Sunday, December 16, 2012

Could latest tragic mass shooting prompt renewed consideration of "smart gun" technologies?

Like so many others, I have been struggling to come to terms with the largely incomprehensible and horrifically tragic mass murder in Connecticut on Friday.  And the struggle has not been especially aided by another round of the same old debates over the politics and practicalities of gun control and over the so-called "gun culture" in the United States.  But a helpful reader reminded me of my posts nearly five years ago here and here about the prospect of smart-gun technologies being a possible frontier for a better gun control discourse.

Because I am not well-versed on gun manufacturing or the modern devises that now control and monitor smart phones and smart cars, I still cannot readily discuss what kind of engineering might have allowed Adam Lanza's mother to buy all the guns she wanted without making it so easy for her son to murder her and so many innocent teachers and children with her guns.  But I have an inkling that most (all?) legal gun purchasers — and surely all law enforcement agencies — would love to have guns that, through some sort of advanced technological means, would become disabled if pointed toward the authorized owner and/or would not function in certain regions and/or would not fire more than a single shot without a special user code. 

Rather than go on and on as I did years ago concerning the seeming value (and failure of) advancing smart-gun technologies with the help of modern GPS tracking, I will close here by linking to my old posts on this topic and by encouraging readers to supply links to any new (or old) discussions of new gun technologies.

Prior posts from way back in February 2008:

UPDATE:  For clarity, I wanted to add that I fully recognize that smart-gun technologies would surely not eliminate all (or even most) gun crimes or harmful/illegal uses of firearms.  But I do think advanced gun technology could and should reduce misuse and harms, just as smart car and related safety technologies have reduced the number and severity of car accidents.

December 16, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (31) | TrackBack

Thursday, December 13, 2012

Does the last decade add support for "more guns, less crime" claims?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new USA Today story, which is headlined "Federal gun checks surge as violent crime ebbs."  Here is how the piece starts:

The number of federally required background checks of prospective gun purchasers has nearly doubled in the past decade — a time when violent crime has been in long decline in many places across the USA, according to FBI records.

The bureau's National Instant Check System (NICS) does not track actual firearms sales — multiple guns can be included in one purchase.  But the steady rise in background checks — from 8.5 million in 2002 to 16.8 million in 2012 — tracks other indicators that signal escalating gun sales.

Advocates on both sides of the gun-rights debate disagree over what is driving the trend. Gun-rights groups attribute the steady increase to the growing popularity of hunting and other gun-recreation uses, the impact of state laws allowing citizens to carry concealed handguns and concerns that the Obama administration will push for laws restricting weapons purchases.

Gun-control advocates, led by the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, say existing gun owners are responsible for most new purchases (about 20% of gun owners possess 65% of the nation's guns, according to a 2006 Harvard study).  Brady Campaign President Dan Gross said concerns about new gun-control laws are part of a "marketing ploy" to keep firearms moving.

No gun-control legislation was passed in President Obama's first term and no major proposal was offered during the 2012 presidential election campaign.  Still, there is an "expectation" that new gun-control proposals will surface in Obama's second term, said National Rifle Association Executive Vice President Wayne LaPierre.  "People expect a siege on the Second Amendment (right to bear arms).''

Larry Keane, senior vice president of the National Shooting Sports Foundation, said gun-related recreation — from hunting to target shooting on the range — is growing, too.  From 2006 through 2011, spending on hunting equipment grew by nearly 30%, according to a national survey published in August by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

Keane said the overall firearms industry has thrived despite the sputtering economy and the decline in violent crime. "Personal safety still is a big reason people purchase firearms," Keane said.  "The economic downturn, I think, raised fears that crime would eventually go back up."

December 13, 2012 in Data on sentencing, Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (10) | TrackBack

Tuesday, December 11, 2012

Split Seventh Circuit panel extended Second Amendment rights to outside home

I have not blogged much of late on Second Amendment jurisprudence, in part because it seems all lower courts have no qualms about saying the the purported "fundamental right" to "keep and bear arms" recognized by the Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald has no application whatsoever to non-violent felons or certain misdemeanants.  Still, a big Second Amendment ruling today from a Seventh Circuit panel in Moore v. Madigan, No. 12-1269 (7th Cir. Dec. 11, 2012) (available here), struck me as blog-worthy.  Here is the close of the majority opinion (per Judge Posner):

We are disinclined to engage in another round of historical analysis to determine whether eighteenth-century America understood the Second Amendment to include a right to bear guns outside the home.  The Supreme Court has decided that the amendment confers a right to bear arms for self-defense, which is as important outside the home as inside.  The theoretical and empirical evidence (which overall is inconclusive) is consistent with concluding that a right to carry firearms in public may promote self-defense.  Illinois had to provide us with more than merely a rational basis for believing that its uniquely sweeping ban is justified by an increase in public safety.  It has failed to meet this burden.  The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment therefore compels us to reverse the decisions in the two cases before us and remand them to their respective district courts for the entry of declarations of unconstitutionality and permanent injunctions.  Nevertheless we order our mandate stayed for 180 days to allow the Illinois legislature to craft a new gun law that will impose reasonable limitations, consistent with the public safety and the Second Amendment as interpreted in this opinion, on the carrying of guns in public.

December 11, 2012 in Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Tuesday, October 09, 2012

What do folks think of a local "violence tax" on guns and ammunition?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new local article out of Chicago, headlined "Cook County Considers 'Violence Tax'." Here are the interesting details:

A potential Cook County tax takes aim at guns, and gun rights activists aren't happy about it.

County president Toni Preckwinkle is considering a "violence tax" on guns and ammunition to help plug a $115 million budget gap in 2013. Under the tax, guns and ammunition would cost more, according to the Chicago Sun-Times, but Preckwinkle isn't saying how much more just yet.

