The secrecy imposed by Arizona on the source and quality of the lethal injection drugs it uses to kill death row inmates has been challenged in a new lawsuit brought by the Guardian and other media organizations.
In the lawsuit, filed with a federal court in Phoenix, the Guardian together with the Associated Press and four of Arizona’s largest news outlets argue that the state’s refusal to disclose any information about its lethal injection drugs is a breach of the public’s first amendment right to know about how the death penalty is being carried out in its name. It follows agroundbreaking first amendment case brought by the Guardian and others in Missouri in May....
Use of midazolam in executions in recent months has proved particularly problematic and contentious. It has been associated with gruesome and prolonged deaths in Florida, Ohio and Oklahoma. The Arizona complaint has been joined, in addition to the Guardian and the Associated Press, by two of the state’s most important newspapers, the Arizona Republic and the Arizona Daily Star. Two major television channels, KPNX-TV Channel 12 and KPHO Broadcasting Corporation, are also party to the suit.
The action is lodged in the US district court in Arizona and is directed against Charles Ryan, director of the department of corrections, and the state’s attorney general, Thomas Horne, both in their official roles. The Guardian and fellow plaintiffs are represented by the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale law school, with the assistance of Ballard Spahr LLP in Phoenix.
Unlike most other lawsuits that have been brought relating to the creeping secrecy that surrounds lethal injection drugs – which have argued the prisoners’ constitutional rights have been violated – the Arizona lawsuit starts with the principle that the public has a right to know how capital punishment is being carried out.
The complaint argues that “the public cannot meaningfully debate the propriety of lethal injection executions if it is denied access to this essential information about how individuals are being put to death by the state.” It says that the established constitutional right of public access to aspects of government procedures means that the state should be obliged to reveal “the source, composition, and quality of drugs, as well as the protocols, that have been or will be used in lethal injection executions and to view the entirety of an execution”.
This is the fourth lawsuit that the Guardian has launched against various manifestations of secrecy in the US death penalty. As well as the actions in Arizona and Missouri, there are ongoing legal complaints currently before the courts in Pennsylvania and in Oklahoma, where the state is being challenged for having drawn the curtain halfway through the botched execution of Clayton Lockett in April.
Friday, November 07, 2014
Guest SCOTUS argument analysis: "Fish are apparently funny . . . and other quick thoughts on Yates"
Professor Todd Haugh was kind enough to send along for posting here this analysis of one of the notable federal criminal justice cases just heard by the Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court heard argument this week in Yates v. United States, the oddball case requiring the Court to determine whether the “anti-shredding” provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act applies to a fisherman who threw a crate of undersized grouper overboard after he was ordered not to by a federal agent. The precise issue was whether the fisherman, John Yates, had adequate notice that 18 U.S.C. § 1519’s “tangible object” provision covered fish along with financial records, which were the focus of SOX following the Enron and Arthur Anderson document-shredding scandal. Although there have been a number of comprehensive posts about the statutory interpretation aspects of the case, see here and here, I wanted to offer my quick reaction to the argument, which I attended.
Fish are funny. First of all, although this may be trivial for hardcore criminal law and sentencing buffs, this was one of the most jovial arguments I have seen, riotous even. The argument was interrupted numerous times by the gallery’s laughter — 15 times according to the transcript — which was prompted by both the litigants and the Justices. And this wasn’t all the Scalia show. Justices Kagan, Sotomayor, and Breyer all offered quips that gave the audience quite a show.
But overcriminalization is not. Part of the reason everyone was in a joking mood was the inherent absurdity of the underlying prosecution. Although Roman Martinez, the Assistant SG, tried to convey that Yates had not just tossed away a few fish, but had directly disobeyed a federal agent and then enlisted his crew to lie about it, the Justices weren’t buying it. At one point, Chief Justice Roberts interrupted Martinez, saying, “You make him [Yates] sound like a mob boss or something.” (Again, to great laughter.) In between the laughs, however, the Court conveyed a serious concern over the sweep of § 1519 and the government’s exercise of discretion. Justices Breyer and Alito, in particular, posed squirm-inducing hypotheticals to Martinez demonstrating that the only thing stopping this provision from criminalizing obviously trivial conduct is the U.S. Attorney’s Office. Martinez’s admission, solicited from Justice Ginsburg, that the U.S. Attorney’s Manual instructs prosecutors to bring the most severe charge available did not help the government’s cause. Justice Scalia, who had previously asked what kind of “mad prosecutor” brought the case and questioned whether it was the “same guy . . . that brought the prosecution in Bond last term,” said that if the government’s policy was to always prosecute so severely, the Court was “going to be much more careful about how extensive statutes are” and how much “coverage” to give them.
And neither is severe sentencing. Much of this was driven by the sentencing risk Yates faced — twenty years for destroying evidence of a civil infraction. A number of Justices questioned why Congress needed to enact another obstruction provision with a 20-year max when there were others available. The government tried to back its way out of the inquiry by explaining that the prosecutor had recommended a Guideline sentence of 21 to 27 months and Yates only got 30 days in jail, but Chief Justice Roberts highlighted that the issue was not the actual sentence received but the “extraordinary leverage that the broadest interpretation of this statute would give Federal prosecutors.” He specifically mentioned prosecutors using the risk of severe sentencing to force pleas, and Justice Scalia’s questions suggests he was troubled by the same thing.
Overcriminalization exacts real hams. I’m by no means a statutory interpretation wonk, so my interest in Yates is focused on how the case tees up the issue of overcriminalization (particularly in the white collar context). Overcriminalization exacts harms by making prosecutors lawmakers and adjudicators of the criminal code, which invariably leads to arbitrary enforcement. This is what so many of the Justices were reacting to during the argument. But overcriminalization’s real harm, which flows from that arbitrary enforcement, is that it lessens the legitimacy of the criminal law. The absurdity of the Yates prosecution, while making for a lively and fun argument, demonstrated the point. It’s fine to laugh, but when that laughter is directed at our criminal justice system, that’s a serious matter. The question is whether the Court will take this opportunity to provide a serious response.
Predicting a winner. Using the method of tallying questions to the litigants during argument as a way to predict the outcome — the party receiving the most questions from the Justices during oral argument is more likely to lose (see here for a discussion of the methodology) — I’ll go ahead and predict a winner. According to my notes, Yates’ attorney received approximately 29 questions (I say approximately because it’s hard to know how to count Justice Breyer’s three-part hypotheticals) to the government’s 36, which suggests Yates will prevail. The tone of the questions certainly point to the same conclusion, and it’s consistent with how other’s saw the argument — see here.
Thursday, November 06, 2014
Impact of California's Prop 47 already being felt ... by defense attorneys and police
This local article from California, headlined "Scramble to implement Prop 47 begins," spotlight the impact already being felt by the passage of the biggest criminal justice reform initiative of Election 2014. Here are the (already remarkable) basics:
Just hours after the last ballot returns were counted, the phone lines of defense attorneys across the state began to light up Wednesday morning with calls from inmates.
