Tuesday, August 12, 2014
"Waking the Furman Giant"
The title of this post is the title of this notable and timely new article by Sam Kamin and Justin F. Marceau available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In its 1972 Furman v. Georgia decision, the Supreme Court — concerned that the death penalty was being imposed infrequently and without objectively measurable criteria — held that the penalty violated the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. In the four decades since Furman there has been considerable Eighth Amendment litigation regarding capital punishment, but almost none of it has focused on the Court’s concern with arbitrariness and infrequency. But this may be about to change. With a growing body of quantitative data regarding the low death sentencing rates in several states, Furman is poised to return to center stage. While previous challenges attacked the form of various state capital statutes, new empirical data is leading condemned inmates to challenge the application of state sentencing statutes.
This article announces the return of Furman — a splintered opinion that nonetheless remains binding precedent 42 years after it was decided — and provides a reading of that case that can guide courts as they consider the latest round of challenges to the application of capital punishment. A careful revisiting of Furman is necessary and overdue because the critical underpinnings of American death penalty jurisprudence — narrowing, eligibility, and individualization — are currently being conflated, or forgotten altogether by both courts and capital litigants. This Article, is a timely guidepost for the inevitable next wave of Furman litigation.
Eleventh Circuit finds probation sentence for public corruption substantively unreasonable
All federal sentencing fans and white-collar practitioners will want to be sure to check out a lengthy opinion today from the Eleventh Circuit in US v. Hayes, No. 11-13678 (11th Cir. Aug 12, 2014) (available here). This start to the majority opinion in Hayes highlights why the substance of the ruling is noteworthy:
“Corruption,” Edward Gibbon wrote more than two centuries ago, is “the most infallible symptom of constitutional liberty.” EDWARD GIBBON, THE HISTORY OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE, Vol. II, Ch. XXI, at 805 (David Womersley ed., Penguin Classics 1995) . And so, although unfortunate, it is perhaps not surprising that, even today, people continue to pay bribes to government officials with the expectation that they will make decisions based on how much their palms have been greased, and not what they think is best for the constituents they serve.
In this criminal appeal involving corruption in Alabama’s higher education system, we consider whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing a sentence of three years of probation (with a special condition of six to twelve months of home confinement) on a 67-year-old business owner who — over a period of four years — doled out over $600,000 in bribes to a state official in order to ensure that his company would continue to receive government contracts, and whose company reaped over $5 million in profits as a result of the corrupt payments. For the reasons which follow, we hold that such a sentence was indeed unreasonable.
Adding to the fun and intrigue of the ruling, Judge Tjoflat has a dissent that runs almost twice as long as the extended majority opinion. Here is how it gets started (with footnotes omitted):
I fully agree with the court that the sentence of probation Hayes received in this case of massive public corruption is shockingly low and should not have been imposed. In appealing the sentence, the Government treats the District Court as the scapegoat, as if placing Hayes on probation was all the court’s doing. The truth is that it was the Government’s doing. To ensure that Hayes was given adequate credit for cooperating in its investigation, the Government deliberately led the District Court to abandon the Sentencing Guidelines, which called for a prison sentence of 135 to 168 months, and then to ignore the Supreme Court’s explicit instructions, in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S. Ct. 586, 169 L. Ed. 2d 445 (2007), on the procedure to use in fashioning an appropriate sentence. This set the stage for the court’s adoption of a fictitious Guideline range of 41 to 51 months and its creation of a downward variance to a sentence of probation.
In appealing Hayes’s sentence to this court, the Government deliberately avoids any discussion of the District Court’s procedural error. To the contrary, it accepts the fictitious Guideline range the court adopted. All it complains of is the variance from that fictitious range to a sentence of probation, arguing that it is substantively unreasonable. Because it invited the procedural error, which, in turn, led to the complained-of substantive error, the “invited error doctrine” precludes the Government from prevailing in this appeal. Yet the court fails to acknowledge that a procedural error has occurred. Instead, it assesses the substantive reasonableness of Hayes’s procedurally flawed sentence — something the Supreme Court prohibits — and thereby avoids the need to grapple with the Government’s invited error. I dissent from the court’s failure to invoke the doctrine and to send the Government hence without day.
In part I of this opinion, I briefly recount the facts giving rise to Hayes’s conviction and sentencing. In part II, I describe how the Guidelines are supposed to operate and will show how the Government and the District Court misapplied the Guidelines and set the stage for the sentence at issue. Part III outlines the role the courts of appeals play in reviewing a defendant’s sentence, pinpoints the procedural errors in this case, and explains why the invited error doctrine precludes the Government from capitalizing on its induced error and obtaining relief. Part IV concludes.
August 12, 2014 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack
Monday, August 11, 2014
Ninth Circuit panel splits over prisoner Sixth Amendment suit about officials reading legal mail
A Ninth Circuit panel handed down a notable new split opinion concerning an Arizona prisoner's lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of how prison officials were treating his legal mail. Here is how the majority opinion in Nordstron v. Ryan, No. 12-15738 (9th Cir. Aug. 11, 2014) (available here) gets started:
Plaintiff-Appellant Scott Nordstrom is on death row in the Arizona State Prison. He alleges that when he sought to send a confidential letter — “legal mail” — to his lawyer, a prison guard actually read the letter, instead of merely scanning and inspecting the letter for contraband. He claims that when he protested to the guard that the letter was a confidential attorney-client communication and should not be read, the guard told him to go pound sand. Nordstrom’s formal grievances were denied on the stated ground that Department of Corrections staff “is not prohibited from reading the [legal] mail to establish the absence of contraband and ensure the content of the mail is of legal subject matter.”
Nordstrom then brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against Department of Corrections officials, as well as the officer who allegedly read his legal mail, seeking to enjoin them from reading his letters to his lawyer. He alleges that the defendants’ conduct violates various constitutional rights, including his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The district court dismissed the complaint at the pre-answer screening stage for failure to state a claim under any constitutional theory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
A prison is no ordinary gated community. It’s a tough place. Corrections officials obviously have good reason to be on the lookout for contraband, escape plans, and other mischief that could jeopardize institutional security. Officials likewise have every right to inspect an inmate’s outgoing legal mail for such suspicious features as maps of the prison yard, the times of guards’ shift changes, and the like. Prison officials know what to look for. But inspecting letters and reading them are two different things, as the Supreme Court recognized in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 576–77 (1974). What prison officials don’t have the right to do is read a confidential letter from an inmate to his lawyer. This is because it is highly likely that a prisoner would not feel free to confide in his lawyer such things as incriminating or intimate personal information — as is his Sixth Amendment right to do — if he knows that the guards are reading his mail.
Reading legal mail — not merely inspecting or scanning it — is what Nordstrom alleges the Department of Corrections is doing, and it is what he seeks to enjoin. We hold today that his allegations, if true, state a Sixth Amendment violation. We reverse the dismissal of his complaint.