The idea follows a violent Chicago summer, when some weekends left multiple people killed and dozens others injured in shootings. The city's murder rate is up 25 percent, and the Cook County Jail is near capacity with 9,000-plus inmates....

The idea raises questions about how much this would raise for the county and whether the tax would really cut down on crime.

"If we can tax cigarettes, it seems we can tax bullets and guns," said Chicago resident Cathryn Taylor. "But at the same time, I get the point that if people are buying the stuff illegally, then the tax doesn't matter because they aren't going through legal channels anyway."

The idea has come up before. Ald. Roberto Maldonado (26th) pushed for a 10-cent per-bullet tax back in 2007 when he was Cook County board commissioner. That didn't happen....

Preckwinkle's budget proposal is set to be unveiled Oct. 18, and an ammunition tax isn't the only potential money maker on the table. The board president reportedly wants to lease the top two floors of the County Building in Chicago's Loop for what she estimates could net at least $1 million a year for 10 years.

In response to this story, I cannot help but think about Chris Rock's great riff on gun control and "bullet control" in which he explains just why the world would be so much better if each bullet cost $5,000.

October 9, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack

Sunday, September 09, 2012

"Decisional Minimalism and the Judicial Evaluation of Gun Regulations"

The title of this post is the title of this intriguing looking new piece by Professor Richard Boldt now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In District of Columbia v. Heller, a sharply divided United States Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, made clear that the Court’s recognition of this right, which it found inconsistent with the District of Columbia’s restriction on the possession of handguns in the home, did not mean that persons have “a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.” The Court chose not to delineate “the full scope of the Second Amendment,” and also “declin[ed] to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions.” The majority opinion in Heller is significant both for the constitutional right it established and for the questions of scope and operation associated with that right that it left unresolved. Justice Scalia’s choice to write this “narrow” opinion has “unleashed a flood of litigation” in the lower courts, as litigants and judges have confronted the uncertainty purposely left by the Supreme Court majority.

Woollard v. Sheridan, a test case brought in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland by Raymond Woollard and the Second Amendment Foundation, is one of many such cases to be presented in recent months. While Justice Scalia’s Heller decision relies on familiar conservative interpretive methods, including a hard-edged textual analysis and a heavy dose of originalism, in order to find a “core” right of individual citizens to possess guns in their homes for self defense, his further choice to avoid resolving significant questions of scope and operation reflects a different form of conservative constitutional jurisprudence, which professor Cass Sunstein has termed “Burkean minimalism.” To the extent that the Supreme Court embraced Burkean minimalism in Heller, the tradition of balanced handgun regulation in the states generally, and the more particular regulatory practice in Maryland, ought to count significantly in both the determination of the scope of the right and in its operation. The exercise of judicial review under these circumstances should be characterized by a deferential stance toward the sensitive public policy judgments reached decades ago and maintained over the years by officials in the legislative and executive branches of state government. Many lower courts confronting these issues have explicitly or implicitly recognized the essentially conservative nature of this developing jurisprudence, its Burkean incrementalism. The District Court in Woollard chose a more aggressive path, and in that respect misread the important cautionary signals that the Supreme Court majority has provided.

September 9, 2012 in Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Monday, July 30, 2012

Notable comments from Justice Scalia on the Second and Eighth Amendments

Justice Scalia is making the rounds as part of a book promotion tour, and on Sunday he appeared on the "Fox News Sunday" program. This Reuters article about the appearance reports on some of his comments about two Amendments that are often of special interest to sentencing fans.  Here are excerpts:

In light of the July 20 massacre in which a gunman killed 12 moviegoers in Colorado, Scalia was asked whether legislatures could ban the sale of semiautomatic weapons.  He said the 2008 [Heller] ruling stated that future cases will determine "what limitations upon the right to bear arms are permissible.  Some undoubtedly are."

Scalia -- a proponent of the idea that the Constitution must be interpreted using the meaning of its text at the time it was written -- cited "a tort called affrighting" that existed when the Second Amendment was drafted in the 18th century making it a misdemeanor to carry "a really horrible weapon just to scare people like a head ax."

"So yes, there are some limitations that can be imposed," he said.  "I mean, obviously, the amendment does not apply to arms that cannot be hand-carried.  It's to 'keep and bear' (arms).  So, it doesn't apply to cannons.  But I suppose there are handheld rocket launchers that can bring down airplanes that will have to be ... decided."

Regarding the death penalty, Scalia said opponents want it struck under the ban on cruel and unusual punishment included in the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. "But it's absolutely clear that the American people never voted to proscribe the death penalty," he said.  "They adopted a cruel and unusual punishment clause at the time when every state had the death penalty and every state continued to have it.  Nobody thought that the Eighth Amendment prohibited it."

July 30, 2012 in Death Penalty Reforms, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10) | TrackBack

Friday, June 01, 2012

Second Circuit rejects Second Amendment attack on federal firearm possession statute

Thanks to a very helpful reader, I see that the Second Circuit has a notable new Second Amendment opinion in US v. Decastro, No. 10-3773 (2d Cir. June 1, 2012) (available here). Here is how the majority opinion (per Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs) gets started:

Following a bench trial on stipulated facts in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Patterson, J.), Angel Decastro was convicted of transporting into his state of residence a firearm acquired in another state in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3).  Decastro appeals on the ground that § 922(a)(3) violates his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms.  He argues: [1] that § 922(a)(3) is unconstitutional on its face; and [2] that, in combination with New York’s licensing scheme, the prohibition on the transportation into New York of a firearm purchased in another state made it virtually impossible for him to obtain a handgun for self-defense. For the following reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Judge Hall concurs in a separate opinion in order to "enunciate how [he] reach[es] the determination that § 922(a)(3) does not impose a substantial burden on the exercise of Decastro’s Second Amendment right."

