Wednesday, July 19, 2017

Pennsylvania Supreme Court finds state sex offender registration law punitive and thus unconstitutional to apply retroactively

In a big opinion today, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided its state's sex offender registration law, though civil in design, was punitive in practice and thus cannot be applied retroactively. The 55-page majority opinion in Pennsylvania v. Muniz, No. (Pa. July 19, 2017) (available here), gets started this way:

We granted discretionary review to determine whether Pennsylvania’s Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9799.10-9799.41, as applied retroactively to appellant Jose M. Muniz, is unconstitutional under the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.  The Superior Court held SORNA’s registration provisions are not punishment, and therefore retroactive application to appellant, who was convicted of sex offenses prior to SORNA’s effective date but sentenced afterwards, does not violate either the federal or state ex post facto clauses.  For the following reasons, we reverse and hold: 1) SORNA’s registration provisions constitute punishment notwithstanding the General Assembly’s identification of the provisions as nonpunitive; 2) retroactive application of SORNA’s registration provisions violates the federal ex post facto clause; and 3) retroactive application of SORNA’s registration provisions also violates the ex post facto clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

The 13-page dissenting opinion authored by Chief Justice Saylor is available here and concludes this way: "Based on the Mendoza-Martinez factors, which I view as almost uniformly suggesting a non-punitive effect, I would conclude that SORNA’s registration requirements do not constitute punishment and do not violate the federal ex post facto clause."

July 19, 2017 in Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (27)

Will (and should) OJ Simpson get paroled in Nevada this week?

This USA Today article, headlined "Why O.J. Simpson is expected to be paroled at July 20 hearing," reports on why an infamous state criminal defendant is expected to secure parole in Nevada after serving only about 30% of his imposed prison term. Here are excerpts:

O.J. Simpson, behind bars in a Nevada prison for almost nine years, is eligible for parole Thursday and one of his former attorneys thinks the matter is all but a foregone conclusion that the former football and TV star will be eligible for release on Oct. 1.

"He’s going to get parole," said Yale Galanter, who represented Simpson during the 2008 trial when Simpson was found guilty of 12 counts, including robbery and kidnapping, and sentenced to nine years minimum and 33 years maximum. "Parole in the state of Nevada is really based on how you behave in prison, and by all accounts he’s been a model prisoner. There are no absolutes anytime you’re dealing with administrative boards, but this is as close to a non-personal decision as you can get."

Four members from the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners will consider parole for Simpson at the board offices in Carson City, Nev., with the proceedings set to begin Thursday at 1 p.m. ET. Simpson, 70, will participate by video conference from about 100 miles away at Lovelock Correctional Center, where he has been imprisoned since December 2008.

Parole is largely determined by a point system, and how the commissioners feel about Simpson — or his acquittal in the murder of his ex-wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and Ron Goldman — can have no impact on parole, according to Galanter. "It really is based on points," he said. "How long have you served, what your disciplinary record is, what the likelihood of committing another crime is, their age, the facts and the circumstances of the case."

The parole board has rejected the idea that Simpson could be facing more conservative commissioners because he’s imprisoned in northern Nevada. In a statement published on its website, the parole board said all commissioners use the same risk assessment and guidelines, adding, "There is no evidence that the board is aware of that indicates that one location has panel members who are more conservative or liberal than the other location."... "Simpson, with the help of several other men, broke into a Las Vegas hotel room on Sept. 13, 2007, and stole at gunpoint sports memorabilia that he said belonged to him. More than a year later, on Oct. 8, 2008, he was found guilty by a jury on all 12 charges. He was granted parole in 2013 on the armed robbery convictions. Galanter called that "the clearest indicator" Simpson will be granted parole on the remaining counts Thursday.

Simpson is being considered for parole for kidnapping, robbery, assault with a deadly weapon and the use of a deadly weapon enhancement. "It’s a fairly routine administrative matter," the attorney said. "It’s more like, 'Mr. Simpson, you’ve been a model prisoner, you have the points, congratulations, do you have anything to say, thank you very much, granted, Oct. 1.' "

Yet, it won’t exactly be routine. The parole board, for example, has said it will issue a decision Thursday so to minimize distractions. The results of some hearings, by contrast, take three weeks to reach the inmate. "The media interest in this one case is a disruption to our operation," the parole board said in its statement. "A decision (on Simpson) is being made at the time of the hearing so that the board’s operation can return to normal as soon as possible after the hearing."...

Simpson will have an opportunity to address the board by video conference as he did during the 2013 hearing. More than 240 media credentials have been approved, according to Keast, who said a dozen satellite trucks are expected at the sites in both in Carson City and Lovelock. If Simpson is paroled, the media figure to return in droves in Oct. 1, when he will be eligible for release from prison.

Notably, Gregg Jarrett at FoxNews believes strongy that OJ shoud not get parole; he explains in this commentary, headlined "O.J. Simpson, up for parole, should never be set free," how the California civil suit finding OJ responsible for wrongful deaths should be sufficient for the Nevada parole board to conclude he presents a risk to public safety.

July 19, 2017 in Celebrity sentencings, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (10)

"Plea Agreements As Constitutional Contracts"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Colin Miller available via SSRN. Here is the abstract:

In his dissenting opinion in Ricketts v. Adamson, Justice Brennan proposed the idea of plea agreements as constitutional contracts and lamented the fact that the Supreme Court had yet to set up rules of construction for resolving plea deal disputes.  Since Adamson, courts have given lip service to Justice Brennan’s dissent and applied his reasoning in piecemeal fashion.  No court or scholar, however, has attempted to define the extent to which a plea agreement is a constitutional contract or develop rules of construction to apply in plea deal disputes.  This gap is concerning given that ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved by plea agreements.

This Article is the first attempt to defend the concept of plea agreements as constitutional contracts and establish a core rule of construction to guide judges in interpreting plea bargains. It advances two theses.  First, plea agreements are constitutional contracts whose constitutional protections extend to all matters relating to plea agreements.  Second, due process requires that courts treat pleading defendants at least as well as parties to other contracts, meaning all of the protections associated with contract law should be incorporated into plea bargaining law through the Due Process Clause.

This Article then argues that incorporation of one of these protections — the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing — would lead to legal reform in three plea bargaining scenarios where pleading defendants are treated worse than parties to other contracts:

(1) substantial assistance motions;

(2) Brady disclosures; and

(3) prosecutorial presentation of sentencing recommendations.

July 19, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Bipartisan discussion of female incarceration issues at "Women Unshackled" event

My twitter feed was full of reports and links to a big criminal justice reform event yesterday which was given the title "Women Unshackled."  This Washington Post article, headlined "Officials from both parties say too many women are incarcerated for low-level crimes," reports on the event, and its coverage starts this way:

Democratic and Republic officials at a conference Tuesday said too many women are being incarcerated for nonviolent offenses, a troubling trend both groups said they were committed to tackling.

From Democratic Sen. Kamala Harris (Calif.) and Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (Tex.) to Republican Rep. Mia Love (Utah) and Oklahoma Gov. Mary Fallin, there was bipartisan agreement that most of the women in jails and prison would be better served by drug rehabilitation and mental health services, rather than harsher sentences. They noted that most women in the criminal-justice system are victims of domestic abuse or sexual violence. And because most incarcerated women have small children, locking them away can destroy an already fragile family.

The discussion came during a day-long conference called “Women Unshackled,” presented by the Justice Action Network and sponsored by the Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, the Coalition for Public Safety and Google.

Some additional coverage of the issues and individuals involved in this event can be found in these recent press pieces:

July 19, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Details emerging on new Trump Administration approach to asset forfeiture ... UPDATED with new DOJ memo

As noted in this prior post, on Monday Attorney General Jeff Sessions gave a speech in which he indicated that a "new directive on asset forfeiture" was forthcoming that, "especially for drug traffickers," sought "to increase forfeitures."  This new AP article, headlined "US restoring asset seizures - with safeguards," reports on what this new directive is going to include. Here are excerpts from the AP piece:

The Trump administration will soon restore the ability of police to seize suspects’ money and property with federal help, but The Associated Press has learned the policy will come with a series of new provisions aimed at preventing the types of abuse that led the Obama Justice Department to severely curtail the practice.

At issue is asset forfeiture, which has been criticized because it allows law enforcement to take possessions without criminal convictions or, in some cases, indictments. The policy to be rolled out Wednesday targets so-called adoptive forfeiture, which lets local authorities circumvent more-restrictive state laws to seize property under federal law. The proceeds are then shared with federal counterparts.

Former Attorney General Eric Holder significantly limited the practice in response to criticism that it was ripe for abuse, particularly with police seizures of small amounts of cash. Attorney General Jeff Sessions plans to ease those restrictions, but also impose new requirements on when federal law can be used, a senior Justice Department official briefed on the policy said Tuesday. The official, who spoke to the AP on condition of anonymity, was not authorized to discuss the changes before their unveiling.

Key changes include requiring more detail from police agencies about probable cause justifying a seizure before federal authorities get involved. Also, the Justice Department will have to decide more quickly whether to take on local seizures and also let property owners know their rights and the status of their belongings within 45 days of the seizure, faster than federal law requires.

Another key change will make it harder for police to seize less than $10,000 unless they have a state warrant, have made an arrest related to the seizure, have taken other contraband, such as drugs, along with the money, or the owner has confessed to a crime. Without at least one of those conditions, authorities will need a federal prosecutor’s approval to seize it under federal law.

Old rules set that threshold at $5,000, the official said. The old process rarely required a federal prosecutor’s sign-off, said Stefan Cassella, a former federal prosecutor and expert on asset forfeiture and money laundering law.

Sessions’ support for asset forfeiture is in keeping with his tough-on-crime agenda and aligns with his oft-stated view that the Justice Department’s top priority should be helping local law enforcement fight violent crime. Police departments use the seizures for expenses, and some agencies felt Holder’s restrictions left them without a critical funding source. When he forecast the rollback of the Holder provision at a conference of district attorneys, the announcement drew applause.

But an embrace of asset forfeiture follows bipartisan efforts to overhaul the practice, and as a growing number of states have made their own laws limiting its use. Republican Rep. Darrell Issa of California, who sponsored legislation this year to tightly regulate asset forfeiture, told the AP that Sessions’ move is “a troubling step backward” that would “bring back a loophole that’s become one of the most flagrantly abused provisions of this policy.”

“I’m glad that at least some safeguards will be put in place, but their plan to expand civil forfeiture is, really, just as concerning as it was before,” Issa said. “Criminals shouldn’t be able to keep the proceeds of their crime, but innocent Americans shouldn’t lose their right to due process, or their private property rights, in order to make that happen.”

UPDATE Here now is the official US Department of Justice news release, headlined "Attorney General Sessions Issues Policy and Guidelines on Federal Adoptions of Assets Seized by State or Local Law Enforcement." And here is the associated one-page order.

July 19, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Tuesday, July 18, 2017

Should the US fight the war on drugs by actually fighting an actual war with Mexico?

The perhpas remarkable question in the title of this post is prompted by this remarkable commentary in US News authored by Matt A. Mayer, who is the CEO of Opportunity Ohio and a former senior official at the US Department of Homeland Security. The piece is headlined "To Solve the Opioid Crisis, Go to War," and here are excerpts:

Experts estimate that as many as 500,000 Americans could die from opioids over the next 10 years. Nearly all of the heroin and fentanyl hitting our streets is coming from Mexico, across the porous southern border. Mexico is also becoming, in some parts of the country, the main supplier of methamphetamine to the U.S., with overdose death rates increasing as the supply has surged.

We will spend tens of billions of dollars on addiction treatment, overdose responses, law enforcement activities, criminal justice processes and the ancillary costs associated with caring for the children of those who die from overdoses. Regardless of how much we spend, if we cannot substantially reduce or stop the flow of opioids and other death drugs across our southern border (and to a lesser extent through our mail system via China), we will continue to see tens of thousands of Americans die each year due to opioid and meth overdoses, with enormous damage to their families and communities....

To slow or stop the flow of opioids and other death drugs into our communities, we must secure the border with Mexico and methodically dismantle the distribution networks that the cartels have established in cities in all 50 states. The cartels are adaptive entities that will alter their strategy and tactics to counter each border and interior enforcement action we take to shut them down in the United States. Though the Mexican government makes some efforts to help with the cartels, corruption within the Mexican government and law enforcement is rampant. We simply can't rely upon the Mexican government for the kind of actions needed to crush the cartels.

This unfortunate reality raises a very uncomfortable question: Do we need to go to war with Mexico to ultimately win the war against opioids and other death drugs? By "go to war," I mean a formal declaration of war by Congress against Mexico in which we use the full force of our military might to destroy the cartels, the poppy fields and all elements of the drug trade. Ideally, as our fight is not with the Mexican government, its military or its people, which try to weaken the cartels, we would try to partner with those entities against the cartels, much as we partnered with the South Vietnamese government and military against the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army.

It sounds crazy, I know – unless you acknowledge we are already fighting a war with Mexico.

Short of such an all-out military effort, has anyone offered a realistic way to defeat the drug cartels and stop the flow of death drugs? Crushing the supply of opioids and other death drugs from Mexico will allow our treatment activities to gain ground against the epidemic and one day get ahead of it. If inexpensive heroin laced with fentanyl, or carfentanil, continues to be easily accessible in our communities, the wave of the opioid epidemic will simply continue to build. We must do something to force the wave to crest and to crash.

Let me put this issue in perspective. Since the first al-Qaida terrorist attack in Yemen in 1992, fewer than 5,000 Americans have died in terrorist attacks, with many of the deaths occurring on Sept. 11, 2001. In response to terrorist attacks, we waged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and spent hundreds of billions of dollars on external and internal security measures to detect and to prevent future attacks.

If we did all of that in response to radical Islamic terrorism, why is it so crazy to consider using our military power to defeat the Mexican drug cartels which have inflicted far more death, mayhem and costs on America than al-Qaida and the Islamic State group combined? Unlike terrorists living in far-off places, halfway around the globe, the Mexican drug cartels are operating right next door and within our communities, pushing enormous amounts of heroin, meth and other death drugs across the southern border and into the veins of our communities.

War with Mexico may sound crazy, but allowing militarized drug cartels to run drug production facilities aimed at supplying opioids and other death drugs to Americans within 1,000 miles of our southern border is even crazier, especially as the death count hits 50,000 people per year. We can continue to fight this war for decades with walls and arrests, or we can win this war in years with aircraft carriers, jets, bombs and the United States Marines.

Imagine how many lives we can save of those 500,000 Americans predicted to die because of Mexican opioids and meth. War with Mexico doesn't sound so crazy anymore, does it? 

July 18, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

"Under the Cloak of Brain Science: Risk Assessments, Parole, and the Powerful Guise of Objectivity"

The title of this post is the title of this notable note by Jeremy Isard that was brought to my attention by a helpful reader. Here is the abstract:

This Note examines the adoption of two psychological risk assessment protocols used on “lifers” by the California Board of Parole Hearings in preparation for parole suitability hearings.  Probation and parole agencies employ risk assessment protocols across state and federal jurisdictions to measure the likelihood that an individual will pose a danger to society if released from prison.  By examining the adoption and recent reformulation of risk assessment protocols in California, this Note considers some of the myriad demands that courts and administrative agencies place on brain science.  Applying the California parole process as a parable of such pressures, this Note argues that brain science has a unique capacity to supersede legal inquiry itself, and thus should only be used in legal and administrative settings with extreme caution.  

