Tuesday, October 24, 2017

"Resolving Judicial Dilemmas"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Alex Sarch and Daniel Wodak recently posted to SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

The legal reasons that bind a judge and the moral reasons that bind all persons can sometimes pull in different directions. There is perhaps no starker example of such judicial dilemmas than in criminal sentencing.  Particularly where mandatory minimum sentences are triggered, a judge can be forced to impose sentences that even the judge regards as “immensely cruel, if not barbaric.” Beyond those directly harmed by overly harsh laws, some courts have recognized that “judges who, forced to participate in such inhumane acts, suffer a loss of dignity and humanity as well.”

When faced with such a judicial dilemma — a powerful tension between the judge’s legal and moral reasons—the primary question is what a judge can do to resolve it. We argue that the two standard responses — sacrificing morality to respect the law (“legalism”), or sacrificing the law to respect morality (“moralism”) — are unsatisfying. Instead, this Article defends an underexplored third response: rather than abandoning one ideal to maximally promote the other, we argue that judges should seek to at least minimally satisfy the demands of both.  Judges should, in other words, look for and employ what we dub Satisficing Options.  These are actions that enjoy sufficient support from both the legal reasons and the moral reasons, and thus are both legally and morally permissible — even if the acts in question would not strictly count as optimal by the lights of the law or morality.

This common sensical response to the problem is not only underappreciated in the literature, but also has great practical import.  Focusing on the sentencing context, this Article demonstrates that judicial dilemmas can be systematically resolved, mitigated or avoided through a range of concrete strategies that on their own or in conjunction can constitute Satisficing Options: these strategies include seeking out legally permitted but morally preferable interpretations of the law, expressing condemnation of unjust laws in dicta, and seeking assistance or cooperation from other actors to help defendants facing substantively unjust mandatory sentences.  While these strategies can at times also go too far, we argue that in certain contexts they can be sufficiently defensible on both legal and moral grounds to be a justifiable response to judicial dilemmas.  This Article thus provides both a novel theoretical framework for understanding the justification of judicial responses to unjust laws, as well as a practical a menu of options which judges can use to guide their responses to the judicial dilemmas that they are increasingly likely to encounter within our criminal justice system.

October 24, 2017 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, October 23, 2017

"Is There a ‘Rational’ Punishment for My Rapist?"

The title of this post is the title of this powerful personal article authored by Amber Rose Carlson.  I recommend the piece in full, and I hesitate to reprint excerpts for fear of diluting the potency of the entire piece.  But this excerpt perhaps will help prompt folks to click through to read the full piece:

“Imagine your rapist had been found guilty and sentenced in court. What would you want his sentence to be?” This was the question asked to me in January 2016 by my therapist during a session of eye movement desensitization and reprocessing therapy (E.M.D.R.) — a treatment that researchers tout as one of the best remedies for severe trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder.

I was raped repeatedly during a three-year span from age 13 to 16. I was also subject to physical and emotional abuse during that time. I’ve since undergone years of traditional talk and group therapy with trauma specialists, and I am more healed today than I ever thought possible.  Still, recovering from trauma is a serious endeavor, and I hoped for more healing....

I’m not a proponent of the death penalty primarily because the flaws in our criminal justice system are egregious and increasingly well-documented. The thought experiment’s framing, however, circumvented my usual concerns about unjust sanctions. I know what my rapist did to me, so I know he is guilty. Worries about the inhumanity of capital punishment were also blunted in part because this was purely hypothetical and in part because of the inhumanity he exhibited those long years with his penchant for violence.

Although the death sentence seemed wholly appropriate, I still considered how I would feel if a judge gave my rapist a less severe punishment: a natural life sentence — a life sentence with no chance for parole without a successful appeal.  In this scenario, my feelings were just as clear: I would be slightly disappointed, but I would still feel mostly satisfied.  Anything less than a death or natural life sentence, I knew, would seem inadequate....

IN FEBRUARY 2016 — only weeks after the thought experiments with my therapist — the philosopher Jennifer Lackey published an opinion piece in The Stone. In the article, she uses her experience teaching philosophy to inmates to argue for the irrationality of natural life sentences.  Lackey bases her argument against natural life sentences on two reasonable claims: (1) people (criminals, specifically) can and do change in profoundly transformative ways, and (2) we cannot know the future.

For Lackey, the fact that we have good statistical evidence that criminals can and do change is especially problematic given our vast epistemic limitations regarding the future. “Natural life sentences,” she wrote, “say to all involved that there is no possible piece of information that could be learned between sentencing and death that could bear in any way on the punishment the convicted is said to deserve, short of what might ground an appeal.” Citing the possibility of prisoner transformation, Lackey then puts her question about rationality directly: “How is it rational,” she asks, “to screen off the relevance of this information? How, that is, is it rational to say today that there can be no possible evidence in the future that could bear on the punishment that a decades-from-now prisoner deserves?”...

I read Lackey’s article very soon after the thought experiments with my therapist. I noticed that Lackey’s argument easily applied to the death penalty, and I realized that the sentences I desired for my rapist were precisely the ones Lackey condemns as irrational.  Since nothing in her argument prevented me from applying her logic to my own desires, I had to wonder if her argument also concluded that I was irrational for desiring permanent punishments.  If it is irrational for the state to prescribe a permanent punishment given our epistemic limitations and prisoners’ likelihood for change, wouldn’t it be similarly irrational for victims to ignore these considerations?

There are, of course, crucial differences between victim’s desires and punishments carried out by the state. While sometimes the criminal justice system considers the wishes of victims and their families, the criminal justice system’s central aim is to protect the interests of the state and the community.  This aim does not always coincide with the interests or wishes of the victim.  Admittedly, there are often very good reasons for the state to ignore the wishes of victims.  But my concern is less about what the state should do in practice and more about what arguments that prioritize transformation say about victims who desire permanent punishments.

Here I will be blunt: it matters very little to me whether my rapist is transformed at some point in his life. It matters to me only to the extent that I will readily agree that it would be better if he became the sort of person who did not inflict violence upon others.  I would be very happy hearing that no other women would be harmed by him. But in terms of the punishment that he deserves?  Transformation does not matter to me.  And this is not irrational: There are many carefully considered reasons one might want a natural life sentence for perpetrators of egregious and irrevocable harm.

Desiring death or a natural life sentence for those who inflict traumatic violence is a rational response because whether or not my particular rapist transforms is irrelevant to whether or not I will ever have the chance to be the sort of person I might have been.  His transformation is irrelevant to whether or not I will be able to live the sort of life I could have were it not for the injustice done to me. I desire a death or natural life sentence for my rapist because that is what seems appropriate given the amount of damage he wrought in my life....

Although my attitude is in no way representative of all victims, epistemic arguments that prioritize criminal transformation must contend with the implication that they can be used to paint trauma victims irrational when they desire retribution.  It’s certainly important to advocate for prisoners who are wrongly incarcerated and for those who were victims of the overzealous war on crime era.  The injustices in our criminal justice system are too numerous and too serious to ignore. But criminal justice reform should not be so myopic that it compounds trauma survivors’ victimization.  Those who manage to survive traumatic crimes have enough to battle without arguments that undermine their rational considerations. Advocates for criminal justice reform can, and should, do better.

October 23, 2017 in Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sex Offender Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (18)

Reviewing publicity's role in federal sentencing decision-making

This new Forbes piece by Brian Jacobs, headlined "The Role of Publicity in Sentencing," reviews how a case's high-profile nature can play a role in a defendant's federal sentencing. Here are excerpts concluding with the author's closing criticism of "any substantial reliance on publicity as a sentencing factor":

Should defendants in cases that attract press coverage be given longer sentences than defendants in cases that pass unnoticed?  The knee jerk response of anyone familiar with the basic principle of equality under the law would likely be a resounding “no.”  And yet, as some recent cases have starkly demonstrated, courts can and do consider a defendant’s level of notoriety as a factor weighing in favor of harsher punishment.

The ability of courts to take publicity into account at sentencing traces back to Section 3553(a) of Title 18, United States Code, which provides a list of factors that district courts are required to consider in imposing sentence, including “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.”  One of the factors district courts must consider is “the need for the sentence imposed— to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.”...

The extent of publicity a case has received and will continue to receive naturally figures into the analysis of whether a given sentence will further the goal of general deterrence.  As one commentator wrote some time ago, “[i]f a case has for some reason attracted great publicity, a severe sentence could be expected to have great deterrent effect.  If, on the other hand, the publicity is minimal and the sentence probably will be known only to the defendant himself and the officials involved with the case, the judge could let the offender off with a light sentence without sacrificing any general preventive effects.”

As evidenced by some recent cases, courts have generally followed through on this reasoning and have considered the extent of a case’s publicity as one factor weighing in favor of higher sentences.  In Ross Ulbricht’s appeal of his conviction for crimes “associated with his creation and operation of an online marketplace known as Silk Road,” the Second Circuit Court of Appeals condoned the district court’s consideration of the extent of the case’s publicity as one factor justifying the life sentence imposed. Specifically, the Second Circuit approved the district court’s reference to the general deterrence that would result from the “unusually large amount of public interest” in the case.  (Ironically, it appears that the Ulbricht’s life sentence and the attendant publicity, far from deterring crime, “actually boosted dark web drug sales.”)

By the same token, in sentencing former congressman Anthony Weiner to 21 months’ imprisonment for transferring obscene materials to a minor, U.S. District Judge Denise L. Cote made express reference to Mr. Weiner’s high profile: “Because of the defendant’s notoriety, gained well before he engaged in this criminal activity, there is intense interest in this prosecution, in his plea, and his sentence, and so there is the opportunity to make a statement that could protect other minors,” she said.  Judge Cote elaborated that, “[g]eneral deterrence is a very significant factor in this sentence.”...

But even as courts are required to consider general deterrence, the consideration given to a case’s publicity, in particular, should be minimal.  The use of general deterrence as a sentencing factor is inherently unfair to an individual defendant, to the extent that the individual defendant’s case is used as a “means for the public good.”  To base a defendant’s sentence on the extent of the publicity a case has received or will receive only exacerbates this unfairness, as notoriety has even less to do with the individual defendant’s case, and more to do with the whims of the press corps and the Department of Justice’s media operation.  In the long run, any substantial reliance on publicity as a sentencing factor, rather than deterring crime, seems just as likely to increase the risk that people will, as one commentator wrote, “find the system unjust” in violation of “the principle of equality before the law.”

October 23, 2017 in Booker in district courts, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, October 12, 2017

Big new report provides state-by-state guide to expungement and rights restoration

Report-coverAs detailed in this new post over at the Collateral Consequences Resource Center, the folks at CCRC have just published this big new report on state expungement and rights restoration practices under the title "Forgiving and Forgetting in American Justice: A 50-State Guide to Expungement and Restoration of Rights." This CCRC post provides this account of the new report's coverage and goals:

This report catalogues and analyzes the various provisions for relief from the collateral consequences of conviction that are now operating in each state, including judicial record-sealing and certificates of relief, executive pardon, and administrative nondiscrimination statutes. Its goal is to facilitate a national conversation about how those who have a criminal record may best regain their legal rights and social status.

Given the millions of Americans who have a criminal record, and the proliferation of laws and policies excluding them from a wide range of opportunities and benefits, there is a critical need for reliable and accessible relief provisions to maximize the chances that these individuals can live productive and law-abiding lives after completion of their court-imposed sentences. Whatever their form, relief provisions must reckon with the easy availability of criminal records, and the pervasive discrimination that frustrates the rehabilitative goals of the justice system.

It is not the report’s purpose to recommend any specific approach to relief. Rather, our goal is simply to survey the present legal landscape for the benefit of the policy discussions now underway in legislatures across the country. We are mindful of the fact that very little empirical research has been done to measure outcomes of the various schemes described, many of which are still in their infancy. It is therefore hard to say with any degree of certainty which approach works best to reintegrate individuals with a record into their communities. At the same time, we hope that our description of state relief mechanisms will inform the work of lawyers and other advocates currently working to assist affected individuals in dealing with the lingering burdens imposed by an adverse encounter with the justice system.

The title of the report provides a framework for analyzing different types of relief provisions. For most of our history, executive pardon constituted the principal way that persons convicted of a felony could “pay their debt to society” and regain their rights as citizens. This traditional symbol of official forgiveness was considered ineffective by mid-20th century reformers, who sought to shift responsibility for restoration to the courts. The reforms they proposed took two quite different approaches: One authorized judges to limit public access to an individual’s record through expungement or sealing, and the other assigned judges something akin to the executive’s pardoning role, through deferred dispositions and certificates of relief. These two approaches to restoration have existed side by side for more than half a century and have never been fully reconciled.

Today, with a new focus on reentry and rehabilitation, policy-makers are again debating whether it is more effective to forgive a person’s past crimes (through pardon or judicial dispensation) or to forget them (through record-sealing or expungement). Despite technological advances and now-pervasive background-checking practices, many states have continued to endorse the forgetting approach, at least for less serious offenses and records not resulting in conviction. At the same time, national law reform organizations have proposed more transparent judicial forgiving or dispensing mechanisms. While the analytical model of “forgiving v. forgetting” is necessarily imperfect given the wide variety of relief provisions operating in the states, it seems to capture the basic distinction between an approach that would mitigate or avoid the adverse consequences of past crimes, and an approach that would limit access to information about those crimes.

The report organizes relief provisions into six categories: executive pardon, judicial record-closing, deferred adjudication, certificates of relief, fair employment and licensing laws, and restoration of voting rights. The judgments made about the availability of each form of relief, reflected in color-coded maps, are in many cases necessarily subjective, and we have done our best to explain our approach in each case.