Until I have a chance to review this opinion more thoroughly, I cannot predict with confidence how strong supports of broad and potent Second Amendment rights might react to this ruling. But I can already predict that NYC Mayor Bloomberg, a very strong advocate of very strong gun control, is certain to be very pleased with this opinion (unless Chief Judge Jacobs happened to hand the opinion down in Manhattan while drinking a Big Gulp of Mountain Dew).

June 1, 2012 in Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Monday, May 07, 2012

Fascinating discussion of Second Amendment in Tenth Circuit's affirmance of alien-in-possession conviction

The Tenth Circuit handed down a really interesting opinion this afternoon in the course of rejecting a set of constitutional attacks on 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(5)(A), which prohibits illegal aliens from possessing firearms.  As explained at the start of the opinion in US v. Huitron-Guizar, No. 11-8051 (11th Cir. May 7, 2012) (available here), the defendant in this case moved "to dismiss the indictment on grounds that § 922(g)(5) unconstitutionally abridges the right to bear arms as interpreted in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), and violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (which applies to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause)."  Here are some of the many interesting passages from the Tenth Circuit 's discussion:

The right to bear arms, however venerable, is qualified by what one might call the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why.”...

Our issue concerns the “who.” Section 922(g), a part of the amended Gun Control Act of 1968, forbids gun possession by nine classes of individuals: felons, fugitives, addicts or users of controlled substances, the mentally ill, illegal and non-immigrant aliens, the dishonorably discharged, renouncers of their citizenship, those subject to court orders for harassing, stalking, or threatening intimate partners or their children, and those convicted for misdemeanor domestic violence.  No Second Amendment challenge since Heller to any of these provisions has succeeded....

Mr. Huitron-Guizar agrees that those guilty of serious crimes and the mentally ill are sensibly stripped of firearms they might otherwise lawfully keep.  Yet he wonders what it is about aliens that permits Congress to impose what he considers a similar disability?...

The [Supreme] Court [in a 1990 Fourth Amendment ruling] seemed unwilling to say that illegal aliens, who reside here voluntarily and who accept some social obligations, have no rights the government is bound to respect when, say, they protest a raid or detention. Instead, Verdugo-Urquidez teaches that “People” is a word of broader content than “citizens,” and of narrower content than “persons.”...

How, historically, has this country regulated weapon possession by foreigners?  Are we to understand gun ownership as among the private rights not generally denied aliens, like printing newspapers or tending a farm, or one of the rights tied to self-government, like voting and jury service, largely limited to citizens?...

We think we can avoid the constitutional question by assuming, for purposes of this case, that the Second Amendment, as a “right of the people,” could very well include, in the absence of a statute restricting such a right, at least some aliens unlawfully here — and still easily find § 922(g)(5) constitutional.

Among the many joys that come from reading all of the Tenth Circuit's work in this case is to see how quickly the panel dispatches a very original (and very unlikely to succeed) effort to spin a political controversy into an argument for a reduced sentence: "Finally, the argument that a departure or variance was in order based on governmental conduct is meritless.  The attempt to connect, in a vague, freewheeling way, the gun possession at issue here with the Fast and Furious Operation of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives is not persuasive."

May 7, 2012 in Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack

Friday, April 13, 2012

A justifiably(?) long prison term for exteme child-care stupidity

It is really hard to have any sympathy for really mean people who hurt children, but this local sentencing story from Illinois, headlined "Rockford man gets 12 years for burning child with iron," leads me to wonder whether we ought to have perhaps a little sympathy for really stupid people who hurt children. Here are the details:

A man who ironed a shirt while it was on the back of an 18-month-old girl pleaded guilty Wednesday to aggravated battery to a child and was sentenced to 12 years in prison. Elliott Moore, 43, of Rockford was sentenced by Judge Rosemary Collins, Winnebago County State’s Attorney Joe Bruscato announced today.

On Feb. 5, 2010, Rockford police officers were sent to Rockford Memorial Hospital to take a report of aggravated battery to a child. Officers learned that the child had a large, open burn mark in the middle of the back.

The child’s mother reported Moore was her live-in care provider who watched her children while she was at school. The mother said on Feb. 4, 2010, she returned home and found Moore standing in the parking lot holding a bag of his clothes, stating he had to go to work. She said he was very agitated and that she knew he did not need to be at work for quite some time. That evening, the mother indicated her daughter was up all night crying. When she changed the child’s clothing, she noticed a large, open burn on her back, Bruscato said.

During an interview with detectives, Moore said he was watching the child and a sibling and was having difficulty ironing because the child was on his lap.  He said that he placed one of his work shirts on the child’s back and ironed.  The defendant said the child woke up crying, and he saw that he had burned her back. He said he then put cold water on her back and put the child in a sleeper....

Aggravated battery to a child is a Class 2 felony with a sentencing range of three to seven years in prison.  Because of the victim’s age, Moore was eligible for an extended term — a range of three to 14 years in prison.

Perhaps I am naive to take at face value the defendant's account of how he burned this toddler, and perhaps deep evil (rather than deep stupidity) is involved here and justifies a decade+ in a cage for this crime.  Still, if the poor child ultimately has no enduring harms and if the defendant truly was just guilty of being huge idiot, I wonder if anyone else questions whether the judge here really needed to nearly max-out the defendant's sentence.

April 13, 2012 in Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Tuesday, February 28, 2012

Is California's prison population reduction going as well as it seems?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this local article headlined "California prisons clearing out."  Here are excerpts:

Images of California's overcrowded prisons are so striking that the U.S. Supreme Court included two photographs of the problem in last year's landmark opinion that forced the state to address the issue.

On Friday, state corrections leaders will announce they have made an important step toward their goal to ease overcrowding, finally getting rid of the last of thousands of bunks that were crammed into day rooms, gymnasiums and other spaces to hold inmates.