With the passage of Proposition 47, simple drug possession and property crimes valued under $950 are now misdemeanors, effective immediately. Punishment means, at the worst, up to a year in jail, no longer prison. It also means up to 10,000 inmates serving time for those crimes can begin to apply for shortened sentences, a process many were eager to get started.
“This morning at 8 a.m., we took 10 attorneys and put them on the phones,” said Randy Mize, a chief deputy at the Public Defender’s Office. “They were taking 200 calls an hour from inmates in county jail. These are people asking us to file petitions on their behalf.”
The scramble to put the new law into practice was starting to touch all corners of the criminal justice system Wednesday, from the City Attorney’s Office, which will have to handle 3,000 extra cases a year, to police officers who will have new protocols to follow for certain arrests.
At Juvenile Hall Wednesday morning, six kids were released because they had felony charges that are now classified as misdemeanors under Proposition 47, and legally minors can’t be detained longer than an adult would, authorities said. “I think the roll out today started fairly smoothly,” Mize said. He attributed much of that to the fact that criminal justice leaders from around the county — including prosecutors, public defenders, the sheriff and probation officers — have been meeting for the past month to prepare for this day....
The law is intended to ease prison overcrowding, and put most of the estimated $200 million saved in prison costs annually into drug and mental health treatment programs to staunch recidivism. The majority of law enforcement officials around the state and the county are skeptical it will have the desired effect, and fear less time behind bars will only contribute to the revolving door of the criminal justice system. But, officials say, they will do their best to make it work. “It’s still a work in progress,” Sheriff Bill Gore said Wednesday. “Our primary concern is clearly the public’s safety.”...
Law enforcement officers were reminded of the new law in police lineups around the county. As of Wednesday, six crimes that used to be felonies are now misdemeanors: drug possession for personal use, as well as five property crimes valued below $950, theft, writing bad checks, forgery, shoplifting and receiving stolen property.
One of the biggest differences when arresting someone on a misdemeanor, rather than a felony, is that the crime must have occurred in the officer’s presence, or be witnessed by a citizen willing to sign an affidavit saying so. Several training memos have been distributed in the past few weeks to prepare deputies on such arrests, Gore said....
The Public Defender’s Office has already identified about 200 state prisoners and 1,800 other offenders either in jail or under the supervision of probation who might be eligible to be resentenced under Proposition 47. The first set of petitions are expected to be filed within the next day or so, with priority given to those in custody. Once the application is filed in court, the District Attorney’s Office will review it to make sure the person is eligible, then a judge will OK it and hand down a new, shorter sentence. The process could be as quick as a few weeks for the first group of offenders, said Mize, with public defender’s office.
“There will be a few cases that the DA thinks should be excluded, and we don’t, and those will be litigated,” Mize said. There may also be a few offenders that prosecutors think are too dangerous to be released, and those cases will be argued. Inmates who can’t be resentenced are those who have prior convictions such as murder, attempted murder and violent sex crimes.
The public defender’s office has also identified nearly 200,000 other people who have been convicted since 1990 — that’s as far back as its database goes — of the crimes reclassified under Proposition 47. They can now apply to have their records show misdemeanor rather than felony convictions. Statewide, that could apply to millions of people. Said Mize, “It will certainly take a lot more work in the short term.”
Prior related posts on California's Prop 47:
- Inititative details and debates over California's Proposition 47 to reduce severity of various crimes
- Is California's Prop. 47 a "common-sense" or a "radical" reform to the state's criminal laws?
- Newt Gingrich helps explain "What California can learn from the red states on crime and punishment"
- Reviewing California's debate over lowering sentences through Prop 47
- Notable pitch for California Prop 47 based in mental health concerns
- New York Times editorial makes the case for California's Prop 47
- California sentencing reform initiative Prop 47 wins big getting almost 60% support
November 6, 2014 in Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
New California report finds many challenges in sex offender monitoring
As reported in this local piece from California, "two-thirds of parole agents who monitor sex offenders juggle caseloads that exceed department standards, a state corrections review reported Wednesday in response to an Orange County murder case." Here is more about the report's findings:
Agents are supposed to supervise between 20 and 40 parolees, depending on how many are high-risk offenders. But more often than not, the state Office of the Inspector General found, agents are overburdened. At 14 of the state’s 37 units responsible for supervising paroled sex offenders, all agents had bigger caseloads than department policies allow. The inspector general surveyed the units’ caseloads in August.
The report also criticized the effectiveness of GPS monitoring and housing restrictions enacted through Jessica’s Law, a 2006 ballot measure. The inspector general tied the restrictions to a spike in homelessness and strained resources....
The state Sex Offender Management Board recommended four years ago that agents supervise no more than 20 paroled sex offenders. But the inspector general said corrections officials haven’t adopted the lower threshold.
The inspector general report was requested by state Sen. Darrell Steinberg after the April arrests of Steven Gordon and Franc Cano, two transient sex offenders registered to live in Anaheim. Steinberg was head of the Senate at the time and chairman of its rules committee....
Steinberg didn’t request that the inspector general probe how Gordon and Cano were supervised by parole agents. Previously, the office did just that after the high-profile convictions of sex offenders Phillip Garrido and John Gardner. This time, Steinberg focused on broader questions about the impact of GPS monitoring and housing restrictions.
The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation estimates that it spent about $7.9 million to monitor more than 6,000 paroled sex offenders with GPS devices in the last fiscal year, a decline from $12.4 million four years earlier.
The detailed 80+-page report from the California Office of Inspector General, which is titled "Special Review: Assessment of Electronic Monitoring of Sex Offenders on Parole and the Impact of Residency Restrictions," is available at this link.
November 6, 2014 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Based on questions asked at SCOTUS oral argument, wins predicted for federal defendants in Johnson and Yates
As discussed in prior posts here and here, yestderay the Supreme Court heard oral argumentsin two notable federal criminal justices cases, Yates v. United States and Johnson v. United States. I am hoping soon to find the time to read the full arguments transcripts in both cases (which are available here and here). Fortunately, thanks to my old pal Professor Ed Lee and this post at ISCOTUSnow, I do not have to read the transcripts in order to have an informed guess as to who will prevail. Here is why:
I’m predicting the winners of the Supreme Court cases based on the number of questions asked during oral argument. Studies have shown that the advocate who receives more questions during oral argument is more likely to lose....
Yates v. United States asks whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519—which makes it a crime for anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation—where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or informational content or purpose.
This is a close call. The Court was very active in questioning both sides. By my count, the Petitioner (Yates) received 49 questions and the Respondent (Solicitor General) 54 questions, which militates slightly in favor of the Petitioner.
But, if you break down the questions asked by Justice, the picture gets more complicated. Four Justices (Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) asked the Respondent fewer questions, while only three Justices (Roberts, Scalia, and Breyer) asked the Petitioner fewer questions. Justice Alito asked both sides an equal number of questions (3). Justice Thomas asked no questions.
My confidence level is not high in predicting the winner. It appears to be a very close case. The total number of questions slightly favors the Petitioner, while the questions per Justice slightly favors the Respondent. If I had to choose, I would give a slight nod to the Respondent (Solicitor General) based on the higher number of Justices (4) who asked the Respondent fewer questions.