July 18, 2017 in Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Monday, July 17, 2017

In latest speech, AG Sessions advocates for more gun and prescription drug prosecutions and more asset forfeiture

Attorney General Sessions gave another notable speech today, and this one was delivered to the National District Attorneys Association.  Regular readers are familiar with the themes AG Sessions has been stressing of late, but these excerpts highlight what struck me as some new parts to what the AG is talking up:

We have a multi-front battle in front of us right now: an increase in violent crime, a rise in vicious gangs, an opioid epidemic, threats from terrorism, and human traffickers, combined with a culture in which family and discipline seems to be eroding further.

From the early 1990s until just a few years ago, the crime rate steadily came down across the country. But violent crime is rising.  The murder rate, for example, has surged nearly 11 percent nationwide in just one year — the largest increase since 1968.  Per capita homicide rates are up in 27 of our 35 largest cities....

These numbers are deeply troubling — and especially since they represent a sharp reversal of decades of progress. My best judgment is that this rise is not an aberration or a blip.  We must take these developments seriously and consider carefully what can be done about them.  Yielding to the trend is not an option for America and certainly not to us....

We must encourage proven police techniques like community-based, proactive policing and “broken windows” — policies that are lawful and proven to work. Better training, better morale, professional excellence are goals of yours. My goal is to help you be effective and never to make your work more difficult. I am asking our U.S. Attorneys to be leaders in this approach. In the long run, there is nothing we can do that is more impactful....

I want to see a substantial increase in gun crime prosecutions. I believe, as we partner together and hammer criminals who carry firearms during crimes or criminals that possess firearms after being convicted of a felony, the effect will be to reduce violent crime.

Next, the DEA reports that 80 percent of heroin addicts started with abuse of prescription drugs. As you know, more than 50,000 died of drug overdoses in 2015. Preliminary numbers indicate 2016 may hit 60,000. We have never seen numbers like this. This nation is prescribing and consuming far too many painkillers. This must end.

Last week, we announced the indictments of over 400 defendants as part of the annual Health Care Fraud Take Down. 120 of those involved opioid-related drug fraud and nearly 50 were doctors. Some of these frauds involved massive amounts of drugs. But I’m convinced this is a winnable war. We can significantly reduce this abuse, which includes the big drug companies as well.

DEA is making these cases a priority. They can make visits to physician and pharmacies and do checks on those who prescribe or sell these drugs. They are reviewing and identifying physician and pharmacy outliers that can help you narrow the search for crooks.

I would urge you to examine every case that involves an arrest of an individual illegally possessing prescription drugs. Make a condition of any plea bargain that the defendant tell where he or she got the drugs. Together, let’s get after these bad actors....

In addition, we hope to issue this week a new directive on asset forfeiture — especially for drug traffickers.  With care and professionalism, we plan to develop policies to increase forfeitures.  No criminal should be allowed to keep the proceeds of their crime.  Adoptive forfeitures are appropriate as is sharing with our partners....

As prosecutors, we have a difficult job, but our efforts at the federal, state, and local levels have a real impact. With every conviction we secure, we make our communities safer.

July 17, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (7)

Sunday, July 16, 2017

"Ministers of Justice and Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN authored by Lissa Griffin and Ellen Yaroshefsky. Here is the abstract:

Over the past few years, scholars, legislators, and politicians have come to recognize that our current state of “mass incarceration” is the result of serious dysfunction in our criminal justice system.  As a consequence, there has been significant attention to the causes of mass incarceration.  These include the war on drugs and political decisions based on a “law and order” perspective.  Congressional and state legislative enactments increased the financing of the expansion of police powers and provided for severely punitive sentencing statutes, thereby giving prosecutors uniquely powerful weapons in securing guilty pleas.  All of this occurred as crime rates dropped.

Where were the lawyers when our criminal justice system was evolving into a system of mass incarceration? Surprisingly, in looking for the causes and cures for the mass incarceration state, very little, if any, attention has been paid to the role of the most powerful actor in the criminal justice system: the prosecutor.  It is the prosecutor who exercises virtually unreviewable discretion in seeking charges, determining bail, negotiating a resolution, and fixing the sentence.  Now, however, there is data that identifies aggressive prosecutorial charging practices as the major cause of the explosion in our prison population.  That is, over the past twenty years prosecutors have brought felony charges in more cases than ever before, resulting in a dramatic increase in prison admissions.  If prosecutorial charging practices have been a major cause of the universally recognized mass incarceration problem, what should be done? How does the role of the prosecutor need to change to prevent a continuation, or a worsening, of our mass incarceration problem?

This Article examines the recognized role of the prosecutor as a “minister of justice,” and makes a range of suggested changes to the prosecution function.  These include re-calibrating the minister of justice and advocacy role balance in recognition of the current mass incarceration crisis; enacting measures to ensure independence from law enforcement in the charging function; collecting currently non-existent, objective data that breaks down and memorializes available information on each decision to charge as well as its consequences; and drafting written charging procedures and policies based on the collection of that data-driven information.

July 16, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

DAG Rosenstein makes the case for his boss's new charging and sentencing directive to federal prosecutors

Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein authored this notable op-ed appearing in the San Francisco Chronicle to explain and justify Attorney General Sessions' new memo to federal prosecutors concerning charging and  sentencing.  The piece was given the headline "Attorney General Jeff Sessions is serious about reducing crime," and here is its full text:

U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions recently revised the federal criminal charging policy. When federal prosecutors exercise their discretion to prosecute a case, they generally “should charge and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense” established by the evidence, he wrote in a May 10 memo. Prosecutors must use “good judgment” in determining “whether an exception may be justified” by the particular facts of the case. The Sessions memo reinstitutes a policy that existed for more than three decades. It was first implemented by President Jimmy Carter’s attorney general, Benjamin Civiletti.

From 2013 to 2017, however, the U.S. Department of Justice protected some criminals from mandatory minimum sentence laws enacted by Congress. During that time, unless cases satisfied criteria set by the attorney general, prosecutors were required to understate the quantity of drugs distributed by dealers and refrain from seeking sentence enhancements for repeat offenders. Beneficiaries of that policy were not obligated to accept responsibility or cooperate with authorities.

After that policy was adopted, the total number of drug dealers charged annually by federal prosecutors fell from nearly 30,000 — where it had stood for many years — to just 22,000. Meanwhile, drug-related violence has surged. There has been a significant spike in murders, including an 11 percent increase in 2015 alone.

Drug overdose deaths also have accelerated at a frightening and unprecedented pace. The annual toll of Americans killed by drug overdoses stood near 36,450 in 2008, with some 20,000 overdose deaths involving prescription drugs, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Estimates show that the 2016 total was on the order of 60,000, making drug overdose the leading cause of death of Americans under age 50.

Officials in many cities are calling on federal prosecutors for help, and tough sentences are one of federal law enforcement’s most important tools. Used wisely, federal charges with stiff penalties enable U.S. attorneys to secure the cooperation of gang members, remove repeat offenders from the community and deter other criminals from taking their places.

In order to dismantle drug gangs that foment violence, federal authorities often pursue readily provable charges of drug distribution and conspiracy that carry stiff penalties. Lengthy sentences also yield collateral benefits. Many drug defendants have information about other criminals responsible for shootings and killings. The prospect of a substantial sentence reduction persuades many criminals to disregard the “no snitching” culture and help police catch other violent offenders.

Minor drug offenders rarely face federal prosecution, and offenders without serious criminal records usually can avoid mandatory penalties by truthfully identifying their co-conspirators. The Sessions policy is serious about crime. It does not aim to fill prisons with low-level drug offenders. It empowers prosecutors to help save lives.

Prior recent related posts: 

July 16, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Saturday, July 15, 2017

Notable high-profile functionality of the dysfunctional Pennsylvania death penalty

Long-time readers surely recall some (of many) prior posts, including ones here and here, highlighting some (of many)  dysfunctional realities of the death penalty in Pennsylvania.  But this local article about horrible multiple murders getting national attention highlights how even a dysfunctional death penalty can still serve a significant function.  The article is headlined "Legal experts praise Bucks deal that led to murder confession," and here are excerpts:

The deal that spared Cosmo DiNardo the death penalty in exchange for a murder confession in a case that’s captivated the region and drawn national attention was lauded Friday by legal experts, who said the agreement was a swift and shrewd way to bring the gruesome case nearer to a close.

Cosmo DiNardo, 20, confessed to participating in the killings of four men. DiNardo also agreed to tell investigators where to find the bodies and lead them to an accomplice.  In exchange for the cooperation, his defense lawyer Paul Lang said, prosecutors agreed not to seek the death penalty.

DiNardo’s four victims, young men from Bucks and Montgomery Counties, disappeared last week.  Their families’ fears were confirmed when human remains were discovered in a 12-foot grave on a farm owned by DiNardo’s parents.  On Friday, DiNardo was charged with murder and related offenses.  Authorities also arrested his cousin and alleged accomplice, Sean Kratz, 20, on the same charges.  And also Friday, they discovered the body of one of the missing men, Jimi Taro Patrick, 19, on the farm.  The remains of Dean A. Finocchiaro, 19; Thomas C. Meo, 21; and Mark R. Sturgis, 22, had been discovered elsewhere on the sprawling property Wednesday.

Bucks County District Attorney Matthew D. Weintraub on Friday credited DiNardo’s confession with implicating Kratz and leading investigators to Patrick’s body, which had been buried separately from the others.  “I’d like to think he wanted to help us get these boys home,” he said, describing the cooperation agreement with DiNardo as critical to solving the case.

In interviews Friday, several legal experts agreed.  “It was absolutely the right thing to do,” Jack McMahon, a former prosecutor who is now a prominent defense lawyer, said of the deal.  “I think both sides did the right thing.”  With evidence mounting in a case this serious, McMahon said, “the defense probably realized that the evidence against his client was pretty overwhelming.  He had only one chip to play, and he used it to leverage for a life sentence.”

Marc Bookman, a former public defender who is director of the Atlantic Center for Capital Representation in Center City, said the agreement had clear benefits for DiNardo and for prosecutors.  “In a case like this, there’s a give and take,” he said.  For the defense, Bookman said, “you’ve got four bodies.  Any defense lawyer is thinking, ‘There’s no real defense to the killing of four people.’ There are defenses to a murder case, but it’s difficult to conceive of a legitimate defense to four bodies buried 12 feet in the ground.”

The severity of the crime made it a clear candidate for a death penalty prosecution, legal experts agreed, giving the prosecution leverage and the defense reason to seek a deal.  “The defense is giving the prosecutor something compelling,” Bookman said.  “He said he would direct them to where the bodies are. You’ve got four grieving families who desperately want closure, however sad that closure might be.  And he’s asking for something in exchange.”

For prosecutors, the threat of life on death row — if not actual execution in a state with a moratorium on the death penalty — upon conviction proved persuasive.  “It’s good to have the death penalty for cases like this — whether you agree with it or not,” said former Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne M. Abraham, whose tenure was marked by an aggressive willingness to pursue the death penalty in murder cases.  “The prosecutor had a bargaining chip, and the defense attorney used it to bargain away [the possibility of] being on death row for 25 to 40 years.”...

The deal DiNardo’s lawyers reached with prosecutors spares the families of the four victims a painful trial and saves taxpayers the expense.  In addition, Abraham said, it saves “hundreds of thousands, if not millions” of dollars spent on the appeals offered to all defendants convicted in capital cases.  Those often go on for decades.

Dennis J. Cogan, a former prosecutor and veteran defense lawyer, called the agreement a “win-win.” Without the confession, he said, the crime might have proved a “tough case” for prosecutors.  With the deal Weintraub struck with DiNardo’s lawyers, Cogan said, “they get the guy, they get the accomplice, and hopefully they bring closure for the families.”

July 15, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (14)

Friday, July 14, 2017

Is there much to — or much to say about — reasonableness review a decade after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough?

The question in the title of this post was the one kicking around my head as I reviewed a DC Circuit sentencing opinion handed down last week in US v. Pyles, No. 14-3069 (DC Cir. July 7, 2017) (available here). A helpful reader made sure I did not miss this lengthy opinion (nearly 50 pages), in which the panel splits over the reasonableness of a (nearly-top-of-the-guideline-range) sentence of 132-months imprisonment for child pornography distribution.   In addition to finding generally reasonable the extended reasonableness discussion of both the majority and the dissent in Pyles, I was struck by how the discussion and debate over the nature and operation of reasonableness review has really not changed much at all in the 10 years since the Supreme Court gave us Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough.

I am not sure anyone should have expected many major jurisprudential developments in the circuit courts after Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough. But, on this summer Friday morning, I am struggling to really think of any major reasonableness review developments. Though there are some important specific rulings from specific circuits on specific issues (like the Dorvee ruling on child porn sentencings from the Second Circuit), I am not sure I could describe any defining characteristics  of reasonableness review circa 2017 that is distinct in any big way from the basic reasonableness review template set by Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough in 2007.

I would especially like to hear from federal practitioners about whether I might be missing something obvious or subtle when noting the seemingly staid nature of reasonableness review jurisprudence over the last decade.  What really strikes me in this context is the fact that debates over federal sentencing laws, polices and practices have been anything but staid over the last decade even as reasonableness jurisprudence has sailed forward ever so smoothly.

July 14, 2017 in Booker and Fanfan Commentary, Booker in the Circuits, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Thursday, July 13, 2017

Still more from AG Sessions on crime and punishment... and some critical commentary thereon

This recent post reprinted some excerpts of a speech by Attorney General Sessions at the 30th DARE Training Conference, and AG Sessions hit some similar points in this subsequent speech yesterday in Las Vegas to law enforcement personnel. This Vegas speech gave special attention to immigration enforcement and "sanctuary cities," and here are excerpts from the start of the speech that help highlight how AG Sessions view a tough approach to law enforcement as central to everything that government seeks to achieve: 

Since the early 1990s, the crime rate has steadily come down across the country — that is, until two years ago. Now, violent crime is once again on the rise in many parts of America.  The murder rate, for example, has surged 10 percent nationwide in just one year — the largest increase since 1968.

These numbers are shocking, and they are informative, but the numbers are not what is most important. What’s most important are the people behind the numbers.  Each one of the victims of these crimes had a family, friends, and neighbors. They’re all suffering, too....

We cannot accept this status quo, and this Department of Justice will not accept it.  Every American has the right to be safe in their homes and in their neighborhoods.

The first and most important job of this government — and any government — is to protect the safety and the rights of its people.  If we fail at this task, then every other government initiative ceases to be important.

As law enforcement officials, we have the responsibility to stop — and reverse — the surge in violent crime and opioids that has taken place over the last two years.  And under President Trump’s leadership, this Department of Justice will answer the call and do its part.

To that end, I have directed our federal prosecutors to work closely with our law enforcement partners at the federal, state, local, and tribal levels to combat violent crime and take violent criminals off our streets.

As we all know, the vast majority of people just want to obey the law and live their lives.  A disproportionate amount of crime is committed by a small group of criminals.  And the more of them we apprehend, prosecute, and convict, the more crime we can deter.