In a news conference scheduled to be held at the Deuel Vocational Institution in Tracy, corrections chief Matthew Cate and other officials are scheduled to announce the end of what the department itself calls "iconic images of (the) overcrowding crisis."...

The use of what the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation calls "nontraditional beds" peaked at just under 20,000 in 2007, Callison said.  Their use stemmed from the prison system at one point holding twice as many inmates as the 80,000 it was designed to house.  "The degree of overcrowding in California's prisons is exceptional ..." the Supreme Court concluded in its May 2011 opinion, which described in graphic detail how officials found room to house them....

Following the court's order that the state reduce its prison population by 33,000 inmates to bring it to 137.5 percent of capacity, state officials went to work.  Gov. Jerry Brown's "realignment" plan, which shifts responsibility for some offenders considered low-level, nonviolent and nonserious to county jails, has since helped cut the prison population from about 144,000 inmates to about 127,770.

"The number of nontraditional beds had been falling since '07, but realignment has basically taken us over the finish line," Callison said.  The department hopes to reduce overall population to 137.5 percent of capacity -- about 110,000 inmates -- by June 2013.

It is surely way too early to reach a final judgment (or even a mid-stream judgment) about whether the Plata prison overcrowding litigation and California's prison-population-reduction responses has proven to be a great public policy success.  But I continue to see in the California papers positive stories like the one reported here, while I am yet to see many stories reflecting the parade of horribles sometimes described by those who opposed the various prison reduction orders during the Plata litigation. Thus the question in the title of this post.

February 28, 2012 in Prisons and prisoners, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack

Friday, February 24, 2012

"Second Amendment Penumbras: Some Preliminary Observations"

The title of this post is the title of this new short paper by Glenn Harlan Reynolds, which is now available via SSRN and has this on-sentence abstract: "With the Second Amendment now a working part of the Bill Of Rights in the wake of the Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. Chicago, this brief Essay examines the likely extent of penumbral rights under the Second Amendment, as well as the possible effect on unenumerated rights in general of an enforceable right to arms."

A quick review of the draft leads me to conclude that Professor Reynolds sees, as do I, how the Second Amendment could now have a potentially profound impact on the application of some criminal gun laws. Consider, for example, this interesting passage from the article:

First Amendment analogies, in fact, suggest another doctrine that might apply: chilling effect.  Traditionally, violation of gun laws was treated as mere malum prohibitum, and penalties for violations were generally light.  During our nation’s interlude of hostility toward guns in the latter half of the twentieth century, penalties for violations of gun laws, especially in states with generally anti-gun philosophies, became much stiffer.  Gun ownership was treated as a suspect (or perhaps “deviant” is a better word) act — one to be engaged in, if at all, at the actor’s peril.

But with gun ownership now recognized as an important constitutional right belonging to all Americans, that deviant characterization cannot be correct.  Regulation of firearms cannot now justifiably proceed on an in terrorem approach, in which the underlying goal is to discourage people from having anything to do with firearms at all.  Laws treating fairly minor or technical violations as felonies must be regarded with the same sort of suspicion as pre–New York Times v. Sullivan laws on criminal libel: as improper burdens on the exercise of a constitutional right.

February 24, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Monday, January 23, 2012

Doesn't Heller and McDonald impact old precedents concerning federal FIP crimes?

The question in the title of this post is prompted an interesting (and I think incorrect) ruling today by a Tenth Circuit panel in US v. Games-Perez, No. 11-1011 (10th Cir. Jan. 23, 2012) (available here).  The issue and basics of the ruling are explained in the majority opinions's first paragraph:  

Defendant and appellant Miguel Games-Perez was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  Claiming that he was unaware that he was actually a felon, Mr. Games-Perez filed a motion inlimine, seeking a pre-trial ruling that the government was required to prove that he actually knew he was a felon.   When that motion was denied, Mr. Games-Perez filed a motion to enter a conditional guilty plea under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2), asking to reserve the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion in limine. The district court granted Mr. Games-Perez’s motion, pursuant to which he entered a conditional guilty plea. The district court sentenced him to fiftyseven months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Mr. Games-Perez appeals his sentence, which we affirm.

The majority opinion affirms the ruling that the defendant need not know he was a felon in order to be guilty of the federal crime of "felon-in-possission" of a firearm by reaffirming a 1996 ruling of the circuit that no mens rea is required as to the "is a felon" element of this federal crime.  Whether that was a sound ruling in 1996 is debatable, but it strikes me that it is a constitutionally problematic ruling in the wake of the SCOTUS Second Amendment rulings in Heller and McDonald that certain persons have a constitutional right to possess a firearm in certain circumstances.

Notably, in a separate lengthy concurrence, Judge Gorsuch assails the soundness of the 1996 precedent stressed by the majority with reference to the Second Amendment:

Following the statutory text would simply require the government to prove that the defendant knew of his prior felony conviction. And there’s nothing particularly strange about that. After all, there is “a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by private individuals in this country,” and the Supreme Court has held the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to own firearms and may not be infringed lightly. Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). At the same time, of course, the Court has expressly indicated that laws dispossessing felons are consistent with the Constitution. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; but see United States v. McCane, 573 F.3d 1037, 1048-49 (10th Cir. 2009) (Tymkovich, J., concurring) (questioning the Court’s analysis on this score). And given all this, it is hardly crazy to think that in a § 922(g)(1) prosecution Congress might require the government to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the only fact (his felony status) separating criminal behavior from not just permissible, but constitutionally protected, conduct.

But, despite this astute analysis, Judge Gorsuch feel compelled to follow the circuit's 1996 precedent rather than to conclude (as his own reasoning suggests) that Heller and McDonald makes this old precedent constitutionally suspect.  Curious -- and worrisome for anyone seriously committed to gun right and/or concerned about broad application of vague laws limiting gun possession.