The second case, Johnson v. United States, asks whether mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun should be treated as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
This case is easier to predict, even though the total question count per side was closer. The Court asked almost the same number of questions to each side: 36 to the Petitioner (Johnson) and 37 to the Respondent (Solicitor General). The questions asked by each Justice tells a different picture. Four Justices (Roberts, Ginsberg, Breyer, and Kagan) asked the Petitioner fewer questions. Only two Justices (Scalia and Alito) asked the Respondent fewer questions. Justice Sotomayor asked the same number of questions (5) to each side, while Justices Kennedy and Thomas asked no questions. Another noteworthy point: Justice Alito, in fact, asked 17 questions to the Petitioner — a high number of questions that is somewhat unusual for a Justice to ask one side during oral argument. Justice Alito’s questioning might have inflated the Petitioner’s total question count, in other words. Accordingly, I predict a win for the Petitioner (Johnson), who argued that mere possession of a short-barreled shotgun is not a violent felony under the ACCA.
Previous related posts:
- SCOTUS hears argument in two notable federal criminal justice cases this week
- Terrific SCOTUSblog previews of this week's SCOTUS arguments in Johnson and Yates
- SCOTUS preview guest-post: "Measuring the Dangerousness of Felonies for Sentencing Purposes"
- "Fish, Shotguns and Judicial Activism"
Wednesday, November 05, 2014
"Fish, Shotguns and Judicial Activism"
The title of this post is the title of this terrific new Bloomberg commentary by Noah Feldman spotlighting some connected issues in the two big federal criminal justice cases being heard today by the US Supreme Court. Here are extended excerpts that explain why jurisprudes, and not just criminal justice fans, ought to be watching these cases closely:
Is a fish a tangible object? Does a sawed-off shotgun pose serious risk of injury? Laugh if you must, but the U.S. Supreme Court is taking up these questions in a pair of cases that will form another chapter in the saga of our vastly expanding federal criminal law. Funny as the cases may seem -- both funny strange and funny ha-ha -- they illustrate how policy and law constantly interact for a court deeply divided about the nature of statutory interpretation.
The fish case, Yates v. United States, involves a Florida fishing boat that was boarded and found to have 72 undersized grouper aboard. Ordered to bring the fish back to port where they would be used as evidence, the skipper, John Yates, instead threw them overboard and tried to substitute fish that were over the legal size requirement.
The criminal nature of the act seems intuitive. The part that has reached the Supreme Court on appeal stems from Yates’s conviction under a provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that punishes anyone who “knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object.” The government says that Yates destroyed a tangible object, namely the fish. Yates says the law, passed after the Enron scandal, is intended to prohibit shredding documents, not throwing fish into the sea....
Aristotle, followed by today’s purpose-driven interpreters such as Justice Stephen Breyer, believed the solution is to interpret the law as its authors would have intended had they only thought of the future case. Others, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, reject the idea that the judge should do anything but apply the law as it is written. Ordinarily, you could expect the case to come down to this division, and to come out 5-4, depending on what Justice Anthony Kennedy thinks of it.
In Yates’s case, things are more complicated. Breyer may well reason that the underlying purpose of the statute is not to protect documents from destruction but to protect evidence in federal cases from being destroyed by defendants. If so, he would uphold Yates’s conviction insofar as Yates was clearly trying to get away with a crime by getting rid of the evidence.
For his part, Scalia may find himself affected by a special principle that he applies only in criminal cases: the “rule of lenity,” according to which an ambiguous statute should be interpreted in favor of the criminal defendant. If Scalia were to follow this principle, he might overturn the conviction.
Of course, whether to apply the rule of lenity depends on whether you think the law is ambiguous. The government says it isn’t: You can hold a fish, so it’s a tangible object. If Scalia thinks the ambiguity -- if any -- derives from context, not language, then according to his own jurisprudence, he shouldn’t apply the rule of lenity, and should uphold the conviction.
The shotgun case, Johnson v. United States, is no less challenging -- and no less odd. Samuel James Johnson, founder of something called the Aryan Liberation Movement, was arrested after he made the mistake of telling an undercover federal agent about his plans for attacking various non-Aryan targets. He was in possession of weapons including an AK-47 -- and that possession was a felony that would ordinarily have gotten him roughly 10 years in prison. But Johnson had three prior convictions. And under the federal Armed Career Criminal Act, a fourth conviction for a violent felony carries a minimum of 15 years.
The law defines “violent felony” to include a range of obvious crimes -- plus any “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” One of Johnson’s prior state convictions was for possession of a short-barreled shotgun. Did owning the illegal shotgun pose a serious potential risk?
You won’t be surprised to hear what the gun lobby thinks about that in its friend of the court briefs -- but that’s not really the important point here. The crucial question is, what’s the meaning of the so-called residual clause of the repeat offender law? How should the courts define what counts as a serious risk of potential injury?
The Supreme Court has been answering that question on a case by case basis -- a practice disliked by, you guessed it, Justice Scalia. He thinks the law is unconstitutionally vague, because it doesn’t provide defendants sufficient notice or the courts adequate guidance. It’s easy to see why the law worries Scalia. He wants the courts to follow the law’s literal meaning, not its policy aims -- but it’s almost impossible not to inject policy when the law tells you to evaluate “serious potential risk of physical injury.”
The purpose-oriented justices look at the interpretive issue and see business as usual. To them, the courts must always consider policy and purpose, whether the subject is tangible fish or injurious firearms.
Who’s right is a deep question of jurisprudence. But as a practical matter, the cases show that Scalia’s approach, devoted to opposing judicial activism, won’t work when Congress actively wants the judiciary to make the law up as it goes along. If Scalia wants to avoid relying on his own judgment, he has to strike down the law as unconstitutional. And that isn’t judicial restraint. It’s activism.
Some previous related posts:
- SCOTUS hears argument in two notable federal criminal justice cases this week
- Terrific SCOTUSblog previews of this week's SCOTUS arguments in Johnson and Yates
- SCOTUS preview guest-post: "Measuring the Dangerousness of Felonies for Sentencing Purposes"
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
US District Judge Kopf reports on retroactive implementation of new reduced federal drug guidelines in Nebraska
As noted in this post from last week, the start of November2014 marked the official start for the new reduced federal guidelines for drug offenses put in place by guideline Amendment 782. At his great blog, US District Judge Richard Kopf has this lengthy new post on the practicalities of implementing the Amendment's retroactivity in his district. I recommend the whole post, from which these excerpts are drawn:
I will take a moment to describe the implementation of Amendment 782 in the District of Nebraska. We are a small district with a large criminal case load, especially including drug cases. As of June 30, 2014, on a per-judge basis, we ranked seventh in the nation and first in the Eighth Circuit for criminal cases. Indeed, Amendment 782 may impact over 700 offenders previously sentenced in our court. Behind the scenes, the implementation of Amendment 782 has had a huge impact on us as we try to fully and fairly implement this important retroactive change to the Guidelines.