Meanwhile, as AG Sessions has been this week expounding his vision for federal criminal enforcement, some commentators concerned about his vision have been explaining their concerns.  Here are two recent pieces with critical commentary on what AG Sessions is up to:

July 13, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, July 12, 2017

Missouri Supreme Court extends Miller to juvenile sentenced to mandatory life without parole eligibility for 50 years

The Supreme Court of Missouri yesterday handed down a notable ruling in State ex rel. Carr v. Wallace, No. SC93487 (Mo. July 11, 2017) (available here), which extends the reach of the US Supreme Court Miller ruling beyond mandatory LWOP sentencing.  Here is how the majority opinion in Carr gets going: 

In 1983, Jason Carr was convicted of three counts of capital murder for killing his brother, stepmother, and stepsister when he was 16 years old.  He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years.  His sentences were imposed without any consideration of his youth.  Mr. Carr filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court. He contends his sentences violate the Eighth Amendment because, following the decision in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to life without parole pursuant to mandatory sentencing schemes that preclude consideration of the offender’s youth and attendant circumstances.

Mr. Carr was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing scheme that afforded the sentencer no opportunity to consider his age, maturity, limited control over his environment, the transient characteristics attendant to youth, or his capacity for rehabilitation.  As a result, Mr. Carr’s sentences were imposed in direct contravention of the foundational principle that imposition of a state’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though they were not children.  Consequently, Mr. Carr’s sentences of life without the possibility of parole for 50 years violate the Eighth Amendment.  Mr. Carr must be resentenced so his youth and other attendant circumstances surrounding his offense can be taken into consideration to ensure he will not be forced to serve a disproportionate sentence in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  Habeas relief is granted.

Chief Justice Fischer dissenting from the decision, and here is the heart of his short opinion:

Carr's three concurrent terms of life in prison without the possibility of parole for 50 years do not run afoul of Miller. Miller only applies to cases in which a sentencing scheme "mandates life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders." 132 S. Ct. at 2469.  Therefore, Miller does not require vacating Carr's sentences.  Nor are Carr's sentences inconsistent with this Court's or any of the Supreme Court's current Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Indeed, the principal opinion's holding that Miller applies to Carr's sentences is, undoubtedly, not just an extension of Miller, but also calls into question whether any mandatory minimum sentence for murder could be imposed on a juvenile offender.  Accordingly, I decline to concur with that implication and remain bound by this Court's unanimous decision in Hart to apply Miller only to cases involving a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole.

July 12, 2017 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (9)

Spotlighting and unpacking the modern decline in death sentences

170711_TE_death-penalty-graph.png.CROP.promovar-mediumlargeBrandon Garrett has this new Slate commentary under the full headline "Why Jurors Are Rejecting the Death Penalty: There used to be 300 death sentences each year in the United States. Last year, there were just 30." Here are excerpts:

Prosecutors in Wake County, North Carolina, have sought the death penalty in eight cases over the past decade. Each time, jurors have rejected the sentence, most recently in March.  The most recent time Wake County jurors imposed a death sentence was a decade ago....

Capital punishment has now been outlawed in 19 states. In the places where it remains legal, jurors are increasingly reluctant to impose it.  Just 30 people were sentenced to death in the United States last year, and only 27 counties out of more than 3,000 nationwide sent anyone to death row.  In the mid-1990s, by contrast, more than 300 people were sentenced to death, with capital punishment being undertaken in as many as 200 counties each year.

Jurors have even started to reject the death penalty in Texas, which has sentenced more people to death than any other state in modern times.  Texas prosecutors are seeking the death penalty less often, and when they do, they’re frequently failing to persuade juries to impose it.  In 15 capital trials in the state since 2015, just eight have resulted in death sentences.

So, what has changed the minds of jurors?  It’s not that they’re morally opposed to the death penalty.  In fact, jurors who object on principle can be disqualified from serving in capital trials.  These are people who are open to imposing the ultimate punishment but decide to reject it after hearing a convicted murderer’s life story, including evidence of mental health issues, childhood abuse, and other mitigating circumstances....

Another reason for the decline in death sentences is that murders have steadily declined across the country, beginning in the mid-’90s.  (There has, however, been a recent spike in the murder rate in certain large cities.)  When my co-authors and I analyzed death sentencing data by county from 1990 through 2016, we found that a drop in the murder rate was strongly associated with the decline in death sentencing.

But death sentences have fallen far faster than murders.  One reason may be the growth in adequately resourced defense lawyers.  In general, states that have statewide offices to represent defendants at capital trials, as opposed to locally appointed lawyers, have experienced far greater declines in death sentencing.  Those offices have the resources to hire experts who can present mental health evidence and explain the defendant’s social history....

Our research also shows there is a strong “muscle memory” effect in death sentencing.  Counties that have issued a death sentence in the past are far more likely to obtain more.  What explains this substantial effect?  Prosecutors may get in the habit of seeking the death penalty, even when neighboring counties do not.  Perhaps losing a capital trial can put a damper on that enthusiasm.  Generally, once that muscle memory fades, counties do not get it back. Indeed, the counties that started out with the most death sentences have experienced the biggest declines over the past 15 years.  For example, in Harris County, Texas, where in the mid-1990s prosecutors led the country by securing 15 or more death sentences per year, there were no death sentences at all in 2015 or 2016.

As the death penalty fades, jurors may become more and more skeptical of its utility.  Last year, psychologists Daniel Krauss and Nicholas Scurich joined me in surveying nearly 500 people summoned for jury duty in Orange County, California, an area that regularly imposes death sentences.  We found that one-third of jurors — a surprisingly high share in that fairly conservative county — would not qualify to serve on a capital jury because they opposed the death penalty on principle.  About one-quarter — a separate group from the one-third of jurors described above — said they would not convict someone of capital murder if that meant the defendant would be executed.  Most strikingly, two-thirds of all jurors we surveyed said the fact that there had not been an execution in California in a decade made them less likely to sentence a person to death.

July 12, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Tuesday, July 11, 2017

Latest comments by AG Sessions on drug problems and federal prosecutorial policies

Attorney General Jeff Sessions spoke today at the 30th DARE Training Conference, and the setting not surprisingly prompted him to talk about drug issues and federal prosecutorial policies. His official remarks are available at this link, and here are excerpts:

Drug abuse has become an epidemic in this country today, taking an unprecedented number of American lives.  For Americans under the age of 50, drug overdoses are now the leading cause of death. In 2015, more than 52,000 Americans lost their lives to drug overdoses — 1,000 every week.  More died of drug overdoses in 2015 than died from car crashes or died at the height of the AIDS epidemic.

And the numbers we have for 2016 show another increase — a big increase. Based on preliminary data, nearly 60,000 Americans lost their lives to drug overdoses last year.  That will be the highest drug death toll and the fastest increase in the death toll in American history.  And every day, more than 5,000 Americans abuse painkillers for the first time.

This epidemic is only growing.  It’s only getting worse.  It’s being driven primarily by opioids — prescription drugs, heroin, and synthetic drugs like fentanyl.  Last year, there were 1.3 million hospital visits in the United States because of these drugs.  According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, heroin use has doubled in the last decade among young people 18 to 25....

Now, this is not this country’s first drug abuse crisis.  In the 1980s, when I was a federal prosecutor, we confronted skyrocketing drug abuse rates across the country and we were successful.  In 1980, half of our high school seniors admitted they had used an illegal drug sometime in that year.  But through enforcing our laws and by developing effective prevention strategies, we steadily brought those rates down.

We were in the beginning of this fight, in 1983, when DARE was founded in Los Angeles.  I believe that DARE was instrumental to our success by educating children on the dangers of drug use.  I firmly believe that you have saved lives. And I want to say thank you for that.  Whenever I ask adults around age 30 about prevention, they always mention the DARE program.  Your efforts work.  Lives and futures are saved.

Now, some people today say that the solution to the problem of drug abuse is to be more accepting of the problem of drug abuse.  They say marijuana use can prevent addiction.  They say the answer is only treatment.  They say don’t talk about enforcement.  To me, that just doesn’t make any sense.  In fact, I would argue that one reason that we are in such a crisis right now is that we have subscribed to this mistaken idea that drug abuse is no big deal.

Ignoring the problem — or the seriousness of the problem — won’t make it go away.  Prevention — through educating people about the danger of drugs — is ultimately how we’re going to end the drug epidemic for the long term. Treatment is important, but treatment often comes too late.  By then, people have already suffered from the effects of drugs.  Then their struggle to overcome addiction can be a long process — and it can fail.  I have seen families spend all their savings and retirement money on treatment programs for their children — just to see these programs fail.

Now, law enforcement is prevention.  And at the Department of Justice, we are working keep drugs out of our country to reduce availability, to drive up its price, and to reduce its purity and addictiveness.  We know drug trafficking is an inherently violent business.  If you want to collect a drug debt, you can’t, and don’t, file a lawsuit in court.  You collect it by the barrel of a gun.  There is no doubt that violence tends to rise with increased drug dealing.

Under the previous administration, the Department of Justice told federal prosecutors not to include in charging documents the full amount of drugs being dealt when the actual amount would trigger a mandatory minimum sentence.  Prosecutors were required to leave out true facts in order to achieve sentences lighter than required by law. This was billed as an effort to curb “mass incarceration” of “low-level offenders”, but in reality it covered offenders apprehended with large quantities of dangerous drugs.

What was the result?  It was exactly what you would think: sentences went down and crime went up.  Sentences for federal drug crimes dropped by 18 percent from 2009 to 2016.  Violent crime — which had been decreasing for two decades — suddenly went up again.  Two years after this policy change, the United States suffered the largest single-year increase in the overall violent crime rate since 1991.

In May, after study and discussion with criminal justice experts, I issued a memorandum to all federal prosecutors regarding charging and sentencing policy that said we were going to trust our prosecutors again and allow them to honestly charge offenses as Congress intended.  This simple two-page guidance instructs prosecutors to apply the laws on the books to the facts of the case, and allows them to exercise discretion where a strict application of the law would result in an injustice.  Instead of barring prosecutors from faithfully enforcing the law, this policy empowers trusted professionals to apply the law fairly and exercise discretion when appropriate.  That is the way good law enforcement has always worked.

But you know it’s not our privileged communities that suffer the most from crime and violence.  Minority communities are disproportionately impacted by violent drug trafficking and addiction.  Poor neighborhoods are too often ignored in these conversations.

Regardless of their level of wealth or their race, every American has the right to live in a safe neighborhood.  Those of us who are responsible for promoting public safety cannot sit back while any American community is ravaged by crime and violence at the hands of drug traffickers.  We can never yield sovereignty over a single neighborhood, city block, or street corner to drug traffickers....

Experience has shown, sadly, that it is not enough that dangerous drugs are illegal.  We also have to make them unacceptable.  We have to create a cultural climate that is hostile to drug abuse. In recent years, government officials were sending mixed messages about drugs.  We need to send a clear message.  We must have Drug Abuse Resistance Education.  DARE is the best remembered anti-drug program. I am proud of your work.  It has played a key role in saving thousands of lives and futures.

So please — continue to let your voices be heard.  I promise you that I will let my voice be heard.  Our young people must understand that drugs are dangerous; that drugs will destroy their lives, or worse yet, end them.  Let’s get the truth out there and prevent new addictions and new tragedies — and make all of our communities safer.  Thank you.

July 11, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Sunday, July 09, 2017

DPIC provides mid-year review of of 2017 death penalty developments

I just noticed that the Death Penalty Information Center recently provided this effective review of 2017 death penalty developments to date. Here are the details with links from the original:

As we reach the mid-point of the year, executions and new death sentences are on pace to remain near historic lows in 2017, continuing the long-term historic decline in capital punishment across the United States.  As of June 30, six states have carried out 13 executions, with 30 other executions that had been scheduled for that period halted by judicial stays or injunctions, gubernatorial reprieves or commutation, or rescheduled.  By contrast, at the midpoint of 2016, five states had carried out 14 executions, and 25 other executions had been halted. 12 executions are currently scheduled for the rest of 2017, with 8 others already halted, and several more death warrants are expected to be issued.

Depending on whether Ohio carries out the five executions pending between now and December, DPIC anticipates a slight increase in executions in the U.S. from 2016's 26-year low.  However, even with the spate of four executions carried out in Arkansas from April 20-27 — that state's first executions since 2005 — there will likely be fewer executions in 2017 than in any other year since 1990.  

New death sentences also remain near historically low levels.  DPIC has confirmed at least 16 new death sentences so far in 2017, a pace very close to the record-low 31 new death sentences imposed in 2016. Florida's abandonment of non-unanimous jury recommendations of death and Alabama's repeal of judicial override of jury recommendations for life are expected to substantially reduce the number of new death sentences in those states. The death sentences of nearly 100 Florida death-row prisoners have been overturned as a result of the state supreme court's declaration than non-unanimous death sentences are unconstitutional, and courts in Delaware and Connecticut have continued emptying those state's death rows after their death penalty statutes were declared unconstitutional.

Three people have been exonerated from death row in 2017 — Isaiah McCoy in Delaware, Rodricus Crawford in Louisiana, and Ralph Daniel Wright, Jr. in Florida — bringing the number of death-row exonerations in the U.S. since 1973 to 159. There have also been three grants of clemency in the first half of 2017, bringing the national total since 1976 to 283. President Barack Obama granted clemency to federal death-row prisoner Abelardo Arboleda Ortiz and military death-row prisoner Dwight Loving, and Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe granted clemency to Ivan Teleguz. All three are now serving sentences of life without parole. The U.S. Supreme Court has issued three significant decisions in 2017 in favor of death-row prisoners. On February 22, in Buck v. Davis, the Court granted relief to Duane Buck due to racially biased testimony on the issue of future dangerousness.  A month later, in Moore v. Texas, the Court unanimously struck down Texas' outlier practice for determining intellectual disability in capital cases.  In McWilliams v. Dunn, the Court found on June 19 that James McWilliams' constitutional rights were violated when Alabama failed to provide him assistance of an independent mental-health expert. The Court ruled against Texas death-row prisoner Erick Davila on June 26.

Other states that have carried out executions so far in 2017 are Texas (4), Alabama (2), Georgia (1), Missouri (1), and Virginia (1).

July 9, 2017 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (30)

Saturday, July 08, 2017

DOJ urges SCOTUS not to review Sixth Circuit panel decision finding retroactive application of Michigan sex offender law unconstitutional

As reported in this post from last summer, a Sixth Circuit panel concluded in Does v. Snyder, No. 15-1536 (6th Cir. Aug. 25, 2016) (available here), that Michigan's amendments to its Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) "imposes punishment" and thus the state violates the US Constitution when applying these SORA provisions retroactively.  Michigan  appealed this decision to the US Supreme Court, and SCOTUS in March asked for the US Acting Solicitor General to express its views on the case.

