Sunday, July 22, 2012

Do US civil commitment procedures risk a "flagrant denial" of human rights?

The question in the title of this post is my response to this (slightly dated) article from the UK's Independent, which is headlined "Court blocks Shawn Sullivan's US extradition."  (Many thanks to the helpful reader who altered me to a story that developed the same day as the SCOTUS health care ruling).  Here is the basic back story:

US government attempts to extradite from Britain a man accused of child sex crimes were blocked by the High Court.... [as] judges sitting in London allowed an appeal against extradition by fugitive Shawn Sullivan, 43, after the American authorities refused to give an assurance that he would not be placed on a controversial sex offenders treatment programme in Minnesota.

Sullivan has been described as one of the US's most-wanted alleged sex criminals, and has also been convicted of sexually assaulting two 12-year-old girls in Ireland. His lawyers argued he could be declared "sexually dangerous" and placed on the US programme without a trial and with no hope of release.

Lord Justice Moses and Mr Justice Eady ruled on June 20 there was a real risk that, if extradited, Sullivan would be subjected to an order of civil commitment to the treatment programme in a "flagrant denial" of his human rights. The judges then gave the US government a last opportunity to provide an assurance that there would be no commitment order made.

Today Lord Justice Moses announced it had been confirmed by the Americans in a post-judgment note that "the United States will not provide an assurance", and Sullivan's appeal under the 2003 Extradition Act was therefore allowed. "The appellant will be discharged from the proceedings," said the judge.

Sullivan, who has joint Irish-US nationality, is wanted to stand trial for allegedly abusing three American girls in the mid-1990s. He was arrested in London in June 2010 while living with Ministry of Justice policy manager Sarah Smith, 34, in Barnes, south-west London. They married while he was held at Wandsworth Prison, before he was granted bail.

His counsel Ben Brandon said at a one-day hearing in April that no one had been released from the treatment programme, operated by the Department of Human Services in Minnesota, since it began in its current form in 1988. Commitment usually followed a person completing a prison sentence but a criminal conviction was not necessary for it to take place, said Mr Brandon. Aaron Watkins, appearing for the US government, told the court Sullivan did not satisfy the criteria for civil commitment but agreed no assurances had been given.

The judges ruled there was a real risk Sullivan would face commitment and a flagrant denial of his right not to suffer loss of liberty without due process, a right protected by Article 5.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

Lord Justice Moses said under the programme "there is no requirement that the offences took place recently nor, indeed, that the misconduct resulted in conviction, provided that the misconduct is substantiated by credible evidence". Mr Justice Eady said the risk of a flagrant denial of human rights was "more than fanciful".

The full ruling referenced in this news account is available at this link, and here are key passage from the ruling:

Civil commitment is unknown to European law, but is a process available in 20 states in the United States. Minnesota's law is said to be more draconian than many others.... [The] Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA) for the State of Minnesota ... reports that the standard for commitment is relatively low, and many sexual offenders qualify for commitment.......[and] of the 600 committed since 1988, the evidence suggests that not one has been released, even on a conditional, supervised basis....

[T]he essential and justifiable purpose of these proceedings is to ensure that the appellant faces the trial he ought to face in respect of the serious allegations made against him. It is plainly in the interests of justice that he should face such a trial. Extradition is not being sought for the purposes of civil commitment....

[But] I conclude that there is a real risk that if returned Mr Sullivan will be the subject of an order of civil commitment ... [and] that there is a real risk that if extradited the appellant might be subject to an order for civil commitment within Minnesota and that that amounts to a risk that he would suffer a flagrant denial of his rights enshrined in [Art. 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights].

July 22, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentencing around the world, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Saturday, July 14, 2012

Fascinating Eighth Amendment ruling by Kansas appeals court about (uniquely?) extreme sex offender sentence

I have been slow to note a remarkable Eighth Amendment opinion handed down late last week by a Kansas appellate court in State v. Proctor, No. 104,697 (Kan. Ct. App. July 6, 2012) (available here). (Hat tip to Eugene Volokh.)  The lengthy opinion and its (limited?) import are hard to summarize, so I will quote in full the start of the opinion here:

In this case, the court must address the constitutionality of a sentence potentially subjecting Defendant Daniel Proctor to lifetime postrelease supervision and, in turn, to imprisonment for life without parole if he were later to commit any felony, including a property crime otherwise calling for probation.  Proctor faces that prospect because he pled guilty to a sex offense — aggravated indecent solicitation of a child — for which he has received a permissible guideline sentence of probation.  For Proctor, a man in his early 20′s, the statutory sentencing scheme could put him behind bars for 50 years if he were to shoplift a $1,000 ring or computer or to write a bad check for them.  Given Proctor’s circumstances and the peculiarly harsh result that could be inflicted on him, the sentence violates the protections against cruel and unusual punishment contained in § 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  The punishment may be considered grossly disproportionate in that context and incompatible with the general purposes of incarceration as a sanction in the criminal justice system.  We, therefore, vacate the sentence imposed on Proctor to that extent and remand to the Saline County District Court for resentencing.

The governing statutes create the prospect of an exceptionally severe punishment — life in prison without parole is second only to a death sentence in its extremity — for persons convicted of designated sex offenses who then commit property crimes.  For Proctor, the disparity between his criminal conduct and that punishment reflects an imbalance of a magnitude implicating constitutional protections.  The Kansas sentencing statutes permit probation for both his underlying offense in this case and property crimes amounting to felonies.  But the commission of those two offenses in that order may lead to life in prison with no prospect for release.  Controlling authority from the United States Supreme Court and the Kansas Supreme Court construing the federal and state constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment cannot be reconciled with that result.  The sentencing scheme exacts a punishment harsher than those for murder, kidnapping, and other crimes the Kansas Legislature has designated as more serious than Proctor’s.  It also appears to be more severe than similar statutes applied to sex offenders in the vast majority of other states.  Those are the ingredients of an unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment.

The analysis by this appellate panel to back up these conclusions is quite interesting and worth a close read by any and everyone interested in the development of modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.

July 14, 2012 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4) | TrackBack

Thursday, July 12, 2012

Who should prosecute and what is a fitting "sentence" for Penn State officials after Freeh Report?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this CNN report on the new investigative report just released about Penn State's poor (and surely criminally negligent) behaviors in the Sandusky affair.  Here is how the CNN report starts:

Penn State's most powerful leaders showed "total and consistent disregard" for victims of child sex abuse and failed to protect children, according to the findings of a long-awaited internal review over how the university handled a scandal involving its former defensive coordinator.

In fact, the report says several former officials "empowered" Jerry Sandusky to continue his abuse, and investigators say legendary head football coach Joe Paterno could have stopped the attacks had he done more.

In a statement released along with the 267-page report, Louis Freeh, the former FBI director and federal judge who spearheaded the review, blasted several top former officials at the school, accusing them of forging an agreement to conceal Sandusky's attacks. "There are more red flags here than you can count," said Freeh, who added that the abuse occurred just "steps away" from where Paterno worked in the university's Lasch Building.

"Our most saddening and sobering finding is the total disregard for the safety and welfare of Sandusky's child victims by the most senior leaders at Penn State," Freeh wrote. "The most powerful men at Penn State failed to take any steps for 14 years to protect the children who Sandusky victimized."

He went on to name four former school officials -- former President Graham Spanier, former Vice President Gary Schultz, Paterno, and former athletic director Tim Curley -- saying they "never demonstrated, through actions or words, any concern for the safety and well-being of Sandusky's victims until after Sandusky's arrest." Their failure "to protect against a child sexual predator harming children" lasted "more than a decade," the full report says.

"They exhibited a striking lack of empathy for Sandusky's victims by failing to inquire as to their safety and well-being, especially by not attempting to determine the identity of the child whom Sandusky assaulted in the Lasch Building in 2001. Further, they exposed this child to additional harm by alerting Sandusky, who was the only one who knew the child's identity, of what (Mike) McQueary saw in the shower on the night of February 9, 2001."

The full report, with all its exhibits, can be found at this link.

July 12, 2012 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Wednesday, July 11, 2012

Fourth Circuit panel talks through challenging restitution issues for child porn downloaders

In a long discussion (which includes a concurring opinion), a Fourth Circuit panel today has weighed in on various statutory issues that arise when restitution is sought as part of the punishment for a child porn downloader. Folks following this issue, which has split the circuits in various ways, should read the full opinion in US v. Burgess, No. 09-4587 (4th Cir. July 11, 2012) (available here); here is the start and a notably snippet from the main opinion:

A jury convicted Albert C. Burgess, Jr., of two felonies involving the receipt and possession of materials depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The district court sentenced Burgess to a term of 292 months’ imprisonment, and to supervised release for life.  The district court also ordered that Burgess pay, among other things, restitution of $305,219.86 under the Mandatory Restitution for Sexual Exploitation of Children Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (the restitution statute), for losses suffered by "Vicky," a child victim portrayed in pornographic material in Burgess’ possession.

Burgess challenges both his convictions and sentences on appeal.  We affirm his convictions and all aspects of his sentences, except the district court’s award of restitution to the victim.  Because the district court did not make specific findings regarding the elements of restitution, we vacate the restitution award and remand the case to the district court for a calculation of the loss Burgess proximately caused the victim....

We are confident in the skill of the district judges throughout this circuit to ascertain the appropriate amount of restitution in a given case.  Nevertheless, we are mindful of the challenges posed in the determination of damages under the restitution statute. Accordingly, we add our voice to that of the Ninth Circuit in Kennedy in requesting that Congress reevaluate the structure of the restitution statute in light of the challenges presented by the calculations of loss to victims in the internet age.  643 F.3d at 1266.

July 11, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

"Are Our Sex Crime Laws So Radical They Deter Reporting?"

The provocative question in the title of this post comes from Professor Dan Filler via this post at The Faculty Lounge, which in turn links to this extended op-ed also by Dan Filler appearing in today's Philadelphia Inquirer.  The op-ed carries the headline "Penn State scandal shows sex-abuse laws can backfire," and here are excerpts:

[T]here is another lesson to be learned from this horrible [Sandusky] story, and it's time we acknowledged it.  Penn State's administrators might have buried the charges against Sandusky partly because our national anxiety about sexual abuse has resulted in a lattice of laws so toxic that people are afraid to report it.  Although Penn State officials may have wanted Sandusky to stop, they also may have feared the overwhelming consequences of reporting the crime....

Over the past two decades, advocates, the media, and politicians have stoked public fears about sexual abuse.  The resulting panic has had serious consequences.  It has subjected all sexual offenders to greater stigma and, more importantly, has led to a complex array of laws that dramatically increase the costs of conviction even for less serious sexual offenses.  In some states, a low-grade sex offender faces greater repercussions than a murderer.

Prison is just the start. Every state also imposes the public shame of community notification.  Most restrict where such offenders can live — in some cases so severely that homelessness becomes the only viable option for offenders.  Some states are even incarcerating people beyond their regular sentences because they are expected to commit sex crimes in the future.

There is little evidence that all these measures reduce the incidence of sex crimes one whit.  They have, however, dramatically raised the stakes of reporting and charging such crimes.

There's no doubt that Penn State administrators were trying to protect the university and its football program.  But they were also trying to protect Sandusky and themselves from the tsunami that would follow.  I take [former Former Penn State president Graham] Spanier at his alleged word that he feared an inhumane result.  He isn't alone: Some recent research suggests that some prosecutors shape their charging and plea-bargaining decisions to moderate the effects of current laws.

And then there are the victims. If administrators and prosecutors are concerned about inhumane responses to sex offenses, think about the most common kind of victims: those who are abused by relatives.  There is already plenty of pressure on children to keep quiet about abuse within families; public shaming and residential restrictions compound the consequences, which in many ways may end up hurting victims by dissuading them from reporting abuse and excluding them from communities when an offending family member is released.

There is no question that society needs strong laws prohibiting and punishing sexual abuse.  But those laws must be well-reasoned and tailored to be both just and effective.

Over the past 20 years, society has approached sex crimes with unbridled passion and anger.  This emotional search for justice is entirely appropriate in particular cases; that is one purpose of sentencing.  But when the same intense feelings become an engine for policy-making, they may undermine the crafting of effective laws.

The goal, after all, is to prevent Jerry Sandusky and others like him from victimizing children, and that won't happen if we deter people from reporting their crimes.  When laws become so radical that they work against the protection of victims, they are inherently inhumane.

July 10, 2012 in Celebrity sentencings, Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (49) | TrackBack

Monday, July 09, 2012

Appeal waiver prompts federal judge to reject child porn plea deal

The Denver Post has this effective article on a notable recent ruling by a federal district judge to reject a plea agreement in order to preserve appellate review. The piece is headlined "Rejected Colorado child porn plea deal puts light on appellate waivers," and here are excerpts:

When Timothy Vanderwerff, who is accused of possessing child pornography, went to the federal courthouse in Denver this year to plead guilty to the crime, the deal he struck with prosecutors looked like many others.

Vanderwerff, who faces up to 20 years in prison for the most serious of the three charges against him, would plead guilty to one of those charges and face no more than 10 years in prison.  He could receive as little as probation, though Vanderwerff agreed in the deal not to ask for a sentence of less than five years.   Lastly, Vanderwerff agreed to waive his right to appeal, so long as the judge didn't sentence him to more than the negotiated range.

It was that final detail that gave Senior U.S. District Judge John Kane pause. Writing in an unusually candid order rejecting the plea deal — a rare occurrence itself — Kane said such waivers can hurt the justice system.  "Indiscriminate acceptance of appellate waivers undermines the ability of appellate courts to ensure the constitutional validity of convictions and to maintain consistency and reasonableness in sentencing decisions," Kane wrote.

Vanderwerff's case has been set for trial in early August....

Kane's refusal of the deal has thrown a light on the practice of negotiating appellate waivers into plea agreements. According to a 2005 study in the Duke Law Journal, appellate waivers are common across the country, occurring in as many as 90 percent of plea deals in some jurisdictions.

They began appearing in federal criminal cases in Colorado after the state's current U.S. attorney, John Walsh, took office in 2010, said Jeff Dorschner, a spokesman for the office.  Walsh, Dorschner said, was concerned about wasting the court's and the government's resources when defendants appeal the sentences they received after initially agreeing to those sentences in plea deals. Such appeals are almost always denied....

In a brief urging Kane to accept the deal, prosecutors wrote that the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals has found appellate waivers acceptable. Prosecutors say they are legitimate parts of the bargaining process.

Vanderwerff's attorney also urged Kane to accept the deal. "Both sides benefit from it," Assistant Federal Public Defender Edward Harris wrote.

Kane, though, viewed the waiver dimly. "[S]acrificing constitutional rights at the altar of efficiency," he wrote, "is of dubious legality."

I have long thought appeals waivers (and related collateral review waivers) are among the most important and least examined aspects of post-Booker modern federal sentencing practices, with huge disparities based on different federal prosecutorial policies and practices and different judicial attitudes and approaches to accepting deals with such waivers.  Right after Booker, as revealed by some posts linked below, I blogged a lot about such waivers and about my view that they are void as against the public policy reflected in Booker's embrace of reasonableness review.  It seems as though Judge Kane's opinion (which I will link if/when I can find it on-line) reflects some of these sentiments.

