Tuesday, May 03, 2016

An (unhelpful?) exploration of how a troubled young man gets 50 years in Mississippi prison for first felony convictions

Rorschach-test_00411577The Clarion-Ledger is starting a series of articles titled "Blinded Justice" that will "examine how justice and punishment are dispensed across Mississippi in wildly varying ways."   This first piece, headlined "50 years for first-time felon? Tyler Moore's story," tells an interesting tale of a troubled youngster seemingly getting slammed on felony burglary charges because local prosecutors seemingly got tired of his many (misdemeanor-level?) crimes.  But the article does not really explore just why prosecutors ultimately were so eager to throw the book at this particular offender.  Here are excerpts from the lengthy piece which, for me, raises more state sentencing questions than answers:

Tyler Moore is serving 50 years in prison.  It was the first felony conviction for the 24-year-old man, struggling to beat a drug addiction and his bipolar disorder.  According to the Mississippi Department of Corrections, his tentative release date is 2061.  “I’ll be dead and gone by then,” said his mother, Lisa.  So how does a first-time offender who pleaded guilty to burglary get 50 years in prison? This is his story....

[In] 2010 ..., [after a charge of] misdemeanor possession of marijuana paraphernalia, Brandon police knocked on the door one morning about 5 and took him to jail on a hit-and-run charge.  The charge against him arose from a party where a young man claimed Moore had run his car into him.  Moore denied the claim, saying the young man jumped on his hood.

On April 1, 2011, the judge reduced the charge to leaving the scene of an accident, and Moore was fined.  While walking out of the courtroom that day, he muttered to someone, “You lying sack of s---.” The judge sentenced him to 10 days in jail.

The misdemeanors kept coming — contributing to the delinquency of a minor and then shoplifting when he walked out of Belk’s with a pair of sunglasses.  Moore apologized to the judge and admitted he had a drug problem.  He spent two days in jail, and the judge ordered drug tests for the next six months.

In August 2011, Moore’s family opted for a change in scenery, moving to Branson, Missouri....  He passed all the court-ordered drug tests. What his family didn’t know was his drug addiction now included spice, which couldn’t be detected by the tests....

As months passed, Moore grew homesick, and an old girlfriend wanted to see him.  He made it back to Mississippi before Christmas.  “I return and have like no money, so what do I do?” he wrote in a sworn statement. “I decide to steal out of some cars to get some money.”  In a Reservoir neighborhood, he went from car to car, stealing University of Alabama floor mats, an iPod, a University of Florida gator decal and other items.  

On Feb. 2, 2012, the Rankin County Sheriff’s Department arrested him and charged him with breaking into six cars....  After two weeks in jail, the judge released him on bond with the understanding he would go to a drug rehabilitation center, where he stayed 30 days.  He admitted using crack cocaine, marijuana and alcohol.

A day after his release in April 2012, deputies responded to a call, where they questioned Moore about a mother saying he had sex with her 15-year-old girl.  They arrested him, and he sat in jail for two weeks on a statutory rape charge. He insisted on his innocence, but he failed his polygraph test.  Once again, the judge sent him for 30 days to drug rehab.

After his release, his mother witnessed an improvement. He got a job at a car dealership... [but] when his employer learned of his burglary arrest, he was fired.  Devastated, he sank into depression.  A psychiatrist diagnosed him with bipolar disorder and prescribed medication. His mother said her son continued to struggle and began hanging out with the wrong crowd....

On a Thursday morning, Jan. 10, 2013, Moore discovered he had 21 missed calls on his cell phone.  When he talked with his mother, she told him deputies were looking for him. “They say you’ve been breaking into houses.”...  That evening, deputies showed up a second time, jailing his mother, father and 14-year-old brother on accessory after the fact charges after learning he was in Louisiana.

Moore’s grandmother decided to turn him in to the Rankin County jail on Sunday, a day before his court appearance.  When they arrived in Brandon, he bolted.  Deputies pursued him and caught him in a Reservoir subdivision, charging him with five counts of house burglary.  With his family behind bars, he confessed to the burglaries.

In a March 4, 2013, memo, the district attorney’s office gave Moore two options: He could plead guilty to auto and home burglaries and receive 50 years, or he could plead guilty to the burglaries and statutory rape, and receive 30 years.  Moore refused to plead guilty to statutory rape.

Ten days later, his new defense lawyer, John Colette of Jackson, proposed to prosecutors an alternative of 25 years in prison, with 25 suspended....  In response to the 50-year offer from prosecutors, Colette told them in a July 26, 2013, email, “Nobody was killed.”

The district attorney’s office didn’t budge.  Moore faced a new charge, this time of escape, after his bunkmate tried to pry open a window in the Rankin County jail.  Colette spoke with the sheriff and prosecutors, who agreed to dismiss the charge.

On Aug. 5, 2013, Moore pleaded guilty to five counts of auto burglary and one count of house burglary. “I just wanted to tell everyone I hurt I’m sorry, and my family,” he told the judge. “I’m not a bad guy. I’ve made some mistakes and I’m on drugs and I ran with the wrong crowd.”...  He confessed, “I don’t understand anything anymore, and I need help.”....

In keeping with the plea bargain, the judge sentenced him to 60 years in prison, suspending 10 of those years, with each sentence running consecutively. Circuit Judge John Emfinger dismissed the other burglary charges and the statutory rape charge. Because authorities recovered nearly all of the items, the judge ordered less than $300 in restitution.

Moore thought his sentences would run concurrently. “It did not seem real,” he wrote, “and to this day, it does not seem real.”... When Moore arrived at the Central Mississippi Correctional Facility, a correctional officer thought the 50 years of time were a mistake and double-checked with Rankin County Circuit Court to make sure the burglary sentences were indeed consecutive, not concurrent....

Moore's new lawyer, veteran defense attorney Tom Fortner, said the 50 years “seems like an awfully harsh sentence for a young person without a prior felony. There are a lot of people convicted for worse crimes who aren’t getting 50 years in prison.”  Fortner asked Judge Emfinger to reconsider his client’s case, saying his then-defense lawyer, Colette, failed to make clear to Moore how soon he would be eligible for parole.  Moore initially believed he would be eligible for parole as early as 2017, but it turned out he won’t be eligible until at least 2025. His tentative release date is 2061.

I find this case so very interesting and blogworthy because it strikes me as a a kind of Rorschach test for assessing the state and problems with modern sentencing systems. Though the article focuses on the severe sentence Moore got at the end of this story, one could reasonably complain about all the sentencing leniency he received for his considerable prior low-level offending. Similarly, though the article suggests it was peculiar and worrisome the local DA pushed for a 50-year sentence in a plea deal, one could reasonably wonder why a sentencing judge did not seem troubled by imposing this sentence. And while a 50-year prison term seems quite extreme for just a series of (minor?) burglary offenses, one could argue that this case was sentence just right if Moore can work hard to improve himself while incarcerated so as to earn parole after serving only 12 years.

May 3, 2016 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Monday, May 02, 2016

Another prominent elderly corrupt politician presenting dynamic federal sentencing issues

NY-DK527_NYCHAR_11U_20150122183914This lengthy Wall Street Journal article, headlined "Sheldon Silver Set to Be Sentenced: Judge has wide leeway as prosecution asks for long prison term, and defense seeks leniency for the former Assembly speaker," reports on issues surrounding a high-profile politician's federal sentencing scheduled for tomorrow in New York. Here are excerpts:

A federal judge is expected to decide Tuesday whether former New York state Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver deserves a long prison sentence for years of corruption, or leniency because he is ill and says he is sorry.

Leading up to the decision, lawyers for Mr. Silver have filed letters of support from ex-colleagues, constituents, family members and even a former employee at a Chinese restaurant he frequented. “I know that Sheldon Silver has been convicted, but please consider his kind personality and his support to the community,” wrote Fei Chen, who was a cook at Nom Wah Tea Parlor in Manhattan’s Chinatown.

The endorsement is part of a trove of materials from both the prosecution and defense that reflect the range of factors judges are supposed to consider in public-corruption cases and the latitude they have in deciding on punishment. Judges in cases like Mr. Silver’s grapple with how to account for breaking the public trust, and to what extent a sentence should serve as a deterrent to future crime.

Mr. Silver, a Manhattan Democrat who served as Assembly speaker for more than two decades, was convicted of honest-services fraud, extortion and money laundering. Prosecutors said Mr. Silver, 72 years old, netted about $4 million in kickbacks from schemes involving a real-estate company and an oncologist. Attorneys for Mr. Silver have said they would appeal.

Prosecutors have asked U.S. District Judge Valerie Caproni for a prison sentence greater than any previously imposed on legislators convicted of public corruption in the state. Court filings suggest the longest sentence for such an official was 14 years. “Silver exploited the vast political power entrusted in him by the public to serve himself,” prosecutors wrote.

Defense lawyers have asked for leniency, suggesting “rigorous community service.” The former legislator also wrote an apology letter to the judge. “I failed the people of New York,” Mr. Silver’s letter said.

U.S. law says judges should decide sentences based not only on the offense, but also the defendant’s “history and characteristics.” Also relevant, the law says, are deterrence, public protection and the needs of the defendant, including medical care. In court filings, Mr. Silver’s lawyers have highlighted his prostate cancer, bile-duct obstruction and knee problems.

For judges, sentencing in public-corruption cases presents a particular quandary: While the convicted official usually isn’t considered a threat to public safety, or capable of committing the same crimes in the future, the government has an incentive to punish such officials harshly to deter others from similar offenses.

“The difficulty you have in high-profile cases is that there is a philosophical argument that general deterrence sometimes trumps all other factors,” said Benjamin Brafman, a defense attorney not connected to the Silver case who represented Carl Kruger, a former state senator who was convicted on public-corruption charges and sentenced to seven years.

In the case of Mr. Silver, Judge Caproni can also consider prosecutors’ evidence that Mr. Silver used his position to help two women with whom he had extramarital affairs because, like the letters, it speaks to his character. In legal filings, attorneys for Mr. Silver said the allegations were unproven.

In recent years, public-corruption cases have garnered more attention, particularly because prosecutors have become increasingly vocal when bringing charges, said Deborah Gramiccioni, executive director of NYU’s Center on the Administration of Criminal Law. “The public’s indignation perhaps seems more pronounced,” said Ms. Gramiccioni, a former federal prosecutor who worked on public-corruption cases. But such indignation doesn’t necessarily influence judges’ decisions, she said....

Data show that New York judges often diverge from the federal guidelines when awarding prison sentences. Of 3,301 cases sentenced in federal court in New York in fiscal 2015, judges awarded sentences within the guideline range in 29.5% of cases, compared with 47.3% nationwide, according to federal statistics. Of 544 fraud cases in New York, 28.5% of sentences fell within the guidelines. Just five people received sentences above the guideline range.

In Mr. Silver’s case, sentencing guidelines suggest a range from about 22 to 27 years. In sentencing filings, both prosecution and defense attorneys cite many of the same public-corruption cases, including that of Mr. Kruger, the former state senator. Attorneys for Mr. Silver note that Mr. Kruger was sentenced to well below the federal recommendations. But prosecutors note that Mr. Kruger pleaded guilty, which they view as a crucial difference. “Unlike Kruger, here Sheldon Silver has accepted no responsibility and shown no remorse for his crimes,” they said.

May 2, 2016 in Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 28, 2016

Lots of discussion of felon disenfrachisement after Virginia Gov boldly restores voting rights

A new set of commentaries about felon disenfranchisement are among the valuable consequences of Virginia's Gov using his executive clemency power to restore voting rights to more than 200,000 former felons.  Here is a sampling:

Prior related posts:

April 28, 2016 in Collateral consequences, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, April 27, 2016

"Unlicensed & Untapped: Removing Barriers to State Occupational Licenses for People with Records"

The title of this post is the title of this lengthy new report from the National Employment Law Project. Here is an excerpt from its executive summary:

This paper examines the significant flaws in state occupational licensing criminal background check requirements.  One barrier to employment that regularly appears in state occupational licensing laws is the blanket ban, which automatically disqualifies people with certain records.  As a gauge for the frequency of blanket bans in licensing laws across the nation, the ABA Inventory reports over 12,000 restrictions for individuals with any type of felony and over 6,000 restrictions based on misdemeanors.  In addition, the ABA Inventory reports over 19,000 “permanent” disqualifications that could last a lifetime and over 11,000 “mandatory” disqualifications, for which licensing agencies have no choice but to deny a license.

Another aspect of the barriers facing workers with records is the prevalence of overly broad criminal record inquiries. The rationale for far-reaching inquiries is ostensibly compelling — licensing agencies seek robust information to advance public safety and health.  No research, however, supports the persistent misconception that a workplace is less safe if an employee has a past record.  Thus, even seemingly rational inquiries frequently operate as overly broad bans against anyone with a record.

License applicants with records face additional challenges presented by a lack of transparency and predictability in the licensure decision-making process and confusion caused by a labyrinth of different restrictions.  Requirements for a single occupation vary widely across states, as do the standards applied to evaluate past offenses.  Further complicating matters, the statutory language and procedures governing individual, or classes of, professions often differ from more general state licensing statutes.

April 27, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 26, 2016

You be the judge for "sentencing supernova": what punishment for former House speaker Dennis Hastert for structuring (and sex) offenses?

MassiveStarLifecycleI have decided to call tomorrow's scheduled sentencing for former House speaker J. Dennis Hastert a "sentencing supernova."  As science geeks know, and as this Wikipedia entry explains, a supernova is "an astronomical event that occurs during the last stellar evolutionary stages of a massive star's life, whose dramatic and catastrophic destruction is marked by one final titanic explosion."  I consider any former speaker of the House to be a "massive star" and I look at his coming sentencing as the culmination of a "dramatic and catastrophic destruction" as it was slowly unearthed by federal authorities that he was committing federal banking offenses in order to pay hush money to one (of now it appears many) of Hastert's long-ago sex abuse victims.

I also am thinking of Hastert's sentencing in "supernova" terms because there are so many dynamic and debatable sentencing issues swirling around his case.  This recent Chicago Tribune article, headlined "More than 40 letters in support of Hastert made public before sentencing," reviews just some of the sentencing issues in play (with my emphasis added):

More than 40 letters in support of former U.S. House Speaker Dennis Hastert — including one from his former congressional colleague Tom DeLay — were made public Friday evening in advance of his sentencing next week on hush money charges.

"We all have our flaws, but Dennis Hastert has very few," wrote DeLay, the Texas Republican who served as majority leader under Hastert in the early 2000s. "He doesn't deserve what he is going through.  I ask that you consider the man that is before you and give him leniency where you can."...

Also included were letters from Hastert's wife, Jean, and sons Joshua and Ethan, who wrote of his devotion to his family and his good deeds as a coach, teacher and later as a politician.  They also wrote of concerns over his failing health — Hastert's lawyers have said he suffered a stroke and near-fatal blood infection last year that left him hospitalized for weeks.  "This has taken a terrible toll on our family," his wife wrote. "I am particularly worried that if he is taken from his home and the care he needs, his health will continue to deteriorate."

Hastert, 74, faces probation to up to five years in prison when he is sentenced Wednesday, although his plea agreement with prosecutors calls for a sentence of no more than six months behind bars.  He pleaded guilty in October to one count of illegally structuring bank withdrawals to avoid reporting requirements, admitting in a plea agreement that he'd paid $1.7 million in cash to a person identified only as Individual A to cover up unspecified misconduct from decades earlier.

In a bombshell sentencing memorandum filed earlier this month, prosecutors alleged Hastert had sexually abused at least four wrestlers as well as a former team equipment manager when he was coach at Yorkville [more than 35 year ago]. The abuse allegedly occurred in hotel rooms during team trips and in almost-empty locker rooms, often after Hastert coaxed the teens into a compromising position by offering to massage them, prosecutors said.  The filing also alleged that Hastert set up a recliner chair outside the locker room showers in order to sit and watch the boys....

When he was confronted by FBI agents about the unusual bank withdrawals in December 2014, Hastert lied and said he was just keeping his money safe because he didn't trust security at the banks, according to prosecutors.  Later, he accused Individual A of extorting him by making false accusations of sexual abuse and even agreed to record phone conversations for the FBI — a gambit that fell apart when agents realized it was Hastert who was lying, according to prosecutors.

I have highlighted above the notable fact, thanks to a shrewd plea deal in this case, Hastert's punishment is statutorily limited to a prison sentencing range of zero to five years and that prosecutors are bound to recommend a sentence of no more than six months imprisonment.  Prosecutors cut this deal, I suspect, because they realize that Hastert's old age and poor health and recent history of public service would make unlikely that a judge would sentence him to a very lengthy prison term.

That all said, it appears nearly undisputable that Hastert did sexually abuse numerous boys while serving as a wrestling coach decades ago and essentially got away with these crimes.  (It is my understanding that the statute of limitations has passed so that he could not now be prosecuted for them.)  His more recent bank/money structuring crimes are, of course, connected to these long-ago terrible crimes and Hastert also actively lied to public officials in a manner that could also have readily brought  separate serious criminal charge for obstruction of justice.  