Here is how the dissent by Judge Bybee in Nordstrom gets started:
Scott D. Nordstrom alleges that, on one occasion during his seventeen-year incarceration, an Arizona Department of Corrections (ADC) officer read a single letter he had written to his attorney. Nordstrom claims that this one event prejudiced his direct appeal, although he cannot explain how.
Based on these allegations, the majority concludes that Nordstrom has adequately pleaded a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. I believe the majority is twice wrong. First, the majority has misread Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), to hold that prison officials may not read legal letters, even to the limited extent necessary to detect illegal conduct. See Maj. Op. at 14. Second, the majority disregards Williams v. Woodford, 384 F.3d 567 (9th Cir. 2004), by holding that an inmate need not show substantial prejudice to state a right-to-counsel claim, as long as this court thinks that such prejudice is likely. See Maj. Op. at 14.
In my view, the Sixth Amendment does not prevent prison officials from reading legal letters with an eye toward discovering illegal conduct. Furthermore, claims under the Sixth Amendment require proof of actual injury, and Nordstrom does not allege any. I respectfully dissent.
Federal district judge extends Ohio's death penalty moratorium based on execution challenges to January 2015
As reported in this Reuters article, a "federal judge has added five months to a moratorium on executions in Ohio amid scrutiny of a double-drug cocktail the state wants to use." Here is more:
U.S. District Court Judge Gregory Frost, in a one-page ruling issued on Friday, said more time is required “in light of the continuing need for discovery and necessary preparations related to the adoption and implementation of the new execution protocol.”
Ohio Governor John Kasich, who since 2011 has commuted death sentences for four men on death row, had no comment about the judge's decision, a spokesman for his office said.
Frost initially ordered a halt to executions in May, barring state officials from carrying out executions until Aug. 15. That decision came after a botched execution in Oklahoma brought renewed scrutiny to lethal injection, and after a lengthy Ohio execution in January that used an untested combination of drugs. Ohio now plans to use those same two drugs in increased dosages.
The decision on Friday also followed the July 23 execution in Arizona of inmate Joseph Wood, who witnesses said "gasped and snorted" for more than 90 minutes as he was put to death at a state prison complex....
The moratorium issued by Frost on Friday is set to remain in effect until January 15, 2015. Frost's actions come after the state said in April it would increase the dose of the sedative midazolam and painkiller hydromorphone used in its lethal injections.
The last execution in the state took place in January when inmate Dennis McGuire, 53, became the first in the country to be put to death using the midazolam and hydromorphone combination. His execution took 25 minutes and witnesses said McGuire was gasping for breath for at least 15 minutes. McGuire was convicted of the rape and murder of a pregnant woman. After reviewing the execution, state officials said they would increase the dosage of the drugs used in future executions.
Before issuing the extended moratorium, Ohio was set to resume executions on Sept. 18 with the lethal injection of Ronald Phillip, convicted of raping and killing his girlfriend’s 3-year-old daughter in 1993.
Three distinct takes on AG Eric Holder's recent reservations about risk-based sentencing
Attorney General Eric Holder's significant speech at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' Annual Meeting a few weeks ago justifiably made headlines based on his expressions of concern about the use of risk assessment instruments in initial sentencing determinations (as previously discussed here). Because this is such an important and dynamic topic, I am waiting until I have a big block of time to discuss with sophistication and nuance AG Holder's sophisticated and nuanced comments on this front.
In the meantime, thankfully, a number of other insightful and sophisticated folks are talking up and about what AG Holder had to say. For starters, in today's New York Times, LawProf Sonja Starr has this new commentary which starts and ends this way:
In a recent letter to the United States Sentencing Commission, Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. sharply criticized the growing trend of evidence-based sentencing, in which courts use data-driven predictions of defendants’ future crime risk to shape sentences. Mr. Holder is swimming against a powerful current. At least 20 states have implemented this practice, including some that require risk scores to be considered in every sentencing decision. Many more are considering it, as is Congress, in pending sentencing-reform bills.
Risk-assessment advocates say it’s a no-brainer: Who could oppose “smarter” sentencing? But Mr. Holder is right to pick this fight. As currently used, the practice is deeply unfair, and almost certainly unconstitutional. It contravenes the principle that punishment should depend on what a defendant did, not on who he is or how much money he has....
Criminal justice policy should be informed by data, but we should never allow the sterile language of science to obscure questions of justice. I doubt many policy makers would publicly defend the claim that people should be imprisoned longer because they are poor, for instance. Such judgments are less transparent when they are embedded in a risk score. But they are no more defensible.
In addition, Judge Richard Kopf and defense attorney Scott Greenfield have this great new blogosphere back-and-forth on this topic:
Greenfield: "Numbers don’t lie (But People Do)"
All this is highly recommended reading!
Sunday, August 10, 2014
"Scientizing Culpability: The Implications of Hall v. Florida and the Possibility of a 'Scientific Stare Decisis'"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper available on SSRN authored by Christopher Slobogin. Here is the abstract:
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hall v. Florida holds that “clinical definitions” control the meaning of intellectual disability in the death penalty context. In other words, the Court “scientized” the definition of intellectual disability. This article discusses the implications of this unprecedented move. It also introduces the idea of scientific stare decisis — a requirement that groups that are scientifically alike be treated similarly for culpability purposes — as a means of implementing the scientization process.
Saturday, August 09, 2014
"May the government try John Hinckley for James Brady’s murder?"
The question in the title of this post is the headline of this astute analysis by Eugene Volokh concerning the legal question that emerged in the wake of James Brady's death being rules a homicide. Here is how it begins:
The death of James Brady, President Ronald Reagan’s press secretary, at age 73 earlier this week has been ruled a homicide by a medical examiner. Brady was injured during an attempt on Reagan’s life in 1981. Let’s assume that the government can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, but for the shooting, Brady would have lived longer (pretty much the legal test for causation in this sort of situation). Could the shooter, John Hinckley Jr., be tried for murdering Brady, even though he has already been tried for attempting to kill Brady, and found not guilty by reason of insanity?
The answer is no, likely for two different reasons.
Wednesday, August 06, 2014
Mizzou complete uneventful execution with single dose of pentobarbital
As reported in this AP article, headlined "Missouri puts to death first inmate since botched execution," the first execution in the US since the messy Arizona execution last month took place every this morning without any problems. Here are the basics and the basic backstory:
A Missouri inmate was put to death Wednesday for raping and killing a college student in 1995, making him the first U.S. prisoner put to death since an Arizona lethal injection went awry last month. The Missouri Department of Corrections said Michael Worthington was executed by lethal injection at the state prison and was pronounced dead at 12:11 a.m. He is the seventh Missouri inmate executed this year.
Worthington had been sentenced to death for the attack on 24-year-old Melinda "Mindy" Griffin during a burglary of her Lake St. Louis condominium.... Worthington, 43, had predicted that the nation's high court and Gov. Jay Nixon would not spare him, insisting in a telephone interview with The Associated Press that he had accepted his fate....