Some older and more recent appeal waiver posts:

UPDATE:  A helpful reader sent me a copy of Judge Kane's opinion in Vanderwerff, and I have provided the document for downloading below.  The opinion runs a to-the-point 11-pages, and it is today's must read.  Here is one of many notable passages:

In the wake of the Supreme Court’s holding that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines are merely advisory, not mandatory, see United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 247 (2005), no circuit court has revisited the enforceability of appellate waivers.  Sentencing, post-Booker, requires a trial court to consider context and to apply criteria rather than perform a mechanical or clerical entry of a matrixed judgment.  See United States v. Calderon-Villaneuva, 1:12-cr-235, Order Denying Unopposed Motion to Enter into Plea Agreement Containing an Appeal Waiver (doc. 14) (D. Colo. June 28, 2012).  Ethical and moral values inevitably infuse the decisionmaking process, but they must be justified by being drawn from governing texts in statutes and judicial opinions and established principles of fairness generally accepted by the community affected by the criminal conduct, i.e., the fundamental values widely accepted by society and identifiable as such.

The responsibility of appellate review is to decide how well the sentencing judge has established the sentence within this described discipline.  That is fundamentally dissimilar to the pre-Booker function of determining whether an arithmetic calculation has been executed correctly.  Rather, reviewing sentences under an abuse of discretion standard is a complex inquiry meant to assure that the judicial administration of justice is relevant to the values and expectations of society.

Indiscriminate acceptance of appellate waivers undermines the ability of appellate courts to ensure the constitutional validity of convictions and to maintain consistency and reasonableness in sentencing decisions.  Indeed, appellate waivers would have insulated from review the underlying convictions in some of the most notable criminal decisions in the Supreme Court’s recent history.  See Nancy J. King and Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sentencing Policy, 55 Duke L. J. 209, 249 (2005) (noting that waivers would have precluded appellate review in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); and United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)).  Thus, such waivers should only be included where they are justified by the facts and circumstances of a particular case.

Download USA_v_Vanderwerff opinion

July 9, 2012 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (37) | TrackBack

Friday, June 29, 2012

"Jerry Sandusky Could Get Pension in Prison Unless Bill Passes"

The title of this post is the headline of this ABC News story, which gets started this way:

Former Penn State football coach Jerry Sandusky will likely receive his $58,898-a-year state pension while in prison, unless a bill stalled in Pennsylvania's senate finance committee is quickly passed by the legislature and signed by the governor.

The bill would prevent employees convicted of sexual offenses related to their jobs from receiving their state pensions, said Cameron Kline, a spokesperson for State Sen. Larry Farnese, D-Philadelphia, who introduced the bill before Sandusky was charged with sexually abusing boys in his Second Mile program.

"This was introduced on Oct. 18, 2011, well before Sandusky's crimes came to light," Kline said. "It's something we think would be very appropriate for a case such as this. Now that it's over, we're a little concerned, confused and angry it's still stuck there. Apparently it's not a priority so the legislation still stays in committee."

Under current law, the pensions of public employees can be seized when a member is convicted of an Act 140 crime. That act includes crimes such as extortion, perjury and bribery but does not include sexual abuse, according to the Pennsylvania State Employees Retirement System website.

Pam Phile, spokesperson for the Pennsylvania State Employees Retirement System, said she could not speculate on whether Sandusky will have to forfeit his pension under the existing law, which was passed in 1978. "SERS reviews the sentencing documents in reaching a forfeiture determination and there has been no sentencing yet in this particular case," Phile said.

Kline said there are potentially other ways Sandusky could be stripped of his pension, but said passing a law at the state level would probably be the most logical. "There could be things at the Penn State level," he said. "[But] I really think it has to be a state law issue. This is the only thing that is at the ready to move. To my knowledge this is the best option."

June 29, 2012 in Celebrity sentencings, Collateral consequences, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (10) | TrackBack

Monday, June 25, 2012

Federal judge upholds Indiana's ban on sex offender use of Facebook and other social media sites

As reported in this AP article, late last week US District Judge Tanya Walton Pratt rejected a challenge to an Indiana law banning registered sex offenders from accessing Facebook and other social networking sites used by children. Here are the basics of the ruling and its context:

"Social networking, chat rooms, and instant messaging programs have effectively created a 'virtual playground' for sexual predators to lurk," Pratt wrote in the ruling, citing a 2006 report by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children that found that one in seven youths had received online sexual solicitations and one in three had been exposed to unwanted sexual material online.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana filed the class-action suit on behalf of a man who served three years for child exploitation, along with other sex offenders who are restricted by the ban even though they are no longer on probation....  "We will be appealing," ACLU legal director Ken Falk said in an email Sunday to The Associated Press. Appeals from federal courts in Indiana go to the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago.

Courts have long allowed states to place restrictions on convicted sex offenders who have completed their sentences, controlling where many live and work and requiring them to register with police.  But the ACLU claimed that that Indiana's social networking ban was far broader, restricting a wide swath of constitutionally protected activities....

Though the law doesn't list which websites are banned, court filings have indicated the law covers Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, Google Plus, chat rooms and instant messaging services.  Earlier filings indicated LinkedIn was also covered by the ban, but Pratt's ruling said it wasn't because children under 18 can't sign up for it.

"It is a very well-reasoned opinion and the Indiana statute has certainly attempted to be specific," said Ruthann Robson, a professor of constitutional law at the City University of New York.  But she faulted the judge and the law for treating all sex offenders as if they were likely to commit another offense.  "A better statute might provide for some sort of individualized determination rather than a blanket prohibition," she said.

Social networking bans have been struck down in two other states. In February, U.S. District Judge Brian Jackson found that Louisiana's prohibition was too broad and "unreasonably restricts many ordinary activities that have become important to everyday life." Pratt said Indiana's ban wasn't as broad the overturned Louisiana ban.

Louisiana lawmakers passed a new law last month that more narrowly defines which sites are prohibited.  News and government sites, email services and online shopping are excluded from the new rules, as are photo-sharing and instant messaging systems.  The measure takes effect Aug. 1.

In Nebraska, a federal judge in 2009 blocked part of a law that included a social networking ban. A second legal challenge by an Omaha-area sex offender is set for trial in July.

Judge Pratt's full opinion in Doe v. Prosecutor, Marion County, Indiana, No. 1:12-cv-00062-TWP-MJD (S.D. Ind. June 22, 2012), is available at this link.  Here is how it starts:

In an effort to prevent the sexual exploitation of Hoosier children and protect the public at large, the State of Indiana prohibits certain registered sex offenders from using social networking sites, instant messaging programs, and chat room programs that allow access by persons under the age of 18.  See Indiana Code § 35-42-4-12(e).  The statute, enacted in 2008, makes the knowing or intentional use of these sites a Class A misdemeanor.  Id. Plaintiff John Doe (“Mr. Doe”), on his own behalf and on behalf of those similarly situated, contends that this statute runs afoul of the targeted sex offenders’ First Amendment rights.  Initially, Mr. Doe filed a motion for a preliminary injunction asking the Court to temporarily enjoin enforcement of the statute by Defendant, Prosecutor of Marion County, Indiana (“State”). (Dkt. #34.)  Since then, the parties have agreed that it would be appropriate for the Court to merge the preliminary injunction motion with a bench trial (Dkt. #40); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).  Accordingly, Mr. Doe now asks the Court to issue a declaratory judgment declaring Indiana Code § 35-42-4-12 unconstitutional on its face and to permanently enjoin the State’s enforcement of the statute.  The Court presided over oral arguments on May 31, 2012, and the Court thanks counsel for their excellent and thoughtful advocacy.

As discussed below, the Court finds that this content-neutral statute is narrowly tailored, leaves open ample alternative channels of communication, and is not overly broad.  It follows, then, that the statute does not violate Mr. Doe’s First Amendment rights. Accordingly, Mr. Doe’s requests to enjoin enforcement of the statute (Dkts. #34 and #42) are DENIED and final judgment is entered in favor of the State.

June 25, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Friday, June 22, 2012

Jerry Sandusky found guilty on 45 counts

and now seems all but certain to get a functional life sentence. My understanding is that he faces a 60-year minimum prison term based on certain counts of conviction, and he was taken immediately into custody following the reading of the verdict.

UPDATE: This AP article, headlined "What's next for Jerry Sandusky after the trial?," provides a road map concerning the legal process still to come. Here are how the piece begins:

The jury took less than two days to find Jerry Sandusky guilty of 45 of 48 counts of child sexual abuse, but the judge will need substantially more time to decide his punishment.

Judge John Cleland ordered a pre-sentencing report, which will take anywhere from one to two months to complete. During that time, Sandusky will be examined by the state Sexual Offenders Assessment Board to decide if he should be treated as a sexually violent predator, and prosecutors could ask the judge for a hearing.

The judge determines whether someone is a sexually violent predator — it carries stiffer reporting and treatment requirements once someone is out of prison — and can use information from the board's investigation in a sentencing decision.

If he's sentenced to state prison — which appears to be certain in this case — then Sandusky will be transferred to Camp Hill, in south-central Pennsylvania, which has 3,000 to 4,000 inmates, about 1,000 of whom are held temporarily for classification.

June 22, 2012 in Celebrity sentencings, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (39) | TrackBack

Saturday, June 09, 2012

"Should Sex Offenders Be Buried With Military Honors?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this piece at BuzzFeed. Here are excerpts:

On Halloween night of 2001, James Allen Selby broke into the home of a recent college graduate named Jenny, hid in a closet until she returned, then dragged her into the shower and raped her.  He was convicted of this and at least 10 other rapes and sexual assaults, including one of a nine-year-old girl. But after he committed suicide in prison, he was buried with full military honors at Fort Sill National Cemetery in Oklahoma.  Now victims, and some military advocates, want a ban on sex offenders in military cemeteries so criminals like Selby can never be honored like that again.

At a House hearing Wednesday, Rep. Vicky Hartzler (R-MO) told the story of a constituent who was sexually abused as a child by her father, a veteran who was later buried in a military cemetery.  Said Hartzler, "She asked that I help ensure no other child has to endure this injustice."  Hartzler has introduced the Hallowed Grounds Act, which would bar Tier III sex offenders — those who have committed crimes against children — from being buried in veterans' or national cemeteries.  She argued, "These offenders have surrendered their right to be honored by victimizing and oppressing others."

The bill has the support of a variety of military and veterans' groups.  Raymond Kelley, legislative director of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, said in the hearing that the Hallowed Grounds Act would be an appropriate extension of existing laws that bar those convicted of capital crimes (those punishable by death, such as murder) from military burial.  Thomas Murphy of the Veterans Benefits Administration also voiced support for the substance of the bill, though he had some logistical concerns about his implementation.

The Army is actually against the bill, but only because it doesn't go far enough. Kathryn Condon, Executive Director of Army National Cemeteries Program, said at the hearing that the Army couldn't support the bill as drafted because it failed to ban "the interment or memorialization of a person found by an appropriate federal authority to have committed a tier III sex offense, but not yet convicted."

But Richard Wright, a professor of criminal justice and author of the book Sex Offender Laws: Failed Policies, New Directions, says the bill is wrongheaded.  He says it's part of a trend in the last 20 to 25 years of "post-conviction laws" targeted specifically at Tier III offenders, but says these laws don't actually accomplish much.  Our criminal justice system, he says, now operates under the belief that "in order for the victim to get justice, something extra has to be done to the offender."  But in fact, offering extra help to the victim — counseling, for instance — is more beneficial to victims' healing processes than additional punishments for the criminal.

June 9, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (22) | TrackBack

Thursday, June 07, 2012

Sex offender barred from schools running for local Utah school board

As reported in this local article, headlined "Registered child sex offender runs for school board," a candidate for a school board in Utah is garnering a lot of extra attention for something he did two decades ago. Here are the details:

A convicted sex offender is hoping to be elected for a seat at the Granite School Board. Dick Wagner Jones, 67, of Holladay, committed his crime more than two decades ago and served five years in prison for it, with 10 years of parole.  And since his offense involved a minor, Jones will be on the Utah sex offender registry until 2015.

It would make for an unusual problem for the school district if he is elected since Jones’ criminal history bars him from being around schools. Granite Board of Education President Gayleen Gandy says there is not much she can say about the candidacy of Jones.  “To be honest, I don’t expect it will deflect a whole lot of attention. Anyone who’d like to run, can register as a candidate,” says Gandy....

If Jones is elected to the Granite School Board this fall, there are stipulations in the law that would allow him to visit schools for business.  However, Jones would need to have his visits approved beforehand and they would have to happen when no students are present. Granite School District officials say they are unable to comment on the candidacy of any individual regardless of the situation.

June 7, 2012 in Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Wednesday, June 06, 2012

"The Evolution of Unconstitutionality in Sex Offender Registration Laws"

The title of this post is the title of this new article authored by Catherine L. Carpenter and Amy E. Beverlin appearing in the May 2012 issue of the Hastings Law Journal. Here is the abstract:

More is not always better. Consider sex offender registration laws. Initially anchored by rational basis, registration schemes have spiraled out of control because legislators, eager to please a fearful public, have been given unfettered freedom by a deferential judiciary.

This Article does not challenge the state’s legislative power to enact sex offender registration laws.  Instead, this Article posits that, even if sex offender registration schemes initially were constitutional, serially amended sex offender registration schemes — what this Article dubs super-registration schemes — are not.  Their emergence demands reexamination of the traditionally held assumptions that defined original registration laws as civil regulations.

Two intertwined causes are responsible for the schemes’ constitutional downfall. The first is a legislative body eager to draft increasingly harsh registration and notification schemes to please an electorate that subsists on a steady diet of fear.  When combined with the second cause, a Supreme Court that has yet to signal much-needed boundaries, the ensuing consequence is runaway legislation that is no longer rationally connected to its regulatory purpose.  Ultimately, this Article is a cautionary tale of legislation that has become unmoored from its constitutional grounding because of its punitive effect and excessive reach.

June 6, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack

Thursday, May 31, 2012

Federal district judge hears constitutional attack on Indiana sex offender Facebook ban

As reported in this new AP article, headlined "Judge hears fight to sex offenders' Facebook ban," one notable legal challenge to one of many bans on sex offender access to social media got a court hearing today in Indianapolis.  Here are the details:

A federal judge said Thursday she plans to rule within a month on the constitutionality of an Indiana law that bans registered sex offenders from using social networking websites where they could prey on children.

The American Civil Liberties Union of Indiana is heading the class-action suit on behalf of a man who served three years for child exploitation, along with other sex offenders who are restricted by the ban even though they are no longer on probation.  Federal judges have barred similar bans in Nebraska and Louisiana.  Similar restrictions remain in effect in New York, Illinois and North Carolina.

In a one-hour hearing at U.S. District Court in Indianapolis, Judge Tanya Walton Pratt questioned attorneys about convicted sex offenders' civil rights and whether the state law is outdated in the age of Facebook, LinkedIn and dozens of other social networking sites.

ACLU attorney Ken Falk argued that even though the 2008 law is only intended to protect children from online sexual predators, it also prevents sex offenders from using social media for political, business and religious activity such as using Facebook to follow the pope or comment on newspaper websites, posting a profile on LinkedIn or following presidential candidates on Twitter.

Falk said the law violates the rights of communication, receiving information and association, all of which the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled are guaranteed by the First Amendment.  He also argued that the ban was unnecessary because Indiana already has a law that makes it a crime to use the Internet to contact a child for the purposes of sexual gratification.

Indiana Deputy Attorney General David Arthur argued that the 2008 ban is limited only to social networking sites that allow access by children, and that Facebook, Twitter and similar sites aren't the only forms of communication. "We still have television. We still have radios. And believe it or not, people still talk face-to-face," he said. Arthur also said the ban doesn't apply to email or Internet message boards....