Based on all these facts, I could make reasonabe arguments for sentences ranging from probation to five years, and I also could imagine lots of arguments for creative alternative sentencing terms instead of (or in addition to) a prison stint.  For example, I believe some members of the community have urged the judge to require Hastert to make significant payment to groups that work with sexually abused boys.  And perhaps one could strain to read federal law to argue that all of those abused by Hastert long ago are still technically victims of his more recent offenses and thus should be able to obtain some kind of restitution through his sentencing.  (This would seem to be stretch, but there are reports that some other "victims" are planning to testify at Hastert's sentencing.)

So I sincerely wonder, dear readers, what supernova sentence you think should be impose in this case?

April 26, 2016 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (37)

"Roadmap to Reentry: Reducing Recidivism Through Reentry Reforms at the Federal Bureau of Prisons"

Roadmap_to_reentry_slide-2The title of this post is the title of this new programming publication from the US Department of Justice.  Here is part of its "Overview":

Each year, more than 600,000 citizens return to neighborhoods across America after serving time in federal and state prisons.  Another 11.4 million individuals cycle through local jails.  And nearly one in three Americans of working age have had an encounter with the criminal justice system — mostly for relatively minor, non-violent offenses, and sometimes from decades in the past.  Federal prisoners are held at the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), a law enforcement agency of the U.S. Department of Justice and the country’s largest and most complex prison system — housing nearly 200,000 prisoners in 122 federally-operated correctional institutions, 13 privately-operated secure correctional facilities, and a network of more than 175 community-based centers around the country....

The long-term impact of a criminal record prevents many people from obtaining employment, housing, higher education, and credit — and these barriers affect returning individuals even if they have turned their lives around and are unlikely to reoffend.  These often-crippling barriers can contribute to a cycle of incarceration that makes it difficult for even the most wellintentioned individuals to stay on the right path and stay out of the criminal justice system.  This cycle of criminality increases victimization, squanders our precious public safety resources, and wastes the potential of people who could be supporting their families, contributing to the economy, and helping to move our country forward.

Under the Obama Administration, the Department of Justice has already taken major steps to make our criminal justice system more fair, more efficient, and more effective at reducing recidivism and helping formerly incarcerated individuals return to their communities.  In 2011, the Department established the Federal Interagency Reentry Council, a unique Cabinet-level effort to remove barriers to successful reentry.  The Reentry Council, which now includes more than 20 federal departments and agencies, has developed significant policies and initiatives that aim not only to reduce recidivism, but also to improve public health, child welfare, employment, education, housing, and other key reintegration outcomes.

To ensure that all justice-involved individuals are able to fulfill their potential when they come home, Attorney General Lynch has launched a major effort to support and strengthen reentry programs and resources at BOP. These principles of reform — known as the Roadmap to Reentry — will be implemented throughout BOP, deepening and further institutionalizing the Department’s commitment to reentry.  These efforts will help those who have paid their debt to society prepare for substantive opportunities beyond the prison gates; promoting family unity, contributing to the health of our economy, and sustaining the strength of our nation.

The Department has also established full-time positions to promote reentry work at BOP, the Executive Office for United States Attorneys, and the Office of Justice Programs; this includes hiring the first-ever Second Chance Fellow — a formerly incarcerated individual with deep expertise in the reentry field — to assist in development of reentry policy initiatives. BOP established a new Reentry Services Division to better equip inmates with the tools needed for success outside the prison walls, including expanded mental health and substance abuse treatment programs and improved work and educational opportunities.  Through the community of U.S. Attorneys, the Department participates in reentry and diversion courts in more than 50 judicial districts nationwide. And the Department supports state, local, and tribal reentry efforts by providing resources under the Second Chance Act of 2007: the Department’s Office of Justice Programs has made nearly 750 Second Chance Act grants totaling more than $400 million, and established a National Reentry Resource Center that serves as a one-stop resource for returning citizens, advocates, and stakeholders.

April 26, 2016 in Collateral consequences, Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, April 25, 2016

Deep thoughts about sentencing, sentencing rules, and sentencing rule-making

I just came across these two interesting new papers on SSRN that raise lots of interesting and deep thoughts about both sentencing outcomes and sentencing rules and sentencing decision-making:

Confronting Political Disagreement About Sentencing: A Deliberative Democratic Framework by Seth Mayer & Italia Patti

Abstract:  There is broad agreement that the American criminal sentencing system is deeply flawed, yet current theoretical frameworks for sentencing have failed to offer a way forward for reform.  These frameworks have not faced up to political disagreement. Instead, they either try to impose disputed moral theories or they downplay normative considerations and seek to impose numerically consistent, rather than normatively justified, sentences. The failures of both approaches are in evidence in the process that led to the development of the United States Sentencing Guidelines.

This Article is the first to offer a framework to directly and effectively confront political disagreement.  It draws on deliberative democratic conceptions of legitimacy to develop a framework for sentencing that addresses disagreement.  Deliberative democracy offers a normatively grounded approach to managing disagreement through collective reasoning, which aims to place the legal system under public control.  This Article articulates criteria for evaluating legal systems from the perspective of a particular conception of deliberative democratic legitimacy and offers reforms to enable the current system to better embody those criteria.

Rules, Standards, Sentencing, and the Nature of Law by Russell Covey

AbstractSentencing law and practice in the United States can be characterized as an argument about rules and standards.  Whereas in the decades prior to the 1980s when sentencing was largely a discretionary activity governed only by broad sentencing standards, a sentencing reform movement in the 1980s transformed sentencing practice through the advent of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum provisions.  As a result, sentencing became far less standard-like and far more rule-like. Although reform proponents believed that this "rulification" of sentencing would reduce unwarranted sentencing disparities and enhance justice, it is far from clear that these goals were achieved. Indeed, the debate between sentencing reformers and their critics is a paradigmatic illustration of the limits of relying upon modifications of legal form to enhance substantive justice.

Building upon the work of legal theorists who have considered the rules versus standards conundrum, this article uses sentencing law as a lens to view some of the fundamental perplexities that bedevil law's grander aspirations -- for determinacy, fairness, even coherence itself.  Because, it is argued, refinements in legal form will never achieve the substantive goals to which law strives, the Essay urges a turn away from formal equality and toward a conception of sentencing justice that is centered on process values such as respect for those affected by sentencing decisions, concern that all voices be adequately heard, and decision making that reflects the considered moral judgment of the decision maker.

April 25, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Sunday, April 24, 2016

American Enterprise Institute leader explains why we need to reform "the status quo in criminal justice"

DownloadArthur C. Brooks, president of the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), has this notable new commentary explaining the role his organization is playing in National Reentry Week and in broader criminal justice reform efforts. (For those who do not know, AEI is a public-policy group "committed to expanding liberty, increasing individual opportunity and strengthening free enterprisehe status quo in criminal justice," with GOP politicians like Dick Cheney and Peter Coors and many corporate titans on its Board of Trustees.) The piece is titled "Reforming the status quo in criminal justice," and here are excertps (with links and emphasis from the original):

On Monday morning, AEI is co-hosting a discussion on America’s criminal justice system with the White House and the Brennan Center for Justice. The event will kick off at 10:00 am EDT on Monday April 25 in the Eisenhower Executive Office Building, next door to the White House.  You can livestream my introductory remarks and the entire event on the White House’s website, and our team will be sharing parts of it in real time on Twitter.

At first blush, this kind of event might seem a little unusual.  A Democratic administration, a major university’s criminal justice center, and a free-enterprise-focused think-tank coming together to discuss mass incarceration? That kind of diverse collaboration is not exactly commonplace in Washington, D.C.

But we believe that collaboration and open discussion are possible across the political spectrum. We jump at opportunities to bring our principles into good-faith dialogue and debate with colleagues of all views on critical subjects. (For more on this subject, check out a recent interview I gave to the “TED Radio Hour” podcast.)

White House policymakers, AEI scholars, and the Brennan Center’s experts hold a wide range of views on the substance of criminal justice reform.  What we share in common is a passionate desire to build a system that more effectively serves both the human dignity and human potential of vulnerable people.  And let’s be honest — there are few subjects in American life that are so clearly misaligned with these twin moral goals as the status quo in criminal justice.

Data show that only about one-third of incarcerated Americans get to participate in any education, vocational, or pre-release programs while behind bars. One professor who studies our prison population estimates that roughly half of all people in prison are functionally illiterate. And partially as a result of these factors, roughly two-thirds of all parolees wind up back in prison within three years of their release.

To be sure, excessive spending and economic inefficiency are serious consequences of this inefficient system. But the heaviest costs that America bears for this human capital tragedy are not material. They are moral.  When we talk about a person who comes out of prison barely able to read and utterly unprepared for citizenship, we are talking about a person stripped of his basic dignity.  When we see a person who is asked to re-enter productive society but has no plausible job prospects, we are looking at someone whose human potential has been badly stunted....

Through action and inaction alike, our society has effectively decided that there are millions of our brothers and sisters, the incarcerated and the formerly incarcerated, whom we simply do not need.  At worst, we view them as human liabilities we must coexist with and manage at minimal cost; at best, as people we can tolerate and try to help.  But as dormant assets to be enlivened and empowered?  Hardly ever.

If we committed ourselves and our society to the moral principle that we need to need everyone, how would criminal justice policy change?  That’s a question we at AEI are dedicated to exploring. My colleagues’ fascinating work on this topic already speaks for itself, and the year ahead will see us continue expanding our work on inmate education and re-entry.

A few recent related posts:

April 24, 2016 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, April 23, 2016

White House Counsel on Economic Advisors releases big report providing "Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System"

Download (2)As highlighted in this prior post, Jason Furman, chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, co-authored a New York Times commentary this past week headlined "Why Mass Incarceration Doesn’t Pay." Today, the full Council of Economic Advisers released this big new report titled "Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System." Here is part of the lengthy report's lengthy executive summary:

Calls for criminal justice reform have been mounting in recent years, in large part due to the extraordinarily high levels of incarceration in the United States. Today, the incarcerated population is 4.5 times larger than in 1980, with approximately 2.2 million people in the United States behind bars, including individuals in Federal and State prisons as well as local jails. The push for reform comes from many angles, from the high financial cost of maintaining current levels of incarceration to the humanitarian consequences of detaining more individuals than any other country.

Economic analysis is a useful lens for understanding the costs, benefits, and consequences of incarceration and other criminal justice policies. In this report, we first examine historical growth in criminal justice enforcement and incarceration along with its causes. We then develop a general framework for evaluating criminal justice policy, weighing its crime-reducing benefits against its direct government costs and indirect costs for individuals, families, and communities. Finally, we describe the Administration’s holistic approach to criminal justice reform through policies that impact the community, the cell block, and the courtroom....

Criminal justice policies have the capacity to reduce crime, but the aggregate crime-reducing benefits of incarceration are small and decline as the incarcerated population grows.

  • Given that the U.S. has the largest prison population in the world, research shows that further increasing the incarcerated population is not likely to materially reduce crime.
  • Economic research suggests that longer sentence lengths have little deterrent impact on offenders. A recent paper estimates that a 10 percent increase in average sentence length corresponds to a zero to 0.5 percent decrease in arrest rates.
  • Emerging research finds that longer spells of incarceration increase recidivism. A recent study finds that each additional sanction year causes an average increase in future offending of 4 to 7 percentage points.

Investments in police and policies that improve labor market opportunity and educational attainment are likely to have greater crime-reducing benefits than additional incarceration.

  • Expanding resources for police has consistently been shown to reduce crime; estimates from economic research suggest that a 10 percent increase in police force size decreases crime by 3 to 10 percent. At the same time, more research is needed to identify and replicate model policing tactics that are marked by trust, transparency, and collaborations between law enforcement and community stakeholders.
  • Labor market conditions and increased educational attainment can have large impacts on crime reduction by providing meaningful alternatives to criminal activity. Estimates from research suggest that a 10 percent increase in the high school graduation rate leads to a 9 percent drop in arrest rates, and a 10 percent increase in wages for non-college educated men leads to a 10 to 20 percent reduction in crime rates....

Given the total costs, some criminal justice policies, including increased incarceration, fail a cost-benefit test.

  • Economic researchers have evaluated the costs and benefits of policies in different criminal justice areas and find that relative to investments in police and education, investments in incarceration are unlikely to be cost-effective.
  • Moreover, cost-benefit evaluations of incarceration and sentencing often fail to consider collateral consequences, which would render these policies even more costly.
  • CEA conducted “back-of-the-envelope” cost-benefit tests of three policies: increasing incarceration, investing in police, and raising the minimum wage.
    • We find that a $10 billion dollar increase in incarceration spending would reduce crime by 1 to 4 percent (or 55,000 to 340,000 crimes) and have a net societal benefit of -$8 billion to $1 billion dollars.
    • At the same time, a $10 billion dollar investment in police hiring would decrease crime by 5 to 16 percent (440,000 to 1.5 million crimes) have a net societal benefit of $4 to $38 billion dollars.
    • Drawing on literature that finds that higher wages for low-income individuals reduce crime by providing viable and sustainable employment, CEA finds that raising the minimum wage to $12 by 2020 would result in a 3 to 5 percent crime decrease (250,000 to 510,000 crimes) and a societal benefit of $8 to $17 billion dollars.

April 23, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (3)

"The Prison Reformer Who Champions Ted Cruz"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Ozy article about a notable supporter of Senator Ted Cruz, who also has played a bit role in sentencing reform in Maryland.  Here is how it starts:

Michael Hough’s statehouse digs are filled with awards — from the American Conservative Union here, the Leadership Institute there.  You can’t miss the gold-framed Declaration of Independence, the old George W. Bush campaign sign or the NRA logo carpet outside the state senator’s office.  The photo of him and Ted Cruz glad-handing isn’t shocking, either, since Hough’s leading the presidential candidate’s primary efforts here in Maryland.  What’s more surprising: the picture next to it — of Hough and his wife, posing with another White House hopeful.  “My wife likes Donald,” the father of three says, painfully.

What’s a state campaign chairman to do?  Hough’s received high praise as “a respected conservative leader” from Cruz himself, though the 36-year-old lawmaker faces not just a divided home, but a divided state — one that could go the way of his wife if polls hold true during Maryland’s primary on Tuesday. It’s just one of many apparent contradictions. Bespectacled with a slick, Cruz-ian comb-over, Hough today looks nothing like the long-haired rock star of his garage-band days. He’s an Air Force vet who never served outside Wyoming.  And while he plays the part of a bona fide guns-and-faith conservative well, Hough’s most significant work is in … compassionate prison reform?

The Justice Reinvestment Act — which eases sentencing laws for nonviolent drug offenders and pushes offenders to treatment rather than prison — passed into law this month, in no small part thanks to Hough, who led the Republican efforts to craft it.  He’s also helped push through bills limiting civil asset forfeiture (“You had the ACLU and the prosecutors support it, which never happens,” he brags) and reforming police conduct and accountability — without being “antipolice,” Hough claims.  Popping open a Diet Coke, at just past 8 a.m., Hough calls the justice act the largest reform “in a generation” — and some experts agree it’s a doozy.

Yet, not everyone’s happy: “The Senate amended the life out of it,” the Maryland Alliance for Justice Reform’s Pat Schenck tells OZY.  It’s something to build off of and “a once-in-a-lifetime bill,” says Keith Wallington of the Justice Policy Institute, if only because “Maryland has (historically) set the bar pretty low for justice reform.” And while an early proposal included a reduction in prisons and budget savings nearing $250 million over 10 years, the Senate version went down to “a paltry” $34 million, Wallington says. “That’s a little overblown,” Hough counters, though he agrees the budget savings in the final bill will be less than originally projected.

At first blush, this stalwart Republican seems like an unlikely advocate for addicts and rampant recidivists.  But while GOPers such as Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan birthed and expanded the war on drugs decades ago, red state leaders from Texas to Utah and Georgia have recently championed justice reform due to both compassionate conservatism and a response to “draconian laws” that proved costly yet rarely improved public safety, says Lauren Krisai with the Reason Foundation, a libertarian think tank.  As a teen growing up with an alcoholic father, Hough knew the tug and pull of crime and addiction — the Nirvana fan got through those years fixing cars, dying his hair blond and red, and ignoring school to the tune of a 2.0 GPA — but as an adult he became an expert in addressing those problems.  “We over-criminalize everything,” says Hough, whose non-legislature job is as a senior policy adviser on criminal justice for the Faith & Freedom Coalition.  “This is where my Christianity and libertarianism come together.”

April 23, 2016 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, April 22, 2016

"Department of Justice to Launch Inaugural National Reentry Week"

The title of this post is the title of this official US Department of Justice press release.  Here are excerpts from the release and details on a few of the planned events of the week that I am especially interested in:

As part of the Obama Administration’s commitment to strengthening the criminal justice system, the Department of Justice designated the week of April 24-30, 2016, as National Reentry Week. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch and U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development Secretary Julián Castro will travel to Philadelphia on MONDAY, APRIL 25, 2016, to hold events as part of National Reentry Week with public housing advocates, legal services providers and community leaders where they will announce new efforts to improve outcomes for justice-involved individuals including youth.

Later in the week, the Attorney General will visit a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility in Talladega, Alabama, to highlight reentry programs in prison. Similarly, Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates will visit a federal women’s prison in Texas and will later hold a media availability at Santa Maria Hostel, a specialized residential substance abuse, mental health and trauma facility. Acting Director Thomas Kane of the Bureau of Prisons will accompany both Attorney General Lynch and Deputy Attorney General Yates on their visits....