Worthington's attorneys had pressed the Supreme Court to put off his execution, citing the Arizona execution and two others that were botched in Ohio and Oklahoma, as well as the secrecy involving the drugs used during the process in Missouri. Those three executions in recent months have renewed the debate over lethal injection. In Arizona, the inmate gasped more than 600 times and took nearly two hours to die. In April, an Oklahoma inmate died of an apparent heart attack 43 minutes after his execution began. And in January, an Ohio inmate snorted and gasped for 26 minutes before dying. Most lethal injections take effect in a fraction of that time, often within 10 or 15 minutes.
Arizona, Oklahoma and Ohio all use midazolam, a drug more commonly given to help patients relax before surgery. In executions, it is part of a two- or three-drug lethal injection.
Texas and Missouri instead administer a single large dose of pentobarbital — often used to treat convulsions and seizures and to euthanize animals. Missouri changed to pentobarbital late last year and since has carried out executions during which inmates showed no obvious signs of distress. Missouri and Texas have turned to compounding pharmacies to make versions of pentobarbital. But like most states, they refuse to name their drug suppliers, creating a shroud of secrecy that has prompted lawsuits.
In denying Worthington's clemency request, Nixon called Worthington's rape and killing of Griffin "horrific," noting that "there is no question about the brutality of this crime — or doubt of Michael Worthington's guilt." Worthington was sentenced to death in 1998 after pleading guilty to Griffin's death, confessing that in September 1995 he cut open a window screen to break in to the college finance major's condominium in Lake St. Louis, just west of St. Louis. Worthington admitted he choked Griffin into submission and raped her before strangling her when she regained consciousness. He stole her car keys and jewelry, along with credit cards he used to buy drugs. DNA tests later linked Worthington to the slaying.
Worthington, much as he did after his arrest, insisted to the AP on Tuesday from his holding cell near the death chamber that he couldn't remember details of the killing and that he was prone to blackouts due to alcohol and cocaine abuse. He said a life prison sentence would have been more appropriate for him....
On Tuesday, Griffin's 76-year-old parents anticipated witnessing Worthington die. "It's been 19 years, and I feel like there's going to be a finality," Griffin's mother, Carol Angelbeck, told the AP, after flying to Missouri from their Florida home. With the execution, "I won't have to ever deal with the name Michael Worthington again. I'm hoping for my family's sake, my sake, that we can go there (to the prison) and get this over with."
"In this case, there is no question in anyone's mind he did it, so why does it take 18 or 19 years to go through with this?" added Jack Angelbeck, Griffin's father. "This drags on and on. At this point, it's ridiculous, and hopefully it's going to end."
This DPIC page reports that there are more scheduled executions in the US until September, and then there are four executions scheduled in a eight-day period in the middle of the month. Three of those executions are planned in Missouri and Texas, which has had no real problem keeping their machineries of death humming along because of their use of pentobarbital as an execution drug. But Ohio has an execution scheduled for September 18 using a drug cocktail that has led to problems in the past. As a result, I suspect Ohio will once again be the state to watch most closely for interesting lethal injection developments and litigation in the weeks ahead.
Tuesday, August 05, 2014
Is Jodi Arias really going to represent herself at her Arizona death penalty retrial?
The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new report from Arizona headlined "Jodi Arias to represent self in Arizona death penalty sentencing retrial." Here are the basics:
An Arizona judge agreed on Monday to allow convicted murder Jodi Arias to represent herself during a sentencing retrial to determine if she will face the death penalty for killing her ex-boyfriend in 2008, a court spokesman said.
Judge Sherry Stephens granted the request by Arias during a hearing in Maricopa County Superior Court, allowing her to act as her own lawyer when the retrial begins in September, said spokesman Vincent Funari.
Stephens issued the ruling from the bench after cautioning the former California waitress that she felt it would not be in her best interest to take over from her current attorneys, Funari said.
Arias was convicted last year of murdering Travis Alexander in his Phoenix-area home six years ago in what authorities said was a bloody crime scene. He was found slumped in his shower, stabbed multiple times, his throat slashed and shot in the head.
The same jury that convicted Arias in a high-profile trial that was live-streamed on the Internet to tens of thousands of viewers found her eligible for the death penalty, but deadlocked on whether she should actually be put to death.
The sentencing phase retrial will see a new jury impaneled next month to weigh her fate, but will not be broadcast live. If the new jury also deadlocks on capital punishment, a judge will sentence Arias to spend either her natural life in prison, or life with the possibility of parole after 25 years.
Monday's decision came during a rare open session in the case, which has mostly been argued in recent months behind closed doors. Funari said while Arias will represent herself, her current attorneys will act as advisory counsels.
Some prior posts on the Arias case:
- After high-profile state murder conviction, Jodi Arias claims she wants death penalty over LWOP
- Are there (and/or should there be) special death penalty rules for female murderers?
- Arizona jurors quickly make finding for Jodi Arias to be formally death eligible
- Jodi Arias now pleading for a life sentence before sentencing jury
- Arizona prosecutors say they are still planning to try again to get Jodi Arias sentenced to death
- Noting the high costs of seeking to give Jodi Arias death penalty fame rather than LWOP pain
"The Miller Revolution"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Cara Drinan now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles — even those convicted of homicide. In this Article, I argue that the Miller decision was, indeed, revolutionary and that, if lower courts and legislators heed the moral leadership of the Miller Court, they could set in motion a return to the juvenile justice model this country began with more than a century ago.
This article proceeds in three parts. Part I traces the development of mandatory juvenile sentences in this country and identifies two key forces driving that development: the practice of transferring juvenile cases to adult court and the emergence of determinate sentencing schemes. Part II is the heart of the article. It examines the Miller decision, as well as its immediate predecessor cases, at a granular level. Having done so, Part II surveys the numerous calls for an expansive reading of Miller that academics and advocates have made to date. Part II then shifts to argue that, indeed, Miller should be read expansively, but that some corollaries of Miller are more readily defensible than others. In particular, I argue that Miller lays the foundation for: 1) the elimination of mandatory minimums as they apply to children and 2) the creation of procedural safeguards for children facing life without parole comparable to those in place for adults facing the death penalty. Part III addresses the likely objections to my two specific proposals and maintains that, despite the concerns of the dissenting Justices in Miller, there are several limiting principles even to an expansive reading of Miller. Finally, by way of conclusion, I note that already there are signs of progressive juvenile justice reform at the state level consistent with the reading of Miller I propose herein and that, in some ways, the Miller revolution is already underway.
Judge denies Florida sex offender's request to be physically castrated
As reported in this local article, a judge in Florida has felt compelled to reject a sex offender's notable request for a notable alternative punishment. Here are the details:
Lester Leroy Williams is serving ten years in prison for sexually battering a child. Back in 2008, he was also sentenced to 4.5 years of probation. Recently, the 35-year-old Williams made a bizarre request: He wants the state to physically castrate him.