More detailed information about different forms of relief is available from the state-by-state summaries that are the heart of the report. Citations to relevant laws and comparisons of the laws of each state are included in the 50-state charts in Appendices A & B. Up-to-date summaries and charts are available from the Restoration of Rights Project, which additionally includes in-depth discussions of the law and policy in its state-by-state “profiles.” This information is updated by the authors on a real-time basis, and we expect to republish this report from time to time when warranted by changes in the law.

October 12, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, October 02, 2017

"Plea Bargains Are a Travesty. There's Another Way."

I just noticed this recent Megan McArdle commentary at Bloomberg View which is summarized by its subheadline: "Better to apply fewer laws more consistently than to continue the U.S.’s current 'randomized draconianism'." Here are excerpts:

The justice system is no longer set up to provide an innocent man his day in court. It is a machine for producing plea bargains in industrial quantities.

It can operate no other way, because the volume of cases is far larger than the court system can actually handle.  So instead of trials that take a long time and cost a lot of money but ideally separate the guilty from the innocent, we have become dependent on an assembly line where the accused go in at one end and come out the other a (relatively) short time later -- as convicted criminals, regardless of their guilt or innocence, but with shorter sentences than they would have faced if convicted at trial and with smaller lawyers’ bills than they would have faced if they had gone to trial....

The most obvious way to begin repairing this broken system is to spend more money building courtrooms and hiring judges, so that defendants actually do have a chance at their constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial.  We should also take a long, hard look at the number of things that are crimes, and the sentencing laws that require many crimes be requited with very harsh penalties.

Most our mass incarceration problem is a sentencing problem, driven by both mandatory minimums and prosecutors who are rewarded for being “tough on crime.” These factors aggravate the flaws of the plea-bargaining system.  Prosecutors can threaten to prosecute on draconian charges, which carry draconian sentences -- and all but force a defendant, even an innocent one, to take a plea bargain, with a lesser charge and a lesser sentence.  Defendants (guilty and innocent alike) usually conclude that the risk of going to trial is simply too great.  And the plea bargains, in turn, keep the machine from choking on the volume of cases being run through it. Instead it grinds out a very poor substitute for justice.

Reducing the number of laws and reducing the ability (or requirement) for prosecutors to secure serious jail time for so many offenses would reduce mass incarceration and start to unclog our court system.  We should do these things.  Unfortunately, they won’t be enough.

While the popular picture among de-incarceration advocates is of prisons and courtrooms is of a system choked with nonviolent drug offenders, in fact, the system handles an immense amount of real, harmful crime.  We’re not going to decriminalize theft or assault or robbery, nor should we.  If we really want a justice system that is not too overwhelmed to provide justice, we are going to have to focus on reducing crime....

Mark Kleiman of NYU, who has taught me most of what I know about crime policy, wrote a brilliant book called “When Brute Force Fails,” on the ways we can retool the justice system to actually reduce crime, rather than simply punishing it more harshly.  Kleiman is liberal, but conservatives should have no fear: This is not a book about how we need loads more social spending and liberal policies to address the “root causes.”  This is a book about how we can police and punish more effectively.  The sort of proposals that should be welcomed by left and right alike.

Kleiman’s ideas and insights are too many to sum up in a column, so I’ll focus on a core observation: Bad policing, and bad prison policy, can create more crime. Our current justice system provides what Kleiman calls “randomized draconianism”: Your odds of getting caught and punished are not very high, but if you are caught, you’ll get treated very harshly.  The likelihood of punishment is so low that there is no deterrent effect to prevent crime, and the severity of punishment is so harsh that it may simply make those who are caught more likely to commit further crimes....

What’s the alternative?  Raise the odds of punishment, and lower the severity.  That means more police on the streets, focused on steadily reducing crime hot-spots and making it unattractive to take up a life of crime in the first place. It means probation and parole systems that provide much more intensive monitoring, but use lighter sanctions like a night or two in jail, rather than revoking someone’s parole and sending them back to prison for five years.  It means exploring new technologies that allow us to put people under “house arrest” of varying intensity.  In the short term, this will mean spending more money and effort on the system.  But there’s good news: Prison is so expensive that even many expensive programs can save money on net if they keep people out of long prison terms.

October 2, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, September 26, 2017

"Retributive Justifications for Jail Diversion of Individuals with Mental Disorder"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper posted to SSRN authored by E. Lea Johnston. Here is the abstract:

Jail diversion programs have proliferated across the United States as a means to decrease the incarceration of individuals with mental illnesses.  These programs include pre-adjudication initiatives, such as Crisis Intervention Teams, as well as post-adjudication programs, such as mental health courts and specialized probationary services.  Post-adjudication programs often operate at the point of sentencing, so their comportment with criminal justice norms is crucial.

This article investigates whether and under what circumstances post-adjudication diversion for offenders with serious mental illnesses may cohere with principles of retributive justice.  Key tenets of retributive theory are that punishments must not be inhumane and that their severity must be proportionate to an offender’s desert.  Three retributive rationales could justify jail diversion for offenders with serious mental illnesses: reduced culpability, the avoidance of inhumane punishment, and the achievement of punishment of equal impact with similarly situated offenders.  The article explores current proposals to effectuate these rationales, their manifestations in law, and how these considerations may impact decisions to divert individuals with serious mental illnesses from jail to punishment in the community.

September 26, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, September 24, 2017

On eve of federal sentencing, any final predictions (or desires) for Anthony Weiner's punishment for underage sexting?

As previewed in prior posts linked below and as set up in this new AP piece, the next chapter (and I fear not the last) in the sordid sorry story of Anthony Weiner will play out tomorrow in a federal court in New York.  Here are the basics:

It seemed as if Anthony Weiner had hit rock bottom when he resigned from Congress in 2011. "Bye-bye, pervert!" one heckler shouted as the Democrat quit amid revelations that he had sent graphic pictures of himself to women on social media. Time has shown his self-destructive drama had only just begun.

Weiner, 53, is set to be sentenced Monday for sending obscene material to a 15-year-old girl in a case that may have also have played a role in costing Hillary Clinton — former boss of Weiner's wife, Huma Abedin — the presidential election.

Federal prosecutors have asked for a sentence of slightly more than two years behind bars because of the seriousness of the crime, in which Weiner sent adult porn to the girl and got her to take her clothes off for him on Skype. "The defendant did far more than exchange typed words on a lifeless cellphone screen with a faceless stranger," prosecutors wrote to the judge. "Transmitting obscenity to a minor to induce her to engage in sexually explicit conduct by video chat and photo — is far from mere 'sexting.'"

But Weiner's attorneys contend he is a changed man who has finally learned his lesson, calling his compulsive sexting a "deep sickness" best treated without time behind bars. The memo also suggested Weiner himself was a victim of the scandal, saying the North Carolina high school student initiated contact with him because she "hoped somehow to influence the U.S. presidential election" and write a tell-all book.

I have just had a chance to review this short sentencing memo that the government filed a few days ago. I found remarkable both the stupidity of Weiner's decision to "sext" with in an obviously underage girl, as well as the government's conclusion that applicable guideline calculations produce "offense level of 33 [meaning] the resulting Guidelines range would be 135 to 168 months’ imprisonment, but for the statutory maximum of 120 months’ imprisonment."  Luckily for Weiner, the "the Government agreed that a sentence within the range of 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment (which would be the applicable Guidelines range without application of the cross-references) would be fair and appropriate under the specific circumstances of this case."  And the Government makes this assertion in support of a prison sentence in that range: "Weiner’s demonstrated history of professed, yet failed, reform make it difficult to rely on his present claim of self-awareness and transformation. On this record, a custodial sentence is necessary to truly effect specific deterrence and prevent the defendant from committing this crime in the future."

Meanwhile, in his lengthy sentencing memo includes, in its words, "Anthony’s own deeply personal meditation to the Court on sickness and recovery (Exhibit 1 to this submission) that speaks most powerfully to his progress."  It also asserts, I think accurately, that Weiner's "wrongful conduct is on orders of magnitude less egregious than any case involving sexually explicit communications with a teenager that has ever been prosecuted in this district" and that "factors the Court must consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) — in isolation and taken together — demonstrate that a sentence of imprisonment is not required here and would result in punishment greater than necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing."

So, dear reader, what do you expect Anthony Weiner will get at sentencing?  I tend predict a "split the difference" outcome in cases like this, so I would be inclined to expect a sentence of a year and a day for him.  Something even a bit shorter would not surprise me, and I would actually be surprised if Weiner got anything more than 21 months.  In the end, at least for me, I have a hard time viewing Weiner's extraordinary stupidity as the involving the kind of evil or danger that really justifies a long federal prison term. 

Prior related posts:

September 24, 2017 in Booker in district courts, Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Saturday, September 23, 2017

"Mitigating America’s Mass Incarceration Crisis Without Compromising Community Protection: Expanding the Role of Rehabilitation in Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper posted to SSRN authored by Mirko Bagaric, Gabrielle Wolf and William Rininger. Here is the abstract:

The United States is in the midst of an unprecedented mass incarceration crisis.  Financially, this is no longer readily sustainable, even for the world’s largest economy.  Further, the human suffering that prison causes is no longer tolerable from the normative perspective.  Nevertheless, lawmakers have failed to propose or adopt coherent or wide-ranging reforms to mitigate this crisis.  The crisis has emerged over the past forty years largely as a result of the emphasis on community protection as the most important objective of sentencing and the fact that the primary means of pursuing community protection during this period has been incapacitation in the form of imprisonment.

In this Article, we argue that policy makers and courts took a profoundly wrong turn by equating community protection almost solely with incapacitation.  A more progressive and often effective means of protecting the community is by rehabilitating offenders.  In theory, rehabilitation is a widely endorsed sentencing objective, so it should already influence many sentencing outcomes, but the reality is otherwise.  Rehabilitation is rarely a dominant or even weighty consideration when courts sentence offenders.  This is attributable, at least in part, to skepticism regarding the capacity of criminal sanctions to reform offenders.  This approach is flawed.  Empirical data establishes that many offenders can be rehabilitated.

In this Article, we argue that sentencing courts should place greater weight on the objective of rehabilitation and that such a change would significantly ameliorate the incarceration crisis, while enhancing community safety. We make three key recommendations in order to implement our proposal.  First, it is necessary to promulgate rehabilitation as a means of protecting the community.  Second, we propose that the role of rehabilitation in sentencing should be expanded.  In particular, and contrary to current orthodoxy, rehabilitation should have a meaningful role even in relation to very serious offenses.  In indicating the role that rehabilitation has played in their decisions, courts should clearly articulate how they have adjusted penalties in light of assessments of offenders’ potential for rehabilitation. Third, it is necessary to ensure that decisions by courts relating to the prospects of rehabilitation are made on the basis of more rigorous, empirically-grounded and transparent criteria.

To this end, we examine the under-researched topic of the role that instruments that predict the likelihood of an offender’s recidivism should play in guiding sentencing decisions.  The solutions advanced in this Article will provide the catalyst for rehabilitation to assume a much larger role in sentencing and thereby significantly ameliorate the incarceration crisis.

September 23, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (6)

Wednesday, September 20, 2017

"Jeff Sessions’s evidence-free crime strategy"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Hill commentary authored by prominent criminologist David Kennedy. Here are excerpts: 

The emerging Department of Justice crime-control strategy is a criminologist’s nightmare. Over the last thirty years researchers, law enforcement leaders and communities have pushed for smarter, better violence prevention — spurred in large part by the incredible violence and community destruction of the crack era, and the utter failure of existing approaches to do anything about it.

It’s paid dividends. We now know a lot about what works and what doesn’t. That knowledge begins, as Attorney General Jeff Sessions himself says, with the fact that “the vast majority of people just want to obey the law and live their lives. A disproportionate amount of crime is committed by a small group of criminals.”

That’s exactly right. The most important discovery about violence in the last decades is that it’s what Harvard University researcher Thomas Abt calls “sticky.” Studies in city after city show that very small, active networks of extraordinarily high-risk victims and offenders — about one-half of 1 percent of the population — are associated with 60 percent to 75 percent of all homicide, and that 5 percent or so of blocks and street corners is similarly associated. And while many people use drugs, those involved in meaningful drug distribution — particularly the most active and violent of them — are also relatively few.

So what should we to do about this “small group of criminals?” It’s a critical question. Sessions has called for a return to the “war on drugs” menu — more law enforcement, mandatory minimums and long sentences, even the anti-drug D.A.R.E. program — plus a new focus on heavy immigration enforcement and a withdrawal from DOJ attention to police misconduct. But we now know for a fact that these things don’t work, and can actually make matters worse.

To understand why, and to see what does work, we should look to the groundbreaking front-line police and community actors who have been developing creative solutions that are more effective, less harmful and profoundly more respectful of traumatized and alienated communities than the old and demonstrably ineffective and discredited menu. They’re embracing new ways of focusing community engagement, social services and law enforcement to both protect and ensure accountability amongst Sessions’ “small group of criminals.” Work I’ve been involved in has law enforcement, community leaders and service providers sit down face-to-face with gang members and drug dealers, emphasize that the community hates the violence, offer to help anybody who wants it and explain the legal risks that come with violence. The result can be dramatic reductions in both violence and enforcement....

The best new crime prevention work recognizes the absolute centrality of what scholars call “legitimacy” — the community perception that authorities are respectful, unbiased, well-intentioned and have the standing to expect compliance. Breaking the bond between communities and the law does profound damage. As legitimacy goes down, crime reporting and cooperation with police and prosecutors go down, and violence goes up. Recognizing the absolute centrality of trust, police are backing away from stop-and- frisk and “zero tolerance” and working hard to reduce police violence and enhance accountability.

The opposite is clearly happening now in Hispanic communities, newly terrified of immigration enforcement: Houston police chief Art Acevedo says robbery, assault, and rape reporting by Hispanic communities are all down, the latter by 43 percent. The administration’s new policies may in fact be creating a safety net for predators....