January 23, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack

Wednesday, January 04, 2012

Fourth Circuit suggests people must be "responsible" to get full Second Amendment protection

The Fourth Circuit has an interesting and notable Second Amendment ruling today in US v. Chapman, No. No. 10-5071 (4th Cir. Jan. 4, 2012) (available here). Here is how the opinion begins, the passage that prompts the title of this post, and the ends of the opinion:

Section 922(g)(8) of Title 18 of the United States Code prohibits a person who is subject to a domestic violence protective order issued under certain specified circumstances from, inter alia, possessing a firearm or ammunition in or affecting interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). The sole issue raised on appeal by Ronald Chapman (Chapman) is whether his conviction on one count of violating § 922(g)(8) survives his as-applied constitutional challenge under the Second Amendment, U.S. Const. amend. II.  For reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the district court [which rejected the defendant's Second Amendment claim]....

Chapman’s claim is not within the core right identified in Heller — the right of a law-abiding, responsible citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense. Assuming arguendo that Chapman was a law-abiding citizen at the time he possessed the six firearms and 991 cartridges of ammunition set forth in the indictment, he was, without a doubt, not a responsible citizen by virtue of: (1) a judicial finding that he likely committed domestic abuse; (2) his engaging in behavior causing him to be judicially prohibited for 180 days from using, attempting to use, or threatening to use physical force against his intimate partner that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; (3) his serious attempts at suicide using firearms in the very home in which he claims to have possessed such firearms for self-defense and his endangering the life of his ex-wife in the process; and (4) his discharge of a firearm out of the bedroom window in the direction of his ex-wife.   Accordingly, we conclude that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard of scrutiny for Chapman and similarly situated persons....

We also recognize that the prohibitory net cast by § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii) may be somewhat overinclusive given that not every person who falls within in it would misuse a firearm against his own child, an intimate partner, or a child of such intimate partner, if permitted to possess one. This point does not undermine the constitutionality of § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii), however, because it merely suggests that the fit is not a perfect one; a reasonable fit is all that is required under intermediate scrutiny....

For the reasons stated, we hold that § 922(g)(8)(A)-(B) and (C)(ii), as applied to Chapman, satisfies the intermediate scrutiny standard in analyzing his Second Amendment challenge to such statute. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court.

This ruling just further confirms my view that the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms is a quirky one among those rights expressly recognized in Bill of Rights.  I doubt that a court would hold that someone could, simply by virtue of being subject to a domestic violence protective order, be subject to federal criminal prosecution for, say, just going to church or writing a book or exercising other First Amendment rights.  Perhaps more worrisome for those who care about gun rights, I wonder if and when folks deeply committed to gun control might claim that persons who are, say, unwilling to register their guns with the authorities are not responsible citizens entitled to full Second Amendment protection.

January 4, 2012 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack

Tuesday, November 29, 2011

Noting some notable denials of cert by SCOTUS on gun rights and CP restitution

As regular readers know, I was giddy yesterday concerning two cert grants by the Supreme Court on sentencing issues (background here): the Justices took up Apprendi's applicability to fines in Southern Union (basics here) and the application of the Fair Sentencing Act in two "pipeline" crack cases (basics here).  However, as well reported in a pair of articles by Warren Richey of the Christian Science Monitor, the Justices denied cert on a couple of notable criminal justices issues as well:

Given that the current SCOTUS Term is already chock full of hot-button issues, I am not very surprised nor very troubled that the Justices decided not to take up new gun and kiddie porn cases.  Still, on both fronts, the only real question seems to be when and how, not whether, these matters will garner Supreme Court review.

November 29, 2011 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Gun policy and sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack

Monday, November 14, 2011

Might restoration of felon gun rights actually reduce recidivism?

As first blogged here, today's New York Times has a lengthy front-page article on state restoration of gun rights to former felons.  The piece is (misleadingly?) headlined "Felons Finding It Easy to Get Gun Rights Reinstated," and the suggestion throughout the article is that the public should be very concerned and quite fearful that some states now make it too easy for some felons to get their gun rights restored after having completed their sentence.  But, because recidivism rates for many offenders are often very high, some of the statistics appearing in the Times piece led me to wonder whether resoration of felon gun rights might actually reduce recidivism and enhance public safety.

The Times article rightly noted that sound data on these matters are had to assemble and assess, but the Times was able to run some notable numbers for Washington state.  Here is some of what the Times found and reported:

That [crime] question — whether the restorations pose a risk to public safety — has received little study, in part because data can be hard to come by.

The Times analyzed data from Washington State....  Since 1995, more than 3,300 felons and people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors have regained their gun rights in the state — 430 in 2010 alone — according to the analysis of data provided by the state police and the court system.  Of that number, more than 400 — about 13 percent — have subsequently committed new crimes, the analysis found.  More than 200 committed felonies, including murder, assault in the first and second degree, child rape and drive-by shooting....

The Times’s analysis found that among the more than 400 people who committed crimes after winning back their gun rights under the new law, more than 70 committed Class A or B felonies.  Over all, more than 80 were convicted of some sort of assault and more than 100 of drug offenses.

So the Times here reports a 13% recidvism rate for Washington state offenders with restored gun rights, but apparenently the recidivism rate is this high only due to counting of minor (i.e., misdemeanor) crimes.  As I understand these numbers, the Times found that only about 200 of the 3,300 prior offenders with restored gun rights since 1995 went on to commit a felony — roughly a 6% felony recidivism rate — and only 70 went on to commit Class A of B felonies — roughly a 2% serious felony recidivism rate.  That strikes me as an impressively low felony and serious felony recidivism rate for these offenders, especially given that states often report that half or more persons with a felony record end up committing a future offense.