In a letter Williams wrote at the Union Correctional Institution in Raiford, he asked Fifth Judicial Circuit Court Judge Hale Stancil to modify his sentence to include castration at the expense of the state. But Stancil denied the unusual request this past Tuesday, stating his court didn't have jurisdiction to rule over the case.
"In 32 years, I have never had this request before," said Stancil, who spoke about the case for the first time to New Times. "I know there is chemical castration, but I've never had an inmate ask to be physically castrated before. I don't think I have authority as a judge to order such a thing."...
Florida already allows certain sex offenders to receive medroxyprogesterone acetate (MPA) treatment as part of their rehabilitation. MPA, an artificial hormone, is normally used to treat symptoms of menopause in women, but when used by men, it decreases testosterone to pre-puberty levels. MPA has been used on sex offenders for years as a way of reducing the chances of recidivism by diminishing the sexual urges of men who have long histories of committing sex crimes.
According to Florida law, courts must sentence repeat offenders of sexual battery to MPA treatment but may choose to administer it to first-time offenders. The treatment does not replace or reduce any other penalty the court could impose, and the courts can order the treatment to last up to life....
The law stipulates though that instead of undergoing the chemical form of castration, sex offenders may -- of their own volition -- ask a court for physical castration, which is what Williams has done. Though the legal leeway seems to exist, it is rarely chosen -- Williams may be the first in Florida to request it even though he isn't even required to have MPA treatment.
"Sex offenders are wretched," said Maryam Sweirki, 25, a Miami advocate for victims of sexual assault. "If he can't handle his penis, then I'm for his decision to take his weapon away."
However, critics of castration believe it to be a cruel and unusual punishment that violates human and reproductive rights; with other critics arguing the law that allows for MPA castration, though it applies to both genders, is unequal in punishment because it has a greater impact on males. Some of the side-effects related to the drug (besides decreased sexual urges) are: a loss of body hair, hot and cold flashes, impotence, depression, thrombosis, and weight gain.
Though it has been shown to decrease the number of reoffenders, some opponents further argue that castration isn't a panacea for all sex offenders because some of them are motivated to sexually abuse because of intense feelings of hatred and hostility, rather than sexual desire.
Some related older posts:
- Isn't chemical castration worth trying if it works?
- "Sex-Offending Teacher Asks for Castration"
- Alabama legislators discussing castration and other novel punishments for sex offenders
- Are there reliable data on the efficacy of chemical castration?
- "Europeans Debate Castration of Sex Offenders"
- "Argentina province OKs chemical castration for rapists"
- Huff Post commentary urging stiffer sentences and chemical castration for sex offenders
- Virginia state senator urging study of physical castration for sex offenders
- After high-profile child rapes, Koreans talk of physical castration and harsher sentencing for sex offenders
- "Sex offender offers to castrate himself for lighter sentence"
Monday, August 04, 2014
Will any Justices express any concerns about drug secrecy after third ugly execution?
The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new AP article headlined "Justices silent over execution drug secrecy." Here are excerpts:
No one on the Supreme Court objected publicly when the justices voted to let Arizona proceed with the execution of Joseph Wood, who unsuccessfully sought information about the drugs that would be used to kill him.
Inmates in Florida and Missouri went to their deaths by lethal injection in the preceding weeks after the high court refused to block their executions. Again, no justice said the executions should be stopped.
Even as the number of executions annually has dropped by more than half over the past 15 years and the court has barred states from killing juveniles and the mentally disabled, no justice has emerged as a principled opponent of the death penalty.
This court differs from some of its predecessors. Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall dissented every time their colleagues ruled against death row inmates, and Justices Harry Blackmun and John Paul Stevens, near the end of their long careers, came to view capital punishment as unconstitutional. "They're all voting to kill them, every so often. They do it in a very workmanlike, technocratic fashion," Stephen Bright, a veteran death penalty lawyer in Georgia, said of the current court.
Wood's execution on July 23 was the 26th in the United States this year and the third in which prisoners took much longer than usual to die. Wood, convicted of killing his estranged girlfriend and her father, was pronounced dead nearly two hours after his execution began, and an Associated Press reporter was among witnesses who said Wood appeared to gasp repeatedly, hundreds of times in all, before he died.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg said she and her colleagues are aware of what happened in Arizona, though she declined to say how the court would rule on a plea to stop the next scheduled execution -- of Michael Worthington on Wednesday in Missouri. "Your crystal ball is as good as mine," she said last week in an interview with The Associated Press.
The court's rejection of Wood's claim that he was entitled to learn more about Arizona's procedures and the source of the execution drugs came at the end of protracted legal wrangling. A federal judge in Arizona initially denied Wood's claim. The federal appeals court in San Francisco then granted a reprieve. But the justices reversed that ruling in a brief order. The court said the judge who initially ruled against Wood "did not abuse his discretion."...
The substance of capital punishment issues usually finds its way in front of the justices when there is no time pressure. In January, the court heard arguments in a case over a Florida law that used a rigid threshold in intelligence test scores in cases of borderline mental disability. In late May, a five-justice majority led by Anthony Kennedy struck down the law because it "contravenes our nation's commitment to dignity."
The soaring language that Kennedy often favors in his opinions has led some death penalty experts to believe that he eventually will provide the fifth vote, along with those of the court's four liberal justices, to end or severely restrict the use of the death penalty. "It is impossible to reconcile that language with the secrecy surrounding lethal injections," said Sherrilyn Ifill, president and director-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund. "My assumption is quite a lot is happening behind the scenes."
Ginsburg cautioned not to read too much into the absence of public dissent when the court rejects 11th-hour appeals to stop executions. "When a stay is denied, it doesn't mean we are in fact unanimous," she said.
Still, Ifill said the court's unwillingness so far to deal with states' reluctance to reveal much about the provenance of lethal injection drugs is troubling. "I'm disappointed after all the revelations that at least some justices weren't prepared to say something pretty strong," she said.
The old saying, "Third time's a charm," has me inclined to predict that we may end up hearing from at least one Justice or two concerning execution drug secrecy the next time this issue is effectively raised before the Supreme Court. Whether that occurs this week on later this year, I suspect this issue will have some legs if states continue to have to experiment with new execution drug protocols and continue to preclude capital defendants from knowing all the experimental details.
A few recent related posts:
- Split Ninth Circuit panel stays Arizona execution based on First Amendment (really?!?!) drug secrecy concerns
- After Kozinski's candor, what will SCOTUS due about First Amendment stay in Arizona capital case?
- After SCOTUS vacates First Amendment stay, Arizona Supreme Court delays execution
- After stays vacated, Arizona needs two hours to complete another ugly execution
- "After troubled execution in Arizona, Ohio to use same drugs, dosage"
- After another ugly execution, will Missouri and Texas have any difficulties keeping up monthly execution plans?
Sunday, August 03, 2014
Significant AG Holder comments asserting severe rigid sentences are not needed to induce cooperation
Attorney General Eric Holder's significant speech at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' Annual Meeting made headlines mostly due to his expression of concern about the use of risk assessment instruments in initial sentencing determinations (as previously discussed here). I will discuss AG Holder's nuanced comments on this front in some future posts.