And draconian sentencing — despite its frequent common-sense appeal — simply isn’t that effective. Violent crime is overwhelmingly a young man’s game, and long sentences just keep prisoners locked up well after they would have stopped of their own accord: a Stanford study shows that three-strikes “lifers” released recently under California prison reform had a 1.3 percent recidivism rate, against nearly 45 percent for other California inmates. They don’t deter that well, in part because criminals discount their futures just like middle-class home buyers do: offenders have been found to view a 20-year prison sentence as only about six times as severe as a one-year stint. Offenders frequently don’t know that the massive federal sentences they may be exposed to even exist until they’re charged and it’s much too late.

Enforcement has also proved utterly pointless with respect to drug markets, where locked-up dealers are easily replaced by new ones. The drug war was incapable of keeping drugs out of the country, from being produced domestically or from being sold and bought freely. It’s unlikely to do better in an age of fentanyl mail-ordered over the dark web. And as for D.A.R.E. — words fail. Criminologists are a cranky bunch, but there’s one thing that they all agree on: D.A.R.E. doesn’t work. By peddling misinformation about the dangers of drug use and telling huge numbers of impressionable kids that drugs and drug use are everywhere, the program can even increase abuse.

We need effective crime reduction strategies, just as we did in the '80s: Even before some cities recently started to see recent increases in homicide, violence suffered by poor minority communities — especially, young black men — was at intolerable levels. The opioid epidemic is hitting the country so hard it is reversing historic gains in life expectancy. We know enough to do better this time. We should do so, not willfully repeat the glaring and horrific mistakes of the recent past.

September 20, 2017 in National and State Crime Data, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, September 15, 2017

Advocacy for the "the smart way to get 'tough' about crime"

Brandon Garrett has this new CNN commentary discussing some of the themes in his new book titled "End of Its Rope: How Killing the Death Penalty Can Revive Criminal Justice." Here is hoe it starts and ends:

It is time to retire the phrase "tough on crime."  There is nothing tough about the harsh punishments that contributed to mass incarceration in this country.  In fact, the opposite is true; as the latest data show, a nationwide push in the past decade to move away from these failed approaches has coincided with a remarkable decline in crime.  Instead of being "tough," we need to be smart.

Multiple states have passed laws to end cash bail, reduce mandatory sentences, invest in addiction and mental health treatment, and divert convicts toward alternatives to incarceration.  Even states such as Louisiana, with the highest incarceration rate in the world, just passed reforms and is currently reviewing 16,000 sentences for possible reduction.  Cities such as Oklahoma City and Houston have taken new steps to reduce jail populations.

And crime continues to fall.  According to a Brennan Center report released on Wednesday, violent crime is back down again so far in 2017, after a spike in 2015-16 in certain cities.  This year is projected to be the year with the second-lowest crime rate in 25 years.  Murder rates are down 2.5%, with declines in cities such as Chicago that accounted for the blip in 2015 and 2016.

So contrary to what some politicians say, there is no national crime wave; it is more like a lake drying up.  Even the localized crime bumps in a handful of cities seem to be subsiding.  We don't need a new war on crime when we are winning the peace....

Now is the time to redouble efforts to focus on deeper reductions in imprisonment, charging, sentencing and release and reentry of prisoners.  Even if the President and the attorney general are trying to redouble the war on drugs, as if we were still living in the 1980s, those days are far behind us.  Reform is working and crime is still falling.  We need to push it farther to shrink our bloated criminal justice system.  That is the smart way to get "tough" about crime.

September 15, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, September 14, 2017

"Fragmentation and Democracy in the Constitutional Law of Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this recently published paper that I recently noticed authored by Richard Bierschbach.  Here is its abstract:

Scholars have long studied the relationship of structural constitutional principles like checks and balances to democracy.  But the relationship of such principles to democracy in criminal punishment has received less attention.  This Essay examines that relationship and finds it fraught with both promise and peril for the project of democratic criminal justice.  On the one hand, by blending a range of inputs into punishment determinations, the constitutional fragmentation of the punishment power can enhance different types of influence in an area in which perspective is of special concern.  At the same time, the potentially positive aspects of fragmentation can backfire, encouraging tunnel vision, replicating power differentials, and making it easier for more well-resourced voices to drown out others.  Thus, the same structure that generates valuable democratic benefits for punishment also falls prey and contributes to serious democratic deficits.  But despite its drawbacks, we cannot and should not abandon the Constitution’s fragmented approach to crime and punishment.  The more promising move is to look for ways to make different loci of influence and representation more meaningful within our existing framework, doing more to ensure that multiple voices are heard.

September 14, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Jared Kushner convening White House meeting on federal prison programming and reentry issues

As reported in this Washington Post piece, headlined "Kushner to gather bipartisan group to come up with ideas for federal prisons," an event scheduled for today in the White House suggests criminal justice reform issues are not completely dormant at the federal level. Here are the details:

President Trump’s son-in-law and senior adviser, Jared Kushner, will convene a roundtable Thursday at the White House to gather recommendations for improving mentoring and job training in federal prisons, a departure from the administration’s focus on more punitive crime-fighting measures.  A bipartisan group of about two dozen elected officials, religious leaders and business leaders were invited to the first major criminal justice-related event held by the Kushner-led Office of American Innovation, which in recent months has brought together technology executives to search for ways to make government more efficient.

Kushner’s interest in corrections policy is personal: His father, Charles Kushner, a real estate executive, was sentenced in 2005 to two years in federal prison after pleading guilty to tax evasion. Jared Kushner has said the experience gave him a glimpse of the challenges inmates and their families face in and outside of prison.  “There is a lot of agreement from the left and the center and the right that once a person has committed a crime we should make sure we give them the best opportunities to try to live a productive life after serving their time,” Kushner told The Washington Post in a telephone interview.  “We’re not looking to train better criminals.”

The event, which had not been officially announced as of Wednesday morning, comes after a months-long push by Trump and Attorney General Jeff Sessions for more aggressive prosecution of drug offenders and illegal immigrants.  In May, Sessions jettisoned an Obama administration policy that instructed federal prosecutors to avoid charging low-level criminals with drug offenses that would trigger severe mandatory-minimum sentences, a shift projected to boost the prison population.  Those efforts are at odds with a growing consensus that the mandatory-minimum sentences that proliferated during the “war on drugs” fueled crowded, costly prisons that unduly burden taxpayers and do not improve public safety.  A number of states, including several led by Republicans, are curbing their inmate populations and even closing prisons by reducing mandatory-minimum sentences and expanding parole and probation.

Kushner’s private discussions in recent months with members of Congress and outside groups have included sentencing reform, according to participants, but Thursday’s meeting is more narrowly focused on preparing inmates to reenter society.  Neither Sessions nor his newly appointed Bureau of Prisons director, retired Army Gen. Mark S. Inch, will attend, although some Justice Department officials are expected to participate.

Criminal justice advocates invited to the roundtable said the gathering is a positive first step, and they called for expanding drug and mental health treatment, vocational training, mentoring programs and placement in halfway houses. “Regardless of what you think about who goes to prison or how long they need to be there, most people come out eventually, so let’s make sure they are better off than when they came in,” said Mark Holden, general counsel for Koch Industries, a leading conservative proponent of reducing incarceration levels.  “Of course I want to see the dialogue on criminal justice issues continue and looked at comprehensively.  We need a holistic solution.”

The federal prison population is expected to grow by 2 percent over the coming year, rising by 4,171 inmates, to a total of 191,493, and reversing the downward trend of the past four years, according to the Trump administration’s proposed budget.  Yet the proposal calls for a 14 percent reduction in federal prison jobs, including 1,850 fewer corrections officers.  Many of those positions are vacant.  The Justice Department is seeking $10 million to cover the costs of food, health care, transportation and programs for the additional inmates, but it’s unclear how much money would be allocated to education and vocational training....

Asked about federal funding, Kushner said, “We’re not at a place where we are prescribing solutions. We’re bringing people together and generating ideas. If prisoner reentry programs are successfully executed, it’s usually a good investment.”  A request for recommendations from participants before the conference said, “While suggestions for the investment of Federal resources are appreciated, please also be sure to highlight opportunities that do not require Federal funding.”

On Capitol Hill, Rep. Douglas A. Collins (R-Ga.) has introduced a bill that would require federal prisons to assess inmates’ needs and offer rehabilitation programs. Co-sponsored by House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), the measure requests $250 million over the next five years for prison education programs.

Among the elected officials slated to participate in Thursday’s program are Housing and Urban Development Secretary Ben Carson, Labor Secretary Alex Acosta, Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.), Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), and Republican Govs. Matt Bevin of Kentucky and Sam Brownback of Kansas.

September 14, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Thursday, September 07, 2017

"Drug War Reform: Criminal Justice, Recovery, and Holistic Community Alternatives"

The title of this post is the title of this article recently posted to SSRN authored by Joshua Horton. Here is its abstract:

This article investigates the issues and possible societal solutions to the Drug War, Opiate Epidemic, Mass Incarceration and other collateral consequences of current policies in three distinct parts. First, it discusses the DeFelonization of drug possession and the ramifications this would have nationally. Next, it addresses the influx of drug users into the community that are currently receiving little to no rehabilitation behind bars. This country will need to find a revenue source to fund a massive rehabilitation effort. It will come from marijuana legalization. And lastly, I investigate an up and coming approach to recovery called Recovery Community Organizations (RCO's). These entities incorporate an innovative, holistic bottom up approach, as opposed to the current top-down, massive, paternalistic governmental and criminal justice approach.

September 7, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, August 28, 2017

"Less Is More: How Reducing Probation Populations Can Improve Outcomes"

Download (3)The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper emerging from the Executive Session on Community Corrections at the Harvard Kennedy School.  Here is the paper's introduction:

This paper will argue that, similar to the growth in prisons that has resulted in our current state of mass incarceration, the tremendous growth in probation supervision in the United States over the past several decades should be reversed, and the entire system of probation significantly downsized.  Specifically, we argue here that while the number of people on probation supervision in the U.S. has declined over the past several years (as have the number of people incarcerated and crime rates), that decline should not only be sustained but significantly increased, with a goal of reducing the number of people under probation supervision by 50 percent over 10 years.  We then discuss New York City as an example of a jurisdiction that has successfully done this.

In many respects, the rationale for this argument mirrors the argument against mass incarceration.  In most jurisdictions, probation is a punitive system that attempts to elicit compliance from individuals primarily through the imposition of conditions, fines, and fees that in many cases cannot be met (Corbett, 2015; Klingele, 2013).  This is not only a poor use of scarce resources; it contributes to a revolving door in which individuals who cannot meet those obligations cycle back and forth between probation and incarceration without necessarily improving public safety.  In fact, the cycle of incarceration and supervision can actually threaten public safety, and it certainly has harmful and farreaching consequences for those who are caught up in it, including job loss, disconnection from family, and housing instability (Council of Economic Advisers, 2015).  Given this, along with national and local data and examples that clearly demonstrate that reducing “mass probation” can go hand in hand with a reduction in the number of people incarcerated and ongoing declines in national and local crime, it begs the question of why so many jurisdictions continue to promulgate this punitive approach.

Because probation is the most severely underfunded and the least politically powerful of all criminal justice agencies, there is no likelihood of any massive infusion of new resources into the field.  Thus, the limited resources saved from this downsizing may be used to invest in community-based programs that provide employment, substance abuse, and mental health treatment to the remaining population — those that pose the highest public safety risk — as a way to significantly reduce that risk and avoid unnecessary monitoring and supervision.  A portion of these savings should also substitute for the rampant use of probation fees used throughout the U.S. as a way to pay for a structurally underfunded system.  These fees are unjust, counter-productive, and antithetical to the legitimacy of any system of justice (Martin, Smith, and Still, 2017).

August 28, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, August 27, 2017

"The Use and Abuse of Mutual-Support Programs in Drug Courts"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Sara Gordon now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

There is a large gap between what we know about the disease of addiction and its appropriate treatment, and the treatment received by individuals who are ordered into treatment as a condition of participation in drug court.  Most medical professionals are not appropriately trained about addiction and most addiction treatment providers do not have the education and training necessary to provide appropriate evidence-based services to individuals who are referred by drug courts for addiction treatment.

This disconnect between our understanding of addiction and available addiction treatment has wide reaching impact for individuals who attempt to receive medical care for addiction in this country, as well as for those individuals who are compelled by a drug court to receive that treatment.  Instead of receiving evidence-based treatment, most drug court participants are referred to mutual-support groups and programs based largely or entirely on 12-step principles.  Mutual-support groups, while well-intentioned and helpful as a supplement to evidence-based addiction treatment, are not a substitute for scientifically valid addiction treatment and should not constitute the primary form of medical assistance received by drug court participants.

This Article argues that drug and other specialty courts can be part of the transformation of the public perception of addiction, as well as the integration of addiction treatment into mainstream medicine by incorporating and endorsing evidence-based strategies for the treatment of addiction, including psychosocial and pharmacological treatments.  Moreover, by adopting these treatments more readily and providing more opportunities for drug court participants to receive evidence-based treatment, drug courts can dramatically improve treatment outcomes for participants.

August 27, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Will deadly protests impact high-profile sentencing in India? Should they?

A classic hypothetical question for hard-core fans of a strictly utilitarian approach to punishment is whether they should and would be inclined to go easy or even release a guilty criminal in order to avoid possible harms being threatened by an angry mob.  (The even harder variation is whether they would punish an innocent person to mollify a mob.)  I bring this up because, as reported in this Reuters article, concerns about mob violence are now not hypothetical in the northern part of India.  The article is headlined "After deadly protests, Indian states in lockdown for 'godman's' rape sentencing," and here are excerpts:

India is deploying thousands of riot police and shutting down internet services in two northern states, as it prepares for the sentencing on Monday of a self-styled ’godman’ whose followers went on the rampage after he was convicted of rape on Friday.

