What is exactly the Blakely remedy in Ohio?

Upon a quick read, I was impressed with many parts of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision today in Foster, the state's big Blakely case (basics here), and not only because this blog got a nice plug in footnote 3 (details here).  Portions of the opinion were thoughtful, especially when the Court surveys the basics of Ohio law and the national post-Blakely landscape in the states.

However, when the Blakely rubber hits the Ohio sentencing road, Foster becomes far less appealing.  Some reasons for concern about Foster are already effectively detailed by commentors here, and for me the big head-scratcher is the exact remedy adopted by the Ohio Supreme Court.  Though it is clear that Foster did not adopt or endorse a remedy incorporating jury findings into Ohio's sentencing scheme, it is not at all clear exactly what remedy Foster did adopt or endorse.

The key remedy discussion of the Foster opinion, starting at page 36, carries the heading "Applying the Booker remedy."  However, the discussion that follows does not state or even suggest that the previously mandatory findings required by Ohio law are now advisory.  Likewise, the Foster opinion does not embrace or even suggest that appellate review for reasonableness (or for anything else) is now a component of Ohio's sentencing system.

A little more guidance emerges from the companion decision Mathis, and especially through this final paragraph:

Although after Foster, the trial court is no longer compelled to make findings and give reasons at the sentencing hearing since R.C. 2929.19(B)(2) has been excised, nevertheless, in exercising its discretion the court must carefully consider the statutes that apply to every felony case.  Those include R.C. 2929.11, which specifies the purposes of sentencing, and R.C. 2929.12, which provides guidance in considering factors relating to the seriousness of the offense and recidivism of the offender.  In addition, the sentencing court must be guided by statutes that are specific to the case itself.

I read this opaque paragraph as suggesting the mandates of Ohio's statutory sentencing system remains important now as an advisory system, although other parts of Mathis raise doubts about whether the Ohio sentencing system preserves any serious role for appellate review.