Before discussing the use of risk assessment instruments in initial sentencing determinations, I first want to recommend that everyone read all of AG Holder's NACDL speech, which is available here, because it includes a number of notable passages addressing a number of notable sentencing topics. Of particular note, these paragraphs seek to debunk the oft-heard statements that reform of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions could prevent prosecutors from securing needed cooperation from defendants:
[T]he Smart on Crime initiative has led us to revise the Justice Department’s charging policies with regard to mandatory minimum sentences for certain federal, drug-related crimes — so that sentences will be determined based on the facts, the law, and the conduct at issue in each individual case. This means that the toughest penalties will now be reserved for the most serious criminals. Over the last few months — with the Department’s urging — the U.S. Sentencing Commission has taken additional steps to codify this approach, amending federal sentencing guidelines for low-level drug trafficking crimes to reduce the average sentence by nearly 18 percent. Going forward, these new guidelines will impact almost 70 percent of people who are convicted of these offenses. And last month, the Commission voted to allow judges to apply these revised guidelines retroactively in cases where reductions are warranted.
Now, some have suggested that these modest changes might somehow undermine the ability of law enforcement and prosecutors to induce cooperation from defendants in federal drug cases. But the reality is that nothing could be further from the truth.
Like anyone who served as a prosecutor in the days before sentencing guidelines existed and mandatory minimums took effect, I know from experience that defendant cooperation depends on the certainty of swift and fair punishment, not on the disproportionate length of a mandatory minimum sentence. As veteran prosecutors and defense attorneys surely recall — and as our U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Wisconsin, John Vaudreuil, has often reminded his colleagues — sentencing guidelines essentially systematized the kinds of negotiations that routinely took place in cases where defendants cooperated with the government in exchange for reduced sentences. With or without the threat of a mandatory minimum, it remains in the interest of these defendants to cooperate. It remains in the mutual interest of defense attorneys and prosecutors to engage in these discussions. And any suggestion that defendant cooperation is somehow dependent on mandatory minimums is plainly inconsistent with the facts and with history.
Far from impeding the work of federal prosecutors, these sentencing reforms that I have mandated represent the ultimate expression of confidence in their judgment and discretion. That’s why I’ve called on Congress to expand upon and further institutionalize the changes we’ve put in place — so we can better promote public safety, deterrence, and rehabilitation while saving billions of dollars and reducing our overreliance on incarceration.
Saturday, August 02, 2014
"Swift, Certain, and Fair Punishment — 24/7 Sobriety and Hope: Creative Approaches to Alcohol- and Illicit Drug-Using Offenders"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Paul Larkin of The Heritage Foundation available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
Local and state government officials in South Dakota and Hawaii have implemented a creative way to address some of the problems stemming from alcohol and drug use. The South Dakota 24/7 Sobriety program and Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (HOPE) project seek to deal with those problems by combining an old criminological theory with modern technological devices. Criminologists, both old and contemporary, have believed that the certainty and celerity of punishment are more effective components of deterrence than is the severity of a penalty. In fact, anyone who has been a parent will tell you that the swift and certain use of a mild or moderate punishment is far more likely to deter unwanted conduct than the threat of an infrequently used severe punishment imposed at some point down the road.
South Dakota and Hawaii have developed innovative programs to deal with substance use and noncompliance with the conditions of supervision. Both programs address this problem. Starting from the proposition that certainty and celerity are more important than severity when measuring the effectiveness of punishment and using a rigorous alcohol-testing regimen, South Dakota has made strides toward the reduction of problem drinking and the attendant harms that it can produce. Hawaii has independently developed and followed a similar approach to the use of drugs and crime, subjecting certain offenders to rigorous, random drug urinalysis punished by the certain imposition of a modest stint in jail for those who fail the required tests. Those creative approaches are worth serious consideration as an effective and humane means of addressing the grim problems that alcohol- and drug-abusers pose for victims and society.
August 2, 2014 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack
Thursday, July 31, 2014
Sixth Circuit panel finds one-day prison sentence unreasonable for white-collar defendant
The Sixth Circuit today has reinforced its reputation as one of the circuits most likely to declare a below-guideline sentence unreasonable with a unanimous panel ruling in US v. Musgrave, No. 13-3872 (6th Cir. July 31, 2014) (available here). Because post-Booker appellate sentence reversals are rare, this relatively short opinion is a must read for everyone who following federal sentencing law and policy closely. In addition, at a time when debates over white-collar sentencing rules and practices remain hot, all those who follow white-collar crime and punishment will want to be sure to check out this opinion as well.
Here is how the Musgrave opinion starts and finishes:
A jury found Paul Musgrave guilty of one count of conspiracy to commit wire and bank fraud and to make false statements to a financial institution; two counts of wire fraud; and one count of bank fraud. The district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment with credit for the day of processing — a downward variance from his Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months’ imprisonment and below the government’s recommendation of 30 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, the government asserts that Musgrave’s one-day sentence is substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we vacate the district court’s sentence and remand for resentencing....
A defendant’s sentence must reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just punishment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In imposing a sentence, the district court must explain, based on permissible considerations, how its sentence “‘meshe[s] with Congress’s own view of the crimes’ seriousness.’” United States v. Peppel, 707 F.3d 627, 635 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Davis, 537 F.3d 611, 617 (6th Cir. 2008)). The collateral consequences of the defendant’s prosecution and conviction are “impermissible factors” when fashioning a sentence that complies with this directive. Peppel, 707 F.3d at 636. A district court’s reliance on these factors “does nothing to show that [the defendant’s] sentence reflects the seriousness of his offense. Were it otherwise, these sorts of consequences— particularly ones related to a defendant’s humiliation before his community, neighbors, and friends—would tend to support shorter sentences in cases with defendants from privileged backgrounds, who might have more to lose along these lines.” United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 765–66 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, when a district court varies downward on the basis of the collateral consequences of the defendant’s prosecution and conviction, the defendant’s sentence will not reflect the seriousness of the offense, nor will it provide just punishment. See Peppel, 707 F.3d at 636; Bistline, 665 F.3d at 765–66.
Impermissible considerations permeated the district court’s justification for Musgrave’s sentence. In imposing a sentence of one day with credit for the day of processing, the district court relied heavily on the fact that Musgrave had already “been punished extraordinarily” by four years of legal proceedings, legal fees, the likely loss of his CPA license, and felony convictions that would follow him for the rest of his life. “[N]one of these things are [his] sentence. Nor are they consequences of his sentence”; a diminished sentence based on considerations does not reflect the seriousness of his offense or effect just punishment. Bistline, 665 F.3d at 765. On remand, the district court must sentence Musgrave without considering these factors....