Gurmeet Ram Rahim Singh’s cult Dera Sacha Sauda has a vast rural following in Punjab and Haryana states, where frenzied mobs burned down gas stations and train stations and torched vehicles after a local court found him guilty of raping two women in a 2002 case.  At least 38 people were killed and more than 200 injured in the violence in Haryana, officials said, drawing sharp criticism for the state government run by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The case has also highlighted the Indian heartland’s fascination with spiritual gurus, who enjoy immense political clout for their ability to mobilize millions of followers frustrated by the shortcomings of the state.  Security forces have cordoned off a jail in Rohtak city, 70 km (44 miles) from New Delhi, where Singh - also known as the guru of bling for the clothes he wears in the movies he has starred in - is being held.

The judge who convicted Singh will hold a special hearing inside the prison in Rohtak around 2.30 pm local time (0900 GMT) on Monday to decide the punishment, in a move that officials hope will prevent his followers from gathering in the streets like they did on Friday. Singh faces a minimum of seven years in prison.

The town of Sirsa, home to Dera’s headquarters, is already under lockdown, BS Sandhu, Haryana’s police chief, told Reuters. School and colleges have been ordered shut, the government said....

In godman Singh’s two films, “Messenger of God” and its sequel, there are sequences in which he fights off villains and tosses burning motorbikes into the air. In his spiritual avatar, Singh dresses in plain white traditional clothes, giving sermons or planting trees. In the movies he dons bejeweled costumes, rides motorbikes and sends bad guys flying.

The Haryana government has faced severe criticism from opposition Congress and a state court for failing to stop the rioting and vandalism. Singh, whose verified Twitter profile calls him a saint, philanthropist, sportsman, actor, singer, movie director, writer, lyricists, and autobiographer, has been photographed with senior BJP leaders including Haryana chief minister Manohar Lal Khattar....

Singh's conviction in a rape case is the latest in a series of cases involving spiritual leaders who have been accused of sexually abusing followers, amassing untaxed money and finding favor with politicians. Besides the rape charges, he is also under investigation over allegations that he convinced 400 of his male followers to undergo castration, allegations he denies.

August 27, 2017 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentencing around the world | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, August 22, 2017

Looking at US prison history while charting "How to End Mass Incarceration"

The quoted title of this post is the headline of this lengthy Jacobin commentary authored by Roger Lancaster, which starts with an extended review of prison history in the United States.  I recommend the full piece, and here is a how it gets started:

The United States has not always been the world’s leading jailer, the only affluent democracy to make “incapacitation” its criminal justice system’s goal.  Once upon a time, it fashioned itself as the very model of what Michel Foucault called “the disciplinary society.”  That is, it took an enlightened approach to punishment, progressively tethering it to rehabilitative ideals.  Today, it is a carceral state, plain and simple.  It posts the highest incarceration rate in the world — as well as the highest violent crime rate among high-income countries.

Politicians, reporters, and activists from across the political spectrum have analyzed the ongoing crisis of mass incarceration.  Their accounts sometimes depict our current plight as an expression of puritanism, as an extension of slavery or Jim Crow, or as an exigency of capitalism.  But these approaches fail to address the question that ought to be foremost in front of us: what was the nature of the punitive turn that pushed the US off the path of reform and turned its correctional system into a rogue institution?

While the state-sanctioned brutality that now marks the American criminal justice system has motivated many activists to call for the complete abolition of prisons, we must begin with a clearer understanding of the complex institutional shifts that created and reproduce the phenomenon of mass incarceration.  Only then will we be able to see a clear path out of the current impasse.

August 22, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

"In Defense of Substantial Sentencing Discretion"

The title of this post is the title of this new article posted on SSRN authored by Antje du Bois-Pedain. Here is the abstract:

This article develops an ideal of sentencing discretion as consisting in sufficient dispositional flexibility for the trial judge to set, on behalf of the polity, reasonable terms for the continuance of relations with the offender in view of his crime. This ideal requires trial judges to have what may be termed “substantial” sentencing discretion: discretion that is exercised with direct reference to the values and goals penal sanctions are expected to serve, and where it is this quality of value-based engagement that provides the justification for the decision.  The article engages with empirical research into sentencing that helps us address the strength of the case for and against substantial sentencing discretion, and ultimately defends substantial sentencing discretion on functional as well as ethical-political grounds.

August 22, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, August 14, 2017

Imaginging how the internet "could put an end to prisons as we know them"

Gosh knows the modern digital revolution and the internet has brought the demise of a number of brick-and-mortar institutions ranging from music stores to travel agencies.  But this new article from Australia makes the case that the internet could bring an end to brick-and-mortar prisons.  The intriguing piece is headlined "Internet of incarceration: How AI could put an end to prisons as we know them," and here is how it gets started:

Dan Hunter is a prison guard's worst nightmare. But he's not a hardened crim.  As dean of Swinburne University's Law School, he's working to have most wardens replaced by a system of advanced artificial intelligence connected to a network of high-tech sensors.

Called the Technological Incarceration Project, the idea is to make not so much an internet of things as an internet of incarceration. Professor Hunter's team is researching an advanced form of home detention, using artificial intelligence, machine-learning algorithms and lightweight electronic sensors to monitor convicted offenders on a 24-hour basis.

"If we had to use human beings, the cost of monitoring every single type of interaction would be prohibitively expensive," he says. But new technologies are now capable of providing automated surveillance at a fraction of that expense, he says, using equipment that's already in existence or under development.

Under his team's proposal, offenders would be fitted with an electronic bracelet or anklet capable of delivering an incapacitating shock if an algorithm detects that a new crime or violation is about to be committed. That assessment would be made by a combination of biometric factors, such as voice recognition and facial analysis.

His vision is futuristic, but it isn't simply technological fetishism. He's convinced such automation will make for a better society. Under his proposal, the main costs of incarceration are borne by the offender and his or her family, not by the state, while law-breakers are isolated from each other, decreasing the risk of offenders becoming hardened by the system.

While technology has transformed our society, the jails of the 21st century operate pretty much as they did 100 years ago. "We are at the point now where we can fundamentally rethink the way in which we incarcerate people," Professor Hunter says. "If what we want to do is we want to keep the community safe, if we want to have the greatest possibility of rehabilitation of the offender and if we want to save money, then there are alternatives to prison that actually make a lot of sense."

Readers may recall this prior post flagging this recent paper authored by Dean Hunter and colleagues titled "Technological Incarceration and the End of the Prison Crisis"

August 14, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentencing around the world | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, August 09, 2017

"White-Collar Showdown"

The title of this post is the title of this essay recently posted to SSRN and authored by Mihailis Evangelos Diamantis. Here is the abstract:

The Sentencing Commission and the judiciary do not see eye to eye when it comes to punishing white-collar fraudsters.  Recent survey data collected by Judge Bennett and his co-authors confirms that judges prefer to sentence fraudsters at or below the minimum of the Sentencing Guidelines range.  This article asks whether that data should give the Sentencing Commission pause.  The survey results might just substantiate the Sentencing Commission's worry that judges are prone to cognitive bias in favor of white-collar defendants, with whom they often overlap demographically.

After suggesting that judges have no particular insight into the factors relevant to fraud sentencing, the article assesses the matter from criminal theory first principles: deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. It concludes — contrary to the apparent views of most judges and many white-collar criminal law scholars — that we should not be so quick to dismiss the guidelines as too harsh.

August 9, 2017 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, August 05, 2017

"Criminal justice reformers are hooked on drug courts, they should kick the habit"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new commentary by Jasmine Tyler in The Hill. Here are excerpts:

With opioid overdose deaths hitting record highs throughout the US, and the White House Commission calling for declaring a state of emergency, many are looking for new solutions to addiction and overdose. But one proposal popular in some circles — the expanded use of drug courts — is not the perfect solution some make it out to be.

Drug courts are an old idea. Created in the 80s to expedite the overwhelmed court dockets created by the drug war, they have already enjoyed a great deal of fanfare and funding — from both sides of the political aisle. But despite the good intentions that often underpin them, they are a flawed solution.

These courts are squarely housed in the criminal justice system, where there is little medical expertise or care available but where punitive sanctions are plentiful. Physicians for Human Rights recently reported that drug courts “routinely fail to provide adequate, medically sound treatment for substance use disorders, with treatment plans that are at times designed and facilitated by individuals with little to no medical training.”

And, even though relapse is an expected part of recovery, people brought before a drug court with a positive drug test are often jailed, and can end up serving lengthy periods of time — sometimes more than had they been prosecuted through the regular criminal system.

Interestingly, the White House Commission didn’t even mention drug courts in the interim report released on July 31, but they did support a number of cutting edge, public health centered, responses such as expanding harm reduction approaches like medication-assisted therapy.

Other solutions the commission should explore for their final report include promoting diversion programs to keep people out of the criminal justice system, making the overdose prevention medication Naloxone available over the counter, and decriminalizing possession of drugs for personal use....

A recent broad study found that there is no evidence that compulsory treatment is effective and may do more harm, and even the Government Accountability Office has found the purported cost-savings difficult to substantiate.

In my days working as a sentencing advocate with public defenders, clients would frequently ask for jail time in lieu of drug courts. This wasn’t because they had no concerns for their own health and well-being, but the opposite. They were deeply concerned with their own health and well-being and felt drug courts would cause more problems for them in the long run....

Beyond the many questions about their effectiveness, drug courts do not address the fundamental reality that any kind of criminal sanctions are simply inappropriate for the overwhelming majority of drug offenders, whose only crime is the personal use of drugs or possession of drugs for personal use. In fact, by offering a notionally “softer” kind of criminalization, drug courts may actually help entrench that fundamentally untenable paradigm....

Drug courts might be a tool in the toolbox of a better system if they are focused only on offenses other than drug use or possession — for example, property crimes committed in connection with drug dependence. But even in that case, they should only be considered if they are set up to provide treatment that is medically appropriate, as well as other social supports, and if — and this is a big if — courts would truly take high risk, high need defendants as the National Association of Drug Court Professionals says they should.

Our communities deserve 21st century solutions and drug courts are, at best, a better version of a broken and outmoded system. They may sometimes have a useful place in the reality we’re stuck with, but they certainly aren’t the way forward. Instead of looking back at a criminal justice solution that has failed, the commission should stay on the right track and focus on health-based programs that address the opioid crisis.

August 5, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (8)

Wednesday, August 02, 2017

"Sentencing by Computer: Enhancing Sentencing Transparency and Predictability, and (Possibly) Bridging the Gap between Sentencing Knowledge and Practice"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting looking new article available via SSRN authored by Mirko Bagaric and Gabrielle Wolf. Here is the abstract:

Computer technology is rapidly infiltrating and changing many aspects of the law. Judicial decision-making has, however, remained largely impervious to technological developments. Sentencing is one of the most controversial, complex and dynamic legal areas.  Sentencing law is also fundamentally broken and has resulted in a mass incarceration crisis, which is the most serious sociolegal problem currently afflicting the United States.  Despite this, it is also ostensibly one of the areas of law that is most amenable to automated decisionmaking.  This is because the relevant variables that inform sentencing decisions are normally clear, especially in circumstances where an offense attracts a presumptive or fixed penalty.

In this Article, we examine the desirability of computers, rather than judges, making sentencing decisions. Some disadvantages may be associated with sentencing by computer, including the possibility that there could be less opportunity to adapt penalties to the specific facts of a case than if a judge made the decision.  However, if an algorithm is developed and applied in a clear and transparent manner, the benefits of computerized sentencing will outweigh the potential disadvantages.  Indeed, we argue that computerized sentencing has the potential to achieve superior outcomes to sentences imposed by judges.  In particular, it can lead to greater transparency, predictability and consistency in decision-making, and eliminate the subconscious bias that currently afflicts the decisions of some judges.  

Moreover, the introduction of computerized sentencing could be the catalyst for a much needed, wide-ranging reassessment of substantive sentencing law, as occurred four decades ago when the United States’ sentencing system changed from an indeterminate system to the largely prescriptive process that exists today.  A fundamental review of sentencing law would almost inevitably close the gap between sentencing knowledge and practice, thereby resulting in profound community benefits, including enhanced community safety and a reduction in the number of prisoners.

August 2, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, July 24, 2017

"Nine Lessons About Criminal Justice Reform: What Washington can learn from the states"

The title of this post is the headline of this extended essay by Bill Keller published last week at The Marshall Project. I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts focused on some of Bill's most sentencing-specific lessons:

“Reform” is one of those ambiguous words that mean different things to different people.  I think of reform as something that aims to reduce the numbers of Americans who are removed from society and deprived of their freedom, and to do it without making us less safe.  In 1972, when I was starting my newspaper life at The Oregonian, 93 out of 100,000 Americans were in state or federal prisons.  By 2008 the incarceration rate had grown nearly six-fold, to 536 per 100,000, and it has hovered in that vicinity ever since. That’s not counting the hundreds of thousands held in county jails on any given day or those confined in the juvenile justice system or immigrant detention.

Every year about 650,000 of those prisoners are released back into the world.  We know that most of them will be unemployed a year later, and that two-thirds of them will be rearrested within three years.  We have a corrections system that fails to correct.

Here are a few lessons Washington can learn from the states.

Lesson 1: It is possible to reduce incarceration and crime at the same time. ...

Lesson 3: Probably the most effective way to reduce incarceration is not to lock people up in the first place — at least not so many, and not for so long....

Lesson 4: While the front end is important, don’t neglect the back end....

Lesson 5: Be wary of reformers who suggest you can cut incarceration drastically by releasing low-level, nonviolent offenders. ...

Lesson 6: Prison reform doesn’t necessarily mean a huge windfall for taxpayers. ...