Courts have long allowed states to place restrictions on convicted sex offenders who have completed their sentences, controlling where many of them live and work and requiring them to register with police.  But Falk told Pratt that the social networking ban was far broader, restricting a wide swatch of constitutionally protected activities.

Arthur compared the social networking ban to laws barring sex offenders from school property and other places frequented by kids. Only in this case, he said, the place is virtual.

Similar social networking bans have been struck down in two other states. In February, U.S. District Judge Brian Jackson found that Louisiana's prohibition was too broad and "unreasonably restricts many ordinary activities that have become important to everyday life."

Louisiana lawmakers passed a new law this month that more narrowly defines which sites are prohibited. News and government sites, email services and online shopping are excluded from the new rules, as are photo-sharing and instant-messaging systems. The measure takes effect Aug. 1.

In Nebraska, a federal judge in 2009 blocked part of a law that included a social networking ban. A second legal challenge by an Omaha-area sex offender is set for trial in July.

May 31, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

Local restrictions on sex offenders continue to grow and expand

This New York Times article, headlined "Public-Place Laws Tighten Rein on Sex Offenders," documents that we have still not yet reached a tipping point when it comes to post-sentencing restrictions on sex offenders. Here are excerpts:

Convicted sex offenders are barred from surfing at the famous pier in this Orange County city. In nearby Dana Point, they are prohibited from casting a fishing line in the harbor.

And if they wander into a public park in Mission Viejo, they could be shipped back to jail for six months, following the City Council’s vote this year to ban them from a host of places where children congregate. “We need to protect our kids,” the Orange County district attorney, Tony Rackauckas, had told the Mission Viejo City Council. “The danger is very real.”

Orange County finds itself at the enter of a new wave of laws restricting the movement of sex offenders. The county government and a dozen cities here have banned sex offenders from even setting foot in public parks, on beaches and at harbors, rendering almost half the parks in Orange County closed to them. Ten more cities are considering similar legislation.

And Orange County is far from alone. In recent years, communities around the country have gone beyond regulating where sex offenders can live and begun banning them outright from a growing list of public places.

From North Carolina to Washington State, communities have designated swimming pools, parks and school bus stops as “child safety zones,” off limits to some sex offenders. They are barred from libraries in half a dozen Massachusetts cities, and from all public facilities in tiny Huachuca City, Ariz. “Child safety zones are being passed more and more at the city and county level,” said Elizabeth Jeglic, a professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice. “It’s becoming more and more restrictive. They’re not only limiting where sex offenders can live, but they’re limiting their movement as well.”

The proliferation of such restrictions reflects the continued concerns of parents and lawmakers about potential recidivism among sex offenders. But it has also increasingly raised questions about their effectiveness, as well as their fairness.

Opponents have dismissed “child safety zones” as unenforceable, saying they are designed to make politicians look tough on crime and drive sex offenders from the area, not make children safer. “These are cheap laws that can be passed to make people feel good,” said Charles P. Ewing, author of “Justice Perverted: Sex Offense Law, Psychology, and Public Policy.”...

Greg Bird was convicted of indecent exposure in 2001. Since then, Mr. Bird said, he has gotten married and turned his life around. But he now pauses at the idea of having children of his own, because he knows he could not even take them to the park to play catch. “Sometimes I wonder, is there any compassion?” Mr. Bird said. “I know I don’t deserve compassion. I broke the law. I get that. But these laws set people up to fail more.”

In some cities, law enforcement has done very little to enforce child safety zones. In Albuquerque, where some sex offenders have been banned from libraries since 2008, with some exceptions, the police have never even issued a trespass notice, a prerequisite to an arrest. Thus far, the parks bans here have led to just three convictions across the entire county.

Still, Mr. Rackauckas said he was satisfied that the laws were serving as a deterrent. “We’re not going to know how many kids were not molested or groomed for later sexual contact as a result of this law,” he said....

[O]nce one community has enacted “child safety zones,” they often spread quickly to nearby towns, as municipal governments fear becoming local havens for sex offenders. In Lake County, Fla., this year, county commissioners — surrounded by communities with tough laws on sex offenders — responded with some of the most restrictive measures anywhere, including a law prohibiting sex offenders from going within 300 feet of a park, school or playground.

Joe Carchio, a city councilman in Huntington Beach, where a park ban went into effect in December, said he felt bad for lower-level offenders whose convictions many years ago prevent them from taking their children to Little League games. Still, he wishes he could have made the restrictions even broader. “In a lot of ways, it is a feel-good law; it makes people feel safe,” Mr. Carchio said. “You make choices in this world, and I guess the choice that individual made is one that is going to follow him for the rest of his life.”

May 31, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (30) | TrackBack

Monday, May 21, 2012

Federal judge rules Texas officials can be liable for sex offender conditions

This new article from the Austin American-Stateman, which is headlined "Judge: Parole officials can be held liable over sex offender restrictions," reports on a notable ruling from a federal judge concerning suits against how Texas has managed its sex offender registry.  Here are the details:

In the latest rebuke of state policies for classifying parolees as sex offenders, an Austin federal judge has ruled that top state parole officials can be held personally liable for continuing missteps.

U.S. District Judge Lee Yeakel of Austin, in an order issued late Friday, blasted the state's continuing refusal to provide due process hearings before imposing restrictive sex-offender conditions on felons never convicted of a sex crime.  Yeakel for the first time ruled that the seven-member state Board of Pardons and Paroles, 12 parole commissioners, state parole director Stuart Jenkins and other parole officials can face monetary damages for their actions.

It's a significant determination that, if not reversed on appeal, could prove costly for both the officials and taxpayers, if several pending inmate lawsuits are successful.  A jury verdict in another case two years ago cost the state approximately $80,000, officials involved in that case said earlier....

The order was the latest setback for the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles and state corrections officials, who have insisted for years that, to ensure public safety, they could impose the stringent conditions on parolees without a due process hearing.

Although previous court rulings have required the hearings, the state has not routinely offered them until recently — and only then under certain circumstances.  Yeakel's order — the latest ruling to indicate that federal courts have lost their patience with the state — came in a suit filed by parolee Buddy Jene Yeary.

Last fall, the judge blocked the state from enforcing the sex offender restrictions — officially known as Special Condition X — on Yeary, an unusual step for a judge to take. According to state records, Yeary pleaded guilty to drug charges in 2003 in Johnson County, south of Fort Worth, and was sentenced to 25 years in prison. Though he was initially indicted on charges of aggravated sexual assault of a child, his sentence order states that "the sex offender registration requirements (in state law) do not apply to the defendant," according to the suit.

Despite that, state records show that when Yeary was paroled in the summer of 2007, parole officials required him to register as a sex offender, placed him under the restrictive sex-offender conditions of release and ordered him to participate in a sex offender treatment program.

In his order Friday, Yeakel ruled that the state has for six years been aware that it must provide hearings to parolees in such cases and that officials' continuing failure to do so leaves them open to liability.  "In light of the resistance of the state of Texas to providing parolees with the procedural due process guaranteed them by the Constitution, even after receiving repeated mandates from federal and state courts, the court is unconvinced that Texas will not return to its unconstitutional policies and practices," the 31-page order states. "Any stigmatic injury suffered by Yeary due to the imposition and continued enforcement of Special Condition X may entitle Yeary to compensatory damages."

Yeakel refused to dismiss Yeary's lawsuit, as state officials had asked.  Instead, he said it would head to a trial....

The ruling comes after years of legal decisions requiring state parole officials to provide hearings before they impose sex offender restrictions on felons never convicted of a sex crime. In addition to federal courts, the state Court of Criminal Appeals last fall ordered the restrictions removed from the parole conditions for a Houston kidnapper because he was not afforded a due process hearing before they were imposed and because he had not been convicted of a sex crime.

May 21, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (16) | TrackBack

Sunday, May 20, 2012

Federal civil commitment of sex offenders subject to new legal challenges

This lengthy article, headlined "Prisoners challenge extended confinement for sex crimes," provides an effective report on the nature and status of the legal issues surrounding sex offenders that the feds have civilly committed after they have completed their prison terms. Here are excerpts:

The high walls surrounding the Federal Correctional Complex at Butner leave no doubt that it’s a prison.  But for dozens of men held behind those walls, there is a growing question of whether they should be prisoners.

They have served their time and now are being imprisoned not for what they did, but what they might do.  They are sex offenders being held -- sometimes for years -- under a recent federal law that allows the detention of those deemed so dangerous the government will not risk their release even when their sentence is complete.  Now, with the bulk of the detainees being held at Butner, federal courts in North Carolina are trying to sort out who should remain in and who should be released from this legal limbo.

Lawyers for the detainees say the extended captivity reflects a law that applies a different and unfair standard to sex offenders.  They also say many detainees do not meet the level of threat the 6-year-old law requires for indefinite detention.  “The law doesn’t seem fair to me,” said Raleigh attorney John Keating Wiles, who has represented several of the men.  “Traditionally, we don’t take away people’s liberty because they might commit a crime.”

The U.S. Department of Justice has sought to extend the confinement of at least 136 sex offenders since 2006, but almost half the attempts have been rejected by the courts or dropped by the government.  Of the men being held for hearings, some, indeed, have criminal histories and behavioral offenses inside prison that raise questions about their release into the community.

In some cases, though, it is unclear whether the problems are deviant sexual compulsions or broader mental impairments and illness compounded by drug and alcohol abuse.  By law, a federal judge must rule on whether a detainee is too dangerous to be released.  In the Eastern District of North Carolina, a visiting judge from Michigan has been brought in, and several district judges have been assigned to help clear a backlog of cases that stacked up in the first four years after the law was passed.

Many cases were stalled by the lawsuit brought on behalf of Graydon Comstock, one of the first to be detained as sexually dangerous after serving time for receiving child pornography.  In 2011, a year after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the government had that authority, a federal court ruled on the merits of classifying Comstock as sexually dangerous and found he did not qualify for commitment.

Eric J. Brignac, a federal public defender who has been involved with many of the cases in the state’s Eastern District, said the commitment procedure has highlighted a societal challenge. “It’s that tension between liberty and security,” Brignac said....

Each case essentially becomes a battle of the experts, with the government presenting doctors, psychologists and mental health analysts to bolster its claims. The defense brings in experts who offer their own assessments. It is up to a judge to sort through the opinions and evidence....

Thomas Shane Matherly, 36, who was scheduled for release in November 2006 but awaits a hearing on whether he’s sexually dangerous, was in New Bern in March in a federal courthouse making an argument similar to that made by the so-called “enemy combatants” detained at Guantanamo Bay. He argued that he is being wrongly held and is seeking damages of more than $50 million for emotional pain and suffering.

Court filings in his case offer a picture of life inside Butner for sex offenders caught in the legal limbo.  His life is like that of a prisoner. He wears an inmate uniform and eats in the prison mess hall. Matherly contends that he and others in a similar circumstance often are called “baby rapers” and “child molesters,” taunts that “very likely could lead to a physical confrontation at some point.”

In some ways, Matherly contends, his detention under the civil procedure has been more restrictive than when he was serving his sentence for possessing child pornography. Prisoners can take classes in blueprint reading, carpentry, car care and electrician skills, he contends, but detainees may not.  Narcotics Anonymous and Alcoholics Anonymous sessions are not available to the detainees, he says.  The detainees are not given as much access to the recreation yard, he complains, or the recreation center with TVs, pool tables, basketball courts, exercise equipment, a band room and hobby-craft rooms.

“The government cannot have it both ways,” Matherly stated in court documents seeking damages. If the confinement is part of a civil process, he further stated, he should not be confined like a criminal. “Civil means civil,” Matherly stated, “with all the rights that accompany it.” Matherly argues that he has “the right to be free from harm.”...

The men branded by the government as sexually dangerous ostensibly are being held because they are mentally ill and need treatment, but few have enrolled in the sexual offender treatment program.  Lawyers and mental health workers advise them to be careful what they say in therapy, acknowledging that it could be used against them at trial....

Some question whether the underlying notion behind the new commitment procedure is about treating the sickest and most dangerous or more about issuing life sentences in cases where criminal law would not otherwise allow. Though prison statistics show low recidivism rates among sex offenders, high-profile cases of repeat offenders have left a lingering belief to the contrary.  “In general, sex offenders are seen as different,” said Brignac, the public defender.  “I think, in part, it is because we see them as incurable.”

May 20, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12) | TrackBack

Thursday, May 17, 2012

Notable Slate piece on gender disparities in sex crime sentencing

Last week in this post I discussed an Arizona case in which a female teacher's aide got a lifetime probation sentence for her sex offenses involving two young teenage boys.  I noted that the case reinforced my sense that adult females sexually involved with under-age boys sometimes get much more lenient sentencing treatment than similarly situated males, and now Emily Bazelon has more to say on the subject in this notable new Slate piece.  Here are a few paragraphs from her commentary:

Is [Gabriela Compton's] sentence of probation nonetheless justified because women molesting boys is just different than men molesting girls?  There are salient differences between men and women when it comes to sex offenses.  For starters, men are far more likely to commit sexual assault than women are, accounting for 96 percent of the total. They are also rearrested much more frequently.

The women who perpetrate this misconduct not surprisingly have serious problems.  Like the men, they have poor coping skills and trouble showing empathy.  This report by the Center for Sex Offender Management breaks female sex offenders into three types, based on clinical observations.  The first group were coerced by men into abusing children, even their own.  The second were themselves victims of incest or other sexual abuse — this kind of history is far more likely for women sex offenders than for men, and the women in this category also tend to victimize young children in their own families.  The third type, labeled “teacher/lover,” sounds more like Gabriela Compton.  They were “often struggling with peer relationships, seemed to regress and perceive themselves as having romantic or sexually mentoring ‘relationships’ with under-aged adolescent victims of their sexual preference, and, therefore, did not consider their acts to be criminal in nature.”...

I’d rather the law err on the side of caution and uniformity here.  And I can’t really get my mind around probation for a woman who was facing nearly four decades in prison, even if it is probation for life that includes sex-offender registration.  Thirteen-year-old boys should be shielded from predatory adults the same way girls are.  If they don’t think they want the shield, well, maybe they don’t know what’s good for them.

Not surprisingly, as as true with my original post, this discussion of gender differences and sexual relations has generated a lot of diverse comments.

Prior related post:

May 17, 2012 in Offender Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Wednesday, May 16, 2012

NY legislature, responding to contrary court ruling, quick to make CP viewing criminal

As reported in this new Reuters story, headlined "N.Y. Senate passes bill to make viewing child porn on Internet a crime," legislatures have a way of moving fast when it comes to going after people who view the wrong kind of porn. Here are the details:

The New York State Senate on Tuesday passed legislation to make it a crime to view child pornography on the Internet, as lawmakers rushed to close a loophole opened by a state appeals court just a week earlier.

State law currently prohibits the possession and promotion of child pornography. But a May 8 ruling by the New York Court of Appeals held that viewing child pornography on the Internet without taking further action such as printing or saving files does not necessarily constitute possession.

The ruling caused an instant furor among state lawmakers, who are acting with unusual speed to pass corrective legislation.

The bill passed by the Senate on Tuesday would make it a felony to "knowingly access with intent to view any obscene performance which includes sexual conduct by a child less than sixteen years of age."...