Seeking general recidivism data for comparison purposes, I found this April 2008 report from the Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission, titled "Recidivism of Adult Felons, 2007," which reports that in Washington state the "overall rate of recidivism for men was 65.9% compared to 53.6% among women."  (I think it is fair to assume that the majority of felons seeking restoration of gun rights are men.)  Based on this data, is it fair to suggest that offenders with restored gun rights in Washington state are roughly than five times less likely to recidivate that other offenders?  (I also found this January 2011 report from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy which reports that "recidivism rates have declined" in Washington in the period from 1990 to 2006 and that "the largest reductions have been for higher risk offenders.")

This comparative data would seem to at least support a plausible working hypothesis that restoring gun rights to felons might actually reduce recidivism and enhance public safety.  Of course, there is a huge apples/oranges problem in trying to compare these recidivism rates.  I certainly hope and expect that Washington aspires to restore gun rights to former felons who appear to pose the least risk to public safety, and thus we should hope and expect recidivism rates to be generally lower for these folks than for others with a felony record.  Still, given that recidivism rates are appear to be so much lower for those who get their gun rights restored, there is a reasonable basis for at least speculating that the process and grant of restoration of rights works to provide additional encouragement for these former felons to stay crime-free in the future.

Some related Second Amendment and gun policy posts:

November 14, 2011 in Data on sentencing, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (21) | TrackBack

Big (ugly?) NY Times report on felons getting back gun rights

This morning's New York Times has this huge front-page story headlined "Felons Finding It Easy to Get Gun Rights Reinstated." Disappointingly (but not surprisingly), the theme of the article is decidedly not praise for efforts by some states to make it easier for former felons to regain a fundamental constitutional right.  Here are some excerpts from an article that should (and likely will) be the subject of lots of discussion and commentary:

Under federal law, people with felony convictions forfeit their right to bear arms. Yet every year, thousands of felons across the country have those rights reinstated, often with little or no review. In several states, they include people convicted of violent crimes, including first-degree murder and manslaughter, an examination by The New York Times has found.

While previously a small number of felons were able to reclaim their gun rights, the process became commonplace in many states in the late 1980s, after Congress started allowing state laws to dictate these reinstatements — part of an overhaul of federal gun laws orchestrated by the National Rifle Association. The restoration movement has gathered force in recent years, as gun rights advocates have sought to capitalize on the 2008 Supreme Court ruling that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to bear arms.

This gradual pulling back of what many Americans have unquestioningly assumed was a blanket prohibition has drawn relatively little public notice. Indeed, state law enforcement agencies have scant information, if any, on which felons are getting their gun rights back, let alone how many have gone on to commit new crimes.

While many states continue to make it very difficult for felons to get their gun rights back — and federal felons are out of luck without a presidential pardon — many other jurisdictions are far more lenient, The Times found. In some, restoration is automatic for nonviolent felons as soon as they complete their sentences. In others, the decision is left up to judges, but the standards are generally vague, the process often perfunctory. In some states, even violent felons face a relatively low bar, with no waiting period before they can apply....

Margaret C. Love, a pardon lawyer based in Washington, D.C., who has researched gun rights restoration laws, estimated that, depending on the type of crime, in more than half the states felons have a reasonable chance of getting back their gun rights.

That universe could well expand, as pro-gun groups shed a historical reluctance to advocate publicly for gun rights for felons. Lawyers litigating Second Amendment issues are also starting to challenge the more restrictive restoration laws. Pro-gun groups have pressed the issue in the last few years in states as diverse as Alaska, Ohio, Oregon and Tennessee.

Ohio’s Legislature confronted the matter when it passed a law this year fixing a technicality that threatened to invalidate the state’s restorations. Ken Hanson, legislative chairman of the Buckeye Firearms Coalition, argued that felons should be able to reclaim their gun rights just as they can other civil rights. “If it’s a constitutional right, you treat it with equal dignity with other rights,” he said.

But Toby Hoover, executive director of the Ohio Coalition Against Gun Violence, contended that the public was safer without guns in the hands of people who have committed serious crimes. “It seems that Ohio legislators have plenty of problems to solve that should be a much higher priority than making sure criminals have guns,” Ms. Hoover said in written testimony.

That question — whether the restorations pose a risk to public safety — has received little study, in part because data can be hard to come by.

The Times analyzed data from Washington State.... Since 1995, more than 3,300 felons and people convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors have regained their gun rights in the state — 430 in 2010 alone — according to the analysis of data provided by the state police and the court system. Of that number, more than 400 — about 13 percent — have subsequently committed new crimes, the analysis found. More than 200 committed felonies, including murder, assault in the first and second degree, child rape and drive-by shooting....

[T]he restoration of civil rights, which is now central to regaining gun rights, is relatively routine, automatic in many states upon completion of a sentence. In some states, felons must also petition for a judicial order specifically restoring firearms rights. Other potential paths include a pardon from the governor or state clemency board or a “set aside”— essentially, an annulment — of the conviction.

Today, in at least 11 states, including Kansas, Ohio, Minnesota and Rhode Island, restoration of firearms rights is automatic, without any review at all, for many nonviolent felons, usually once they finish their sentences, or after a certain amount of time crime-free. Even violent felons may petition to have their firearms rights restored in states like Ohio, Minnesota and Virginia. Some states, including Georgia and Nebraska, award scores of pardons every year that specifically confer gun privileges.

Felons face steep odds, though, in states like California, where the governor’s office gives out only a handful of pardons every year, if that. “It’s a long, drawn-out process,” said Steve Lindley, chief of the State Department of Justice’s firearms bureau. “They were convicted of a felony crime. There are penalties for that.”