Lesson 8: Many states are finding that incentives work better than mandates.

July 24, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, July 23, 2017

"North Dakota’s Norway Experiment: Can humane prisons work in America? A red state aims to find out."

The title of this post is the headline of this interesting new Mother Jones piece.  Here are a few excerpts from a piece that justifies a full read:

Scandinavian prisons tend to elicit eye rolls from law-and-order types weaned on the punitive American model.  Yet a growing number of state corrections officials are coming to the realization that our approach is ineffective, costly, and cruel.  Fred Patrick, director of the Center on Sentencing and Corrections at the Vera Institute of Justice, cites the nation’s staggering recidivism rate — 77 percent of inmates released from state prisons are rearrested within five years.  “Once you realize that this system isn’t working well,” he says, “it’s fairly easy to pivot to: ‘How do we do something different?'”...

North Dakota has advantages as a laboratory for correctional reforms. Like Norway, it is sparsely populated and relatively homogeneous — race-based prison gangs hold little sway here.  Another advantage, Don Specter told me, is simply that the state government is sufficiently small that it can be responsive to the exertions of a visionary leader.  Yet [North Dakota prisons chief Leann] Bertsch and [deputy Karianne] Jackson have no illusions about transforming their system into a corrections utopia overnight.  “You have to pace yourself,” Bertsch says.

The Norwegian principle of “dynamic security” posits that warm relationships between inmates and staff reduce the potential for violence. American prisons typically try to create safe conditions by means of oppressive rules, random searches, and the threat of additional punishment. Transitioning from one approach to the other requires a profound paradigm shift and the ability to sell front-line prison workers on a brand new mindset.  “How do you get somebody who thinks they’re in law enforcement to figure out you need to be more of an empath, more of a social worker, a friend, and a mentor?” Jackson asks.

The correctional officers I met at the state penitentiary, ex-military all, weren’t outwardly hostile to the idea of cultivating relationships with prisoners, but it clearly didn’t come naturally to them.  For that reason, perhaps, the brass created a mandate: Guards in the segregation unit must have at least two conversations per shift with each of the inmates under their supervision.  “It’s worth a shot,” a corrections officer named Josh Hedstrom told me.  “Because what we were doing before wasn’t working.”

July 23, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, July 21, 2017

"Should California drop criminal penalties for drug possession?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this effective new opinion piece in the San Francisco Chronicle authored by Beau Kilmer and Robert MacCoun. Here are excerpts:

For better or worse, California likes to decide drug policy at the ballot box.  Voters have already approved marijuana legalization, but criminal sanctions against users of heroin, cocaine and other drugs are very much intact, though they’ve been moving in a more lenient direction.  It would not be surprising to see a proposition entirely eliminating criminal penalties for drug possession in the near future.

The removal of criminal penalties for drug possession — which is very different from allowing legal sales — is not a new idea. It has been implemented in other countries, and a joint statement from the United Nations and World Health Organization last month recommended the review and repeal of “laws that criminalize or otherwise prohibit … drug use or possession of drugs for personal use.”

California already moved in this direction in 2014 when voters approved Proposition 47, which reduced to a misdemeanor the possession of heroin, methamphetamine and other drugs. Possession of these drugs, however, is still a criminal offense.

Possession arrests and convictions can have devastating effects on users and their families — especially for young men of color, who are disproportionately targeted, and for immigrants, who can be deported for a criminal offense.  There are a number of additional sanctions associated with drug convictions; for example, they can make it harder to receive federal aid for college, or access public housing.  The stigma around criminalization can also make it harder for users to get help or discuss their problems with family members and health professionals.

On the other side, there are two main arguments for criminalizing possession.  First, there’s deterrence, with the goal of discouraging use by threatening users with sanctions. Second, there’s leverage — that is, using arrest and prosecution to steer those with substance-use disorders toward treatment....

We think that a constructive new debate about decriminalizing drug possession can start with three observations:

Decriminalizing drug possession and use does not give users a free pass to commit other crimes.  If substance use leads individuals to drive impaired or engage in violence, they should be punished for those offenses.  Jurisdictions could consider “bundling” decriminalization with innovative treatment and/or sanctioning regimes for those whose use leads them to commit crimes that threaten public safety.

Eliminating criminal penalties needn’t mean eliminating all sanctions on use. Many jurisdictions outside California punish cannabis possession with civil fines, and the same could be done for other drugs.  (A failure to pay the fine could still be punishable by jail time.)  Many citizens will be subjected to drug testing at work. And the informal social sanctions of stigma and shame will continue to play an important role, as we see with tobacco smoking and heavy alcohol use.

Decriminalizing possession does not have to be permanent. Risk-averse decision makers could adopt a sunset provision that automatically reimposes criminal penalties after a fixed amount of time unless the Legislature acts to extend the change in policy.

Californians have a lot to consider when it comes to decriminalizing possession, especially because we are still learning about the consequences of Prop. 47.  But now is the time for a rigorous discussion about removing criminal penalties for drug possession, rather than rushing to judgment in the heat of a future election season.

July 21, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Sunday, July 16, 2017

"Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Lissa Griffin and Ellen Yaroshefsky. Here is the abstract:

Over the past few years, scholars, legislators, and politicians have come to recognize that our current state of “mass incarceration” is the result of serious dysfunction in our criminal justice system.  As a consequence, there has been significant attention to the causes of mass incarceration.  These include the war on drugs and political decisions based on a “law and order” perspective.  Congressional and state legislative enactments increased the financing of the expansion of police powers and provided for severely punitive sentencing statutes, thereby giving prosecutors uniquely powerful weapons in securing guilty pleas.  All of this occurred as crime rates dropped.

Where were the lawyers when our criminal justice system was evolving into a system of mass incarceration? Surprisingly, in looking for the causes and cures for the mass incarceration state, very little, if any, attention has been paid to the role of the most powerful actor in the criminal justice system: the prosecutor.  It is the prosecutor who exercises virtually unreviewable discretion in seeking charges, determining bail, negotiating a resolution, and fixing the sentence.  Now, however, there is data that identifies aggressive prosecutorial charging practices as the major cause of the explosion in our prison population.  That is, over the past twenty years prosecutors have brought felony charges in more cases than ever before, resulting in a dramatic increase in prison admissions.  If prosecutorial charging practices have been a major cause of the universally recognized mass incarceration problem, what should be done? How does the role of the prosecutor need to change to prevent a continuation, or a worsening, of our mass incarceration problem?

This Article examines the recognized role of the prosecutor as a “minister of justice,” and makes a range of suggested changes to the prosecution function.  These include re-calibrating the minister of justice and advocacy role balance in recognition of the current mass incarceration crisis; enacting measures to ensure independence from law enforcement in the charging function; collecting currently non-existent, objective data that breaks down and memorializes available information on each decision to charge as well as its consequences; and drafting written charging procedures and policies based on the collection of that data-driven information.

July 16, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, July 13, 2017

Still more from AG Sessions on crime and punishment... and some critical commentary thereon

This recent post reprinted some excerpts of a speech by Attorney General Sessions at the 30th DARE Training Conference, and AG Sessions hit some similar points in this subsequent speech yesterday in Las Vegas to law enforcement personnel. This Vegas speech gave special attention to immigration enforcement and "sanctuary cities," and here are excerpts from the start of the speech that help highlight how AG Sessions view a tough approach to law enforcement as central to everything that government seeks to achieve: 

Since the early 1990s, the crime rate has steadily come down across the country — that is, until two years ago. Now, violent crime is once again on the rise in many parts of America.  The murder rate, for example, has surged 10 percent nationwide in just one year — the largest increase since 1968.

These numbers are shocking, and they are informative, but the numbers are not what is most important. What’s most important are the people behind the numbers.  Each one of the victims of these crimes had a family, friends, and neighbors. They’re all suffering, too....

We cannot accept this status quo, and this Department of Justice will not accept it.  Every American has the right to be safe in their homes and in their neighborhoods.

The first and most important job of this government — and any government — is to protect the safety and the rights of its people.  If we fail at this task, then every other government initiative ceases to be important.

As law enforcement officials, we have the responsibility to stop — and reverse — the surge in violent crime and opioids that has taken place over the last two years.  And under President Trump’s leadership, this Department of Justice will answer the call and do its part.

To that end, I have directed our federal prosecutors to work closely with our law enforcement partners at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels to combat violent crime and take violent criminals off our streets.

As we all know, the vast majority of people just want to obey the law and live their lives.  A disproportionate amount of crime is committed by a small group of criminals.  And the more of them we apprehend, prosecute, and convict, the more crime we can deter.

Meanwhile, as AG Sessions has been this week expounding his vision for federal criminal enforcement, some commentators concerned about his vision have been explaining their concerns.  Here are two recent pieces with critical commentary on what AG Sessions is up to:

July 13, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, July 11, 2017

"It’s time to refocus the punishment paradigm"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new commentary in The Hill authored by Adam Gelb and Barbara Broderick. Here are excerpts:

[O]ne of the most powerful findings in criminology is that rewards are better shapers of behavior than punishments. But that’s not typically how it works for the 4.7 million Americans on probation or parole, the community supervision programs founded for the purpose of redirecting troubled lives.

Instead, supervision has become mostly about enforcing the rules — report to your probation officer, attend treatment, etc. — and locking people up when they don’t obey.  Corrections professionals call it “Trail ’em, nail ’em, and jail ’em.”

People who commit crimes need to be held accountable for their actions, of course, but the criminal justice system serves a much wider purpose: protecting public safety.  In order to cut crime and recidivism rates — and rein in corrections spending — we need to harness what the research says about changing behavior.  That means refocusing the punishment model and making the primary mission of supervision to promote success, not just punish failure.

This fundamental transformation is one of a set of proposed paradigm shifts in community corrections highlighted in a report set to be released later this month from Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government and the National Institute of Justice — the product of three years of discussions among leading experts in criminal justice, of which we were a part.

Our group sought to identify strategies for probation, parole, and other programs that can both promote public safety and build trust between communities and justice institutions.  Other shifts include moving from mass to targeted supervision, concentrating resources on more serious offenders, and swapping intuition-based policies for evidence-based practices (such as focusing treatment on changing characteristics that contribute to offending, like poor impulse control, and avoiding those that don’t.)

Making supervision more reward-based holds great potential.  A probation officer’s job has traditionally been defined as reactive: wait until something bad happens and then impose a sanction, often a return to prison. This not only costs state taxpayers an average of $30,000 per year for each inmate, it also ignores a good part of what we know works best when it comes to steering ex-offenders away from continued criminality....

Drug courts have helped pioneer reward-based practices by holding graduation ceremonies to commemorate program completion.  Many graduates say it’s the first time in their lives that they’ve achieved something and been publicly acknowledged for it, and studies suggest that this type of recognition inspires them to persist in their sobriety.

Such ceremonies shouldn’t be limited to specialized courts or programs, which handle only a small fraction of the millions of people on community supervision.  They should be expanded and accompanied by other rewards for progress along the way.  Local communities and businesses can chip in with small gift cards and other tokens of recognition.

At least 15 states have passed laws that establish “earned compliance credits,” which typically permit offenders to earn a month off of their supervision terms for each month that they’re in compliance.  This tactic could be expanded and used in new ways.  For instance, for each month they obey the rules, parolees or probationers could have a reduction or elimination of the monthly fee (typically about $50) that they’re required to pay.

Another potentially promising method would capture the power of social media to push positive messages to probationers and parolees when they do well.  Pass a drug test, complete a phase of treatment, or get a job — and you’d receive a batch of digital pats on the back from your treatment team and circle of family and friends.

It’s human instinct to punish wrongdoing, and accountability won’t — and shouldn’t — vanish from the criminal justice system.  We can’t just reward people when they do right but fail to respond when they do wrong. But by shifting the emphasis from retribution to rewards, we can make a greater impact on behavior.

July 11, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (5)

"Punishment and the Burden of Proof"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Michael Louis Corrado. Here is the abstract:

Justifying state punishment presents a difficulty for those who deny that human actions are free in the sense required by moral responsibility.  The argument I make in this paper, following work done by Double, Vilhauer, and Sehon, is that those who believe that human beings do sometimes act freely face exactly the same difficulty, for no current account of freedom has the sort of evidentiary support that condemning a person to punishment requires; no current account could meet even the most minimal burden of proof.  Recourse to purely preventive methods, such as are proposed for a system of quarantine of dangerous individuals, seems undesirable because of the absence of limits under such a system, limits like the requirements of proportionality and guilt.  That same objection holds as well against proposals of non-retributive punishment: the adoption of a system of punishment, understood retributively or non-retributively, does not preclude the state even in theory from also adopting a system of preventive measures.

The answer that I suggest is a system of limited deprivations of freedom justified in much the way the doctrine of takings is justified, along with the specific exclusion of purely preventive methods for competent individuals.

July 11, 2017 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, July 10, 2017

Drug Policy Alliance issues big new report calling for drug decriminalization

Download (2)This new press release reports on the latest call by the Drug Policy Alliance (DPA) for drug decriminalization in the US.  The DPA has this new report titled "It's Time for the U.S. to Decriminalize Drug Use and Possession," and the press release discusses its work with other organization to push this agenda forward.  Here is start and end of the DPA report's executive summary:

By any measure and every metric, the U.S. war on drugs — a constellation of laws and policies that seeks to prevent and control the use and sale of drugs primarily through punishment and coercion – has been a colossal failure with tragic results. Indeed, federal and state policies that are designed to be “tough” on people who use and sell drugs have helped over-fill our jails and prisons, permanently branded millions of people as “criminals”, and exacerbated drug-related death, disease and suffering — all while failing at their stated goal of reducing problematic drug use.

This report offers a roadmap for how to begin to unwind our failed drug war. It focuses on one practical step that can and should be taken to avoid many of the harms that flow from punitive prohibitionist drug laws and to promote proven, effective health-based interventions.