About 15 states have criminalized the viewing of child pornography, many of them in response to court decisions, according to the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children.

May 16, 2012 in Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack

Tuesday, May 15, 2012

"Can a sex-offender ever have a fresh start?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this notable commentary by Ronnie Polaneczky appearing in the Philadelphia Daily News.  Here is how it begins:

Twenty-seven years ago, Dale Bickerstaff did a horrible thing. He was strung out on crack, so he’s sketchy on the details. But he admits he had sex with a female acquaintance whose apartment he broke into, with a friend, to steal a TV.

Bickerstaff maintains that the sex he had with the acquaintance, who was at home, was consensual. The victim and the court disagreed, and he went to jail in 1985 for rape.  He was released from prison in 2001 eager for a fresh start.  But a fresh start, he has learned, is often impossible once potential employers learn that you’ve been imprisoned for a sex crime.

“They say, ‘You can’t work here; you’re a rapist,’” says Bickerstaff, 52, who was recently offered good custodial jobs by two employers — including the Philadelphia International Airport — that then canceled the offers once his long-ago conviction came to light.  “No one takes the time to know you.  They see you on the Internet [sex-offender registry] and they slam the door.”

I won’t lie.  When Bickerstaff asked me to tell his story, I flinched.  What employer in his right mind, I wondered, would knowingly hire a convicted rapist?  If something terrible happened, the employer would be held liable for a negligent hiring.  And I can’t imagine many employees would happily work alongside Bickerstaff once they learned of his past.

Then again, the rape was in 1985, Bickerstaff did his time, and he hasn’t had a single infraction since leaving prison 12 years ago.  So he has more than paid his debt to society. He has also married a good woman whose five grown children and grandchildren have provided him a level of stability and support he says he has never known.

What more does he need to convince an employer that he’s worth a chance? “Honestly, there’s no easy answer,” says William Hart, director of the city’s Re-Integration Services for Ex-offenders (RISE).  The program helps newly released inmates who are most likely to re-offend (overwhelmingly, young men) find community and social supports to prevent them from re-terrorizing the public.

But RISE doesn’t work with either sex offenders or arsonists because the program hasn’t the professional staff to deal with clinical issues specific to those offenders.  Still, Hart believes that Bickerstaff’s conviction, as time goes on, will play less and less a role in his employment.

Megan Dade, director of the Pennsylvania Sexual Offenders Assessment Board, is not so sure.  “The problem is that many people still believe that ‘once a sex offender, always a sex offender,’ even though new research shows that for many people that is just not the case,” says Dade, whose board evaluates sex offenders for the courts.

Her organization is working to refine the state’s classification of sex offenders to distinguish those likely to re-offend from those who probably won’t.  But she knows that, no matter the classification, sex offenders face huge employment hurdles.  “It’s not easy for any former inmate to find work, especially in this economy,” she says.  “For a sex offender, it’s doubly hard.”

But this local story, headlined "Registered sex offender wins election in small Texas town," reveals that at least in some places and with some jobs, a registered sex offender can get a second chance.  Here are the basics:

Everywhere you look in Skellytown, there are signs of support for Warren "Red" Mills, which is why him winning one of the two open seats should come as no surprise.

But Mills is a registered sex offender with a history that includes jail time for sexual contact without consent and probation for separate allegations of sexual contact with two minors.  That made him an unlikely candidate for city office.  But according to city officials, Mills is allowed to hold the position because he does not have a felony conviction.

Some residents still don't like it. Some say it was inappropriate for him to run in the first place and even more inappropriate for him to win.  Others are disappointed.   But his supporters say he is a good man who will do good things for their city.

May 15, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (55) | TrackBack

Sixth Circuit panel produces pair of notable opinions in CP sentencing reversal

Judicial administration fans, as well as sentencing fans, will want to find time to check out today's Sixth Circuit panel decision in US v. Aleo, No. 10-1569 (6th Cir. May 15, 2012) (available here). The start of the majority opinion highlights what the opinion covers and what it is notable:

In this case, we deal with two appeals arising out of the criminal conviction and sentencing of Craig Aleo. Craig Aleo appeals his sentence (Part I), and his trial attorney, John Freeman, appeals the sanction imposed upon him by the district court (Part II).

Craig Aleo was sentenced to the statutory maximum sentence of 720 months of imprisonment after he pleaded guilty to one count each of producing, possessing, and transporting and shipping child pornography. His guidelines range was 235–293 months. Because we cannot find a justification within the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to justify the variance imposed by the district court, we reverse and remand for resentencing.

Craig Aleo’s trial counsel, John Freeman, was sanctioned $2,000, based on the district court’s inherent power to sanction, because he filed a motion asking the court to compel the government to make a formal motion regarding any victim who wanted to speak at trial pursuant to the Crime Victim Rights Act (CVRA), naming the victim, and providing a preview of the victim’s statement.  Because there is no objective evidence that trial counsel filed this motion in bad faith, we reverse.

And the start of Judge Sutton's concurring opinion highlights why judicial administration aficianados ought also find Aleo of interest:

I join the court’s decision in full, including its conclusion that the district court abused its discretion when it invoked its inherent power to impose sanctions on defense attorney John Freeman for filing a frivolous motion.  I write separately to express skepticism about a lower federal court’s power ever to use inherent authority, as opposed to the contempt power established by statute (18 U.S.C. § 401) and implemented by rule (Fed. R. Crim. P. 42), to punish a defense attorney in a criminal case for filing a frivolous motion.

May 15, 2012 in Booker in the Circuits, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Wednesday, May 09, 2012

South Carolina Supreme Court declares lifetime sex offender GPS tracking unconstitutional on various grounds

The South Carolina Supreme Court has a very interesting (and seemingly ground-breaking) constitutional ruling concerning GPS tracking of a sex offender.  The ruling in SC v. Dykes, No. 27124 (S.C. May 9, 2012) (available here), is a bit hard to figure out: the first opinion seems to announce the opinion for the court, but then a footnote at the state of Justice Hearn's opinion states that "[b]ecause a majority of the Court has joined the separate concurring opinion of Justice Kittredge, his concurrence is now the controlling opinion in this case." I will quote the first paragraph from both opinions in the case, because they both are noteworthy, starting here with the opinion of Justice Hearn:

Jennifer Rayanne Dykes appeals the circuit court's order that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her natural life pursuant to Section 23-3-540(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010). She lodges five constitutional challenges to this statute: it violates her substantive due process rights, her right to procedural due process, the Ex Post Facto clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. We hold the mandatory imposition of lifetime satellite monitoring violates Dykes' substantive due process rights and reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The very lengthy opinion by Justice Hearn, which apparently garnered only two (of the five) votes on the court, is thereafter followed by a shorter opinion by Justice Kittredge which starts this way:

I concur in result. I commend my learned colleague for her scholarly research, and I agree with the majority's general proposition that persons have a fundamental right "to be let alone."  But I respectfully disagree that Appellant, as a convicted child sex offender, possesses a right that is fundamental in the constitutional sense.  I do not view Appellant's purported right as fundamental.  I would find Appellant possesses a liberty interest entitled to constitutional protection, for all persons most assuredly have a liberty interest to be free from unreasonable governmental interference.  I would find that the challenged mandatory lifetime, non-reviewable satellite monitoring provision in section 23-3-540(C) is arbitrary and fails the minimal rational relationship test.

Long story short, it appears that all members of the South Carolina Supreme Court have concluded that the mandatory lifetime satellite monitoring now required by stature in South Carolina for sex offender Jennifer Rayanne Dykes is unconstitutional.  (I mention the full name of the defendant in this case because I cannot help but wonder, yet again, if the defendant's gender may have played at least an unconscious role in this notable outcome.  I do not think it is implausible to at least suspect this case might well have come out another way if the the defendant was named Johnny Rex Dykes.)

I have not kept count of how many states are like South Carolina in requiring lifetime GPS monitoring of many sex offenders, but I am pretty sure this ruling could (and should?) have ripple effects in at least a few other jurisdictions.  I am also sure that both constitutional scholars and those interested in the intersection of modern technology and criminal justice doctrines ought to check out the Dykes opinions.

May 9, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Tuesday, May 08, 2012

A gendered outcome?: lifetime probation for female teacher's aide engaged in sex acts with middle-schoolers

Though this local reportabout a state sex offender sentencing in Arizona is a bit prurient, the story (and all its prurient details) reinforces my sense that adult females sexually involved with under-age boys sometimes get much more lenient sentencing treatment than similarly situated males.  The story is headlined "Gabriela Compton, Former Middle School Teacher's Aide, Gets Probation for Sexing One Student and Sexting Another," and here are the basics:

Welcome to the wide world of teacher sex-scandal sentencing, as former middle school teacher's aide Gabriela Compton was sentenced this morning to a life on probation. Compton, now 21, was arrested in March 2011 after principals at Phoenix's Western Valley Middle School found out Compton had been sending nudie pictures to students.  As you can imagine, the teenage boys on the receiving end of those pictures didn't exactly keep the pics to themselves.

According to court documents previously obtained by New Times, the police investigation led to the cops finding out Compton had groped a student, and had sex with another.

Compton exchanged cell phone numbers with a 14-year-old male student in late February 2011, according to the documents, and the student asked Compton to send him a picture of herself. Compton cut to the chase, and sent over the picture of her topless, according to the documents, and the student sent her a picture back of a penis.... After a few more rounds of sexting, Compton picked up the boy and a few of his friends to drive them home, except she took a quick detour to have sex with the 14-year-old student in the back of her van while parked in an industrial park near 67th Avenue and Van Buren Road, the documents said.

Then a 13-year-old student told his story to the cops. He told police he did the sexting thing with Compton as well, and he and the 14-year-old student compared notes the nude pictures of Compton they received, according to the documents. The documents also stated Compton told the boy that she wanted to "rub his cock," and he replied by telling the teacher's aide that he wanted to grab her breasts -- and you betcha the teenaged boy told police he did, after Compton bought him some shoes and a shirt at the mall.

Compton asked the boy if he wanted to have sex, according to the documents, and told him that they could do it "for his birthday," which was coming up, but apparently not before Compton's arrest.

This additional AP story about this case provides more of the notable sentencing details (and less of the prurient ones):

Maricopa County prosecutors say 21-year-old Gabriela Compton was sentenced Tuesday to three terms of lifetime probation with sex offender terms for three counts of sex abuse. Compton was indicted in April 2011 on three counts each of sexual abuse and sexual conduct with a minor and one count of furnishing obscene or harmful items to minors.

Prosecutors say she entered into a plea agreement.  Compton could have faced a prison sentence of at least 39 years if she was convicted on all seven counts.  Compton was a special-education instructional aide at Western Valley Middle School.  She was put on administrative leave in March 2011 and resigned soon afterward.

I am not a specialist on Arizona sex offender laws and sentencing, but I suspect that absent the plea deal, this sex offender was potentially facing decades of mandatory prison time.  I also suspect that the judge's sentencing decision to give a teacher's aide who preyed on students only probation (albeit a lifetime term) would likely be subject to lots of controversy... if the aide was a man and the victims were girls.  But when a woman molests (willing and eager?) young teenagers, then sentencing outcomes are (justifiably?) seen in a somewhat different light.

May 8, 2012 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (28) | TrackBack

Monday, May 07, 2012

Stressing AEDPA deference, split Ninth Circuit upholds 3-strikes sentence for failing to register

Late Friday, the Ninth Circuit issued a notable habeas opinion in Crosby v. Schwartz, No. 10-17726 (9th Cir. May 4, 2012) (available here), which rejects a defendant's Eighth Amendment attack on his three-strikes prison sentence of 26-years-to-life based on his failure to register as a sex offender.  Here is an excerpt from the majority opinion:

Taken together, these three cases [involving similar Eighth Amendment claims] emphasize a consistent principle found in the sex offender registration context — whether the crime is a de minimis crime for which a life sentence is disproportionate is related to how closely the violation is tied to helping achieve the purposes of the sex offender registration statute. See Gonzalez, 551 F.3d at 884-85; Carmony, 127 Cal. App. 4th at 1078-79; Meeks, 123 Cal. App. 4th at 708-10. Thus, the state court was not objectively unreasonable when it concluded that Crosby’s failure to register after he moved was not a mere technical offense. Crosby was no longer living at his last registered address at the time of his arrest, and his failure to register impeded the police’s ability to find him for surveillance.  The state court’s decision is even more reasonable because, unlike the defendant in Carmony, there was evidence that Crosby was actively attempting to evade his obligation to register through the theft and falsifying of stolen identification cards.

Additionally, the California Court of Appeal found that Crosby’s prior convictions were serious and violent crimes.  It noted that during the incident resulting in the rape and forcible copulation convictions, Crosby engaged in multiple acts of violence and threatened the life of the victim.  It was further noted that during the prior robbery conviction, Crosby and an accomplice robbed a restaurant at gunpoint.  The use of violence in Crosby’s prior convictions distinguishes his case from those in which the inference of disproportionality was found to be met by the court....

Crosby’s challenge arises under AEDPA, and we must give the appropriate deference to California Court of Appeal’s decision.  In light of the various cases that have dealt precisely with sex offender registration convictions under the gross disproportionality principle, it was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law for the California Court of Appeal to affirm Crosby’s sentence under the Eighth Amendment.

An intriguing partial dissent by Judge Noonan expresses deep concern about arguments from California's lawyers that he sees as advancing the "remarkable contention ... that there is no limit to the punishment that the state may prescribe for any recidivist." He goes on to lament the implications of this argument with a notable classic reference:

In California’s sweeping gloss, proportionality in sentencing a recidivist has been eliminated.  The repeat felon, however technical his felony, is to be “incapacitated.”  With a severity worthy of Sparta, the state of California will bring to book those who thrice fall afoul of any felony provision in its legislation.

I do not believe that the humane restraint of the Eighth Amendment has been so removed from its role in measuring the proportion of the penalty to the offense.

May 7, 2012 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (13) | TrackBack

Sunday, May 06, 2012

Note examines "vastly different" circuit views on internet bans for supervised release

Via Concurring Opinions, I discovered this new student note titled "You Don’t Have Mail: The Permissibility of InternetUse Bans in Child Pornography Cases and the Need for Uniformity Across the Circuits."  Here is the abstract:

The federal courts of appeal have formed vastly different conclusions with respect to the reasonableness of Internet-use bans as a term of supervised release in virtual child pornography cases.  All courts ground their decisions in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the federal statute governing supervised release conditions.  Nonetheless, when presented with seemingly analogous facts, some courts uphold Internet-use bans, whereas others strike them down.  Courts upholding such bans conclude that they constitute effective deterrents and ensure public safety.  Courts overturning the bans, on the other hand, assert that they unreasonably deprive offenders of their liberty interests.

Because decisions regarding the permissibility of Internet-use bans are, under the current statutory regime, incoherent at best and arbitrary at worst, Congress should amend § 3583(d) to provide judges with meaningful, cyberspecific guidance.  Accordingly, this Note proposes that Congress adopt the UNIFORM Act, which sets forth child pornography–specific guidelines for determining the terms for supervised release.  Inspired by the United States Sentencing Guidelines and extracted from the caselaw regarding the permissibility of Internet-use bans, the UNIFORM Act seeks to limit judges’ sentencing discretion in child pornography cases.  At bottom, this Note posits a commonsense compromise, informed by existing statutes and caselaw, which would achieve consistency in an area of the law currently plagued by judicial ambiguity.