Studies on the impact of gun restrictions largely support barring felons from possessing firearms. One study, published in the American Journal of Public Health in 1999, found that denying handgun purchases to felons cut their risk of committing new gun or violent crimes by 20 to 30 percent. A year earlier, a study in the Journal of the American Medical Association found that handgun purchasers with at least one prior misdemeanor — not even a felony — were more than seven times as likely as those with no criminal history to be charged with new offenses over a 15-year period.

Criminologists studying recidivism have found that felons usually have to stay out of trouble for about a decade before their risk of committing a crime equals that of people with no records. According to Alfred Blumstein, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, for violent offenders, that period is 11 to 15 years; for drug offenders, 10 to 14 years; and for those who have committed property crimes, 8 to 11 years. An important caveat: Professor Blumstein did not look at what happens when felons are given guns....

Washington’s gun rights restoration statute dates to a 1995 statewide initiative, the Hard Times for Armed Crimes Act, that toughened penalties for crimes involving firearms. The initiative was spearheaded, in part, by pro-gun activists, including leaders of the Second Amendment Foundation, an advocacy group, and the N.R.A.

Although it drew little notice at the time, the legislation also included an expansion of what had been very limited eligibility for restoration of firearms rights. “There were a lot of people who we felt should be able to get their gun rights restored who could not,” said Alan M. Gottlieb, founder of the Second Amendment Foundation, who was active in the effort.

Under the legislation, “Class A” felons — who have committed the most serious crimes, like murder and manslaughter — are ineligible, as are sex offenders. Otherwise, judges are required to grant the petitions as long as, essentially, felons have not been convicted of any new crimes in the five years after completing their sentences. Judges have no discretion to deny the requests based upon character, mental health or any other factors. Mr. Gottlieb said they explicitly wrote the statute this way. “We were having problems with judges that weren’t going to restore rights no matter what,” he said.

The statute’s mix of strictness and leniency makes Washington a useful testing ground. The Times’s analysis found that among the more than 400 people who committed crimes after winning back their gun rights under the new law, more than 70 committed Class A or B felonies. Over all, more than 80 were convicted of some sort of assault and more than 100 of drug offenses.

 

November 14, 2011 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Gun policy and sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (14) | TrackBack

Thursday, November 03, 2011

"The Right Not to Keep or Bear Arms"

The title of this post is the title of this terrifically-interesting new paper on SSRN by Professor Joseph Blocher.  Here is the abstract:

Sometimes a constitutional right to do a particular thing is accompanied by a right not to do that thing. The First Amendment, for example, guarantees both the right to speak and the right not to speak.  This Article asks whether the Second Amendment should likewise be read to encompass both the right to keep or bear arms for self-defense and the inverse right to protect oneself by avoiding them, and what practical implications, if any, the latter right would have.

The Article concludes -- albeit with some important qualifications -- that a right not to keep or bear arms is implied by what the Supreme Court has called the “core” and “central component” of the Second Amendment: self-defense, especially in the home.  Recognizing such a right might call into question the constitutionality of the growing number of “antigun control” laws that make it difficult or illegal for private individuals to avoid having guns in their actual or constructive possession.

November 3, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack

Wednesday, October 26, 2011

"Record-Low 26% in U.S. Favor Handgun Ban"

N9ggmdee1k60atawqdbprqThe title of this post comes from the headline of this new Gallup report, which includes this explanation of the latest poll data on gun control sentiments:

A record-low 26% of Americans favor a legal ban on the possession of handguns in the United States other than by police and other authorized people. When Gallup first asked Americans this question in 1959, 60% favored banning handguns. But since 1975, the majority of Americans have opposed such a measure, with opposition around 70% in recent years.

The results are based on Gallup's annual Crime poll, conducted Oct. 6-9. This year's poll finds support for a variety of gun-control measures at historical lows, including the ban on handguns, which is Gallup's longest continuing gun-control trend.

For the first time, Gallup finds greater opposition to than support for a ban on semiautomatic guns or assault rifles, 53% to 43%. In the initial asking of this question in 1996, the numbers were nearly reversed, with 57% for and 42% against an assault rifle ban. Congress passed such a ban in 1994, but the law expired when Congress did not act to renew it in 2004. Around the time the law expired, Americans were about evenly divided in their views.

Additionally, support for the broader concept of making gun laws "more strict" is at its lowest by one percentage point (43%). Forty-four percent prefer that gun laws be kept as they are now, while 11% favor less strict laws. As recently as 2007, a majority of Americans still favored stricter laws, which had been the dominant view since Gallup first asked the question in 1990.

Americans' preference regarding gun laws is generally that the government enforce existing laws more strictly and not pass new laws (60%) rather than pass new gun laws in addition to stricter enforcement of existing laws (35%). That has been the public's view since Gallup first asked the question in 2000; the 60% this year who want stricter enforcement but no new laws is tied for the high in the trend.

All key subgroups show less support for stricter gun laws, and for a ban on handguns, than they did 20 years ago. In 1991, 68% of Americans favored stricter gun laws and 43% favored a ban on handguns. Those percentages are 43% and 26%, respectively, today.

Relatively few key subgroups favor stricter gun-control laws today, whereas in 1991, all did. Since then, Democrats' views have shown less change, with a 10-point decline in the percentage favoring stricter laws. Republicans show a much larger decline of 35 points. In addition to Democrats, majorities of Eastern residents and those without guns in their household still favor stricter gun laws....

Americans have shifted to a more pro-gun view on gun laws, particularly in recent years, with record-low support for a ban on handguns, an assault rifle ban, and stricter gun laws in general. This is the case even as high-profile incidents of gun violence continue in the United States, such as the January shootings at a meeting for U.S. Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in Arizona.

