during the country’s crackdown on so-called juvenile “superpredators” — teenagers who were labeled violent, dangerous and incapable of change. The theory, which was popularized by academics and embraced by Democrats and Republicans alike, resulted in disproportionately extreme sentencing of black and Latino youths.

As the documentary explores, the “superpredator” theory has now largely been discredited and disavowed. And a series of Supreme Court rulings, relying heavily on developmental science, has said that the personal circumstances of teenage offenders must be taken into account when they’re sentenced. The court has also ruled that many of them should have the chance to prove they’ve changed.

In the above excerpt from Second Chance Kids, go inside the parole hearing that will decide Rolon’s fate. Watch as Rolon and his legal team plead for his release after 18 years, and as Botelho’s family argues against it.

As juvenile offenders across the country await their potential re-sentencing, the documentary asks tough questions about crime and punishment in America, and what happens when some offenders are given a second chance.

The PSB website allows one to watch the documentary in full, and it also has these two companion articles:

"They Were Sentenced as “Superpredators.” Who Were They Really?"

"How Brain Science Is Changing How Long Teens Spend in Prison"

May 3, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (9)

Tuesday, May 02, 2017

"Tell the Client's Story: Mitigation in Criminal and Death Penalty Cases"

263155631_Def_LThe title of this post is the title of this notable new collection of essays edited by Edward Monahan and James Clark and produced by ABA Book Publishing.  Here is a description from the ABA website:

Tell the Client's Story provides litigation teams the best strategies for effective mitigation work in criminal and capital cases.  Top mitigation experts from across the nation with demonstrated practice wisdom will help readers to successfully litigate complex criminal cases.  The book also utilizes significant legal, social science, and behavioral science research findings that will inform practitioners on multi-disciplinary approaches to crafting courtroom strategy.  Using practical case studies, surveys, checklists, and appendices that are grounded in multi-professional scientific and clinical literatures, this book will give readers approaches to cogently and persuasively present mitigation evidence to decision makers.  In addition to understanding the law and ethics of mitigation, you will learn how to:

• Develop consistent arguments for life imprisonment -- rather than death -- and mitigated sentences in other criminal cases through effective storytelling and theme-building;

• Build productive relationships with clients, witnesses, and experts;

• Utilize the Capital Jury Project's empirical findings for successful jury selection and persuasion;

• Develop robust case theories;

• Collect and organize information crucial for compelling mitigation;

• Create a winning mitigation team and employ the cutting-edge methodology of structured case review;

• Proactively manage media coverage for positive mitigation outcomes, and

• Effectively present mitigation evidence at pretrial, voir dire, and penalty phases.

This book will benefit seasoned defense professionals, while also providing crucial guidance for attorneys and other professionals with limited or no experience in mitigation techniques.

May 2, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, May 01, 2017

Spotlighting again the use of risk-assessment computations at sentencing (under an inaccurate headline)

Adam Liptak has this new column discussing the Loomis risk-assessment sentencing case pending SCOTUS cert review, but the column bears the inaccurate headline "Sent to Prison by a Software Program’s Secret Algorithms."  As of this writing, software programs alone have not sent any persons to prison, not in the Wisconsin case before SCOTUS or any other that I know about.  Software may be making recommendations to sentencing decision-makers, and that certainly justifies scrutiny, but we have not quite yet reached the brave new world that this headline suggests.  That said, the headline did grab my attention, and here are parts of the article that follows:

[A] Wisconsin man, Eric L. Loomis, who was sentenced to six years in prison based in part on a private company’s proprietary software. Mr. Loomis says his right to due process was violated by a judge’s consideration of a report generated by the software’s secret algorithm, one Mr. Loomis was unable to inspect or challenge.

In March, in a signal that the justices were intrigued by Mr. Loomis’s case, they asked the federal government to file a friend-of-the-court brief offering its views on whether the court should hear his appeal.

The report in Mr. Loomis’s case was produced by a product called Compas, sold by Northpointe Inc. It included a series of bar charts that assessed the risk that Mr. Loomis would commit more crimes. The Compas report, a prosecutor told the trial judge, showed “a high risk of violence, high risk of recidivism, high pretrial risk.” The judge agreed, telling Mr. Loomis that “you’re identified, through the Compas assessment, as an individual who is a high risk to the community.”

The Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled against Mr. Loomis. The report added valuable information, it said, and Mr. Loomis would have gotten the same sentence based solely on the usual factors, including his crime — fleeing the police in a car — and his criminal history.

At the same time, the court seemed uneasy with using a secret algorithm to send a man to prison. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley, writing for the court, discussed, for instance, a report from ProPublica about Compas that concluded that black defendants in Broward County, Fla., “were far more likely than white defendants to be incorrectly judged to be at a higher rate of recidivism.”

Justice Bradley noted that Northpointe had disputed the analysis. Still, she wrote, “this study and others raise concerns regarding how a Compas assessment’s risk factors correlate with race.” In the end, though, Justice Bradley allowed sentencing judges to use Compas. They must take account of the algorithm’s limitations and the secrecy surrounding it, she wrote, but said the software could be helpful “in providing the sentencing court with as much information as possible in order to arrive at an individualized sentence.”

Justice Bradley made Compas’s role in sentencing sound like the consideration of race in a selective university’s holistic admissions program. It could be one factor among many, she wrote, but not the determinative one.

In urging the United States Supreme Court not to hear the case, Wisconsin’s attorney general, Brad D. Schimel, seemed to acknowledge that the questions in the case were substantial ones. But he said the justices should not move too fast. “The use of risk assessments by sentencing courts is a novel issue, which needs time for further percolation,” Mr. Schimel wrote.