May 6, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Friday, May 04, 2012

"Delineating Sexual Dangerousness"

The title of this post is the title of this new article from Professor Fredrick Vars, which is now available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

Only “dangerous” individuals may be indefinitely detained. Is a one percent chance of a future crime clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness?  For sex offenders, fear and uncertainty in case law leave open this passage to limbo.  This article closes it.

The due process balancing test used to evaluate standards of proof provides the framework.  This article explains the relationship between the standard of proof and the definition of “dangerous” and argues that only an approach combining the two is consistent with the Constitution.

Applying decision theory with assumptions favoring the government, this article calculates a minimum likelihood of recidivism for commitment.  Of the 20 jurisdictions with sex offender commitment, just one requires something close to that constitutional floor. Thousands have been detained applying unconstitutional standards, and the vast majority remains so.

May 4, 2012 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Tuesday, May 01, 2012

Indiana legislators (over?)reacting to pair of sex offenders earning early prison release

This new AP story, headlined "Early prison release for sex offenders irks lawmakers," provides a telling and notable how sex offenders can get into trouble and prompt a harsh legislative response for, in essence, just being good prisoners.  Here are the details:

Indiana lawmakers are planning changes to the state’s early release law in response to this week’s slated release of two convicted sex offenders who significantly shortened their prison terms by earning college degrees.

Republican Sen. Jim Merritt of Indianapolis said Tuesday the law’s shortcoming is illustrated by the case of Christopher Wheat, a former high school swim coach convicted of having a sexual relationship with a 14-year-old female swim student.

Wheat, 38, is scheduled for release Thursday from the New Castle Correctional Facility after serving less than two years of his eight-year sentence.  Merritt said Wheat “manipulated the system” to cut his sentence to about 20 months by earning two computer science degrees behind bars. “I think he gamed the system.  And we need to make sure nobody does that anymore,” Merritt said.  “We all believe education in prison should be for the rehabilitation of one’s character and preparing them for their life as an ex-offender.”...

Wheat was sentenced to eight years in September 2010 following his conviction on two counts of sexual misconduct with a minor and one count of child solicitation.  His victim was a then-14-year-old student he coached at Lawrence North High School in Indianapolis.

Doug Garrison, a spokesman for the Indiana Department of Correction, said Wheat was sentenced to 15 years in prison, with five years suspended and another two years in community corrections, leaving him with an eight-year sentence.  It was cut to four years for good behavior and another two years and three months were removed when he earned an associate degree and a bachelor’s degree. Garrison said Wheat must wear a GPS-monitored ankle bracelet following his release from prison.

Merritt said he’s working with Sen. Randy Head, R-Logansport, to draft legislation for the next General Assembly that would likely include making convicted sex offenders unable to shave time off their sentences by earning degrees in prison.  It might also seek to prevent inmates from using previously accumulated college credits toward their degrees, as Wheat had done....

Merritt said the slated release of another convicted sex offender -- also Thursday from the New Castle prison -- demonstrates that changes are needed to the state’s early release law. Daniel J. Moore, a 53-year-old former New Whiteland Baptist Church pastor, pleaded guilty in March 2010 to child solicitation and sexual misconduct with a minor for a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old girl who was a church member.  His 10-year sentence was cut to five for good behavior, and he earned associate and bachelor’s degrees in human services, further paring his sentence to about two and a half years.

State Sen. Pat Miller, R-Indianapolis, said she also will push for changes to the early release law “to fix this terrible situation.” “Sexual predators are a menace to our society. The pain they inflict upon their victims lasts a lifetime, and it makes no sense that these violent offenders are being released early from prison,” Miller said in a statement.

May 1, 2012 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2) | TrackBack

Sunday, April 29, 2012

"Debate rages over severity of child-porn sentences"

The AP has this lengthy new piece, sharing the headline of this post, on what is now a fairly old story: federal judges and others highlighting that the guideline sentences for child porn downloaders seem often unduly harsh.  I am not aware of any major new developments on this front, but these excerpts from the AP piece effectively review recent parts of this long-running debate over federal sentencing law and practices:

Their crimes are so loathsome that some hardened courtroom veterans recoil at viewing the evidence.  Yet child-pornography offenders are now the focus of an intense debate within the legal community as to whether the federal sentences they face have become, in many cases, too severe.

By the end of this year, after a review dating to 2009, the U.S. Sentencing Commission plans to release a report that's likely to propose changes to the sentencing guidelines that it oversees.  It's a daunting task, given the polarized viewpoints that the commission is weighing.  The issue "is highly charged, both emotionally and politically," said one of the six commissioners, U.S. District Judge Beryl Howell.

On one side of the debate, many federal judges and public defenders say repeated moves by Congress to toughen the penalties over the past 25 years have badly skewed the guidelines, to the point where offenders who possess and distribute child pornography can go to prison for longer than those who actually rape or sexually abuse a child.  In a 2010 survey of federal judges by the Sentencing Commission, about 70 percent said the proposed ranges of sentences for possession and receipt of child pornography were too high.  Demonstrating their displeasure, federal judges issued child porn sentences below the guidelines 45 percent of the time in 2010, more than double the rate for all other crimes.

On the other hand, some prosecutors and members of Congress, as well as advocates for sexual-abuse victims, oppose any push for more leniency.  At a public hearing in February, the Sentencing Commission received a victim's statement lamenting that child pornography offenders "are being entertained by my shame and pain."...

Once completed, the Sentencing Commission report will be submitted to Congress, which could shelve it or incorporate its recommendations into new legislation.  Already, the commission has conveyed some concerns.  In a 2010 report on mandatory minimum sentences, the commission said the penalties for certain child pornography offenses "may be excessively severe and as a result are being applied inconsistently."

However, similar misgivings voiced by the commission in previous years failed to deter Congress from repeatedly ratcheting up the penalties - including legislation in 2003 that more than doubled average sentences for child pornography crimes....

In a recent article for the journal of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, former Sen. Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and former federal prosecutor Linda Dale Hoffa criticized the approach by Congress.  "The fact that child pornography offenders can be given longer sentences than child abusers or violent offenders reflects a lack of care by Congress," Specter and Hoffa wrote.  "In the rush to prove itself hostile to individuals who possess or distribute child pornography, Congress has obscured the real distinctions between different offenders."...

As a backdrop to the sentencing debate, Internet-based child pornography has proliferated, and the crime is an increasingly high priority for federal law enforcement agents.  According to the Justice Department, federal prosecutors obtained at least 2,713 indictments for sexual exploitation of minors in 2011, up from 1,901 in 2006....

There's one point of agreement in the sentencing debate: All parties agree that penalties should remain severe -- or be toughened -- for those who produce and promote child pornography.  A key point of contention, by contrast, is the degree to which offenders charged with receipt and possession of child porn pose a risk of physically abusing children themselves, as opposed to looking at images of abuse....

Susan Howley, public policy director for the National Center for Victims of Crime, has been urging those involved in the debate to keep the victims in mind.  She says they face higher risk of developing mental health disorders, sexual dysfunction and substance abuse problems. "While sentencing does not appear to be the perfect tool to reduce the market for child abuse images, it is one of the few tools available," Howley told the public hearing in February. "Through sentencing we express to society, and to the individual victims and family members harmed, that we recognize the seriousness of this offense."

A few related older and more recent child porn prosecution and sentencing posts:

April 29, 2012 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Saturday, April 28, 2012

"Prison Officials Go After Masturbating Prisoners"

The title of this post is the headline of this local article from Connecticut discussing a bill being considered by state lawmakers.  Here are the details:

Prison officials in Connecticut want lawmakers to pass a bill that would label inmates who commit lewd acts in their cells, including masturbation, as sex offenders. It's an ongoing problem at prisons. In 2011, 94 inmates committed 390 indecent exposure violations of this type, according to the bill.

At the high-security Northern Correctional Institution, some inmates masturbate in front of staff, often a female staff member, a Correction Department spokesman said. Lisamarie Fontano, president of the union representing prison workers, said more than 500 such incident reports were written up at Northern last year.

Internal discipline hasn't deterred the behavior, but she believes inmates will stop if they know they will have to register as a sex offender when they leave prison, Fontano said.

Prior sort-of related posts:

April 28, 2012 in Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (14) | TrackBack

Thursday, April 19, 2012

Are we approaching a tipping point in the modern-day sex offender panic?

The question in the title of this post is prompted by this new piece in Stateline, which is headlined "Are sex offense laws too broad?." Here are excerpts from the piece:

Over eight years in the Missouri House, Republican Representative Rodney Schad has gotten numerous phone calls, letters, and emails from registered sex offenders and their families about the damage the registry has caused in their lives — the harassment, persistent unemployment, and community ostracism. Three years ago, Schad decided to start researching the state's registration policy, and what he found surprised him.

"There's no way to tell who's dangerous and who isn't," says Schad. "[People] look up their address and see 10 offenders living or working near their house." In his view, the list is becoming bloated and less helpful to ordinary citizens than it should be.

To try and refine who actually shows up on the public registry, Schad crafted legislation to create a tier system so that only the most dangerous offenders are listed publicly. Currently, anyone convicted of any type of sex crime, from public urination to child molestation, is placed on the list. The bill also creates an appeals process, so that offenders can petition to be removed from the registry after 10 or 20 years, depending on their crime, and removes all juvenile sex offenders tried in juvenile court from the public registry....

Missouri is not the only state pushing back against the strictest registry requirements. Georgia, which had one of the toughest sex offender laws in the nation, scaled back its registration requirements in 2010 for people who had committed crimes such as false imprisonment or non-sexual kidnapping. This immediately removed 819 people from the registry, according to the Atlanta Journal- Constitution.

In Ohio, which was the first state to go along with the Adam Walsh Act in 2007, the state Supreme Court has struck down three controversial portions of SORNA compliance legislation in the last two years: the lifetime registration of some juveniles, the application of the more restrictive Adam Walsh Act penalties to offenders sentenced under previous, less strict laws, and community re-notification requirements for offenders previously sentenced.

Even though opposition to the harshest sex offender policies is brewing, the more common story is still more punishment, not less. The Louisiana House passed a billl this week to exclude sex offenders convicted of computer-related offenses from social networking sites. The Arkansas parole board is considering banning registered sex offenders from using the Internet, and New York has recently distributed sex offenders' email addresses to online gaming companies which are then disabling offenders' accounts.

April 19, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack

Thursday, April 05, 2012

"NY Moves to Ban Sex Offenders from Video Game Websites"

WaluigiThe title of this post is the headline of this news story, which includes this report on the latest effort to keep sex offenders from using the internet to have certain kinds of fun:

Registered sex offenders in New York state are being shut out of online gaming systems that have allowed them to interact with children anonymously under an agreement announced Thursday by state Attorney General Eric Schneiderman.

The deal applies only to sex offenders within state borders — boundaries that may not hold much weight in virtual gaming worlds where players young and old mix anonymously, conversing by voice and written message. "Online gaming is not just a digital playground. It has the potential to be a 21st century crime scene," Schneiderman said, citing a 2008 Pew Research Center study that found that 27 percent of teenagers acknowledge playing games online with strangers. Many games require players to interact virtually with others.

The deal may be the first of its kind to focus on online gaming; Schneiderman said he was aware of no other. Such precautions are frequently taken on more traditional social networking sites such as Facebook.

The agreement — dubbed "Operation: Game Over" by Schneiderman's office — has led companies including Microsoft and Apple to shut down or suspend communication privileges for more than 3,500 accounts. The attorney general declined to identify companies that have thus far declined to participate.

Schneiderman said his office was exploring ways in which the program could be expanded to other states. In New York, registered sex offenders are required to disclose all their email addresses and online accounts, allowing gaming companies to perform a weekly purge of player accounts associated with the offenders.

Earlier this month, Schneiderman said, a 19-year-old man pleaded guilty to sexual abuse charges after befriending a 10-year-old through Microsoft's Xbox LIVE and luring the boy to his home.

The companies that have agreed to participate in the program are Microsoft, Apple, Blizzard Entertainment, Electronic Arts, Warner Bros. and Disney Interactive Media Group.

April 5, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6) | TrackBack

Wednesday, April 04, 2012

Kansas Supreme Court rules that repeat dog molester can avoid sex offender registration

As reported via this local article, the Kansas Supreme Court "has decided that a Sedgwick County man who molested a rottweiler won’t have to register as a sex offender."  Here is more about the ruling:

The state’s highest court overturned both Sedgwick County District Court Judge Joseph Bribiesca and the Kansas Court of Appeals, who had ruled Joshua Coman would have to register as a sex offender after his second conviction for sodomy involving a dog.

In his appeal, Coman argued that Kansas’s registration law did not apply to him because he was convicted of a misdemeanor that wasn’t on the list of felony offenses for which registration is required....

In 2008, a former roommate of Coman’s “discovered Coman in her garage with the dog in a compromising position,” the court record said.  Police were called and Coman admitted to having penetrated the female rottweiler with his finger, the court record said.  At the time, he was on probation after being prosecuted on a similar incident in Reno County the year before.  Coman pleaded guilty and was sentenced to six months in jail.

But the question of whether he would have to register as a sex offender came down to interpretation of the way the law is worded.  The statute lists several crimes where sex-offender registration is required, including felony sodomy.  Misdemeanor sodomy is not on the list.

Prosecutors had argued that a “catch all” provision in the law would allow a judge to require offender registration of anyone convicted of a “sexually motivated” crime.  The Supreme Court justices disagreed, concluding that the Legislature excluded misdemeanor sodomy on purpose.

The full opinion in Kansas v. Coman is available at this link

I wonder if (when) PETA or similar animal groups in Kansas will soon urge the legislature to fix this registry loophole which, obviously, now places all the innocent dogs in Kansas at greater risk.  (Indeed, I am glad Toto is not alive to learn of this notable jurisprudential development.)

April 4, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack

Tuesday, April 03, 2012

Ohio Supreme Court finds required juve sex offender registration unconstitutional on numerous grounds

As reported in this lengthy official press release, the "Supreme Court of Ohio today voided as unconstitutional provisions of the Ohio Adam Walsh Act (AWA) that impose automatic lifelong registration and community notification requirements on certain juvenile sex offenders who were tried within the juvenile court system."  Here is more on this significant state Supreme Court ruling which has national implications:

In a 5-2 majority decision authored by Justice Paul E. Pfeifer, the court held that applying automatic lifetime sex offender registration and community notification requirements imposed by the AWA against an Athens County 15-year-old violated the prohibitions in the U.S. and Ohio constitutions against cruel and unusual punishment, and also violated the defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law....

ustice Pfeifer’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor and Justices Evelyn Lundberg Stratton, Judith Ann Lanzinger and Yvette McGee Brown. Justices Terrence O’Donnell and Robert R. Cupp entered separate dissenting opinions.

The full opinions in In re C.P., No. 2012-Ohio-1446 (Ohio Apr. 3, 2012) (available here), run 53 pages and they are all must reads for any and everyone who follows juvenile justice issue or sex offender registration issues or Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Here is how the majority opinion gets started:

In this case we determine the constitutionality of R.C. 2152.86, which creates a new class of juvenile sex-offender registrants: public-registry-qualified juvenile-offender registrants.  These offenders are automatically subject to mandatory, lifetime sex-offender registration and notification requirements, including notification on the Internet.  We hold that to the extent that it imposes such requirements on juvenile offenders tried within the juvenile system, R.C. 2152.86 violates the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 9, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16.