The reasons for the shift do not appear related to reactions to the crime situation, as Gallup's Crime poll shows no major shifts in the trends in Americans' perceptions of crime, fear of crime, or reports of being victimized by crime in recent years. Nor does it appear to be tied to an increase in gun ownership, which has been around 40% since 2000, though it is a slightly higher 45% in this year's update. The 2011 updates on these trends will appear on Gallup.com in the coming days.

Perhaps the trends are a reflection of the American public's acceptance of guns. In 2008, Gallup found widespread agreement with the idea that the Second Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees the right of Americans to own guns. Americans may also be moving toward more libertarian views in some areas, one example of which is greater support for legalizing marijuana use. Diminished support for gun-control laws may also be tied to the lack of major gun-control legislation efforts in Congress in recent years.

October 26, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Wednesday, October 05, 2011

One of these things is not like the others: Heller, Graham, Kennedy and Booker

250px-CMErnieSortingThe title of this post is inspired by an interesting footnote in the interesting dissent by Judge Kavanaugh in the interesting DC Circuit Second Amendment ruling yesterday (first blogged here).  As readers of any TV generation should know, I am making reference to a classic Sesame Street segment (if you want hum along, go here or here) as a way to set up this interesting insight and discussion from Judge Kavanaugh in footnote 3 near the start of his lengthy dissent:

Heller was similar in its overarching practical and real-world ramifications to recent Supreme Court decisions such as Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).  Those decisions disapproved novel or uncommon state legislative efforts to regulate beyond traditional boundaries in areas that affected enumerated individual constitutional rights — California’s law banning sale of violent video games, Florida’s law permitting life without parole for certain juvenile crimes, Louisiana’s law permitting the death penalty for certain rapes, and Colorado’s law prohibiting gay people from receiving protection from discrimination.  Because those laws were outliers, the decisions invalidating them did not cause major repercussions throughout the Nation.  Heller was a decision in that same vein, in terms of its immediate practical effects in the United States.  By contrast, of course, some Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution’s individual rights provisions not only are significant jurisprudentially but also have substantial practical impacts on common federal or state practices.  See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  Heller was not a decision of that kind.

As a descriptive matter, Judge Kavanaugh is spot on in noting that many of the most high-profile modern SCOTUS constitutional rulings involved invalidation of a "novel or uncommon" and "outlier" piece of state legislation, while a few others upset more common criminal justice practices.  (Thus, the first answer to the Sesame Street question posed above is Booker, which Judge Kavanaugh rights asserts was more disruptive of traditional and common practices than Heller or Graham or Kennedy.)  Critically, though, Judge Kavanaugh goes on to develop a jurisdictional approach to the Second Amendment based in the idea that the novelty or outlier status of any gun regulation makes it constitutionally suspect. I am tempted to call this a Sesame Street approach to the Second Amendment: if a particular jurisdiction's gun regulation is not like a lot of others, then it is (presumptively?) unconstitutional.

Of course, it make plenty of textual sense to assert that a novel or uncommon punishment is constitutionally suspect given the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments."  But it is hard to see just where and how a presumption against novel gun regulation finds expression in the text of the Second Amendment's prohibition on infringements of the right to keep and bear arms.  Moreover, there is a competing constitutional tradition (based in federalism and the decentralization of power) to praise and protect efforts by individual states to try a unique approach to regulation in order to foster a laboratory for legislative innovation.

That all said, I find myself somewhat drawn to this Sesame Street approach to the Second Amendment, in large part because of its super-majoritarian quality and practical convenience.  However, I suspect others may see more virtues than vices in Judge Kavanaugh's jurisprudential approach.  Gosh knows this approach has proved controversial in the Eighth Amendment context, and there is has considerably more textual support than in the Second Amendment setting.

October 5, 2011 in Second Amendment issues, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Tuesday, October 04, 2011

Split DC Circuit panel issues important Second Amendment ruling in via Heller II

The DC Circuit has another big Second Amendment ruling in the Heller case today in Heller v. DC, No. No. 10-703 (DC Cir. Oct. 4, 2011) (available here).   Here is how the majority opinion (per Judge Ginsburg) gets started: 

In June 2008 the Supreme Court held the District of Columbia laws restricting the possession of firearms in one’s home violated the Second Amendment right of individuals to keep and bear arms.   See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570. In the wake of that decision, the District adopted the Firearms Registration Amendment Act of 2008 (FRA), D.C. Law 17-372, which amended the Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975, D.C. Law 1-85.  The plaintiffs in the present case challenge, both facially and as applied to them, the provisions of the District’s gun laws, new and old, requiring the registration of firearms and prohibiting both the registration of “assault weapons” and the possession of magazines with a capacity of more than ten rounds of ammunition. The plaintiffs argue those provisions (1) are not within the District’s congressionally delegated legislative authority or, if they are, then they (2) violate the Second Amendment.

The district court granted summary judgment for the District and the plaintiffs appealed. We hold the District had the authority under D.C. law to promulgate the challenged gun laws, and we uphold as constitutional the prohibitions of assault weapons and of large-capacity magazines and some of the registration requirements.   We remand the other registration requirements to the district court for further proceedings because the record is insufficient to inform our resolution of the important constitutional issues presented.

Here is part of the start of the very lengthy dissent by Judge Kavanaugh:

In this case, we are called upon to assess those provisions of D.C.’s law under Heller.  In so doing, we are of course aware of the longstanding problem of gun violence in the District of Columbia.  In part for that reason, Heller has engendered substantial controversy.  See, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253 (2009); Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32.  As a lower court, however, it is not our role to re-litigate Heller or to bend it in any particular direction.  Our sole job is to faithfully apply Heller and the approach it set forth for analyzing gun bans and regulations.

In my judgment, both D.C.’s ban on semi-automatic rifles and its gun registration requirement are unconstitutional under Heller.

October 4, 2011 in Gun policy and sentencing, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack