Thursday, April 21, 2016

"Restoring Human Capabilities After Punishment: Our Political Responsibilities Toward Incarcerated Americans"

The title of this post is the title of this lengthy paper by Kony Kim now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Why should non-incarcerated Americans invest in the wellbeing of incarcerated Americans?  To date, our public discourse about penal reform has avoided this question, focusing on pragmatic reasons for facilitating “prisoner reentry” and “reintegration” while shelving unresolved, and deeply contested, philosophical questions about criminal justice and punishment.  As a result, we as a society have engaged in much data-driven policy talk about the economic costs and benefits of reducing recidivism, but little normative reflection about the rights and responsibilities held by incarcerated adults who are at once human beings, members of society, persons convicted of crimes, victims of inhumane punishment — and, often, survivors of poverty.

Thus, my first task is to clarify the individual and collective obligations that apply within our context of mass incarceration: the moral responsibilities that are held by and toward incarcerated Americans, non-incarcerated Americans, and our shared public institutions.  My second task is to draw out implications for policy and discourse: to explain not only what reform measures we should prioritize, but how we should frame and assess them.  In particular, I call for systemic changes that would provide all incarcerated Americans with opportunities to pursue higher education and to develop redemptive self-narratives; and I argue that we should frame and assess such measures not primarily as cost-saving devices, but as ethically significant efforts to secure capabilities that are essential to human flourishing and required by justice.

In setting forth these arguments, my purpose is to spark deeper ethical reflection about correctional reform, and specifically to invite meaningful engagement with one key normative question: What do we, as a civilized society with a history of social and penal injustice, owe incarcerated Americans?  Ultimately, I wish to underscore that the people confined in our prisons have legitimate moral claims upon us – insofar as they remain human beings and members of society and, as such, bearers of rights as well as responsibilities.  Equally, I wish to establish that, in our collective efforts to repair the harms of mass incarceration, we can and should empower those Americans most directly harmed by our penal system to lead the way in transforming it.

April 21, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Economists explain "Why Mass Incarceration Doesn’t Pay"

Social-costs-and-benefits-1-638Jason Furman, chairman of the White House Council of Economic Advisers, and Douglas Holtz­-Eakin, a former director of the Congressional Budget Office, have this new New York Times commentary headlined "Why Mass Incarceration Doesn’t Pay." Here are excerpts:

Congress is considering bipartisan legislation to loosen tough sentencing laws. The bill faces resistance from some lawmakers. As economists who differ on many issues, we both agree that cost­benefit analysis provides a useful framework for analyzing complicated questions. And in this case, we agree that the verdict of such analysis is clear: Our sentencing rules are failing and need to be changed.

On the benefit side of the equation, prisons and jails play an essential role in managing violent criminals and reducing crime, particularly helping people in poor communities who are the most likely to be victims of murder, robbery or other violent crimes.

But a general rule in economics — the law of diminishing marginal benefits — applies to incarcerating additional people or adding years to sentences. Research finds that more incarceration has, at best, only a small effect on crime because our incarceration rate is already so high. As the prison population gets larger, the additional prisoner is more likely to be a less risky, nonviolent offender, and the value of incarcerating him (or, less likely, her) is low.

The same general principle applies to the length of prison sentences, which in many cases have gotten longer as a result of sentence enhancements, repeat­offender laws, “three strikes” laws and “truth-­in-­sentencing” laws. Longer sentences do not appear to have a deterrent effect; one study finds, for example, that the threat of longer sentences has little impact on juvenile arrest rates. Other studies have found that sentencing enhancements have only modest effects on crime. They are unlikely to meaningfully affect the overall crime rate or generate meaningful gains in public safety.

Moreover, in many cases the analysis suggests that adding prisoners or years to sentences can be harmful. A growing body of research shows that incarceration and longer sentences could increase recidivism. Individuals may build criminal ties while incarcerated, lose their labor­-market skills and confront substantial obstacles to re­entry after release. A new study finds that each additional year of incarceration increases the likelihood of re­offending by four to seven percentage points after release.

The bottom line: The putative benefits of more incarceration or longer sentences are actually costs. Those costs are not confined to the prison population. Time in prison not only means a loss of freedom, but it also means a loss of earnings, risks to the health and safety of the incarcerated, and prolonged absences from family that can strain marriages and increase behavioral problems in children. The probability that a family is in poverty increases by nearly 40 percent while a father is incarcerated....

Finally, more than $80 billion is spent annually on corrections, or over $600 per household. The annual cost of imprisoning one person averages approximately $30,000 for adults and $110,000 for juveniles, higher than the cost of a year of college. At the federal level, the Bureau of Prisons budget grew 1,700 percent from 1980 to 2010 and now devours more than 25 percent of the entire Department of Justice budget.

There are other tools that can reduce crime more cost­-effectively, including promoting employment and wage growth and investing in education. That is one reason that between 2008 and 2012, a majority of states were able to reduce incarceration and crime. Incarceration plays an important role in promoting public safety, and imposing prison sentences for criminal conduct has moral and practical dimensions. But the criminal justice system should be designed to ensure that the benefits of incarceration exceed the costs. Individuals incarcerated for nonviolent drug crimes — 50 percent of the federal prison population — pose a low risk, and the costs of incarcerating these people outweigh the benefits.

Similarly, since criminal behavior declines and costs increase with age, releasing older individuals who have already served lengthy sentences is also likely to yield net benefits.

April 21, 2016 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (4)

Wednesday, April 20, 2016

Your tax dollars at work?: cost accounting for Aurora theater shooter James Holmes' failed capital trial

As a matter of abstract philosophy, I have struggled for decades concerning my opinion on capital punishment.  But as a matter of modern public policy, I have generally concluded that the death penalty is not a great use of limited resources for most states.  This new Denver Post article, headlined "Aurora theater shooting trial cost taxpayers at least $3 million: Final cost of James Holmes' trial in the Aurora theater shooting likely won't ever be known," reinforces my perspectives in this regard. Here are the details:

Jailing, evaluating and prosecuting the man who committed the Aurora movie theater shooting cost taxpayers at least $3 million, but the final expense of one of the mostly closely watched court cases in Colorado history may never be known. The $3 million tab was compiled by The Denver Post following multiple open-records requests over the past year. It covers the amount spent from 2012 through 2015 specifically on preparing for and seeing through the trial of James Holmes.

Nearly $1.6 million of the cost was covered by federal grants. When including the salaries of judges, prosecutors, sheriff's deputies and other government employees who spent most or all of their time on the case — but who would have been paid regardless — the total cost rises to more than $7 million.

And there's still a big chunk of expense missing from that amount. The state's taxpayer-funded public defenders — who represented Holmes — are not required to disclose what they spend on a case. Doing so, they say, would violate ethics rules and subject poor defendants to lower standards of attorney-client confidentiality. Generally, the office of the state public defender reports having spent nearly $2 million on death-penalty and potential death-penalty cases since July 2002, not including staff salaries.

The theater shooting trial was one of the longest in state history. Prosecutors sought the death penalty, and Holmes, who pleaded not guilty by reason of insanity, underwent two psychiatric evaluations by state-appointed experts — at a cost of more than $600,000 to the state Department of Human Services. Holmes ultimately was found guilty of murdering 12 people and trying to murder 70 more in the July 2012 attack on the Century Aurora 16 movie theater; he was sentenced to life in prison without parole in August.

While the case prompted public debates about the cost of the death penalty and mental health evaluations, the biggest expense that has been reported was for providing victims' assistance services. The Arapahoe County district attorney's office spent nearly $1.2 million on salaries for victims' advocates, travel expenses for victims to attend the trial and other costs. All of those costs were covered by a federal grant.

Arapahoe County District Attorney George Brauchler, whose office published its close-to-final cost figures last week, said the costs were about in line with what he expected. In addition to the federal grant, the state government appropriated about $500,000 to cover trial-related costs for the district attorney's office. He said more than half of what his office spent on the case was spent before the trial even began one year ago this month, and he rejected the criticism that seeking the death penalty ballooned the trial's price tag. Instead, Brauchler said the case was expensive because of the number of victims involved.

The county DA here make a reasonable point that the nature of the crime may be the reason for the considerable expense as much as the nature of the punishment sought. Nevertheless, I believe this case could and would have cost taxpayers a whole lot less if prosecutors had accepted the defense's early offer to plead guilty in exchange for an LWOP sentence. (That LWOP sentences was ultimately achieved in the end after a lengthy and costly capital trial.) Moreover, the costs here include the opportunity costs of having so many Colorado state justice officials (police, prosecutors, judges) working on this case so intensely when there surely were many other Colorado crime and criminals that might have otherwise gotten their attention.

Of course, and I think not to be overlooked in any accounting of general capital costs/benefits, Holmes' defense team likely was only willing to offer to plead guilty and take LWOP because Colorado has capital punishment on its books. Consequently, it would be unfair to suggest abolition of the death penalty will always produce massive savings in major murder cases. But, as regular readers should know, this kind of accounting leads me to suggest, yet again, that states ought to have ways to "delegate" major murders to the feds for more efficient and effective capital prosecutions.

A few (of many) older related posts (with lots of comments):

April 20, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Tuesday, April 19, 2016

"The Meaning of Life in Criminal Law"

Like many sentient beings, I have long wondered about the meaning of life.  Helpfully, this new article by Eldar Haber posted to SSRN, which has the same title as the title of this post, talks throught life's meaning in the context of criminal law. Here is the abstract:

Inflation and deflation change the value of money.  Policymakers have used this rationale to amend legislation fixed to a monetary value.  What is not acknowledged is that increase in life expectancy could also be a form of inflation, and, accordingly, could affect “the value” of nonmonetary sanctions — chiefly, imprisonment and capital punishment. Under a utilitarian approach to criminal law, with an increase in life expectancy, nonmonetary sanctions with confined-terms reduce their deterrent value, while nonmonetary sanctions with finite-terms, inter alia, life-imprisonment without parole and capital punishment, increase their deterrent value and severity.  Under a retributive approach to criminal law, changes in life expectancy also affect the magnitude of nonmonetary criminal sanctions and change the proportionality between the criminal conduct and the punishment.  Nevertheless, although life expectancy in the United States has increased substantially, legislators have not adjusted nonmonetary criminal sanctions accordingly.  At the least, scholars and policymakers failed to recognize the role of life expectancy in the formation of criminal sanctions.  Hence, current criminal punishments have not been recalibrated properly.

This Article revisits theories of criminal punishments while offering a new perspective on determining nonmonetary criminal sanctions that recognizes life expectancy considerations.  It examines the current and desirable approach toward life expectancy considerations in criminal punishment theories while reviewing statistical data on the increase of life expectancy in the United States since independence.  After discussing criminal punishment theories, and evaluating the role of life expectancy considerations under them, I conclude that criminal law theories, to a great extent, support life expectancy considerations.  Under both utilitarian and retributive approaches, lack of practical considerations of life expectancy in criminal punishments could lead to a misconception of criminal law theories and erode the important role played by criminal sanctions.  Accordingly, this Article examines consequences of failing to apply life expectancy considerations in practice and proposes modest solutions to overcome this perceived problem.

April 19, 2016 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, April 17, 2016

An interesting perspective on Virginia's recent capital experiences

Virginia made capital headlines last week after Gov. Terry McAuliffe altered a bill passed by the state's legislature calling for use of the electric chair if the state could not obtain need lethal drugs.  The headline of this Washington Post piece from last week explains his proposed alternative approach: "In a move that could jeopardize executions, McAuliffe wants to shield the identity of makers of lethal-injection drugs."

Meanwhile, this new commentary by Kerry Dougherty, a columnist for The Virginian-Pilot, provides some perspective on this execution method brouhaha and Virginia's recent experience with the death penalty. The piece is headlined "Lost in all the death-penalty drug talk is that there are only 7 men on death row in Virginia," and here are excerpts:

Last winter, state legislators came up with a solution: They said that if drugs are unavailable, the commonwealth should fire up Old Sparky.  Predictably, this sparked a heated debate among politicians. Some argued that the electric chair is cruel.

Others shrugged, saying painless deaths are not the goal of the state.  “I hear, ‘Oh my Lord, he might have to suffer,’ ” said the Senate’s Democratic leader, Richard Saslaw in March. “… If we don’t have the necessary drugs, then we need this bill.  When you commit acts like that, you give up your right, as far as I’m concerned, to say, ‘Well, I want to die humanely.’ ”

The governor seems to disagree.  “We take human beings, we strap them into a chair, and then we flood their bodies with 1,800 volts of electricity, subjecting them to unspeakable pain until they die,” McAuliffe said last week, according to news reports.  “Virginia citizens do not want their commonwealth to revert back to a past when excessively inhumane punishments were committed in their name.”

McAuliffe’s language calls for the state to buy the drugs needed to put prisoners to sleep from special pharmacies. The names of those companies would be cloaked in secrecy, as they are in some other states.  “All I’m doing today is providing a humane way to carry out capital punishment here in Virginia so we have options,” McAuliffe said. “If they do not take it up, I want to be clear, they will be ending capital punishment here in Virginia.”

Now the question becomes, should the people’s business be conducted covertly?  I can answer that: No, it shouldn’t.

Lost in all this talk about how to kill the last men on Virginia’s death row is the happy fact that there are just seven men living there. Seven.  According to an NBC news report, Virginia’s death row was at its most crowded in 1995 when it housed 57 condemned prisoners.  Both executions and death sentences have dropped sharply since then.

The ultimate penalty is imposed on those who commit the most heinous crimes.  Last year, for instance, Virginia executed one man: The loathsome Alfredo Prieto.  He killed a young couple in Fairfax in 1988, raping one of the victims as she died. The Washington Post reported that he had killed as many as seven others. One of those murders was of a 15-year-old in California while he was on the run after the double homicide in Fairfax.

I couldn’t gin up any sympathy for this predator.  Neither could the governor, who refused to block his execution in October. Yet Prieto was the first man executed in the Old Dominion in more than two years.

Why all the empty cells on death row?  Many reasons. But one component is certainly 1995’s “truth-in-sentencing” law pushed by then-Gov. George Allen.  The measure abolished parole and closed the revolving doors on Virginia’s prisons. Suddenly a 10-year sentence meant the convict would spend most of a decade in prison. And a life sentence? It actually meant life in prison.

Given this ironclad alternative to execution, it’s become rare for a Virginia jury — or judge — to send a convict to death row. Before we get back to arguing about the death penalty, can’t we all agree that’s a good thing?

April 17, 2016 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Colorado 8th-graders caught sexting could have to register as sex offenders"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable press report which helps highlight why so many juvenile justice advocates are so concerned about the broad reach of modern sex offender laws and registries. Here are the details:

Three Colorado middle and high schools were rocked by a string of recent underage sexting scandals, prompting police investigations. If charged, the teens involved in the case — some as young as eighth-graders — could face charges of child pornography, which would require them to register as sex offenders if convicted.

The stiff penalties for sexting has sparked a debate in Colorado and other state assemblies over whether misbehaving teens should face the same punishment as child pornographers. But efforts by the Colorado Legislature to lighten the penalties have stalled.

In the sexting case at Bear Creek, a K-8 school in Lakewood, the five students involved were in eighth grade. School leaders turned to the local police after discovering that nude photos were being circulated, The Denver Post reported. Meanwhile, Colorado Springs police were contacted last Wednesday about allegations that a partially nude photo was shared among a circle of students from two other Colorado schools, Pine Creek High School and Challenger Middle School, according to KRDO news.

At this point, no charges have been filed in any of the cases, but the Pine Creek and Challenger school cases have been handed over to the Fourth Judicial District Attorney’s Office. The juveniles involved could be hit with a felony sex offender charge.