With 700 offenders potentially eligible for a sentencing reduction, our district decided that every potentially eligible offender would have his or her case individually scrutinized whether or not a motion had been filed and that every such offender would have a lawyer. After conferring with the United States Attorney, the Federal Public Defender and our probation office, we issued general (standing) orders....
Four people are responsible for superintending the implementation of Amendment 782: two very senior United States Probation officers who are experts in the Guidelines; the head of the drug prosecution unit of the US Attorney’s office; and the Federal Public Defender. They have cooperated nicely, and have established internal operating protocols between them. After the Clerk’s office tracked down the whereabouts of each of the 700 or so offenders through the Bureau of Prisons (a huge task), the group of four sensibly decided upon a “triage” plan. Offenders who are eligible for release on the earliest possible date (November 1, 2015), get attention first. Offenders who are eligible later receive attention later.
Ultimately, the Federal Public Defender, or one of his assistants or a Criminal Justice Act panel lawyer, will file a motion for relief when the group of four decide that the time is right. A probation officer will submit and file as a restricted document a worksheet that includes a calculation under Amendment 782 and the Guidelines. That worksheet will also include a report on the offender’s institutional adjustment and the probation officer’s recommendation about whether relief should be granted....
After the motion is filed, and the worksheet is submitted, the prosecutor and defense lawyer will confer and in most cases a stipulation will be reached. Assuming a stipulation is reached, it will be filed. After that, and without a hearing, relief will normally be granted. If no stipulation can be reached, then in my cases a hearing will be held.
It is possible that a judge might tentatively conclude not to follow a stipulation. While I cannot speak for the other judges, in my cases, I will hold a hearing to give the parties an opportunity to be heard. Whether or not the defendant will be present at such a hearing has yet to be determined by me. In the past, if a dispute of fact arose and the offender could be expected to have unique knowledge of the facts, I have not hesitated to give the offender an opportunity to appear and testify. It is probable that I will follow the same approach for Amendment 782 factual disputes where the testimony of the offender is critical to the fair resolution of the matter. However, in the huge majority of cases, this will not be necessary.
In summary, the equitable and effective implementation of Amendment 782 requires a lot of “behind the scenes” work. We are fortunate to have the cooperative, but always zealous, assistance of prosecutors and defense lawyers, aided by a probation office that is second to none.
"Profiles in Probation Revocation: Examining the Legal Framework in 21 States"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new research report just released by the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. Via the Robina Institute at this webpage, here are the basics of the report's coverage and contents:
The Robina Institute is pleased to present the publication of Profiles in Probation Revocation: Examining the Legal Framework in 21 States, a close look at probation revocation practices in twenty-one states and the Model Penal Code. The first publication of the Probation Revocation Project, Profiles on Probation Revocation, allows for a comparison across selected jurisdictions. This report reveals a wide variation in probation practices in the United States and we hope it will further the dialogue on community supervision and probation practices.
This publication is the first in a series that will be produced by the Probation Revocation Project. The focus of this publication is the legal framework of probation: that is, how have the legislature and courts defined the purpose and functions of probation in each state? The focus of one or more subsequent publications will be how probation actually works within that legal framework.
In addition, I received from one of the authors of the report this more extended summary of its coverage:
The report compiles — in a convenient format — the results of a yearlong research project conducted by the Robina Institute on the laws relating to probation revocation in 21 American states. By leafing through the volume’s four-page “legal profiles,” readers can easily see how much variation exists in statewide laws of probation and probation revocation, while zeroing in on issues of greatest interest. Whether a reader’s jurisdiction is included in the report’s 21 states or not, the legal profiles contain a wealth of information that will allow for comparison with one’s own system.
The focus of the report is probation revocations and what leads up to them. Each legal profile describes a particular state’s approach to issues collected under twelve headings concerning probation. These are: Definition and Purpose, Forms of Probation, Length of Term, Early Termination, Supervision, Conditions, Modification of Conditions, Extension of Probation Term, Revocation Procedures, Legal Standard for Revocation, Revocation and Lesser Sanctions, and Appeal. The selected topics embrace aspects of the use of probation that may contribute to (or, conversely, reduce) revocation rates or the numbers of probationers who enter revocation proceedings.
Each profile begins with the nature of the probation sanction itself, including lengths of term and the burdens placed on probationers through sentence conditions. These are the early precursors of revocation rates. The profiles also focus on what happens during the probation term, and how the law allows the terms of conditions of probation to lighten or grow more restrictive in individual cases. For example, legal arrangements during the probation period that encourage probationers to succeed — or at least do not impede their success — will have an impact on revocation numbers. Finally, the profiles give close attention to each state’s probation revocation process itself, including the legal grounds for revocation, the identity of the ultimate decisionmaker (judicial versus administrative), rules for hearings, procedural rights that accrue to the probationer, and the range of sanctions that may be imposed after a sentence violation is proven or admitted.
The report relies on official legal source materials such as statutes, court rules, caselaw, administrative rules and policies, and publicly-available documents. The report seeks to describe, more or less, the “law-on-the-books,” while realizing that the official sources do not necessarily reflect actual practices of probation supervision and revocation on the ground. Even so, the report provides new and valuable comparative information about statewide legal superstructures for probationary sentences. While not a full portrait of what happens in individual states, the report illuminates crucial legal boundaries within which local and case-specific discretion must be exercised.
Monday, November 03, 2014
"Narcotics Prosecutors as Problem Solvers"
The title of this post is the title of this intriguing little new piece by Mark Osler now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
When deciding whether and how to pursue narcotics cases, federal prosecutors should focus not on number of convictions or quantity of drugs intercepted, but rather on whether they are solving problems through the cases they choose. He first examines federal prosecutors' extremely broad discretion in selecting narcotics defendants and charges, as well as some of the negative effects of the failure to employ a "problem solving" rubric in the war on drugs to date. He then suggests a number of changes that such a rubric would bring to the way narcotics cases are pursued, including a change in the proxy that prosecutors use for defendant culpability from drug quantity to drug profits.
Judge Rakoff highlights prosecutorial sentencing power in explaining "Why Innocent People Plead Guilty"
Regular readers know that US District Judge Jed Rakoff has become a prominent regular critic of many aspects of the modern federal criminal justice system. In the latest issue of The New York Review of Books, Judge Rakoff provides an astute and effective review of how prosecutors have come to possess considerable unregulated sentencing powers in our modern system dominated by plea bargainiang. His lengthy article's title, "Why Innocent People Plead Guilty," spotlights one key aspect of Judge Rakoff's concerns with the current system. But, as these passages reveal, his central theme in this must-read piece is unregulated prosecutorial powers:
The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.” The Constitution further guarantees that at the trial, the accused will have the assistance of counsel, who can confront and cross-examine his accusers and present evidence on the accused’s behalf. He may be convicted only if an impartial jury of his peers is unanimously of the view that he is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and so states, publicly, in its verdict.