He added that Mr. Loomis “was free to question the assessment and explain its possible flaws.” But it is a little hard to see how he could do that without access to the algorithm itself. The company that markets Compas says its formula is a trade secret. “The key to our product is the algorithms, and they’re proprietary,” one of its executives said last year. “We’ve created them, and we don’t release them because it’s certainly a core piece of our business.”

Compas and other products with similar algorithms play a role in many states’ criminal justice systems. “These proprietary techniques are used to set bail, determine sentences, and even contribute to determinations about guilt or innocence,” a report from the Electronic Privacy Information Center found [available here]. “Yet the inner workings of these tools are largely hidden from public view.”...

There are good reasons to use data to ensure uniformity in sentencing. It is less clear that uniformity must come at the price of secrecy, particularly when the justification for secrecy is the protection of a private company’s profits. The government can surely develop its own algorithms and allow defense lawyers to evaluate them. At Rensselaer last month, Chief Justice Roberts said that judges had work to do in an era of rapid change. “The impact of technology has been across the board,” he said, “and we haven’t yet really absorbed how it’s going to change the way we do business.” 

Some prior related posts on Loomis case:

May 1, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, April 30, 2017

"Purpose-Focused Sentencing: How Reforming Punishment Can Transform Policing"

The title of this post is the title of this essay authored by Jelani Jefferson Exum recently posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Today’s discussions about police reform have focused on changing police training and procedures.  As accounts of deaths of African-Americans at the hands of police officers have played out in the news and social media, demands for racial justice in policing have become more prevalent.  To end what I have coined as “the Death Penalty on the Street,” there have been calls for diversity training, training on non-lethal force, and, of course, community policing.  While it is perfectly rational for the response to excessive police force to be a focus on changing policing methods, such reforms will only have limited success as long as attitudes about black criminality remain the same.  Though we would like to hold them to a higher standard, police officers are merely human, so they carry with them the same biases and prejudices that any of us can hold.  Studies have shown that, in general, Americans are -- regardless of our race -- biased against blacks, especially young black men.  African Americans are more likely seen as criminals, and most of us overestimate the amount of crime attributable to the black population.  Therefore, in order to truly address the problem of racial injustice in policing, we must address the racial biases held by our society that play out in our criminal justice system.  Though perhaps not the obvious place for this revolution to start, sentencing reform has the potential to change the face of the punishment in our country, thus transforming the (usually black) face of whom we see as deserving of punishment by the police and the courts.

This Essay proposes “purpose-focused sentencing” as a means of remedying the over-incarceration of blacks, thereby combatting attitudes about crime and black criminality, and in turn, affecting how police see and treat blacks.  The goal is to reduce the racial disparity in incarceration, not solely through an overall lessened reliance on prisons and jails, but also by assessing and identifying appropriate sentences to fulfill criminal justice purposes.  Once those purposes -- deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, and retribution -- are identified and assessed, there will not be room to justify disparities in sentencing attributable only to the race of the defendant.  All sentences, regardless of the peculiarities of an individual defendant, must be tailored to a specific result, rather than imposed at the whim of a particular judge or in accordance with legislation that has no basis in an identified sentencing goal.  As a result, we will see prisons and jails being used much more exclusively (to the extent that incarceration is used at all) for violent, repeat felons, which statistics tell us are not where our racial disparities lie today.  When punishment is more closely aligned with what the offender has done, and what our goals of punishments are given that behavior, we can begin to combat the stereotype that the dangerous criminal is most likely black.

Once sentencing no longer feeds into the heightened public view of blacks as criminals, the spillover effect will be that the new wave of police officers will not see blacks this way either.  And if they do, society certainly will not view this biased police violence against blacks as reasonable.  This Essay offers a solution that will take years, if not generations, to implement; and it will perhaps take even longer for it to completely transform the face of policing.  However, the proposal is a long-term approach that will immediately begin to move criminal justice in the right direction and encourage honest conversations about what we are trying to do in our system and how our current methods of punishment are only perpetuating racial injustice.

April 30, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Should an offender's citizenship status impact prosecutorial charging decisions and how?

The question in the title of this post is prompted in part by a comment made by Attorney General Jeff Sessions in this speech given on Friday and in part by this news article out of Baltimore brought to my attention by a commentor.  Here is part of the speech from AG Sessions focusing on the how some prosecutors may now be concerning themselves with citizen status in charging:

We have also taken steps to end the lawless practices of so-called “sanctuary” jurisdictions, which make our country less safe.  I understand there are those who disagree.  But the American people rightly demand a lawful system of immigration. Congress has established a lawful system of immigration.

The Bureau of Justice Statistics just released a report showing that 42 percent of defendants charged in U.S. district court were non-U.S. citizens.  And according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, in 2013, 48 percent of all deported aliens who were convicted for coming back to the United States illegally were also convicted of a non-immigration related crime.

And yet, I regret to say that we’ve seen district attorneys openly brag about not charging cases appropriately -- giving special treatment to illegal aliens to ensure these criminal aliens aren’t deported from their communities.  They advertise that they will charge a criminal alien with a lesser offense than presumably they would charge a United States citizen.  It baffles me.

Regardless, no jurisdiction has a right to violate federal law, especially when that violation leads to the death of innocent Americans, like Kate Steinle.  As the President has made clear, our system is a system of laws, and we will be the Administration that ends the rampant immigration illegality.