Penalties for underage sexting vary from state to state. In Colorado, minors caught trading nude photos are legally susceptible to harsh child pornography charges. It’s one reason why the Legislature has been working toward a solution to reduce possible sentencing for teens who sext. The latest bill to reach the Legislature would reduce charges for minors to a misdemeanor, echoing the laws of 11 other states. But a vote on the Colorado measure stalled in a House committee last week. Lawmakers against the measure were primarily concerned that, while it would be good to reduce potential child pornography charges for sexters, the bill was still too harsh on kids sending nude images.

State Representative Yeulin Willet, who cosponsored the bill, says that the misdemeanor charge did not go too far. He argued that the juvenile petty offense that the bill introduced accounts legally for "virtually no crime at all" and "basically just takes that juvenile into some counseling or education, end of story."... "To say that this is a victimless situation is just not a fact," he said. "These images get stolen, hacked, now they end up in the hands of thousands or more via digital media, and now you have a suicidal young girl."

But Jennifer Eyl, director of family stability programs at the Rocky Mountain Children’s Law Center, says that even the misdemeanor charge was too harsh. It criminalized the behavior of sexting itself, even consensual sexual behavior between teens, she said, rather than targeting the issue of non-consensual spreading of nude images. "It’s really kind of this blanket prevention of sexting, which, we work with kids, we just know that that’s not going to happen. Sexting is part of 21st-century communication between teenagers," she said. Eyl also expressed concerns that the most vulnerable children — in the foster system or without strong parental involvement — were particularly susceptible to blanket charges because foster parents might be more inclined to involve police should they find nude photos.

A few prior related posts:

April 17, 2016 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (8)

Saturday, April 16, 2016

Privacy gurus: what do you think of (coercive?) plea discussions requiring disclosure of defendant's iPhone password?

I have had the great pleasure of working through the years with a number of super-smart privacy-tech scholars (see here and here).  I am very interested to hear what these folks and others think of this fascinating new story from an NYC federal district court.  The story is headlined "Meth, kiddie porn-dealing dentist has two weeks to give up iPhone password if he wants shot at plea deal, judge says," and here are the interesting details: 

A Manhattan dentist charged with distributing methamphetamines and child pornography has two weeks to decide whether he will disclose to the government the password to his locked iPhone so the FBI can examine the creepy contents, a federal judge said Friday.

Dr. John Wolf has been trying to cut a plea deal with the Brooklyn U.S. Attorney's office, but prosecutors haven't offered a plea agreement until it can be determined whether there is additional criminal evidence on the iPhone. Assistant U.S. Attorney Moira Penza said the iPhone is password protected and the FBI has been trying to unlock the device without asking a judge to order Apple to assist the government.

"We've been considering the possibility that we will just give them the password," defense lawyer Marc Agnifilo told Federal Judge William Kuntz....

Kuntz said he wanted to set a deadline in case there is no agreement. "I don't have to tell you this is a very complicated, contentious issue," Kuntz said Friday. Wolf allegedly traded meth with a drug dealer for dental services, but also had a trove of child porn which he gave to an undercover FBI agent who posed as a pervert. Wolf's lawyer said his client was addicted to meth before he was arrested.

April 16, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

"The history of drug criminalization in America is a history of social panics rooted in racism and xenophobia"

Ungass_2016-624x312The title of this post is the subheadline of this new Salon comentary carrying the primary headline "The real reason cocaine, heroin and marijuana are illegal has nothing to do with addiction."  Here is how the lengthy piece gets started:

Looking out at the trail of devastation and death that the heroin epidemic has left in its wake, it’s hard to imagine that not long ago one could purchase the drug from a Sears catalogue.  Heroin was created by German chemists during the late 1890s and marketed through Bayer, the company best known for selling aspirin.  For decades, suburban housewives could peruse pages of flashy advertisements for Bayer Heroin, the cure for sore throats, coughs, headaches, diarrhea, stress and menopause.  In fact, until recently the percentage of Americans using opium-derived medicine was higher at the turn of the 20th century than at any other time in history.

The majority of illicit drugs we see today were once legal, popular and used for medicinal purposes.  Cocaine made its debut in toothache drops marketed to children.  Cannabis was recognized for its ability to relieve pain and nausea long before it became associated with youthful vagrancy.

As the world grapples with the fallout from the War on Drugs — and heads towards UNGASS 2016, a possible opportunity to put things right — it’s important to know the history of these drugs and their journey from medicine to menace. We didn’t suddenly discover that they were far more addictive or dangerous than other medicines.  In fact, the reasons that drugs like heroin, cocaine, marijuana and others are illegal today have far more to do with economics and cultural prejudice than with addiction.

Heroin was the first to fall from pharmaceutical darling to a demonized, black-market street drug.  Long used as a cure for aches and pains, it wasn’t until Chinese immigrants came to the United States to work on the railroads and mines that opium-based products such as heroin were perceived as dangerous.  American settlers were not happy with the Chinese arrivals, who brought with them a cultural tradition of smoking opium for relaxation in the evenings.  The settlers accused the Chinese of “taking our jobs,” and economic resentment morphed into rumors of Chinese men luring white women into opium dens and getting them addicted.  Rumors turned to fear, which turned to hysteria, which politicians seized upon.  In 1875 California passed the first anti-opium law, enforced by raids on Chinese opium dens. Other states soon followed.  The first federal law regulating heroin was the Harrison Act of 1914, which eventually led to its criminalization.

Cocaine was criminalized for similar reasons, only this time the backlash was directed against black Americans.  After the Civil War, economic resentment simmered over the freed slaves gaining a foothold in the economy.  White Southerners grumbled about black men “forgetting their place,” and fears spread about a drug some of them smoked, which was rumored to incite them to violence.  In the early 1900s New Orleans became the first city to slap down laws against cocaine use and the trend quickly spread, dovetailing with efforts in Latin America to criminalize the coca leaf, an ingredient in cocaine, which was used for religious purposes among indigenous populations.

Marijuana was next in the firing line.  During the 1920s, tensions sprang up in the South over the influx of Mexican immigrants who worked for low wages.  By the 1930s, the Great Depression had bred panic among people desperate for work and they directed their angst towards immigrants.  The media began propagating stories about Mexicans and their mysterious drug, marijuana.  The first national law criminalizing marijuana, the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, passed thanks to a strong push from Harry Anslinger, head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, who referred to marijuana as “the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind.”

While such claims of marijuana inducing violence may sound ridiculous to those of us who know marijuana as a drug that does precisely the opposite, it goes to show that the criminalization of drugs has little to do with relative risk or danger.  Instead, the main impetus for criminalization is fear over certain groups seen as an economic or cultural threat to established America.  Recognizing this fact does not mean ignoring or minimizing the very real harm that drugs can cause.

Most illicit drugs carry risks and serious potential for problematic use.  But so does glue. So do gasoline, cough syrup, shoe polish, paint thinner, nail polish remover, cleaning fluids, spray paint, whipped cream cans, vanilla extract, mouthwash, nutmeg, prescription pills and countless other household items that are not only addictive, but potentially fatal if misused.

April 16, 2016 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Pot Prohibition Issues, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Friday, April 15, 2016

Making in Oklahoma the modern "conservative appeal against death penalty"

Richard Viguerie has this notable new commentary in an Oklahoma paper headlined "A conservative appeal against death penalty." Here are excerpts:

This election year, Republican and Democratic voters in records numbers agree on something: They distrust political leaders and the political establishment.  That same distrust applies to ambitious prosecutors, who are part of the political establishment.  Too many have been caught cheating to win convictions, withholding exculpatory evidence and using coerced confessions.

The bipartisan distrust of the political establishment is certainly increasing with regard to the death penalty.  The government's troubling track record of exercising its life-ending authority provides ample reason for concern.  Since 1973, more than 155 people have been released from death row because they were wrongfully convicted. Ten were from Oklahoma.  As an anti-abortion, pro-law enforcement conservative who believes in the sanctity of life and society's duty to protect the innocent, I find this unacceptable.

Oklahoma's well-documented wrongful convictions and failure to adhere to established execution protocols have shown that it cannot be trusted with properly carrying out the solemn responsibility of executing inmates. Oklahoma officials might soon compound these known problems by attempting again to execute Richard Glossip, a man who may well be innocent....

Conservatives are the leaders against government abuse and lawlessness. We understand that government can be callous about its errors, which are costly and cause harm to the innocent. When government tries to execute a man who may well be innocent, I believe we have an even higher calling to speak out.

Oklahoma's systemic failures and Glossip's case in particular are emblematic of what is wrong with America's death penalty. The death penalty's problems are a confluence of things that all Americans loathe: a big, broken, costly and dangerous government program prone to mistakes, and with questionable positive benefits.

It was recently announced that a bipartisan group of eminent Oklahomans would be donating their time to a first-of-its-kind review of the Oklahoma death penalty system. I urge all Oklahomans, and especially conservatives, to support the call for a moratorium on the Oklahoma death penalty until this commission has finished its task and made its recommendations.

The death penalty system, where errors are gravest, is prone to flaws and lawlessness like any other government program.

Recent prior related post:

April 15, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Thursday, April 14, 2016

Could and should past concussions be a significant mitigator at federal sentencing of white-collar offender?

Books1002defordThe question in the title of this post is prompted by this interesting local article about a high-profile federal sentencing that has been postponed so that the defendant can participate in a study of the long-term symptoms of traumatic brain injury.  The headline of this story is "Ex-Cleveland Brown Reggie Rucker says concussions possibly caused him to steal from nonprofits," and here are the interesting details:

Former Cleveland Browns wide receiver Reggie Rucker indicated Wednesday that he will rely on concussions that he suffered as a football player as a possible explanation for embezzling money from his non-violence groups when a judge sentences him later this year.

Rucker, 68, of Warrensville Heights is participating in a study at the National Institute of Health that is examining the long-term symptoms of traumatic brain injury — something that many current and former NFL players say they suffer from as a result of concussions.

His attorneys asked U.S. District Judge Dan Polster to delay his May 23 sentencing because Rucker has another test to undergo in June.  That test that could prove useful in explaining why Rucker stole about $100,000 from the Cleveland Peacemakers Alliance and other nonprofits, attorney Jack Sammon said at a hearing Wednesday. Over objections from the U.S. Attorney's Office, Polster postponed Rucker's sentencing date until July 14.

"I want to have as much information about Mr. Rucker as I can reasonably get," the judge said.

Rucker pleaded guilty in February to wire fraud and making false statements to the FBI. Prosecutors said Rucker cut thousands of dollars in checks from his nonprofits and withdrew cash from ATMs at casinos across the country.  His actions often placed his agencies in the red leaving many of his outreach worker without paychecks.

Rucker used the money to pay personal expenses, including gambling debts and his mortgage, all while making passionate pleas to the public and government agencies for money for his philanthropic endeavors, prosecutors said.

Michael Hennenberg, an attorney representing Rucker, said the former Browns player suffered seven or eight concussions that he knows of during his 13-year career. Three of those came as a result of blows that knocked him unconscious, the attorney said.

Such injuries are known to cause impulsiveness and compulsiveness, both of which may play into Rucker's crimes, Hennenberg said. "Reggie Rucker is the first person in the country to be examined to determine the full implications of his now-known significant brain injuries," Hennenberg said.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Adam Hollingsworth objected to postponing the sentencing, in part because Rucker has already submitted past medical records that point to possible brain injuries. He also noted that doctors have said a definitive traumatic brain injury diagnosis is not possible until a person dies and an autopsy is performed....

Under a plea agreement he reached with prosecutors, Rucker faces a prison sentence of between 21 and 27 months. He enrolled in the Ohio Casino Control Commission's lifetime irrevocable exclusion program in March, meaning he can no longer legally gamble at casinos in the state. "Mr. Rucker's actions to defraud charitable organizations and line his pockets were conscious decisions on his part, and he will be held accountable for those actions," Mike Tobin, a spokesman for the U.S. Attorney's Office, said in a statement Wednesday.

The guilty plea cemented a fall from grace for Rucker, a beloved football player who made a name for himself by heading organizations that encourage non-violent responses to disputes between Cleveland residents.

Despite the brain injury discussions, Hennenberg stressed that Rucker has accepted responsibility for his actions. He released a document the former football player gave to the U.S. Probation Office on Friday that will be used when the office makes its sentencing recommendation. "I have learned and continue to learn many valuable life lessons as a result of my wrongful conduct that brought me into the criminal justice system," Rucker's written statement reads.

April 14, 2016 in Booker in district courts, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Costs of Pretrial Detention"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new piece authored by Shima Baradaran Baughman now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Spending on U.S. incarceration has increased dramatically over the last several decades.  Much of this cost is on incarcerating pretrial detainees — inmates not convicted of a crime — which constitute the majority of individuals in our nation’s jails.  

Current statutory schemes give judges almost complete discretion to order pretrial detention based on unexplained or unidentified factors.  With this discretion, judges tend to make inconsistent decisions in every jurisdiction, some releasing almost all defendants — including the most dangerous — and others detaining most defendants — even those who are safe to release.  There are constitutional and moral reasons to evaluate our current detention scheme, but even the fiscal impact of pretrial detention alone calls for an empirical analysis.

Although legal scholarship has applied cost-benefit analysis to other areas of criminal law, this Article is the first attempt at conducting such analysis in the pretrial arena.  This Article compares the risk posed by each defendant and the cost of any crimes they may potentially commit while released with the costs incurred by detaining these defendants.  The results show that relying on the cost-benefit model provided here, judges could bring significant savings — approximately $78 Billion, increased safety, and potentially more equitable pretrial detention decisions.

April 14, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, April 13, 2016

Important drug offender data begging hard normative policy question regarding noncitizen US prisoners

Attachment-1I just came across this interesting posting and data analysis via NumbersUSA, a group that describes itself as "moderates, conservatives & liberals working for immigration numbers that serve America's finest goals."  The posting is titled "Sentencing Reform Legislation Would Disproportionately Favor Non-Citizens," and here are some excerpts (with one very critical line emphasized by me toward the end of this excerpt):

U.S. prisoner data clearly shows two things. One, the majority of low-level drug offenders are serving their sentences in state, not federal prisons. Two, most of those incarcerated in federal prison for drug charges are non-citizens....

[Only] 3.6 percent of all prisoners, or 48,600, under state jurisdiction are serving time for drug possession. The remaining drug offenders were convicted for trafficking and other related offenses, such as facilitating the illicit drug trade. The distribution of drug prisoners in state prisons is fairly evenly divided among Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. A higher proportion of females (24%) than males (15%) are incarcerated for drugs in state prisons.

As of April 7, 2016, there were 196,285 prisoners in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, with 46.5 percent of these prisoners, (91,270) sentenced for drug offenses. The percentage of prisoners incarcerated for drugs is just over two and half times greater than the state prison population. However, overall, there are fewer prisoners serving time in federal prison for drug charges than in state prisons (212,000).

The Federal government collects data differently for state and federal prisoners. In order to get the breakdown of offenses for federal drug prisoners, data from the U.S Sentencing Commission is available. Looking at sentencing statistics from FY2007 to FY2015, a clear distinction between federal and state prison populations is that the proportion of federal prisoners serving time for drug possession is much higher than for state prisoners, and Hispanics are disproportionately represented among federal drug inmates.

There is a higher ratio of Hispanics serving drug sentences for both trafficking and possession convictions in federal prisons.  As Daniel Horowitz pointed out, this is because many of the drug offenders in federal prison are serving sentences for drug convictions related to the illicit drug trade on the U.S.-Mexico border.

In response to a congressional request regarding sentencing data for federal drug offenses, the U.S. Sentencing Commission sent data showing that 95% of the 305 individuals serving time in federal prison for simple drug offenses are non-citizens and 95.7 % were sentenced in southwest border districts — virtually all of them in Arizona. Furthermore, 95.7 % of the simple possession drug crimes for which offenders are incarcerated involved marijuana and the median weight of the drug involved in cases from border districts was 22,000 grams (approximately 48 pounds). Only 13 simple possession cases were tried in non-border districts in FY 2014.