The Obama Administration has taken major steps to make our criminal justice system fairer, more efficient and more effective at reducing recidivism and helping formerly incarcerated individuals contribute to their communities. Removing barriers to successful reentry helps formerly incarcerated individuals compete for jobs, attain stable housing, and support their families. An important part of that commitment is preparing those who have paid their debt to society for substantive opportunities beyond the prison gates, and addressing collateral consequences to successful reentry that too many returning citizens encounter.

Leadership from across the Administration are traveling during National Reentry Week in support of these many events and are encouraging federal partners and grantees to work closely with stakeholders like federal defenders, legal aid providers and other partners across the country to increase the impact of this effort. National Reentry Week events are being planned in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. U.S. Attorney’s Offices alone are hosting over 200 events and BOP facilities are holding over 370 events....

• On Monday, April 25, 2016, the White House will hold an event with the Brennan Center on the costs of incarceration.

• On Monday, April 25, 2016, Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates will deliver remarks before a screening of “Pull of Gravity” a documentary that follows returning inmates as they encounter reentry obstacles, hosted by the Justice Department as part of National Reentry Week. Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Criminal Division will also participate....

• On Wednesday, April 27, 2016, the White House will host the Fair Chance Opportunities Champions of Change event in South Court Auditorium. Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch will deliver remarks and Deputy Attorney General Sally Q. Yates will moderate a panel at the event....

• On Thursday, April 28, 2016, the head of the Civil Rights Division, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta of the Civil Rights Division will deliver remarks at a reentry event at Mickey Leland Transitional Housing Facility, sponsored by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia....

April 22, 2016 in Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Iowa Supreme Court requires giving reasons for even a presumptive consecutive sentence, and concurrence laments when "sentencing is given short shrift"

I helpful reader alerted me to an interesting little decision from the Supreme Court of Iowa today that makes me fell extra good going into the weekend.  For starters, the majority opinion in Iowa v. Hill, No. 15–0030 (Iowa April 22, 2016) (available here), reaches the important and valuable conclusion that a sentencing court must give reasons to justify a consecutive sentence even if the law creates a presumption for such a sentence.  Second, a special concurring opinion by Justice Appel cites some of my scholarship to stress the point that sentencing proceedings should generally get a lot more attention.

Here is the start of the majority opinion in Hill:

In this appeal, we must decide whether the presumption for consecutive sentences in Iowa Code section 908.10A (2013) excuses the district court from the general requirement to state why it imposed a consecutive sentence and, if not, whether the district court’s stated reason for this consecutive sentence was adequate.  The defendant pled guilty to failure to comply with sex-offender registry requirements, an offense he committed while on parole for the underlying sex crime.  The district court imposed a two-year prison sentence consecutive to his parole revocation and stated, “The reason for the sentence is protection of the community, seriousness of the crime, and the nature and circumstances of the offense.”  The defendant appealed on grounds that the sentencing court failed to give reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding the statutory presumption for consecutive sentences obviated any need to give reasons for imposing the consecutive sentence.  The dissenting judge disagreed, noting section 908.10A allows discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, requiring the sentencing court to give reasons for its choice.  On further review, we hold the district court must give reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence under section 908.10A and that the reasons given in this case were insufficient.  Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals, vacate the sentencing order, and remand the case for resentencing.

And here are snippets from Justice Appel's special concurring opinion in Hill:

In this era of plea bargains, sentencing is often the most critical phase of a criminal proceeding.... But too often in our courtrooms, sentencing is given short shrift by the participants. There often seems to be an assumption that the process that led to the determination of guilt is generally sufficient to inform the court of the necessary information for sentencing....

Once a lawyer has fulfilled the distinct professional responsibilities related to sentencing, the district court must exercise its discretion in setting the sentence. Even in a case that seems less consequential than other matters on a court’s crowded docket, the impact on the parties with a stake in the sentencing decision is substantial and requires a careful, thoughtful discretionary decision by the district court. Sentencing is not a time to cut corners....

The decision regarding whether sentences are served concurrently or consecutively ... is often of great moment and, as the court recognizes, must be made separately from the underlying sentence on each count. A decision to impose a lengthy prison term for the underlying crimes is not the same as the geometric increase in incarceration that may result from a decision to run sentences consecutively. In considering the distinct question of whether to run sentences consecutively or concurrently, the district court must be careful to avoid mere boilerplate recitation and demonstrate an exercise of reasoned judgment.

April 22, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Just how should sentencing law deal with a truly habitual petty criminal?

This morning I came across this recent Huffington Post piece lamenting in its headline a seemingly a very severe application of Louisiana's habitual offender law: "Louisiana Man May Face Life For Shoplifting Snickers Bars: Critics say the case shows how habitual-offender laws can bully small-time crooks into pleading guilty rather than risking the consequences of a trial." To its credit, the HuffPo piece use this latest shoplifting case story to talk more generally about how severe mandatory sentencing laws can functionally place tremendous pressure on a defendant to plead guilty to try to avoid an extreme prison term.

But, rather use this story to reiterate my long-standing disaffinity for severe mandatory sentencing provisions (especially because of the often unchecked power it can place in the hands of prosecutors), I did a bit of digging into the story behind the habitual offender now in big trouble for his candy caper, and what I found prompted the question in the title of this post.  Consider specifically the factual backstory reported in this local piece headlined "Accused New Orleans candy thief, facing 20 years to life, turns down deal for 4 years":

New Orleans shoplifter Jacobia Grimes, facing a possible sentence of 20 years to life for stuffing $31 worth of candy bars into his pockets at a Dollar General store, has rejected a plea offer from District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro’s office that would have seen him serve a four-year sentence as a double offender, his attorney said Friday.

The offer was the same sentence that Grimes agreed to serve when he pleaded guilty in 2010 to swiping socks and trousers in a similar shoplifting attempt. Grimes, 34, did not appear in court for a hearing Friday. He remains jailed on a violation of his $5,000 bond, having tested positive last week for opiates, cocaine, oxycodone and marijuana.

But Criminal District Court Judge Franz Zibilich again suggested to prosecutors and Grimes’ attorneys that they work out a deal for less jail time, followed by probation and drug treatment. Zibilich noted Grimes’ lengthy criminal record, which includes more than a dozen arrests since 2000. Most of the nearly nine years he has spent in prison since 2001 were the result of shoplifting convictions, records show. “I agree he has to pay the consequences, even though it’s candy. I would like to see some sort of split sentence,” Zibilich said.

However, Assistant District Attorney Iain Dover said state law may not allow it, given Grimes’ status as a potential “quad” offender under the state’s habitual offender law. “I can’t see how we get there under the law,” Dover said.

Cannizzaro’s office charged Grimes in a bill of information Feb. 3 under a state statute for theft of goods by someone with multiple convictions for the same thing. His earlier convictions elevated his alleged candy heist, on Dec. 9 at a Dollar General store on South Claiborne Avenue, to a felony. Whether Grimes would face 20 years to life if he’s convicted of the candy theft would be up to Cannizzaro’s office. State laws give prosecutors discretion following a conviction to raise the ante by filing a “multiple bill.”

His case, given the nature of the crime and the possible penalty, has gained wide attention, prompting Cannizzaro to publicly dismiss the notion that he would seek such a heavy sentence for a shoplifter. Dover argued that Grimes’ criminal record shows that slaps on the wrist don’t seem to work. “It’s not the state’s fault. It’s this guy’s fault. He’s had a chance. He’s had the opportunities,” Dover said.

Zibilich suggested that both sides could agree to go below the mandatory minimum prison sentence in a plea deal that includes treatment, so long as nobody challenged it. “Do we have to be married to every single syllable of this book?” he asked of the state’s penal code.

Grimes’ trial is scheduled for May 26. His attorneys, Miles Swanson and Michael Kennedy, have opted to forgo a jury and let Zibilich decide the case.

This only things that seems really obvious to me in this case is that even some extended stints in state prison are not working to help Jacobia Grimes stop being a petty criminal.  Even recognizing that incapacitating this petty criminal via incarceration is likely not especially cost effective for the taxpayers of Louisiana, at this point what other punishment options would you suggest the prosecutor and judge seriously consider under these circumstances?

April 22, 2016 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

"Why I refuse to send people to jail for failure to pay fines"

ImagesThe title of this post is the headline of this lengthy recent Washington Post commentary authored by Ed Spillane, the presiding judge of the College Station Municipal Court and president of the Texas Municipal Courts Association. Here are excerpts:

As a municipal judge in College Station, Tex., I see 10 to 12 defendants each day who were arrested on fine-only charges: things like public intoxication, shoplifting, disorderly conduct and traffic offenses.  Many of these people, like Melissa, have no money to pay their fines, let alone hire a lawyer.

What to do with these cases?  In Tate v. Short, a 1971 Supreme Court decision, the justices held that jail time is not a proper punishment for fine-only criminal cases, citing the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment.  But in many jurisdictions, municipal judges — whether they’re overworked, under pressure to generate revenue through fees, skeptical of defendants’ claims to poverty or simply ignorant of the law — are not following the rules.  As a result, far too many indigent defendants are cited for contempt of court and land behind bars for inability to pay.

There’s another way, and I’ve been experimenting with it in my own courtroom.

There are no firm numbers nationally on how many fine-only cases end with the defendants in jail, but figures from particular jurisdictions around the country are grim, if partial.  A 2014 survey by NPR, New York University’s Brennan Center for Justice and the National Center for State Courts showed that in Benton County, Wash., a quarter of people in jail for misdemeanors on a typical day were there for nonpayment of fines and court fees.  (The study also found that civil and criminal fees and fines had increased in 48 states since 2010.)  The percentage of jail bookings in Tulsa involving inmates who had failed to pay court fines and fees more than tripled, from 8 to 29 percent of 1,200 inmates, between 2004 and 2013, according to reporting by the Tulsa World.  Eighteen percent of all defendants sent to jail in Rhode Island between 2005 and 2007 were incarcerated because of court debt; in 2005 and 2006, that amounted to 24 people per day....

Fortunately, courts and judges are not powerless to fix the system.

First, defendants must be allowed to argue economic hardship in an indigency hearing, which is Constitutionally required if a defendant says he or she can’t pay.  It’s unclear how many judges skip these hearings, and practices vary from one jurisdiction to another, but Lauren-Brooke Eisen, senior counsel at the Brennan Center, says there’s no question that some judges aren’t holding them.  “Sometimes it’s not always nefarious,” Eisen says. “They have very full dockets. . . . It can require overtime just to finish their docket for the day. It’s not always a deliberate decision to not hold those hearings.”...

Once a defendant proves indigency, we can also be much more creative in our sentencing than “fine or jail” (or a suspended driver’s license, a popular measure that disproportionately hurts low-income workers who can’t get to their jobs without driving).  Community service at a nonprofit or government entity is one of the strongest tools judges have at their disposal; in my experience, it boosts defendants’ self-esteem and provides valuable assistance to organizations that need the help....

Judges can also sentence defendants to anger-management training, classes for first-time offenders or drunk-driving-impact panels. National research shows that alternative sentencing like teen court can reduce recidivism, and my time on the bench confirms this.  One defendant in an alcohol-related case, Jeff Schiefelbein, was sent to a Mothers Against Drunk Driving victim-impact panel in 1997.  He was so moved by the experience that he decided to create a designated-driver program for anyone who is intoxicated and needs a ride home.  Since 1999, his organization, Carpool, has provided on average 650 rides each weekend in College Station.

And occasionally, as a judge, you can choose mercy.  Roger S. was facing an $800 fine for speeding, driving without insurance or registration and driving with defective equipment.  He also had terminal cancer.  He wrote to me, explaining that he could not afford his treatments, much less what he owed the court. I picked up the phone and called him from court.  He was a little surprised but pleased to be talking to the judge.  After discussing his medical treatment and all of those costs in detail, I waived his fines because of indigency and inability to perform community service, much to his and his family’s relief....

Of course, no matter how many great alternatives judges can provide instead of jail time, if a defendant fails to come to court, he or she won’t be able to hear about them.  Courts must be as accessible as possible, and that starts with allowing children to accompany their parents.  One of the revelations in the Justice Department’s report on Ferguson was that children weren’t allowed in municipal court, which explains why many defendants were unable to appear. Several courts in Texas limit or don’t allow parents bringing their children, even though kids don’t present a problem in my court — maybe because we provide coloring books and toys for them to play with while their parents take care of their cases....

I used to prosecute felonies as an assistant district attorney in Brazos County. During that time, I worked for a year in the intake division.  This drove home a lesson that my boss, the district attorney, had been trying to instill in me: Every case file is an individual whose rights are as important and sacred as mine or those of my family.  The decision to charge or dismiss demands empathy and vigilance. Misdemeanor criminal cases provide an opportunity for a much happier outcome than most felonies because there is a genuine chance for a defendant to learn from a mistake and never set foot in a courtroom again — and keeping someone out of jail is a good way to ensure that happens.  In these cases, it should be possible for defendants to resolve their cases without losing their liberty.

All judges want to uphold the rule of law in the communities we serve, but too often we can get lost in the day-to-day business of running a court; we ignore the consequences of what we do.  An arrest can cost a citizen his or her job, dignity and security.  Alternative sentencing is a way to achieve what we should all want: an end to criminal behavior.

April 22, 2016 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, April 21, 2016

"Restoring Human Capabilities After Punishment: Our Political Responsibilities Toward Incarcerated Americans"

The title of this post is the title of this lengthy paper by Kony Kim now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Why should non-incarcerated Americans invest in the wellbeing of incarcerated Americans?  To date, our public discourse about penal reform has avoided this question, focusing on pragmatic reasons for facilitating “prisoner reentry” and “reintegration” while shelving unresolved, and deeply contested, philosophical questions about criminal justice and punishment.  As a result, we as a society have engaged in much data-driven policy talk about the economic costs and benefits of reducing recidivism, but little normative reflection about the rights and responsibilities held by incarcerated adults who are at once human beings, members of society, persons convicted of crimes, victims of inhumane punishment — and, often, survivors of poverty.

Thus, my first task is to clarify the individual and collective obligations that apply within our context of mass incarceration: the moral responsibilities that are held by and toward incarcerated Americans, non-incarcerated Americans, and our shared public institutions.  My second task is to draw out implications for policy and discourse: to explain not only what reform measures we should prioritize, but how we should frame and assess them.  In particular, I call for systemic changes that would provide all incarcerated Americans with opportunities to pursue higher education and to develop redemptive self-narratives; and I argue that we should frame and assess such measures not primarily as cost-saving devices, but as ethically significant efforts to secure capabilities that are essential to human flourishing and required by justice.

In setting forth these arguments, my purpose is to spark deeper ethical reflection about correctional reform, and specifically to invite meaningful engagement with one key normative question: What do we, as a civilized society with a history of social and penal injustice, owe incarcerated Americans?  Ultimately, I wish to underscore that the people confined in our prisons have legitimate moral claims upon us – insofar as they remain human beings and members of society and, as such, bearers of rights as well as responsibilities.  Equally, I wish to establish that, in our collective efforts to repair the harms of mass incarceration, we can and should empower those Americans most directly harmed by our penal system to lead the way in transforming it.

April 21, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Economists explain "Why Mass Incarceration Doesn’t Pay"

Social-costs-and-benefits-1-638Jason Furman, chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, and Douglas Holtz­-Eakin, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office, have this new New York Times commentary headlined "Why Mass Incarceration Doesn’t Pay." Here are excerpts:

Congress is considering bipartisan legislation to loosen tough sentencing laws. The bill faces resistance from some lawmakers. As economists who differ on many issues, we both agree that cost­benefit analysis provides a useful framework for analyzing complicated questions. And in this case, we agree that the verdict of such analysis is clear: Our sentencing rules are failing and need to be changed.

On the benefit side of the equation, prisons and jails play an essential role in managing violent criminals and reducing crime, particularly helping people in poor communities who are the most likely to be victims of murder, robbery or other violent crimes.

But a general rule in economics — the law of diminishing marginal benefits — applies to incarcerating additional people or adding years to sentences. Research finds that more incarceration has, at best, only a small effect on crime because our incarceration rate is already so high. As the prison population gets larger, the additional prisoner is more likely to be a less risky, nonviolent offender, and the value of incarcerating him (or, less likely, her) is low.

The same general principle applies to the length of prison sentences, which in many cases have gotten longer as a result of sentence enhancements, repeat­offender laws, “three strikes” laws and “truth-­in-­sentencing” laws. Longer sentences do not appear to have a deterrent effect; one study finds, for example, that the threat of longer sentences has little impact on juvenile arrest rates. Other studies have found that sentencing enhancements have only modest effects on crime. They are unlikely to meaningfully affect the overall crime rate or generate meaningful gains in public safety.

Moreover, in many cases the analysis suggests that adding prisoners or years to sentences can be harmful. A growing body of research shows that incarceration and longer sentences could increase recidivism. Individuals may build criminal ties while incarcerated, lose their labor­-market skills and confront substantial obstacles to re­entry after release. A new study finds that each additional year of incarceration increases the likelihood of re­offending by four to seven percentage points after release.

The bottom line: The putative benefits of more incarceration or longer sentences are actually costs. Those costs are not confined to the prison population. Time in prison not only means a loss of freedom, but it also means a loss of earnings, risks to the health and safety of the incarcerated, and prolonged absences from family that can strain marriages and increase behavioral problems in children. The probability that a family is in poverty increases by nearly 40 percent while a father is incarcerated....