And here is part of the Baltimore press article highlighting what AG Sessions seems to be talking about:

The Baltimore State's Attorney's Office has instructed prosecutors to think twice before charging illegal immigrants with minor, non-violent crimes in response to stepped up immigration enforcement by the Trump administration.

Chief Deputy State's Attorney Michael Schatzow, in a memo sent to all staff Thursday and obtained by The Baltimore Sun, wrote that the Justice Department's deportation efforts "have increased the potential collateral consequences to certain immigrants of minor, non-violent criminal conduct." "In considering the appropriate disposition of a minor, non-violent criminal case, please be certain to consider those potential consequences to the victim, witnesses, and the defendant," Schatzow wrote....

The Homeland Security Department issued memos in February saying any immigrant in the country illegally who is charged or convicted of any offense, or even suspected of a crime, will now be an enforcement priority.

Elizabeth Alex, a Baltimore regional director for CASA de Maryland, said immigrants and their relatives are afraid to engage in the court process, and Baltimore prosecutors are right to include immigration status as part of their consideration in how to handle a case. "Prosecutorial discretion exists in all kinds of cases, and it's more education to [prosecutors] about the multiple factors that they should take into consideration as they proceed," she said. "The consequences are different today than they were a year ago."

U.S. Rep. Andy Harris, the lone Republican in Maryland's congressional delegation, said it is "a real shame that the State Attorney's office is unwilling to enforce the law against illegal aliens who commit crimes in the United States."

"A vast majority of Americans believe that illegal aliens who commit crimes while here in the U.S. should bear the full brunt of the law, and be deported," Harris said through a spokesperson.

The Justice Department declined to comment on the Baltimore memo. But in remarks Friday on Long Island, Sessions decried district attorneys who he said "openly brag about not charging cases appropriately -- giving special treatment to illegal aliens to ensure these criminal aliens aren't deported from their communities."... The comments appeared to be in response to the acting district attorney in Brooklyn, N.Y., who earlier this week issued similar instruction to prosecutors there.

"We must ensure that a conviction, especially for a minor offense, does not lead to unintended and severe consequences like deportation, which can be unfair, tear families apart and destabilize our communities and businesses," Acting District Attorney Eric Gonzalez said in an announcement Monday. Gonzalez went a step further, hiring two immigration attorneys to train staff on immigration issues and to advise prosecutors when making plea offers and sentencing recommendations "in an effort to avoid disproportionate collateral consequences."

Mayor Catherine E. Pugh, who has sought to reassure immigrants that Baltimore is a "welcoming city" that will not check for proof of citizenship, declined to comment on the State's Attorney's Office memo. "Mayor Pugh will leave prosecution strategies and tactics to the State's Attorney and her staff," spokesman Anthony McCarthy said in an e-mail....

Police Commissioner Kevin Davis has expressed concern about immigrants not reporting crimes or cooperating with investigations because they fear repercussions related to their status, and has attended community meetings stressing that police won't make immigration checks.  Schatzow, in the State's Attorney's Office memo, noted such concerns, saying fear of being deported could "impair our effectiveness in combating violent crimes and criminals."

Notably, it has long been common in many settings for defense attorneys to seek and prosecutors to seriously consider downgrading certain charges from felonies to misdemeanors for some immigrant offenders in order to keep them from being subject to automatic deportation under applicable federal statutes.  I am uncertain whether AG Sessions is baffled by this practice, but I am certain that this practice is not confined to just a few jurisdictions.

That said, I do think the equation feels a bit different if and when we focus on foregoing certain criminal charges altogether for a certain class of offender because of the collateral consequences of deportation that could follow from any charges.  Though I would be troubled by deportation always serving as the de facto punishment for, say, low-level marijuana possession, I also would be concerned about the deterrent impact (as well as the optics) of policies and practices that make it easier for illegal immigrant offenders to avoid charges for certain classes of criminal wrong-doing.  Stated somewhat differently, given that citizens as well as non-citizens can and often do suffer an array of profound collateral consequences even when charged with minor, non-violent crimes, I would like to see prosecutors in Baltimore and everywhere else regularly instructed to consider "potential collateral consequences" for all offenders in all setting when making charging decisions.

April 30, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Friday, April 28, 2017

"Rethinking Federal Diversion: The Rise of Specialized Criminal Courts"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Christine Scott-Hayward now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Over the last five years, there has been a proliferation in the federal system of front-end specialized criminal courts. Most of these courts are drug courts, but there are also veterans courts, courts for youthful defendants, and new "alternative to incarceration" courts. Although these courts are often described as "diversion" courts, most of them do not offer true diversion, whereby a defendant does not receive a criminal conviction. They have received significant support from a variety of stakeholders, including former Attorney General Eric Holder.

This paper explores the origins and development of front-end federal specialized criminal courts, and situates them in the existing landscape of diversion and alternative to incarceration laws and programs, particularly those in the federal criminal justice system. It argues that their rapid expansion in such a short time is problematic for a variety of reasons.

First, it is not clear what are the goals of these courts. Second, the use and effectiveness of specialized criminal courts in general is complicated; research on drug and other specialized courts in both the state and federal systems shows mixed results on measures such as recidivism reduction, cost-savings, and treatment outcomes. In addition, there are significant procedural and other equity concerns with specialized criminal courts. Third, although some of these new federal front-end specialized criminal courts show high completion rates, none has been formally evaluated, and publicly available documents about them raise questions about the extent to which they conform to evidence-based practices and their compliance with federal sentencing law. This article discusses the future of federal diversion and alternatives to incarceration, and suggests some ways to ensure that existing and future specialized criminal courts can achieve their goals. It also explores some other reforms that may achieve these same goals.