In a letter sent to Sen. Jeff Sessions last fall, the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that 77% of individuals convicted of federal drug possession charges and more than 25% of individuals convicted of federal drug trafficking charges in FY2015 were non-citizen.

The profile for federal drug prisoners is different than at the state level, and this is why Congress needs to recognize and address these differences when crafting legislation that will effect this population.  Federal drug and immigration enforcement are for now inextricably tied together....

Sentencing reform bills reducing penalties for some federal prisoners (S. 2123 and H.R. 3713) are being portrayed by their supporters as a long overdue corrective to harsh sentencing laws for individuals who violate federal drug laws, which they argue create racial disparities in the nation’s prison population.

Reforming drug sentencing laws is one thing.  Releasing criminal aliens back into U.S. interior, is quite another.  The Obama Administration has already shown its willingness to do the latter, including those who were deemed to be criminal threats to the public.  Without a bill with strong, clear language and, most importantly, a Congress willing to extend oversight over the executive branch, it is plain that the sentencing reform legislation likely to soon come before Congress will accomplish little more than to provide an early release for dangerous criminal aliens, while still failing to hold President Obama to account for his failure to enforce U.S. immigration law.

This data discussion is a bit confusing because of its many references to both federal and state prisoners and both trafficking and possession offense and both percentages and absolute numbers. But, data particulars and confusions aside, the piece rightly highlights a very important data reality integral to any sophisticated discussion of efforts to reduce the federal prison population, especially for drug offenses: a significant percentage (and thus a large total number) of imprisoned and future federal drug offenders who would benefit from federal sentencing reform (perhaps up to 35% or even higher) would be noncitizens.

It understandable that persons deeply concerned about illegal immigration, and likely eager for policy changes always to prioritize benefits to US citizens over noncitizens, would find troublesome the statistical reality that federal sentencing reforms would benefit noncitizens significantly. However, this perspective may change if one realizes that noncitizen serious federal drug offenders who would get reduced sentences under any proposed sentencing reform would not get released "back into the US interior." Rather, any and every noncitizen serious federal drug offender who gets a reduced sentence is always going to be subject to immediate deportation once release from prison.

The important reality the many imprisoned and future noncitizen federal drug offenders are all to be deported after serving their federal prison sentences raises the hard normative policy question that is begged in any discussion of this data. That question is: What normative policy goal are we really achieving — other than spending billions of federal taxpayer dollars to house, feed and provide medical care to criminal noncitizens — by having noncitizens serve extra long federal prison terms if they are all to be deported at the end of these their terms no matter what?

Bill Otis and many others opposing proposed federal reforms are quick to stress the risk of increased domestic crime if we reduce current and future federal sentences and thereby release former offenders back into US communities sooner.  But that argument really does not hold up when we are talking about noncitizen offenders who will be forcibly deported to another nation after finishing whatever length of sentence they serve at federal taxpayer expense. (Indeed, I suspect imprisoning noncitizens in the US for long terms actually leads criminal noncitizens to become ever-more connected to US citizens and makes them even more likely to seek illegal return to the US after they are deported).

April 13, 2016 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (33)

Tuesday, April 12, 2016

Ninth Circuit talks through requirements for Miller resentencing a decade after mandatory LWOP

The Ninth Circuit yesterday issued an interesting opinion faulting a district court for how it limited the evidence it considered and other problems with how it conducted a resentencing of a juvenile murderer given a mandatory LWOP sentence a decade before such a sentences was deemed unconstitutional by the Surpeme Court.  Miller fan will want to read US v. Pete, No. 14-103 (9th Cir. April 11, 2016) (available here), in full, and here is how the opinion starts and along with some key passages from the heart of its analysis: 

Branden Pete was 16 years old when he committed a crime that resulted in a mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole.  Later, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), held unconstitutional for juvenile offenders mandatory terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  On resentencing, the district court refused to appoint a neuropsychological expert pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) to help Pete develop mitigating evidence.

Our principal question on appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in declining to appoint such an expert to aid the defense.  We conclude that it did, and so remand for appointment of an expert, and for resentencing after considering any expert evidence offered.  We also consider, and reject, Pete’s other challenges to his resentencing....

In rejecting the motion to appoint an expert, the district court ... noted that Pete’s upbringing and the circumstances of the crime have not changed, and maintained that because a psychiatric evaluation had been done in 2003, a second evaluation would be “duplicative.” “[I]t is difficult to conceive how,” the district court stated, “the passage of time may impact [the psychiatric] evidence” presented during the pretrial proceedings nearly ten years before.  Further, the district court held that the impact of incarceration on Pete “is not the type of mitigating evidence which Miller contemplates.”  We disagree with the district court as to all three aspects of its reasoning....

When the district court ruled that no expert testimony was “necessary,” it ignored Miller’s reasoning and directives.  At the time of resentencing, Pete’s neuropsychological condition had not been evaluated in more than a decade.  An updated evaluation could have revealed whether Pete was the same person psychologically and behaviorally as he was when he was 16.  Rather than being “duplicative,” as the district court believed, a new evaluation could have shown whether the youthful characteristics that contributed to Pete’s crime had dissipated with time, or whether, instead, Pete is the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.” Id. at 2469 (citation omitted); see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733.  Similarly, without current information relating to the policy rationales applicable specifically to juvenile offenders, Pete was hamstrung in arguing for a more lenient sentence.

More specifically, the significant mitigating evidence available to Pete at resentencing, other than his own testimony and that of his lawyer (neither of which the district court credited), would have been information about his current mental state — in particular, whether and to what extent he had changed since committing the offenses as a juvenile. This information was directly related to Pete’s prospects for rehabilitation, including whether he continued to be a danger to the community, and therefore whether the sentence imposed was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see id. (a)(2)(C), (D).  Such information is pertinent to determining whether, as Miller indicates is often the case, Pete’s psychological makeup and prospects for behavior control had improved as he matured, with the consequence that his prospects for rehabilitation and the need for incapacitation had changed.

April 12, 2016 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Accounting for Prosecutors"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting looking new paper by Daniel Richman now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

What role should prosecutors play in promoting citizenship within a liberal democracy?  And how can a liberal democracy hold its prosecutors accountable for playing that role? Particularly since I’d like to speak in transnational terms, peeling off a distinctive set of potential “prosecutorial” contributions to democracy — as opposed to those made by other criminal justice institutions — is a challenge.  Holding others — not just citizens but other institutions – to account is at the core of what prosecutors do.  As gatekeepers to the adjudicatory process, prosecutors shape what charges are brought and against whom, and will (if allowed to) become shapers of citizenship.  They also can can promote police compliance with legal and democratic norms.  Because the prosecutorial role in case creation is largest when crimes are not open and notorious, prosecutors can also play an outsized role in the bringing of cases that target instances of illegitimate subordination (including domestic violence) and corruption that are antithetical to a liberal democracy.

After considering ways in which prosecutors might promote democratic values, I explore (quite tentatively) how prosecutors can be held to account.  Working from existing practices and structures, I consider how we might promote their potential contributions through legal and institutional design with respect to reason-giving obligations; geographic scale; insulation from direct political influence, and modulation of their message.

April 12, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Interesting alternative sentencing being used in Thailand for drunk drivers

Regular readers know that I have long viewed drunk driving as a much-too-common, potentially-deadly offense that I fear is not regularly punished appropriately to best reduce recidivism and the extraordinary harms to public safety and property that this offense too often produces.  Consequently, I was intrigued to see this new article about a new kind of sentencing being tried for this offense in the Land of Smiles.  The piece is headlined "Thai drunk drivers to do morgue work in 'shock sentencing' strategy," and here are the details:

Drunk-drivers in Thailand will be sentenced to community service in morgues in an attempt to combat the world’s second highest road death rate. The plan to confront offenders with the risks of their actions in starkly morbid fashion was unveiled as the country embarked on its most dangerous time on the roads – the Thai new year holidays.

In a country with a notoriously poor road safety record, the ruling junta hopes the initiative will drive home the message that drink driving and reckless driving is lethal. "Traffic offenders who are found guilty by courts will be sent to do public service work at morgues in hospitals," said Police Col Kriangdej Jantarawong, deputy director of the Special Task Planning Division.

"It is a strategy used to make traffic offenders afraid of driving recklessly and driving while they are drunk because they could end up in the same condition. It is aimed to be a deterrent, a way to discourage people."

The “shock sentencing” strategy was approved by the Cabinet as the kingdom prepared for the extended Songkran new year festivities that formally begin on Wednesday. There is much higher traffic than normal as millions return to their home villages, while the festivities are also marked by heavy consumption of alcohol, including by drivers. Nominal helmet laws for motorcyclists are widely flouted.

The combination means the celebrations are accompanied by carnage on the roads each year. The government’s safety campaign bluntly refers to the holiday week as “The Seven Days of Danger”. The death toll has been increasing in recent years, despite government crackdowns and awareness campaigns. The authorities have also said that they will immediately impound the cars of motorists driving under the influence.

"We originally had community services at hospital wards (for offenders)," said Nontajit Netpukkana, a senior official at the department of probation. "But we think the intensity that comes from working in a morgue will help give those doing community service a clearer picture of what happens after accidents caused by drink driving.”

April 12, 2016 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 11, 2016

"The Battle Against Prison for Kids"

The title of this post is the headline of this new article from The Nation. The piece's subtitle is "We’re feeding children into a system that breaks them," and here is how it gets started:

For as long as youth prisons have existed in the United States, so too has the pretense that there are no youth prisons. Early 19th-century reformers who sought to remove children from the harsh adult penal system established new institutions specifically for the detention of youths.  They didn’t call them prisons, but Houses of Refuge, dedicated to the discipline and reform of newly coined group, “juvenile delinquents.”  Founded with ostensibly laudable intent, the institutions were overcrowded fortresses, riddled with abuse, serving to institutionalize strict social control over poor and immigrant communities.  That is, they were prisons.

And so began the unending march of euphemisms, in which children’s prisons have been known by any other name — residential treatment facilities, youth camps, youth-development centers, to name a few — exposing juveniles to many the same cruelties and racial discriminations of the adult prison system. In the two centuries since its formal birth, the juvenile-justice system has changed radically, while youth prisons have hardly changed at all. It’s as if the clock on reform stopped in the turn-of-the-century Progressive Era and has only recently started shakily ticking again.

Last year, before the election spectacle swallowed the news cycle whole, juvenile-justice reform made headlines as a keystone in President Obama’s legacy-construction efforts.  Overdue political action from state houses has gained serious ground in removing youths from adult prisons.  On any given day, 10,000 juveniles are housed in adult facilities, where they are five times more likely to be sexually assaulted than in juvenile institutions (a monstrous statistic, especially considering the prevalence of sexual abuse in youth facilities).  The necessity of getting kids out of our shameful adult system cannot be overstated.  It’s a limited achievement, though.  And even as more and more youth prisons close, we must be vigilant against “alternatives” that press the same oppressive, discriminatory stigmas of criminality and delinquency onto kids outside prison walls.

April 11, 2016 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)

New Orleans judge threatening to turn public defender funding crisis into a public safety problem

32This local article from the Big Easy reports on notable efforts by a local judge to make sure it is no longer easy for public officials to ignore the problem of inadequate funding of public defenders to represent indigent criminal defendants.  The article is headlined "New Orleans judge orders release of seven inmates charged with serious felonies because of lack of money for defense, but men will remain jailed pending an appeal," and here are the basic details:

In a potentially blockbuster ruling, an Orleans Parish judge on Friday ordered seven indigent inmates released from jail because of a lack of state money for attorneys to represent them amid a squeeze on public defense funding in New Orleans and across Louisiana.

However, Criminal District Court Judge Arthur Hunter stayed his order, which also included a suspension of the men’s prosecutions, pending an appeal from District Attorney Leon Cannizzaro’s office. Assistant District Attorney David Pipes told Hunter an appeal is coming, and Hunter gave him 10 days. The seven men will remain behind bars pending the outcome of that appeal.

All of them face serious felony charges — including murder, armed robbery and aggravated rape — and all have been deemed indigent. Most have spent more than a year behind bars, going months without legal help on their cases, attorneys said.

Hunter ruled that the lack of state funding for the seven men’s defense violated their Sixth Amendment rights and that the resulting uncertainty on when their cases might move forward warrants their release. “The defendants’ constitutional rights are not contingent on budget demands, waiting lists and the failure of the Legislature to adequately fund indigent defense,” Hunter wrote in his 11-page ruling, portions of which he read from the bench.

“We are now faced with a fundamental question, not only in New Orleans but across Louisiana: What kind of criminal justice system do we want? One based on fairness or injustice, equality or prejudice, efficiency or chaos, right or wrong?”

A spokesman for Cannizzaro’s office said the district attorney “believes that releasing defendants charged with serious acts of violence poses a clear and present danger to public safety, and he intends to appeal the ruling.” Spokesman Christopher Bowman added, “It appears that the judge’s ruling declares that a legislative act — namely the most recent budget — violates the Louisiana Constitution.”

Tulane Law School professor Pam Metzger, who is representing all seven in their bid for release, said she was “thrilled that the judge appreciates the extraordinary constitutional obligations of providing poor people with counsel and due process of law.” She said she was disappointed that Hunter stayed his ruling but that attorneys would continue pressing to free the men.

In addition to Metzger, each of the men has an attorney appointed by Hunter. But in his ruling, Hunter said the appointment of private attorneys without any state money available for early witness and defendant interviews, filing motions and strategizing “makes a mockery of the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel.”

Hunter was following directions laid out in a 2005 Louisiana Supreme Court decision on when judges can halt prosecutions because of a lack of adequate indigent defense funds. The court said a judge can stop a case “until he or she determines that appropriate funding is likely to be available.” The “absence of a date certain” when that money will come, Hunter found, also violates the right to due process guaranteed in the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the Louisiana Constitution’s edict for the Legislature to “provide for a uniform system for securing and compensating qualified counsel for indigents.”...

Chief Public Defender Derwyn Bunton’s office had turned away the seven cases, citing a severe budget shortfall, bloated workloads and the loss of several experienced attorneys in his office.

Hunter, who has taken drastic measures during past funding shortfalls at the Public Defenders Office — he ordered the release of several inmates after Hurricane Katrina — doled out the seven men’s cases to private attorneys, who promptly sought a halt to the prosecutions and the men’s release. They said they can’t do any work on the cases unless they get money to pay for investigators and other expenses.

Hunter’s ruling came after a series of hearings in his courtroom that began in November with testimony from Bunton and Jay Dixon, who heads the Louisiana Public Defender Board, among others. They testified that indigent defense in Louisiana is facing a crisis because of a system in which local offices are funded largely through fines and fees leveled on criminal defendants, mostly for traffic violations. Those revenues have slid steadily over the past several years, in some parishes more than others. All told, almost a dozen district public defenders across the state have instituted austerity programs.

In New Orleans, that has meant a hiring freeze since last summer and, beginning in January, a refusal by Bunton’s office to accept appointments in serious felony cases — now at 110 and counting — because of a lack of experienced attorneys to handle them, according to Bunton. “Obviously, the charges involved in these cases are really serious, so I do think folks should be concerned about public safety,” Bunton said Friday. “We wouldn’t need to be in this position if (the state) provided the resources that are necessary under the constitution. You can only prosecute as fast as you can defend, and if you can’t defend, you can’t prosecute.”...

The defenders’ funding troubles may be getting even worse. In Baton Rouge, lawmakers grappling with the state’s deep budget morass have threatened deep cuts in the $33 million in annual state funding that has supplemented local revenue, making up about a third of the overall funding for indigent defense across the state. The Louisiana Supreme Court has in the past endorsed a halt to prosecutions until adequate funding becomes available. But it has stopped short of ordering action by the Legislature.

