More reasons Smylie made me smile

There is a lot to say about yesterday's Blakely work by Indiana Supreme Court in its Smylie decision (basics here).  Thanks to The Indiana Law Blog's coverage here, I can link to press stories about Smylie from the Indianapolis Star and the AP.  In addition, Michael Ausbrook at INCourts has interesting posts covering Smylie here and here .

Though Smylie is of particular concern for Indiana lawyers, this comment spotlights that it could be a very significant precedent for other state courts working through a range of Blakely issues.  Though I will need subsequent posts to discuss the intriguing jurisprudential aspects of Smylie, I wanted first to spotlight the two amusingly snarky comments in the Smylie court's discussion of the Supreme Court's work in Blakely:

1. Early on in describing Blakely, the Smylie court states: "While many who read Apprendi deduced that 'statutory maximum' meant 'statutory maximum,' the Blakely majority chose to define it as 'the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.'"

2. After fully explaining Blakely, the Smylie court states: "Whether [Blakely] represents sound jurisprudence or policy is of no moment for us under the Supremacy Clause, and we cannot see any grounds for sustaining Indiana's sentencing scheme given the Blakely holding."