The drama inherent in these guarantees is regularly portrayed in movies and television programs as an open battle played out in public before a judge and jury. But this is all a mirage. In actuality, our criminal justice system is almost exclusively a system of plea bargaining, negotiated behind closed doors and with no judicial oversight. The outcome is very largely determined by the prosecutor alone....
Until late last year, federal prosecutors were under orders from a series of attorney generals to charge the defendant with the most serious charges that could be proved — unless, of course, the defendant was willing to enter into a plea bargain. If, however, the defendant wants to plead guilty, the prosecutor will offer him a considerably reduced charge — but only if the plea is agreed to promptly (thus saving the prosecutor valuable resources). Otherwise, he will charge the maximum, and, while he will not close the door to any later plea bargain, it will be to a higher-level offense than the one offered at the outset of the case.
In this typical situation, the prosecutor has all the advantages. He knows a lot about the case (and, as noted, probably feels more confident about it than he should, since he has only heard from one side), whereas the defense lawyer knows very little. Furthermore, the prosecutor controls the decision to charge the defendant with a crime. Indeed, the law of every US jurisdiction leaves this to the prosecutor’s unfettered discretion; and both the prosecutor and the defense lawyer know that the grand jury, which typically will hear from one side only, is highly likely to approve any charge the prosecutor recommends.
But what really puts the prosecutor in the driver’s seat is the fact that he — because of mandatory minimums, sentencing guidelines (which, though no longer mandatory in the federal system, are still widely followed by most judges), and simply his ability to shape whatever charges are brought — can effectively dictate the sentence by how he publicly describes the offense. For example, the prosecutor can agree with the defense counsel in a federal narcotics case that, if there is a plea bargain, the defendant will only have to plead guilty to the personal sale of a few ounces of heroin, which carries no mandatory minimum and a guidelines range of less than two years; but if the defendant does not plead guilty, he will be charged with the drug conspiracy of which his sale was a small part, a conspiracy involving many kilograms of heroin, which could mean a ten-year mandatory minimum and a guidelines range of twenty years or more. Put another way, it is the prosecutor, not the judge, who effectively exercises the sentencing power, albeit cloaked as a charging decision.
Long-time readers know that this article gets to the heart of debates that Bill Otis and I have often had over the virtues and vices of mandatory minimum sentencing provisions. Because Judge Rakoff comes down on my side of this debate, few should be surprised to hear that I am a big fan of this article (though I wish Judge Rakoff had also discussed and lamented how acquitted conduct sentencing rules in the federal system further enhances prosecutors' charging/plea/sentencing powers).
Prior related posts on Judge Rakoff's commentaries:
- "Why innocent people plead guilty": Judge Jed Rakoff suggests "tens of thousands of innocent people" have been "coerced into pleading guilty"
- Judge Rakoff calls for fraud guidelines to be "scrapped in their entirety" in favor of a "non-arithmetic, multi-factor test"
- Thoughtful response to Judge Rakoff's call to scrap fraud guidelines
Sunday, November 02, 2014
"Crashing the Misdemeanor System"
The title of this post is the title of this intriguing article by Jenny Roberts recently posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:
With “minor crimes” making up more than 75% of state criminal caseloads, the United States faces a misdemeanor crisis. Although mass incarceration continues to plague the nation, the current criminal justice system is faltering under the weight of misdemeanor processing.
Operating under the “broken windows theory,” which claims that public order law enforcement prevents more serious crime, the police send many petty offenses to criminal court. This is so even though the original authors of the theory noted that “[o]rdinarily, no judge or jury ever sees the persons caught up in a dispute over the appropriate level of neighborhood order” and that “a judge may not be any wiser or more effective than a police officer.” Prosecutors have largely failed to exercise discretion in misdemeanor cases, instead churning them through the already overburdened courts. Judges too have been complicit, failing to dismiss weak cases and to intervene when defenders represent their clients ineffectively. As a result, many cases end in a quick guilty plea with little or no jail time. The “broken windows theory” suggests that everyone benefits from such efficiency.
Yet the effect of misdemeanor convictions is anything but minor. A quick guilty plea appears advantageous for a disorderly conduct misdemeanor in exchange for the night already served in jail. But this conviction can, and does, lead to eviction from public housing. It can, and does, pose a bar to showing “good moral conduct” for citizenship. And it can, and does, make it difficult to find work in an era when employers routinely run criminal background checks. The many harsh collateral consequences of even a “minor” misdemeanor conviction create serious barriers to the most basic aspects of life. Mass misdemeanor processing thus harms the individual, his family, his community, and society.
Refusing to process individuals quickly would impose some of the real costs of mass misdemeanor processing on the justice system itself. Such a “crash” of the criminal justice system would not be dramatic. Instead, if defense counsel litigated some of the many factual and legal issues that misdemeanors present, the system would grind to a halt under its own weight. The representation would be nothing more than Gideon and its progeny require, but would shift the burden for mass misdemeanor processing to the prosecution and the courts from misdemeanor defendants. Under this weight, legislators might reduce the short- and long-term costs of mass misdemeanor policing. Prosecutors might exercise greater discretion, and police officers might maintain order without needless arrests.
Part I explores the idea of crashing the system as a potential response to the misdemeanor crisis. Part II describes the potential role for defense counsel in such an institutional response. Part III outlines specific strategies that specialized defender practice groups might pursue to crash the system. Part IV explores arguments for and against efforts to crash the existing misdemeanor system.
Wednesday, October 29, 2014
Federal judge (improperly?) delays imposing max sentence on fraudster to allow time to consider withdrawal of plea
This Newsday article provide an account of a seemingly unusual development as a federal district judge was about to throw the book at a high-profile white-collar defendant. Here are the details:
Onetime New York Islanders part owner Stephen Walsh was hit with the maximum sentence of 20 years for a $50 million fraud on Wednesday, but the judge postponed imposing it to let stunned defense lawyers consider an appeal or voiding his guilty plea.
Walsh, 70, of Sands Point, an Islanders executive and co-owner from 1991 to 2000, was accused in 2009 of bilking investors in his WG Trading Company to finance a lavish lifestyle. He pleaded guilty in April, and partner Paul Greenwood pleaded guilty in 2010.
At the sentencing before U.S. District Judge Miriam Cedarbaum in Manhattan, Walsh said he was "deeply sorry," while his lawyer argued most investors were made whole and said Walsh deserved credit for charitable work, such as co-founding a Long Island Alzheimer's foundation. They asked for 18 to 24 months with community service.
But Cedarbaum was unmoved, noting that the scam went on for 13 years and Walsh fought the charges for five years before pleading guilty and taking responsibility. "The proceeds of this scheme were used for personal extravagances and high living," she said. "Lots of people lost lots of money, and some of it will trickle back to them, but that does not justify using it for your own benefit and spending it on frivolous things."
The judge said she was imposing the maximum penalty for securities fraud of 20 years. That was the sentence recommended by probation officers, called for under federal sentencing guidelines and urged by prosecutors.
Walsh, as part of his plea, had agreed to not appeal any sentence up to 240 months. But white-collar defendants frequently get more lenient treatment -- in part because many judges feel federal guidelines overemphasize the significance of the amount of loss in calculating sentences -- and the sentence produced gasps from Walsh's friends and family in the gallery. "Oh my God!" said one woman.