April 3, 2012 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3) | TrackBack

Arkansas parole board assessing total internet ban for all released sex offenders

As reported in this recent local story, headlined "Arkansas board eyes Internet ban for sex offenders," officials in the Natural State are considering a broad (unnatural?) restriction on all released sex offenders. Here are the basics:

Some freed sex offenders will be able to send e-mails and browse the Web for a while longer while the state Board of Parole researches whether it can adopt a policy that bars convicted sex offenders from using the Internet without infringing on their First Amendment rights.

The board had been scheduled to vote Thursday, at a meeting in Hot Springs, on a proposal to prohibit all paroled sex offenders from using the Internet -- at least for an initial period after their release from prison.  The board now restricts sex offenders' Internet access on a case-by-case basis.

But the board put off discussing imposing the broader restriction at the request of Chairman John Felts, who said the state attorney general's office is researching whether such a ban would be constitutional.  "We just want to make sure that we don't make a ruling that we have to back off of," Felts said....

At that meeting, Knoll said parole officers have found that offenders are frequently using the Internet to download child pornography and communicate with children.  Under the proposal, all sex offenders would initially be barred from accessing the Internet, but they could request permission to use it for a specific purpose, such as for use in the workplace.

Felts said he discussed the proposal Monday with Graves and Assistant Attorney General Arnold Jochums, a legal adviser to the board, and Jochums requested more time for research.  He said the board also contacted the Association of Paroling Authorities International, which agreed to survey states on their policies.

In a phone interview, criminal-defense attorney Jeff Rosenzweig of Little Rock said it's a "close question" on whether the board could bar offenders' Internet access. But he called the policy "ill-considered, particularly since so much of life and commerce and everything else like that has gone to the Internet.  It would put them at even more of a disadvantage in trying to be law-abiding, to reintegrate back into society," he said.

In Louisiana, a federal judge ruled that a law prohibiting certain types of sex offenders from using social networking sites, chat rooms and peer-to-peer networks was an unconstitutional restriction on free speech.  Unlike the Arkansas policy, however, the law made accessing the sites a crime and applied to offenders who were no longer under state supervision.  Pam Laborde, a spokesman for the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, said the state's Parole Board now imposes restrictions on a case by-case basis.

In Texas, a Board of Pardons and Paroles policy, adopted in 2009, prohibits certain sex offenders from using social-networking sites, using the Internet to gain access to obscene material, communicating through the Internet with anyone they know to be under 17 or communicating on the Internet about sexual topics with anyone under 17, whether the offender knows the person's age or not.

The Texas restriction applies only to offenders deemed to be at high risk of re-offending and whose convictions involved the use of a computer.  Offenders can petition for an exception if the restriction interferes with the ability to attend school or perform duties at work.

As I have noted before, just whether, when, and how sex offenders can be prohibited from getting on-line is a challenging legal issue that seems certain to arise in many jurisdictions in many different ways.  I suspect it is only a matter of when, not if, this issue in some variation eventually get to the Supreme Court.

Some related posts:

April 3, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (12) | TrackBack

Sunday, April 01, 2012

Did severe sentence impact Arkansas Supreme Court's teacher-student "right to sex" ruling?

As noted in this Reuters article, the "Arkansas Supreme Court struck down a state law on Thursday that banned teachers from having sex with students under age 21, overturning a sexual assault conviction against a former teacher who had a consensual relationship with an 18-year-old student." The Arkansas Supreme Court's ruling in Paschal v. Arkansas, 2012 Ark. 127 (Ark. Mar. 29, 2012) (available here), is based on the Arkansas Constitution and a prior state ruling concerning right to sexual autonomy among consenting adults.  Here is more on the ruling (with my emphasis added) via the Reuters report:

In a 4-3 decision, the court vacated the conviction against David Paschal, a former teacher in the Elkins School District in northern Arkansas, because the girl was legally an adult during the relationship.

For about five months, Paschal, then 36, had a consensual sexual relationship with the female student at Elkins High School, according to court documents.  The girl had been a student of Paschal in tenth and eleventh grades, and she later became his classroom aide and offered to babysit his children.  The two began their affair in 2009, when she was a senior, and Paschal was arrested the following year.

In 2011, he was convicted of four counts of second-degree sexual assault and one count of bribing a witness at a jury trial last year. He was sentenced to 30 years in prison.

"Regardless of how we feel about Paschal's conduct, which could correctly be referred to as reprehensible, we cannot abandon our duty to uphold the rule of law when a case presents distasteful facts," Chief Justice Jim Hannah wrote in the decision.  The issue presented to the court hinged on "Paschal's fundamental right to engage in private, consensual, noncommercial acts of sexual intimacy with an adult. We hold that it does," the majority said.

In the dissent, Justice Robert Brown wrote that the decision "minimizes the role of a teacher." He also argued that the state has a general interest in the ensuring the welfare of children in school against teachers who abuse positions of trust and authority.

Neither the majority nor the dissent in Paschal makes any significant mention of the sentence that had been imposed on this defendant for having sex with his 18-year-old student.  But, as suggested by the title of this post and the fact I stressed above, I suspect that the severe sentence given to David  Paschal played a role — perhaps a large role — in convincing four Arkansas justices to strike down his convictions.  I really wonder if this case comes down the same way had the defendant received, say, a prison term of only three years rather than a term of three decades.

April 1, 2012 in Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11) | TrackBack

Sunday, March 25, 2012

Another effective review of federal sentencing severity for child porn downloaders

The Louisville Courier-Journal has this lengthy and effective article (and a few companion pieces) discussing a topic familiar to regular readers of this blog: the severeity of federal sentencing rules for those who download child pornography from the internet.  The main article is headlined "Are child porn laws unfair? Viewers' sentences can be worse than molesters'," and here are excerpts:

Born with spina bifida and dependent on a wheelchair, 26-year-old Jon Michael Fox cannot hurt a soul, his mother and lawyer say.  But after being caught with more than 1,200 images of child pornography on his computer, some of which he traded with others, Fox was sentenced in 2009 by a federal judge in Louisville to 14 years in prison — with no option of early release.

The Justice Department says that long sentences for offenders such as Fox — even if they have had no contact with children — are vital in slowing the demand for child porn and the abuse of children exploited in making it.

But Fox’s attorney, Frank Campisano Jr., called Fox’s sentence “ludicrous,” saying his client “never could be a threat to anyone, including a child.”  Fox’s mother, Kathy, said, “He could have killed someone and got less.”

The facts appear to back her up. In 2010, about 1,800 offenders sentenced nationally for child pornography crimes in federal courts received longer average sentences than those convicted of arson, robbery, assault or even manslaughter, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission.

In Kentucky’s Western District, the average federal sentence for child pornography was twice that for drug trafficking. Offenders released from prison also are required to submit to longer periods of supervision — sometimes for the rest of their life.

Federal offenders in the Western District of Kentucky were sentenced to an average of 10 years in prison from 2006 through last year for downloading and trading child pornography. That was nearly four times longer than offenders in Jefferson Circuit Court got for sexually abusing children, according to Courier-Journal research.

Such facts help explain a growing chorus of critics taking issue with what they say are Draconian penalties for those caught with child pornagraphy — even as they acknowledge, as do Campisano and Kathy Fox, that it is harmful....

U.S. Chief District Judge Joseph McKinley Jr. of Owensboro has said in sentencing hearings that the penalties often don’t fit the crime. “This is the first time that most of them have ever been in trouble,” McKinley Jr. s aid of such perpetrators. “And then, boom, here they are looking at 16 years in prison for engaging in their dark secret in the privacy of their own home.”

Those receiving the longest sentences in Western Kentucky had prior convictions involving sexual contact with children — including one man sentenced to life in prison. But 56 of 70 had no prior history of sexual contact with children.

The newspaper’s review found only three cases over the five-year period in which an offender was prosecuted for producing child pornography. “By and large, we never get the actual pornographers,” McKinley said at a hearing....

Former federal prosecutors in Louisville say that penalties for child pornography offenses are inordinately severe. “These are horrible crimes, but the sentences are way too long,” said Kent Wicker, a former U.S. attorney now in private practice.

Brian Butler, another former federal prosecutor, who called the penalties “insane,” cited a client he defended, Arthur Wayne Kniffley, 37, who was sentenced in 2010 to 17½ years in prison for possession and distribution of child pornography.  That was more than three times the five- year sentence he got in state court 13 years earlier for molesting three children.  Kniffley told authorities that he viewed child pornography to suppress his urges to commit other acts against children.

Companion pieces to this lead article are headlined "By the Numbers: Child pornography vs. other federal crimes," and "Do viewers of child porn also molest?" and "Prosecutions of child porn producers are rare."

March 25, 2012 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack

Sunday, March 18, 2012

Extraordinary review of federal sex offender civil commitment program

USA Today has published this extraordinary report on the federal sex offender civil commitment program under the headline "Sexual predators rarely committed under Justice program." Here is how it gets started:

Inside the sprawling federal prison here is a place the government reserves for the worst of the worst — sexual predators too dangerous to be set free.

Six years ago, the federal government set out to indefinitely detain some of the nation's most dangerous sex offenders, keeping them locked up even after their prison sentences had ended. But despite years of effort, the government has so far won court approval for detaining just 15 men.

Far more often, men the U.S.Justice Department branded as "sexually dangerous" predators, remained imprisoned here for years without a mandatory court hearing before the government was forced to let them go, a USA TODAY investigation has found. The Justice Department has either lost or dropped its cases against 61 of the 136 men it sought to detain. Some were imprisoned for more than four years without a trial before they were freed.

Dozens of others are still waiting for their day in court. They remain in a prison unit where authorities and former detainees said explicit drawings of children are commonplace, but where few of the men have received any treatment for the disorders that put them there.

Despite that, neither the Justice Department nor other watchdog agencies have offered any public assessment of how well the federal civil commitment law works.

For this investigation, USA TODAY reviewed all 136 cases that have been brought to court, drawing on thousands of pages of legal filings and dozens of interviews with attorneys, psychologists and former detainees.

The outcomes documented by that review have raised questions about a system meant to control men too seriously ill to control themselves. A federal appeals court in Richmond, Va., has already called delays in bringing the men to trial "troubling," and suggested that they could raise concerns about the detainees' constitutional right to due process. And Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner, R-Wis., one of the law's key supporters, said "there will be somebody who will have to answer" for them.

"We need to be very, very careful in a free society about a system in which a group of people can make statements that result in someone being deprived of their liberty for a future crime," said Fred Berlin, the director of the Sexual Behaviors Consultation Unit at the Johns Hopkins Hospital. "If it's going to be done, it has to be done in a just and fair manner."

Many of the men the government sought to detain have been found guilty of molesting children or brutal sexual assaults. One killed a woman. U.S. Bureau of Prisons psychologists certified that the men also suffer from mental abnormalities making them "sexually dangerous," a determination that keeps them locked up while their cases are reviewed. By law, a federal judge must ultimately decide whether the government can prove the inmate is too dangerous to be released. Worst of the worst

But in case after case, those determinations have come into question. In at least two cases, the government could not prove the men had committed crimes serious enough to justify committing them. Others had not been found guilty of a "hands-on" sex offense in decades. Some psychological assessments failed to fully account for men's ages, a key factor when assessing risk.

March 18, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (21) | TrackBack

Tuesday, March 13, 2012

Wisconsin Supreme Court addresses registration requirements for homeless sex offenders

As reported in this local press article, which is headlined "Court rules for homeless sex offender who didn't register address," today the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed the registration requirements for homeless sex offenders. Here are the basics:

William Dinkins Sr. spent nine years in prison for a sex crime, so he had to register as sex offender before he got out in 2008.  But Dinkins had nowhere to go, and no address to provide within 10 days of his release, so he was  charged and convicted of a new felony— violating the sex offender registration law.

The Court of Appeals reversed and on Tuesday the state Supreme Court upheld that decision.  "In isolation, the penalty subsection of the statute appears to criminalize the failure to provide required information — without regard to the registrant's ability to provide that information," the court found.

The state argued that Dinkins could have listed a park bench or some other street location where he intended to sleep in order to comply with the law.  The majority opinion makes clear that not all homeless offenders would be exempt from registration, but that listing a bench or doorway would be an unreasonable interpretation of the law in Dinkins' case.

Justice Annette Ziegler, in a harsh dissent joined by Justice Michael Gableman, accuses the majority of creating "a registration loophole for arguably some of the most dangerous sex offenders: those whose whereabouts are unknown and who are otherwise not subject to supervision by the Department of Corrections."

All the opinions in Wisconsin v. Dinkins, which are available at this link and run more than 50 pages, make for interesting reading concerning an issue that is arising in nearly every jurisdiction.

In unrelated (but weirdly connected) news, this other new story discusses an effort by a private company to turn homeless people into wireless network providers under the headlined "Homeless people turned into walking Wi-Fi hotspots in 'charitable experiment'."  Perhaps we might kill two bird with one stone by forcing homeless sex offenders to become Wi-Fi hotspots and then enable their tracking via this internet connection. And though this may all sound like a joke, if homeless sex offenders were to become a means for people to get free and fast internet access, perhaps more people would be willing to have these sex offenders in and around their neighborhoods.

March 13, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (28) | TrackBack

Thursday, March 08, 2012

"From Peer-to-Peer Networks to Cloud Computing: How Technology Is Redefining Child Pornography Laws"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now available via SSRN by Professor Audrey Rogers. Here is the abstract:

Child pornography circulating in cyberspace has ballooned into the millions.  To punish this flood, the law must accurately delineate culpable conduct.  Technology such as peer-to-peer networks has erased the divisions among traders of child pornography, and, therefore, the differentials in punishment have lost their underpinnings.  The current sentencing controversy surrounding child pornographers is merely the tip of the iceberg of the larger need to revamp the offenses themselves.

This paper provides a framework for a normative critique of the offenses and their sentences. It suggests the law could better reflect technology by comporting with a refined harm rationale that rests on the fundamental injury to the victim’s dignity and privacy. Drawing on comparisons to diverse laws such as the Geneva Convention’s ban on photographs of prisoners of war, this paper states all traders in child pornography violate the rights of the children depicted and therefore inflict harm, albeit at different levels. Accordingly, the paper proposes three categories: producers, traders, and seekers of child pornography with base sentences varying accordingly.  Starting at the same base level, the Sentencing Commission could then propose enhancements or departures to distinguish among the traders and their individual culpability.

March 8, 2012 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing, Web/Tech | Permalink | Comments (18) | TrackBack

Monday, March 05, 2012

Super Tuesday meets sex offender panic in Virginia

With Super Tuesday on my mind (and lots of political ads on my TV), I found notable this local article from Virginia headlined "Schools Take Precautions as Voters Head to the Polls."  Here are excerpts:

When your child heads to school Tuesday, they could be coming dangerously close to a sex offender.  The Republican presidential primary is Tuesday, and since schools often serve as polling places, they have to allow all registered voters in -- even sex offenders.

It's a touchy topic.  Four schools in Charlottesville, two in Greene County, five in Orange County, and several more across the state are acting as voting precincts for elections, with schools in session.

But a lot of people wonder why sex offenders are allowed to vote on school property in the first place.  When schools open their doors for classes, parents know the law prohibits sex offenders from coming in.

In Virginia, it's clear -- every adult convicted of a sexually violent offense is prohibited from entering or being present during school hours and during school-related activities. However, that law does not apply if the offender is registered and qualified to vote, and is coming on school property solely to cast their ballot.