At a recent hearing, Metzger described an “abject state of financial crisis. There is no money to fund these defenses. ... The cause of the delay rests entirely with the state. The Legislature has been on notice not simply for weeks or months or years but for decades.”

In a legal filing last week, however, Cannizzaro’s office described the private attorneys seeking to be relieved from the cases as bent on “nothing less than anarchy” by pressing for the defendants’ release and a halt to their prosecutions, while “hoping for a paycheck” at the expense of justice. “They are seeking to bring down a system they disagree with rather than protecting the rights of those individuals this court has appointed them to represent,” Pipes wrote.

A statement from Mayor Mitch Landrieu called Hunter’s ruling “a miscarriage of justice on all sides” and urged the judge “for the sake of the victims and their families” to “reconsider putting alleged murderers back on the streets, like Darrian Franklin.”

“The state needs to live up to its obligation by fully funding the public defender, and the judge should continue to work on getting the State to appropriately fund its responsibilities,” the statement read.

April 11, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Thursday, April 07, 2016

"Reconceptualizing the Eighth Amendment: Slaves, Prisoners, and 'Cruel and Unusual' Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting new article by Alex Reinert now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

The meaning of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause has long been hotly contested. For scholars and jurists who look to original meaning or intent, there is little direct contemporaneous evidence on which to rest any conclusion. For those who adopt a dynamic interpretive framework, the Supreme Court’s “evolving standards of decency” paradigm has surface appeal, but deep conflicts have arisen in application.  This Article offers a contextual account of the Eighth Amendment’s meaning that addresses both of these interpretive frames by situating the Amendment in eighteenth and nineteenth-century legal standards governing relationships of subordination.  In particular, I argue that the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment” was intertwined with pre- and post-Revolutionary notions of the permissible limits on the treatment of slaves.

The same standard that the Framers adopted for the treatment of prisoners in 1787 was contemporaneously emerging as the standard for holding slaveholders and others criminally and civilly liable for harsh treatment of slaves.  Indeed, by the middle of the nineteenth century, constitutional law, positive law, and common law converged to regulate the treatment of prisoners and slaves under the same “cruel and unusual” rubric.  Thus, when the Supreme Court of Virginia referred to prisoners in 1871 as “slaves of the State,” the description had more than rhetorical force.

Going beyond the superficial similarity in legal standards, examining how the “cruel and unusual” standard was explicated in the context of slavery offers important insights to current debates within the Eighth Amendment.  First, the contention by some originalists that the Punishments Clause does not encompass a proportionality principle is in tension with how courts interpreted the same language in the context of slavery. Indeed, relationships of subordination had long been formally governed by a principle of proportional and moderate “correction,” even though slavery in practice was characterized by extreme abuse.  Second, to the extent that dynamic constitutional interpretation supports limiting criminal punishment according to “evolving standards of decency,” the comparative law frame used here raises questions as to how far our standards have evolved.  This, in turn, should cause commentators and jurists to reconsider whether the twenty-first century lines we have drawn to regulate the constitutional bounds of punishment are adequate to advance the principle of basic human dignity that is thought to be at the heart of the Eighth Amendment.

April 7, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, April 06, 2016

"Normative Retroactivity"

The title of this post is the title of this timely new piece by William Berry now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

When the Court interprets the Constitution to accord a new right to criminal offenders, the question quickly becomes which prisoners might benefit from the new rule.  The current retroactivity doctrine relies on a confusing substance-procedure dichotomy.  Drawn from Teague v. Lane, this test often results in lower court splits on the retroactivity question.  Just this term, the Supreme Court has already decided the question of retroactivity in one case — Montgomery v. Louisiana, and has granted certiorari in another — Welch v. United States.

This Article rejects the substance-procedure dichotomy and offers a competing theoretical frame for considering the question of retroactivity.  Specifically, the Article develops the concept of “normative retroactivity,” arguing that retroactivity should relate directly to the normative impact of the new rule on previous guilt and sentencing determinations.  Further, the article advances a doctrinal test for assessing normative retroactivity of new rules of criminal constitutional law that combines the normative impact of the rule with a balancing test that weighs the applicable values of fundamental fairness and equality under the law against the competing values of finality, comity, and government financial burden.

April 6, 2016 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, April 05, 2016

"How Drug Warriors Helped to Fuel the Opioid Epidemic"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Atlantic piece.  Here is how it starts and ends:

Despite almost 50 years of the drug war — a policy that creates black markets, enriches drug cartels, and fuels killing zones in scores of cities, even as it causes the United States to cage more human beings than any other democracy in the world — it remains extremely easy for Americans to acquire the most addictive, deadly drugs.

“Overdoses from heroin, prescription drugs, and opioid painkillers have overtaken car accidents to become the leading cause of injury-related deaths in America,” The Economist reports.  “In 2014, they were responsible for 28,647 deaths. Between 2001 and 2014, deaths from heroin overdoses alone increased six-fold, according to the National Institute on Drug Abuse.  On average, 125 people a day die from drug overdoses, 78 of them from heroin or painkillers. These numbers have been compared to deaths from HIV in the late 1980s and 1990s.”

Had the War on Drugs merely failed to prevent this epidemic, even as it destabilized numerous countries and undermined domestic liberties, it would be an abject failure.  But federal drug policy has actually been worse than useless in heroin’s rise.

In a saner world, American researchers and patients would’ve spent the last several decades experimenting with marijuana to maximize its potential as a pain reliever.  Pot use isn’t without health consequences, but is much less harmful than many prescription drugs.  Instead, drug warriors fought to stymie marijuana research, keep pot illegal, and stigmatize medical marijuana as a dangerous fraud, even as doctors prescribed more opioid painkillers — that is, medical heroin. Many get addicted, and when the pills run out, they seek a street substitute....

“What has made it previously difficult to emphasize treatment over criminal justice,” President Obama said last month, “is that the problem was identified as poor, minority, and as a consequence, the thinking was, it's often a character flaw in those individuals who live in those communities, and it's not our problem they're being locked up. One thing that's changed in this opioid debate is that it reaches everybody.  Because it's having an impact on so many people, we're seeing a bipartisan interest in addressing this problem … not just thinking in terms of criminalization or incarceration, which unfortunately has been our response to the disease of addiction."

But even today’s reformers are far too timid. The War on Drugs rages daily, and it is still a catastrophe.  The catastrophe is rooted in the black markets that federal policy creates.  It is exposed by the urban killing zones that those markets guarantee.  It is shown to be futile by the ease of acquiring the most addictive drugs despite prohibition. And it is exacerbated by decades of efforts to prevent milder drugs from serving as substitutes.  End it.

April 5, 2016 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Keeping Track: Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral State"

The title of this post is the title of this new article by Kathryne Young and Joan Petersilia which reviews a trio of criminal justice books. Here is the abstract:

This Review argues that an important root cause of our criminal justice ails can be found in the social processes that comprise the system’s daily activities and forms of control over individual Americans — processes largely taken for granted.  To explore the ground level interpersonal interactions that underpin the criminal justice system, we engage three recent books: Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizenship by Professors Charles Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody, and Donald Haider-Markel; On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City by Professor Alice Goffman; and The Eternal Criminal Record by Professor James Jacobs.

Substantively and methodologically, the books might first seem an odd trio.  But together, they reveal the importance of a key phenomenon: “surveillance” in the word’s broadest sense — keeping track of people’s movements, histories, relationships, homes, and activities.

April 5, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 04, 2016

Senators Grassley and Feinstein convening hearing on whether DOJ is "Adequately Protecting the Public" from state marijuana reforms

This recent press release from US Senate's Caucus on International Narcotics Control details that this caucus has a hearing scheduled to explore how the federal government is keeping an eye on state-level marijuana reforms. (Exactly what this has to do with international control is unclear, but big-government drug warriors on both sides of the political aisle like Senators Grassley and Feinstein have never really been too keen to worry about limiting government growth in this arena.) Here are the basic details on what is prompting this hearing:

Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee and the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, and Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Co-chairman of the Caucus on International Narcotics Control, will hold a hearing entitled, “Is the Department of Justice Adequately Protecting the Public from the Impact of State Recreational Marijuana Legalization?”

In August 2013, the Obama Administration decided to effectively suspend enforcement of federal law on marijuana in states that legalized it for recreational use. But to disguise its policy as prosecutorial discretion, the Administration also announced federal priorities that it claimed would guide its enforcement going forward. These priorities include preventing marijuana from being distributed to minors, stopping the diversion of marijuana into states that haven’t legalized it, and preventing adverse public health effects from marijuana use. At the time, the Justice Department warned that if state efforts weren’t enough to protect the public, then the federal government might step up its enforcement or even challenge the state laws themselves. This put the responsibility on the Department of Justice to monitor developments in these states, develop metrics to evaluate the effectiveness of its policy, and change course if developments warranted.

But a report from the Government Accountability Office that Grassley and Feinstein requested found that the Administration doesn’t have a documented plan to monitor the effects of state legalization on any of these priorities. Moreover, according to the report, officials at the Department could not even say how they make use of any information they receive related to these priorities. Grassley and Feinstein are convening this hearing to explore this problem.

What I find most notable and disconcerting about this hearing is that it claims to be exploring whether the big federal government bureaucrats inside the Beltway at DOJ who are very far removed from direct public accountability are "protecting the public" from state reforms in Alaska and Colorado and Oregon and Washington which were enacted directly by the public through voter initiatives.

Cross posted at Marijuana Law, Policy and Reform.

April 4, 2016 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Sunday, April 03, 2016

"Subconstitutional Checks"

The title of this post is the title of this great-looking new paper authored by Shima Baradaran Baughman now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Constitutional checks are an important part of the American justice system.  The Constitution demands structural checks where it provides commensurate power.  The Constitution includes several explicit checks in criminal law. Criminal defendants have the right to counsel, indictment by grand jury, trial by jury, the public or executive elects or appoints prosecutors, legislatures limit actions of police and prosecutors, and courts enforce individual constitutional rights and stop executive misconduct.  However, these checks have rarely functioned as intended by the constitution and criminal law has failed to create — what I call — “subconstitutional checks” to adapt to the changes of the modern criminal state.

Subconstitutional checks are stopgaps formed in the three branches of government to effectuate the rights in the constitution when the system is stalled in dysfunction, when one branch has subjugated the others, or when two or more branches have colluded with one another.  The need for sub constitutional checks is evident in the criminal arena. In the modern criminal state, plea agreements have virtually replaced jury trials, discipline and electoral competition between prosecutors is rare, separation of powers does not serve its purpose because the interests of all branches are often aligned, and individual constitutional rights have little real power to protect defendants from the state.

As a result, the lack of structural constitutional checks in criminal law has lead to constitutional dysfunction.  Though never recognized as such, constitutional dysfunction in criminal law is evidenced by mass incarceration, wrongful convictions, overly harsh legislation, and an inability to stop prosecutor and police misconduct.  This Article sheds light on the lack of constitutional checks by performing an external constitutional critique of the criminal justice system to explore this structural gap in the three branches and concludes that creating subconstitutional checks has the potential of reducing criminal dysfunction and creating a more balanced criminal justice system.

April 3, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

A more positive spin on clemency developments and more positive aspects

LisaRichRegular readers may grow somewhat tired of hearing me kvetch about President Obama being much more willing to talk the talk than walk the walk when it comes to criminal justice reform generally and clemency developments in particular. For that reason (and others), I invited always sunny Lisa Rich to provide for blogging her sunny perspective on clemency events that transpired at the White House last week. Here is what she was kind enough to send my way for posting:

A somewhat sentimental post by Lisa A. Rich, former director of Legislative & Public Affairs at the U.S. Sentencing Commission and current director of the Texas A&M School of Law Residency Externship Program in Public Policy:
Last Week, I had the privilege of joining not only the tireless advocates of the Justice Roundtable and White House staff but over two dozen recipients of clemency spanning four presidencies during the Justice Roundtable and White House Briefings on “Life After Clemency.”
Personally, it was a joy to see all of the people — Nkechi Taifa, Mark Osler, Cynthia Rosenberry, Jesselyn McCurdy, Julie Stewart, Margy Love, and so many others who have been working tirelessly to answer the Obama Adminstration’s call to action on clemency.  I am in awe of the ceaseless dedication these advocates demonstrate every day in their pursuit of hope and justice for those human beings who deserve a chance to be something so much more than a statistic in our cycle of mass incarceration. These advocates and those for whom they do their jobs are the role models I discuss in my classes and they are the ones who inspire me to be better.
But more than my personal connection with those I miss because I am no longer living in D.C., the events over these past three days were important for two reasons.  First, all of us, including the President and White House staff saw and heard what hope is all about.  We heard from clemency recipients about heartache, mistake, and loss being turned into determination, faith, and commitment.  We heard people who genuinely want to make their communities and their lives better, stronger, and happier.  I am delighted that policymakers inside and outside of Washington are taking the opportunity to get to know these people — as people, not numbers, not workload, not files on a desk.
Second, I was pleased that two of my students were in the audience — and in fact had been given the opportunity to be involved in preparing for these events.  As part of Texas A&M School of Law’s new externship program in public policy, these students got to see policymaking in action from start to finish; they got to see firsthand the effects of both good and bad policy decisions.  Their experiences may not seem all that different from the hundreds of law students who go to D.C. and elsewhere each semester to partake in policy but it actually was a defining moment for me and them.  These students are the future policymakers and advocates.  To me, the events of these past three days were not just about hope for those impacted by outdated laws and poor decision making, but hope that the next generation of lawyers, policymakers, and advocates being trained by the brilliant people who participated in these events will learn from our mistakes; that they will engage in sound decision making based on evidence and best practices; that they will carry on the work done so well by so many. As an advocate and a teacher that is what hope is all about.

April 3, 2016 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (14)

Might the US be willing to learn from the German prison experience?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new Huffington Post commentary by Vincent Schiraldi, headlined "What we can learn from German prisons."  The commentary provides a bit of a preview of this segment to air tonight on 60 Minutes under the title "This is prison? 60 Minutes goes to Germany: Germany's prison system keeps convicts comfortable, costs less and has lower recidivism rates, but would Americans ever accept it?".  Here is the start of the Huffington Post piece:

On Sunday, April 3, 60 Minutes will air a story on several U.S. delegations to German prisons by advocates, researchers and public officials that should be mandatory viewing for anyone who works in or cares about America’s massive prison problem. In a country that has only a fraction of our incarceration rate, even Germany’s deepest-end prisons are humane and decent in ways that, at least at present, are difficult to fathom in the U.S. context.

The groups who funded or organized the trips - the Vera Institute of Justice, John Jay College of Justice, and the Prison Law Office - hope to change that. Inspired by these delegations, when I was working for Mayor Bill de Blasio’s Office of Criminal Justice, I organized a study tour to one of the prisons they had visited - the Neustrelitz Prison near Berlin, which houses adolescents and young adults.

The place couldn’t have been more different than a U.S. prison or juvenile facility. In fact, it was a bit of both, because young people are allowed to be tried in Germany’s juvenile courts up to age 21, unlike U.S. juvenile courts whose jurisdiction expires somewhere between ages 16 and 18, depending on the state.

The young people we met were all involved in programming from farming, to wood shop, to metal work, to in-depth therapy. The freedom of movement was extraordinary, with most youth sleeping in unlocked rooms at night and eventually going on home visits and transitioning out to daytime work, returning to the facility at night. Sentences were much shorter than those experienced by people locked up in the U.S., which partially explains why only 79 out of every 100,000 Germans are behind bars, compared to America’s world-leading incarceration rate of 700 per 100,000.

April 3, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Saturday, April 02, 2016

"Unfinished Project of Civil Rights in the Era of Mass Incarceration and the Movement for Black Lives"

The title of this post is the title of this newly published article authored by Nicole Porter. Here is the piece's introduction:

American criminal justice system has been dominated by relentless growth for the last forty years. The culture of punishment, in part driven by political interests leveraging “tough on crime” policies and practices marketed as the solution to the “fear of crime,” has been implemented at every stage of the criminal justice process: arresting, charging, sentencing, imprisonment, releasing, and post-incarceration experiences in the era of mass incarceration.