Drug decriminalization is a critical next step toward achieving a rational drug policy that puts science and public health before punishment and incarceration.  Decades of evidence has clearly demonstrated that decriminalization is a sensible path forward that would reap vast human and fiscal benefits, while protecting families and communities.

Drug decriminalization is defined here as the elimination of criminal penalties for drug use and possession, as well as the elimination of criminal penalties for the possession of equipment used for the purpose of introducing drugs into the human body, such as syringes.  Throughout this report, we will use the phrase “drug possession” to include drug possession, drug use, and possession of paraphernalia used for the purpose of introducing drugs into the human body.

Ideally, drug decriminalization entails the elimination of all punitive, abstinence-based, coercive approaches to drug use; however, for purposes of this report, the term encompasses a spectrum of efforts to eliminate criminal penalties, even if such efforts do not eliminate all forms of coercion entirely.  Drug decriminalization also ideally entails the removal of criminal penalties for low-level sales, given that the line between seller and user is often blurred (this subject and the broader issue of people who sell drugs will be addressed in a subsequent DPA report).

This report is the product of a comprehensive review of the public health and criminology literature, an analysis of drug policies in the U.S. and abroad, and input from experts in the fields of drug policy and criminal justice.  By highlighting the benefits of eliminating criminal penalties for drug use and possession, we seek to provide policymakers, community leaders and advocates with evidence-based options for a new approach....

This report makes the following recommendations for local, state and federal policymakers in the U.S.:

• Congress and U.S. states should eliminate federal and state criminal penalties and collateral sanctions for drug use, drug possession for personal use, and possession of paraphernalia intended for consuming drugs.

• Congress should amend federal law to de-schedule marijuana and remove it from the federal Controlled Substances Act.

• Administrative penalties – such as civil asset forfeiture, administrative detention, driver’s license suspension (absent impairment), excessive fines, and parental termination or child welfare interventions (absent harm to children) – run counter to the intent of a decriminalization policy and should not be imposed.

• Decriminalization policies — like other drug policies — generally function far more effectively when accompanied by robust and diverse harm reduction and treatment-on-demand programs, including medication-assisted treatment.

• Local and state governments should adopt pre-booking diversion and 911 Good Samaritan policies to prioritize public health over punishment and incarceration.

July 10, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, July 07, 2017

Split Third Circuit panel finds numerous problems with short federal sentences for child-abusing Army couple

A remarkable and unusual federal sentencing involving a child-abusing couple led yesterday to a remarkable and unusual federal circuit sentencing opinion in US v. Jackson, No. 16-1200 (3d Cir. July 6, 2017) (available here). Here is how the 80-page(!) majority opinion by Judge Cowen gets started:

John and Carolyn Jackson (“John” and “Carolyn”) were convicted of conspiracy to endanger the welfare of a child and endangering the welfare of a child under New Jersey law— offenses that were “assimilated” into federal law pursuant to the Assimilative Crimes Act (“ACA”).  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Carolyn to 24 months of imprisonment (as well as three years of supervised release). John received a sentence of three years of probation (together with 400 hours of community service and a $15,000 fine). The government appeals from these sentences.

We will vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.  Concluding that there is no “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline, the District Court declined to calculate Defendants’ applicable sentencing ranges under the Guidelines. Although we adopt an “elements-based” approach for this inquiry, we conclude that the assault guideline is “sufficiently analogous” to Defendants’ offenses of conviction. Furthermore, the District Court failed to make the requisite findings of fact — under the applicable preponderance of the evidence standard — with respect to this Guidelines calculation as well as the application of the statutory sentencing factors.  We also agree with the government that the District Court, while it could consider what would happen if Defendants had been prosecuted in state court, simply went too far in this case by focusing on state sentencing practices to the exclusion of federal sentencing principles. Finally, the sentences themselves were substantively unreasonable.

Here is how the dissenting opinion by Judge McKee gets started:

It is impossible for anyone with an ounce of compassion to read through this transcript without becoming extraordinarily moved by allegations about what these children had to endure. Had the defendants been convicted of assault, or crimes necessarily involving conduct that was in the same “ballpark” as assault as defined under New Jersey law, I would readily agree that this matter had to be remanded for resentencing using the federal guidelines that govern assault.  However, the district court held a ten and a half hour sentencing hearing in an extraordinarily difficult attempt to sort through the emotion and unproven allegations and sentence defendants for their crimes rather than the conduct the government alleged at trial and assumes in its brief. I believe the court appropriately did so pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

Before I begin my discussion, however, I must note that the defendants in this case were acquitted of the only federal offenses with which they were charged: assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury.  As I discuss more fully in Section II, these assault charges seem to drive the government’s argument and the Majority’s analysis.  In order to minimize confusion about the precise nature of the charges in this case and the conduct that was proven, a chart listing each of the charges and their outcomes is attached as an addendum to this dissent.

There are lots of lots of interesting elements to this unusual case, but the rarity of reversals of sentences as substantively unreasonable led me to read that part of the majority opinion most closely.  The majority here repeatedly finds flaws in how the district court weighed various permissible § 3553(a) considerations.  And the discussion begins by noting that the guidelines called for sentences of perhaps 20 or more years for these defendants so that "probation for John and 24 months’ imprisonment for Carolyn represented enormous downward variances, which require correspondingly robust explanations for why such lenience was warranted."

July 7, 2017 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, July 05, 2017

Federal district judge explains his remarkable reasons for rejecting an unremarkable plea deal in heroin dealing prosecution

A helpful reader alerted me to a fascinating opinion issued last week by US District Judge Joseph Goodwin of the Southern District of West Virginia in US v. Walker, No. 2:17-cr-00010 (SD W. Va. June 26, 2017) (available here).  The full opinion is a must read, and here is its conclusion:

My twenty-two years of imposing long prison sentences for drug crimes persuades me that the effect of law enforcement on the supply side of the illegal drug market is insufficient to solve the heroin and opioid crisis at hand. I also see scant evidence that prohibition is preventing the growth of the demand side of the drug market. Nevertheless, policy reform, coordinated education efforts, and expansion of treatment programs are not within my bailiwick. I may only enforce the laws of illicit drug prohibition.

The law is the law, and I am satisfied that enforcing the law through public adjudications focuses attention on the heroin and opioid crisis.  The jury trial reveals the dark details of drug distribution and abuse to the community in a way that a plea bargained guilty plea cannot.  A jury trial tells a story.  The jury members listening to the evidence come away with personally impactful information about the deadly and desperate heroin and opioid crisis existing in their community.  They are educated in the process of performing their civic duty and are likely to communicate their experience in the courtroom to family members and friends.  Moreover, the attendant media attention that a jury trial occasions communicates to the community that such conduct is unlawful and that the law is upheld and enforced.  The communication of a threat of severe punishment acts as an effective deterrent.  As with other criminalized conduct, the shame of a public conviction and prison sentence specifically deters the sentenced convict from committing the crime again — at least for so long as he is imprisoned.

Over time, jury verdicts involving the distribution of heroin and opioids reinforce condemnation of the conduct by the public at large. In turn, respect for the law propagates.117 This respect for the law may eventually reduce such criminal conduct.

The secrecy surrounding plea bargains in heroin and opioid cases frequently undermines respect for the law and deterrence of crime.  The bright light of the jury trial deters crime, enhances respect for the law, educates the public, and reinforces their sense of safety much more than a contract entered into in the shadows of a private meeting in the prosecutor’s office.

For the reasons stated, I REJECT the plea agreement.

It will be quite interesting to see if the parties appeal this rejection of the plea agreement or if the defendant decides to plea without the benefit of any agreement (which I believe must be accepted if the judge finds it is voluntary).

July 5, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Sunday, June 25, 2017

"A Holistic Framework to Aid Responsible Plea-Bargaining By Prosecutors"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new note authored by Aditi Juneja now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

In our criminal justice system, ninety-four percent of cases are resolved through plea in state courts.  As Justice Kennedy recently observed: “the reality [is] that criminal justice today is, for the most part, a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”  This note is focused on expanding what prosecutors believe justice entails during the plea-bargaining process.  Unlike theories of plea-bargaining that state the goal to be the “highest deserved punishment the prosecutor could obtain on a plea,” this note focuses on how prosecutors can ensure that the lowest deserved punishment possible to achieve justice is imposed in order to preserve a defendant's right to liberty.

To achieve this goal, the note attempts to explain what factors individual prosecutors consider when plea bargaining. If provided a framework, prosecutors are capable of evaluating the multiple considerations that would be relevant in attempting to maximize the public good.  This note operates from the premise that it is possible, and perhaps preferable, to transform the culture of prosecutors’ offices from the ground up.  In order to contextualize the way these factors would be considered, it is important to understand the amount of prosecutorial discretion possessed by individual prosecutors.  As such, this note explores the scope of prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining.  First, the note considers the scope of prosecutorial discretion possessed by individual prosecutors within the context of office customs, office policies, ethical obligations and laws. The note then outlines a framework of factors a prosecutor might consider in deciding what plea deal to offer including the completeness of information, purposes of punishment, the defense counsel, reasons a defendant might plead guilty besides factual guilt, and impacts of punishment on the legitimacy of law.  This is the first academic paper to suggest that line prosecutors themselves attempt to conduct a multi-factored analysis in determining what plea deal should be offered is necessary and that the plea deal should be distinct from the sentence that might be offered at trial given the lack of procedural safeguards.

June 25, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, June 24, 2017

Former DAG Sally Yates makes the case against AG Sessions new federal charging and sentencing policies

Former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates that this new Washington Post commentary under the headline "Making America scared again won’t make us safer." Here are excerpts:

All across the political spectrum, in red states and blue states, from Sen. John Cornyn (R-Tex.) and the Koch brothers to Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and the American Civil Liberties Union, there is broad consensus that the “lock them all up and throw away the key” approach embodied in mandatory minimum drug sentences is counterproductive, negatively affecting our ability to assure the safety of our communities.

But last month, Attorney General Jeff Sessions rolled back the clock to the 1980s, reinstating the harsh, indiscriminate use of mandatory minimum drug sentences imposed at the height of the crack epidemic.  Sessions attempted to justify his directive in a Post op-ed last weekend, stoking fear by claiming that as a result of then-Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr.’s Smart on Crime policy, the United States is gripped by a rising epidemic of violent crime that can only be cured by putting more drug offenders in jail for more time.

That argument just isn’t supported by the facts.  Not only are violent crime rates still at historic lows — nearly half of what they were when I became a federal prosecutor in 1989 — but there is also no evidence that the increase in violent crime some cities have experienced is the result of drug offenders not serving enough time in prison.  In fact, a recent study by the bipartisan U.S. Sentencing Commission found that drug defendants with shorter sentences were actually slightly less likely to commit crimes when released than those sentenced under older, more severe penalties.

Contrary to Sessions’s assertions, Smart on Crime focused our limited federal resources on cases that had the greatest impact on our communities — the most dangerous defendants and most complex cases. As a result, prosecutors charged more defendants with murder, assault, gun crimes and robbery than ever before.  And a greater percentage of drug prosecutions targeted kingpins and drug dealers with guns.

During my 27 years at the Justice Department, I prosecuted criminals at the heart of the international drug trade, from high-level narcotics traffickers to violent gang leaders. And I had no hesitation about asking a judge to impose long prison terms in those cases.  But there’s a big difference between a cartel boss and a low-level courier. As the Sentencing Commission found, part of the problem with harsh mandatory-minimum laws passed a generation ago is that they use the weight of the drugs involved in the offense as a proxy for seriousness of the crime — to the exclusion of virtually all other considerations, including the dangerousness of the offender.  Looking back, it’s clear that the mandatory-minimum laws cast too broad a net and, as a result, some low-level defendants are serving far longer sentences than are necessary — 20 years, 30 years, even mandatory life sentences, for nonviolent drug offenses.

Under Smart on Crime, the Justice Department took a more targeted approach, reserving the harshest of those penalties for the most violent and significant drug traffickers and encouraging prosecutors to use their discretion not to seek mandatory minimum sentences for lower-level, nonviolent offenders.  Sessions’s new directive essentially reverses that progress, limiting prosecutors’ ability to use their judgment to ensure the punishment fits the crime....

While there is always room to debate the most effective approach to criminal justice, that debate should be based on facts, not fear. It’s time to move past the campaign-style rhetoric of being “tough” or “soft” on crime. Justice and the safety of our communities depend on it.

Prior recent related posts:

June 24, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Sunday, June 18, 2017

Could jail be "the answer" for drug addicts?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this New York Times opinion piece headlined "Addicts Need Help. Jails Could Have the Answer." This piece is authored by Sam Quinones, the journalist and author of the widely praised "Dreamland: The True Tale of America’s Opiate Epidemic." Here is how the lengthy piece gets started and its final line:

Not long ago, I visited a Narcotics Anonymous meeting where men with tattoos and short-cropped hair sat in a circle and talked out their errors. One had lived under an overpass, pimping his girlfriend’s daughter for cash to buy heroin. As the thought brought him to tears, his neighbor patted his shoulder. Others owned to stealing from grandparents, to losing jobs and children. Soon, most in the room — men with years of street addiction behind them — were wiping their eyes.

What made the meeting remarkable, however, was not the stories, but where it was taking place. Unit 104 is a 70-man pod in Kenton County Detention Center in northern Kentucky, across the Ohio River from Cincinnati. The unit, and an equivalent one for women, is part of a new approach to jail made necessary by our nationwide epidemic of opiate addiction. Drug overdoses are now the leading cause of death among Americans under 50.