Defense lawyer Michael Tremonte first asked Cedarbaum to impose 20 years and a day, so it would become appealable. "I don't think anyone expected we would be at the outer range of the hypothetical guideline range," he said. "There is not another case even remotely like it where a 20-year sentence has been imposed."
The judge refused, telling him that she would not circumvent a plea agreement in which Walsh gave up his right to appeal the sentence. But she agreed to postpone imposing the sentence until Tuesday, to give Tremonte the chance to consult with Walsh and research grounds for withdrawing the plea. Tremonte and prosecutors had no comment after the hearing.
Walsh and Greenwood were charged soliciting $7.6 billion, mostly from institutional investors, to pursue a conservative investing strategy, and then misappropriating it. Walsh allegedly used investor money to finance a divorce settlement and fund businesses for his children, and Greenwood purchased expensive stallions and high-priced teddy bears.
I am inclined to be a bit sympathetic to the defense side here because I find troublesome any and all waivers of the right to appeal a sentence. That said, I would guess that the defendant here had sound legal representation and knowingly agreed to a plea deal that included such a waiver, and thus I am not especially inclined to believe he should now be able to back out of the deal because it did not work out the way he expected. And I am not aware of any case in which a judge defered imposition of a sentence to give the defendant a chance to try to undo a plea deal simply because that judge was going to impose a long sentence that was, as reported above, "recommended by probation officers, called for under federal sentencing guidelines and urged by prosecutors."
Monday, October 27, 2014
Prosecutors in South Africa indicate they plan to appeal Pistorius outcome
As reported in this article, headlined "South Africa prosecutors to appeal against Pistorius sentence," it appears that the Blade Runner is not done running from serious legal difficulties. Here are the bascis:
South Africa’s state prosecutor plans to appeal against Oscar Pistorius’s culpable homicide conviction and five-year prison sentence for shooting his girlfriend Reeva Steenkamp, it said on Monday.
Nathi Mncube, spokesman for the National Prosecuting Authority, said the NPA expected to file papers in the next few days. Until the papers were filed, it would not announce the grounds for appeal, it said.
But Pistorius’s conviction for culpable homicide has drawn criticism from some legal commentators. After the athlete, a double-amputee who starred at the 2012 London Olympics and Paralympics, was sentenced last week, there was more controversy when lawyers said he could serve as little as 10 months, or a sixth of the five-year term.
In South Africa, an appeal can only be made on a matter of law, “where we think . . . the judge made an error in interpretation and in the manner in which she applied the law to the facts”, Mr Mncube said.
Pistorius had been charged with premeditated murder after shooting Steenkamp, a 29-year-old model and law graduate, four times through the locked toilet door in a bathroom at his home in the early hours of Valentine’s Day last year. But Judge Thokozile Masipa ruled that the prosecution failed to show Pistorius had intent to kill, while saying there was “no basis on which this court could make inferences of why the accused would want to kill the deceased”. Instead, she appeared to believe Pistorius’s version of events, despite describing the 27-year-old as a “poor” and “evasive” witness.
"Truth, Justice, and the American Style Plea Bargain"
The title of this post is the title of this article by Ken Strutin now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:
In the 2011 term, the Supreme Court decided two cases, Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, which highlighted whether the Sixth Amendment right to counsel safeguarded the integrity of the trial or encompassed non-trial facets such as the plea bargain. This line of decisions has been followed most recently by Burt v. Titlow, which further defined the role of postconviction record-making in assessing the fundamental question: Did the right to effective assistance of counsel protect the accuracy of the verdict or the fairness of the process?
Through the prism of recent Supreme Court plea bargaining decisions this Article examines their implications for the competing goals of truth versus process. Part I frames the argument about the nature of criminal justice and the tension between fact-finding trials and resolution making plea negotiations. Then, those values are scrutinized in the context of three recent and watershed Supreme Court decisions: Part II Missouri v. Frye, Part III Lafler v. Cooper, and Part IV Burt v. Titlow. Lastly, Part V considers the lessons of wrongful incarceration as guideposts to align accuracy with certainty in the administration of justice.
Sunday, October 26, 2014
More drug war collateral damage: "Law Lets I.R.S. Seize Accounts on Suspicion, No Crime Required"
The title of this post includes my extra bit of spin on the headline of this notable front-page New York Times article, which gets started this way:
For almost 40 years, Carole Hinders has dished out Mexican specialties at her modest cash-only restaurant. For just as long, she deposited the earnings at a small bank branch a block away — until last year, when two tax agents knocked on her door and informed her that they had seized her checking account, almost $33,000.
The Internal Revenue Service agents did not accuse Ms. Hinders of money laundering or cheating on her taxes — in fact, she has not been charged with any crime. Instead, the money was seized solely because she had deposited less than $10,000 at a time, which they viewed as an attempt to avoid triggering a required government report. “How can this happen?” Ms. Hinders said in a recent interview. “Who takes your money before they prove that you’ve done anything wrong with it?”
The federal government does. Using a law designed to catch drug traffickers, racketeers and terrorists by tracking their cash, the government has gone after run-of-the-mill business owners and wage earners without so much as an allegation that they have committed serious crimes. The government can take the money without ever filing a criminal complaint, and the owners are left to prove they are innocent. Many give up.
“They’re going after people who are really not criminals,” said David Smith, a former federal prosecutor who is now a forfeiture expert and lawyer in Virginia. “They’re middle-class citizens who have never had any trouble with the law.”
On Thursday, in response to questions from The New York Times, the I.R.S. announced that it would curtail the practice, focusing instead on cases where the money is believed to have been acquired illegally or seizure is deemed justified by “exceptional circumstances.”
Richard Weber, the chief of Criminal Investigation at the I.R.S., said in a written statement, “This policy update will ensure that C.I. continues to focus our limited investigative resources on identifying and investigating violations within our jurisdiction that closely align with C.I.’s mission and key priorities.” He added that making deposits under $10,000 to evade reporting requirements, called structuring, is still a crime whether the money is from legal or illegal sources. The new policy will not apply to past seizures.
October 26, 2014 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (21) | TrackBack
Media coalition sues Arizona on First Amendment grounds seeking more info on executions
As detailed in this article from The Guardian, the "secrecy imposed by Arizona on the source and quality of the lethal injection drugs it uses to kill death row inmates has been challenged in a new lawsuit brought by the Guardian and other media organizations." Here is more about the lawsuit (including a link to the filing):
Saturday, October 25, 2014
"Jury Says Castrated Sex Offender Should Be Freed"
The title of this post is the headline of this notable AP story out of California. Here are the intriguing details:
A Southern California jury on Friday found that a castrated sex offender who preyed on young girls should no longer be considered a sexually violent predator and is eligible for release. Jurors in Orange County determined that Kevin Reilly, 53, does not need to remain locked up at a state mental hospital. He could be released as early as Friday, his lawyer said, but online jail records show he remained in custody as of mid-afternoon.