In the context of white-collar crime, we have emphasized that “it is hard to see how a one-day sentence” would “serve the goals of societal deterrence.” Davis, 537 F.3d at 617. “‘Because economic and fraud-based crimes are more rational, cool, and calculated than sudden crimes of passion or opportunity, these crimes are prime candidates for general deterrence.’” Peppel, 707 F.3d at 637 (quoting United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1240 (11th Cir. 2006)); see also Davis, 537 F.3d at 617.
Consideration of general deterrence is particularly important where the district court varies substantially from the Guidelines. See, e.g., Aleo, 681 F.3d at 300 (explaining that the greater the variance, the more compelling the justification based on the § 3553(a) factors must be). This is even truer here, given that the crimes of which Musgrave was convicted are especially susceptible to general deterrence and the fact that there is a general policy favoring incarceration for these crimes. Indeed, “[o]ne of the central reasons for creating the sentencing guidelines was to ensure stiffer penalties for white-collar crimes and to eliminate disparities between white-collar sentences and sentences for other crimes.” Davis, 537 F.3d at 617. More importantly, Congress understood white-collar criminals to be deserving of some period of incarceration, as evidenced by its prohibition on probationary sentences in this context. Id. Where a district court’s view of a particular crime’s seriousness appears at odds with that of Congress and the Sentencing Commission, we expect that it will explain how its sentence nevertheless affords adequate general deterrence. Id.; Camiscione, 591 F.3d at 834. The district court failed to do so here.
Musgrave must be resentenced. The district court relied on impermissible considerations and failed to address adequately how what amounted to a non-custodial sentence afforded adequate general deterrence in this context. Nevertheless, it bears repeating that “[w]hile appellate courts retain responsibility for identifying proper and improper sentencing considerations after Booker, it is not our task to impose sentences in the first instance or to second guess the individualized sentencing discretion of the district court when it appropriately relies on the § 3553(a) factors.” Davis, 537 F.3d at 618 (citing United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 392 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). The district court’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for the district court, in its discretion, to impose a sentence sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the § 3553(a) factors.
I view the main message of this Musgrave case, along with other cited cases in which the Sixth Circuit has reversed similar one-day sentences on appeal, that the Sixth Circuit generally believe that at least a short period of incarceration is nearly essential for any serious crime for which the guidelines recommend years of incarceration even if the defendant is a relatively sympathetic first offender not likely to re-offend.
July 31, 2014 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
"Attorney General Eric Holder to Oppose Data-Driven Sentencing"
The title of this post is the headline of this important new article from Time detailing that the Attorney General is formally coming out against some of the data-driven, risk-based sentencing reforms based on concerns about the potential impact on equal justice. Here are highlights from this article (with more to follow in coming posts):
Citing concerns about equal justice in sentencing, Attorney General Eric Holder has decided to oppose certain statistical tools used in determining jail time, putting the Obama Administration at odds with a popular and increasingly effective method for managing prison populations. Holder laid out his position in an interview with TIME on Tuesday and will call for a review of the issue in his annual report to the U.S. Sentencing Commission Thursday, Justice department officials familiar with the report say.
Over the past 10 years, states have increasingly used large databases of information about criminals to identify dozens of risk factors associated with those who continue to commit crimes, like prior convictions, hostility to law enforcement and substance abuse. Those factors are then weighted and used to rank criminals as being a high, medium or low risk to offend again. Judges, corrections officials and parole officers in turn use those rankings to help determine how long a convict should spend in jail.
Holder says if such rankings are used broadly, they could have a disparate and adverse impact on the poor, on socially disadvantaged offenders, and on minorities. “I’m really concerned that this could lead us back to a place we don’t want to go,” Holder said on Tuesday.
Virtually every state has used such risk assessments to varying degrees over the past decade, and many have made them mandatory for sentencing and corrections as a way to reduce soaring prison populations, cut recidivism and save money. But the federal government has yet to require them for the more than 200,000 inmates in its prisons. Bipartisan legislation requiring risk assessments is moving through Congress and appears likely to reach the President’s desk for signature later this year.
Using background information like educational levels and employment history in the sentencing phase of a trial, Holder told TIME, will benefit “those on the white collar side who may have advanced degrees and who may have done greater societal harm — if you pull back a little bit — than somebody who has not completed a master’s degree, doesn’t have a law degree, is not a doctor.”
Holder says using static factors from a criminal’s background could perpetuate racial bias in a system that already delivers 20% longer sentences for young black men than for other offenders. Holder supports assessments that are based on behavioral risk factors that inmates can amend, like drug addiction or negative attitudes about the law. And he supports in-prison programs — or back-end assessments — as long as all convicts, including high-risk ones, get the chance to reduce their prison time.
But supporters of the broad use of data in criminal-justice reform — and there are many — say Holder’s approach won’t work. “If you wait until the back end, it becomes exponentially harder to solve the problem,” says former New Jersey attorney general Anne Milgram, who is now at the nonprofit Laura and John Arnold Foundation, where she is building risk-assessment tools for law enforcement. For example, prior convictions and the age of first arrest are among the most powerful risk factors for reoffending and should be used to help accurately determine appropriate prison time, experts say.
And data-driven risk assessments are just part of the overall process of determining the lengths of time convicts spend in prison, supporters argue. Professor Edward Latessa, who consulted for Congress on the pending federal legislation and has produced broad studies showing the effectiveness of risk assessment in corrections, says concerns about disparity are overblown. “Bernie Madoff may score low risk, but we’re never letting him out,” Latessa says.
Another reason Holder may have a hard time persuading states of his concerns is that data-driven corrections have been good for the bottom line. Arkansas’s 2011 Public Safety Improvement Act, which requires risk assessments in corrections, is projected to help save the state $875 million through 2020, while similar reforms in Kentucky are projected to save it $422 million over 10 years, according to the Pew Center on the States. Rhode Island has seen its prison population drop 19% in the past five years, thanks in part to risk-assessment programs, according to the state’s director of corrections, A.T. Wall....
Holder says he wants to ensure the bills that are moving through Congress account for potential social, economic and racial disparities in sentencing. “Our hope would be to work with any of the Senators or Congressmen who are involved and who have introduced bills here so that we get to a place we ought to be,” Holder said.
Wednesday, July 30, 2014
Indiana reforms highlight how sentencing laws impact cops as well as courts
This interesting local article from Indiana, headlined "Meth Suppression Unit Encounters Positive, Negative Aspects to Massive Sentencing Overhaul," spotlights some of the ways sentencing reform impacts law enforcement operations and priorities. Here are excerpts:
Indiana's criminal sentencing reform took effect nearly a month ago and police detectives and prosecutors are still trying to take it all in. The overhaul brought sweeping changes for law enforcement officers, especially the Evansville Police Department's Meth Suppression Unit.
During the 2013 session, the General Assembly passed House Enrolled Act 1006 which re-wrote the felony portion of the state's criminal code. The new law expands upon the state's four levels of felonies (Class A-D) and creates six levels of felonies (Level 1-6). The reform was intended to ease prison crowding and give judges more discretion to let low-level offenders serve their time in community correctional programs.
For example, what was once a Class A felony became a Level 1 or Level 2 felony, depending on severity. As part of the reform, offenders would have to serve 75% of their sentences instead of the current 50%. While the reform strengthens the sentences for sex crimes and violent crimes, it lessens the sentences for drug crimes. While it has some positive and negative aspects, the jury is still out on the reform, said Evansville Police Detective Patrick McDonald.
"For me, I've been on the street now for 10 years," Det. McDonald said. "There hasn't been a major overhaul of the criminal code like this. Under the old system, manufacturing [meth] was manufacturing [meth]. It was never able to be enhanced by weight so now we have to look at how we process meth labs and try to get a weight out of that."...
The criminal sentencing overhaul eliminated some enhancement charges the Meth Suppression Unit frequently used, McDonald said. McDonald detailed one such example in which a man previously convicted of meth was allegedly caught trying to buy pseudoephedrine, the key ingredient in meth production. Because that man had already been convicted of a meth-related offense, prosecutors added the enhancement charge which bumped up his sentence by eight years.
Some other enhancement charges have been clarified and more clearly defined, McDonald said. He cited the enhancement charge of dealing drugs within 1000 feet of a park or school. Under the new sentencing guidelines, detectives no longer have to prove children were present; the enhancement charge is applicable when it can be 'reasonably expected' that children are present.
The reform also brought drastic changes to what level felony shall apply to how much narcotics detectives discovered. "What used to be dealing over three grams [the General Assembly] raised that up to be 28 grams," McDonald said. "Three grams is a fairly significant amount, about $300 to $350 worth of meth or cocaine. What we historically considered a 'dealer weight' has been pushed down to minimal prison time."
Monday, July 28, 2014
US District Judge Gleeson prods prosecutors to undo stacked gun counts and then praises effort to do justice
Regular readers are likely familiar with the remarkable series of opinions issued by US District Judge John Gleeson in which he has forcefully expressed deep concerns with how federal prosecutors sometimes exercise their charging and bargaining powers in the application of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. But, as reported in this New York Times piece, headlined "Citing Fairness, U.S. Judge Acts to Undo a Sentence He Was Forced to Impose," Judge Gleeson's latest opinion discusses how federal prosecutors ultimately aided his efforts to undo an extreme mandatory minimum sentence. Here are the basics:
Francois Holloway has spent nearly two decades of a 57-year sentence in a federal prison, for serious crimes that no one disputes he committed. There were armed carjackings, and his participation in an illegal chop shop, where stolen cars would be dismantled and sold for parts. But the fairness of the mandatory sentence has been a matter of dispute, not only for Mr. Holloway, but also for a surprising and most effective advocate: the trial judge, John Gleeson.
As Mr. Holloway filed one motion after another trying to get his sentence and his case re-evaluated, Judge Gleeson, of Federal District Court in Brooklyn, began to speak out against those mandatory sentences that he believed were unduly harsh. Mr. Holloway’s 57-year term was more than twice the average sentence in the district for murder in 1996, the year he was sentenced.
More recently, Judge Gleeson began his own campaign on Mr. Holloway’s behalf, writing to Loretta E. Lynch, who is the United States attorney for the Eastern District of New York, to request that she vacate two of Mr. Holloway’s convictions. The payoff from Judge Gleeson’s efforts will be apparent on Tuesday in a highly unusual hearing, when the judge is expected to resentence Mr. Holloway, who is 57, to time served.
“Prosecutors also use their power to remedy injustices,” Judge Gleeson wrote in a memorandum released on Monday. “Even people who are indisputably guilty of violent crimes deserve justice, and now Holloway will get it.”...
Mr. Holloway was charged in 1995 with three counts of carjacking and using a gun during a violent crime (even though it was an accomplice, and not Mr. Holloway, who carried the gun), along with participating in the chop shop. The government offered him a plea deal of about 11 years. He turned it down after his lawyer assured him he could win at trial. Mr. Holloway did not win.
For the first conviction on the gun count, the law required Mr. Holloway to receive five years. But for the second and third convictions, the law required 20 years for each one, served consecutively, a requirement known as “stacking,” which some judges and lawyers argue sounds like a recidivism provision, although it can be applied for crimes, like Mr. Holloway’s, committed hours apart that are part of the same trial.
None of Mr. Holloway’s co-defendants, who all pleaded guilty, received more than six years. At Mr. Holloway’s sentencing in 1996, Judge Gleeson said that “by stripping me of discretion,” the stacked gun charges “require the imposition of a sentence that is, in essence, a life sentence.” (The remainder of the 57 years was the 12 years required for the three carjackings.)...
At a hearing on the Holloway case this month, an assistant United States attorney, Sam Nitze, said that “this is both a unique case and a unique defendant,” citing his “extraordinary” disciplinary record and his work in prison. Also, he said, three of Mr. Holloway’s carjacking victims have said that the 20 years that Mr. Holloway had served in prison was “an awfully long time, and people deserve another chance.” Mr. Nitze agreed to vacate the two convictions, while emphasizing that this should not be taken as indicative of Ms. Lynch’s view on the stacking provision in other cases.
In his opinion issued last week, Judge Gleeson said that Mr. Holloway’s sentence illustrated a “trial penalty,” where those willing to risk trial could be hit with mandatory minimum sentences “that would be laughable if only there weren’t real people on the receiving end of them.”
Judge Gleeson's full 11-page opinion in Holloway v. US, No. 01-CV-1017 (E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2014)(available for download below), is a must-read for lots of reasons. The opinion is not be easily summarized, but this part of its conclusion provide a flavor of what comes before:
It is easy to be a tough prosecutor. Prosecutors are almost never criticized for being aggressive, or for fighting hard to obtain the maximum sentence, or for saying “there’s nothing we can do” about an excessive sentence after all avenues of judicial relief have been exhausted. Doing justice can be much harder. It takes time and involves work, including careful consideration of the circumstances of particular crimes, defendants, and victims – and often the relevant events occurred in the distant past. It requires a willingness to make hard decisions, including some that will be criticized.
This case is a perfect example. Holloway was convicted of three armed robberies. He deserved serious punishment. The judgment of conviction in his case was affirmed on direct review by the Supreme Court, and his collateral attack on that judgment failed long ago. His sentence was far more severe than necessary to reflect the seriousness of his crimes and to adequately protect the community from him, but no one would criticize the United States Attorney if she allowed it to stand by doing nothing. By contrast, the decision she has made required considerable work. Assistant United States Attorney Nitze had to retrieve and examine a very old case file. He had to track down and interview the victims of Holloway’s crimes, which were committed 20 years ago. His office no doubt considered the racial disparity in the use of § 924(c), and especially in the “stacking” of § 924(c) counts. He requested and obtained an adjournment so his office could have the time necessary to make an extremely important decision....
This is a significant case, and not just for Francois Holloway. It demonstrates the difference between a Department of Prosecutions and a Department of Justice. It shows how the Department of Justice, as the government’s representative in every federal criminal case, has the power to walk into courtrooms and ask judges to remedy injustices....