Finally, more than $80 billion is spent annually on corrections, or over $600 per household. The annual cost of imprisoning one person averages approximately $30,000 for adults and $110,000 for juveniles, higher than the cost of a year of college. At the federal level, the Bureau of Prisons budget grew 1,700 percent from 1980 to 2010 and now devours more than 25 percent of the entire Department of Justice budget.

There are other tools that can reduce crime more cost­-effectively, including promoting employment and wage growth and investing in education. That is one reason that between 2008 and 2012, a majority of states were able to reduce incarceration and crime. Incarceration plays an important role in promoting public safety, and imposing prison sentences for criminal conduct has moral and practical dimensions. But the criminal justice system should be designed to ensure that the benefits of incarceration exceed the costs. Individuals incarcerated for nonviolent drug crimes — 50 percent of the federal prison population — pose a low risk, and the costs of incarcerating these people outweigh the benefits.

Similarly, since criminal behavior declines and costs increase with age, releasing older individuals who have already served lengthy sentences is also likely to yield net benefits.

April 21, 2016 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, April 20, 2016

Your tax dollars at work?: cost accounting for Aurora theater shooter James Holmes' failed capital trial

As a matter of abstract philosophy, I have struggled for decades concerning my opinion on capital punishment.  But as a matter of modern public policy, I have generally concluded that the death penalty is not a great use of limited resources for most states.  This new Denver Post article, headlined "Aurora theater shooting trial cost taxpayers at least $3 million: Final cost of James Holmes' trial in the Aurora theater shooting likely won't ever be known," reinforces my perspectives in this regard. Here are the details:

Jailing, evaluating and prosecuting the man who committed the Aurora movie theater shooting cost taxpayers at least $3 million, but the final expense of one of the mostly closely watched court cases in Colorado history may never be known. The $3 million tab was compiled by The Denver Post following multiple open-records requests over the past year. It covers the amount spent from 2012 through 2015 specifically on preparing for and seeing through the trial of James Holmes.

Nearly $1.6 million of the cost was covered by federal grants. When including the salaries of judges, prosecutors, sheriff's deputies and other government employees who spent most or all of their time on the case — but who would have been paid regardless — the total cost rises to more than $7 million.

And there's still a big chunk of expense missing from that amount. The state's taxpayer-funded public defenders — who represented Holmes — are not required to disclose what they spend on a case. Doing so, they say, would violate ethics rules and subject poor defendants to lower standards of attorney-client confidentiality. Generally, the office of the state public defender reports having spent nearly $2 million on death-penalty and potential death-penalty cases since July 2002, not including staff salaries.

The theater shooting trial was one of the longest in state history. Prosecutors sought the death penalty, and Holmes, who pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, underwent two psychiatric evaluations by state-appointed experts — at a cost of more than $600,000 to the state Department of Human Services. Holmes ultimately was found guilty of murdering 12 people and trying to murder 70 more in the July 2012 attack on the Century Aurora 16 movie theater; he was sentenced to life in prison without parole in August.

While the case prompted public debates about the cost of the death penalty and mental health evaluations, the biggest expense that has been reported was for providing victims' assistance services. The Arapahoe County district attorney's office spent nearly $1.2 million on salaries for victims' advocates, travel expenses for victims to attend the trial and other costs. All of those costs were covered by a federal grant.

Arapahoe County District Attorney George Brauchler, whose office published its close-to-final cost figures last week, said the costs were about in line with what he expected. In addition to the federal grant, the state government appropriated about $500,000 to cover trial-related costs for the district attorney's office. He said more than half of what his office spent on the case was spent before the trial even began one year ago this month, and he rejected the criticism that seeking the death penalty ballooned the trial's price tag. Instead, Brauchler said the case was expensive because of the number of victims involved.

The county DA here make a reasonable point that the nature of the crime may be the reason for the considerable expense as much as the nature of the punishment sought. Nevertheless, I believe this case could and would have cost taxpayers a whole lot less if prosecutors had accepted the defense's early offer to plead guilty in exchange for an LWOP sentence. (That LWOP sentences was ultimately achieved in the end after a lengthy and costly capital trial.) Moreover, the costs here include the opportunity costs of having so many Colorado state justice officials (police, prosecutors, judges) working on this case so intensely when there surely were many other Colorado crime and criminals that might have otherwise gotten their attention.

Of course, and I think not to be overlooked in any accounting of general capital costs/benefits, Holmes' defense team likely was only willing to offer to plead guilty and take LWOP because Colorado has capital punishment on its books. Consequently, it would be unfair to suggest abolition of the death penalty will always produce massive savings in major murder cases. But, as regular readers should know, this kind of accounting leads me to suggest, yet again, that states ought to have ways to "delegate" major murders to the feds for more efficient and effective capital prosecutions.

A few (of many) older related posts (with lots of comments):

April 20, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

"The Meaning of Life in Criminal Law"

Like many sentient beings, I have long wondered about the meaning of life.  Helpfully, this new article by Eldar Haber posted to SSRN, which has the same title as the title of this post, talks throught life's meaning in the context of criminal law. Here is the abstract:

Inflation and deflation change the value of money.  Policymakers have used this rationale to amend legislation fixed to a monetary value.  What is not acknowledged is that increase in life expectancy could also be a form of inflation, and, accordingly, could affect “the value” of nonmonetary sanctions — chiefly, imprisonment and capital punishment. Under a utilitarian approach to criminal law, with an increase in life expectancy, nonmonetary sanctions with confined-terms reduce their deterrent value, while nonmonetary sanctions with finite-terms, inter alia, life-imprisonment without parole and capital punishment, increase their deterrent value and severity.  Under a retributive approach to criminal law, changes in life expectancy also affect the magnitude of nonmonetary criminal sanctions and change the proportionality between the criminal conduct and the punishment.  Nevertheless, although life expectancy in the United States has increased substantially, legislators have not adjusted nonmonetary criminal sanctions accordingly.  At the least, scholars and policymakers failed to recognize the role of life expectancy in the formation of criminal sanctions.  Hence, current criminal punishments have not been recalibrated properly.

This Article revisits theories of criminal punishments while offering a new perspective on determining nonmonetary criminal sanctions that recognizes life expectancy considerations.  It examines the current and desirable approach toward life expectancy considerations in criminal punishment theories while reviewing statistical data on the increase of life expectancy in the United States since independence.  After discussing criminal punishment theories, and evaluating the role of life expectancy considerations under them, I conclude that criminal law theories, to a great extent, support life expectancy considerations.  Under both utilitarian and retributive approaches, lack of practical considerations of life expectancy in criminal punishments could lead to a misconception of criminal law theories and erode the important role played by criminal sanctions.  Accordingly, this Article examines consequences of failing to apply life expectancy considerations in practice and proposes modest solutions to overcome this perceived problem.

April 19, 2016 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 17, 2016

An interesting perspective on Virginia's recent capital experiences

Virginia made capital headlines last week after Gov. Terry McAuliffe altered a bill passed by the state's legislature calling for use of the electric chair if the state could not obtain need lethal drugs.  The headline of this Washington Post piece from last week explains his proposed alternative approach: "In a move that could jeopardize executions, McAuliffe wants to shield the identity of makers of lethal-injection drugs."

Meanwhile, this new commentary by Kerry Dougherty, a columnist for The Virginian-Pilot, provides some perspective on this execution method brouhaha and Virginia's recent experience with the death penalty. The piece is headlined "Lost in all the death-penalty drug talk is that there are only 7 men on death row in Virginia," and here are excerpts:

Last winter, state legislators came up with a solution: They said that if drugs are unavailable, the commonwealth should fire up Old Sparky.  Predictably, this sparked a heated debate among politicians. Some argued that the electric chair is cruel.

Others shrugged, saying painless deaths are not the goal of the state.  “I hear, ‘Oh my Lord, he might have to suffer,’ ” said the Senate’s Democratic leader, Richard Saslaw in March. “… If we don’t have the necessary drugs, then we need this bill.  When you commit acts like that, you give up your right, as far as I’m concerned, to say, ‘Well, I want to die humanely.’ ”

The governor seems to disagree.  “We take human beings, we strap them into a chair, and then we flood their bodies with 1,800 volts of electricity, subjecting them to unspeakable pain until they die,” McAuliffe said last week, according to news reports.  “Virginia citizens do not want their commonwealth to revert back to a past when excessively inhumane punishments were committed in their name.”

McAuliffe’s language calls for the state to buy the drugs needed to put prisoners to sleep from special pharmacies. The names of those companies would be cloaked in secrecy, as they are in some other states.  “All I’m doing today is providing a humane way to carry out capital punishment here in Virginia so we have options,” McAuliffe said. “If they do not take it up, I want to be clear, they will be ending capital punishment here in Virginia.”

Now the question becomes, should the people’s business be conducted covertly?  I can answer that: No, it shouldn’t.

Lost in all this talk about how to kill the last men on Virginia’s death row is the happy fact that there are just seven men living there. Seven.  According to an NBC news report, Virginia’s death row was at its most crowded in 1995 when it housed 57 condemned prisoners.  Both executions and death sentences have dropped sharply since then.

The ultimate penalty is imposed on those who commit the most heinous crimes.  Last year, for instance, Virginia executed one man: The loathsome Alfredo Prieto.  He killed a young couple in Fairfax in 1988, raping one of the victims as she died. The Washington Post reported that he had killed as many as seven others. One of those murders was of a 15-year-old in California while he was on the run after the double homicide in Fairfax.

I couldn’t gin up any sympathy for this predator.  Neither could the governor, who refused to block his execution in October. Yet Prieto was the first man executed in the Old Dominion in more than two years.

Why all the empty cells on death row?  Many reasons. But one component is certainly 1995’s “truth-in-sentencing” law pushed by then-Gov. George Allen.  The measure abolished parole and closed the revolving doors on Virginia’s prisons. Suddenly a 10-year sentence meant the convict would spend most of a decade in prison. And a life sentence? It actually meant life in prison.

Given this ironclad alternative to execution, it’s become rare for a Virginia jury — or judge — to send a convict to death row. Before we get back to arguing about the death penalty, can’t we all agree that’s a good thing?

April 17, 2016 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Colorado 8th-graders caught sexting could have to register as sex offenders"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable press report which helps highlight why so many juvenile justice advocates are so concerned about the broad reach of modern sex offender laws and registries. Here are the details:

Three Colorado middle and high schools were rocked by a string of recent underage sexting scandals, prompting police investigations. If charged, the teens involved in the case — some as young as eighth-graders — could face charges of child pornography, which would require them to register as sex offenders if convicted.

The stiff penalties for sexting has sparked a debate in Colorado and other state assemblies over whether misbehaving teens should face the same punishment as child pornographers. But efforts by the Colorado Legislature to lighten the penalties have stalled.

In the sexting case at Bear Creek, a K-8 school in Lakewood, the five students involved were in eighth grade. School leaders turned to the local police after discovering that nude photos were being circulated, The Denver Post reported. Meanwhile, Colorado Springs police were contacted last Wednesday about allegations that a partially nude photo was shared among a circle of students from two other Colorado schools, Pine Creek High School and Challenger Middle School, according to KRDO news.

At this point, no charges have been filed in any of the cases, but the Pine Creek and Challenger school cases have been handed over to the Fourth Judicial District Attorney’s Office. The juveniles involved could be hit with a felony sex offender charge.

Penalties for underage sexting vary from state to state. In Colorado, minors caught trading nude photos are legally susceptible to harsh child pornography charges. It’s one reason why the Legislature has been working toward a solution to reduce possible sentencing for teens who sext. The latest bill to reach the Legislature would reduce charges for minors to a misdemeanor, echoing the laws of 11 other states. But a vote on the Colorado measure stalled in a House committee last week. Lawmakers against the measure were primarily concerned that, while it would be good to reduce potential child pornography charges for sexters, the bill was still too harsh on kids sending nude images.

State Representative Yeulin Willet, who cosponsored the bill, says that the misdemeanor charge did not go too far. He argued that the juvenile petty offense that the bill introduced accounts legally for "virtually no crime at all" and "basically just takes that juvenile into some counseling or education, end of story."... "To say that this is a victimless situation is just not a fact," he said. "These images get stolen, hacked, now they end up in the hands of thousands or more via digital media, and now you have a suicidal young girl."

But Jennifer Eyl, director of family stability programs at the Rocky Mountain Children’s Law Center, says that even the misdemeanor charge was too harsh. It criminalized the behavior of sexting itself, even consensual sexual behavior between teens, she said, rather than targeting the issue of non-consensual spreading of nude images. "It’s really kind of this blanket prevention of sexting, which, we work with kids, we just know that that’s not going to happen. Sexting is part of 21st-century communication between teenagers," she said. Eyl also expressed concerns that the most vulnerable children — in the foster system or without strong parental involvement — were particularly susceptible to blanket charges because foster parents might be more inclined to involve police should they find nude photos.

A few prior related posts:

April 17, 2016 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (8)

Saturday, April 16, 2016

Privacy gurus: what do you think of (coercive?) plea discussions requiring disclosure of defendant's iPhone password?

I have had the great pleasure of working through the years with a number of super-smart privacy-tech scholars (see here and here).  I am very interested to hear what these folks and others think of this fascinating new story from an NYC federal district court.  The story is headlined "Meth, kiddie porn-dealing dentist has two weeks to give up iPhone password if he wants shot at plea deal, judge says," and here are the interesting details: 

A Manhattan dentist charged with distributing methamphetamines and child pornography has two weeks to decide whether he will disclose to the government the password to his locked iPhone so the FBI can examine the creepy contents, a federal judge said Friday.

Dr. John Wolf has been trying to cut a plea deal with the Brooklyn U.S. Attorney's office, but prosecutors haven't offered a plea agreement until it can be determined whether there is additional criminal evidence on the iPhone. Assistant U.S. Attorney Moira Penza said the iPhone is password protected and the FBI has been trying to unlock the device without asking a judge to order Apple to assist the government.

"We've been considering the possibility that we will just give them the password," defense lawyer Marc Agnifilo told Federal Judge William Kuntz....

Kuntz said he wanted to set a deadline in case there is no agreement. "I don't have to tell you this is a very complicated, contentious issue," Kuntz said Friday. Wolf allegedly traded meth with a drug dealer for dental services, but also had a trove of child porn which he gave to an undercover FBI agent who posed as a pervert. Wolf's lawyer said his client was addicted to meth before he was arrested.

April 16, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

"The history of drug criminalization in America is a history of social panics rooted in racism and xenophobia"

Ungass_2016-624x312The title of this post is the subheadline of this new Salon comentary carrying the primary headline "The real reason cocaine, heroin and marijuana are illegal has nothing to do with addiction."  Here is how the lengthy piece gets started:

Looking out at the trail of devastation and death that the heroin epidemic has left in its wake, it’s hard to imagine that not long ago one could purchase the drug from a Sears catalogue.  Heroin was created by German chemists during the late 1890s and marketed through Bayer, the company best known for selling aspirin.  For decades, suburban housewives could peruse pages of flashy advertisements for Bayer Heroin, the cure for sore throats, coughs, headaches, diarrhea, stress and menopause.  In fact, until recently the percentage of Americans using opium-derived medicine was higher at the turn of the 20th century than at any other time in history.

The majority of illicit drugs we see today were once legal, popular and used for medicinal purposes.  Cocaine made its debut in toothache drops marketed to children.  Cannabis was recognized for its ability to relieve pain and nausea long before it became associated with youthful vagrancy.

As the world grapples with the fallout from the War on Drugs — and heads towards UNGASS 2016, a possible opportunity to put things right — it’s important to know the history of these drugs and their journey from medicine to menace. We didn’t suddenly discover that they were far more addictive or dangerous than other medicines.  In fact, the reasons that drugs like heroin, cocaine, marijuana and others are illegal today have far more to do with economics and cultural prejudice than with addiction.

Heroin was the first to fall from pharmaceutical darling to a demonized, black-market street drug.  Long used as a cure for aches and pains, it wasn’t until Chinese immigrants came to the United States to work on the railroads and mines that opium-based products such as heroin were perceived as dangerous.  American settlers were not happy with the Chinese arrivals, who brought with them a cultural tradition of smoking opium for relaxation in the evenings.  The settlers accused the Chinese of “taking our jobs,” and economic resentment morphed into rumors of Chinese men luring white women into opium dens and getting them addicted.  Rumors turned to fear, which turned to hysteria, which politicians seized upon.  In 1875 California passed the first anti-opium law, enforced by raids on Chinese opium dens. Other states soon followed.  The first federal law regulating heroin was the Harrison Act of 1914, which eventually led to its criminalization.

Cocaine was criminalized for similar reasons, only this time the backlash was directed against black Americans.  After the Civil War, economic resentment simmered over the freed slaves gaining a foothold in the economy.  White Southerners grumbled about black men “forgetting their place,” and fears spread about a drug some of them smoked, which was rumored to incite them to violence.  In the early 1900s New Orleans became the first city to slap down laws against cocaine use and the trend quickly spread, dovetailing with efforts in Latin America to criminalize the coca leaf, an ingredient in cocaine, which was used for religious purposes among indigenous populations.