As the country has awakened to that epidemic, a new mantra has emerged: “We can’t arrest our way out of this,” accompanied by calls for more drug-addiction treatment. Yet the opiate epidemic has swamped our treatment-center infrastructure. Only one in 10 addicts get the treatment they need, according to a 2016 surgeon general’s report. New centers are costly to build, politically difficult to find real estate for and beyond the means of most uninsured street addicts, anyway.

So where can we quickly find cheap new capacity for drug treatment accessible to the street addict? Jail is one place few have thought to look.

Jails typically house inmates awaiting trial or serving up to a year for a misdemeanor crime. Many inmates are drug addicts. They vegetate for months, trading crime stories in an atmosphere of boredom and brutality. Any attempt at treatment is usually limited to a weekly visit by a pastor or an Alcoholics Anonymous volunteer. When inmates are released, they’re in the clothes they came in with, regardless of the weather, and have no assistance to re-enter the real world. This kind of jail has always been accepted as an unavoidable fixed cost of government.

But the sheer dimensions of the opiate-addiction epidemic are forcing new ideas. One of them, now being tried in Kentucky, is jail not as a cost but as an investment in recovery. Jails as full-time rehab centers — from lights on to lights out. Jailing addicts is anathema to treatment advocates. However, as as any parent of an addict can tell you, opiates are mind-controlling beasts. A kid who complained about the least little household chore while sober will, as an addict, walk through five miles of snow, endure any hardship or humiliation, to get his dope.

Waiting for an addict to reach rock bottom and make a rational choice to seek treatment sounds nice in theory. But it ignores the nature of the drugs in question, while also assuming a private treatment bed is miraculously available at the moment the addict, who is usually without insurance, is willing and financially able to occupy it. The reality is that, unlike with other drugs, with opiates rock bottom is often death. (Drug overdose deaths last year most likely exceeded 59,000, the most ever in the United States, The Times found in an analysis of preliminary data this month, up about 19 percent over 2015.)

Jail can be a necessary, maybe the only, lever with which to encourage or force an addict who has been locked up to seek treatment before it’s too late. “People don’t go to treatment because they see the light,” said Kevin Pangburn, director of Substance Abuse Services for the Kentucky Department of Corrections. “They go to treatment because they feel the heat.”

Jail may in fact be the best place to initiate addict recovery. It’s in jail where addicts first come face-to-face with the criminal-justice system, long before they commit crimes that warrant a prison sentence. Once in custody and detoxed of the dope that has controlled their decisions, it’s in jail where addicts more clearly behold the wreckage of their lives. And it is at that moment of clarity and contrition when they are typically plunged into a jailhouse of extortion, violence and tedium....

Amid this national epidemic of opiate addiction, rethinking jail, as Kentucky has, as a place of sanctuary and recovery for a population that has lost hope, might not just be advisable; it may be indispensable.

June 18, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7)

Friday, June 16, 2017

You be the juvenile sentencing judge: what sentence for teen guilty of involuntary manslaughter for encouraging suicide?

A high-profile state (bench) trial culminated this morning in a notable involuntary manslaughter conviction in the so-called in texting suicide case.  This Boston Globe article provides the basic details to set up the question in the title of this post:

Michelle Carter, who repeatedly urged her boyfriend to kill himself, was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter Friday by a juvenile court judge, ending an extraordinary trial that explored a virtual relationship between teenagers that ended in a suicide.

Judge Lawrence Moniz delivered his verdict after deliberating for two days in the jury-waived trial in Bristol Juvenile Court where Carter [who was 17 at the time of the offense] was being tried as a youthful offender.  The trial riveted lawyers and the public alike as it delved into the painful interior lives of two teenagers who called themselves boyfriend and girlfriend though they had met in person only a few times....

Bristol prosecutors alleged Carter should still be held accountable for the death of Conrad Roy III even though she was not present when the 18-year-old with prior suicide attempts filled his truck with carbon monoxide on July 12, 2014.  Carter and Roy spoke for 47 minutes as he parked in the parking lot of a Kmart in Fairhaven.  When he told he was too scared and had left the truck, she ordered him to return, according to testimony at her trial. “Get back in,” she allegedly said.

Roy left a suicide note addressed to Carter that was made public during her trial.

Speaking from the bench, Moniz said that he concluded Carter was guilty of involuntary manslaughter, in part, for ordering Roy back into the truck in what she knew was a toxic environment where it would take him 15 minutes to die — and failed to notify anyone as required under Massachusetts law.  “Miss Carter had reason to know that Mr. Roy had followed her instruction and placed himself in the toxic environment of that truck,” Moniz said.  “Knowing that Mr. Roy is in the truck, knowing the condition of the truck. Knowing, or at least having the state of mind that 15 minutes must pass, Miss Carter took no actions … She called no one.  She did not issue a simple additional instruction: Get out of the truck.”

Moniz also said the case was not legally novel since 200 years ago, a state prison inmate was prosecuted for convincing a man facing the death sentence to hang himself in his cell six hours before he was to be executed.  Moniz also noted that Roy had a long and troubled psychiatric history that included multiple suicide attempts — but each time he stopped and sought out help from his family and friends.

Moniz set sentencing for Aug. 3.  She faces up to 20 years in prison if given the maximum sentence for involuntary manslaughter.

I would be shocking if the judge here decided to impose a sentence anywhere near the applicable 20-year max. I am inclined to guess a prison sentence in the range of a year or two will be what the juvenile judge here will be considering. But I have not followed this case and the evidence closely, so I am really judge guessing here based on the nature of the crime and the offender. And I am interested to hear if others have more informed (or uninformed) views on what a fair and effective sentences in this case would look like.

June 16, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (19)

Tuesday, June 13, 2017

"Whom Should We Punish, and How? Rational Incentives and Criminal Justice Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this paper authored by Keith Hylton recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This essay sets out a comprehensive account of rational punishment theory and examines its implications for criminal law reform.  Specifically, what offenses should be subjected to criminal punishment, and how should we punish?  Should we use prison sentences or fines, and where should we use them?  Should some conduct be left to a form of market punishment through private lawsuits?  Should fines be used to fund the criminal justice system?

The answers I offer address some of the most important public policy issues of the moment, such as mass incarceration and the use of fines to finance law enforcement.  The framework of this paper is firmly grounded in rational deterrence policy, and yet points toward reforms that would soften or reduce the scope of criminal punishment. 

June 13, 2017 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, June 09, 2017

"Measuring the Creative Plea Bargain"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting-looking paper authored by Thea Johnson available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

A great deal of criminal law scholarship and practice turns on whether a defendant gets a good deal through plea bargaining.  But what is a good deal?  And how do defense attorneys secure such deals?  Much scholarship measures plea bargains by one metric: how many years the defendant receives at sentencing. In the era of collateral consequences, however, this is no longer an adequate metric as it misses a world of bargaining that happens outside of the sentence.  Through empirical research, this Article examines the measure of a good plea and the work that goes into negotiating such a plea.  Through in-depth interviews with twenty-five public defenders in four states, I investigate the ways in which collateral consequences impact the negotiation of the plea.  What emerges is a picture of creative plea bargaining that takes into account a host of noncriminal sanctions that fall outside of the charge and sentence.  Public defenders assess the priorities of their clients — regarding both the direct and collateral consequences of the case — and piece together pleas that meet these varied needs.  The length of sentence after a plea does not tell the full story about whether a defendant got a good deal because a successful plea now encompasses much beyond the final sentence.

These findings have broad implications for the way we think about assessing public defense offices and individual defenders.  Much of what goes into a plea — particularly at the misdemeanor level — is a product of the client’s desire to avoid certain collateral consequences, and those desires generally do not enter the formal record or off-the-record negotiations with prosecutors.  As a result, pleas that look bad on paper may actually be meeting the needs of the client.  Therefore, in order to assess pleas and the defenders who negotiate them, we must understand the limits of publicly available data and focus on creating a more robust data set by which to judge public defenders.  Additionally, this Article provides a fuller picture of prevailing professional norms at the plea phase after Padilla, Lafler, and Frye.  As courts grapple with the role of the defense attorney during plea bargaining, it is critical that they understand that in many cases lawyers achieve optimal outcomes by providing advice and advocacy for their clients on concerns outside of the immediate criminal case.  Finally, this Article serves as a renewed call for attention and funding for the holistic model of public defense.

June 9, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, June 08, 2017

"Neither Justice Nor Treatment: Drug Courts in the United States"

PhrThe title of this post is the title of this notable new report issued by the group Physicians for Human Rights. Here is an excerpts from the report's executive summary:

U.S. drug courts [are] specialized courts within the criminal justice system set up to provide alternative sentencing options — treatment instead of jail or prison time — for people charged with criminal behavior linked to drug possession, sale, or addiction.  The first courts were opened in 1989 to ease dockets and jails that were overflowing as a result of strict federal and state laws passed in the 1980s in an attempt to reduce drug supply and consumption.

Almost three decades later, there are more than 3,100 drug courts operating in the United States.  But while the courts’ proponents say they reduce recidivism for people with substance use disorders, critics say the system abuses due process, often mandates treatment for people who don’t actually need it — people without drug dependence — and fails to provide quality care to many who do.

Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) assessed the availability and quality of substance use disorder treatment through drug courts in three states — Florida, New Hampshire, and New York, chosen for the diversity of their drug court and health system approaches — and found major obstacles to quality evidence-based treatment for drug court participants in all three states.  Overall, PHR found that drug courts largely failed at providing treatment to those who truly needed it, and filled up limited treatment spaces with courtmandated patients who didn’t always need the care.  In many cases, court officials with no medical background mandated inappropriate treatment not rooted in the evidence base, or mandated treatment for people who didn’t need it.  In all cases, the functioning and mandate of the drug courts posed significant human rights concerns.

At the most basic level, PHR found that access to quality treatment was hampered by the inherent tension between a punitive criminal justice logic and therapeutic concern for drug court participants as patients.  In fact, despite the stated intention of drug courts to treat people who use drugs as ill rather Executive Summary than deviant, drug court participants were often punished for relapsing, missing therapy appointments, or otherwise failing to follow court rules.

One key concern motivating this research was whether drug courts were able to appropriately diagnose and facilitate treatment for people with substance use disorders who are in conflict with the law.  We found that, in many cases, they were not.  Diagnosis and initial treatment plans for drug court participants were often developed by people with no medical training or oversight, at times resulting in mandated treatment that was directly at odds with medical knowledge and recommendations.  The most egregious example of this was the refusal, delay, or curbing of medication-assisted treatment (MAT) (also known as substitution or replacement therapy) to people with opioid use disorders, despite evidence that treatment for such disorders in many cases requires long-term — sometimes permanent — medication.  Some drug courts also prevented participants from accessing or staying on medically prescribed treatment for anxiety, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, and other chronic health problems.

Human rights concerns are thus particularly relevant for drug courts, as these courts blur the line between voluntary and coerced treatment, and compel participants to waive the right to confidentiality.  Furthermore, most drug courts operate with regulations that subject medical expertise and advice regarding treatment to prosecutorial oversight and potential veto, raising questions about a person’s ability to access impartial evidencebased care.  Even where courts did not actively violate human rights protections of their participants, the regulatory set-up constantly threatened such violations.

June 8, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Judge Jack Weinstein talks through general deterrence and gang activity in federal gun sentencing

A helpful reader forwarded to me the latest interesting sentencing opinion authored by US District Judge Jack Weinstein. The full 25-page opinion in US v. Lawrence, No. 16-CR-243 (E.D.N.Y. May 23, 2017), is an interesting read for a lot of reasons, is not readily summarized and is available for download below. Here is how it gets started and ends to provide taste for the full opinion:

Defendant in the instant case pled guilty to a serious crime.  He is either a gang member or on the verge of becoming one.  He recklessly fired an illegally possessed handgun repeatedly down a public street, with the likelihood that a passing pedestrian might be hit: in fact he wounded his companion.

This case presents some of the critical difficulties in federal sentencing. It requires balancing general deterrence (and, relatedly, incapacitation) by a relatively long prison term with specific deterrence (and its other aspect, rehabilitation) by a relatively short term in prison. Both must be considered under section 3553(a)(2)(B) of section [1]8 of the United States Code.  By compromising, and reducing a somewhat draconian sentence (possibly less effective for general deterrence), or increasing the sentence (possibly less effective for rehabilitation), the sentence may risk frustrating either goal.

The subtle weighing of alternatives is made more difficult by the presence of numerous competing vectors (such as family or work or criminal history).  In the present case the court accepted, and acted on, testimony of an expert witness that increasing the length of incarceration does not proportionally increase general or specific deterrence....

The Guidelines do not consider gang membership as a factor in sentencing, except for defendants who are sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 521 (pertaining to criminal street gangs), where the Guidelines provide for an upward departure. U.S.S.G. § 5K2.18.  Were gang membership a sentencing factor in cases other than those under 18 U.S.C. § 521, courts would give greater weight to this factor.  This court recommends that the Sentencing commission revisit the gang membership problem.

Download Lawrence - Judgment%2c Memo%2c and Order

June 8, 2017 in Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, June 06, 2017

"Kinds of Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this essay by Douglas Husak now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

Contemporary states execute, imprison, fine, place on probation, conditionally discharge, caution, and do a great deal more to the persons they convict.  What general principles govern how retributivists should choose between the foregoing responses to culpable wrongdoing — or select an altogether different type of sanction?  If my subsequent reasoning is sound, it is easy to understand why retributivists have tended to neglect this issue.  They have neglected it because they have little to contribute to its resolution.  In what follows, I will support this conclusion and discuss a few of the somewhat controversial positions on which it rests.  I hope to make some headway on this topic by defending what I call the deferential view about kinds of punishment (or deferential view for short).