"There was simply no evidence he was likely to reoffend," said Holly Galloway, deputy public defender. "What the jury did was amazing because they followed the law and that's a hard thing to do with someone with his history, but it's the right thing to do."
Reilly served time in prison for sex offenses committed in the 1980s and 1990s and has been locked up in a state mental hospital since 2000 under a California law that enables authorities to forcibly commit sex offenders they believe will reoffend. He paid to be surgically castrated in 2003 to help control his pedophilia and completed a treatment program for sex offenders in 2010. State-appointed evaluators found he was not likely to reoffend, Galloway said, adding that Reilly also completed a bachelor's degree and master's degree.
Prosecutors argued that Reilly is still dangerous and that the effects of his castration, which aimed eliminate his sex drive, can be mitigated through testosterone injections. Michael Carroll, deputy district attorney, said Reilly did not confess to molesting one of his victims until three years ago and there were conflicting reports about what he told his evaluators and the court.
"I don't think he was honest during his treatment," Carroll said. "I think he continued to lie and attempted to manipulate because his ultimate purpose, I think, is to get out of the hospital, not necessarily to prevent creating any future victims." Reilly served time for committing lewd acts on four young girls over more than a decade, and later conceded he had abused at least three others, Carroll said. Most of the girls were between 4 and 8 years old.
He is required to register as a sex offender once he is released, and is planning to move to Utah, where he will participate in an outpatient treatment program for sex offenders and look for an accounting job, Carroll said.
Stories like this one provide support for my general view that juries, serving often as the conscience of a community, can and should be more often trusted to make difficult sentencing-type determinations and should not be relegated only to serving as a limited (and infrequently used) fact-finder in the operation of modern criminal justice systems.
October 25, 2014 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12) | TrackBack
Due to Alleyne, Kansas Supreme Court requires resentencing of murderer of abortion provider
As reported in this local article, headlined "Kansas Supreme Court vacates Roeder's 'Hard 50' sentence," the top court in the Sunflower State reversed a state mandatory minimum sentence in a high-profile murder case. Here are the details:
The Kansas Supreme Court on Friday upheld the premeditated first-degree murder conviction of Scott Roeder, convicted in the 2009 church killing of Wichita abortion provider Dr. George Tiller, but vacated his “Hard 50” life sentence.
In ordering Roeder’s sentence remanded to the Sedgwick County District Court, the Kansas high court noted the 2013 U.S. Supreme Court decision that deemed a sentence of 50 years without the possibility of parole must be levied by a jury as opposed to the trial judge.
The Kansas court has vacated and remanded at least five other Hard 50 sentences in light of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Alleyene vs. United States....
The court rejected all of Roeder’s other arguments in his bid for a new trial. Among those arguments was that Sedgwick County District Court Judge Warren Wilbert declined to allow Roeder to present a voluntary manslaughter defense based on the “imperfect defense of others” concept. Roeder never denied at trial that he intended to shoot and kill Tiller in the vestibule of the doctor’s Wichita church before services on Sunday, May 31, 2009, but said he did so to prevent the abortion provider from taking the lives of unborn children.
Roeder, who testified that his anti-abortion activities began after his 1992 conversion to Christianity, said his frustration grew after Tiller was acquitted in 2009 of 19 charges brought by former Kansas Attorney General Phill Kline alleging that Tiller broke state law in performing late-term abortions. Roeder testified that upon learning of Tiller's acquittal, he believed that “nothing was being done” and the legal process had been exhausted....
But the district court ruled that Roeder wasn’t entitled to use a necessity defense, based in part on a previous Kansas Supreme Court ruling — also involving an anti-abortion case — that a person isn’t entitled to a such a defense if the activity they were trying to stop was a legal activity....
“Even for Roeder's professed purpose of stopping all abortions, not just illegal abortions, the Draconian measure of murder was not the only alternative,” Justice Lee Johnson wrote in the unanimous decision. The district court also ruled, and the Supreme Court agreed, that Roeder wasn’t entitled to a voluntary manslaughter defense because no imminent threat existed on that Sunday morning to justify the use of lethal force....
The Kansas Legislature, responding to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Alleyene, rewrote the Kansas law on Hard 50 sentencing during a special session in 2013. The new law says a jury must determine whether special circumstances exist to impose the increased minimum sentence. But how such new sentencing will be conducted has yet to be determined, as none has yet been conducted in the cases where a Hard 50 sentence has been vacated. Sedgwick County District Attorney Mark Bennett said Friday after the Roeder decision that he intended to conduct such a hearing.
The full 50+ page opinion of the Kansas Supreme Court in Kansas v. Roeder, No. 104,520 (Kansas Oct. 24, 2014), is available at this link.
Friday, October 24, 2014
ACLU flies suit against Florida county's latest sex offender residency restrictions
As reported in this local article, headlined "ACLU sues over rule on where sex offenders can live in Miami-Dade," a notable new lawsuit has been brought against a community that has a long sad history of difficulties with sex offender residency realities. Here are the details:
For five years, Miami-Dade County’s sex offender law has sparked national headlines, as homeless parolees have been forced to move from street corners to parking lots because of a law that prohibits them from squatting near public spaces where children gather. Now, the dozens of homeless sex offenders — shuffled from under the Julia Tuttle Causeway to a Shorecrest street corner and finally to a parking lot near train tracks and warehouses just outside Hialeah — have a voice arguing on their behalf.
On Thursday, the national chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union filed a lawsuit in federal court reasoning that Miami-Dade County and the state Department of Corrections have violated the offenders’ basic rights to personal safety, and to maintain a home. The suit doesn’t name the ACLU’s clients, referring to them as John Doe 1, 2 and 3.
“It undermines public safety. It’s harder to find a job and maintain treatment. Housing stability is just as critical to these folks as to anyone else,” said Brandon Buskey, staff attorney for the Criminal Law Reform Project at the ACLU in New York City.
But the man behind the controversial county ordinance said no one has the right to demand where they live. Ron Book, the powerhouse state lobbyist and chair of the Miami-Dade Homeless Trust, said the courts have upheld the residency restrictions, and the ACLU is simply regurgitating an issue that’s been dealt with. “The U.S. Supreme Court has said they’re entitled to live places that don’t endanger the health, safety and welfare of law-abiding citizens of the U.S. But they’re entitled to take their $350 to the courthouse,” Book said of the ACLU. “I don’t support those with sexual deviant behavior living in close proximity to where kids are.”
The 22-page lawsuit, filed in the U.S. Court’s Southern District, calls the county ordinance vague, says it doesn’t allow sex offenders their due process, and adds that it leaves them in a vulnerable position and unsafe. “These individuals, who frequently subsist on meager incomes after being released from prison, are unable to locate stable, affordable housing in Miami-Dade County. This transience is primarily because the ordinance arbitrarily renders off-limits broad swaths of housing,” according to the complaint....