Marijuana was next in the firing line.  During the 1920s, tensions sprang up in the South over the influx of Mexican immigrants who worked for low wages.  By the 1930s, the Great Depression had bred panic among people desperate for work and they directed their angst towards immigrants.  The media began propagating stories about Mexicans and their mysterious drug, marijuana.  The first national law criminalizing marijuana, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, passed thanks to a strong push from Harry Anslinger, head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, who referred to marijuana as “the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind.”

While such claims of marijuana inducing violence may sound ridiculous to those of us who know marijuana as a drug that does precisely the opposite, it goes to show that the criminalization of drugs has little to do with relative risk or danger.  Instead, the main impetus for criminalization is fear over certain groups seen as an economic or cultural threat to established America.  Recognizing this fact does not mean ignoring or minimizing the very real harm that drugs can cause.

Most illicit drugs carry risks and serious potential for problematic use.  But so does glue. So do gasoline, cough syrup, shoe polish, paint thinner, nail polish remover, cleaning fluids, spray paint, whipped cream cans, vanilla extract, mouthwash, nutmeg, prescription pills and countless other household items that are not only addictive, but potentially fatal if misused.

April 16, 2016 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Pot Prohibition Issues, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, April 15, 2016

Making in Oklahoma the modern "conservative appeal against death penalty"

Richard Viguerie has this notable new commentary in an Oklahoma paper headlined "A conservative appeal against death penalty." Here are excerpts:

This election year, Republican and Democratic voters in records numbers agree on something: They distrust political leaders and the political establishment.  That same distrust applies to ambitious prosecutors, who are part of the political establishment.  Too many have been caught cheating to win convictions, withholding exculpatory evidence and using coerced confessions.

The bipartisan distrust of the political establishment is certainly increasing with regard to the death penalty.  The government's troubling track record of exercising its life-ending authority provides ample reason for concern.  Since 1973, more than 155 people have been released from death row because they were wrongfully convicted. Ten were from Oklahoma.  As an anti-abortion, pro-law enforcement conservative who believes in the sanctity of life and society's duty to protect the innocent, I find this unacceptable.

Oklahoma's well-documented wrongful convictions and failure to adhere to established execution protocols have shown that it cannot be trusted with properly carrying out the solemn responsibility of executing inmates. Oklahoma officials might soon compound these known problems by attempting again to execute Richard Glossip, a man who may well be innocent....

Conservatives are the leaders against government abuse and lawlessness. We understand that government can be callous about its errors, which are costly and cause harm to the innocent. When government tries to execute a man who may well be innocent, I believe we have an even higher calling to speak out.

Oklahoma's systemic failures and Glossip's case in particular are emblematic of what is wrong with America's death penalty. The death penalty's problems are a confluence of things that all Americans loathe: a big, broken, costly and dangerous government program prone to mistakes, and with questionable positive benefits.

It was recently announced that a bipartisan group of eminent Oklahomans would be donating their time to a first-of-its-kind review of the Oklahoma death penalty system. I urge all Oklahomans, and especially conservatives, to support the call for a moratorium on the Oklahoma death penalty until this commission has finished its task and made its recommendations.

The death penalty system, where errors are gravest, is prone to flaws and lawlessness like any other government program.

Recent prior related post:

April 15, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Thursday, April 14, 2016

Could and should past concussions be a significant mitigator at federal sentencing of white-collar offender?

Books1002defordThe question in the title of this post is prompted by this interesting local article about a high-profile federal sentencing that has been postponed so that the defendant can participate in a study of the long-term symptoms of traumatic brain injury.  The headline of this story is "Ex-Cleveland Brown Reggie Rucker says concussions possibly caused him to steal from nonprofits," and here are the interesting details:

Former Cleveland Browns wide receiver Reggie Rucker indicated Wednesday that he will rely on concussions that he suffered as a football player as a possible explanation for embezzling money from his non-violence groups when a judge sentences him later this year.

Rucker, 68, of Warrensville Heights is participating in a study at the National Institute of Health that is examining the long-term symptoms of traumatic brain injury — something that many current and former NFL players say they suffer from as a result of concussions.

His attorneys asked U.S. District Judge Dan Polster to delay his May 23 sentencing because Rucker has another test to undergo in June.  That test that could prove useful in explaining why Rucker stole about $100,000 from the Cleveland Peacemakers Alliance and other nonprofits, attorney Jack Sammon said at a hearing Wednesday. Over objections from the U.S. Attorney's Office, Polster postponed Rucker's sentencing date until July 14.

"I want to have as much information about Mr. Rucker as I can reasonably get," the judge said.

Rucker pleaded guilty in February to wire fraud and making false statements to the FBI. Prosecutors said Rucker cut thousands of dollars in checks from his nonprofits and withdrew cash from ATMs at casinos across the country.  His actions often placed his agencies in the red leaving many of his outreach worker without paychecks.

Rucker used the money to pay personal expenses, including gambling debts and his mortgage, all while making passionate pleas to the public and government agencies for money for his philanthropic endeavors, prosecutors said.

Michael Hennenberg, an attorney representing Rucker, said the former Browns player suffered seven or eight concussions that he knows of during his 13-year career. Three of those came as a result of blows that knocked him unconscious, the attorney said.

Such injuries are known to cause impulsiveness and compulsiveness, both of which may play into Rucker's crimes, Hennenberg said. "Reggie Rucker is the first person in the country to be examined to determine the full implications of his now-known significant brain injuries," Hennenberg said.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam Hollingsworth objected to postponing the sentencing, in part because Rucker has already submitted past medical records that point to possible brain injuries. He also noted that doctors have said a definitive traumatic brain injury diagnosis is not possible until a person dies and an autopsy is performed....

Under a plea agreement he reached with prosecutors, Rucker faces a prison sentence of between 21 and 27 months. He enrolled in the Ohio Casino Control Commission's lifetime irrevocable exclusion program in March, meaning he can no longer legally gamble at casinos in the state. "Mr. Rucker's actions to defraud charitable organizations and line his pockets were conscious decisions on his part, and he will be held accountable for those actions," Mike Tobin, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's Office, said in a statement Wednesday.

The guilty plea cemented a fall from grace for Rucker, a beloved football player who made a name for himself by heading organizations that encourage non-violent responses to disputes between Cleveland residents.

Despite the brain injury discussions, Hennenberg stressed that Rucker has accepted responsibility for his actions. He released a document the former football player gave to the U.S. Probation Office on Friday that will be used when the office makes its sentencing recommendation. "I have learned and continue to learn many valuable life lessons as a result of my wrongful conduct that brought me into the criminal justice system," Rucker's written statement reads.

April 14, 2016 in Booker in district courts, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Costs of Pretrial Detention"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new piece authored by Shima Baradaran Baughman now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Spending on U.S. incarceration has increased dramatically over the last several decades.  Much of this cost is on incarcerating pretrial detainees — inmates not convicted of a crime — which constitute the majority of individuals in our nation’s jails.  

Current statutory schemes give judges almost complete discretion to order pretrial detention based on unexplained or unidentified factors.  With this discretion, judges tend to make inconsistent decisions in every jurisdiction, some releasing almost all defendants — including the most dangerous — and others detaining most defendants — even those who are safe to release.  There are constitutional and moral reasons to evaluate our current detention scheme, but even the fiscal impact of pretrial detention alone calls for an empirical analysis.

Although legal scholarship has applied cost-benefit analysis to other areas of criminal law, this Article is the first attempt at conducting such analysis in the pretrial arena.  This Article compares the risk posed by each defendant and the cost of any crimes they may potentially commit while released with the costs incurred by detaining these defendants.  The results show that relying on the cost-benefit model provided here, judges could bring significant savings — approximately $78 Billion, increased safety, and potentially more equitable pretrial detention decisions.

April 14, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Important drug offender data begging hard normative policy question regarding noncitizen US prisoners

Attachment-1I just came across this interesting posting and data analysis via NumbersUSA, a group that describes itself as "moderates, conservatives & liberals working for immigration numbers that serve America's finest goals."  The posting is titled "Sentencing Reform Legislation Would Disproportionately Favor Non-Citizens," and here are some excerpts (with one very critical line emphasized by me toward the end of this excerpt):

U.S. prisoner data clearly shows two things. One, the majority of low-level drug offenders are serving their sentences in state, not federal prisons. Two, most of those incarcerated in federal prison for drug charges are non-citizens....

[Only] 3.6 percent of all prisoners, or 48,600, under state jurisdiction are serving time for drug possession. The remaining drug offenders were convicted for trafficking and other related offenses, such as facilitating the illicit drug trade. The distribution of drug prisoners in state prisons is fairly evenly divided among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. A higher proportion of females (24%) than males (15%) are incarcerated for drugs in state prisons.

As of April 7, 2016, there were 196,285 prisoners in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, with 46.5 percent of these prisoners, (91,270) sentenced for drug offenses. The percentage of prisoners incarcerated for drugs is just over two and half times greater than the state prison population. However, overall, there are fewer prisoners serving time in federal prison for drug charges than in state prisons (212,000).

The Federal government collects data differently for state and federal prisoners. In order to get the breakdown of offenses for federal drug prisoners, data from the U.S Sentencing Commission is available. Looking at sentencing statistics from FY2007 to FY2015, a clear distinction between federal and state prison populations is that the proportion of federal prisoners serving time for drug possession is much higher than for state prisoners, and Hispanics are disproportionately represented among federal drug inmates.

There is a higher ratio of Hispanics serving drug sentences for both trafficking and possession convictions in federal prisons.  As Daniel Horowitz pointed out, this is because many of the drug offenders in federal prison are serving sentences for drug convictions related to the illicit drug trade on the U.S.-Mexico border.

In response to a congressional request regarding sentencing data for federal drug offenses, the U.S. Sentencing Commission sent data showing that 95% of the 305 individuals serving time in federal prison for simple drug offenses are non-citizens and 95.7 % were sentenced in southwest border districts — virtually all of them in Arizona. Furthermore, 95.7 % of the simple possession drug crimes for which offenders are incarcerated involved marijuana and the median weight of the drug involved in cases from border districts was 22,000 grams (approximately 48 pounds). Only 13 simple possession cases were tried in non-border districts in FY 2014.

In a letter sent to Sen. Jeff Sessions last fall, the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that 77% of individuals convicted of federal drug possession charges and more than 25% of individuals convicted of federal drug trafficking charges in FY2015 were non-citizen.

The profile for federal drug prisoners is different than at the state level, and this is why Congress needs to recognize and address these differences when crafting legislation that will effect this population.  Federal drug and immigration enforcement are for now inextricably tied together....

Sentencing reform bills reducing penalties for some federal prisoners (S. 2123 and H.R. 3713) are being portrayed by their supporters as a long overdue corrective to harsh sentencing laws for individuals who violate federal drug laws, which they argue create racial disparities in the nation’s prison population.

Reforming drug sentencing laws is one thing.  Releasing criminal aliens back into U.S. interior, is quite another.  The Obama Administration has already shown its willingness to do the latter, including those who were deemed to be criminal threats to the public.  Without a bill with strong, clear language and, most importantly, a Congress willing to extend oversight over the executive branch, it is plain that the sentencing reform legislation likely to soon come before Congress will accomplish little more than to provide an early release for dangerous criminal aliens, while still failing to hold President Obama to account for his failure to enforce U.S. immigration law.

This data discussion is a bit confusing because of its many references to both federal and state prisoners and both trafficking and possession offense and both percentages and absolute numbers. But, data particulars and confusions aside, the piece rightly highlights a very important data reality integral to any sophisticated discussion of efforts to reduce the federal prison population, especially for drug offenses: a significant percentage (and thus a large total number) of imprisoned and future federal drug offenders who would benefit from federal sentencing reform (perhaps up to 35% or even higher) would be noncitizens.

It understandable that persons deeply concerned about illegal immigration, and likely eager for policy changes always to prioritize benefits to US citizens over noncitizens, would find troublesome the statistical reality that federal sentencing reforms would benefit noncitizens significantly. However, this perspective may change if one realizes that noncitizen serious federal drug offenders who would get reduced sentences under any proposed sentencing reform would not get released "back into the US interior." Rather, any and every noncitizen serious federal drug offender who gets a reduced sentence is always going to be subject to immediate deportation once release from prison.

The important reality the many imprisoned and future noncitizen federal drug offenders are all to be deported after serving their federal prison sentences raises the hard normative policy question that is begged in any discussion of this data. That question is: What normative policy goal are we really achieving — other than spending billions of federal taxpayer dollars to house, feed and provide medical care to criminal noncitizens — by having noncitizens serve extra long federal prison terms if they are all to be deported at the end of these their terms no matter what?

Bill Otis and many others opposing proposed federal reforms are quick to stress the risk of increased domestic crime if we reduce current and future federal sentences and thereby release former offenders back into US communities sooner.  But that argument really does not hold up when we are talking about noncitizen offenders who will be forcibly deported to another nation after finishing whatever length of sentence they serve at federal taxpayer expense. (Indeed, I suspect imprisoning noncitizens in the US for long terms actually leads criminal noncitizens to become ever-more connected to US citizens and makes them even more likely to seek illegal return to the US after they are deported).

April 13, 2016 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (33)

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

Ninth Circuit talks through requirements for Miller resentencing a decade after mandatory LWOP

The Ninth Circuit yesterday issued an interesting opinion faulting a district court for how it limited the evidence it considered and other problems with how it conducted a resentencing of a juvenile murderer given a mandatory LWOP sentence a decade before such a sentences was deemed unconstitutional by the Surpeme Court.  Miller fan will want to read US v. Pete, No. 14-103 (9th Cir. April 11, 2016) (available here), in full, and here is how the opinion starts and along with some key passages from the heart of its analysis: 

Branden Pete was 16 years old when he committed a crime that resulted in a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole.  Later, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), held unconstitutional for juvenile offenders mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  On resentencing, the district court refused to appoint a neuropsychological expert pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) to help Pete develop mitigating evidence.

Our principal question on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in declining to appoint such an expert to aid the defense.  We conclude that it did, and so remand for appointment of an expert, and for resentencing after considering any expert evidence offered.  We also consider, and reject, Pete’s other challenges to his resentencing....

In rejecting the motion to appoint an expert, the district court ... noted that Pete’s upbringing and the circumstances of the crime have not changed, and maintained that because a psychiatric evaluation had been done in 2003, a second evaluation would be “duplicative.” “[I]t is difficult to conceive how,” the district court stated, “the passage of time may impact [the psychiatric] evidence” presented during the pretrial proceedings nearly ten years before.  Further, the district court held that the impact of incarceration on Pete “is not the type of mitigating evidence which Miller contemplates.”  We disagree with the district court as to all three aspects of its reasoning....

When the district court ruled that no expert testimony was “necessary,” it ignored Miller’s reasoning and directives.  At the time of resentencing, Pete’s neuropsychological condition had not been evaluated in more than a decade.  An updated evaluation could have revealed whether Pete was the same person psychologically and behaviorally as he was when he was 16.  Rather than being “duplicative,” as the district court believed, a new evaluation could have shown whether the youthful characteristics that contributed to Pete’s crime had dissipated with time, or whether, instead, Pete is the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Id. at 2469 (citation omitted); see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733.  Similarly, without current information relating to the policy rationales applicable specifically to juvenile offenders, Pete was hamstrung in arguing for a more lenient sentence.

More specifically, the significant mitigating evidence available to Pete at resentencing, other than his own testimony and that of his lawyer (neither of which the district court credited), would have been information about his current mental state — in particular, whether and to what extent he had changed since committing the offenses as a juvenile. This information was directly related to Pete’s prospects for rehabilitation, including whether he continued to be a danger to the community, and therefore whether the sentence imposed was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see id. (a)(2)(C), (D).  Such information is pertinent to determining whether, as Miller indicates is often the case, Pete’s psychological makeup and prospects for behavior control had improved as he matured, with the consequence that his prospects for rehabilitation and the need for incapacitation had changed.

April 12, 2016 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Accounting for Prosecutors"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting looking new paper by Daniel Richman now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

What role should prosecutors play in promoting citizenship within a liberal democracy?  And how can a liberal democracy hold its prosecutors accountable for playing that role? Particularly since I’d like to speak in transnational terms, peeling off a distinctive set of potential “prosecutorial” contributions to democracy — as opposed to those made by other criminal justice institutions — is a challenge.  Holding others — not just citizens but other institutions – to account is at the core of what prosecutors do.  As gatekeepers to the adjudicatory process, prosecutors shape what charges are brought and against whom, and will (if allowed to) become shapers of citizenship.  They also can can promote police compliance with legal and democratic norms.  Because the prosecutorial role in case creation is largest when crimes are not open and notorious, prosecutors can also play an outsized role in the bringing of cases that target instances of illegitimate subordination (including domestic violence) and corruption that are antithetical to a liberal democracy.

After considering ways in which prosecutors might promote democratic values, I explore (quite tentatively) how prosecutors can be held to account.  Working from existing practices and structures, I consider how we might promote their potential contributions through legal and institutional design with respect to reason-giving obligations; geographic scale; insulation from direct political influence, and modulation of their message.