April 28, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, April 27, 2017

Does acceptance of a commutation moot a prisoner's collateral legal challenge to a prison sentence he is still serving?

The complicated question in the title of this post is the issue addressed in a complicated set of opinions issued by various members of the en banc Fourth Circuit as the full court dismissed as moot the long-running case of Raymond Surratt in US v. Surratt, No. 14-6851 (4th Cir. April 21, 2017) (available here).  As the latest opinion in Surratt reveals, I was involved in this case as an amicus, but I had largely forgotten that fact given that the Surratt panel opinion, as noted here, was decided nearly two years ago and oral argument before the en banc Fourth Circuit took place more than a year ago. 

I surmise that the en banc Fourth Circuit was deeply divided on the procedural and substantive issues that the complicated Surratt case presented and that a mootness ruling served as a convenient way to dispose of a hard case thanks to the deus ex machina of Prez Obama's grant of clemency to Raymond Surratt.  I am surely biased in this view because I served as an amicus in the case, but also because I think these passages from Judge Wynn's dissent make a pretty solid case against mootness:

Here, there is no dispute that if we vacate Petitioner’s commuted sentence and remand for resentencing, Petitioner will likely face a sentence shorter than that imposed by the commutation. In particular, whereas the President commuted Petitioner’s life sentence to 200 months’ imprisonment, Petitioner’s applicable Guidelines range is 120 to 137 months, less than his time-served.  Accordingly, Petitioner has a continuing “concrete interest” — namely, his liberty — in having us vacate his current sentence and remand for resentencing under the applicable Guidelines.  We and other courts have found arguably substantially less significant interests adequate to preclude mootness. See, e.g., Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543, 547 (4th Cir. 2009) (holding that the petitioner’s release from prison did not moot his collateral challenge to his sentence because a favorable appellate decision could “affect the length of his parole”); Richards v. United States, 212 F.2d 453, 454 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (holding that defendant’s collateral challenge to the lower end of his sentencing range was not moot, even though defendant had already served more than that lower end, because “there is some possibility” that having a longer minimum sentence “may in some indirect way affect him adversely in the future”).

I am not alone in my view that an injustice continues by declaring this matter now moot. Indeed, the Seventh Circuit, the only circuit that appears to have squarely addressed the issue, refused to find mootness in analogous circumstances, holding that a petitioner may collaterally challenge his original sentence, notwithstanding that the challenged sentence was commuted during the course of litigating that collateral challenge, when the commuted sentence exceeds the mandatory minimum the petitioner would face if he prevailed on his collateral challenge.  See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F.3d 585, 595 (7th Cir. 2006); Madej v. Briley, 371 F.3d 898, 899 (7th Cir. 2004).  In Simpson, for example, after the petitioner filed a habeas petition challenging his death sentence, the Governor of Illinois commuted the petitioner’s sentence from death to life imprisonment without parole. 458 F.3d at 595.  Like the government does here, the State argued that the commutation rendered the petitioner’s collateral challenge to his sentence nonjusticiable, and therefore moot, because of the petitioner’s decreased sentence and “the executive nature of his confinement.” Id.  The Seventh Circuit rejected both arguments, explaining that because the petitioner would face a mandatory minimum of 20 years’ imprisonment if he prevailed on his collateral attack, as opposed to the life sentence imposed by the Governor, “it [wa]s possible for [the petitioner] to obtain relief, and his sentencing claims [we]re not moot.” Id. Put differently, “[a] full remedy for the constitutional shortcoming at the original sentencing hearing entails allowing [the petitioner] to seek that lower sentence now.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Madej, 371 F.3d at 899).

I presume Raymond Surratt could opt to seek Supreme Court review of the Fourth Circuit's decision that his collateral challenge to his old/new sentence is moot. But, ironically, the Fourth Circuit's mootness claim may arguably get stronger in the very process of cert review, at least functionally if not legally, because Surratt likely will have finished serving his 200 months in federal prison by the time the Supreme Court could get around to taking up and hearing Surratt's challenge to the Fourth Circuit's mootness conclusion.

April 27, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (13)

Noting state efforts to reform probation sentences and practices

Though considerable attention is now given the the two million plus individuals incarcerated in the United States, much less attention is typically given to the significantly larger population subject to probation.  (This latest BJS accounting details that at year-end 2015, an estimated 2,173,800 persons were incarcerated, while 3,789,800 were on probation.)  But this new lengthy Stateline article, headlined "Doing Less Time: Some States Cut Back on Probation," reports that some states are starting to give more attention to this important part of criminal punishment practices. Here are excerpts:

In Georgia, one in 16 adults is on probation. That’s almost four times the national average.  And offenders there spend more than twice as long on probation as in the rest of the country, sometimes as long as 20 years or life.  Meanwhile, probation officers juggle as many as 400 cases at a time.  The state is looking to change all that.

At the behest of Republican Gov. Nathan Deal, who has focused his efforts on revising the state’s criminal justice system, Georgia lawmakers passed a probation reform bill in March. The bill would, among other things, shorten probation sentences and reduce the caseloads of probation officers who are spread thin.  If Deal signs the bill as expected, the new law will go into effect July 1.

Georgia joins several other states that are looking for ways to reduce the time that offenders spend on probation or parole, as they’ve sought to reduce sentences for lesser crimes, and reduce jail and prison overcrowding.  The idea is to ease burdens on probation officers, devote resources to monitoring more dangerous offenders, help offenders re-enter society, and reduce recidivism rates.