June 6, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, June 02, 2017

"From Grace to Grids: Rethinking Due Process Protection for Parole"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper available via SSRN authored by Kimberly Thomas and Paul Reingold. Here is the abstract:

Current due process law gives little protection to prisoners at the point of parole, even though the parole decision, like sentencing, determines whether or not a person will serve more time or will go free.  The doctrine regarding parole, which developed mostly in the late 1970s, was based on a judicial understanding of parole as an experimental, subjective, and largely standardless art — rooted in assessing the individual “character” of the potential parolee.

In this Article we examine the foundations of the doctrine, and conclude that the due process inquiry at the point of parole should take into account the stark changes in sentencing and parole practice over the years.  Since the development of the parole due process doctrine in the 1970s, two seismic shifts have occurred.  First, the constitutional protections provided at the initial sentencing have vastly increased.  Second, the parole process itself has been transformed by the move to evidence-based parole guidelines and the use of actuarial risk-assessment instruments as the norm in parole decision-making.

In this Article we document the changes in this under-scrutinized area and assert that the liberty interest in parole should more closely match the present-day legal account of the liberty interest that courts afford defendants at sentencing. 

June 2, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, May 29, 2017

The Economist urges "Rethinking Prison"

20170527_cna400The current print edition of The Economist has a series of article on prison policies and practices. Here are links to the article in the series and their extended headlines:

"America’s prisons are failing. Here’s how to make them work: A lot is known about how to reform prisoners. Far too little is done."

"More women are being put behind bars. Fewer should be: Female convicts are less violent and more likely to have stolen to support children

"Too many prisons make bad people worse. There is a better way: The world can learn from how Norway treats its offenders"

Here is an excerpt from the last of these articles:

Reserving prison for the worst offenders has hefty benefits.  First, it saves money.  In America, for example, incarcerating a federal convict costs eight times as much as putting the same convict on probation.  Second, it avoids mixing minor offenders with more hardened criminals, who will teach them bad habits.  “The low-level guys don’t tend to rub off on the higher-level prisoners. It goes the other way,” says Ron Gordon of the Utah Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, a state body.

Modern electronic tags are cheap and effective. In a recent study Rafael Di Tella of Harvard University and Ernesto Schargrodsky of Torcuato Di Tella University compared the effects of electronic tagging versus prison for alleged offenders in Buenos Aires.  Earlier research had failed to deal with the fact that criminals who are tagged are less likely to reoffend than the more dangerous ones who are locked up.  The authors found a way round this.  Alleged criminals in Argentina are assigned randomly to judges for pre-trial hearings. Liberal judges are reluctant to hold them in the country’s awful jails, so they often order them to be tagged.  So-called mano dura (tough hand) judges prefer to lock them up.  The researchers observed what happened to similar offenders under different regimes.  Only 13% of those who were tagged were later rearrested; for those sent to prison the figure was 22%.

May 29, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, May 24, 2017

American Law Institute officially approves revised Model Penal Code: Sentencing provisions

This afternoon I received an email with this exciting news: "Members of the American Law Institute (ALI) voted at their 2017 Annual Meeting in Philadelphia on Wednesday, May 24th to approve the Proposed Final Draft of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing." Here is the context via the email of what I think is a very big deal after a very long process:

Under Reporter Kevin R. Reitz (Co-Director of the Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice and James Annenberg La Vea Land Grant Chair in Criminal Procedure Law at the University of Minnesota Law School), and Associate Reporter Cecelia M. Klingele (Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin, Madison), the project reexamines the sentencing provisions of the 1962 Model Penal Code in light of the many changes in sentencing philosophy and practice that have taken place since its original publication.

The Model Penal Code: Sentencing project provides guidance on some of the most important issues that courts, corrections systems, and policymakers are facing today, including the general purposes of the sentencing system; rules governing sentence severity — including sentences of incarceration, community supervision, and economic penalties; the elimination of mandatory minimum penalties; mechanisms for combating racial and ethnic disparities in punishment; instruments of prison population control; victims’ rights in the sentencing process; the sentencing of juvenile offenders in adult courts; the creation of judicial powers to review many collateral consequences of conviction; and many issues having to do with judicial sentencing discretion, sentencing commissions, sentencing guidelines, and appellate sentence review.

“As a matter of recent history in this country, we’re at quite an important moment, where the conversation and political attitudes towards criminal justice policy and sentencing policy have been shifting dramatically at the state level,” said Professor Reitz.  “Despite current uncertainties in the federal government, legislators, policymakers, and lawmakers in state and local criminal justice systems are searching for workable solutions to problems of mass punitiveness that have grown since the 1970s.  This moment in history is particularly fortuitous for the Model Penal Code because we are arriving at the point of completion just as this new or changed nationwide debate is occurring. For lawmakers, judges, and corrections leaders, we can provide the tools they will need to create important and lasting sentencing reforms in their jurisdictions.”

May 24, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, May 23, 2017

"The Effects of Racial Profiling, Taste-Based Discrimination, and Enforcer Liability on Crime"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper by Murat Mungan now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The literature contains ambiguous findings as to whether statistical discrimination, e.g. in the form of racial profiling, causes a reduction in deterrence.  These analyses, however, assume that enforcers' incentives are exogenously fixed.  This article demonstrates that when the costs and benefits faced by officers in enforcing the law are endogenously determined, statistical discrimination as well as taste-based discrimination lead to an increase in criminal activity.  Moreover, the negative effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination.

This suggests, contrary to the impression created by the existing literature, that statistical discrimination is not only harmful, but, may be even more detrimental than taste-based discrimination.  Thus, for purposes of maximizing deterrence, the recent focus in empirical research on identifying taste-based discrimination as opposed to statistical discrimination may be misplaced.  A superior approach may be to identify whether any type of racial discrimination takes place in the enforcement of laws, and to provide enforcers with incentives to minimize the impact of their discriminatory behavior.

May 23, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (6)

Saturday, May 20, 2017

"Proportional Mens Rea and the Future of Criminal Code Reform"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Michael Serota and available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

This Essay argues that the principle of proportional mens rea — roughly, the idea that more blameworthy states of mind should be punished more severely, while less blameworthy states of mind should be punished more leniently — is central to the administration of justice, yet has largely been ignored by American criminal justice policies.  I contend that this oversight provides a key justification and source of guidance for future criminal code reform efforts, while explaining how a criminal code reform agenda premised on the principle of proportional mens rea might be realized as a matter of course.

The Essay is comprised of three parts. Part I sets forth the theory of proportional mens rea and criminal legislation animating this Essay.  Part II highlights the extent to which American criminal codes, as well as American sentencing policies more generally, fail to live up to this normative benchmark.  Part III then concludes with a discussion of the two main models of criminal code reform, what I respectively refer to as the thick model and the thin model, through which efforts to better align criminal codes with the principle of proportional mens rea might proceed.

May 20, 2017 in Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

Friday, May 19, 2017

US Commission on Civil Rights conducting big hearing on collateral consequences

As detailed in this official meeting notice, the United States Commission on Civil Rights is having a big public "briefing" focused on "Collateral Consequences: The Crossroads of Punishment, Redemption, and the Effects on Communities." The event in DC begins at 9:30 am and will be live-streamed at this link. Here is the scheduled run-down of the panels and speakers:

Panel One: Overview of Collateral Consequences of Incarceration:

National experts provide an overview of the long-lasting effects of incarceration after a prison sentence has ended. Panelists will discuss how these continuing barriers impact recidivism and particular communities. Speakers’ Remarks:

  • Margaret Love, Executive Director, Collateral Consequences Resource Center
  • Vikrant Reddy, Senior Research Fellow, Charles Koch Institute
  • Traci Burch, Associate Professor of Political Science, Northwestern University
  • John Malcolm, Vice President of the Institute for Constitutional Government, Heritage Foundation
  • Naomi Goldberg, Policy and Research Director, Movement Advancement Project

Panel Two: Access to Civil Participation after Incarceration:

National experts and professors discuss the barriers to civil participation following incarceration, specifically focusing on the right to vote and jury participation. Speakers’ Remarks:

  • Marc Mauer, Executive Director, The Sentencing Project
  • Hans von Spakovsky, Senior Legal Fellow, Meese Center for Legal and Judicial Studies, Heritage Foundation
  • James Binnall, Assistant Professor of Law, Criminology, and Criminal Justice, California State University at Long Beach
  • Anna Roberts, Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law and Faculty Fellow, Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and Equality

Panel Three: Access to Self-Sufficiency and Meeting Basic Needs:

National experts discuss the barriers to self-sufficiency and meeting basic needs after incarceration. Panelists will focus on employment, housing and access to public benefits. Speakers’ Remarks:

  • Maurice Emsellem, Program Director, National Employment Law Project
  • Kate Walz, Director of Housing Justice, Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law
  • Amy Hirsch, Managing Attorney, North Philadelphia Law Center; Welfare, Aging and Disabilities Units, Community Legal Services
  • Marc Levin, Director, Center for Effective Justice; Texas Public Policy Foundation; Right on Crime

May 19, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, May 18, 2017

"Deterrence and the Optimal Use of Prison, Parole, and Probation"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Paul Riskind now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In this article we derive the sentence — choosing among the sanctions of prison, parole, and probation — that achieves a target level of deterrence at least cost.  Potential offenders discount the future disutility of sanctions and the state discounts the future costs of sanctions.  Prison has higher disutility and higher cost per unit time than parole and probation, but the cost of prison per unit of disutility can be lower or higher than the cost of parole and probation per unit of disutility.  The optimal order of sanctions depends on the relative discount rates of potential offenders and the state, and the optimal duration of sanctions depends on the relative costs per unit of disutility among the sanctions and on the target level of deterrence.

We focus on the case in which potential offenders discount the disutility of sanctions at a higher rate than the state discounts the costs of sanctions.  In this case, if prison is more cost-effective than parole and probation — that is, has a lower cost per unit of disutility — prison should be used exclusively.  If prison is less cost-effective than parole and probation, probation should be used if the deterrence target is low enough, and prison followed by parole should be used if the deterrence target is relatively high.  Notably, it may be optimal to employ a prison term even if prison is less cost-effective than parole and probation and even if prison is not needed to achieve the target level of deterrence, because of what we refer to as the front-loading advantage of imprisonment.

May 18, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, May 14, 2017

"Dismissals as Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Anna Roberts available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

More than a third of our states have given judges a little-known power to dismiss prosecutions, not because of legal or factual insufficiency, but for the sake of justice.  Whether phrased as dismissals “in furtherance of justice” or dismissals of “de minimis” prosecutions, these exercises of judicial power teach two important lessons.

First, judges exercising these dismissals are rebutting the common notion that in the face of over-criminalization and over-incarceration they are powerless to do more than rubberstamp prosecutorial decision-making.  In individual cases, they push back against some of the most problematic aspects of our criminal justice system: its size, harshness, and bias.

Second, these cases converge on shared principles of justice.  These principles conjure a vision of a very different criminal justice system: one in which an alleged criminal act is viewed not in isolation, but within a broader context that includes the apparent motivations for it, and the state’s role in and response to it.  There is no logical reason to confine these principles to this procedural context, and the Article urges their broader consideration.

May 14, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Wednesday, May 10, 2017

Highlighting that conservative voters say they support criminal justice reform efforts

Vikrant Reddy authored this National Review commentary discussing the results of a recent interesting poll (which I highlighted here) under the headlined "The Conservative Base Wants Criminal-Justice Reform."  Here are excerpts:

Last week, the Charles Koch Institute (CKI) polled several hundred conservative voters to assess whether they recognize criminal justice as an important issue currently facing the nation. While specific reasons for their interest are debatable, 81 percent of Trump voters polled described the issue as either “very important” or “somewhat important” — a definite consensus.

Ordinarily, polls that confirm the status quo are not interesting.  This poll, however, caught the attention of those who have been asking whether conservative attitudes towards criminal-justice policy may have changed since the November 2016 election.  It’s a fair question.

The new presidential administration has given mixed messages, sometimes using strong rhetoric about increasing criminal penalties, but other times speaking with thoughtfulness about expanding treatment for opioid addiction.  Some prominent administration figures, such as Vice President Mike Pence, have a history as reformers.  Others, such as Attorney General Jeff Sessions, have a history as skeptics.  The views of the president himself are unpredictable.

Furthermore, when asked if judges should have more freedom to assign punishments other than prison (such as civil or community service), 63 percent of Trump voters “strongly agreed” or “agreed.”  When asked about the practice of civil asset forfeiture, which allows law-enforcement agencies to seize an individual’s property without requiring that the individual be charged or convicted of a crime, 59 percent of Trump voters found common ground with their liberal counterparts, responding that that they “strongly disagreed” or “disagreed” with such policing practices....

People surprised by the results of the poll ought to focus on one important figure: Fifty-four percent of Trump voters said they knew someone who is or has been incarcerated. That may surprise progressives who accuse conservatives of being out of touch and aloof from criminal-justice realities, but it shouldn’t surprise anybody who works in the criminal-justice arena and regularly talks to conservatives about their views....

Increasingly, then, the Americans who experience criminal justice as a personal issue are rural conservatives. Consider the example of Oklahoma.  On the night that Trump won the presidency, voters also approved changes to the state criminal code that reclassified certain drug felonies as misdemeanors, effectively expressing the view that too many drug offenses in Oklahoma were being treated with needlessly long bouts of incarceration. Oklahomans appear to prefer better probation and parole that monitors drug offenders and provides them with treatment.  This referendum vote took place in a state in which every single county voted for Trump.  A higher percentage of people (65.3 percent) voted for Trump in Oklahoma, than in any state, except Wyoming and West Virginia. It’s hard to be “Trumpier” than Oklahoma.

Leadership matters in public policy, and for that reason, it would be good to see clear support for criminal-justice reform from the White House.  Conservative legislators and governors, however, do not need to wait for cues from the administration.  The conservative base is already providing them. They have wanted criminal justice reform for a decade, and their minds did not change because of one election.

Recent prior related post:

May 10, 2017 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)