While it may not excuse criminal offending, the destructive effects of mass incarceration and excessive punishment are visited disproportionately upon individuals and communities of color and reinforce that the project of the civil rights revolution remains unfinished.  In recent years, there has been growing consensus across ideological lines to address mass incarceration.  Yet, policy changes are incremental in approach and do not achieve the substantial reforms needed to significantly reduce the rate of incarceration and its collateral impacts.  Incremental policy reforms include: reducing the quantity differential between crack and powder cocaine that results in racially disparate sentencing outcomes at the federal level and in certain states; reclassifying certain felony offenses to misdemeanors; expanding voting rights and access to public benefits for persons with felony convictions; and adopting fair chance hiring policies for persons with criminal records.

The Movement for Black Lives, or Black Lives Matter, offers a new public safety framework to finish the project of civil rights in the era of mass incarceration.  This movement has a sophisticated analysis that seeks to address the underlying structural issues that result in poor policy outcomes for communities of color, including high rates of incarceration.  The public safety framework does not excuse criminal offending, but offers a new approach of viewing justice-involved persons — a disproportionate number of whom are African American and Latino — as worthy recipients of public safety responses not dominated by arrests, admissions to prison, or collateral consequences.

Aligning a Black Lives Matter framework with public safety strategies expands policy responses beyond the criminal justice system to evidence-based interventions demonstrated to reduce criminal offending.  Research shows that early childhood education, quality healthcare, and targeted employment programs can help reduce recidivism and prevent justice involvement.  More importantly, the Black Lives Matter framework can help to shift norms away from the punitiveness that dominates U.S. criminal justice policy.

April 2, 2016 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, March 31, 2016

Extraordinany (and extraordinarily timely) issue of the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science

The March 2016 issue of The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science has an extraordinary collections of essays by an extraordinary array of legal scholars and sociologists and criminologists under the issue title "The Great Experiment: Realigning Criminal Justice in California and Beyond." Though many of the articles focus on California's unique and uniquely important recent criminal justice reforms experiences, all folks interested in and concerned about sentencing and corrections reform in the United States ought to find the time to read most or all of the articles in this collection.

The special editors of this issue, Charis Kubrin and Carroll Seron, authored this introduction to the collection under the title "The Prospects and Perils of Ending Mass Incarceration in the United States."  Here is an excerpt from that introduction:

This volume of The ANNALS represents the first effort by scholars to systematically and scientifically analyze what Joan Petersilia (2012) has described as “the biggest criminal justice experiment ever conducted in America.”  She went on to note that “most people don’t even realize it’s happening,” a point underscored by Franklin Zimring in the volume’s concluding remarks.  At a historic moment in which imprisonment patterns across the U.S. are shifting for the first time in nearly 40 years, the California case is ripe for in-depth examination.  The political landscape around decarceration is also shifting in ways that do not fit the debate of the last 40 years.  The initiative behind the prison buildup was largely an offshoot of more conservative, law and order political agendas, but as the nation debates a move toward prison downsizing and decarceration, there is support from both the Left and the Right for this fundamental shift in policy (Aviram, this volume; Beckett et al., this volume) — unusual bedfellows at a time of political polarization.  While this political convergence will no doubt be contested, as Joan Petersilia emphasizes in the volume’s preface, it nonetheless represents an important moment to have a systematic, rigorous, and scientific evaluation of California’s experiment and its implications on hand for policy-makers.

March 31, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

"A Fatally Flawed Proxy: The Role of 'Intended Loss' in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Fraud"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Daniel Guarnera now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Of all federal criminal defendants, those convicted of fraud are among the most likely to receive a sentence below the term recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.  The most important (and controversial) driver of fraud sentences under the Guidelines is the economic loss — actual or intended, whichever is greater — resulting from the crime.

This Article examines the role of the “intended loss” calculation.  The U.S. Sentencing Commission designed the intended loss enhancement to function as a rule-oriented proxy for defendant culpability.  By applying the framework of rules and standards, this Article argues that culpability, by its nature, is too multifarious a concept to be accurately represented by a single variable.  Furthermore, a recently-enacted amendment to the definition of intended loss — which restricts its scope to losses “that the defendant purposely sought to inflict” — will only exacerbate the problem by excluding a significant subset of plainly culpable conduct.

Rather than attempt to fine-tune the intended loss calculation any further, this Article contends that the purposes of sentencing in general (and the goals of the Guidelines in particular) would be better served by enabling judges to conduct a more standard-based inquiry into the wide array of facts that can bear on culpability.  It evaluates several proposals that would give judges greater discretion while, at the same time, minimizing the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities.

March 31, 2016 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, March 30, 2016

GOP frontrunner Donald Trump says "some form of punishment" would be needed for women who have abortions if procedure is made illegal

This recent article at The Crime Report, headlined "Trump On Crime: Tough Talk, Few Specifics," highlighted how hard it is to figure out Donald Trump's policy position on various criminal justice issues (in which I was quoted):

Most experts we talked to say it’s hard to distinguish the rhetoric from the policies. “[The Trump campaign] has not issued a platform yet, so I’m not sure that I’d take anything that he’s been saying as an actual criminal justice policy,” said Inimai M. Chettiar, director of the Brennan Center’s Justice Program.

“What’s really frustrating, is that (he’s) like a cardboard candidate; you know what his pitch is but you don’t know anything else beyond that,” said Prof. Laurie Levenson of Loyola Law School. “And maybe he doesn’t either.”

Berman suggests half-jokingly that there’s a “simple answer” to the question of what Donald Trump believes about criminal justice. “Who the hell knows?” he said.

On many policy issues, Trump has sidestepped detailed responses by pointing to his experience in real estate and suggesting that good dealmakers keep their positions ambiguous at the start of any negotiation. That seems to apply to his approach to justice as well. Asked about specific criminal justice reforms, Trump often changes the subject back to supporting police or vague answers about needing to be “tough.”

But today GOP frontrunner Trump is making headlines for talking about criminal punishment in an especially controversial setting.  This FoxNews piece, headlined "Trump says abortion ban should mean punishment for women who have procedure," provides the details:

Republican presidential front-runner Donald Trump said Wednesday said that if abortion were illegal in the United States, then women who have the procedure should be punished.  Trump made the comments during a taping of an MSNBC town hall that will be aired later Wednesday.

Host Chris Matthews pressed Trump to clarify, asking him whether abortion should be punished and who ultimately should be held accountable. “Look, people in certain parts of the Republican Party, conservative Republicans, would say, ‘Yes, it should,’” Trump said. The candidate later put out a statement saying: “This issue is unclear and should be put back into the states for determination.”...

When asked specifically at the town hall what he thought, the New York businessman answered, “I would say it’s a very serious problem and it’s a problem we have to decide on. Are you going to send them to jail?”

“I’m asking you,” Matthews prompted.

“I am pro-life,” Trump said.

Matthews pressed on, asking again who should be punished in an abortion case if it were illegal.

“There has to be some form of punishment,” Trump said.

“For the woman?” Matthews asked.

“Yeah,” Trump responded, adding later that the punishment would “have to be determined.”

His rivals seized on the remarks. Ohio Gov. John Kasich later told MSNBC “of course women shouldn’t be punished.” An aide to Texas Sen. Ted Cruz tweeted: “Don't overthink it: Trump doesn't understand the pro-life position because he's not pro-life.”

With all due respect to the statement made by an aide to Senator Ted Cruz, it seems to me that Donald Trump actually understands — and may be taking more seriously than many other politicians — the oft-stated pro-life position that life begins at conception and that abortion it at least somewhat akin to homicide.

The National Right to Life Committee, the nation's oldest and largest pro-life organization,  states expressly here that in the US "over 40 million unborn babies have been killed in the 40 years since abortion was legalized and more than 1.2 million are killed each year" and that "medical science has known conclusively that every individual's life begins at the moment of fertilization."   Pro-Life Action League states expressly here that "killing an unborn child is inherently wrong, and therefore can never be justified regardless of circumstances. It is no more just to kill an unborn child in order to avoid hardship than it would be to kill a toddler to avoid hardship. Because the unborn child is unseen, it is easier for society to condone killing him or her, though this is morally indistinguishable from killing any child at any stage of development."  The American Life League similarly states expressly here that "abortion is a direct attack on a preborn child which kills; it is murder."

If one genuinely believes that any abortion involves the intentional "killing" of a human life, that it is "morally indistinguishable from killing any child at any stage of development," and that "it is murder," and thus an act which should be criminally prohibited (like all other forms of intentional homicide), then I would hope that one ought also be genuinely committed to criminally punishing, at least to some extent, any and every person intentionally involved in this act of intentional killing which "morally indistinguishable from killing any child at any stage of development." 

In modern society, we threaten to punish all sorts of persons (at least with fines) for all sorts of petty crimes like overtime parking and illegal copying of a DVD and loitering.  I believe I am understanding and showing respect to the views and claims of persons who are pro-lifer when I surmise they consider any intentional abortion to be a societal wrong that is far more serious than, say, overtime parking or loitering.  If that is right, then I also think it would be fair to say that Donald Trump is actually understanding and showing respect for the views and claims of persons who are pro-life when he suggests that women intentionally involved in obtaining illegal abortions ought to be subject to at least "some form of punishment."

March 30, 2016 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Prez Obama commutes the sentence of 61 more federal drug offenders

As reported in this Washington Post piece, "President Obama commuted the sentences of 61 inmates Wednesday, part of his ongoing effort to give relief to prisoners who were harshly sentenced in the nation’s war on drugs." Here is more on this notable clemency news:

More than one-third of the inmates were serving life sentences. Obama has granted clemency to 248 federal inmates, including Wednesday's commutations.  White House officials said that Obama will continue granting clemency to inmates who meet certain criteria set out by the Justice Department throughout his last year....  Since the Obama administration launched a high-profile clemency initiative, thousands more inmates have applied.  Another 9,115 clemency petitions from prisoners are still pending....

But sentencing reform advocates said that many more prisoners are disappointed they have not yet heard from the president about their petitions. “Sixty-one grants, with over 10,000 petitions pending, is not an accomplishment to brag about,” said Mark Osler, a law professor at the University of St. Thomas in Minnesota and an advocate for inmates petitioning for clemency.  “I know some of those still waiting, men who were grievously over-sentenced, who have reformed themselves, and never had a record of violence.  My heart breaks for them, as their hope for freedom — a hope created by the members of this administration — slips away.”

The White House has argued that broader criminal justice reform is needed beyond the clemency program. “Despite the progress we have made, it is important to remember that clemency is nearly always a tool of last resort that can help specific individuals, but does nothing to make our criminal justice system on the whole more fair and just,” said White House counsel W. Neil Eggleston. “Clemency of individual cases alone cannot fix decades of overly punitive sentencing policies.  So, while we continue to work to resolve as many clemency applications as possible — and make no mistake, we are working hard at this — only broader criminal justice reform can truly bring justice to the many thousands of people behind bars serving unduly harsh and outdated sentences.”

Among those granted clemency on Wednesday was Byron Lamont McDade, who had an unusual advocate in his corner.  The judge who sent McDade to prison for more than two decades for his role in a Washington-area cocaine conspiracy personally pleaded McDade’s case for early release. U.S. District Judge Paul L. Friedman said McDade’s 27-year punishment was “disproportionate” to his crime, but that he had no choice but to impose the harsh prison term in 2002 because of then-mandatory sentencing guidelines. Over the years, the judge had urged the Bureau of Prisons and the White House to reduce McDade’s sentence to 15 years.  He received no response until now....

On Thursday, the White House will hold an event called Life after Clemency that will include former inmates and their attorneys, along with some prison reform advocates. The president’s senior adviser, Valerie Jarrett, is meeting with advocates, former inmates and family members of prisoners Wednesday at the White House for an event about women and the criminal justice system.

This White House Press release provides basic details on the full list of 61 offenders who today learned that they now have a "prison sentence commuted to expire on July 28, 2016." Many of those listed appear to have been involved in a crack offense, though other drug cases sentenced both before and after Booker can be found in the group.  Notably, this NACDL press release reports that "25 of [these 61 offenders] were applicants whose petitions were supported by Clemency Project 2014."  This White House blog post authored by White House counsel W. Neil Eggleston provides more details and context concerning these grants:

Today, the President announced 61 new grants of commutation to individuals serving years in prison under outdated and unduly harsh sentencing laws.  More than one-third of them were serving life sentences.  To date, the President has now commuted the sentences of 248 individuals more than the previous six Presidents combined. And, in total, he has commuted 92 life sentences.

Underscoring his commitment not just to clemency, but to helping those who earn their freedom make the most of their second chance, the President will meet today with commutation recipients from both his Administration and the previous administrations of Presidents George W. Bush and Bill Clinton.  During the meeting, the commutation recipients will discuss their firsthand experiences with the reentry process and ways that the process can be strengthened to give every individual the resources he or she needs to transition from prison and lead a fulfilling, productive life. 
 
Building on this conversation, tomorrow the White House will host a briefing titled Life After Clemency with advocates, academics, and Administration officials to discuss and share ideas on the President’s clemency initiative and ways to improve paths to reentry. In addition to officials from the White House and the Department of Justice, experts, academics, and commutation recipients will share their expertise and insights on returning to society after years behind bars.  To watch the briefing live, tune in tomorrow, Thursday, March 31, at 2:00 PM EDT at www.whitehouse.gov/live.

March 30, 2016 in Clemency and Pardons, Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

"Sentencing Reductions versus Sentencing Equality"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting and timely new paper by Susan Klein now available via SSRN.  Here is the abstract:

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted by an odd conglomeration of Democrat and Republican who agreed that federal sentences should be based upon relevant offender and offense characteristics, not including such things as race, gender, geography, ideological bent of the sentencing judge, or citizenship. That goal has become lost and less relevant in today’s world of draconian and mandatory minimum sentencing, especially in the drug trafficking, child pornography, and fraud arenas. Mass incarceration has run rampant. Sentences are so out-of-whack with most basic principles justice that the fact that female offenders may receive slightly lower prison terms than their male counterparts should no longer be the very top of our reform agenda.

This is not to suggest that scholars and the public shouldn’t be concerned with sentencing disparity, especially based on race. However, the disparity between federal and state sentences is so much wider (and occurs so much more frequently) than the disparity among similarly-situated federal offenders that the latter appears less of a significant issue in absolute terms. Whatever reform capital policy-makers and scholars retain should be poured into championing alternatives to criminalization (such as fines, drug treatment, and apologies) and alternatives to long prison terms (such as probation and parole). Reforms must focus on discovering what offenses we could safely decriminalize, and what programs are effective in keeping individuals out of prison in the first place (or in curbing recidivism once incarceration has occurred).

If giving judges more discretion at sentencing means lower average prison terms, this will probably rebound to the benefit of our minority populations as a whole, even if it might mean that in particular cases minority defendants receive slightly higher sentences for the same conduct as their white counterparts. Likewise, if sentencing, parole, and probation decisions based upon “risk assessment” leads to lower overall incarceration rates, we may have to tolerate this even if it generates higher risk numbers for certain minority offenders. Critics of every substantive criminal-law and sentencing reform proposal need to remember the big picture, and not lose sight of the forest of mass incarceration for the trees of unwarranted sentencing disparity.

March 30, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, March 29, 2016

Oklahoma creates Death Penalty Review Commission full of prominent folks .... which will likely achieve ....?