It's a provision that has parents like Janet Ball worried.  "As a mother and a grandmother, I do not want a sex offender anywhere near that school, no matter what," she said....

School officials don't anticipate any type of contact at all between their students and voters.  Doors will be locked from the gym to the school and extra hands will be on deck to keep voters away from kids.

Jeck even went on to explain that they are using this as a teaching to tool to help kids understand what all goes into the voting process, but a lot of people say keeping voters away from students isn't good enough.  They want the law changed to keep sexual predators away from schools at all times.  "I think that they should be provided with an absentee ballot, that would take care of this issue," said voter Virginia Ferrell.

"But that's been the law, they have been allowed to in the state of Virginia for years, so hopefully that won't be an issue because you always worry you know, being a mother and grandmother myself, you constantly worry," said Greene County Registrar Sandra Shifflett.

On a positive note, the voting exception is only granted to those sexual offenders who have not been convicted of a felony.  Anyone with a felony has their right to vote taken away all together.

This story strikes me as a truly great (aka truly terrible) example of sensationalized sex offender panic reporting.  The first sentence asserts that kids on election day could be coming "dangerously close to a sex offender," but later the article notes that school official "don't anticipate any type of contact at all between their students and voters," and it ends by noting that anyone convicted of a felony is not even able to vote in Virginia.  (That said, given all the SuperPAC commercials I have seen attacking one candidate for supporting ex-felon voting rights, perhaps the local media is wise to alert parents about the risk of hordes of disenfrachised Virginia sex offenders storming the polling places in Virginia to try to find a way to vote for Rick Santorum.)

March 5, 2012 in Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (25) | TrackBack

Friday, March 02, 2012

"Man Gets 2 Years For Semen Sample At Sunflower Market"

The title of this post is the headline of this local report of a federal sentencing in New Mexico. Here are some of the distasteful details:

A man has been sentenced to federal prison for tricking a woman into tasting his semen at the Sunflower Market.

Police arrested former Sunflower Market employee Anthony Garcia for putting his own semen onto a spoon and tricking a woman into tasting it.  Garcia told the judge Thursday that he didn't know the consequences were going to be high, and he apologized to the victim and Sunflower Market.

However, in a rare move, the judge sentenced Garcia to 24 months in federal prison, which is more than the 12 to 18 months expected.  "It doesn't happen a lot.  A judge really has to be particularly concerned with the kind of offense conduct to go up," said U.S. District Attorney Ken Gonzales.

Prosecutors said Garcia tricked four women into sampling the semen and watching their reactions, and DNA tests proved Garcia was responsible.  They said that Garcia's criminal history also factored into the stiffer penalty.

"There is one incident in a local Walmart where he flashed his private parts, where he flashed a young lady who was in the store," Gonzales said.  Gonzales said Garcia also flashed a jogger on the Bosque.

Before she handed down the sentence, the judge told Garcia that what he did was despicable, heinous and horrendous. At one point, the judge told Garcia she's practically speechless in trying to articulate just how offensive it is....

Garcia has been ordered to serve his sentence at the Bureau of Prisons in Stafford, Ariz. He's also ordered to take psychosexual evaluations and undergo sex offender treatment Garcia has a case pending in district court of criminal sexual contact of a minor, kidnapping, and bribery, which is set for trial in April.

There are a lot of interesting legal elements to this case, including the remarkable fact that the guidelines recommended such a low prison sentence for this "despicable, heinous and horrendous" behavior and yet often recommends a sentence many, many years longer for downloading child porn.  Perhaps this case represents one of those rare examples in which the applicable guidelines actually recommend a sentence that is insufficient to achieve the 3553(a)(2) punishment purposes.

Especially because it is late on a Friday afternoon after a long week, I hope folks do not find this sentencing story to leave them with a bad taste going into the weekend.  (Sorry, lame and tasteless jokes here are just too easy.)

UPDATE:  This news report about the sentencing (which looks like a reprint of a Justice Department press release) explains the federal charges to which this defendant pleaded guilty:

Thursday afternoon, a U.S. District Judge in Albuquerque sentenced Anthony Garcia, 32, of Albuquerque, to a 24-month term of imprisonment for his conviction for adulterating food with semen and making false statements to federal investigators during a criminal investigation. Garcia will be on supervised release for three years after completing his prison sentence. Garcia also was ordered to pay restitution to the victim of his criminal conduct. Garcia was arrested on July 13, 2011, based on a two-count indictment charging him with (1) adulterating food with semen; and (2) making false statements during the course of a federal investigation. Garcia has been in federal custody since his arrest.

March 2, 2012 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack

Thursday, March 01, 2012

First Circuit jumps into circuit split in affirming child porn restitution award

In a long discussion at the end of a long opinion, the First Circuit yesterday weighed in on the various statutory issues that arise when restitution is sought as part of the punishment for a child porn downloader.  Folks following this issue, which has split the circuits in various ways, should read the full opinion in US v. Kearney, No. 10-2434 (1st Cir. Feb. 29, 2012) (available here), and here are some notable snippets:

Under § 2259, restitution may only be awarded to a "victim," which "means the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter." 18 U.S.C. § 2259(c). Kearney contends that it is "unclear" that Vicky is a victim of Kearney's conduct, with little explanation.

Vicky is plainly a victim of Kearney's crimes.  Any argument that Vicky has not suffered harm as a result of Kearney's crimes defies both fact and law....

It is clear to us that Congress intended some causal link between the losses and the offense to support the mandated restitution.  However, in this statute, Congress also did not specify the level of causation except in one place -- the catch-all clause of the definition of losses, 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)(F).

With the exception of only a Fifth Circuit panel (which relied on the difference in language between the catch-all clause and the other clauses) in an opinion which has been vacated for rehearing en banc, In re Amy Unknown, 636 F.3d at 198-201, all other circuit decisions have said they interpret the statute as using a proximate causation standard connecting the offense to the losses.... The government does not dispute that a proximate cause test applies.

This seeming agreement on a standard suggests more harmony than there is.  On rather similar facts the circuits have reached different outcomes in applying the proximate cause test, and those outcomes cannot be entirely explained by differences in the facts of record. Compare Monzel, 641 F.3d at 537-40 (finding proximate cause but remanding to determine the amount of harm so caused), and McDaniel, 631 F.3d at 1209 (holding that the district court did not clearly err in finding proximate cause), with McGarity, 2012 WL 370104, at *37-38 (finding that proximate cause was not established); Aumais, 656 F.3d at 154-55 (same), and Kennedy, 643 F.3d at 1263-65 (same).  In our view, any proximate cause standard must be understood and applied in terms of the precise language of the statute and the clear intentions of Congress....

The restitution statute was enacted against a body of Supreme Court case law explaining the type of harm caused by distribution and possession of child pornography, including psychological harm, as discussed above.  These cases make clear that injury to the child depicted in the child pornography, including injury that will require mental-health treatment, is a readily foreseeable result of distribution and possession of child pornography.

March 1, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sex Offender Sentencing, Victims' Rights At Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

Monday, February 27, 2012

Trio of notable sentencing losses by child porn defendants in Sixth Circuit

The Sixth Circuit has, just in the last two business days, handed down three notable published sentencing opinions in child porn cases.  For a variety of reasons, anyone following this area of federal sentencing ought to find time to review the trio.  But, as explained at the end of this post, such a review will not leave one with much confidence about modern federal sentencing justice in these kinds of cases.

Based on a too-quick review of the trio, the opinion in US v. Robinson, No. 09-1959 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2012) (available here), strikes me as the most consequential because it reverses a below-guideline sentence as substantively unreasonable in an opinion that starts this way:

Rufus Robinson pled guilty to knowingly possessing over 7100 images of child pornography on his computer.  Some of the images involved the bondage, torture, and rape of prepubescent children.  Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Robinson’s recommended sentence was 78 to 97 months’ imprisonment.  The district court rejected that recommendation and imposed a sentence of one day in custody, a term of supervised release of five years, and a $100 special assessment.  The United States contends that Robinson’s sentence is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable.  We agree that the sentence is substantively unreasonable, and vacate his sentence.

US v. Cunningham, No. 10-3092 (6th Cir. Feb. 24, 2012) (available here), covers some similar ground in the course of affirming a (within-guideline) sentence in an opinion that begins this way:

Defendant Thomas Cunningham appeals the district court’s judgment sentencing him to concurrent prison terms of 121 months and 120 months after he pleaded guilty to three child pornography offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2), 2252A(a)(2), and 2252A(a)(5)(B).  Defendant raises assignments of error with several procedural and substantive aspects of the district court’s sentence.  Because the district court’s imposition of Defendant’s sentence was comprehensive and legally sufficient, we AFFIRM.

US v. Ferguson, No. 10-3070 (6th Cir. Feb. 27, 2012) (available here), involves a similar defendant convicted and sentenced for child porn possession, but the sentencing issues raised (and deemed waived) on appeal concerned conditions of supervised release (perhaps because the defendant worked out a plea deal in which he got only a 30-month sentence for his kiddie porn offenses). 

There is so much that might be said individually about each of these cases and what they reveal about the child porn guidelines and/or appellate review for reasonableness.  But I find most remarkable that these opinion create the impression that defendant Cunningham may have been the most mitigated of these three offenders, even though he had the highest guideline range (121-151 months) and received the longest prison term (121 months). 

Based on points discussed by the Sixth Circuit, defendant Robinson arguably is a much more serious offender than defendant Cunningham, but he faced a much lower guideline range (78-97 months) which means that, even after today's reversal of his one-day prison sentence, on resentencing  defendant Robinson is still very likely to get a much shorter prison sentence than defendant Cunningham. 

Finally, because defendant Ferguson's lawyer was apparently able to put together a sweet plea deal, defendant Ferguson is now likely already out of federal prison even though there are facts set forth in his case which might suggest he could well pose more danger to the public than the others.  I am not sure just how or why 30 months was set at the fixed sentence in his case, but the outcome even on appeal provides further proof that "winning" sentencing arguments at the plea bargain stage may prove much more important and even more enduring in these cases than "winning" at the sentencing stage.

Short summary: sentencing in kiddie porn downloading cases are even more of a mess than one can reasonably assess.

February 27, 2012 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (21) | TrackBack

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Federal judge finds unconstitutional broad state law limiting sex offender internet activity

Thanks to this new post by Eugene Volokh at his conspiracy, I just learning of a notable new ruling concerning an issue that seems destined to be the subject of much constitutional litigation in lots of different flavors in the years to come.  The post is titled "Federal District Court Strikes Down Ban on Much Internet Activity by Registered Sex Offenders," and here are snippets and links:

A Louisiana statute bans much Internet activity by registered sex offenders who had been convicted of child pornography or other sex crimes involving children (or of video voyeurism); the law, like most other laws dealing with sex offenders, includes within its coverage sex offenders who are no longer in prison or on probation. The law bans “using or accessing of social networking websites, chat rooms, and peer-to-peer networks” by such offenders, unless “the offender has permission to use or access social networking websites, chat rooms, or peer-to-peer networks from his probation or parole officer or the court of original jurisdiction.”  And the law defines the prohibited sites very broadly...

This blog would therefore qualify as a “chat room,” as would any newspaper site that allows reader comments.  Any service that lets people set up their own Web pages would qualify as a “social networking website.”

Last Thursday, a federal district court struck down the law, holding that it was unconstitutionally overbroad.  The court therefore did not have to decide whether a law that was more focused on registered sex offenders’ communications to minors, or that were especially likely to be seen by minors rather than by adults, would be constitutional.

The court also rejected, for two reasons, the argument that the exception for any offender who got “permission … from his probation or parole officer or the court of original jurisdiction” narrowed the law sufficiently: First, the law didn’t impose any standards that the permission-granting authority would use. (Such standardless discretion has often been held to be unconstitutional where First Amendment rights are involved.) Second, it isn’t clear how a defendant who isn’t on probation or parole could get permission from the court of original jurisdiction, since some such courts might not (under the law of the jurisdiction to which the court belongs) have the authority to do or say anything more with regard to defendants whose sentences have been completed.

The court’s analysis seems quite right to me.  I would think that even narrower restrictions would be unconstitutional as to people who have finished serving their sentences (though the matter isn’t an open and shut, and raises interesting — though imperfect — analogies to the restrictions on the Second Amendment rights of felons and some misdemeanants who have finished serving their sentences).  But certainly restrictions that are this broad are unconstitutional.

February 21, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (23) | TrackBack

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

Fascinating DOJ testimony to US Sentencing Commission about child porn sentencing

As mentioned in this prior post, today was the first day for two big full-day public hearings before the US Sentencing Commission in DC.   Today was "for the Commission to gather testimony from invited witnesses regarding the issue of penalties for child pornography offenses in federal sentencing."

I suspect a lot of interesting testimony was presented, and I hope any reader who were in attendance might consider posting a comment with any notable observations.  Helpfully, the USSC has posted the submitted written testimony of the witnesses via links to the official agenda, and I just had a chance to review the joint submission by the witnesses from the Justice Department. There is much of interest in this testimony (and in all the other linked testimony), but I thought these passages were especially worth spotlighting in light of controversies over application of the current federal child porn guidelines:

We believe the sentencing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2, poses some challenges to the successful handling and sentencing of child pornography cases.   This guideline has existed in its current version more or less since 2003.   Whether or not in 2003 it accurately calibrated the seriousness of the offenders, our experience today tells us two things: first, the guideline has not kept pace with technological advancements in both computer media and internet and software technologies; and second, there is a range of aggravating conduct that we see today that is not captured in the current guideline.  As a result, prosecutors, probation officers, and judges are often assessing these cases using a guideline that does not account for the full range of the defendant’s conduct and also does not adequately differentiate among offenders given the severity of their conduct....

[T]he Commission should consider whether § 2G2.2’s existing specific offense characteristics should be revised and consolidated to bring them in line with today’s reality, and whether new specific offense characteristics should be added to better differentiate among offenders based on their offense severity and risk to children.

There are several characteristics that could be taken into account in a revised guideline. The Commission could add a provision that addresses the harm caused by distribution such as that by P2P technologies.  The Commission could also consider adding specific offense characteristics for image severity that address images of bestiality as well as images of infants and toddlers.  As for the enhancement for the quantity of images, the image table might be revised to reflect the plain reality that offenders today can amass collections, not of hundreds of images, but tens, or even hundreds, of thousands of images.

The Commission could consider adding new specific offense characteristics to better differentiate among offenders, such as by accounting for offenders who communicate with one another and in so doing, facilitate and encourage the sexual abuse of children and production of more child pornography, as well as for offenders who create and administer the forums where such communication is taking place.  The Commission could also consider a specific offense characteristic that addresses the length of time the offender has committed the offense to distinguish those offenders who have gotten away with their crime for years from those who may have just begun committing these crimes.   The Commission could also consider recognizing variations in the sophistication of the criminal conduct to appropriately address the more technologically sophisticated offenders who might use multiple internet technologies to collect child pornography, or who might use sophisticated measures to avoid being detected by law enforcement, or who are members of a group dedicated to child sexual exploitation.  By considering these types of changes, the Commission could improve § 2G2.2’s ability to meaningfully differentiate among offenders based on the severity of their offense conduct and the risk they pose to children.