Yesterday, the Acting SG filed this brief with SCOTUS stating that in "the view of the United States, the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied." The discussion section of the brief begins this way:

Michigan’s sex-offender-registration scheme contains a variety of features that go beyond the baseline requirements set forth in federal law and differ from those of most other States.  After applying the multi-factor framework set out in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), the court of appeals concluded that the cumulative effect of SORA’s challenged provisions is punitive for ex post facto purposes.  While lower courts have reached different conclusions in analyzing particular features of various state sex-offender-registration schemes, the court of appeals’ analysis of the distinctive features of Michigan’s law does not conflict with any of those decisions, nor does it conflict with this Court’s holding in Smith.  Every court of appeals that has considered an ex post facto challenge to a sex-offender-registry statutory scheme has applied the same Smith framework to determine whether the aggregate effects of the challenged aspects of that scheme are punitive.  And although most state sex-offender-registry schemes share similar features, they vary widely in their form and combination of those features.  Accordingly, to the extent the courts of appeals have reached different outcomes in state sexoffender-registry cases, those outcomes reflect differences in the statutory schemes rather than any divergence in the legal framework.  Finally, petitioners’ concern (Pet. 26-29) that the court of appeals’ decision will prevent the State from receiving some federal funding does not warrant review.  That concern is premature, as it may well be the case that Michigan can continue to receive federal funds notwithstanding this decision.  And the decision does not prevent the State from implementing a sex-offender-registration scheme that is consistent with federal law.  Further review is therefore not warranted.

July 8, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Sex Offender Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (16)

"Criminal justice reform starts before the trial and sentence"

The title of this post is the title of this new commentary at The Hill authored by Marc Levin and Ed Chung. Here are excerpts (with links from the original): 

Recent media stories have speculated on the future of federal efforts to reform the criminal justice system. Much of the discussion surrounds the possibility of rekindling bipartisan sentencing and corrections reform legislation that was on the cusp of being enacted in the previous Congress.

While comprehensive reforms to lower federal mandatory minimum sentences remain aspirational, there are other policies on which the right and left agree that could have as much, if not more, impact in reducing the nation’s incarcerated population while maintaining public safety. 

Every day, approximately 450,000 people who have not been convicted of a crime are currently behind bars while they await adjudication of their case.  This is more than double the number of people in federal prison and two and half times the total jail population in 1980.  According to a recent analysis by the Prison Policy Initiative, “99 percent of the growth in jails over the last 15 years has been a result of increases in the pre-trial population.”  This increase was not due to a more criminalized or violent society but rather stemmed from discretionary criminal justice policies that increasingly conditioned release from jail on whether they could pay for bail. 

Money bail systems, however, are neither the most effective nor fairest way to achieve the goals of the justice system prior to trial.  For those whom a court determines to be a danger to society, allowing them to pay for their release seems like an illogical remedy where a rich dangerous person is freed but a poor dangerous person remains in jail. And, to ensure a person returns for court appearances, more effective methods have developed in recent years that combine an objective assessment of a person’s risks with appropriate human supervision and electronic monitoring.

The harms and inequities associated with money bail systems — especially when it comes to nonviolent, low-risk poor defendants — are well documented.  According to an analysis by the Arnold Foundation, keeping low-risk defendants in jail for even two or three days increases the likelihood that they will commit a new crime by 40 percent.  The impact also is felt disproportionately by those who cannot pay for even relatively modest bail and thus remain locked up.

The movement to reform bail systems has taken root in a small but growing number of both conservative and progressive states.  Connecticut last month enacted a statute that bars the imposition of financial conditions for pretrial release for most misdemeanors.  Earlier this year, New Jersey passed legislation that eliminated bail for minor crimes and instituted the use of a risk assessment tool to help courts determine pretrial supervision conditions.  Kentucky, which instituted the same risk assessment tool in 2013, will now automatically release people determined to be low-risk if they meet certain criteria.  And Washington, D.C., releases 90 percent of those arrested with conditions to report to a pretrial agency and comply with drug testing and other requirements. 

While state and local policy change is the primary means of achieving bail reform, given that pretrial detention implicates the guarantees of equal protection and due process found in the U.S. Constitution, the federal government can play a collaborative role, even if most of the people in jail awaiting trial are in local facilities.  Through its technical assistance efforts, the Department of Justice (DOJ) shares advancements made in a small number of states with a national audience and provides valuable data that reveals the impact of pretrial practices across the nation. From issuing statements of interest on bail in pending federal litigation to providing guidance on the proper use of risk assessment instruments, the DOJ must remain committed to pretrial policies that prioritize public safety over a person’s ability to pay.

Congress also has an important voice that can exemplify the bipartisan support for bail reform across the country.  The legislative branch’s bully pulpit is especially effective when emphasizing points of agreement across the political spectrum....

There is still much work to be done to reform the criminal justice system.  Fortunately, this remains a priority that transcends partisanship, even in the current political climate. It is time for our national leaders to act on the consensus developed among states, local communities, advocates, and think tanks representing different ideological perspectives like ours. 

July 8, 2017 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Friday, July 07, 2017

Split Third Circuit panel finds numerous problems with short federal sentences for child-abusing Army couple

A remarkable and unusual federal sentencing involving a child-abusing couple led yesterday to a remarkable and unusual federal circuit sentencing opinion in US v. Jackson, No. 16-1200 (3d Cir. July 6, 2017) (available here). Here is how the 80-page(!) majority opinion by Judge Cowen gets started:

John and Carolyn Jackson (“John” and “Carolyn”) were convicted of conspiracy to endanger the welfare of a child and endangering the welfare of a child under New Jersey law— offenses that were “assimilated” into federal law pursuant to the Assimilative Crimes Act (“ACA”).  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Carolyn to 24 months of imprisonment (as well as three years of supervised release). John received a sentence of three years of probation (together with 400 hours of community service and a $15,000 fine). The government appeals from these sentences.

We will vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing.  Concluding that there is no “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline, the District Court declined to calculate Defendants’ applicable sentencing ranges under the Guidelines. Although we adopt an “elements-based” approach for this inquiry, we conclude that the assault guideline is “sufficiently analogous” to Defendants’ offenses of conviction. Furthermore, the District Court failed to make the requisite findings of fact — under the applicable preponderance of the evidence standard — with respect to this Guidelines calculation as well as the application of the statutory sentencing factors.  We also agree with the government that the District Court, while it could consider what would happen if Defendants had been prosecuted in state court, simply went too far in this case by focusing on state sentencing practices to the exclusion of federal sentencing principles. Finally, the sentences themselves were substantively unreasonable.

Here is how the dissenting opinion by Judge McKee gets started:

It is impossible for anyone with an ounce of compassion to read through this transcript without becoming extraordinarily moved by allegations about what these children had to endure. Had the defendants been convicted of assault, or crimes necessarily involving conduct that was in the same “ballpark” as assault as defined under New Jersey law, I would readily agree that this matter had to be remanded for resentencing using the federal guidelines that govern assault.  However, the district court held a ten and a half hour sentencing hearing in an extraordinarily difficult attempt to sort through the emotion and unproven allegations and sentence defendants for their crimes rather than the conduct the government alleged at trial and assumes in its brief. I believe the court appropriately did so pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3553(a). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.

Before I begin my discussion, however, I must note that the defendants in this case were acquitted of the only federal offenses with which they were charged: assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm, and assault resulting in serious bodily injury.  As I discuss more fully in Section II, these assault charges seem to drive the government’s argument and the Majority’s analysis.  In order to minimize confusion about the precise nature of the charges in this case and the conduct that was proven, a chart listing each of the charges and their outcomes is attached as an addendum to this dissent.

There are lots of lots of interesting elements to this unusual case, but the rarity of reversals of sentences as substantively unreasonable led me to read that part of the majority opinion most closely.  The majority here repeatedly finds flaws in how the district court weighed various permissible § 3553(a) considerations.  And the discussion begins by noting that the guidelines called for sentences of perhaps 20 or more years for these defendants so that "probation for John and 24 months’ imprisonment for Carolyn represented enormous downward variances, which require correspondingly robust explanations for why such lenience was warranted."

July 7, 2017 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (4)

Texas continues to demonstrate how state "smart on crime" reforms can lead to less imprisonment and less crime

This Dallas Morning News article, headlined "With crime, incarceration rates falling, Texas closes record number of lock-ups," highlights why the Lone Star state should be viewed as a shining star for anyone eager to see states find paths to having less crime and less incarceration.  Here are excerpts:

Texas will shutter more prisons this year than it has in any single year in history, a response to the state's tight budget and shrinking inmate population.  In the state's two-year budget, which lawmakers approved in May, the Texas Department of Criminal Justice was ordered to close four prison facilities by Sept. 1.  When all four are closed, tough-on-crime Texas will have shuttered eight prisons in just six years.

Criminal justice reform advocates, agency officials and lawmakers say the closings are possible because of a combination of factors, including falling crime rates and legislative efforts to reduce the number of people who spend time behind bars.  "This is something we have done incrementally over the last decade," said Derek Cohen, deputy director at the Center for Effective Justice at the right-leaning Texas Public Policy Foundation.  "We're not any less safe publicly for that."

The drop in Texas' prison population began around 2007, when lawmakers were faced with an expensive decision.  The state had spent decades and millions of dollars building hulking prison edifices across rural Texas.  Tens of thousands of cells were quickly filling, and without changing the way Texas operated its criminal justice system, the state would soon be forced to spend millions more to house a burgeoning inmate population.

A state known for its lock-'em-up-and-throw-away-the-key approach to crime began to shift its approach.  Instead of erecting more massive prisons, lawmakers invested in diversion programs to help troubled Texans get back on track and avoid incarceration.  They spent more on initiatives to provide services to people whose mental illnesses landed them crosswise with the law.  Lawmakers in 2015 updated a decades-old property crime punishment scheme that had resulted in felony punishments for thieves who had stolen penny-ante items.  "What we saw was almost within 18 months, just an immediate decrease in the number of people sent to state jail on property offenses," said Doug Smith, a policy analyst with the Texas Criminal Justice Coalition.

At the same time, crime rates fell across the state.  Texas Department of Public Safety data shows that crime rates have fallen each year since at least 2012.  The overall crime rate in Texas fell nearly 6 percent from 2013 to 2014.  And it dropped another 4.7 percent the following year.

Texas closed its first prison in 2011 after much hand-wringing.  The Central Unit was a 79-year-old, sprawling behemoth on valuable land in the growing Houston suburb of Sugar Land. The prison population had begun to fall already, dropping 8 percent from 2004 to 2011. Legislators were facing a budget shortfall of up to $27 billion, and closing the Central Unit could save them about $50 million over two years.  For the first time in Texas history, it made political and fiscal sense to close a prison. It turned out, lawmakers were just getting started.

Two years later, they shuttered the Jesse R. Dawson State Jail in Dallas and a pre-parole unit in Mineral Wells.  Earlier this year, the criminal justice department closed a privately operated intermediate sanctions facility in Houston that was right next to Minute Maid Park.  As the closings continued, inmate population continued to drop, from 156,000 in 2011 to about 146,000 today, according to department spokesman Jason Clark....

It's unclear, though, whether the shuttering trend will continue in Texas.  Lawmakers this year did not approve any changes that criminal justice reform advocates said would keep the prison population on the decline.  Among the measures lawmakers rejected were proposals to reduce drug offense penalties and to keep 17-year-olds in the juvenile justice system, as most states do, instead of sending them to adult prisons.

July 7, 2017 in Scope of Imprisonment, State Sentencing Guidelines, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Thursday, July 06, 2017

Virginia Gov decides claim of delusional disorder does not justify halting scheduled execution of double murderer

As noted in this prior post, tonight's planned execution in Virginia of William Morva has brought renewed attention to the intersection of mental illness and capital punishment. That attention likely played a role in this decision by Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe to release this statement today explaining his decision not to prevent Morva's execution. Here is how the statement starts and ends:

Over the past several weeks, my staff and I have carefully considered the petition for clemency submitted by William Morva, who was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death for the murder of Montgomery County Deputy Sheriff Corporal Eric Sutphin and hospital security guard Derrick McFarland.  We have also reviewed extensive communications from family members of the victims, law enforcement officials, community leaders, and concerned observers from all over the world.

Consistent with the three previous petitions for commutation of a capital sentence that I have reviewed, I have evaluated Mr. Morva’s submission for evidence that he has been subjected to a miscarriage of justice at any phase of his trial that could have impacted the verdict or his sentence.  After extensive review and deliberation, I do not find sufficient cause in Mr. Morva’s petition or case records to justify overturning the will of the jury that convicted and sentenced him.

There is no question that, in a carefully orchestrated effort to escape custody while awaiting trial for burglary, robbery and firearms charges, Mr. Morva brutally attacked a deputy sheriff, stole his firearm and used it to murder Mr. McFarland, who was unarmed and had his hands raised as he was shot in the face from a distance of two feet.  The next day, Mr. Morva murdered Corporal Sutphin by shooting him in the back of the head.

Mr. Morva’s petition for clemency states that he suffers from a delusional disorder that rendered him unable to understand the consequences of his actions.

That diagnosis is inconsistent with the findings of the three licensed mental health professionals appointed by the trial court, including an expert psychiatrist who is Board-Certified in both Psychiatry and Forensic Psychiatry.  Two of these three experts were called by Mr. Morva’s own legal team.  These experts thoroughly evaluated Mr. Morva and testified to the jury that, while he may have personality disorders, he did not suffer from any condition that would have prevented him from committing these acts consciously and fully understanding their consequences....

I have determined that Mr. Morva was given a fair trial and that the jury heard substantial evidence about his mental health as they prepared to sentence him in accordance with the law of our Commonwealth.  In short, the record before me does not contain sufficient evidence to warrant the extraordinary step of overturning the decision of a lawfully empaneled jury following a properly conducted trial.

I personally oppose the death penalty; however, I took an oath to uphold the laws of this Commonwealth regardless of my personal views of those laws, as long as they are being fairly and justly applied. Thus, after extensive review and deliberation consistent with the process I have applied to previous requests for commutation, I have declined Mr. Morva’s petition. I have and will continue to pray for the families of the victims of these terrible crimes and for all of the people whose lives have been impacted.

UPDATE: This Reuters article suggests that Morva's execution was completed without difficulty Thursday night.

July 6, 2017 in Clemency and Pardons, Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

"The Wireless Prison: How Colorado’s tablet computer program misses opportunities and monetizes the poor"

Tablet_bannerThe title of this post is the title of this lengthy new Prison Policy Initiative posting about an important new part of the prison experience in a growing number of jurisdictions.  I recommend the full piece, and here are excerpts from how it starts and concludes (with links from the original):

A recent Denver Post article reports that the Colorado state prison system has awarded a contract to prison communications giant GTL (formerly Global Tel*Link) for a tablet program that will eventually be deployed in all the state’s prisons.

The Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) is somewhat of an early adopter of emerging communications technology.  For several years it has offered electronic messaging, an email-like service that allows people in prison to send and receive messages using a proprietary, fee-based platform operated by a contractor.  Colorado DOC’s electronic messaging program isn’t perfect, but its rollout was notable for giving people a new communication option.  The tablet program, on the other hand, foreshadows a potential new paradigm in corrections, shifting numerous communications, educational, and recreational functions to a for-profit contractor; and, at the same time, making incarcerated people and their families pay for services, some of which are now commonly funded by the state.

What makes the Colorado/GTL contract especially frustrating is that it could have been an innovative step toward providing incarcerated people with useful technology. Experts who have studied government technology contracting warn that projects often fail because details are not sufficiently thought through.  The Colorado DOC seems to have walked down this familiar path by focusing largely on its own financial interest without giving much thought to the user experience or the financial impact on incarcerated people and their families....

Historically, people in prison have communicated with the outside world using tools that were simultaneously specialized and universal. Specialized in the sense that letters and phone calls were subject to restrictions and monitoring for security.  Universal in the sense that the actual communications networks were the same ones used by the population at large — namely the nation’s mail system and the network of Bell telephone companies.  These networks charged reasonable, regulated rates for universal service.   Emerging technologies for prison communication are taking a decidedly different approach: instead of applying security protocols to a general purpose network, prisons are relying on specialized providers that use proprietary systems and charge user fees far in excess of cost.  The profits of this model are then divided among the prison systems and the private equity firms that own the providers.

New technologies have the potential to help incarcerated people.  But the ways in which such systems are being implemented tend to focus on profits over people.  The Colorado/GTL contract provides other jurisdictions with a case study in how new technologies can be implemented in ways that financially exploit incarcerated people and their support networks.  Other jurisdictions should view the Colorado experience with caution, and strive to develop better, more humane models for bringing prison communications into the twenty-first century.

July 6, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Technocorrections, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

An amusing shout-out for the US Sentencing Commission's guideline simplification efforts

I just noticed an blog-worthy little concurrence by Judge Owens at the end of a Ninth Circuit panel decision last week in US V. Perez-Silvan, No. 16-10177 (9th Cir. June 28, 2017) (available here). The case concerned application of the "crime of violence" sentencing enhancement to a sentence for illegal reentry after deportation based on a prior Tennessee conviction for aggravated assault, and Judge Owen wrote this short opinion to praise the work of both his court and the US Sentencing Commission:

I fully join Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion, which faithfully applies controlling law to the question at hand.  But what a bad hand it is -- requiring more than 16 pages to resolve an advisory question.  I applaud the United States Sentencing Commission for reworking U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 to spare judges, lawyers, and defendants from the wasteland of DescampsSee U.S.S.G. supp. app. C, amend. 802 (2016); U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b) (2016).  I continue to urge the Commission to simplify the Guidelines to avoid the frequent sentencing adventures more complicated than reconstructing the Staff of Ra in the Map Room to locate the Well of the Souls.  Cf. Almanza-Arenas v. Lynch, 815 F.3d 469, 482–83 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Owens, J., concurring); Raiders of the Lost Ark (Paramount Pictures 1981).

July 6, 2017 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Highlighting efforts to expand Miller (and Graham?) to older "kids" in Pennsylvania

This new local article, headlined "In Philly courts, whether they'll die in prison comes down to their birthday," reports on efforts by young adult offenders to expand the Supreme Court's recent Eighth Amendment doctrines limiting severe juvenile punishments.  Here are excerpts:

In 1982, when Judge Armand Della Porta sentenced Orlando Stewart to spend the rest of his life in prison, he did it with apparent regret.  “This is the best example of how wrong mandatory sentencing is,” he said.  Stewart was the last of 10 West Philadelphia teenagers sentenced in the 1981 death of University of Pennsylvania graduate student Douglas Huffman. They’d gone out in a pack, looking for someone to rob.  One teen hit Huffman, knocking him to the pavement where he hit his head hard enough to fracture his skull. Huffman declined medical treatment, and was found dead in his bed two days later.

Seven of the teens served short sentences, some as little as a year.  Ronald Saunders, who orchestrated the attack, was sentenced to life.  But he was made eligible for parole this March after a U.S. Supreme Court ruling that drew on evolving brain science to conclude juveniles are less culpable than adults, and cannot be doomed to life without parole under mandatory sentencing rules.  Charles Manor, the teen who knocked Huffman to the ground, was also made eligible for parole.

But Stewart, who never touched Huffman, won’t get a new sentence.  That’s because two months and 10 days before the crime, Stewart turned 18.  Those two months were the difference between kid and adult under the law — and between the “hope for some years of life outside prison walls” promised in that 2016 Supreme Court decision and the certainty of death in prison.

Now, appeals by 18-, 19-, and 20-year-old lifers like Stewart have begun to reach Pennsylvania’s highest court.  One was filed in June by Charmaine Pfender, who was 18 when she shot a man she says was attempting to rape her at knifepoint, killing him.  Such petitions argue that the same immaturity and impulsivity that diminish younger teens’ culpability continue well into the 20s, as a person’s brain continues to develop.  If successful, the appeals could have sweeping implications: More than half of Pennsylvania’s lifers entered the state prison system between age 18 and 25.  That’s 2,763 inmates.

These arguments appear to be gaining traction elsewhere.  An Illinois appeals court in December granted a new sentencing hearing to Antonio House, who was 19 when he participated in a gang-related killing.  And a federal judge has agreed to hear arguments in the Connecticut case of Luis Noel Cruz, who was 18 when he participated in a murder.

Laurence Steinberg, a Temple University psychologist specializing in brain development, says such arguments have a scientific basis. His research shows that, while cognitive abilities mature by age 16, other parts of the brain mature later. Areas that influence criminal culpability, like impulsiveness, risk-aversion, and resistance to peer pressure, continue maturing well into the 20s.  “The science would certainly say there’s significant brain maturation that continues to go on at least until age 21, if not beyond,” he said. “The legal question is harder than the scientific question.”...

In light of evolving neuroscience, some jurisdictions have begun to set up young-adult courts, targeting those between 18 and 25 for consideration that is somewhere between juvenile and adult proceedings. San Francisco, Brooklyn, and Chicago have all launched such initiatives.  But in a string of U.S. Supreme Court cases, beginning with Roper v. Simmons, the 2005 case that abolished the juvenile death penalty, the court determined “a line must be drawn.” Age 18 seemed a conventional choice.

This line has led to perplexing moments in the courtroom over the last year and a half, as Pennsylvania judges have worked to resentence some 500 juvenile lifers — the largest such population in the nation.  Their sentences were deemed illegal under Miller vs. Alabama, a 2012 case, but it took a second case, Montgomery v. Louisiana, to get Pennsylvania courts to apply the ruling retroactively.

At least a half-dozen lifers who sought new sentences in Philadelphia waited for months while lawyers tracked down birth certificates from the 1950s, ’60s, or ’70s to determine whether they were on the right side of 18 at the time of the crime.  One, Steven Drake — the only 18-year-old in a group of 11 youths charged in a 1971 stabbing in West Philadelphia — was 23 days too old to make the cut, according to the date of birth on his court docket.

As the title of this post highlights, while this article discusses efforts to expanded the reach of the Supreme Court's Miller ruling precluding mandatory LWOP sentencing of juvenile murderers, this kind of litigation also would carry the potential to expanded the reach of the Supreme Court's prior Graham ruling precluding any LWOP sentencing for juvenile non-homicide offenders.

July 6, 2017 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Wednesday, July 05, 2017

"How smart was Obama's 'Smart on Crime' initiative? Not very"

The title of this post is the headline of this new Fox News commentary authored by Lawrence Leiser (president of the National Association of Assistant United States Attorneys), Nathan Catura (president of the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association), Bob Bushman (president of the National Narcotics Officers’ Associations’ Coalition), Al Regnery (chairman of the Law Enforcement Action Network), and Ron Hosko (president of the Law Enforcement Legal Defense Fund). The piece largely serves as a defense of the new Sessions charging/sentencing policies, and here is the bulk of what this impressive quintet have to say:

Department of Justice policies since the 1980s directed federal prosecutors to charge the most serious readily provable offense, unless justice required otherwise.  It’s undisputed that this charging practice, applied over the course of several Republican and Democratic administrations in recent decades, contributed to the reduction of violent crime by half between 1991 and 2014.

The Obama administration’s “Smart on Crime” initiative — touted by former Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates in a recent oped in the Washington Post titled “Making America scared again won’t make us safer” — undermined those hard-fought gains in public safety, and ushered in significant increases in violent crime.  In 2015, violent crime rose 5.6 percent — the greatest increase since 1991 — and included a shocking 10.8 percent increase in homicide rates.  And, although the final numbers for 2016 have not been published, the preliminary data suggests another substantial increase in the violent crime rate.

Among the policies championed by then Attorney General Eric Holder and Deputy Attorney General Yates was one that reversed long-standing charging policies and directed federal prosecutors to avoid minimum sentences against drug traffickers, as mandated by Congress, and instead pursue lesser charges.  Despite the well-known and deadly violence associated with drug cartels, gangs and their networks, the Holder-Yates policies directed federal prosecutors in certain cases to under-charge drug trafficking cases and avoid triggering statutory minimum penalties by not pressing charges on the actual amount of drugs that traffickers distributed, such as heroin, crack cocaine, and methamphetamine.

Changes in federal law enforcement policy can ripple through communities across the country and affect their safety.  “Smart on Crime” was part of a larger policy shift within the Obama administration from drug abstinence and accountability to drug acceptance and victimization.  Since its inception, correlative increases in drug abuse, overdose deaths and violent crime have had a devastating impact on every community, regardless of sex or demographics.  The reduced charging and sentencing of thousands of drug traffickers and their early release from prison — all hallmarks of the Holder-Yates policies of the Obama years — have begun to leave their devastating mark downstream on the safety of communities across the nation.  The surge in violent crime should not be surprising.  Drug trafficking by its very nature, is a violent crime.

Take the recent account of Michael Bell, a former federally-convicted methamphetamine dealer who, when facing new state charges in Tennessee for kidnapping and domestic assault, shot two sheriff’s deputies during a court proceeding.  Bell would have still been in federal prison had he not been released in 2015, three years earlier than scheduled, because of the across-the-board sentencing reductions prior administration leaders pushed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to impose.

Not surprisingly, those former officials continue to use the term “low level, non-violent offender” to promote a sanitized narrative of drug trafficking for profit.  Law enforcement professionals know that drug trafficking enterprises are comprised of integrated networks of street corner dealers, mid-level traffickers, distributors, producers and cartel leaders, whose collective efforts inherently rely on violence and have contributed to the deaths of over 50,000 Americans last year in drug overdoses alone.

Despite the evocative “second chance” narrative that stirs support among sentencing reformers, law enforcement professionals also know that the people who end up in federal prison work hard to get there.  Few offenders go to prison for their first offense, or even the second or third.  Many of the people who end up in federal prison have committed violent crimes, are members of drug trafficking and criminal organizations or simply have chosen to continue to disregard our laws. Because the majority of criminals admit their guilt, plea bargaining involves the dismissal or reduction of related charges, which greatly reduces the criminal histories and sentences of countless criminals. That means the numbers and types of crimes for which many of them are arrested, but never charged or convicted, are incalculable.  Criminals are committing thousands of crimes and violent acts against our citizens for which they are never held accountable.

Seeking justice and keeping the peace, it is federal law enforcement agencies and their state and local partners who will strive to enforce the laws that Congress enacted to protect our country and its citizens.  The surest way to preserve public safety is to honor the laws the people have passed and to enforce them to the fullest.

July 5, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Drug Offense Sentencing, National and State Crime Data, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (25)

Divided California Supreme Court decides Prop 47 did not alter rules for retroactivity of Prop 36 three-strikes reform

As reported in this Los Angeles Times article, headlined "California Supreme Court makes it harder for three-strike prisoners to get sentence reductions," earlier this week the top court in California divided over the resolution of an intricate and interesting retroactivity question. Here are the details:

Judges have broad authority in refusing to lighten the sentences of “three-strike” inmates, despite recent ballot measures aimed at reducing the state’s prison population, the California Supreme Court ruled Monday. In a 4-3 decision, the court said judges may freely decline to trim sentences for inmates who qualify for reductions under a 2012 ballot measure intended to reform the state’s tough three-strikes sentencing law.

Justice Leondra R. Kruger, an appointee of Gov. Jerry Brown, joined the more conservative justices to reach the result. The decision aimed to resolve questions posed by two ballot measures in recent years to reduce the population of the state’s overburdened prison system.

Proposition 36 allowed three-strike inmates to obtain sentence reductions if their third strike was neither serious nor violent. Judges were entitled to refuse a reduction if they believed the inmate posed an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” They could consider the inmate’s history, disciplinary record in prison or other evidence.

Two years later, voters passed another ballot measure to reduce the prison population.  That measure, Proposition 47, created a definition of a safety risk that judges were required to apply.  Inmates could be denied a sentence reduction only if they were deemed to pose an unreasonable risk of committing certain crimes, including a killing, a sexually violent offense, child molestation or other serious or violent felony punishable by life in prison or the death penalty.

The court majority, led by Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye, said Monday that definition did not apply to three-strikers, who have been sentenced to 25 years to life for repeated crimes.  If it had, Cantil-Sakauye wrote, it would “result in the release of more recidivist serious and/or violent offenders than had been originally contemplated under Proposition 36.”

Cantil-Sakauye noted that none of the ballot materials for Proposition 47 mentioned that it would affect three-strike prisoners. Proposition 47 allowed judges to reduce some nonviolent felonies to misdemeanors.  “Based on the analysis and summary they prepared, there is no indication that the Legislative Analyst or the Attorney General were even aware that the measure might amend the resentencing criteria governing the Three Strikes Reform Act,” the chief justice wrote.

The ruling came in appeals filed by David J. Valencia and Clifford Paul Chaney, who were both sentenced to 25 years to life under the three strikes law and both eligible for reduced terms under Proposition 36. Valencia’s criminal history included kidnapping, making criminal threats and striking his wife.  Chaney’s record included armed robbery and three convictions for driving under the influence....

Justice Kathryn Mickle Werdegar and Brown’s two other appointees — Justices Goodwin Liu and Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar — noted in dissents that Proposition 47 clearly stated that the definition would apply throughout the criminal code.  The more restrictive definition advanced “the goal of concentrating state corrections spending on the most dangerous offenders,” Cuéllar wrote, and gave three-strike prisoners only “a marginally stronger basis” for winning sentence reductions.

Liu said the court majority had concluded “that the drafters of Proposition 47 pulled a fast one on an uninformed public.” But it is also possible that voters, unhappy about the huge amounts of money being spent on prisons, “knew exactly what they were doing,” Liu wrote.  Monday’s ruling “disserves the initiative process, the inmates who are now its beneficiaries, and the judicial role itself,” he said.

The full 110-page(!) opinion in this case is available at this link.

July 5, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Federal district judge explains his remarkable reasons for rejecting an unremarkable plea deal in heroin dealing prosecution

A helpful reader alerted me to a fascinating opinion issued last week by US District Judge Joseph Goodwin of the Southern District of West Virginia in US v. Walker, No. 2:17-cr-00010 (SD W. Va. June 26, 2017) (available here).  The full opinion is a must read, and here is its conclusion:

My twenty-two years of imposing long prison sentences for drug crimes persuades me that the effect of law enforcement on the supply side of the illegal drug market is insufficient to solve the heroin and opioid crisis at hand. I also see scant evidence that prohibition is preventing the growth of the demand side of the drug market. Nevertheless, policy reform, coordinated education efforts, and expansion of treatment programs are not within my bailiwick. I may only enforce the laws of illicit drug prohibition.

The law is the law, and I am satisfied that enforcing the law through public adjudications focuses attention on the heroin and opioid crisis.  The jury trial reveals the dark details of drug distribution and abuse to the community in a way that a plea bargained guilty plea cannot.  A jury trial tells a story.  The jury members listening to the evidence come away with personally impactful information about the deadly and desperate heroin and opioid crisis existing in their community.  They are educated in the process of performing their civic duty and are likely to communicate their experience in the courtroom to family members and friends.  Moreover, the attendant media attention that a jury trial occasions communicates to the community that such conduct is unlawful and that the law is upheld and enforced.  The communication of a threat of severe punishment acts as an effective deterrent.  As with other criminalized conduct, the shame of a public conviction and prison sentence specifically deters the sentenced convict from committing the crime again — at least for so long as he is imprisoned.

Over time, jury verdicts involving the distribution of heroin and opioids reinforce condemnation of the conduct by the public at large. In turn, respect for the law propagates.117 This respect for the law may eventually reduce such criminal conduct.

The secrecy surrounding plea bargains in heroin and opioid cases frequently undermines respect for the law and deterrence of crime.  The bright light of the jury trial deters crime, enhances respect for the law, educates the public, and reinforces their sense of safety much more than a contract entered into in the shadows of a private meeting in the prosecutor’s office.

For the reasons stated, I REJECT the plea agreement.

It will be quite interesting to see if the parties appeal this rejection of the plea agreement or if the defendant decides to plea without the benefit of any agreement (which I believe must be accepted if the judge finds it is voluntary).

July 5, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Tuesday, July 04, 2017

"Impeachable Offenses? The Case for Removal of the 45th President of the United States"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new blog created by former federal prosecutor and sentencing guru Professor Frank Bowman. Frank sent a note about the blog around a criminal law professor listserve yesterday, and I thought sharing that note today was, in a nerdy-law-professor way, kind of patriotic. So here is a bit of what Frank had to say about his new blog:

I propose to discuss, as dispassionately as possible, the case for impeachment of Mr. Trump. An actual impeachment is, as I’m sure you’d agree, a highly unlikely event.  But the prospect is talked about constantly, so I thought I’d try to create a resource for careful examination of all aspects of the question. I hope to make it a combination of (1) sources for those really interested in the subject, (2) quick-hit posts of links to other articles by other authors discussing impeachment, and (3) a growing series of essays by me, perhaps some of my students, and maybe other contributors on aspects of the impeachment problem.

Although it is a work in progress, I now have enough content on the site that I feel comfortable in telling people about it. I am in the midst of a series of posts analyzing the case for criminal obstruction of justice against Mr. Trump. See, e.g., this posting. In it, I discuss the views of Eric Posner, Daniel Hemel, Randall Eliason, Alan Dershowitz, and others. Professor Dershowitz has been kind enough to respond to my remarks on his position, and I’ve posted a rejoinder.

July 4, 2017 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (14)

Monday, July 03, 2017

Highlighting Justice Gorsuch's interesting concurrence in Hicks on the perils of permitting sentencing error to persist

Adam Liptak has this effective new article in the New York Times about the effectiveness of the new Justice on the Supreme Court, Neil Gorsuch. The article is headlined "Confident and Assertive, Gorsuch Hurries to Make His Mark," and it develops the point that Justice Gorsuch's "early opinions were remarkably self-assured." The article and that line reminded me that I have been meaning to highlight Justice Gorsuch's remarkable little concurrence on the final day of the term in the Hicks v. US, No. 16-7806 (S. Ct. June 26, 2017) (available here).

Hicks is a quirky case in a quirky posture after the defendant was sentenced under the wrong crack sentencing law during the transitional uncertainty after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act. The government admits in its briefing to SCOTUS that Hicks' 20-year mandatory-minimum sentence was legally erroneous, but the government asked SCOTUS to remand the case to the Fifth Circuit to conduct the full plain error analysis. The Supreme Court did just that via a short order, but the Chief Justice joined by Justice Thomas dissented with a short opinion suggesting that SCOTUS should make a plain error decision before being willing to vacate the judgment below. This dissent, it seems, prompted Judge Gorsuch to want to defend the Court's action and in so doing he had a lot of interesting things to say. These passages from the end of his concurrence in particular caught my attention:

A plain legal error infects this judgment—a man was wrongly sentenced to 20 years in prison under a defunct statute.  No doubt, too, there’s a reasonable probability that cleansing this error will yield a different outcome.  Of course, Mr. Hicks’s conviction won’t be undone, but the sentencing component of the district court’s judgment is likely to change, and change substantially. For experience surely teaches that a defendant entitled to a sentence consistent with 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)’s parsimony provision, rather than pursuant to the rigors of a statutory mandatory minimum, will often receive a much lower sentence.  So there can be little doubt Mr. Hicks’s substantial rights are, indeed, implicated.  Cf. Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U. S. ___, ___ (2016).  When it comes to the fourth prong of plain error review, it’s clear Mr. Hicks also enjoys a reasonable probability of success.  For who wouldn’t hold a rightly diminished view of our courts if we allowed individuals to linger longer in prison than the law requires only because we were unwilling to correct our own obvious mistakes?  Cf. United States v. Sabillon-Umana, 772 F.3d 1328, 1333 (CA10 2014).

Now this Court has no obligation to rove about looking for errors to correct in every case in this large country, and I agree with much in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Nunez v. United States, 554 U.S. 911, 911–913 (2008), suggesting caution..... But, respectfully, I am unaware of any such reason here.  Besides, if the only remaining objection to vacating the judgment here is that, despite our precedent routinely permitting the practice, we should be wary of remanding a case without first deciding for ourselves the latter elements of the plain error test, that task is so easily done that in this case that I cannot think why it should not be done. Indeed, the lone peril in the present case seems to me the possibility that we might permit the government to deny someone his liberty longer than the law permits only because we refuse to correct an obvious judicial error.

Based on Justice Gorsuch's votes in a few other criminal cases, early indications suggest that he is far more often going to vote in favor of the government rather than in favor of criminal defendants across the range of criminal law and procedure cases.  But his decision to write separately in this little case to push back at the dissenters here with this particular language leads me to wonder if Justice Gorsuch (like the Justice he replaced) might prove to be an especially interesting and unpredictable vote and voice in federal sentencing cases in particular.

July 3, 2017 in New crack statute and the FSA's impact, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

"Crime, the Constitution, and the Trump Administration"

The title of this post is the title of this extended commentary authored by Tim Lynch, who directs the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice.  Here is how it starts and ends:

President Trump says crime is a serious problem and that he’s going to do something about it.  His first move was to nominate Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions to be the new attorney general.  Sessions, a former federal prosecutor, is widely known for his “lock ‘em up” philosophy and tough stances on drugs and immigration.  As the first 100 days of the Trump presidency recede into history, it is a good time to pause and assess what’s in store for the American criminal justice system.

To begin, it is very unfortunate that Trump has chosen to elevate the crime problem in the way that he has because it reinforces the mistaken idea that the federal government “oversees” our criminal justice system.  In fact, the Constitution says very little about federal criminal jurisdiction.  According to the constitutional text, piracy, treason, and counterfeiting are supposed to be the federal government’s concern, but not much else.  The common law crimes of murder, rape, assault, and theft are to be handled by state and local governments.  Of course, as the federal government grew in size and scope, it came to involve itself in a host of local matters — from schools to road maintenance to crime fighting.  Although Trump has spoken of “draining the swamp” and slashing the federal budget, he not only seems uninterested in reducing the federal role in crime-fighting, but is also clearly moving to expand that role....

To conclude this overview of the criminal justice policy landscape, the first few months of the Trump presidency have been unsettling, to say the least.  Trump may have good intentions, but his gut instincts in the area of criminal justice are terribly misguided.  Massive deportations, marijuana raids, property seizures, and militarized policing will jolt the foundations of our constitutional republic.  Criminal justice reformers will win some policy battles — especially at the state and local level, but the road ahead looks treacherous indeed.

July 3, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, July 02, 2017

Reviewing what Hurst has come to mean for the death penalty in Florida

This new Miami Herald article, headlined "There are fewer murderers on Florida’s Death Row but not because of executions," reports on the enduring echo effects of the Supreme Court's most significant capital punishment ruling in recent years. Here is how the article gets started:

The full impact of a historic U.S. Supreme Court ruling on Florida’s death penalty system is finally emerging as the state’s Death Row population is smaller than it was more than a decade ago and will keep shrinking for a long time.

Florida has not executed an inmate in 18 months. No inmates haves been sent to Death Row in more than a year, a sign that prosecutors are not trying as many first-degree murder cases because of uncertainties in the sentencing system.

“There is no reason to sign a death warrant if you know it’s going to get delayed,” said State Attorney Bernie McCabe, the top prosecutor in Pinellas and Pasco counties. “I think judges are reluctant to if they don’t know what the rules are.”

Florida’s Death Row population now stands at 362, according to the Department of Corrections web site. That’s the lowest number since 2004; only a year ago, the population was 389.

Many more cells on Death Row are certain to be emptied as the Florida Supreme Court continues to vacate death sentences because they violate a 2016 U.S. Supreme Court decision known as Hurst v. Florida.  The case struck down the state’s death penalty sentencing system because it limited jurors to an advisory role, a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.

In four new cases, the state’s high court upheld first-degree murder convictions Thursday but ordered that all four defendants must be resentenced because of the Hurst decision, a step that could spare any or all of them a trip to the execution chamber.

One of the four, John Sexton, was convicted of the brutal 2010 Pasco County slaying of Ann Parlato, a 94-year-old woman who lived alone. The jury that convicted Sexton recommend his execution by a vote of 10 to 2, a split decision that justices said Thursday is a violation of the Hurst decision.  Justices also lifted the death sentence of Tiffany Ann Cole, convicted of burying a couple alive in Jacksonville.  She’s one of three women on Death Row.

Legal experts say that in all, up to 150 death sentences could be reversed or be sent back to trial courts for resentencing hearings in other cases in which the jury’s recommendation of a death sentence was not unanimous. Those penalty phase hearings will strain the limited resources of prosecutors and public defenders, who must scramble to find old trial transcripts and witnesses and must empanel new juries.  “I’ll use one word: ‘chaos,’ ” said retired Supreme Court Justice Gerald Kogan of Miami. “It’s just a mess.”

Scott Sundby, a law professor at the University of Miami, said the impact on the criminal justice system will be significant.  “It essentially means that every new penalty phase is going to have to be re-investigated and presented in full,” Sundby said.  “There will not be an ability to simply rely on the prior penalty phase.”

July 2, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Saturday, July 01, 2017

Amish farmer sentenced to six year in federal prison for regulatory offenses and obstruction

GirodpictureThis local article reports on a notable federal sentencing that seemed driven, at least in part, by the defendant's disinclination to respect the federal government. The article is headlined "Amish farmer sold herbal health products. He’s going to prison for 6 years." Here are some of the details:

An Amish man was sentenced Friday to six years in prison for obstructing a federal agency and for making and selling herbal health products that were not adequately labeled as required by federal law. Samuel A. Girod of Bath County, a member of the Old Order Amish faith, was convicted in March on 13 charges, including threatening a person in an attempt to stop him from providing information to a grand jury.

U.S. District Judge Danny Reeves repeatedly asked Girod in court if he wished to make a statement but Girod refused. Girod, who represented himself, does not acknowledge that the court has jurisdiction. “I do not waive my immunity to this court,” Girod told the judge. “I do not consent.”

Girod has become a cause for some who see him as a victim of the federal government. More than 27,000 people have signed an online petition seeking to have him released from jail. About 75 supporters of Girod, including many Amish, gathered near the federal courthouse on Barr Street in downtown Lexington before and after the sentencing.

“We still have a country where people still come together to help each other,” said Emanuel Schlabach, 27, an Amish man from Logan County. As assistant U.S. attorneys left the courthouse after the sentencing, Girod supporters jeered them. “Shame on you!” shouted one supporter.

One non-Amish supporter, Richard Mack of Arizona, said after the sentencing that, “This is a national disgrace and outrage. ... He is being punished for being stubborn.” Mack, a former Arizona sheriff and political activist, said he and others will ask President Donald Trump to issue a pardon to Girod. Mack said he has used Girod’s chickweed salve with no ill effects.

Girod operated a business in Bath County that made products to be used for skin disorders, sinus infections and cancer. One product called TO-MOR-GONE contained an extract of bloodroot that had a caustic, corrosive effect on human skin, according to an indictment.

A federal court in Missouri had barred Girod from distributing the products until he met certain conditions, including letting the U.S. Food and Drug Administration inspect his business. But when two agents tried to inspect the plant in November 2013, Girod and others blocked them and made them leave, the indictment charged. Federal prosecutors said in a sentencing memorandum that Girod knowingly and intentionally sold misbranded products to customers and did not tell any of them about the injunction.

At trial, customers testified that they would not have purchased his products if they had known about the injunction. Girod argued that his products weren’t subject to Federal Drug Administration oversight because they were herbal remedies, not drugs. He also argued that requiring FDA approval of his products infringed on his religious freedom. Old Order Amish seek to insulate themselves from the modern world, including modern pharmaceuticals, he said.

Federal jurors rejected Girod’s defense, convicting him of conspiring to impede federal officers; obstructing a proceeding before a federal agency; failing to register with the FDA as required; tampering with a witness; failing to appear before a hearing; and distributing misbranded drugs....

In documents filed June 19, Girod argued that the charges in the indictment “do not apply to me.” “I am not a creation of state/government, as such I am not within its jurisdiction,” Girod wrote. He added later: “The proceedings of the ‘United States District Court’ cannot be applied within the jurisdiction of the ‘State of Kentucky.’”

Girod’s supporters outside the courthouse said his case is an example of overreach by the federal government. “I don’t need the FDA to protect me from an Amish farmer,” read a sign held by T.J. Roberts, a Transylvania University student from Boone County. “I feel what happened here is an example of judges making the law,” Roberts said. “What the FDA did here is an example of executive overreach in which they are choosing what Americans can put in or on their own bodies. I struggle to find where the victim is in this and where the crime was committed.”

But Judge Reeves said Girod brought the trouble on himself “because he steadfastly refused to follow the law.” To Girod, Reeves said, “You refused to follow anyone but yourself.”

I always have a negative reaction to any use of prison time in response to what seem like non-violent regulatory offenses by a person who would appear to present no genuine threat to public safety.  And this case especially caught my eye not only because a lot of federal prison time was imposed, but also because this critical report about the sentencing from a political blog indicates that the applicable federal guideline range here was 63-78 months.  In other words, the sentencing judge here though the defendant needed and deserved a sentence significantly above the bottom of the applicable guideline range in this case.  Also of note, the judge who decided a six year prison term was necessary in this case, U.S. District Judge Danny Reeves, happens to be the newest member of the US Sentencing Commission.

July 1, 2017 in Booker in district courts, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, White-collar sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (27)

Friday, June 30, 2017

"Examining Racial Disparities in Criminal Case Outcomes among Indigent Defendants in San Francisco"

The title of this post is the title of this interesting big new report published by the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice.  This Crime Report piece about the report provides this overview of its findings:

An individual’s race and ethnic background determine how he is treated at the “front end” of the criminal justice system, according to a study published this week.  The study, which, focused on poor African-American, Latino and white defendants (all male) in San Francisco, found what it called “systematic differences” in outcomes during the preliminary steps of an individual’s involvement in the justice system, from arrest and booking to the pretrial phase.

“Defendants of color are more likely to be held in custody during their cases, which tend to take longer than the cases of White defendants,” said the study, published by the Quattrone Center for the Fair Administration of Justice.  “Their felony charges are less likely to be reduced, and misdemeanor charges (are) more likely to be increased during the plea bargaining process, meaning that they are convicted of more serious crimes than similarly situated White defendants.”

The study’s conclusions added a troubling dimension to existing research on racial disparities in the U.S. justice system which has largely concentrated on “final case outcomes,” such as conviction, incarceration and sentence length.  In California, for example, African-American men are incarcerated at 10 times the incarceration rate of white men, five times the incarceration rate of Latino men, and 100 times the incarceration rate of Asian men, according to figures cited by the study.

But the study authors’ examination of more than 10,000 records of cases between 2011 and 2014 provided by the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office challenged the notion that the difference is explained simply by the fact that African-Americans or Hispanics commit more crimes than other groups.  Their findings suggest that whites are in fact treated more leniently when they are apprehended during the early stages of their involvement in the justice system, thus making them less likely to end up with prison terms in the first place.

The full report linked above runs more than 100 pages, but the Quattrone Center webisite has this shorter summary version.

June 30, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Chicago now an even more fascinating study in federal criminal enforcement and gun crimes

The title of this post is my reaction to this new press release from the Department of Justice titled "Attorney General Jeff Sessions: We Cannot Accept these Levels of Violence in Chicago." Here is how it starts and ends:

Today Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued the following statement on the unacceptable violence plaguing the City of Chicago and outlined steps that the Department of Justice is taking to increase public safety:

"No child in America should have to walk the streets of their neighborhood in fear of violent criminals, and yet in Chicago, thousands of children do every day. Last year, more than 4,300 Chicagoans were shot, and more than 700 were killed — the deadliest year in two decades.”

“The Trump Administration will not let the bloodshed go on; we cannot accept these levels of violence. That's why, under President Trump's strong leadership, we have created the Chicago Gun Strike Force and are sending 20 more permanent ATF agents to Chicago, reallocating federal prosecutors and prioritizing prosecutions to reduce gun violence, and working with our law enforcement partners to stop the lawlessness.”...

The Crime Gun Strike Force, a permanent team of special agents, task force officers, intelligence research specialists, and ATF Industry Operations investigators who are focused on the most violent offenders, in the areas of the city with the highest concentration of firearm violence.

The Strike Force became operational June 1, 2017, and consists of 20 additional permanent ATF special agents, 6 intelligence research specialists, 12 task force officers from the Chicago Police Department (CPD), 2 task force officers from the Illinois State Police, and 4 NIBIN specialists (National Integrated Ballistics Information Network).

I have noted in lots of posts in recent years how remarkable it is that the largest city in the US (New York) keeps having crime declines while the third largest city (Chicago) is struggling with increased crime.  This pattern has been in place for at least a half-decade (see this 2012 post), and I sure hope this new Chicago Gun Strike Force can help matters in Chicago.

June 30, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Gun policy and sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)

Disconcerting data reminder of why drug use (and thus drug crime) is so hard to track and assess

Though told mostly as a public health data story, this new post at FiveThirtyEight also struck me as a criminal justice data story as well.  The lengthy piece by Kathryn Casteel is headlined "Data On Drug Use Is Disappearing Just When We Need It Most," and here is how it starts:

It’s no secret that heroin has become an epidemic in the United States. Heroin overdose deaths have risen more than sixfold in less than a decade and a half. Yet according to one of the most widely cited sources of data on drug use, the number of Americans using heroin has risen far more slowly, roughly doubling during the same time period.

Most major researchers believe that source, the National Survey on Drug Use and Health, vastly understates the increase in heroin use. But many rely on the survey anyway for a simple reason: It’s the best data they have. Several other sources that researchers once relied on are no longer being updated or have become more difficult to access. The lack of data means researchers, policymakers and public health workers are facing the worst U.S. drug epidemic in a generation without essential information about the nature of the problem or its scale.

“We’re simply flying blind when it comes to data collection, and it’s costing lives,” said John Carnevale, a drug policy expert who served at the federal Office of National Drug Control Policy under both Republican and Democratic administrations. There is anecdotal evidence of how patterns of drug use are changing, Carnevale said, and special studies conducted in various localities are identifying populations of drug users. “But the national data sets we have in place now really don’t give us the answers that we need,” he said.

June 30, 2017 in Drug Offense Sentencing, National and State Crime Data, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, June 29, 2017

The rest of SCOTUSblog's symposium on OT 2016 death penalty decisions

I noted in this post on Tuesday that the folks at SCOTUSblog had a new "Special Feature" in the form of a "Symposium on October Term 2016’s death-penalty decisions."  In the prior post I linked to the first four entries in this symposium, and here are now the last four:

June 29, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

Two more notable recent criticisms of tough turn by AG Jeff Sessions

I have noted in a few prior posts various criticisms of the US Attorney General's new tough charging and sentencing guidance for federal prosecutors (which got an extra jolt of attention when AG Sessions took to the editorial pages of the Washington Post to make his case via this opinion piece).  This week I have notice these two more notable criticisms:

Via Real Clear Politics, "Trump Should Reject Sessions' Stance on Sentencing Reform" by Brett Tolman

Via The Washington Post, "Jeff Sessions isn’t making America safer. He might be making it more dangerous." By Inimai Chettiar and Ames C. Grawert

UPDATE: Here is one more notable new addition via Forbes, "What Sessions Doesn't Get: Narcotics Trafficking Is A Market" by Mark Osler

June 29, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Pair of Senators introduce the "Reverse Mass Incarceration Act of 2017"

As reported in this article from The Hill, "Senate Democrats unveiled a proposal Wednesday to push back against Attorney General Jeff Sessions's 'tough on crime' policies." Here are the details:

Sens. Cory Booker (N.J.) and Richard Blumenthal (Conn.) introduced the Reverse Mass Incarceration Act of 2017 to incentivize states through grant funding to decrease their prison populations.

It's intended to counter the 1994 Crime Bill, otherwise known as the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. That law authorized $12.5 billion in grants to fund or offset the costs of incarceration, nearly 50 percent of which was earmarked for states that adopted tough “truth-in-sentencing” laws, which required offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences, according to the Brennan Center for Justice....

The Booker-Blumenthal bill provides $20 billion in grant funding to be divvied up every three years among eligible states. States would only be considered eligible to apply if the total number of people in correctional or detention facilities in the state decreased by 7 percent or more in that three-year period. States must also keep crime rates from increasing by more than 3 percent.

The proposal is estimated to reduce the national prison population by 20 percent over 10 years. “State sentencing policies are the major drivers of skyrocketing incarceration rates, which is why we’ve introduced legislation to encourage change at the state level,” Booker said in a statement. “We need to change federal incentives so that we reward states that are addressing this crisis and improving community safety, instead of funneling more federal dollars into a broken system.”

The idea is based on a 2015 proposal from the Brennan Center for Justice. “The federal government has a long history of dangling money in front of state and local leaders to spur policy changes,” program Director Inimai Chettiar said in a statement. “We saw it with the 1994 Crime Bill, which helped put more people behind bars. This bold bill shifts the current flow of funding in the opposite direction. It is one of the single biggest steps we can take to reduce imprisonment.”

The full text of the Reverse Incarceration Act runs only about two pages and is available at this link.  I would be very surprised if this bill gets any traction in Congress, but even its formal introduction seemed notable.

June 29, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Wednesday, June 28, 2017

En banc Sixth Circuit reverses preliminary injunction that had been preventing Ohio from moving forward with executions

Unsurprisingly, the en banc Sixth Circuit today ruled for the State of Ohio in its appeal of a lower court stay issued earlier this year which blocked Ohio from using its latest three-drug protocol to execute condemned murderers.  Here is how the majority opinion (per Judge Kethledge, who wrote the dissent in the original panel ruling) in  In re: Ohio Execution Protocol, No. 17-3076 (6th Cir. June 28, 2017) (available here) gets started:

Roughly two decades have passed since the plaintiffs in this case murdered their victims. Ronald Phillips raped a three-year-old girl and beat her so badly that her internal organs ruptured. For two days she suffered intense abdominal pain and vomiting, until her heart collapsed. See State v. Phillips, 656 N.E.2d 643, 650-52 (Ohio 1995).  Gary Otte entered the home of an Ohio man, robbed him, and then shot him in the head.  Two nights later, Otte pushed his way into a woman’s home and did the same things to her. After each murder Otte went out partying. See State v. Otte, 660 N.E.2d 711, 715-16 (Ohio 1996).  Raymond Tibbetts killed an elderly man and his caretaker. Police found the man slumped in his chair with butcher knives protruding from his chest and back.  His caretaker lay on the floor in a pool of blood with her skull cracked open and its contents scattered nearby. See State v. Tibbetts, 749 N.E.2d 226, 237-39 (Ohio 2001).

Phillips, Otte, and Tibbetts now claim that Ohio’s Execution Protocol would cause them to suffer severe pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment.  In a sense the claim is unprecedented: the Supreme Court “has never invalidated a State’s chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.” Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2732 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State’s chosen procedure here is the same procedure (so far as the combination of drugs is concerned) that the Supreme Court upheld in Glossip.  Every other court of appeals to consider that procedure has likewise upheld it, including most recently the Eighth Circuit, which rejected a nearly identical challenge in a procedural posture identical to the one here.  See McGehee v. Hutchinson, 854 F.3d 488, 492 (8th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1275 (2017); Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2739-40 (collecting cases); Brooks v. Warden, 810 F.3d 812, 818-22 (11th Cir. 2016); cf. Jordan v. Fisher, 823 F.3d 805, 811-12 (5th Cir. 2016).  Yet here the district court thought the same procedure is likely invalid.  We respectfully disagree and reverse the court’s grant of a preliminary injunction.

The chief dissent was penned by Judge Moore (who wrote the majority decision for the original panel upholding the stay).  This dissent runs about twice as long as the majority opinion, and it gets started this way:

There is a narrow question before this court: Should Gary Otte, Ronald Phillips, and Raymond Tibbetts have a trial on their claim that Ohio’s execution protocol is a cruel and unusual punishment, or should Ohio execute them without such a trial?  The majority has concluded that there is no need for a trial on the merits of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claim. I disagree.

There is no dispute that the second and third drugs in Ohio’s execution protocol cause immense pain.  There is significant evidence that the first drug, midazolam, cannot prevent someone from feeling that pain.  After a five-day hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, the district court determined that there should be a full trial on the merits of Plaintiffs’ claim that Ohio’s use of midazolam as the first drug in a three-drug execution protocol creates a constitutionally unacceptable risk of pain. Despite the deferential standard of review that this court should apply, the majority casts aside the district court’s determination that Plaintiffs should have a trial before the state executes them.  The majority also determines that despite Defendants’ unequivocal sworn testimony that they would no longer use pancuronium bromide or potassium chloride in executions, judicial estoppel does not prevent their renewed attempt to use those drugs. For the reasons discussed below, I would hold that Plaintiffs should have a trial on their Eighth Amendment and judicial-estoppel claims, and I respectfully dissent.

This Ohio DRC execution page details that Ohio is scheduled to execute Ronald Phillips on July 26 and has scheduled executions for more than two dozen other Ohio inmates running all the way through 2020. This Sixth Circuit will surely be appealed by Phillips to the US Supreme Court in the coming weeks, but I would be very surprised if SCOTUS takes up the case after it has recently allowed other midazolam executions to go forward. And if Ohio is able to to complete executions uneventfully with its current protocol, the state could now be on a path to having more executions in the next few years than perhaps any other state in the nation.

June 28, 2017 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (8)

Trump Administration says it "strongly supports" latest Kate’s Law to increase penalties on illegal reentry

The Trump Administration yesterday released this (unusual?) "statement of administration policy" concerning a bill in the House of Representatives known as Kate's Law. Here is its full text:

The Administration strongly supports H.R. 3004, Kate’s Law. This bill commemorates Kate Steinle, the 32-year-old woman who was shot and killed two years ago in San Francisco as she walked along a pier with her father. The alleged shooter, Francisco Sanchez, was an illegal immigrant who had already been deported five times and had seven felony convictions.

H.R. 3004 would increase the penalties that may be imposed on criminal aliens convicted of illegal reentry, deterring reentry and keeping criminal aliens off our streets. The bill is consistent with the Administration's broader efforts to strengthen enforcement of our immigration laws and improve the security of our Nation's borders.

If H.R. 3004 were presented to the President in its current form, his advisors would recommend that he sign the bill into law. 

Notably, as this White House statement indicates and as detailed in this recent Cato commentary by David Bier titled "Kate’s Law: A Waste of Federal Resources," the latest version of Kate's Law (H.R. 3004, available here) does not include the five-year mandatory minimum prison term that has appeared in some prior versions of "Kate's Law."  Rather, the version that the Trump Administration now "strongly supports" serves to raise the maximum prison term for various illegal reentry offenders with particular criminal histories.  Consequently, I do not think this version of Kate's Law would really have too much of an impact on too many illegal reentry cases.  In turn, advocates of federal sentencing reform who are justifiably concerned about great more use and reliance on federal mandatory minimum sentencing provisions should be pleased to see a version of Kate's Law apparently gaining steam that does not include any new mandatory minimum sentencing provisions.

One last cheeky comment combined with a final observation about this statement from the Trump Administration.  I was tempted to title this post, "Unlike Obama, Prez Trump formally expresses strong support for federal sentencing reform."  I decided not to use such a post title because, though I think it would be in many ways accurate, the phrasing would have a "fake news" quality to it.  Modern conversations about and references to "federal sentencing reform" are generally about lowering possible prison terms, not increasing them.  Moreover, the Obama Administration in various ways at various times over the course of the two terms did express support for federal sentencing reform.

That all said, I was tempted to title this post, "Unlike Obama, Prez Trump formally expresses strong support for federal sentencing reform," because this statement on Kate's Law showcases the kind of express and aggressive support that a White House can (and I think should) put behind criminal justice reform legislation it supports.  Though I am certain Prez Obama and his team worked behind the scenes in various ways and gave various speeches to support various sentencing reform efforts, I do not recall the Obama team ever issuing any formal "statement of administration policy" like this one from the Trump team in support of any particular sentencing reform proposal in Congress.  Of particular note, especially if we consider parallel points in a first Term, Prez Obama to my knowledge never formally expressed support from the White House as President in 2009 for bills in Congress that sought to completely equalize crack and powder cocaine sentencing (though the Holder DOJ did testify in support of complete equalization in front of the then Democratically controlled Congress).

UPDATE: I just now have seen that Attorney General Jeff Sessions is also adding his voice in support of Kate's Law via this official statement which includes these passages:

Countless families and communities have suffered as a result of these ‘sanctuary’ policies, which undermine federal law by safeguarding criminal illegal aliens from federal law enforcement. One victim of these policies was Kate Steinle, who was killed by an illegal alien who had been deported five times and yet still walked the streets freely. Her death was preventable, and she would still be alive today if only the City of San Francisco had put the public’s safety first. How many more Americans must die before we put an end to this madness?

Kate’s Law and the No Sanctuary for Criminals Act would penalize criminal illegal aliens who break our laws and the jurisdictions that attempt to shield them from justice. These bills can restore sanity and common-sense to our system by ending abusive attempts to undermine federal law, and they can prevent future tragedies by empowering law enforcement.

June 28, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Obama Administration, Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Offense Characteristics, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (11)

Impressive refreshment of Restoration of Rights Project

CcrcIn this post nearly five years ago, I noted the creation by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) of a terrific on-line resource profiling the law and practice in each US jurisdiction relating to relief from the numerous civil rights and other consequences of criminal conviction.  Now, as detailed in this news release, this resource has gotten an impressive new update. Here are the details via the release:

The Collateral Consequences Resource Center and its partner organizations, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the National Legal Aid and Defender Association, and the National HIRE Network, are pleased to announce the launch of the newly expanded and fully updated Restoration of Rights Project.

The Restoration of Rights Project is an online resource that offers state-by-state analyses of the law and practice in each U.S. jurisdiction relating to restoration of rights and status following arrest or conviction.  Jurisdictional "profiles" cover areas such as loss and restoration of civil rights and firearms rights, judicial and executive mechanisms for avoiding or mitigating collateral consequences, and provisions addressing non-discrimination in employment and licensing. Each jurisdiction's information is separately summarized for quick reference.

In addition to the jurisdictional profiles, a set of 50-state comparison charts summarizes the law and illustrates national patterns in restoration laws and policies.  We expect to supplement these resources in weeks to come with jurisdiction-specific information about organizations that may be able to assist individuals in securing relief, and information on other third-party resources.

The resources that comprise the Restoration of Rights Project were originally published in 2006 by CCRC Executive Director Margaret Love, and the profiles and comparison charts have expanded over the years to broaden their scope and to account for the many changes in this complex area of the law.  The project has recently been hosted by CCRC and NACDL, and its resources have been published in the treatise on collateral consequences published jointly by NACDL and Thompson Reuters (West).

Project resources have now been re-organized into a unified online platform that makes them easier to access, use, and understand.  The short "postcard" summaries of the law in each state -- which serve as a gateway to more detailed information -- have also been reviewed and revised to provide a more current and accurate snapshot of applicable law in each state.

The Project is intended as a resource for practitioners in all phases of the criminal justice system, for courts, for civil practitioners assisting clients whose court-imposed sentence has exposed them to additional civil penalties, for policymakers and advocates interested in reentry and reintegration of convicted persons, and for the millions of Americans with a criminal record who are seeking to put their past behind them.

The Restoration of Rights Project is available now at: http://restoration.ccresourcecenter.org

June 28, 2017 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, June 27, 2017

SCOTUSblog begins symposium on OT 2016 death penalty decisions

I will not likely remember the Supreme Court term just completed, October Term 2016, as especially notable for sentencing developments.  There were no big blockbuster sentencing cases, although the Beckles vagueness ruling was certainly consequential and a few other rulings will surely launch a few law review article.  And, of course, in the intricate and endlessly litigated world of the death penalty, a mixed bag of smaller SCOTUS rulings still add up to something worth watching (especially with the added bit of uncertainty that comes with Justice Gorsuch replacing Justice Scalia).

Helpfully for those who just cannot get enough of the SCOTUS capital docket, the folks over at SCOTUSblog have this new "Special Feature" in the form of a "Symposium on October Term 2016’s death-penalty decisions."   Here are links to the four pieces already up at SCOTUSblog, and I surmise more be coming:

June 27, 2017 in Death Penalty Reforms, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Will Trump Use Science to Fight Crime?"

The question in the title of this post is the headline of this notable new piece by Ted Gest at The Crime Report, which reports on what some criminologists had to say at a recent event about crime fighting in the Trump Administration.  Here are excerpts:

Leading criminologists expressed cautious optimism yesterday that President Trump will embrace evidence-based practices in his administration’s war on crime.

Laurie Robinson, who advocated the use of science in justice as an Assistant Attorney General in the Obama administration, declared, “I do not think the [criminal justice] field is turning back” on evidence-based programs. Robinson, now a member of the criminology faculty at George Mason University, said that officials “on the front line have to know what works, and how to pay for it.” She noted that bipartisan justice reform plans had been approved in recent years in such conservative states as Georgia, Louisiana and North Dakota.

Her comments came at the annual gathering sponsored by the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at the George Mason campus, in northern Virginia near Washington, D.C.. The session opened with a discussion on the “Progress of Evidence-Based Crime Policy in the Last Three Decades.”

Some critics have expressed doubt that the new administration will base policies on scientific evidence, noting Trump’s professed disbelief in global warming and Attorney General Jeff Sessions’ advocacy of tough-on-crime practices that studies have found ineffective....

Denise O’Donnell, who headed the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Assistance under Obama, said many U.S. policing leaders have concluded that “there is power in data.” She cited such developments as the use of public opinion surveys by police departments in formulating policies on officers’ body-worn cameras.

James Burch, a vice president of the Washington, D.C.-based Police Foundation and a former Justice Department official, offered a “qualified yes” to the question of whether evidence-based criminal justice practices will continue under Trump. Burch said he detected a “different tone” in discussions among police chiefs and sheriffs at national conventions in recent years. Law enforcement officials are asking themselves “how do we hold ourselves accountable?” he said....

Speakers pointed out that in opening a national “summit” on crime reduction and public safety last week, Sessions said that in a new national “Public Safety Partnership” involving 12 localities, the Justice Department will provide “diagnostic teams” to “assess the local factors driving increased violent crime, and will help local leaders develop strategies to address those factors.”

June 27, 2017 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Pennsylvania Supreme Court issues major Miller ruling declaring presumption against the imposition of LWOP on juvenile killers

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court yesterday handed down a major ruling on the application and implementation of the Supreme Court's modern Miller Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The lengthy ruling in Pennsylvania v. Batts, No. 45 MAP 2016 (Pa. June 26, 2017 (available here), gets started this way:

Qu’eed Batts (“Batts”) was convicted of a first-degree murder that he committed when he was fourteen years old. His case returns for the second time on discretionary review for this Court to determine whether the sentencing court imposed an illegal sentence when it resentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. After careful review, we conclude, based on the findings made by the sentencing court and the evidence upon which it relied, that the sentence is illegal in light of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (holding that a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole, imposed upon a juvenile without consideration of the defendant’s age and the attendant characteristics of youth, is prohibited under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016) (holding that the Miller decision announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively and clarifying the limited circumstances in which a life-without-parole sentence is permissible for a crime committed when the defendant was a juvenile).

Pursuant to our grant of allowance of appeal, we further conclude that to effectuate the mandate of Miller and Montgomery, procedural safeguards are required to ensure that life-without-parole sentences are meted out only to “the rarest of juvenile offenders” whose crimes reflect “permanent incorrigibility,” “irreparable corruption” and “irretrievable depravity,” as required by Miller and Montgomery.  Thus, as fully developed in this Opinion, we recognize a presumption against the imposition of a sentence of life without parole for a juvenile offender.  To rebut the presumption, the Commonwealth bears the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile offender is incapable of rehabilitation.

Because Pennsylvania has a large JLWOP population impacted by Miller and because proving rehabilitation incapacity beyond a reasonable doubt seem to be perhaps close to impossible, this Batts ruling strikes me as a  big deal jurisprudentially and practically.  (And, for any remaining Apprendi/Blakely fans, it bears noting that the Batts opinion expressly rejects the defendant's contention that a "jury must make the finding regarding a juvenile’s eligibility to be sentenced to life without parole.)

June 27, 2017 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (2)

Monday, June 26, 2017

SCOTUS denies cert on Wisconsin case with defendant challenging risk-assessment sentencing

I had thought I had reported on all the blog-worthy action in the the Supreme Court on this busy day via prior posts here and here and here ... until one of my favorite colleagues alerted me to the fact that today's SCOTUS order list also included a denial of cert in Loomis V. Wisconsin.  This local press article discusses thie cert denial under the headline "Supreme Court refuses to hear Wisconsin predictive crime assessment case."

As some may recall from some prior postings, Loomis concerned a due process challenge to the use of risk-assessment instruments at sentencing.  And, as noted here, the Supreme Court was interested enough in this issue to invite the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States.  But now it seems SCOTUS was not quite yet ready to take up this interesting and important issue in this case.

Some prior related posts on Loomis case:

June 26, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Should Ohio automatically release inmates if prisons too crowded?"

The question in title of this post is the headline of this Columbus Dispatch article which somewhat imperfectly describes one somewhat notable provision of a huge criminal justice revision proposal in the Buckeye State. Here is the context:

A proposed sweeping rewrite of Ohio’s criminal laws includes a provision that would allow the state to release hundreds of low-level, nonviolent inmates when the prison population hits 47,000. The state prison population last week stood at 50,093 — 3,093 above that threshold.

That change is among hundreds recommended by the Ohio Criminal Justice Recodification Committee, which on June 15 completed a two-year task of rewriting the entire state criminal code. The result is a 4,017-page bill submitted to the General Assembly. The committee composed of judges, legislators, prosecutors, law-enforcement officials and others voted 18-2 to recommend the overhaul.

Other changes include the return of a version of “bad time” for inmates who misbehave in prison, reduced add-on sentences for crimes committed while in possession of a gun, expanded opportunities for offenders to obtain drug treatment in lieu of prison, and an increase in the theft amount that triggers a felony charge to $2,500.

Created by the legislature, the committee was charged with “enhancing public safety and the administration of criminal justice.” The last time criminal laws were overhauled was 1974, although some statutes date to 1953 and have been “effectively superseded or contradicted” by new layers of laws. The committee’s recommendations need the approval of the legislature.

Judge Frederick D. Pepple of Auglaize County Common Pleas Court, chairman of the committee, said he’s pleased with the overall report. “These improvements make the system better and could save hundreds of millions of dollars. When I stand back and look at it, without getting into every nitty-gritty detail, I’m satisfied.”

Pepple said the rewrite cut down the length of the code by nearly 25 percent, mostly by condensing language. More important, Pepple said the changes would “significantly improve the quality of justice and better protect the people of Ohio ... We tried to make it readable and understandable so people know what is against the law.”

Franklin County Prosecutor Ron O’Brien was one of two committee members, along with Clark County Prosecutor Andy Wilson, to vote against the package. O’Brien said that while he agreed with most of the recommendations, several were deal breakers, including the prison-release provision, which he said would be like “Bastille Day every day.” O’Brien said he disagreed with granting “unilateral authority to reduce prison population.”

The provision would be triggered when the total prison population exceeds 43,500 men and 3,500 women for at least 30 days in a row. At that point, the director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction would “direct the parole board to select from those who are eligible for overcrowding parole release a sufficient number of prisoners to be released within thirty days to maintain the inmate population at less than 43,500 for males and 3,500 for females. No more than five hundred male inmates and five hundred female inmates may be released per month pursuant to this section.” The board would select inmates for release “who present the least threat to the public, including the victims and their families,” and those who have committed nonviolent and non-sex-oriented crimes.

In a statement to The Dispatch, Gary Mohr, director of the Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, said he voted for (but did not propose) the overcrowding release provision. However, he said he prefers a method built into the current state-budget proposal to divert nonviolent drug offenders to community treatment “to avoid the potentially lifelong collateral consequences of coming to prison.”...

Ohio Senate President Larry Obhof, R-Medina, praised the committee. “How this group of experts from varying political viewpoints worked together over the last two years speaks volumes about their commitment to pursuing reforms within Ohio’s criminal-justice system.” Holly Harris, executive director of the U.S. Justice Action Network, said that if the rewrite of criminal laws is adopted, “Ohio is ready to take another leap forward on reforming their justice system.”

June 26, 2017 in Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (5)

House Oversight Committee schedules hearing this week on "Criminal Justice Reform and Efforts Reduce Recidivism"

Via a Twitter reference, I just saw that the Full House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has now scheduled a hearing under the title "Criminal Justice Reform and Efforts Reduce Recidivism."  Other than this official calendar notice, I know nothing about this event or whether it suggests anything significant for any congressional criminal justice reform efforts.  But even without yet knowing more about what is leading to this House hearing, the very fact of a hearing with this "pro-reform" title provides some encouraging news for anyone concerned that Congress was not even going to keep discussing possible criminal justice reforms.

June 26, 2017 in Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (0)

Narrow ruling on Bivens case and rearguments now coming on two notable others

The Supreme Court's action on litigation involving the President's travel ban and a ruling for a church are certain to dominate headlines and SCOTUS analysis for the days to come.  But sentencing fans will not want to entirely overlook some lower-profile developments that also unfolded at SCOTUS this morning on three cases with criminal justice components.  In order to cover a lot of ground quickly, I will borrow language from Crime & Consequences and SCOTUSblog concerning what the cases concerned and what SCOTUS did:

The three cases:  Jennings v. Rodriguez (involving bond hearings for aliens detained pending deportation); Sessions v. Dimaya (concerning whether provisions governing an alien's removal from the United States, is unconstitutionally vague based on Johnson); Hernandez v. Mesa (civil case arising out of a shooting by a border patrol agent across the southern border) .

Today's action per SCOTUSblog: "Ordered reargument in cases involving immigrants' bond hearings and the vagueness of crime of violence in the immigration laws, and remanded for reconsideration of a cross-border shooting in light of an earlier decision."

This USA Today piece, headlined "Supreme Court punts on cross-border shooting, two immigration cases," provides more particulars and context.

June 26, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (1)

SCOTUS rules IAC of appellate counsel in state postconviction proceedings does not excuse procedural default

Resolving a technical and important issue, the US Supreme Court this morning in Davila v. Davis, No. 16-6219 (S. Ct. June 26, 2017) (available here), refused to extend some inmate-friendly habeas jurisprudence. The opinion for the Court in the 5-4 ruling was authored by Justice Thomas and it begins this way:

Federal habeas courts reviewing convictions from state courts will not consider claims that a state court refused to hear based on an adequate and independent state procedural ground.  A state prisoner may be able to overcome this bar, however, if he can establish “cause” to excuse the procedural default and demonstrate that he suffered actual prejudice from the alleged error.  An attorney error does not qualify as “cause” to excuse a procedural default unless the error amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. Because a prisoner does not have a constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, ineffective assistance in those proceedings does not qualify as cause to excuse a procedural default. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U. S. 722 (1991).

In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S. 413 (2013), this Court announced a narrow exception to Coleman’s general rule.  That exception treats ineffective assistance by a prisoner’s state postconviction counsel as cause to overcome the default of a single claim — ineffective assistance of trial counsel — in a single context — where the State effectively requires a defendant to bring that claim in state postconviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal. The question in this case is whether we should extend that exception to allow federal courts to consider a different kind of defaulted claim — ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. We decline to do so.

The dissent authored by Justice Breyer and joined by the other more liberal justces begins this way:

As the Court explains, normally a federal habeas court cannot hear a state prisoner’s claim that his trial lawyer was, constitutionally speaking, “ineffective” if the prisoner failed to assert that claim in state court at the appropriate time, that is, if he procedurally defaulted the claim.  See ante, at 1 (the prisoner’s failure to raise his federal claim at the initial-review state collateral proceeding amounts to an “adequate and independent state procedural ground” for denying habeas relief).

But there are equitable exceptions. In Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U. S. 1 (2012), and later in Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U. S. 413 (2013), we held that, despite the presence of a procedural default, a federal court can nonetheless hear a prisoner’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective, where (1) the framework of state procedural law “makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,” id., at 429; (2) in the state “‘initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective,’” ibid. (quoting Martinez, 566 U. S., at 17); and (3) “the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit,” id., at 14.

In my view, this same exception (with the same qualifications) should apply when a prisoner raises a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. See, e.g., Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U. S. 387, 396 (1985) (Constitution guarantees a defendant an effective appellate counsel, just as it guarantees a defendant an effective trial counsel).

June 26, 2017 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences? | Permalink | Comments (6)