Though I generally think of myself as an optimist, this notable news item out of Oklahoma, headlined "Oklahoma Bipartisan Death Penalty Review Commission formed, supported," triggers the cynical little voice in my head that comes out when I hear about the creation of a blue-ribbon commission in the sentencing arena.  (For those curious about aesthetic backstories, this Wikipedia entry highlights why we color expert panels blue instead of, say, having pink-ribbon commissions.)  Before I go cynical, here are the details of the latest governmental gathering of note:

A group of prominent Oklahomans joined together Monday (March 28) to form a blue-ribbon, bipartisan Oklahoma Death Penalty Review Commission.  The Commission will conduct what a press statement called “the first-ever independent, objective and thorough review of the state’s entire capital punishment system.”...

“Oklahoma has an opportunity to lead the nation by being the first state to conduct extensive research on its entire death penalty process, beginning with an arrest that could lead to an execution,” said former Gov. Brad Henry, of Henry-Adams Companies, LLC, one of the group’s co-chairs.“The Commission includes distinguished Oklahomans with differing views and perspectives on capital punishment who are donating their time to work together on a research-driven review,” he said.

Joining Gov. Henry as co-chairs are Reta Strubhar, a judge on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (1993-2004) and an Assistant District Attorney of Canadian County (1982-1984); and Andy Lester, of the Spencer Fane law firm and a former U.S. Magistrate Judge for Western District of Oklahoma who served on President Ronald Reagan’s Transition team for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (1980-1981).

Members of the Commission have experience in a variety of aspects of the capital punishment system, including victim advocacy, policymaking, prosecution, defense, and judging. They also include leading lawyers, business leaders, and scholars.  In addition to the co-chairs, the members are Robert H. Alexander, Jr., of The Law Office of Robert H. Alexander, Jr.; Howard Barnett, President of OSU-Tulsa; Dean Andrew Coats, Dean Emeritus of OU College of Law; Dean Valerie Couch, Oklahoma City University School of Law; Maria Kolar, Assistant Professor of OU College of Law; Rob Nigh, Chief Public Defender, Tulsa County; Christy Sheppard, a victims’ advocate; Kris Steele, Director of The Education and Employment Ministry (TEEM) and former Speaker of the House; and Gena Timberman, founder of The Luksi Group.

“Our goal is to provide a resource for Oklahomans to allow them to make informed judgments about our state’s capital punishment system that, we hope, will benefit both Oklahoma and the country as a whole,” said Henry.

Though I have long been a fan of any "research-driven review" of any sentencing system, I am not optimistic based on my own experiences in Ohio that this kind of death penalty review commission will be able to achieve all that much other than producing a lengthy report that will be embraced or rejected by political leaders based entirely on their already established views on the death penalty.  This cynical prediction is based on how an array of ABA reports on state death penalty systems and how a recent Ohio Death Penalty Task Force report was received.

Critically, I do not mean to be asserting that this Oklahoma Death Penalty Review Commission is unimportant or sure to inconsequential.  But I do mean to assert that basic political dynamics rather than refined policy analysis defines and often limits the possibilities for reforming the administration of the death penalty.

March 29, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Monday, March 28, 2016

A week of extraordinary reporting and commentary via The Crime Report

Regularly readers are perhaps used to me regularly praising The Crime Report for its impressive original reporting and interesting commentaries on an erray of criminal justice issues. This post is another in this series, prompted by the fact that I have been meaning to do distinct posts about nearly a dozen pieces I saw over at TCR just over the last (too busy week). I remain hopeful I will get a chance to blog separately about some of the pieces below that I find more interesting or important, but for now I am going to have to be content to urger everyong to click through a read everyone of these linked piece:

March 28, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Time, Death, and Retribution"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Chad Flanders now available via SSRN. To call this article timely and just dead on is both accurate and punny. Here is the abstract:

The heart of a Lackey claim is that when a death row inmate is kept waiting too long for his execution, this delay can amount to cruel and unusual punishment — either because they delay is itself cruel and unusual, or because the execution on top of the delay is.  All Lackey claims brought by death row inmates have failed, but not for want of trying.  The usual complaint against Lackey claims is that those who, by their own appeals, delay their execution date cannot turn around and use that delay as an argument against their death sentences.  I agree with other scholars that this argument is incorrect.  However, even if it is true that prisoner choice cannot make an otherwise unconstitutional sentence constitutional, Lackey claims can — and should — fail if the courts adopt a certain theory of retribution, what I call “intrinsic desert retribution”.  Examining that type of retribution, distinguishing it from other retributive theories, and showing how intrinsic desert retribution can refute most Lackey claims, is one of this article’s major contributions. In doing so, it breaks with most of the scholarly literature, which tends to be sympathetic to Lackey claims.

But the fact that Lackey claims may survive given a certain theory of retribution does not make that theory something the state may permissibly pursue.  And this is the second major contribution of the article: to make the case that retribution may in fact not be a permissible state purpose.  In short, Lackey claims do not fail because they are too strong — they fail because they are not strong enough.  The Supreme Court has traditionally held that the state may permissibly put someone to death because of retribution.  But the Court has also said, in other contexts, that the state may not pursue certain aims.  The state cannot promote religion, for one; nor can it adopt policies based solely on “animus” against a certain class of persons.  My article suggests that when the state adopts retribution as a goal in capital punishment, and pursues that goal even after years of delay, then retribution starts to look more and more like something that, while it may be morally right, cannot be a goal the state can legitimately pursue.

March 28, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, March 26, 2016

Wouldn't (severe? creative?) alternatives to incarceration be the best response to animal cruelty convictions?

Peace_love_stop_animal_abuse_postcard-r136275981620429394a9c237e5c49925_vgbaq_8byvr_324The question in the title of this post is prompted by this local story of a high-profile sentencing of a high-profile defendant convicted of multiple misdemeanor counts of animal cruelty. The piece is headlined "Former Raven Terrence Cody sentenced to nine months in Baltimore County animal cruelty case," and here are the details:

Baltimore County judge sentenced former Ravens player Terrence Cody on Thursday to nine months in jail in an animal cruelty case that drew interest across the country. Cody, 27, was convicted in November of multiple misdemeanors in connection with the death of his dog, Taz, last year, as well as two misdemeanor drug charges.  Prosecutors said Taz starved to death.

Cody faced the possibility of more than two years of incarceration. More than 5,000 people signed an online petition urging Judge Judith C. Ensor to impose the maximum sentence. Ensor said that she did not discount the petition but that she had to make an independent decision based on the case.  "My responsibility is to listen and to make the best decision I can," she said at the sentencing hearing.

Defense attorney Joe Murtha acknowledged that Cody neglected Taz but said that Cody loved the animal and didn't intend for it to die. He said that Cody was emotionally incapable of caring for the dog and that he suffers from depression.  "His level of depression is so significant that he's become just isolated," said Murtha, who added that his communication with his client has been limited because of Cody's depression.

Prosecutor Adam Lippe discounted the idea that Cody was depressed. He argued for the maximum amount of jail time — 905 days.  "I'm sure every defendant awaiting sentencing is depressed," Lippe said.

Lippe said during the trial that the dog starved to death at Cody's former home in Reisterstown over a period of at least a month. Cody testified at the trial that he believed Taz was suffering from worms.

Cody spent $8,000 to buy and import Taz, a Canary mastiff, from Spain. He took the animal to a Reisterstown animal hospital a few hours before it died. The dog, which once weighed at least 100 pounds, was down to less than 50 pounds at that point. Cody — whose nickname at the University of Alabama was Mount Cody — was drafted by the Ravens as a defensive lineman in 2010. The team released him when he was indicted last year.

After the trial last year, Cody was acquitted of two felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty. Ensor, who presided over the bench trial, said Thursday she was convinced that Cody did not torture Taz intentionally. "I remain firm" in that belief, she said.

The judge also sentenced Cody to probation before judgment for illegally possessing an alligator and for possessing drug paraphernalia. Police found a gas-mask bong and a 6-foot-long green glass bong in the home. She imposed suspended sentences for several counts, including a marijuana charge. She also sentenced Cody to 18 months of supervised probation and said he must undergo mental health treatment. During the probation period, he is not allowed to own or possess an animal. Cody will serve the sentence at the Baltimore County Detention Center in Towson.

Cody's girlfriend, Kourtney J. Kelley, 28, was also convicted in the animal cruelty case. She was sentenced last month to 60 days and has since been paroled. She was found guilty of five counts in connection with neglecting Taz. Cody, wearing a black hoodie and jeans, briefly addressed the court, saying he accepted responsibility. He also said he believed Kelley should not have been punished in the case....

Lippe said he was satisfied with the sentence. He said Cody had other dogs that were "fat and happy," but for some reason he treated Taz differently. "I can't explain to you why he decided to kill this animal," Lippe said. "It makes no sense at all."

I am huge aminal lover within a family which has always cared greatly about pets both usual (e.g., my dog and cat are hanging with me as I type this) and unusual (e.g., I have a bunch of parrot, angel fish and hermit crab stories).  Consequently, I fully understand how emotional so many folks get about animal cruelty and why there is often strong support for imposing the harshest possible sentences on those persons who get convicted of animal cruelty crimes.  

Nevertheless, as the question in the title of this post suggests and to parrot the words of the local prosecutor in this case, it really makes so sense at all to me to view lengthy terms of incarceration as the most efficacious response to these sorts of crimes.  Specifically, to focus on this case, did prosecutor Adam Lippe really think the citizens of Baltimore would be better off if former NFL player Terrence Cody served nearly 3 years in a local jail (at significant taxpayer expense) rather than, say, spending the next few years trying to get back into the NFL to make large sums of money that could be donated to animal protection societies or working publicly on helping animals as a part of community service program? 

I fully understand the potential incapacitative benefits of incarceration for dangerous people with a history of seriously risky or harmful behaviors.  But unless there is strong reason to believe Terrence Cody is a real danger to others, I think the the citizens and animals of Baltimore could and would be much better served through severe and creative alternatives to incarceration in a case like this.  But, problematically in the US and as part of our transformation into "incarceration nation," it seems that nearly all prosecutors and most members of the general public embrace the notion that the only way to be tough is through extended (and costly) periods of incarceration.

March 26, 2016 in Celebrity sentencings, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, March 24, 2016

"To change the world, start with prisons"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable FoxNews commentary authored by Christian Colson. Here are excerpts:

One Easter weekend, I accompanied my father, Charles Colson, to a prison in South Carolina. We held a worship service on Death Row, and about 20 men came out of their cells to sing songs and listen to my dad give a message about the resurrection of Jesus.

My father, whose books on Christian life and thought have sold more than 5 million copies, could have spent Easter weekend in more influential pulpits.  He could have commanded an audience of thousands of Christians who were well-resourced and well-connected, rather than men in prison jumpsuits.  But instead, every Easter for decades following his release from prison in 1975 for a Watergate-related crime until his death in 2012, he chose to go back behind bars to celebrate with the incarcerated.  My father understood that if we want to change the world, we must start behind bars.

The criminal justice system may not seem like the place to initiate cultural renewal, but no place could be better. When our nation’s 2.2 million prisoners are held in conditions that do little to help address the roots of criminal behavior, they remain likely to continue in a criminal lifestyle after they are released.

Prisoners might seem like improbable standard bearers for cultural transformation, but my dad believed wholeheartedly that whenever prisoners are transformed, they will transform the culture of their prisons and society at large....

Prisons are full of untapped potential.  Under the right conditions, many people — like my father — can pay their debt to society, prepare for a new future and make the most of their second chance.  A variety of prison programs that address the roots of criminal behavior through education, mentoring, substance-abuse treatment and more have been shown to reduce recidivism.

Legislation based on restorative values can support this goal.  The Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, now making its way through Congress, would require the Federal Bureau of Prisons to implement and incentivize programming to reduce rates of re-offense.  This is good news not just for prisoners but for everyone affected by crime and incarceration.  When recidivism rates go down, more children grow up seeing their parents outside of a prison waiting room.  There are fewer victims.  Communities have a chance to flourish as they benefit from the contributions of members who are successfully reintegrating.

At the first Easter, mourners gathered at the tomb of a man who had been executed with criminals.  There seemed to be no future for his followers, a small group of poorly educated misfits with no worldly power or influence.  And yet, the nascent Christian movement transformed the culture of the Roman Empire and the entire modern history of the world.

When my dad spent “Resurrection Sunday” behind bars with prisoners, including those condemned to die, he often invoked that first Easter, where the hope of the Gospel emerged from a sealed tomb that was supposed to be as secure as any prison....  As Easter reminds us, the change the world most needs sometimes comes from unexpected places.

March 24, 2016 in Aspects and impact of Sentencing Reform and Corrections Act, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Religion | Permalink | Comments (1)

Wednesday, March 23, 2016

Notable new comments and commitments on criminal justice reform from GOP House Speaker Paul Ryan

160323-paulryan-1404_923bb8d76407e0b58fd5c662ccf6c762.nbcnews-fp-1200-800This notable new article about a notable new speech by Speaker of the House Paul Ryan, headlined "Paul Ryan just gave a remarkably candid speech and admitted one of his biggest policy mistakes," has significantly increased my optimism about some form of federral sentencing reform moving forward in Congress this year.  Here are the details:

House Speaker Paul Ryan gave a candid speech about the "State of American Politics" on Wednesday, during which he admitted that he too hasn't always lived up to what he believes is a high-standard of political discourse.

A member of the audience asked Ryan after the speech if he had been persuaded differently on any policy position he has held and was willing to admit he was wrong.

Ryan — who earlier repeated an apology he had made in 2014 for a past statement about America's supposed "makers and takers" when discussing poverty in the country — said he had been wrong about criminal justice. "One of the things that I learned is that there are a lot of people who've been in prison that committed crimes that were not violent crimes," he said. "Once they have that mark on their record, their future is really bleak."

He said that, when he came to Congress in the late 1990s, he was a staunch supporter of tough crime laws. He admitted that both his own party and Democrats overcompensated at the time. The policies, he said, "end up ruining their lives and hurting their communities where we could've have alternative means of incarceration, instead of basically destroying someone's life. I've become a late convert."

"Criminal-justice reform is something I never thought of when I was younger," he continued. "Be tough on crime, be tough on crime." Ryan said criminal-justice reform bills would be brought to the House floor soon. He pledged to "advance this."

"I didn't necessarily know this before, but redemption is a beautiful thing. It's a great thing," he said. "Redemption is what makes this place work. We need to honor redemption. We need to make redemption something that is valued in our culture and our society and in our laws."

Ryan's candid comments on poverty and criminal-justice reform came at the end of a powerful speech about the current discourse in American politics, which he lamented would end up making Americans "distrust institutions" and "lose faith in government."

March 23, 2016 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

"Why Dylann Roof is a Terrorist Under Federal Law, and Why it Matters"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Jesse Norris now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

After white supremacist Dylann Roof killed nine African-Americans at a Charleston, South Carolina church, authorities declined to refer to the attack as terrorism.  Many objected to the government’s apparent double standards in its treatment of Muslim versus non-Muslim extremists and called on the government to treat the massacre as terrorism. Yet the government has neither charged him with a terrorist offense nor labelled the attack as terrorism.

This Article argues that although the government was unable to charge him with terrorist crimes because of the lack of applicable statutes, the Charleston Massacre still qualifies as terrorism under federal law.  Roof’s attack clearly falls under the government’s prevailing definition of domestic terrorism.  It also qualifies for a terrorism sentencing enhancement, or at least an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines, as well as for the terrorism aggravating factor considered by juries in deciding whether to impose the death penalty.

Labelling Roof’s attack as terrorism could have several important implications, not only in terms of sentencing, but also in terms of government accountability, the prudent allocation of counterterrorism resources, balanced media coverage, and public cooperation in preventing terrorism.  For these reasons, the Article contends that the government should treat the Charleston Massacre, and similar ideologically-motivated killings, as terrorism.