February 15, 2012 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (26) | TrackBack

Sunday, February 12, 2012

Timely discussion of federal judicial concerns with guideline sentences for kiddie porn downloaders

Today's Boston Globe has this notable article on a controversial component of the federal sentencing guidelines.  The piece is headlined "US judges balk at rigid child porn sentences; Say guidelines often demand punishment beyond severity of crime."  Here are excerpts:

In 2010, federal judges deviated below sentencing guidelines in child pornography cases 43 percent of the time, compared with 18 percent for all other crimes, according to data from the US Sentencing Commission, the agency that Congress established to set the guidelines....

Just last month, a federal court judge in Boston sentenced a Dedham man to 21 months in prison for possession of child pornography -- far lower than the 63 months he faced under sentencing guidelines, and even lower than the 30 months prosecutors had recommended as part of a plea deal.  The judge who pronounced the sentence was US District Court Judge Patti B. Saris, who also happens to chair the Sentencing Commission. “As far as I’m concerned, there are some problems with the guidelines," she said in open court in issuing the sentence.

In another example, US District Court Judge Michael A. Ponsor sentenced a man in 2010 in Springfield to four years of probation, though prosecutors asked that he serve the 6-to-8-year sentence called for by the guidelines.

The judges’ persistent departure from the guidelines for child pornography offenses has caused such a stir that the US Sentencing Commission has agreed to examine them again, listing the endeavor as a priority.  A public hearing is set for Feb. 15 in Washington....

Prosecutors acknowledge that the guidelines should be reconfigured to better reflect a defendant’s culpability.  But they maintain that any changes to how the guidelines are calculated should not affect the actual scale of the sentences.  They say Congress -- and society -- have called for the toughened penalties for the crime.

“There’s been recognition nationwide that there’s been an epidemic," said James Lang, chief of the criminal division for the US attorney’s office in Massachusetts. “There is an exploitation [of children] that goes on every time those photos are shared."

Congress has been so aggressive in its efforts to toughen child pornography sentencing guidelines over the last decade that it overrode the Sentencing Commission’s edicts for the first time in its history, in 2003.  The changes effectively doubled what the average sentence for possession of child pornography had been in the two previous years, according to a Sentence Commission study, from 28 to 54 months.

But within the legal community, there has since been a growing chorus of criticism from those who say the punishment is too great, even for such a universally reviled crime. “The sentences are excessive, and the issue is one that could be modified," said former US senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, who has also served as a prosecutor.  He co-authored a journal in a law trade magazine in October calling for sentencing reforms.  “It’s important to justice.  But it’s hard to do, because child pornography is so highly emotional."...

Opponents of the guideline argue that the additional penalties -- known as enhancements -- are inherent factors in the crime, and unfairly increase the guidelines.  The guidelines, for instance, call for additional penalties if a computer was used in the crime, and for a further enhancement if the child depicted in the images is prepubescent or under 12 years old -- factors that exist in more than 90 percent of the cases, according to Sentencing Commission data.  Also, anyone using a file-sharing network could fall under the distribution category because their images are open to anyone, even if they do not purposely send them out.

With added enhancements for sadistic or violent images, and for increased penalties when more pictures are involved, a defendant could face a sentence of 20 years in prison for receiving child pornography -- higher than guidelines for crimes involving use of a gun or physical violence or abuse.

Federal prosecutors defend the length of prison time, arguing that it protects the young children who are the victims in such cases.  Lang acknowledged that the sentencing enhancements should be reconfigured to reflect the way the crime is carried out.  A defendant should face tougher penalties for running a chat group, rather than simply being involved in the chats, for instance.  Defendants should also face tougher sentences according to the ages of the victims in the photos.

Prosecutors argue that the public, and judges, should make no distinction between those who possess pictures and those who produce them, pointing to a case out of Milford in which the discovery of child pornography images led to the prosecution of an international child porn production ring.  More than 100 young children have been identified and removed from dangerous environments, according to prosecutors.

This companion piece in the Globe reports on a number of cases in which child porn offenders received sentences well below applicable guideline ranges.  As noted in the main article, the US Sentencing Commission has a big public hearing scheduled for this coming Wednesday to discuss these and related issues concerning the child porn guidelines.  I am especially interest to see what the Justice Department says to the USSC about these matters and how the guidelines might be modified to foster more judicial respect for the sentences recommended in these cases.

February 12, 2012 in Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (5) | TrackBack

Wednesday, February 08, 2012

Two big public hearings on tap for US Sentencing Commission next week

As reported on its website and in official notices here and here, the US Sentencing Commission has planned two full-day public hearings for next week in DC.

The first day of hearings, slated for February 15 (with the official agenda here), is "for the Commission to gather testimony from invited witnesses regarding the issue of penalties for child pornography offenses in federal sentencing." The second day of hearings, slated for February 16 (with the official agenda here), is "for the Commission to gather testimony from invited witnesses on federal sentencing options pursuant to United States v. Booker."

I have the great honor and privilege of being one of the invited witnesses for the second day of these hearings, and I hope to post my written testimony once I finish writing it.  I also expect the USSC will post the submitted written testimony of other witnesses before long, too.  In the meantime, readers are welcome (and, in fact, encouraged) to make predictions about what various witnesses are likely to say to the Commission on these topics and what member os the USSC might say in response.

February 8, 2012 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Booker in district courts, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7) | TrackBack

Monday, February 06, 2012

Eleventh Circuit affirms life sentences, but vacates restitution award, for child porn ring

The Eleventh Circuit has a very lengthy opinion today in US v. McGarity, No. 09-12070 (11th Cir. Feb. 6, 2012) (available here), which eventually gets around to affirming life sentences given to participants in a massive kiddie porn ring. Here is the literary start to the opinion:

If “[a]ll the world’s a stage” as Shakespeare wrote, this case demonstrates just how much the dimensions of that stage are shrinking with the advent of the internet, at least in regards to child pornography.  We are concerned here with the fruits of a cooperative, multi-national criminal investigation directed at tracking a sprawling international child pornography ring, comprised of as many as 64 known individuals sharing more than 400,000 images and 1,000 videos of child pornography across at least six countries. Ultimately, a joint task force arrested fourteen members of the ring and charged them with offenses relating to child pornography, although we have before us only the appeals of the following seven defendants...

This opinion would not be all that blog-worthy but for a lengthy discussion of all the issues surrounding child porn restitution awards under federal law which start on page 97 of the opinion.  Here is a key paragraph from that discussion:

[W]e make two findings here: 1) we affirm our holding in McDaniel that end-user defendants may proximately cause injuries to the victims of sexual child abuse; and 2) for proximate cause to exist, there must be a causal connection between the actions of the end-user and the harm suffered by the victim.  The first finding has by now been adequately discussed.  As to the second finding, any other result would undermine the express wording of § 2259.  Proximate cause is required by the specific language of the statute. Since the role of the judiciary is to “apply the text, not to improve upon it,” Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989), we apply the statute as written, with its requirement of proximate cause.  Any other result would turn 108 restitution for possession of child pornography into strict liability.  We, like most of our sister circuits to consider the issue, decline such an interpretation.

February 6, 2012 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (17) | TrackBack

Wednesday, February 01, 2012

Notable recent state child porn sentencing developments in South Dakota

Thanks to this brief new AP article, which is headlined "South Dakota child pornography convict gets 100-year prison sentence cut about in half," I learned about a fascinating ruling from last year by the South Dakota Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Bruce, 2011 S.D. 14 (SD April 6, 2011) (available here).

Working backwards, here is the latest sentencing news in this notable case:

A 100-year prison sentence handed down to a Pierre man convicted of possessing child pornography has been cut about in half.  The South Dakota Supreme Court last year ruled that the initial sentence for 48-year-old Troy Bruce was excessive and ordered a new sentencing.

KCCR radio reports that Judge Mark Barnett on Tuesday sentenced Bruce to a total of 55 years in prison.  Bruce will be eligible for parole after serving one-fourth of the sentence. He also was given credit for about two years he already has served behind bars.

This report prompted me to wonder if the South Dakota Supreme Court had actually deemed a child porn sentence to be unconstitutional, and the Bruce ruling nearly does.  Here are notable snippets from the majority opinion in Bruce:

Bruce was convicted of possessing one DVD containing fifty-five videos of child pornography.  He received the ten-year maximum sentence on all fifty-five counts.  Forty-five of the sentences were suspended, but the sentences on the remaining ten counts were to be served consecutively resulting in a total sentence of 100 years.  Bruce contends that this sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment....

When such statutory ranges are established, the legislative intent is that "the more serious commissions of [the] crime . . . deserve sentences at the harsher end of the spectrum.... Imposing the maximum possible term where the circumstances of the crime only justify a sentence at a lower range violates legislative intent to reserve the most severe sanctions for the most serious combinations of the offense and the background of the offender.” Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 25.   Further, we now adopt Justice Konenkamp’s recommendation “that courts look at two additional determinants when assessing the seriousness of a child pornography offense: (1) the specific nature of the material and (2) the extent to which the offender is involved with that material.” Blair, 2006 S.D. 75, ¶ 83....

With respect to the seriousness of this offense, the pornography involved much more than lewd images but less than the worst possible material covered by the statute....

With respect to Bruce’s involvement, he was convicted of possessing the one DVD containing fifty-five images. Although thirty other discs containing child pornography images were found, the court “consider[ed] Counts 1 through 10 as one act” for the purpose of determining parole eligibility. Additionally, there was no evidence that Bruce manufactured or distributed child pornography. Finally, there was no evidence suggesting that Bruce had ever sexually abused a child, had sexual contact with a child, or solicited a child for sexual images. This was a case of simple possession of images.

Bruce’s character and history reflect that he was a divorced forty-eight year old with three children, one who was still a minor. Other than a careless driving offense, Bruce had no prior criminal history. He was a former member of the National Guard and a veteran who had served in Saudi Arabia and Iraq during Operation Desert Storm....

Bruce’s maximum sentences were not reserved for the most serious combination of criminal conduct and background of the offender. We therefore conclude that this is the exceedingly rare case in which Bruce’s sentence was grossly disproportionate to the “particulars of the offense and the offender.” See Bonner, 1998 S.D. 30, ¶ 25. Because Bruce did not present comparative information with which to conduct an intra- and interjurisdictional analysis, we reverse and remand to the circuit court to consider that evidence on resentencing.

A concurring opinion in Bruce adds these notable observations:

In South Dakota, gross disparity in the sentence length for possession of child pornography exists.  For example, in State v. Martin, 2003 S.D. 153, 674 N.W.2d 291, the defendant’s sentence for possession of child pornography was a term of two years in the penitentiary with all but forty-five days in jail suspended subject to additional conditions. In the present case, the aggregate sentence is a term of 100 years in the penitentiary. Yet the facts of the two cases are similar: both involve the possession but not the manufacture or distribution of multiple computer-based images of child pornography. The difference in the length of the sentences for these similar crimes is shocking.

I think it is safe to assert that, not just in South Dakota, but all across this great nation, "gross disparity in the sentence length for possession of child pornography exists."  I have seen and heard of many state (and few federal cases) in which a child porn possession conviction results in only months in prison, and yet a few months ago in Florida (as reported here) Daniel Enrique Guevara Vilca received a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for mere child porn possession!  What a sad and disturbing mess.

February 1, 2012 in Examples of "over-punishment", Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (28) | TrackBack

Tuesday, January 31, 2012

Fascinating AP update on efforts by "Amy" to get restitution from child porn downloaders

This new AP article, headlined "Court to weigh restitution for child porn victim," reports on the news I covered in this post last week, namely that the Fifth Circuit has called for en banc review of whether and how federal law permits a child depicted in illegal porn to secure a restitution award in the sentencing of an offender who only downloaded that child's image. The AP article adds important back-story to the story with this accounting of the child's partial success in obtaining restitution to date:

A federal appeals court in New Orleans has agreed to rehear two cases in which a victim of child pornography sought restitution from men who viewed sexually explicit photographs of her on the Internet. The victim in both cases, who is identified only as a woman named "Amy," was a young child when her uncle sexually abused her and widely circulated images of the abuse, according to court records....

Amy, now a woman in her early 20s living in Pennsylvania, has filed more than 700 requests for restitution across the country since 2009, collecting more than $1.5 million from dozens of individuals, according to James Marsh, one of her attorneys.

The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children says its analysts have found more than 35,000 images of Amy's abuse among the evidence in more than 3,200 child pornography cases since 1998.

Under the Crime Victims Rights' Act, Amy sought more than $3.3 million in restitution from Paroline to cover the cost of her lost income, attorneys' fees and psychological care.

The AP article also reports that the full Fifth Circuit will not hear argument in the case until May, which in turn means it is unlikely we will get a ruling from the en banc court until probably the fall at the earliest.

January 31, 2012 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (8) | TrackBack

Sunday, January 29, 2012

"Should Teens Be Jailed for Sex Offenses?"

The title of this post is the headline of this lengthy recent piece in The Daily Beast, which carries this subheading: "Parents are fighting powerful laws that imprison teens for sex.  Prosecutors say kids should respect the law. Meet one young Romeo who didn't — and spent six years behind bars." The full piece gets started this way:

Francie Baldino, a mother of two from Royal Oak, Mich., can tell you the day she became an activist against America’s sex-offender laws.  It was the day her teenage son went to prison — for falling in love with a teenage girl.  “The prison term was unthinkable,” says Baldino. “He was just a dumb kid.”

Her son, Ken, was an 18-year-old senior in high school when he was arrested for having sex with his girlfriend, a 14-year-old freshman, in 2004.  The age of consent in Michigan is 16.  He got sentenced to a year in jail and three years’ probation.  After that, when the two teens resumed their relationship — violating his probation — he got five to 15 years.

His mother is part of a surprising rebellion that has now spread to all 50 states: parents fighting against sex-offender laws — the very laws designed to safeguard their children. These parents argue that the laws are imposing punishments on their high-school sons that are out of proportion to the crime.

Baldino’s son, for instance, spent more than six years behind bars and today must wear a GPS device the size of a box of butter.  Sometimes, he says, it loses its signal and sets off an alarm.  “That’s really helpful when I’m at work,” says the blue-eyed 26-year-old, who wears stud earrings and works at a door-and-window store.

No one keeps a tally of how many cases fall into this category nationwide. But there is one measure of the scale of the movement: there are now more than 50 organizations — at least one in every state — battling against prosecutions like these.  Baldino’s group is Michigan Citizens for Justice, which she says includes more than 100 parents.  Another group in Michigan, the Coalition for a Useful Registry, has around 150 parents as members, it says.  Organizations in other states report similar numbers.  One of the largest, Texas Voices, claims some 300 parents as members.

The questions are difficult: Should the scales of justice be weighted in favor of the young? Is a sex crime somehow less terrible, if it involves teens?   The cases they are fighting are highly complex, charged with emotion, and rarely black-and-white.  The questions are profoundly difficult: Should the scales of justice be weighted in favor of the young?  Is a sex crime somehow less terrible, if it involves teens?  The judge in the Baldino case, Fred Mester, openly acknowledged the complexities.  Referring to his own high-school days when handing down the prison sentence in 2005, he said, “Half my senior class … were dating freshman girls, and I suspect half of them would be in here today.”

Prosecutors say it’s simple: kids should obey the law, and parents need to keep their children under control.  Paul Walton, a chief assistant prosecutor in Michigan, says Baldino’s son had only himself to blame: he was an adult, and he chose his own actions. “The court isn’t imposing restrictions because it’s fun — it’s the law,” Walton says.  “You can disagree on the age of consent, but the law says that prior to that age, a person doesn’t have the ability to consent.”

January 29, 2012 in Offender Characteristics, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (37) | TrackBack