At the center of the battle between the ACLU and Miami-Dade is a law approved in 2010 called the Lauren Book Safety Ordinance. Lauren Book, Ron Book’s daughter, was sexually molested by a trusted nanny for six years, starting when she was 11. Lauren Book-Lim, now married and 29, is an advocate for the sexually abused. The 2010 ordinance was created after nearly 100 offenders were sent scrambling from squalid living conditions under the Julia Tuttle Causeway. The new law doesn’t allow offenders on parole within 2,500 feet of schools, parks, bus stops, or any other place children might congregate. Before the law, Miami-Dade followed a less restrictive state-created 1,000-foot law.
But the county ordinance had unintended consequences: It left sex offenders with few living options and almost immediately became a hot-button issue around the nation, even the world. There’s even a Wikipedia page about it.
Miami-Dade’s sexual offender homelessness issue first came to light in late 2009, when images of 92 homeless sex offenders living in plywood and cardboard sleeping quarters tucked under the Julia Tuttle Causeway at the height of the recession were splashed across TV. At the time, the county was still following the 1,000-foot state law.
Though the homeless offenders had been living there for about three years, embarrassed officials put up “No Trespassing” signs under one of the main causeways linking Miami and Miami Beach, and tore down the rickety structures. A promise to spend $1 million to find housing for the offenders didn’t solve the problem. The new, tougher, 2,500-foot ordinance was created mainly because of the Julia Tuttle fiasco....
Howard Simon, executive director of the Florida chapter of the ACLU said no entity should be allowed to strip anyone of their basic rights and force them into “dangerous and squalid conditions.”
“This is the second chapter of the same sad story,” he said. “The county provoked international outrage when it forced people to live under the Julia Tuttle bridge. Now it’s forcing people to live alongside railroad tracks.”
More details about the lawsuit and links to the filings are available at this ACLU page.
October 24, 2014 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack
Split Minnesota Supreme Court rules lenient sentence in rape case was abuse of discretion
As reported in this local article, headlined "Minnesota Supreme Court criticizes probation sentence in rape case," the top appellate court in Minnesota recently took the unusual step of overruled a trial judge's sentencing decision as an abuse of discretion. Here are the details:
In a rare and harshly worded ruling, the Minnesota Supreme Court said Wednesday that a lower court judge erred in sentencing a particularly violent rapist to probation rather than the recommended 12 years in prison.
Justice David Lillehaug opened his 21-page opinion by saying that district courts have a great deal of discretion in sentencing. And the state high court rarely holds that it has been abused, he said. “But rarely is not never,” he continued. “This is such a rare case.”
The state Supreme Court vacated the sentence of 30 years’ supervised probation given to Jose Arriaga Soto Jr. Polk County District Judge Jeffrey Remick now must conduct additional fact-finding on whether the recommended 12-year sentence should be imposed or if a departure from the guidelines is justified.
Soto was 37 when he beat and raped a woman for two hours after drinking all night in an East Grand Forks apartment in 2012. Soto pleaded guilty to first-degree criminal sexual conduct. A co-defendant who was involved in the rape to a lesser degree than Soto received 12 years in prison, the opinion noted in its many criticisms of the ruling.
A presentencing report said Soto had minimized his actions without taking responsibility and blamed the victim. At his sentencing, he apologized to her. The opinion notes, in a tempered outrage, the horrors of the assault for the victim: “Soto committed a forcible and violent assault against an intoxicated and thus particularly vulnerable person. The assault lasted approximately 2 hours and the victim was repeatedly subjected to multiple penetrations by two men. Soto slapped the victim’s face, choked her, and caused several injuries.”
The opinion noted the Legislature and the Sentencing Guidelines Commission have determined a sentence of 12 years in prison is “presumed to be appropriate” for someone with Soto’s criminal history who commits such a rape. The victim’s vulnerability, the multiple forms of penetration and other particular cruelty that may be involved suggests that an upward departure on the case could have been appropriate, the opinion says. The opinion also noted that Soto’s co-defendant, Ismael Hernandez, was “arguably less culpable than Soto — he left the room shortly after the sexual assault began,” but he went to prison for the presumptive sentence of 12 years....
Three of the seven justices dissented from Lillehaug’s opinion. Alan Page wrote that the district court relied on factors generally recognized by the higher court as potentially relevant considerations in determining whether probation was appropriate for Soto. “While another [district] court or the members of our court might have arrived at a different conclusion, that alone does not make this situation the ‘rare case’ warranting our intervention,” wrote Page, who was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Lorie Gildea and G. Barry Anderson....
Even though probation wasn’t recommended in Soto’s pre-sentence report by a probation officer or an evaluator from a sex offender treatment program, Remick placed him on supervised probation for 30 years. The judge emphasized Soto’s age, lack of serious criminal record and family support. He also said the crime was primarily caused by alcohol and that Soto’s attitude in court was largely respectful and that “this particular type of event seems largely out of character.”
Lillehaug’s opinion challenged all the factors Remick listed for Soto’s amenability to probation, finding that he drew false or inappropriate conclusions in considering them. He said the judge should have argued that Soto was “particularly” amendable, the legal standard used to justify the departure of staying a presumptive sentence.
The full majority and dissenting opinion in Minnesota v. Soto, No. A13-0997 (Minn. Oct. 22, 2014), can be accessed at this link.
October 24, 2014 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack
Wednesday, October 22, 2014
"The Death Penalty’s 'Finely Tuned Depravity Calibrators': Fairness Follies of Fairness Phonies Fixated on Criminals Instead of Crimes"
The title of this post is the title of this new article by Lester Jackson available via bepress SelectedWorks. Here is the abstract:
It has been loudly and repeatedly proclaimed by opponents that capital punishment is “unfair.” In their view, it is unfair because (1) only some murderers receive the ultimate sentence and (2) they are not the most deserving. Underlying this view is the remarkable assumption that fairness is subject to “fine tuning” and “moral accuracy.”
It is argued here that this assumption is indefensible both in theory and in practice. As a theoretical matter, it is insupportable to suggest that matters of conscience, right and wrong, are subject to calibration or “accuracy.” Right and wrong are not determined in the same manner as taking blood tests. Moreover, and this lies at the heart of the fallacy, there simply is no agreement upon what is fair punishment for unlawful intentional killing. Regarding the death penalty, the values chasm is unbridgeable.
In practice, this is clearly demonstrated by the considerations employed by those who allege unfairness. Using chicanery, outright falsehood and abuse of power, they have a laser focus on convicted criminals with no concern for past -- and future -- victims. It is easy to worry about criminals when the suffering of victims is left out of so-called fairness calibrations. When the assessment of fairness is confined to comparing the fate of one criminal against another, the reductio ad absurdum is that there should be no punishment for any violent crime.
This is the inevitable result of what is nowhere found in the actual written Constitution but, nevertheless, has been ordered by anti-capital punishment United States Supreme Court justices: “individualized sentencing.” That mandate, which places a heavy focus upon a criminal’s background and record, should be reconsidered.
Penal codes make certain conduct criminal. It is conduct that should be the prime (and perhaps exclusive) consideration. In determining punishments, the focus should be on crimes and not on the criminals who commit them. Based on such determinations, another view of fairness is presented.