Michigan Gov. Rick Snyder, a Republican, last month signed into law a package of bills that will, among other things, minimize punishments for “technical violations” of probation and allow judges to shorten probation time for good behavior.  Meanwhile, South Dakota, which has worked to update its probation system since 2014, last month enacted a law that allows people convicted of lesser crimes to be discharged from probation after a year for good behavior.

Minnesota lawmakers proposed bills last month that would reduce probation time for certain offenses such as misdemeanors and give courts the power to end probation terms early. Oklahoma and Louisiana have bills pending that would cut the time offenders spend on probation or parole.  Since 2012, Alabama and Hawaii have shortened probation terms.

Changing probation laws is popular with many lawmakers, from fiscal conservatives worried about the rising costs of criminal justice to social justice advocates concerned that too many people are locked up. The bills typically pass with overwhelmingly bipartisan support — measures in Georgia and Michigan, for example, passed unanimously. “It benefits the state as a whole, no matter who you are and what perspective you come from,” said Republican state Sen. John Proos, who sponsored the Michigan bill.

The moves also are favored by probation officers, who monitor people on probation or parole.  “I see this as a good thing. Shorter terms and fewer conditions for probation allow people to become more productive citizens,” said Marcus Hodges, president of the National Association of Probation Executives.

Too often, he said, people on probation are saddled with too stringent conditions, which make it more likely that they will violate the terms of their probation and end up back behind bars.  “I’ve got to ask the question, ‘Are we setting them up for failure?’ ” Hodges said.  “This whole notion of the probation to prison pipeline is something that we’ve got to look at.”...

Most states cap the amount of time that a person can be put on probation.  But in Georgia, felony probation can stretch on indefinitely, said Marissa McCall Dodson, the policy director of the Southern Center for Human Rights who helped craft the Georgia bill.  That’s one of the contributing factors that make Georgia the state with the highest probation rate in the country.  Under the new law, probationers will have the right to ask to have their probation terminated after three years. And for certain low-level offenses, probation officers will automatically put in a request for early termination of probation after three years. Probationers still have to meet the terms of their probation....

The push to overhaul probation comes in the wake of efforts to reduce jail and prison populations by reducing sentences for lesser offenses and moving many offenders to probation instead of serving jail or prison time.  “Probation has been touted as a better option than incarceration, particularly for states struggling with unsustainable prison growth,” said Rebecca Silber of the Vera Institute, a research organization that advocates for changes in the criminal justice system.  “But it doesn’t come without costs.  And one of those costs is that probation can keep people in very serious legal jeopardy for very minor violations.”...

One approach that states have used to reduce their probation populations is using “earned discharge,” which allows probationers to earn time off for complying with the conditions of their sentences, such as completing a drug treatment program.  Missouri started using this approach in 2012, and in three years, 36,000 probationers and parolees were able to reduce their probation terms by an average of 14 months.  Caseloads dropped by 18 percent, with no increase in recidivism rates.

April 27, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, April 26, 2017

Sixth Circuit to review en banc Ohio's execution protocol ... on a pace likely to preclude executions for at least a few more months

As indicated in this short order, yesterday the Sixth Circuit announced that it would be rehearing en banc the State of Ohio's appeal of the lower court stay issued earlier this year which blocked Ohio from using its latest three-drug protocol to execute condemned murderers.  A few weeks ago, a divided three-judge panel upheld the trial court's stay, but now the full Sixth Circuit (apparently absent one recused judge) will hear oral argument on these matters on June 14.

One key issue in the Ohio lethal injection litigation concerns that state's plan to use midazolam as the first drug in the execution process.  The apparent recent success that Arkansas has had with a similar protocol using midazolam now seems likely to be part of the discussion and debate before the full Sixth Circuit.

Because the lower court stay remains in place as the full Sixth Circuit take up this issue, Ohio's Gov Kasich is certainly going to have to reschedule at least two slated executions.  As detailed on this Execution Schedule page from the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction, Ronald Phillips is currently scheduled for execution on May 10, and another inmate has a June 13 execution date.  Though it seems likely the en banc Sixth Circuit will seek to rule not long after it hears oral argument (and it usually makes sense to assume that a vote for en banc review will lead to a different outcome than the prior panel decision), I am not sure it would be wise for Ohio to assume it will have an execution green light by its July 26 execution date.

As the Ohio DRC execution page details, Ohio has already scheduled executions for 33 Ohio inmates(!) running all the way through 2021(!).  So if the Sixth Circuit (and ultimately the Supreme Court) eventually upholds the state's latest execution protocol, Ohio could be on a path to having more executions in the next few years than perhaps any and every other state in the nation.

Prior recent related posts:

April 26, 2017 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Tuesday, April 25, 2017

Oklahoma commission recommends continued moratorium on executions due to "volume and seriousness of the flaws" in state's capital punishment system

Report-of-the-OK-DP-Review-Commn_April-2015-1As reported in this local article, "two years after the state of Oklahoma last carried out an execution, a commission spearheaded by former Gov. Brad Henry has recommended extending a current moratorium on the death penalty in Oklahoma."  Here is more:

"Due to the volume and seriousness of the flaws in Oklahoma's capital punishment system, Commission members recommend that the moratorium on executions be extended until significant reforms are accomplished," Henry said in a news release.

Executions in Oklahoma have been on hold since Oct. 1, 2015, the day after Richard Glossip received his third stay of execution because the Oklahoma Department of Corrections did not have the right drugs as specified in the DOC’s lethal injection protocol. A multicounty grand jury issued a highly critical report nearly a year ago related to multiple agencies’ handling of Glossip’s case and the January 2015 execution of Charles Warner, and it doesn’t appear as though anyone involved is any closer to being able to resume the use of capital punishment.

The Oklahoma Death Penalty Review Commission had 10 full-day meetings, held numerous conference calls, commissioned independent studies and conducted interviews with people from all sides of the issue, including with family members of people who were wrongfully convicted. "Many of the findings of the Commission's investigation were disturbing and led members to question whether the death penalty can be administered in a way that ensures no innocent person is put to death," Henry said in the release.

The commission is making 40 recommendations to address systemic problems in forensics, innocence protection, the execution process, and the roles of the prosecution, defense, jury and judiciary, according to the news release.

The full report from the Oklahoma Death Penalty Review Commission runs nearly 300 pages and is available at this link.  Here is a passages from the report's executive summary:

In light of the extensive information gathered from this year-long, in-depth study, the Commission members unanimously recommend that the current moratorium on the death penalty be extended.

The Commission did not come to this decision lightly. While some Commission members had disagreements with some of the recommendations contained in this report, there was consensus on each of the recommendations.  Due to the volume and seriousness of the flaws in Oklahoma’s capital punishment system, Commission members recommend that the moratorium on executions be extended until significant reforms are accomplished.

Many of the findings of the Commission’s year-long investigation were disturbing and led Commission members to question whether the death penalty can be administered in a way that ensures no innocent person is put to death. Commission members agreed that, at a minimum, those who are sentenced to death should receive this sentence only after a fair and impartial process that ensures they deserve the ultimate penalty of death.  To be sure, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that the death penalty should be applied only to “the worst of the worst.”  Unfortunately, a review of the evidence demonstrates that the death penalty, even in Oklahoma, has not always been imposed and carried out fairly, consistently, and humanely, as required by the federal and state constitutions.  These shortcomings have severe consequences for the accused and their families, for victims and their families, and for all citizens of Oklahoma.

April 25, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

"An Indigent Criminal Defendant is Entitled to 'An Expert of His Own'"

The title of this post is the title of this short and timely new piece authored by Fredrick Vars now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The Supreme Court yesterday (April 24, 2017) heard the case of an Alabama death row inmate, James McWilliams. A thus far overlooked argument could save his life and help level the playing field in other capital cases. The Court in 1985 promised independent expertise. Now is its chance to make good on that promise.

For more on the issue presented and SCOTUS oral argument in McWilliams v. Dunn, folks can check out this recent SCOTUSblog posting by Amy Howe titled "Argument analysis: Nine justices, with five votes for death row inmate?" and/or this new Slate commentary by Dahlia Lithwick titled "Back at the Supreme Court, After Garland: It’s strange being back in this place, and stranger still to hear them debate lunacy."

April 25, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, April 24, 2017

Marshall Project highlights tens of thousands imprisoned for minor parole violations

The Marshall Project has this interesting new report on technical parole violations and their consequences headlined "At Least 61,000 Nationwide Are in Prison for Minor Parole Violations." Here is how it starts:

Among the millions of people incarcerated in the United States, a significant portion have long been thought to be parole violators, those who were returned to prison not for committing a crime but for failing to follow rules: missing an appointment with a parole officer, failing a urine test, or staying out past curfew.

But their actual number has been elusive, in part because they are held for relatively short stints, from a few months to a year, not long enough for record keepers to get a good count.   To help fill the statistical gap, The Marshall Project conducted a three-month survey of state corrections departments, finding more than 61,250 technical parole violators in 42 state prison systems as of early 2017.

These are the inmates who are currently locked up for breaking a rule of parole, rather than parolees who have been convicted of a new crime; the number does not include those in county and local jails, where thousands more are likely held. (The eight remaining states — Alabama, Connecticut, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia — said either they did not keep current state-level data or it would be too costly to generate.)

The total, 61,250, seems small, given the 2.3 million people behind bars in this country. Imprisoning fewer technical violators would make only a dent in the effort to reduce mass incarceration. “But still,” said Marc Mauer, executive director of The Sentencing Project, “the numbers aren’t trivial.”

To Mauer and other experts on what drives prison and jail populations, the fact that tens of thousands of people are incarcerated for infractions such as traveling without permission or frequenting a bar that serves alcohol is significant in itself.  That may be all the more true in seven states — Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, New York, and Pennsylvania — which, according to the Marshall Project data, have more technical parole violators in their prisons than the other 35 states combined.

April 24, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (2)

An empirical dive into federal "Health Care Fraud Sentencing"

The quoted title of this post is the title of this notable new Note authored by Kyle Crawford. Here is the abstract:

Health care fraud convictions are on the rise, but little is known about how health fraud offenders are sentenced.  This Note offers the first comprehensive empirical account of sentencing decisions in health fraud cases based on a new dataset constructed from United States Sentencing Commission data.  This analysis shows that there is a large disparity in how health fraud offenders are sentenced compared to other white collar offenders and general crimes offenders.  Between 2006 and 2014, health fraud offenders received fewer Guidelines-range sentences and more below-Guidelines sentences than other offenders.  This is because: (1) health fraud offenders are older, whiter, more educated, and less likely to have a criminal record than other offenders, which are demographic characteristics associated with lighter sentences; (2) judges are dissatisfied with the loss table, which is used to sentence most health fraud offenders; and (3) judges view the collateral consequences of sentencing health fraud offenders — many of whom are health professionals — as a mitigating factor.

This analysis also shows a stark difference in the number of health fraud cases brought in districts across the country.  The ten districts with the highest proportion of health fraud convictions account for nearly a quarter of all health fraud convictions. In addition, health fraud offenders go to trial more often than other offenders.  This results from the threat of severe collateral consequences — exclusion from Medicare and Medicaid and possible loss of a medical license.  These offenders have a larger incentive to go to trial than other offenders, especially because pleading guilty does not allow health fraud offenders to avoid these collateral consequences.

April 24, 2017 in Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Capital procedure day at SCOTUS .... perhaps from early morning until late at night thanks to Arkansas

The Supreme Court this morning is hearing oral argument in two capital cases.  Here are the basics and previews via SCOTUSblog:

McWilliams v. Dunn

Issue: Whether, when this court held in Ake v. Oklahoma that an indigent defendant is entitled to meaningful expert assistance for the “evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense,” it clearly established that the expert should be independent of the prosecution.

Argument preview: What kind of help does the Constitution require for defendants in capital cases?

Davila v. Davis:

Issue: Issue: Whether the rule established in Martinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler, that ineffective state habeas counsel can be seen as cause to overcome the procedural default of a substantial ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, also applies to procedurally defaulted, but substantial, ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims.

Argument preview: Another Texas capital case raising a nested ineffective assistance of counsel issue 

Meanwhile, as detailed in this AP report, two condemned inmates scheduled to be executed tonight in Arkansas have been pressing unsuccessfully a variety of claims in an effort to halt their executions.  Here are the basics on two cases now all but certain to be before the Justices of the Supreme Court in some posture before the night is over:

Two Arkansas inmates scheduled to be put to death Monday in what could be the nation's first double execution in more than 16 years asked an appeals court on Sunday to halt their lethal injections because of poor health that could cause complications. Lawyers for Jack Jones and Marcel Williams asked the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on Sunday to grant them stays of execution.

Jones' lawyers say he suffers from diabetes and is on insulin, has high blood pressure, neuropathy and had one leg amputated below the knee. He is on heavy doses of methadone and gabapentin. They say he may be resistant to the lethal injection drug midazolam because of the drugs he is taking for his maladies and could suffer a "tortuous death." Lawyers for Williams say he weighs 400 pounds and it will be difficult to find a vein for lethal injunction, so the drugs are unlikely to work as intended.

The state said the appeals are just delaying tactics and should be denied. It was not clear when the appeals court will rule....

Also on Sunday, two lower court federal judges ruled against inmates in separate cases. Judge Kristine Baker denied a request from several inmates, including Jones and Williams, that the rules for witnesses to view the executions be changed. Judge J. Leon Holmes denied a stay of execution for Williams saying that the matter should be dealt with by the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals, because the inmate had already been appealed to the higher court.

Jones and Marcel Williams are scheduled to die on Monday and another inmate, Kenneth Williams, is set for execution Thursday. Both Jones and Williams have admitted they are guilty. Williams was sent to death row in 1994 for the rape and murder of Stacy Errickson. Jones was given the death penalty for the 1995 rape and murder of Mary Phillips.

April 24, 2017 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Interesting final phrase in Justice Breyer's latest pitch for SCOTUS to consider whether whether capital punishment is now unconstitutional

Via a dissent in Glossip v. Gross back in 2015, Justice Breyer explained at great length why he thought "it is now time to reopen the question" of "whether the death penalty violates the Constitution."  Since that time, Justice Breyer has made a fairly regular habit of dissenting or commenting on the denial of certiorari in capital cases with administrative problems along the lines he stressed in his Glossip dissent.  Today's SCOTUS order list includes another such statement by Justice Breyer in Smith v. Ryan, a case that involves a prisoner who has been on death row in Arizona for more than 40 years.  Here is a paragraph from the heart of Justice Breyer's statement that captures the essence of many of his capital statements since Glossip:

What legitimate purpose does it serve to hold any human being in solitary confinement for 40 years awaiting execution?  What does this case tell us about a capital punishment system that, in my view, works in random, virtually arbitrary ways?  I have previously explored these matters more systematically, coming to the conclusion that this Court should hear argument as to whether capital punishment as currently practiced is consistent with the Constitution’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment.”  Amdt. 8. See Glossip v. Gross, 576 U. S. ___, ___ (2015) (BREYER, J., dissenting).  The facts and circumstances of Smith’s case reinforce that conclusion.

Because statements by Justice Breyer like this one have become fairly common, I would not have blogged about this latest effort save for one little phrase in Justice Breyer's final sentence that struck me as new and unusual.  Here is the final sentence with my emphasis added on the phrase that caught my attention:

Smith’s confinement reinforces the need for this Court, or other courts, to consider in an appropriate case the underlying constitutional question.

I took a quick look at some other capital case statements from this Term by Justice Breyer and did not see this "other courts" phrase anywhere in his prior calls for the Supreme Court to take up the constitutionality of capital punishment.  I suspect that Justice Breyer has now come fully to realize, perhaps due in part to the new addition of Justice Gorsuch, that he is not going to be able to cajole his colleagues into taking up the constitutionality of capital punishment on their own and now the issue will likely get before SCOTUS only if a lower court takes up the issue in a bold, high-profile way.

I suspect I am reading way too much into three words in a little single Justice statement concerning the denial of cert.  Still, especially with talk of a new SCOTUS vacancy this summer, I do not think I am wrong to view the next few months and years as a potential turning point in the history of capital punishment in the US.  Justice Breyer has demonstrated his interest in playing a central role in defining the future of the death penalty, and this latest little statement perhaps reflects a realization that his window of opportunity to do so may be closing.