The Article also makes two policy suggestions meant to facilitate a more consistent use of the term terrorism. First, the Article proposes a new federal terrorism statute mirroring hate crime statutes, which would enable every terrorist to be charged with a terrorist offense.  Second, simplifying the definition of terrorism to encompass any murder or attempted murder meant to advance an ideology would avoid the obfuscation invited by current definitions. However, even without such changes, the government still has the authority and responsibility to treat attacks such as Roof’s as terrorism for nearly all purposes.

A few prior related posts:

March 23, 2016 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

Sunday, March 20, 2016

Making an empirical case for the relative efficacy of post-Plata realignment in California

A trio of criminologists make a data-driven case for some positive aspects of California's experiences with realignment in this Washington Post opinion piece headlined "Releasing low-level offenders did not unleash a crime wave in California."  Here are excerpts (with a link to the report that provides the empirical basis for its claims):

Some fear that reducing sentences for nonviolent crimes and letting low-level offenders back on the streets — key components of prison reform — could produce a new and devastating crime wave.  Such dire predictions were common in 2011 when California embarked on a massive experiment in prison downsizing.  But five years later, California’s experience offers powerful evidence that no such crime wave is likely to occur.

In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that California’s wildly overcrowded prisons were tantamount to cruel and unusual punishment and ordered the state to reduce its prison population by some 33,000 people in two years.  In response, the state enacted the controversial California Public Safety Realignment law, known in legislative shorthand as AB 109.

With a budget of more than $1 billion annually, “realignment” gave each of the state’s 58 counties responsibility for supervising a sizable class of offenders — the “triple nons,” or non-serious, nonviolent, non-sex offenders — formerly housed in state prisons. Each county received unprecedented flexibility and authority to manage this population as it saw fit.

Recently, we brought together a group of distinguished social scientists to do a systematic, comprehensive assessment of California’s prison downsizing experiment.  The results, published this month in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, show that California’s decision to cede authority over low-level offenders to its counties has been, for the most part, remarkably effective public policy and an extraordinarily rich case study in governance....

To answer questions about the relationship between prison reform and crime rates, we not only compared statewide crime rates before and after the downsizing but also examined what happened in counties that favored innovative approaches vs. those that emphasized old-fashioned enforcement.

Clearly, our most important finding is that realignment has had only a very small effect on crime in California. Violent crime rates in the state have barely budged.  We’ve seen no appreciable uptick in assaults, rapes and murders that can be connected to the prisoners who were released under realignment.  This makes a lot of sense when you think about it; by and large, these offenders were eligible for release because of the nonviolent nature of their crimes.

On the other hand, a small uptick in property crime can be attributed to downsizing, with the largest increase occurring for auto theft.  So is this an argument against realignment and against prison reform more broadly?  We think not. The cost to society of a slight increase in property crime must be weighed against the cost of incarceration.

Take the example of auto theft. Our data suggest that one year served in prison instead of at large as a result of realignment prevents 1.2 auto thefts per year and saves $11,783 in crime-related costs plus harm to the victims and their families. On the other hand, keeping someone behind bars for a year costs California $51,889. In purely monetary terms — without considering, say, the substantial economic and social hardship that imprisonment can create for prisoners’ children and other relatives — incarcerating someone for a year in the hope of preventing an auto theft is like spending $450 to repair a $100 vacuum cleaner.

Turning to the question of which counties’ strategies were most successful, we have another important early finding: Counties that invested in offender reentry in the aftermath of realignment had better performance in terms of recidivism than counties that focused resources on enforcement.  As other states and the federal government contemplate their own proposals for prison downsizing, they should take a close look at what these California counties are doing right.

I have long been saying that California is a critical state to watch in the sentencing reform discussion, and I am pleased to see that a "group of distinguished social scientists" have so far concluded that the state's realignment experiences in the wake of the Supreme Court's Plata "has been, for the most part, remarkably effective public policy." But, critically, thanks to voter initiatives, California's recent sentencing reform efforts have not been confined to realignment: in 2012, California voters passed reforms to the state's three strikes laws via Prop 36, and in 2014 California voters passed reforms to what crimes are treated as felonies via Prop 47. And, notably, though some in law enforcement were quick to complain after AB 109 that realignment was responsible for a uptick in property crimes in the state, of late the focus of crime concerns and criticism has been Prop 47.

As I have repeatedly said in this space and others, I think it is especially problematic that California does not have the help of a independent sentencing commission that could and should seek to track and assess all these moving sentencing reform parts in the state.  In the absence of such a body, we all will have to rely on empirical and advocacy work done by outside researchers and policy groups concerning the effects of sentencing reform on the west coast.

March 20, 2016 in National and State Crime Data, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, March 19, 2016

"Voices on Innocence"

The title of this post is the title given to a collection of short essays by a number of notable authors now available at this link via SSRN. Here is the abstract for the collection:

In the summer of 2015, experts gathered from around the country to sit together and discuss one of the most pressing and important issues facing the American criminal justice system — innocence.  Innocence is an issue that pervades various areas of research and influences numerous topics of discussion.

What does innocence mean, particularly in a system that differentiates between innocence and acquittal at sentencing?  What is the impact of innocence during plea bargaining? How should we respond to growing numbers of exonerations?  What forces lead to the incarceration of innocents? Has an innocent person been put to death and, if so, what does this mean for capital punishment? As these and other examples demonstrate, the importance and influence of the innocence issue is boundless.  As the group, representing various perspectives, disciplines, and areas of research, discussed these and other questions, it also considered the role of innocence in the criminal justice system more broadly and examined where the innocence issue might take us in the future.

This article is a collection of short essays from some of those in attendance — essays upon which we might reflect as we continue to consider the varying sides and differing answers to the issue of innocence.  Through these diverse and innovative essays, the reader is able to glimpse the larger innocence discussion that occurred in the summer of 2015. As was the case at the roundtable event, the ideas expressed in these pages begins a journey into an issue with many faces and many paths forward for discussion, research, and reform.

March 19, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

Friday, March 18, 2016

Making the (Trumpian?) case for winning the drug war via full legalization

HarpersWeb-Cover-201604-302x410_black This cover story of the April 2016 issue of Harper's magazine is authored by Dan Baum and is headlined "Legalize It All: How to win the war on drugs."  And, as I mean to suggest via  the headline of this post, this article may be channeling what GOP Prez candidate front-runner Donald Trump really thinks about how to improve modern drug policy in the US.  (Recall that I had this post on my marijuana reform blog, way back when Trump first announced his serious run for the Oval Office last summer, which highlights that Trump not all that long ago had once suggested full legalization would be the only way to "win" the drug war.)  Here are is an except from the first part of the lengthy Harper's piece:

Nixon’s invention of the war on drugs as a political tool was cynical, but every president since — Democrat and Republican alike — has found it equally useful for one reason or another. Meanwhile, the growing cost of the drug war is now impossible to ignore: billions of dollars wasted, bloodshed in Latin America and on the streets of our own cities, and millions of lives destroyed by draconian punishment that doesn’t end at the prison gate; one of every eight black men has been disenfranchised because of a felony conviction.

As long ago as 1949, H. L. Mencken identified in Americans “the haunting fear that someone, somewhere, may be happy,” an astute articulation of our weirdly Puritan need to criminalize people’s inclination to adjust how they feel.  The desire for altered states of consciousness creates a market, and in suppressing that market we have created a class of genuine bad guys — pushers, gangbangers, smugglers, killers.  Addiction is a hideous condition, but it’s rare. Most of what we hate and fear about drugs — the violence, the overdoses, the criminality — derives from prohibition, not drugs. And there will be no victory in this war either; even the Drug Enforcement Administration concedes that the drugs it fights are becoming cheaper and more easily available.

Now, for the first time, we have an opportunity to change course. Experiments in alternatives to harsh prohibition are already under way both in this country and abroad. Twenty-three states, as well as the District of Columbia, allow medical marijuana, and four — Colorado, Washington, Oregon, and Alaska — along with D.C., have legalized pot altogether.  Several more states, including Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada, will likely vote in November whether to follow suit.

Portugal has decriminalized not only marijuana but cocaine and heroin, as well as all other drugs.  In Vermont, heroin addicts can avoid jail by committing to state-funded treatment. Canada began a pilot program in Vancouver in 2014 to allow doctors to prescribe pharmaceutical-quality heroin to addicts, Switzerland has a similar program, and the Home Affairs Committee of Britain’s House of Commons has recommended that the United Kingdom do likewise.  Last July, Chile began a legislative process to legalize both medicinal and recreational marijuana use and allow households to grow as many as six plants.  After telling the BBC in December that “if you fight a war for forty years and don’t win, you have to sit down and think about other things to do that might be more effective,” Colombian president Juan Manuel Santos legalized medical marijuana by decree. In November, the Mexican Supreme Court elevated the debate to a new plane by ruling that the prohibition of marijuana consumption violated the Mexican Constitution by interfering with “the personal sphere,” the “right to dignity,” and the right to “personal autonomy.”  The Supreme Court of Brazil is considering a similar argument.

Depending on how the issue is framed, legalization of all drugs can appeal to conservatives, who are instinctively suspicious of bloated budgets, excess government authority, and intrusions on individual liberty, as well as to liberals, who are horrified at police overreach, the brutalization of Latin America, and the criminalization of entire generations of black men.  It will take some courage to move the conversation beyond marijuana to ending all drug prohibitions, but it will take less, I suspect, than most politicians believe.  It’s already politically permissible to criticize mandatory minimums, mass marijuana-possession arrests, police militarization, and other excesses of the drug war; even former attorney general Eric Holder and Michael Botticelli, the new drug czar — a recovering alcoholic — do so. Few in public life appear eager to defend the status quo.

A few prior related posts:

March 18, 2016 in Campaign 2016 and sentencing issues, Drug Offense Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

Monday, March 14, 2016

"The Tyranny of Small Things" observed during local sentencing proceedings

I have long told my student that you can learn a lot by just watching, and this new paper on SSRN authored by Yxta Maya Murray reinforces this point in an interesting sentencing setting. The paper is just titled "The Tyranny of Small Things," and here is the abstract:

This legal-literary essay recounts a day I spent watching criminal sentencings in an Alhambra, California courthouse, emphasizing the sometimes quotidian, sometimes despairing, imports of those proceedings.  I take leave of the courthouse marshaling arguments that resemble those of other scholars who tackle state overcriminalization and selective enforcement.  My original addition exists in the granular attention I pay to the moment-by-moment effects of a sometimes baffling state power on poor and minority people.  In this approach, I align myself with advocates of the law and literature school of thought who believe that the study (or, in this case, practice) of literature will aid the aims of justice by disclosing buried yet critical human experience and emotions.

March 14, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (4)

Sunday, March 13, 2016

"Feds want convicted journalist to serve 5 years, his lawyers ask for no prison time"

The title of this post is the headline of this interesting ArsTechnica article previewing an interesting federal sentencing scheduled for later this month in federal court in California.  Here are the particulars with all links from the original article to the parties' sentencing submissions and related materials:

Federal prosecutors have asked a judge to impose a sentence of five years against Matthew Keys, who was found guilty last year on three counts of criminal hacking under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.  That federal law, which was passed in 1984, was what the late activist Aaron Swartz was prosecuted under.  Last year, President Barack Obama called for Congress to expand prison sentences for those found guilty under this law.

Keys worked previously as an online producer for KTXL Fox 40, a Sacramento, California-based television station. Prosecutors argued that in December 2010, shortly after his dismissal, he handed over login credentials to a Tribune Media content management system (CMS), which allowed members of Anonymous to make unauthorized changes to a Los Angeles Times story. (At the time, both companies were both owned by Tribune Media.)  Those changes amounted to a short-lived prank: they lasted only 40 minutes, and there is little evidence that the prank was widely noticed. Criminal charges were not filed until March 2013.

Even after he was found guilty, Keys continued to deny the government’s narrative.  In a brief interview with Ars after his trial concluded, he described the prosecution’s theory as "total bullshit."

"A sentence of five years imprisonment reflects Keys’s culpability and places his case appropriately among those of other white-collar criminals who do not accept responsibility for their crimes," Matthew Segal, an Assistant United States Attorney, wrote in the Thursday sentencing memorandum.

In the 12-page filing, Segal explained that, although Keys initially "succeeded in deflecting suspicion away from himself," the FBI changed course after it reviewed chat logs found on the computer belonging to Wesley "Laurelai" Bailey, a former Anonymous member.  Those chat logs between Bailey and Ryan Ackroyd (aka "Kayla"), included a line where Kayla wrote: "Iol he's not so innocent and we have logs of him too, he was the one who gave us passwords for LA times, fox40 and some others, he had superuser on alot of media."  Segal explains further that Keys’ attack was "an online version of urging a mob to smash the presses for publishing an unpopular story," adding that Keys employed "means that challenge core values of American democracy."

Keys’ defense lawyers filed their own sentencing memorandum on Wednesday, asking the court to impose no prison time at all or go with a "non-custodial sentence."  The 69-page filing goes to great lengths to illustrate Keys lengthy history in journalism, going way back to his elementary school days when he edited the school bulletin.  "In recent years, Matthew’s sacrifices have paid off in the form of impactful journalism that has received national attention," wrote Jay Leiderman, his attorney, who has also worked on many other Anonymous-related cases.  "His stories have encouraged discourse, influenced policy and won the attention and accolades from his peers in the industry, public interest groups and even law enforcement officials."

Leiderman also notes that if the government’s recommendations stand, "[Keys] faces a far more severe sentence than any member of Lulzsec served.  60 months, which the Government seeks, would be more than any person engaged in hacking crimes during this period — by about double!"

I am a bit sorry I am not teaching my sentencing class this semester because the issues raised in this case and the parties' filing provide a great primer on guideline calculation disputes and the application of post-Booker sentencing jurisprudence based in the factors set forth in 3553(a). (I am teaching a 1L legal writing class in which students have to develop variance arguments for a white-collar offender, and I may urge my students to look at the parties' submissions for inspiration.)

March 13, 2016 in Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, White-collar sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Why We Would Spare Walter White: Breaking Bad and the True Power of Mitigation"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting-looking article authored by Bidish Sarma and recently posted on SSRN. Here is the abstract:

What if Walter White had been captured by the federal authorities?  Considering that he committed the murders of many individuals and orchestrated many more in the course of building and running his global meth trade, the prosecution would be able to seek the ultimate punishment against him.  But, would a jury give him the death penalty? Walt’s gripping journey stirred within viewers a range of complex emotions, but even those revolted by his actions must concede that it is extraordinarily difficult to envision a random collection of twelve people unanimously agreeing that he deserves a state-sanctioned execution.  Indeed, it seems that many of us actually rooted for Walt throughout the series, even when we struggled to understand why.

This Essay explores the answer to the question of why we would spare Walter White from the death penalty.  Its exploration underscores the critical importance of “mitigation” — a capacious term that refers to evidence introduced by capital defense lawyers to persuade jurors to hand down something less harsh than a death sentence.

Breaking Bad, through its masterful construction of its core narrative, situated us to empathize with Walt, to view him as someone we could understand, to feel about him the way we might feel about a friend or colleague or neighbor. Whether we argued vociferously in online forums that his actions were nearly always justified or simply watched with a suppressed but distinct hope that he might emerge as a partially redeemed man, many of us never condemned Walt. We did not want him to die an undignified death at someone else’s hands.  In fact, we were relieved that death came to him on his own terms.  And, if he had been captured, we would not have sent him to the death chamber.  Knowing Walt — understanding his “mitigation” — bent us towards mercy.

To start, this Essay explains how a capital trial unfolds and sets out the factors that jurors must take into account when they decide whether to choose death for a convicted capital defendant.  After establishing the basic framework for the death-determination in Part I, this Essay focuses on Walter White’s hypothetical penalty phase in Part II.  It describes both the “aggravating” evidence the prosecution would use to persuade jurors that death is the appropriate punishment and the “mitigating” evidence the defense would use to persuade jurors that a sentence less than death is appropriate.  Part II concludes with an explanation of why a jury likely would not sentence Walter White to die.