April 12, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Interesting alternative sentencing being used in Thailand for drunk drivers

Regular readers know that I have long viewed drunk driving as a much-too-common, potentially-deadly offense that I fear is not regularly punished appropriately to best reduce recidivism and the extraordinary harms to public safety and property that this offense too often produces.  Consequently, I was intrigued to see this new article about a new kind of sentencing being tried for this offense in the Land of Smiles.  The piece is headlined "Thai drunk drivers to do morgue work in 'shock sentencing' strategy," and here are the details:

Drunk-drivers in Thailand will be sentenced to community service in morgues in an attempt to combat the world’s second highest road death rate. The plan to confront offenders with the risks of their actions in starkly morbid fashion was unveiled as the country embarked on its most dangerous time on the roads – the Thai new year holidays.

In a country with a notoriously poor road safety record, the ruling junta hopes the initiative will drive home the message that drink driving and reckless driving is lethal. "Traffic offenders who are found guilty by courts will be sent to do public service work at morgues in hospitals," said Police Col Kriangdej Jantarawong, deputy director of the Special Task Planning Division.

"It is a strategy used to make traffic offenders afraid of driving recklessly and driving while they are drunk because they could end up in the same condition. It is aimed to be a deterrent, a way to discourage people."

The “shock sentencing” strategy was approved by the Cabinet as the kingdom prepared for the extended Songkran new year festivities that formally begin on Wednesday. There is much higher traffic than normal as millions return to their home villages, while the festivities are also marked by heavy consumption of alcohol, including by drivers. Nominal helmet laws for motorcyclists are widely flouted.

The combination means the celebrations are accompanied by carnage on the roads each year. The government’s safety campaign bluntly refers to the holiday week as “The Seven Days of Danger”. The death toll has been increasing in recent years, despite government crackdowns and awareness campaigns. The authorities have also said that they will immediately impound the cars of motorists driving under the influence.

"We originally had community services at hospital wards (for offenders)," said Nontajit Netpukkana, a senior official at the department of probation. "But we think the intensity that comes from working in a morgue will help give those doing community service a clearer picture of what happens after accidents caused by drink driving.”

April 12, 2016 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 11, 2016

"The Battle Against Prison for Kids"

The title of this post is the headline of this new article from The Nation. The piece's subtitle is "We’re feeding children into a system that breaks them," and here is how it gets started:

For as long as youth prisons have existed in the United States, so too has the pretense that there are no youth prisons. Early 19th-century reformers who sought to remove children from the harsh adult penal system established new institutions specifically for the detention of youths.  They didn’t call them prisons, but Houses of Refuge, dedicated to the discipline and reform of newly coined group, “juvenile delinquents.”  Founded with ostensibly laudable intent, the institutions were overcrowded fortresses, riddled with abuse, serving to institutionalize strict social control over poor and immigrant communities.  That is, they were prisons.

And so began the unending march of euphemisms, in which children’s prisons have been known by any other name — residential treatment facilities, youth camps, youth-development centers, to name a few — exposing juveniles to many the same cruelties and racial discriminations of the adult prison system. In the two centuries since its formal birth, the juvenile-justice system has changed radically, while youth prisons have hardly changed at all. It’s as if the clock on reform stopped in the turn-of-the-century Progressive Era and has only recently started shakily ticking again.

Last year, before the election spectacle swallowed the news cycle whole, juvenile-justice reform made headlines as a keystone in President Obama’s legacy-construction efforts.  Overdue political action from state houses has gained serious ground in removing youths from adult prisons.  On any given day, 10,000 juveniles are housed in adult facilities, where they are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted than in juvenile institutions (a monstrous statistic, especially considering the prevalence of sexual abuse in youth facilities).  The necessity of getting kids out of our shameful adult system cannot be overstated.  It’s a limited achievement, though.  And even as more and more youth prisons close, we must be vigilant against “alternatives” that press the same oppressive, discriminatory stigmas of criminality and delinquency onto kids outside prison walls.

April 11, 2016 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

New Orleans judge threatening to turn public defender funding crisis into a public safety problem

32This local article from the Big Easy reports on notable efforts by a local judge to make sure it is no longer easy for public officials to ignore the problem of inadequate funding of public defenders to represent indigent criminal defendants.  The article is headlined "New Orleans judge orders release of seven inmates charged with serious felonies because of lack of money for defense, but men will remain jailed pending an appeal," and here are the basic details:

In a potentially blockbuster ruling, an Orleans Parish judge on Friday ordered seven indigent inmates released from jail because of a lack of state money for attorneys to represent them amid a squeeze on public defense funding in New Orleans and across Louisiana.

However, Criminal District Court Judge Arthur Hunter stayed his order, which also included a suspension of the men’s prosecutions, pending an appeal from District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro’s office. Assistant District Attorney David Pipes told Hunter an appeal is coming, and Hunter gave him 10 days. The seven men will remain behind bars pending the outcome of that appeal.

All of them face serious felony charges — including murder, armed robbery and aggravated rape — and all have been deemed indigent. Most have spent more than a year behind bars, going months without legal help on their cases, attorneys said.

Hunter ruled that the lack of state funding for the seven men’s defense violated their Sixth Amendment rights and that the resulting uncertainty on when their cases might move forward warrants their release. “The defendants’ constitutional rights are not contingent on budget demands, waiting lists and the failure of the Legislature to adequately fund indigent defense,” Hunter wrote in his 11-page ruling, portions of which he read from the bench.

“We are now faced with a fundamental question, not only in New Orleans but across Louisiana: What kind of criminal justice system do we want? One based on fairness or injustice, equality or prejudice, efficiency or chaos, right or wrong?”

A spokesman for Cannizzaro’s office said the district attorney “believes that releasing defendants charged with serious acts of violence poses a clear and present danger to public safety, and he intends to appeal the ruling.” Spokesman Christopher Bowman added, “It appears that the judge’s ruling declares that a legislative act — namely the most recent budget — violates the Louisiana Constitution.”

Tulane Law School professor Pam Metzger, who is representing all seven in their bid for release, said she was “thrilled that the judge appreciates the extraordinary constitutional obligations of providing poor people with counsel and due process of law.” She said she was disappointed that Hunter stayed his ruling but that attorneys would continue pressing to free the men.

In addition to Metzger, each of the men has an attorney appointed by Hunter. But in his ruling, Hunter said the appointment of private attorneys without any state money available for early witness and defendant interviews, filing motions and strategizing “makes a mockery of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

Hunter was following directions laid out in a 2005 Louisiana Supreme Court decision on when judges can halt prosecutions because of a lack of adequate indigent defense funds. The court said a judge can stop a case “until he or she determines that appropriate funding is likely to be available.” The “absence of a date certain” when that money will come, Hunter found, also violates the right to due process guaranteed in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Louisiana Constitution’s edict for the Legislature to “provide for a uniform system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for indigents.”...

Chief Public Defender Derwyn Bunton’s office had turned away the seven cases, citing a severe budget shortfall, bloated workloads and the loss of several experienced attorneys in his office.

Hunter, who has taken drastic measures during past funding shortfalls at the Public Defenders Office — he ordered the release of several inmates after Hurricane Katrina — doled out the seven men’s cases to private attorneys, who promptly sought a halt to the prosecutions and the men’s release. They said they can’t do any work on the cases unless they get money to pay for investigators and other expenses.

Hunter’s ruling came after a series of hearings in his courtroom that began in November with testimony from Bunton and Jay Dixon, who heads the Louisiana Public Defender Board, among others. They testified that indigent defense in Louisiana is facing a crisis because of a system in which local offices are funded largely through fines and fees leveled on criminal defendants, mostly for traffic violations. Those revenues have slid steadily over the past several years, in some parishes more than others. All told, almost a dozen district public defenders across the state have instituted austerity programs.

In New Orleans, that has meant a hiring freeze since last summer and, beginning in January, a refusal by Bunton’s office to accept appointments in serious felony cases — now at 110 and counting — because of a lack of experienced attorneys to handle them, according to Bunton. “Obviously, the charges involved in these cases are really serious, so I do think folks should be concerned about public safety,” Bunton said Friday. “We wouldn’t need to be in this position if (the state) provided the resources that are necessary under the constitution. You can only prosecute as fast as you can defend, and if you can’t defend, you can’t prosecute.”...

The defenders’ funding troubles may be getting even worse. In Baton Rouge, lawmakers grappling with the state’s deep budget morass have threatened deep cuts in the $33 million in annual state funding that has supplemented local revenue, making up about a third of the overall funding for indigent defense across the state. The Louisiana Supreme Court has in the past endorsed a halt to prosecutions until adequate funding becomes available. But it has stopped short of ordering action by the Legislature.

At a recent hearing, Metzger described an “abject state of financial crisis. There is no money to fund these defenses. ... The cause of the delay rests entirely with the state. The Legislature has been on notice not simply for weeks or months or years but for decades.”

In a legal filing last week, however, Cannizzaro’s office described the private attorneys seeking to be relieved from the cases as bent on “nothing less than anarchy” by pressing for the defendants’ release and a halt to their prosecutions, while “hoping for a paycheck” at the expense of justice. “They are seeking to bring down a system they disagree with rather than protecting the rights of those individuals this court has appointed them to represent,” Pipes wrote.

A statement from Mayor Mitch Landrieu called Hunter’s ruling “a miscarriage of justice on all sides” and urged the judge “for the sake of the victims and their families” to “reconsider putting alleged murderers back on the streets, like Darrian Franklin.”

“The state needs to live up to its obligation by fully funding the public defender, and the judge should continue to work on getting the State to appropriately fund its responsibilities,” the statement read.

April 11, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, April 07, 2016

"Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and 'Cruel and Unusual' Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new article by Alex Reinert now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has long been hotly contested. For scholars and jurists who look to original meaning or intent, there is little direct contemporaneous evidence on which to rest any conclusion. For those who adopt a dynamic interpretive framework, the Supreme Court’s “evolving standards of decency” paradigm has surface appeal, but deep conflicts have arisen in application.  This Article offers a contextual account of the Eighth Amendment’s meaning that addresses both of these interpretive frames by situating the Amendment in eighteenth and nineteenth-century legal standards governing relationships of subordination.  In particular, I argue that the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” was intertwined with pre- and post-Revolutionary notions of the permissible limits on the treatment of slaves.

The same standard that the Framers adopted for the treatment of prisoners in 1787 was contemporaneously emerging as the standard for holding slaveholders and others criminally and civilly liable for harsh treatment of slaves.  Indeed, by the middle of the nineteenth century, constitutional law, positive law, and common law converged to regulate the treatment of prisoners and slaves under the same “cruel and unusual” rubric.  Thus, when the Supreme Court of Virginia referred to prisoners in 1871 as “slaves of the State,” the description had more than rhetorical force.

Going beyond the superficial similarity in legal standards, examining how the “cruel and unusual” standard was explicated in the context of slavery offers important insights to current debates within the Eighth Amendment.  First, the contention by some originalists that the Punishments Clause does not encompass a proportionality principle is in tension with how courts interpreted the same language in the context of slavery. Indeed, relationships of subordination had long been formally governed by a principle of proportional and moderate “correction,” even though slavery in practice was characterized by extreme abuse.  Second, to the extent that dynamic constitutional interpretation supports limiting criminal punishment according to “evolving standards of decency,” the comparative law frame used here raises questions as to how far our standards have evolved.  This, in turn, should cause commentators and jurists to reconsider whether the twenty-first century lines we have drawn to regulate the constitutional bounds of punishment are adequate to advance the principle of basic human dignity that is thought to be at the heart of the Eighth Amendment.

April 7, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, April 06, 2016

"Normative Retroactivity"

The title of this post is the title of this timely new piece by William Berry now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

When the Court interprets the Constitution to accord a new right to criminal offenders, the question quickly becomes which prisoners might benefit from the new rule.  The current retroactivity doctrine relies on a confusing substance-procedure dichotomy.  Drawn from Teague v. Lane, this test often results in lower court splits on the retroactivity question.  Just this term, the Supreme Court has already decided the question of retroactivity in one case — Montgomery v. Louisiana, and has granted certiorari in another — Welch v. United States.

This Article rejects the substance-procedure dichotomy and offers a competing theoretical frame for considering the question of retroactivity.  Specifically, the Article develops the concept of “normative retroactivity,” arguing that retroactivity should relate directly to the normative impact of the new rule on previous guilt and sentencing determinations.  Further, the article advances a doctrinal test for assessing normative retroactivity of new rules of criminal constitutional law that combines the normative impact of the rule with a balancing test that weighs the applicable values of fundamental fairness and equality under the law against the competing values of finality, comity, and government financial burden.

April 6, 2016 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 05, 2016

"How Drug Warriors Helped to Fuel the Opioid Epidemic"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Atlantic piece.  Here is how it starts and ends:

Despite almost 50 years of the drug war — a policy that creates black markets, enriches drug cartels, and fuels killing zones in scores of cities, even as it causes the United States to cage more human beings than any other democracy in the world — it remains extremely easy for Americans to acquire the most addictive, deadly drugs.

“Overdoses from heroin, prescription drugs, and opioid painkillers have overtaken car accidents to become the leading cause of injury-related deaths in America,” The Economist reports.  “In 2014, they were responsible for 28,647 deaths. Between 2001 and 2014, deaths from heroin overdoses alone increased six-fold, according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse.  On average, 125 people a day die from drug overdoses, 78 of them from heroin or painkillers. These numbers have been compared to deaths from HIV in the late 1980s and 1990s.”

Had the War on Drugs merely failed to prevent this epidemic, even as it destabilized numerous countries and undermined domestic liberties, it would be an abject failure.  But federal drug policy has actually been worse than useless in heroin’s rise.

In a saner world, American researchers and patients would’ve spent the last several decades experimenting with marijuana to maximize its potential as a pain reliever.  Pot use isn’t without health consequences, but is much less harmful than many prescription drugs.  Instead, drug warriors fought to stymie marijuana research, keep pot illegal, and stigmatize medical marijuana as a dangerous fraud, even as doctors prescribed more opioid painkillers — that is, medical heroin. Many get addicted, and when the pills run out, they seek a street substitute....

“What has made it previously difficult to emphasize treatment over criminal justice,” President Obama said last month, “is that the problem was identified as poor, minority, and as a consequence, the thinking was, it's often a character flaw in those individuals who live in those communities, and it's not our problem they're being locked up. One thing that's changed in this opioid debate is that it reaches everybody.  Because it's having an impact on so many people, we're seeing a bipartisan interest in addressing this problem … not just thinking in terms of criminalization or incarceration, which unfortunately has been our response to the disease of addiction."

But even today’s reformers are far too timid. The War on Drugs rages daily, and it is still a catastrophe.  The catastrophe is rooted in the black markets that federal policy creates.  It is exposed by the urban killing zones that those markets guarantee.  It is shown to be futile by the ease of acquiring the most addictive drugs despite prohibition. And it is exacerbated by decades of efforts to prevent milder drugs from serving as substitutes.  End it.

April 5, 2016 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral State"

The title of this post is the title of this new article by Kathryne Young and Joan Petersilia which reviews a trio of criminal justice books. Here is the abstract:

This Review argues that an important root cause of our criminal justice ails can be found in the social processes that comprise the system’s daily activities and forms of control over individual Americans — processes largely taken for granted.  To explore the ground level interpersonal interactions that underpin the criminal justice system, we engage three recent books: Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship by Professors Charles Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald Haider-Markel; On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City by Professor Alice Goffman; and The Eternal Criminal Record by Professor James Jacobs.

Substantively and methodologically, the books might first seem an odd trio.  But together, they reveal the importance of a key phenomenon: “surveillance” in the word’s broadest sense — keeping track of people’s movements, histories, relationships, homes, and activities.

April 5, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 04, 2016

Senators Grassley and Feinstein convening hearing on whether DOJ is "Adequately Protecting the Public" from state marijuana reforms

This recent press release from US Senate's Caucus on International Narcotics Control details that this caucus has a hearing scheduled to explore how the federal government is keeping an eye on state-level marijuana reforms. (Exactly what this has to do with international control is unclear, but big-government drug warriors on both sides of the political aisle like Senators Grassley and Feinstein have never really been too keen to worry about limiting government growth in this arena.) Here are the basic details on what is prompting this hearing:

Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, and Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Co-chairman of the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, will hold a hearing entitled, “Is the Department of Justice Adequately Protecting the Public from the Impact of State Recreational Marijuana Legalization?”

In August 2013, the Obama Administration decided to effectively suspend enforcement of federal law on marijuana in states that legalized it for recreational use. But to disguise its policy as prosecutorial discretion, the Administration also announced federal priorities that it claimed would guide its enforcement going forward. These priorities include preventing marijuana from being distributed to minors, stopping the diversion of marijuana into states that haven’t legalized it, and preventing adverse public health effects from marijuana use. At the time, the Justice Department warned that if state efforts weren’t enough to protect the public, then the federal government might step up its enforcement or even challenge the state laws themselves. This put the responsibility on the Department of Justice to monitor developments in these states, develop metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of its policy, and change course if developments warranted.

But a report from the Government Accountability Office that Grassley and Feinstein requested found that the Administration doesn’t have a documented plan to monitor the effects of state legalization on any of these priorities. Moreover, according to the report, officials at the Department could not even say how they make use of any information they receive related to these priorities. Grassley and Feinstein are convening this hearing to explore this problem.

What I find most notable and disconcerting about this hearing is that it claims to be exploring whether the big federal government bureaucrats inside the Beltway at DOJ who are very far removed from direct public accountability are "protecting the public" from state reforms in Alaska and Colorado and Oregon and Washington which were enacted directly by the public through voter initiatives.

Cross posted at Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform.

April 4, 2016 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Sunday, April 03, 2016

"Subconstitutional Checks"

The title of this post is the title of this great-looking new paper authored by Shima Baradaran Baughman now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Constitutional checks are an important part of the American justice system.  The Constitution demands structural checks where it provides commensurate power.  The Constitution includes several explicit checks in criminal law. Criminal defendants have the right to counsel, indictment by grand jury, trial by jury, the public or executive elects or appoints prosecutors, legislatures limit actions of police and prosecutors, and courts enforce individual constitutional rights and stop executive misconduct.  However, these checks have rarely functioned as intended by the constitution and criminal law has failed to create — what I call — “subconstitutional checks” to adapt to the changes of the modern criminal state.

Subconstitutional checks are stopgaps formed in the three branches of government to effectuate the rights in the constitution when the system is stalled in dysfunction, when one branch has subjugated the others, or when two or more branches have colluded with one another.  The need for sub constitutional checks is evident in the criminal arena. In the modern criminal state, plea agreements have virtually replaced jury trials, discipline and electoral competition between prosecutors is rare, separation of powers does not serve its purpose because the interests of all branches are often aligned, and individual constitutional rights have little real power to protect defendants from the state.

As a result, the lack of structural constitutional checks in criminal law has lead to constitutional dysfunction.  Though never recognized as such, constitutional dysfunction in criminal law is evidenced by mass incarceration, wrongful convictions, overly harsh legislation, and an inability to stop prosecutor and police misconduct.  This Article sheds light on the lack of constitutional checks by performing an external constitutional critique of the criminal justice system to explore this structural gap in the three branches and concludes that creating subconstitutional checks has the potential of reducing criminal dysfunction and creating a more balanced criminal justice system.

April 3, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

A more positive spin on clemency developments and more positive aspects

LisaRichRegular readers may grow somewhat tired of hearing me kvetch about President Obama being much more willing to talk the talk than walk the walk when it comes to criminal justice reform generally and clemency developments in particular. For that reason (and others), I invited always sunny Lisa Rich to provide for blogging her sunny perspective on clemency events that transpired at the White House last week. Here is what she was kind enough to send my way for posting:

A somewhat sentimental post by Lisa A. Rich, former director of Legislative & Public Affairs at the U.S. Sentencing Commission and current director of the Texas A&M School of Law Residency Externship Program in Public Policy:
Last Week, I had the privilege of joining not only the tireless advocates of the Justice Roundtable and White House staff but over two dozen recipients of clemency spanning four presidencies during the Justice Roundtable and White House Briefings on “Life After Clemency.”
Personally, it was a joy to see all of the people — Nkechi Taifa, Mark Osler, Cynthia Rosenberry, Jesselyn McCurdy, Julie Stewart, Margy Love, and so many others who have been working tirelessly to answer the Obama Adminstration’s call to action on clemency.  I am in awe of the ceaseless dedication these advocates demonstrate every day in their pursuit of hope and justice for those human beings who deserve a chance to be something so much more than a statistic in our cycle of mass incarceration. These advocates and those for whom they do their jobs are the role models I discuss in my classes and they are the ones who inspire me to be better.
But more than my personal connection with those I miss because I am no longer living in D.C., the events over these past three days were important for two reasons.  First, all of us, including the President and White House staff saw and heard what hope is all about.  We heard from clemency recipients about heartache, mistake, and loss being turned into determination, faith, and commitment.  We heard people who genuinely want to make their communities and their lives better, stronger, and happier.  I am delighted that policymakers inside and outside of Washington are taking the opportunity to get to know these people — as people, not numbers, not workload, not files on a desk.
Second, I was pleased that two of my students were in the audience — and in fact had been given the opportunity to be involved in preparing for these events.  As part of Texas A&M School of Law’s new externship program in public policy, these students got to see policymaking in action from start to finish; they got to see firsthand the effects of both good and bad policy decisions.  Their experiences may not seem all that different from the hundreds of law students who go to D.C. and elsewhere each semester to partake in policy but it actually was a defining moment for me and them.  These students are the future policymakers and advocates.  To me, the events of these past three days were not just about hope for those impacted by outdated laws and poor decision making, but hope that the next generation of lawyers, policymakers, and advocates being trained by the brilliant people who participated in these events will learn from our mistakes; that they will engage in sound decision making based on evidence and best practices; that they will carry on the work done so well by so many. As an advocate and a teacher that is what hope is all about.

April 3, 2016 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (14)

Might the US be willing to learn from the German prison experience?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new Huffington Post commentary by Vincent Schiraldi, headlined "What we can learn from German prisons."  The commentary provides a bit of a preview of this segment to air tonight on 60 Minutes under the title "This is prison? 60 Minutes goes to Germany: Germany's prison system keeps convicts comfortable, costs less and has lower recidivism rates, but would Americans ever accept it?".  Here is the start of the Huffington Post piece:

On Sunday, April 3, 60 Minutes will air a story on several U.S. delegations to German prisons by advocates, researchers and public officials that should be mandatory viewing for anyone who works in or cares about America’s massive prison problem. In a country that has only a fraction of our incarceration rate, even Germany’s deepest-end prisons are humane and decent in ways that, at least at present, are difficult to fathom in the U.S. context.

The groups who funded or organized the trips - the Vera Institute of Justice, John Jay College of Justice, and the Prison Law Office - hope to change that. Inspired by these delegations, when I was working for Mayor Bill de Blasio’s Office of Criminal Justice, I organized a study tour to one of the prisons they had visited - the Neustrelitz Prison near Berlin, which houses adolescents and young adults.

The place couldn’t have been more different than a U.S. prison or juvenile facility. In fact, it was a bit of both, because young people are allowed to be tried in Germany’s juvenile courts up to age 21, unlike U.S. juvenile courts whose jurisdiction expires somewhere between ages 16 and 18, depending on the state.

The young people we met were all involved in programming from farming, to wood shop, to metal work, to in-depth therapy. The freedom of movement was extraordinary, with most youth sleeping in unlocked rooms at night and eventually going on home visits and transitioning out to daytime work, returning to the facility at night. Sentences were much shorter than those experienced by people locked up in the U.S., which partially explains why only 79 out of every 100,000 Germans are behind bars, compared to America’s world-leading incarceration rate of 700 per 100,000.

April 3, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, April 02, 2016

"Unfinished Project of Civil Rights in the Era of Mass Incarceration and the Movement for Black Lives"

The title of this post is the title of this newly published article authored by Nicole Porter. Here is the piece's introduction:

American criminal justice system has been dominated by relentless growth for the last forty years. The culture of punishment, in part driven by political interests leveraging “tough on crime” policies and practices marketed as the solution to the “fear of crime,” has been implemented at every stage of the criminal justice process: arresting, charging, sentencing, imprisonment, releasing, and post-incarceration experiences in the era of mass incarceration.

While it may not excuse criminal offending, the destructive effects of mass incarceration and excessive punishment are visited disproportionately upon individuals and communities of color and reinforce that the project of the civil rights revolution remains unfinished.  In recent years, there has been growing consensus across ideological lines to address mass incarceration.  Yet, policy changes are incremental in approach and do not achieve the substantial reforms needed to significantly reduce the rate of incarceration and its collateral impacts.  Incremental policy reforms include: reducing the quantity differential between crack and powder cocaine that results in racially disparate sentencing outcomes at the federal level and in certain states; reclassifying certain felony offenses to misdemeanors; expanding voting rights and access to public benefits for persons with felony convictions; and adopting fair chance hiring policies for persons with criminal records.

The Movement for Black Lives, or Black Lives Matter, offers a new public safety framework to finish the project of civil rights in the era of mass incarceration.  This movement has a sophisticated analysis that seeks to address the underlying structural issues that result in poor policy outcomes for communities of color, including high rates of incarceration.  The public safety framework does not excuse criminal offending, but offers a new approach of viewing justice-involved persons — a disproportionate number of whom are African American and Latino — as worthy recipients of public safety responses not dominated by arrests, admissions to prison, or collateral consequences.

Aligning a Black Lives Matter framework with public safety strategies expands policy responses beyond the criminal justice system to evidence-based interventions demonstrated to reduce criminal offending.  Research shows that early childhood education, quality healthcare, and targeted employment programs can help reduce recidivism and prevent justice involvement.  More importantly, the Black Lives Matter framework can help to shift norms away from the punitiveness that dominates U.S. criminal justice policy.

April 2, 2016 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, March 31, 2016

Extraordinany (and extraordinarily timely) issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

The March 2016 issue of The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science has an extraordinary collections of essays by an extraordinary array of legal scholars and sociologists and criminologists under the issue title "The Great Experiment: Realigning Criminal Justice in California and Beyond." Though many of the articles focus on California's unique and uniquely important recent criminal justice reforms experiences, all folks interested in and concerned about sentencing and corrections reform in the United States ought to find the time to read most or all of the articles in this collection.

The special editors of this issue, Charis Kubrin and Carroll Seron, authored this introduction to the collection under the title "The Prospects and Perils of Ending Mass Incarceration in the United States."  Here is an excerpt from that introduction:

This volume of The ANNALS represents the first effort by scholars to systematically and scientifically analyze what Joan Petersilia (2012) has described as “the biggest criminal justice experiment ever conducted in America.”  She went on to note that “most people don’t even realize it’s happening,” a point underscored by Franklin Zimring in the volume’s concluding remarks.  At a historic moment in which imprisonment patterns across the U.S. are shifting for the first time in nearly 40 years, the California case is ripe for in-depth examination.  The political landscape around decarceration is also shifting in ways that do not fit the debate of the last 40 years.  The initiative behind the prison buildup was largely an offshoot of more conservative, law and order political agendas, but as the nation debates a move toward prison downsizing and decarceration, there is support from both the Left and the Right for this fundamental shift in policy (Aviram, this volume; Beckett et al., this volume) — unusual bedfellows at a time of political polarization.  While this political convergence will no doubt be contested, as Joan Petersilia emphasizes in the volume’s preface, it nonetheless represents an important moment to have a systematic, rigorous, and scientific evaluation of California’s experiment and its implications on hand for policy-makers.

March 31, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

"A Fatally Flawed Proxy: The Role of 'Intended Loss' in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Daniel Guarnera now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Of all federal criminal defendants, those convicted of fraud are among the most likely to receive a sentence below the term recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  The most important (and controversial) driver of fraud sentences under the Guidelines is the economic loss — actual or intended, whichever is greater — resulting from the crime.

This Article examines the role of the “intended loss” calculation.  The U.S. Sentencing Commission designed the intended loss enhancement to function as a rule-oriented proxy for defendant culpability.  By applying the framework of rules and standards, this Article argues that culpability, by its nature, is too multifarious a concept to be accurately represented by a single variable.  Furthermore, a recently-enacted amendment to the definition of intended loss — which restricts its scope to losses “that the defendant purposely sought to inflict” — will only exacerbate the problem by excluding a significant subset of plainly culpable conduct.

Rather than attempt to fine-tune the intended loss calculation any further, this Article contends that the purposes of sentencing in general (and the goals of the Guidelines in particular) would be better served by enabling judges to conduct a more standard-based inquiry into the wide array of facts that can bear on culpability.  It evaluates several proposals that would give judges greater discretion while, at the same time, minimizing the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities.

March 31, 2016 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, March 30, 2016

GOP frontrunner Donald Trump says "some form of punishment" would be needed for women who have abortions if procedure is made illegal

This recent article at The Crime Report, headlined "Trump On Crime: Tough Talk, Few Specifics," highlighted how hard it is to figure out Donald Trump's policy position on various criminal justice issues (in which I was quoted):

Most experts we talked to say it’s hard to distinguish the rhetoric from the policies. “[The Trump campaign] has not issued a platform yet, so I’m not sure that I’d take anything that he’s been saying as an actual criminal justice policy,” said Inimai M. Chettiar, director of the Brennan Center’s Justice Program.

“What’s really frustrating, is that (he’s) like a cardboard candidate; you know what his pitch is but you don’t know anything else beyond that,” said Prof. Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School. “And maybe he doesn’t either.”

Berman suggests half-jokingly that there’s a “simple answer” to the question of what Donald Trump believes about criminal justice. “Who the hell knows?” he said.

On many policy issues, Trump has sidestepped detailed responses by pointing to his experience in real estate and suggesting that good dealmakers keep their positions ambiguous at the start of any negotiation. That seems to apply to his approach to justice as well. Asked about specific criminal justice reforms, Trump often changes the subject back to supporting police or vague answers about needing to be “tough.”

But today GOP frontrunner Trump is making headlines for talking about criminal punishment in an especially controversial setting.  This FoxNews piece, headlined "Trump says abortion ban should mean punishment for women who have procedure," provides the details:

Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump said Wednesday said that if abortion were illegal in the United States, then women who have the procedure should be punished.  Trump made the comments during a taping of an MSNBC town hall that will be aired later Wednesday.

Host Chris Matthews pressed Trump to clarify, asking him whether abortion should be punished and who ultimately should be held accountable. “Look, people in certain parts of the Republican Party, conservative Republicans, would say, ‘Yes, it should,’” Trump said. The candidate later put out a statement saying: “This issue is unclear and should be put back into the states for determination.”...

When asked specifically at the town hall what he thought, the New York businessman answered, “I would say it’s a very serious problem and it’s a problem we have to decide on. Are you going to send them to jail?”

“I’m asking you,” Matthews prompted.

“I am pro-life,” Trump said.

Matthews pressed on, asking again who should be punished in an abortion case if it were illegal.

“There has to be some form of punishment,” Trump said.

“For the woman?” Matthews asked.

“Yeah,” Trump responded, adding later that the punishment would “have to be determined.”

His rivals seized on the remarks. Ohio Gov. John Kasich later told MSNBC “of course women shouldn’t be punished.” An aide to Texas Sen. Ted Cruz tweeted: “Don't overthink it: Trump doesn't understand the pro-life position because he's not pro-life.”

With all due respect to the statement made by an aide to Senator Ted Cruz, it seems to me that Donald Trump actually understands — and may be taking more seriously than many other politicians — the oft-stated pro-life position that life begins at conception and that abortion it at least somewhat akin to homicide.

The National Right to Life Committee, the nation's oldest and largest pro-life organization,  states expressly here that in the US "over 40 million unborn babies have been killed in the 40 years since abortion was legalized and more than 1.2 million are killed each year" and that "medical science has known conclusively that every individual's life begins at the moment of fertilization."   Pro-Life Action League states expressly here that "killing an unborn child is inherently wrong, and therefore can never be justified regardless of circumstances. It is no more just to kill an unborn child in order to avoid hardship than it would be to kill a toddler to avoid hardship. Because the unborn child is unseen, it is easier for society to condone killing him or her, though this is morally indistinguishable from killing any child at any stage of development."  The American Life League similarly states expressly here that "abortion is a direct attack on a preborn child which kills; it is murder."

If one genuinely believes that any abortion involves the intentional "killing" of a human life, that it is "morally indistinguishable from killing any child at any stage of development," and that "it is murder," and thus an act which should be criminally prohibited (like all other forms of intentional homicide), then I would hope that one ought also be genuinely committed to criminally punishing, at least to some extent, any and every person intentionally involved in this act of intentional killing which "morally indistinguishable from killing any child at any stage of development." 

In modern society, we threaten to punish all sorts of persons (at least with fines) for all sorts of petty crimes like overtime parking and illegal copying of a DVD and loitering.  I believe I am understanding and showing respect to the views and claims of persons who are pro-lifer when I surmise they consider any intentional abortion to be a societal wrong that is far more serious than, say, overtime parking or loitering.  If that is right, then I also think it would be fair to say that Donald Trump is actually understanding and showing respect for the views and claims of persons who are pro-life when he suggests that women intentionally involved in obtaining illegal abortions ought to be subject to at least "some form of punishment."

March 30, 2016 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Prez Obama commutes the sentence of 61 more federal drug offenders

As reported in this Washington Post piece, "President Obama commuted the sentences of 61 inmates Wednesday, part of his ongoing effort to give relief to prisoners who were harshly sentenced in the nation’s war on drugs." Here is more on this notable clemency news:

More than one-third of the inmates were serving life sentences. Obama has granted clemency to 248 federal inmates, including Wednesday's commutations.  White House officials said that Obama will continue granting clemency to inmates who meet certain criteria set out by the Justice Department throughout his last year....  Since the Obama administration launched a high-profile clemency initiative, thousands more inmates have applied.  Another 9,115 clemency petitions from prisoners are still pending....

But sentencing reform advocates said that many more prisoners are disappointed they have not yet heard from the president about their petitions. “Sixty-one grants, with over 10,000 petitions pending, is not an accomplishment to brag about,” said Mark Osler, a law professor at the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota and an advocate for inmates petitioning for clemency.  “I know some of those still waiting, men who were grievously over-sentenced, who have reformed themselves, and never had a record of violence.  My heart breaks for them, as their hope for freedom — a hope created by the members of this administration — slips away.”

The White House has argued that broader criminal justice reform is needed beyond the clemency program. “Despite the progress we have made, it is important to remember that clemency is nearly always a tool of last resort that can help specific individuals, but does nothing to make our criminal justice system on the whole more fair and just,” said White House counsel W. Neil Eggleston. “Clemency of individual cases alone cannot fix decades of overly punitive sentencing policies.  So, while we continue to work to resolve as many clemency applications as possible — and make no mistake, we are working hard at this — only broader criminal justice reform can truly bring justice to the many thousands of people behind bars serving unduly harsh and outdated sentences.”

Among those granted clemency on Wednesday was Byron Lamont McDade, who had an unusual advocate in his corner.  The judge who sent McDade to prison for more than two decades for his role in a Washington-area cocaine conspiracy personally pleaded McDade’s case for early release. U.S. District Judge Paul L. Friedman said McDade’s 27-year punishment was “disproportionate” to his crime, but that he had no choice but to impose the harsh prison term in 2002 because of then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. Over the years, the judge had urged the Bureau of Prisons and the White House to reduce McDade’s sentence to 15 years.  He received no response until now....

On Thursday, the White House will hold an event called Life after Clemency that will include former inmates and their attorneys, along with some prison reform advocates. The president’s senior adviser, Valerie Jarrett, is meeting with advocates, former inmates and family members of prisoners Wednesday at the White House for an event about women and the criminal justice system.

This White House Press release provides basic details on the full list of 61 offenders who today learned that they now have a "prison sentence commuted to expire on July 28, 2016." Many of those listed appear to have been involved in a crack offense, though other drug cases sentenced both before and after Booker can be found in the group.  Notably, this NACDL press release reports that "25 of [these 61 offenders] were applicants whose petitions were supported by Clemency Project 2014."  This White House blog post authored by White House counsel W. Neil Eggleston provides more details and context concerning these grants:

Today, the President announced 61 new grants of commutation to individuals serving years in prison under outdated and unduly harsh sentencing laws.  More than one-third of them were serving life sentences.  To date, the President has now commuted the sentences of 248 individuals more than the previous six Presidents combined. And, in total, he has commuted 92 life sentences.

Underscoring his commitment not just to clemency, but to helping those who earn their freedom make the most of their second chance, the President will meet today with commutation recipients from both his Administration and the previous administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton.  During the meeting, the commutation recipients will discuss their firsthand experiences with the reentry process and ways that the process can be strengthened to give every individual the resources he or she needs to transition from prison and lead a fulfilling, productive life. 
 
Building on this conversation, tomorrow the White House will host a briefing titled Life After Clemency with advocates, academics, and Administration officials to discuss and share ideas on the President’s clemency initiative and ways to improve paths to reentry. In addition to officials from the White House and the Department of Justice, experts, academics, and commutation recipients will share their expertise and insights on returning to society after years behind bars.  To watch the briefing live, tune in tomorrow, Thursday, March 31, at 2:00 PM EDT at www.whitehouse.gov/live.

March 30, 2016 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

"Sentencing Reductions versus Sentencing Equality"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting and timely new paper by Susan Klein now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted by an odd conglomeration of Democrat and Republican who agreed that federal sentences should be based upon relevant offender and offense characteristics, not including such things as race, gender, geography, ideological bent of the sentencing judge, or citizenship. That goal has become lost and less relevant in today’s world of draconian and mandatory minimum sentencing, especially in the drug trafficking, child pornography, and fraud arenas. Mass incarceration has run rampant. Sentences are so out-of-whack with most basic principles justice that the fact that female offenders may receive slightly lower prison terms than their male counterparts should no longer be the very top of our reform agenda.

This is not to suggest that scholars and the public shouldn’t be concerned with sentencing disparity, especially based on race. However, the disparity between federal and state sentences is so much wider (and occurs so much more frequently) than the disparity among similarly-situated federal offenders that the latter appears less of a significant issue in absolute terms. Whatever reform capital policy-makers and scholars retain should be poured into championing alternatives to criminalization (such as fines, drug treatment, and apologies) and alternatives to long prison terms (such as probation and parole). Reforms must focus on discovering what offenses we could safely decriminalize, and what programs are effective in keeping individuals out of prison in the first place (or in curbing recidivism once incarceration has occurred).

If giving judges more discretion at sentencing means lower average prison terms, this will probably rebound to the benefit of our minority populations as a whole, even if it might mean that in particular cases minority defendants receive slightly higher sentences for the same conduct as their white counterparts. Likewise, if sentencing, parole, and probation decisions based upon “risk assessment” leads to lower overall incarceration rates, we may have to tolerate this even if it generates higher risk numbers for certain minority offenders. Critics of every substantive criminal-law and sentencing reform proposal need to remember the big picture, and not lose sight of the forest of mass incarceration for the trees of unwarranted sentencing disparity.

March 30, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Oklahoma creates Death Penalty Review Commission full of prominent folks .... which will likely achieve ....?

Though I generally think of myself as an optimist, this notable news item out of Oklahoma, headlined "Oklahoma Bipartisan Death Penalty Review Commission formed, supported," triggers the cynical little voice in my head that comes out when I hear about the creation of a blue-ribbon commission in the sentencing arena.  (For those curious about aesthetic backstories, this Wikipedia entry highlights why we color expert panels blue instead of, say, having pink-ribbon commissions.)  Before I go cynical, here are the details of the latest governmental gathering of note:

A group of prominent Oklahomans joined together Monday (March 28) to form a blue-ribbon, bipartisan Oklahoma Death Penalty Review Commission.  The Commission will conduct what a press statement called “the first-ever independent, objective and thorough review of the state’s entire capital punishment system.”...

“Oklahoma has an opportunity to lead the nation by being the first state to conduct extensive research on its entire death penalty process, beginning with an arrest that could lead to an execution,” said former Gov. Brad Henry, of Henry-Adams Companies, LLC, one of the group’s co-chairs.“The Commission includes distinguished Oklahomans with differing views and perspectives on capital punishment who are donating their time to work together on a research-driven review,” he said.

Joining Gov. Henry as co-chairs are Reta Strubhar, a judge on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (1993-2004) and an Assistant District Attorney of Canadian County (1982-1984); and Andy Lester, of the Spencer Fane law firm and a former U.S. Magistrate Judge for Western District of Oklahoma who served on President Ronald Reagan’s Transition team for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1980-1981).

Members of the Commission have experience in a variety of aspects of the capital punishment system, including victim advocacy, policymaking, prosecution, defense, and judging. They also include leading lawyers, business leaders, and scholars.  In addition to the co-chairs, the members are Robert H. Alexander, Jr., of The Law Office of Robert H. Alexander, Jr.; Howard Barnett, President of OSU-Tulsa; Dean Andrew Coats, Dean Emeritus of OU College of Law; Dean Valerie Couch, Oklahoma City University School of Law; Maria Kolar, Assistant Professor of OU College of Law; Rob Nigh, Chief Public Defender, Tulsa County; Christy Sheppard, a victims’ advocate; Kris Steele, Director of The Education and Employment Ministry (TEEM) and former Speaker of the House; and Gena Timberman, founder of The Luksi Group.

“Our goal is to provide a resource for Oklahomans to allow them to make informed judgments about our state’s capital punishment system that, we hope, will benefit both Oklahoma and the country as a whole,” said Henry.

Though I have long been a fan of any "research-driven review" of any sentencing system, I am not optimistic based on my own experiences in Ohio that this kind of death penalty review commission will be able to achieve all that much other than producing a lengthy report that will be embraced or rejected by political leaders based entirely on their already established views on the death penalty.  This cynical prediction is based on how an array of ABA reports on state death penalty systems and how a recent Ohio Death Penalty Task Force report was received.

Critically, I do not mean to be asserting that this Oklahoma Death Penalty Review Commission is unimportant or sure to inconsequential.  But I do mean to assert that basic political dynamics rather than refined policy analysis defines and often limits the possibilities for reforming the administration of the death penalty.

March 29, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, March 28, 2016

A week of extraordinary reporting and commentary via The Crime Report

Regularly readers are perhaps used to me regularly praising The Crime Report for its impressive original reporting and interesting commentaries on an erray of criminal justice issues. This post is another in this series, prompted by the fact that I have been meaning to do distinct posts about nearly a dozen pieces I saw over at TCR just over the last (too busy week). I remain hopeful I will get a chance to blog separately about some of the pieces below that I find more interesting or important, but for now I am going to have to be content to urger everyong to click through a read everyone of these linked piece:

March 28, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Time, Death, and Retribution"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Chad Flanders now available via SSRN. To call this article timely and just dead on is both accurate and punny. Here is the abstract:

The heart of a Lackey claim is that when a death row inmate is kept waiting too long for his execution, this delay can amount to cruel and unusual punishment — either because they delay is itself cruel and unusual, or because the execution on top of the delay is.  All Lackey claims brought by death row inmates have failed, but not for want of trying.  The usual complaint against Lackey claims is that those who, by their own appeals, delay their execution date cannot turn around and use that delay as an argument against their death sentences.  I agree with other scholars that this argument is incorrect.  However, even if it is true that prisoner choice cannot make an otherwise unconstitutional sentence constitutional, Lackey claims can — and should — fail if the courts adopt a certain theory of retribution, what I call “intrinsic desert retribution”.  Examining that type of retribution, distinguishing it from other retributive theories, and showing how intrinsic desert retribution can refute most Lackey claims, is one of this article’s major contributions. In doing so, it breaks with most of the scholarly literature, which tends to be sympathetic to Lackey claims.

But the fact that Lackey claims may survive given a certain theory of retribution does not make that theory something the state may permissibly pursue.  And this is the second major contribution of the article: to make the case that retribution may in fact not be a permissible state purpose.  In short, Lackey claims do not fail because they are too strong — they fail because they are not strong enough.  The Supreme Court has traditionally held that the state may permissibly put someone to death because of retribution.  But the Court has also said, in other contexts, that the state may not pursue certain aims.  The state cannot promote religion, for one; nor can it adopt policies based solely on “animus” against a certain class of persons.  My article suggests that when the state adopts retribution as a goal in capital punishment, and pursues that goal even after years of delay, then retribution starts to look more and more like something that, while it may be morally right, cannot be a goal the state can legitimately pursue.

March 28, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 26, 2016

Wouldn't (severe? creative?) alternatives to incarceration be the best response to animal cruelty convictions?

Peace_love_stop_animal_abuse_postcard-r136275981620429394a9c237e5c49925_vgbaq_8byvr_324The question in the title of this post is prompted by this local story of a high-profile sentencing of a high-profile defendant convicted of multiple misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty. The piece is headlined "Former Raven Terrence Cody sentenced to nine months in Baltimore County animal cruelty case," and here are the details:

Baltimore County judge sentenced former Ravens player Terrence Cody on Thursday to nine months in jail in an animal cruelty case that drew interest across the country. Cody, 27, was convicted in November of multiple misdemeanors in connection with the death of his dog, Taz, last year, as well as two misdemeanor drug charges.  Prosecutors said Taz starved to death.

Cody faced the possibility of more than two years of incarceration. More than 5,000 people signed an online petition urging Judge Judith C. Ensor to impose the maximum sentence. Ensor said that she did not discount the petition but that she had to make an independent decision based on the case.  "My responsibility is to listen and to make the best decision I can," she said at the sentencing hearing.

Defense attorney Joe Murtha acknowledged that Cody neglected Taz but said that Cody loved the animal and didn't intend for it to die. He said that Cody was emotionally incapable of caring for the dog and that he suffers from depression.  "His level of depression is so significant that he's become just isolated," said Murtha, who added that his communication with his client has been limited because of Cody's depression.

Prosecutor Adam Lippe discounted the idea that Cody was depressed. He argued for the maximum amount of jail time — 905 days.  "I'm sure every defendant awaiting sentencing is depressed," Lippe said.

Lippe said during the trial that the dog starved to death at Cody's former home in Reisterstown over a period of at least a month. Cody testified at the trial that he believed Taz was suffering from worms.

Cody spent $8,000 to buy and import Taz, a Canary mastiff, from Spain. He took the animal to a Reisterstown animal hospital a few hours before it died. The dog, which once weighed at least 100 pounds, was down to less than 50 pounds at that point. Cody — whose nickname at the University of Alabama was Mount Cody — was drafted by the Ravens as a defensive lineman in 2010. The team released him when he was indicted last year.

After the trial last year, Cody was acquitted of two felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty. Ensor, who presided over the bench trial, said Thursday she was convinced that Cody did not torture Taz intentionally. "I remain firm" in that belief, she said.

The judge also sentenced Cody to probation before judgment for illegally possessing an alligator and for possessing drug paraphernalia. Police found a gas-mask bong and a 6-foot-long green glass bong in the home. She imposed suspended sentences for several counts, including a marijuana charge. She also sentenced Cody to 18 months of supervised probation and said he must undergo mental health treatment. During the probation period, he is not allowed to own or possess an animal. Cody will serve the sentence at the Baltimore County Detention Center in Towson.

Cody's girlfriend, Kourtney J. Kelley, 28, was also convicted in the animal cruelty case. She was sentenced last month to 60 days and has since been paroled. She was found guilty of five counts in connection with neglecting Taz. Cody, wearing a black hoodie and jeans, briefly addressed the court, saying he accepted responsibility. He also said he believed Kelley should not have been punished in the case....

Lippe said he was satisfied with the sentence. He said Cody had other dogs that were "fat and happy," but for some reason he treated Taz differently. "I can't explain to you why he decided to kill this animal," Lippe said. "It makes no sense at all."

I am huge aminal lover within a family which has always cared greatly about pets both usual (e.g., my dog and cat are hanging with me as I type this) and unusual (e.g., I have a bunch of parrot, angel fish and hermit crab stories).  Consequently, I fully understand how emotional so many folks get about animal cruelty and why there is often strong support for imposing the harshest possible sentences on those persons who get convicted of animal cruelty crimes.  

Nevertheless, as the question in the title of this post suggests and to parrot the words of the local prosecutor in this case, it really makes so sense at all to me to view lengthy terms of incarceration as the most efficacious response to these sorts of crimes.  Specifically, to focus on this case, did prosecutor Adam Lippe really think the citizens of Baltimore would be better off if former NFL player Terrence Cody served nearly 3 years in a local jail (at significant taxpayer expense) rather than, say, spending the next few years trying to get back into the NFL to make large sums of money that could be donated to animal protection societies or working publicly on helping animals as a part of community service program? 

I fully understand the potential incapacitative benefits of incarceration for dangerous people with a history of seriously risky or harmful behaviors.  But unless there is strong reason to believe Terrence Cody is a real danger to others, I think the the citizens and animals of Baltimore could and would be much better served through severe and creative alternatives to incarceration in a case like this.  But, problematically in the US and as part of our transformation into "incarceration nation," it seems that nearly all prosecutors and most members of the general public embrace the notion that the only way to be tough is through extended (and costly) periods of incarceration.

March 26, 2016 in Celebrity sentencings, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, March 24, 2016

"To change the world, start with prisons"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable FoxNews commentary authored by Christian Colson. Here are excerpts:

One Easter weekend, I accompanied my father, Charles Colson, to a prison in South Carolina. We held a worship service on Death Row, and about 20 men came out of their cells to sing songs and listen to my dad give a message about the resurrection of Jesus.

My father, whose books on Christian life and thought have sold more than 5 million copies, could have spent Easter weekend in more influential pulpits.  He could have commanded an audience of thousands of Christians who were well-resourced and well-connected, rather than men in prison jumpsuits.  But instead, every Easter for decades following his release from prison in 1975 for a Watergate-related crime until his death in 2012, he chose to go back behind bars to celebrate with the incarcerated.  My father understood that if we want to change the world, we must start behind bars.

The criminal justice system may not seem like the place to initiate cultural renewal, but no place could be better. When our nation’s 2.2 million prisoners are held in conditions that do little to help address the roots of criminal behavior, they remain likely to continue in a criminal lifestyle after they are released.

Prisoners might seem like improbable standard bearers for cultural transformation, but my dad believed wholeheartedly that whenever prisoners are transformed, they will transform the culture of their prisons and society at large....

Prisons are full of untapped potential.  Under the right conditions, many people — like my father — can pay their debt to society, prepare for a new future and make the most of their second chance.  A variety of prison programs that address the roots of criminal behavior through education, mentoring, substance-abuse treatment and more have been shown to reduce recidivism.

Legislation based on restorative values can support this goal.  The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, now making its way through Congress, would require the Federal Bureau of Prisons to implement and incentivize programming to reduce rates of re-offense.  This is good news not just for prisoners but for everyone affected by crime and incarceration.  When recidivism rates go down, more children grow up seeing their parents outside of a prison waiting room.  There are fewer victims.  Communities have a chance to flourish as they benefit from the contributions of members who are successfully reintegrating.

At the first Easter, mourners gathered at the tomb of a man who had been executed with criminals.  There seemed to be no future for his followers, a small group of poorly educated misfits with no worldly power or influence.  And yet, the nascent Christian movement transformed the culture of the Roman Empire and the entire modern history of the world.

When my dad spent “Resurrection Sunday” behind bars with prisoners, including those condemned to die, he often invoked that first Easter, where the hope of the Gospel emerged from a sealed tomb that was supposed to be as secure as any prison....  As Easter reminds us, the change the world most needs sometimes comes from unexpected places.

March 24, 2016 in Aspects and impact of Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Religion | Permalink | Comments (1)