April 24, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Sunday, April 23, 2017

Six months after voting to speed executions, is California really getting any closer to carrying out death sentences?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new AP article headlined "California moves — slowly — toward resuming executions."  Here are excerpts:

California has long been what one expert calls a “symbolic death penalty state,” one of 12 that has capital punishment on the books but has not executed anyone in more than a decade.

Prodded by voters and lawsuits, the nation’s most populous state may now be easing back toward allowing executions, though observers are split on how quickly they will resume, if at all.

Corrections officials expect to meet a Wednesday deadline to submit revised lethal injection rules to state regulators, trying again with technical changes after the first attempt was rejected in December.

The California Supreme Court, meanwhile, is expected to rule by August on challenges to a ballot initiative narrowly approved by voters in November that would speed up executions by reducing the time allowed for appeals....

California could come close to resuming executions in the next year, said law professor Robert Weisberg, co-director of the Stanford Criminal Justice Center, though others say too many variables and challenges remain to make a prediction.... The state’s proposed lethal injection regulations are patterned after a single-drug process that already passed muster with the U.S. Supreme Court, Weisberg said.

Corrections officials submitted the regulations only after they were forced to act by a judge’s ruling on behalf of crime victims angered at the state’s three-year delay. But the regulations replacing California’s old three-drug method are likely to be approved at some point, Weisberg said.

Deborah Denno, a professor at Fordham University School of Law and an expert on lethal injections, was among those who said recent revisions to the state’s proposed regulations still don’t cure underlying problems that can lead to botched executions....

California voters have eased penalties for many crimes in recent years but have repeatedly rejected efforts to end the death penalty. They did so again in November, when 51 percent approved Proposition 66, designed to speed up death penalty cases. Fifty-three percent of voters defeated a competing measure that would have abolished the death penalty. The state Supreme Court quickly blocked Proposition 66 while it considers challenges.

Appellate lawyer Kirk Jenkins, who studies the court, expects the justices will reject the proposition’s five-year deadline for deciding death row appeals because it violates the separation of powers. Death penalty appeals average at least a decade from the time a condemned inmate is assigned a post-trial lawyer to a final decision by the state’s high court, he said, and the justices already have a backlog of about 300 capital cases. “There is no possible way that the court could meet the deadlines in Prop. 66” without putting aside virtually all other decisions, Jenkins said.

The initiative also makes it easier for corrections officials to adopt new lethal injection procedures. But even a complete rejection of Proposition 66 would not derail the executions of inmates whose appeals are exhausted, Weisberg said. Those executions could proceed once the state has an approved lethal injection process.

Experts said the delays may give opponents time to mount another campaign next year asking voters again if they want to abolish the death penalty. “In California, it’s become a symbolic death penalty state,” Denno said. “Whether that is going to change or not is unpredictable.”

April 23, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 20, 2017

Virginia Gov commutes death sentence of defendant who has claimed innocence in murder-for-hire crime

As reported in this new Washington Post piece, "Virginia Gov. Terry McAuliffe (D) has commuted the death sentence of Ivan Teleguz, a 38-year-old man who was set to be executed Tuesday in the murder-for-hire of his former girlfriend." Here is more:

Teleguz has maintained his innocence in the 2001 slaying of 20-year-old Stephanie Yvonne Sipe in Harrisonburg.  His lawyers have argued that two key witnesses have recanted their testimony, calling his guilt into question.  Multiple courts have deemed those recantations unreliable, and the man who killed Sipe has never wavered in saying that Teleguz paid him to commit the murder.

McAuliffe said Thursday that while he believes Teleguz is guilty, the sentencing phase of his trial was “terribly flawed and unfair.”  Teleguz will now serve life in prison without a chance of parole.

In their clemency petition, attorneys for Teleguz stressed that jurors were falsely told that Teleguz also was involved in a Pennsylvania murder — but that purported killing never occurred. Prosecutors pointed to testimony of that supposed crime as evidence that Teleguz “solves problems” with murder.  “The jury acted on false information,” McAuliffe said.

In making his decision, McAuliffe said he reviewed over 6,000 pages of documents, including letters from Sipe’s family.  He called her relatives before his news conference Thursday afternoon.  “My heart aches for the family of Stephanie Sipe,” he said, “but the Virginia Constitution and our sacred values of due process under law require me to act.”

McAuliffe personally opposes the death penalty, citing his Catholic faith. But this marks the first time he has commuted a death sentence.  As governor, he has presided over three executions, and at the behest of correctional officials he has pushed for more secrecy in the lethal injection process....

Teleguz’s plea for a commutation attracted high-profile support, including from billionaire Richard Branson and former Maryland governor Robert L. Ehrlich, Jr.

Investigators and Sipe’s family, however, are confident of Teleguz’s guilt.  “There's no doubt in my mind that he hired these people to kill my sister,” Sipe's sister, Jennifer Tilley, told the Harrisonburg television station WHSV last week.  “And it blows my mind, it really does, that he is still trying to fight and plead for his life.”...

The last time a Virginia governor commuted a death sentence was in 2008, when then-Gov. Timothy M. Kaine (D) stopped the execution of triple murderer Percy L. Walton. Kaine commuted Walton’s sentence to life in prison without parole, saying that Walton was mentally incompetent and that putting him to death would be unconstitutional.

Prior related post:

April 20, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)