A prosecutor who says nothing can be done about an unjust sentence because all appeals and collateral challenges have been exhausted is actually choosing to do nothing about the unjust sentence. Some will make a different choice, as Ms. Lynch did here.
Numerous lawyers have been joining pro bono movements to prepare clemency petitions for federal prisoners, and indeed the Department of Justice has encouraged the bar to locate and try to help deserving inmates. Those lawyers will find many inmates even more deserving of belated justice than Holloway. Some will satisfy the criteria for Department of Justice support, while others will not. In any event, there’s no good reason why all of them must end up in the clemency bottleneck. Some inmates will ask United States Attorneys for the kind of justice made possible in this case, that is, justice administered not by the President but by a judge, on the consent of the Department of Justice, in the same courtroom in which the inmate was sentenced. Whatever the outcome of those requests, I respectfully suggest that they should get the same careful consideration that Ms. Lynch and her assistants gave to Francois Holloway.
Fascinating Fourth Circuit split over how federal sentencing problems should inform guideline interpretation
I just noticed a notable ruling by a split Fourth Circuit panel from late last week in US v. Valdovinos, No. 13-4768 (4th Cir. July 25, 2014) (available here). The precise legal issue concerning guideline interpretation in Valdovinos is not all that compelling, but how the judges dispute the right way to resolve the issue surely is. Here is how the panel majority opinion (running 18 pages) concludes:
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that North Carolina’s legislatively mandated sentencing scheme, not a recommended sentence hashed out in plea negotiations, determines whether an offender’s prior North Carolina conviction was punishable by more than a year in prison. Because Valdovinos’s offense of conviction was indeed punishable by imprisonment exceeding one year, it qualifies as a predicate felony under Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(B) of the Guidelines [thereby enhancing his sentence]. We appreciate the fervor and policy arguments of our friend in dissent. Indeed, we can agree with many of the latter. What we cannot agree with is that “application of relevant precedent” does not require the result here. Carachuri and Simmons do just that. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Here is how Judge Davis's remarkable dissenting opinion (running 30 pages) gets revved up and concludes (emphasis in the original):
Our disagreement as to the outcome in this case stems, I think, less over the content and application of relevant precedent and more from a fundamental disagreement regarding our role as arbiters of a flailing federal sentencing regime. Where, as here, we have been presented with a choice in how to interpret the interstices of federal sentencing law, and where one choice would exacerbate the harmful effects of over-20 incarceration that every cadre of social and political scientists (as well as an ever-growing cohort of elected and appointed officials, state and federal, as well as respected members of the federal judiciary) has recognized as unjust and inhumane, as well as expensive and ineffectual, this insight can and should inform our analysis. I deeply regret the panel’s failure to take advantage of the opportunity to do so here....
Here, in a tiny corner of the chaotic morass that is federal sentencing law, Mr. Valdovinos has offered us a measured approach, to a novel issue of federal sentencing law, that adheres to Supreme Court and our relevant circuit precedents and is consistent with our values. If accepted by this panel, his argument, which is surely more than merely “clever”, see ante, at 8, would affect a tiny number of federal cases drawing legal relevance from North Carolina’s historical (and now superseded) sentencing regime. And Mr. Valdovinos’s sentence in this case likely would be reduced to a bottom guideline of 15 months, instead of the bottom guideline sentence he received, 27 months. He’d soon be on his way home to Mexico, if not already arrived.
That the majority declines the opportunity to decide this case on the foundations discussed herein is regrettable, a choice that not only ignores the growing wisdom informed by widespread acknowledgement of our unjust federal sentencing jurisprudence, but actually hinders its progress. Would that my friends could see that it’s a new century, complete with a host of profound and valuable insights at our avail. I discern no compelling reason why, in the performance of our adjudicative responsibilities, which every member of the panel has unfailingly carried out to the best of our ability in this case and in full accordance with our solemn oath to “administer justice,” 28 U.S.C. § 453, we ought not to draw on these insights.
One of them is that sometimes, in our shared quest for justice under law, it requires so little of us to achieve so much. Respectfully, I dissent.
July 28, 2014 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack
"Are Opponents Of The Death Penalty Contributing To Its Problems?"
The question in the title of this post is the headline of this notable recent NPR story. Here are excerpts:
Kevin Cooper was convicted of murdering a married couple and two children, and was sentenced to die. That was back in 1985. Cooper is still awaiting execution on California's death row.
San Bernardino County District Attorney Michael Ramos, who is handling the case, blames the long delay on Cooper's multiple appeals in state and federal courts. "This is all a big strategic plan to really manipulate the system to attack capital punishment, not just in California, but in the United States," Ramos says.
The death penalty is under considerable pressure, both from court decisions and a series of problematic executions, including one this week in Arizona. Six states have abolished the death penalty over the past seven years. Death penalty supporters such as Ramos say this is no accident. They believe opponents intentionally toss sand in the gears of the execution process, and then complain that the system doesn't work. "It's a delaying tactic that then allows them to scream it's unconstitutional because it's been delayed too long," Ramos says.
Defense attorneys dismiss this as nonsense. The problems with the death penalty, they say, were not created by its opponents. "It's not the defense attorneys who are holding executions up," says Deborah Denno, a law professor at Fordham University. "Not by a long shot."...
Last week, U.S. District Judge Cormac Carney found California's system of capital punishment unconstitutional because executions are delayed for too long and are "arbitrary" in terms of which condemned prisoners are ever actually executed. Death penalty supporters argue that it's the killers — and their attorneys — causing most of the delays.
"Having done everything they can to cause the problem, they decry the problem," says Kent Scheidegger, legal director of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Sacramento, which defends victims' rights.
But many of the delays aren't caused by defense attorneys, rather the very lack of them, Denno says. In California, it can take years for a condemned prisoner even to be appointed counsel, and years more to wait for what is known as a post-conviction hearing.
"Even before a case gets to federal court, there's often more than 10 years of delays built into the system that don't have anything to do with what's brought from the defense," says Joseph Luby, an attorney with the Death Penalty Litigation Clinic in Kansas City, Mo., which defends the condemned....
In addition to traditional questions regarding innocence and adequacy of counsel, defense attorneys now will typically challenge a state's method of execution. Lethal injections, which for years had a more anodyne reputation than gas chambers or the electric chair, have become problematic in and of themselves....
Scheidegger, the foundation attorney, says death penalty opponents, having successfully promoted lethal injections at the expense of older methods by portraying it as more humane, are now undermining states' use of drugs through their legal challenges.
Recent related posts on the California capital ruling by US District Judge Carney:
- Federal district judge declares California's death penalty unconstitutional under Eighth Amendment
- Lots of notable discussion of yesterday's notable decision striking down California's death penalty
- Furman and randomness (not just delay) at heart of California capital ruling
- Thoughtful Teague-based criticism of the remarkable California capital ruling in Jones v. Chappell