Part III steps back to identify distinct conclusions that we could draw from viewers’ prevailing willingness to ride with Walt until the end.  It concludes that it would be unwise to dismiss Walt as a fictitious outlier. Rather than ask ourselves what makes Walt’s particular case for mercy special, we should ask ourselves how the show managed to make him so real.  Breaking Bad’s storytelling proved so powerful that the show’s writers were themselves amazed that viewers continued to stand by Walt’s side through it all.  If we would spare Walter White, surely we would spare many others facing capital punishment.  But to get there, we need to do more than hear that they have struggles and triumphs of their own; we need to walk with them on their journeys.  We must feel like we did when the last episode of Breaking BadI began — wondering exactly how things will end, but unwilling to bring that end by our hands.

March 13, 2016 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Thursday, March 10, 2016

Rep Lamar Smith makes case against federal sentencing reform by questioning success of Texas reforms

One recurring theme of many advocates for federal sentencing reform is that state-level reforms, lead notably by Texas, have been successful at reducing incarceration levels without seeing an increase in crime. But at the end of this new Washington Times commentary, headlined "How weak prison terms endanger the innocent: Mandatory minimums keep the guilty behind bars to pay their debt to society," US House Representative Lamar Smith from Texas questions whether Texas reforms have truly been effective. Here are some notable excerpts from the piece:

Congress should be wary of reducing federal prison sentences. Unfortunately, much of the discussion on sentencing laws has focused on the criminals. What about the victims of their crimes? What about the dangers of putting these offenders back out on the streets where many prey again on law-abiding citizens?

The lives and property of innocent Americans are at stake.  Past experience should persuade us not to weaken penalties, which could lead to thousands of dangerous criminals being released into our communities....

Supporters of lower prison sentences also argue that judges need more discretion.  They say that a one-size-fits-all penalty does not allow for consideration of mitigating factors, which might be necessary to determine a fair sentence.

But prior experience with judicial discretion in sentencing counters this claim.  It is exactly the problem of too much discretion in the hands of activist judges that fueled the decades-long crime wave that preceded mandatory minimum sentences.  Furthermore, judicial discretion led to widespread discrepancies in sentences, even when the circumstances were similar.

The minimum sentencing structure ensures that judges apply a uniform penalty based on the crime, not on the judge’s subjective opinion.  Criminals receive equal punishment for equal crimes.  And the removal of hardened criminals from our streets for longer periods of time helps make our neighborhoods safer....

In my home state of Texas, new policies sought to reduce incarceration time and focus resources on treatment and post-release supervision.  Yet almost one-quarter of inmates released have been rearrested and sent back to prison within three years.  Early release programs don’t appear to be working.

Mandatory minimums help keep these individuals behind bars where they belong.  That’s one explanation for why crime rates remain down.  The purpose of criminal law is to punish bad behavior, deter criminal acts and protect the American people.  Releasing prisoners too soon could condemn many Americans to becoming victims of violence.  This can be avoided if prisoners are not released before their sentences have been served.

March 10, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, March 09, 2016

"Criminal Injustice: A Cost Analysis of Wrongful Convictions, Errors, and Failed Prosecutions in California's Criminal Justice System"

The title of this post is the title of this new report recently published by The Opportunity Institute.  Here is the report's executive summary:

Criminal (In)justice examines 692 individuals who were prosecuted and convicted in California state or federal courts, only to have their convictions dismissed because the government prosecuted the wrong person, because the evidence was lacking, or because the police, defense, prosecutors, or court erred to such a degree that the conviction could not be sustained.  The 692 individuals subjected to these failed prosecutions spent a total of 2,346 years in custody, and their prosecutions, appeals, incarceration, and lawsuits cost California taxpayers an estimated $282 million when adjusted for inflation.  Eighty-five of these cases arose from a large group exoneration — the Rampart police corruption scandal — and are discussed separately in a later section of this report.

The remaining 607 convictions, all of which were reversed between 1989 and 2012, illuminate a dark corner in California’s criminal justice system.  These 607 individuals spent a total of 2,186 years in custody.  They burdened the system with 483 jury trials, 26 mistrials, 16 hung juries, 168 plea bargains, and over 700 appeals and habeas petitions. Many of the individuals subjected to these flawed prosecutions filed lawsuits and received settlements as a result of the error, adding to the taxpayer cost.  Altogether, we estimate that these 607 faulty convictions cost taxpayers $221 million for prosecution, incarceration and settlement, adjusted for inflation. This estimate is only a window onto the landscape of possible costs, as it does not include the often unknowable costs suffered by those subjected to these prosecutions.

The sections below provide a review of these 607 cases and offer some recommendations for change.

The first section, Characteristics of Injustice, paints a collective picture of the cases in our sample. Compared to California’s average, the individuals subjected to these errors were disproportionately prosecuted for violent crimes, especially homicide. This may be because prosecutions for violent crime are more likely to generate error than prosecutions for other crimes, though that question was beyond the scope of our research. Whatever the reason, failed prosecutions for violent crime account for a greater percentage of the wasted $221 million than failed prosecutions for other crimes. Indeed, flawed homicide convictions alone account for 52% of the $221 million, in part because these homicide cases took an average of 11 years to resolve and generated more lawsuits and civil settlements.

The second section, Causes of Injustice, catalogs the multitude of errors, dividing them into eight categories: eyewitness identification errors, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective defense counsel, judicial mistake during trial, Fourth Amendment search and seizure violations, inadequate police practices before trial, unreliable or untruthful official testimony (officer or informant), and failure of prosecutorial discretion.

Prosecutorial misconduct and eyewitness identification were the most common errors in the flawed homicide prosecutions. When broken down by type of error, prosecutorial misconduct accounted for more of the cost in our sample than any other type of error.  By contrast, the most common errors in our sample were Fourth Amendment search and seizure errors, and judicial mistake.  These errors were resolved relatively quickly, however, and resulted in relatively little cost.

The third section, Costs of Injustice, walks through the cost analysis.  It documents the many hurdles raised by the California Victims Compensation and Government Claims Board.  This section also identifies many of the additional costs not captured by our methodology, including costs arising from wrongful misdemeanor convictions, flawed juvenile convictions, and cases that resolved prior to conviction, among others.  These unaccounted costs highlight the fact that this report documents only a portion of the vast unknown waste in California’s criminal justice system — but it is at least a beginning.

Criminal (In)justice ends with a section on Next Steps and Recommendations.  The problems presented in this report are undoubtedly complex, and each of them individually could be subject to its own investigation.  This report does not attempt to comprehensively define the universe of best practices that will solve all of the issues raised.  Instead, it identifies promising avenues for reform and highlights practices and jurisdictions that are leading the way. In particular, in 2006 the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice issued a report containing detailed recommendations regarding eyewitness identification, false confessions, informant testimony, problems with scientific evidence, and accountability for prosecutors and defense attorneys.  The recommendations represent the unanimous views of a diverse group of prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, law enforcement, and other stakeholders.  To date, however, many of the substantive reforms have not been adopted, compromising public safety and leaving our criminal justice system at risk of endlessly repeating the errors catalogued here. (The report can be found at www.ccfaj.org.)

March 9, 2016 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6)

Tuesday, March 08, 2016

Judge John Gleeson invents and issues a "federal certificate of rehabilitation"

Thanks to this post at the Collateral Consequences Resource Center, I see that US District Judge John Gleeson has issued yet another remarkable opinion concerning the collateral consequences of a federal criminal conviction and what he thinks he can do as a federal judge in response.  Here is how the 33-page opinion in  Doe v. US, No. 15-MC-1174 (EDNY March 7, 2016)(available here) gets started:

On June 23, 2015, Jane Doe moved to expunge a now thirteen-year-old fraud conviction due to its adverse impact on her ability to work.  The conviction has proven troublesome for Doe because it appears in the government’s databases and in the New York City Professional Discipline Summaries.  In other words, the conviction is visible to a prospective employer both as the result of a criminal background check and upon examination of her nursing license.  Numerous employers have denied Doe a job because of her conviction.  On more than one occasion, she was hired by a nursing agency only to have her offer revoked after the employer learned of her record. Despite these obstacles, Doe has found work at a few nursing companies, and she currently runs her own business as a house cleaner.  Doe’s two children help to support her, and during periods of unemployment, her parents have also assisted her financially.

The government opposes Doe’s motion, contending that federal district courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction to expunge a conviction on equitable grounds.  The Second Circuit has ruled, however, that “[t]he application of ancillary jurisdiction in [expungement] case[s] is proper.” U.S. v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 538 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978).  Accordingly, I have weighed the equities in this case, which are grounded in my understanding of Doe’s criminal conviction and sentence; I was the judge who presided over her jury trial and imposed punishment.

I conclude that while Doe has struggled considerably as a result of her conviction, her situation does not amount to the “extreme circumstances” that merit expungement.  See id. at 539.  That said, I had no intention to sentence her to the unending hardship she has endured in the job market.  I have reviewed her case in painstaking detail, and I can certify that Doe has been rehabilitated.  Her conviction makes her no different than any other nursing applicant.  In the 12 years since she reentered society after serving her prison sentence, she has not been convicted of any other wrongdoing.  She has worked diligently to obtain stable employment, albeit with only intermittent success. Accordingly, I am issuing Doe a federal certificate of rehabilitation.  As explained below, this court-issued relief aligns with efforts the Justice Department, the President, and Congress are already undertaking to help people in Doe’s position shed the burden imposed by a record of conviction and move forward with their lives.

March 8, 2016 in Collateral consequences, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Sunday, March 06, 2016

In praise of (impossible?) request tasking Government Accountability Office with accounting for "the cost of crime in the United States"

Crime-2010I was quite pleased to discover this notable press release from the House Judiciary Committee reporting on a notable letter sent by two Representatives to the Comptroller General.  Here is the substantive heart of both the press release and the letter:

House Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.) and Congressman Steve King (R-Iowa) have requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) study the cost of crime in the United States to better inform members of the House Judiciary Committee as it continues its bipartisan criminal justice reform initiative.  In 2014, there were nearly 1.2 million violent crimes and 8.3 million property crimes in the United States, generating substantial costs for Americans, communities, and the country. In a letter to Comptroller General Gene Dodaro, Goodlatte and King request that the GAO study this issue and breakdown the cost of crime for federal, state, and local governments.

Below is the text of the letter....  

Dear Comptroller General Dodaro:

In June of last year, the House Judiciary Committee launched a criminal justice reform initiative.  Over the ensuing months, the Committee has addressed a variety of criminal justice issues through legislation. In order to assist our efforts in this endeavor, we are writing to you regarding our concerns about the cost of crime in the United States.  According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, there were an estimated 1,165,383 violent crimes and an estimated 8,277,829 property crimes in 2014.  Undoubtedly, these and other crimes generate substantial costs to society at individual, community, and national levels. 

Accordingly, we seek the assistance of the Government Accountability Office in fully investigating the cost of crime in the United States.  Specifically, we are interested in:

  1. The cost of Federal and State crimes to victims of crime:
    1. Total cost
    2. Cost by state
  2. The cost of crime to the United States economy and to state economies
  3. The cost of crime to Federal, State, and local governments
  4. The cost of crime, per year:
    1. Per type of criminal offense
    2. Average cost per criminal  
    3. Average cost per victim
  5. The rate of recidivism of offenders who are released from terms of imprisonment, and the costs described under #1 through #3 for crimes committed by such offenders subsequent to their release  

We look forward to working with you so that GAO can expeditiously complete this important task. 

I am already very excited to see what the GAO comes up with as it takes up this request to "study the cost of crime in the United States." Indeed, upon seeing this press release, I started thinking it was quite notable and somewhat curious that there apparently has not been any prior requests for the GAO to engaging in what I agree is an "important task."

That said, I think this task has to start with important and challenging questions that are integral to defining what kinds of "Crimes" and what kinds of "costs" are to be included in this study and its efforts at accounting. Notably, this letter references the "nearly 1.2 million violent crimes and 8.3 million property crimes in the United States" as reported by the FBI, but this accounting leaves out what would seem to be some of the most wide-spread significant crimes in America according to various measures of nationwide illegal behaviors each year, namely drunk driving (with over 100 million estimated yearly incidents) and marijuana trafficking (over 50 million estimated incidents). Should the GAO leave out drunk driving incidents unless one includes a physical harm to persons or property? Should the GAO leave out marijuana offenses altogether in its accounting even though roughly half of all drug arrests nationwide are for these offenses and those arrests have various obvious economic costs to governments?

Ultimately, though, the challenge of defining what "crimes" to consider pales in comparison to defining what "costs" to consider in this kind of study. The majority of violent crimes recorded by the FBI are aggravated assaults, which are "an unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily injury." And these kinds of assaults seem to come in all shapes and sizes in 2014 according to FBI data: Of those reported to law enforcement, "26.9 percent were committed with personal weapons, such as hands, fists, or feet. Firearms were used in 22.5 percent of aggravated assaults, and knives or cutting instruments were used in 18.8 percent. Other weapons were used in 31.9 percent of aggravated assaults." Can GAO reasonably guess that the "costs" to a victim of being severely beaten by fists are less (or perhaps more) than the costs of being shot? Do these costs turn significantly on the nature of the victim based on their age, health, gender or professional activities? If such an assault requires a person to say in bed for a week to recover, should we say the "costs" of missed acitivities are the same or are different for, say, a sales clerk or a student or an unemployed person?

Critically, as the image reprinted here highlights, doing these calculations is possible if you make a lot of assumptions.  Indeed, the Rand Corporation has run these numbers in the past, although many questions and concerns could obviously be raised about its accounting decisions.

March 6, 2016 in Data on sentencing, National and State Crime Data, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Saturday, March 05, 2016

"From Mass Incarceration to Mass Control, and Back Again: How Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a For-Profit Nightmare"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new and timely article now available via SSRN and authored by Carl Takei.  Here is the abstract:

Since 2010, advocates on the right and left have increasingly allied to denounce mass incarceration and propose serious reductions in the use of prisons.  This alliance serves useful shared purposes, but each side comes to it with distinct and in many ways incompatible long-term interests. I f progressive advocates rely solely on this alliance without aggressively building our own vision of what decarceration should look like, the unintended consequences could be serious.
This Article describes the current mass incarceration paradigm and current left-right reform efforts. It then outlines how, if progressives do not set clear goals for what should replace mass incarceration, these bipartisan efforts risk creating a nightmare scenario of mass control, surveillance, and monitoring of Black and Brown communities.  Finally, the Article explains why this mass control paradigm would lay the groundwork for a heavily-privatized, extraordinarily difficult-to-end resurgence of mass incarceration in subsequent decades.

March 5, 2016 in Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Friday, March 04, 2016

"The Absence of Equality and Human Dignity Values Makes American Sentencing Systems Fundamentally Different from Those in Other Western Countries"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now available via SSRN authored by Michael Tonry.  Here is the abstract:

Concern for equality and human dignity is largely absent from American sentencing.  Prison sentences are imposed much more often than in any other Western country and prison terms are incomparably longer.  The greater frequency of imprisonment is a product of punitive attitudes and politicization of crime control policies.  The longer terms result partly from abolition of parole release in every jurisdiction for all or some inmates, but mostly from the proliferation since the mid-1980s of mandatory minimum, three-strikes, life without parole, and truth-in-sentencing laws.

The ideas that offenders should be treated as equals and with concern and respect for their interests largely disappeared, though they had been animating values of earlier indeterminate and determinate sentencing systems.  Their disregard is evident in the nature of contemporary laws but also in low-visibility policies and practices including the near absence of meaningful systems of appellate sentence review, low standards of proof — or none at all — at the sentencing stage, and the absence of policies that limit the weight given to past convictions in the sentencing of new offenses or set standards for sentencing of people convicted of multiple offenses.

March 4, 2016 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)