Practitioner's Notes: Federal Sentencing Guideline Analysis Has No Place in State Court

It seems obvious, at least to me, that the federal sentencing guidelines do not apply in state courts.  Indeed, there is an intermediate appellate decision in New York in which this “issue” was addressed by the court.  The Appellate Division, First Department, in People v. Sung Min, 249 A.D.2d 130, 671 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1st Dept. 1998), explains:  “While there exist United States Sentencing Guidelines established by the United States Sentencing Commission, pursuant to 28 USC § 994, they apply exclusively to Federal Courts.  There are no sentencing guidelines for New York State Courts.”

Apparently, however, it is less obvious to others, as intrepid state and local prosecutors are trying to impose the federal sentencing guidelines on state court criminal sentencings by suggesting that they are “informative.”  This very tactic was recently tried by the New York Attorney General’s Office in a state criminal action in which the defendants were charged with a violation of the Donnelly Act, New York’s antitrust statute.  It was argued that because Donnelly Act jurisprudence is based largely upon federal antitrust cases, consideration of the sentences that would have been imposed had these changes been brought federally would be meaningful to the state court.  Fortunately, the sentencing court held that it was not.

Introducing the federal sentencing guidelines into the New York state system would be an unmitigated disaster.  The federal sentencing guidelines generally provide for sentences that are substantially harsher than most state sentences for equivalent conduct.  And with good reason, not the least of which being there are far fewer federal cases.  Because the federal criminal justice system has the luxury of bringing far fewer cases, it can devote more resources to each one.  State systems, particularly states like New York, have to move many, many cases, and do so quickly.  If state prosecutors made a “federal case” out of every state crime for which there were an equivalent federal crime, many already overburdened state systems would collapse under the weight.  The prisons couldn’t handle all of the prisoners with such longer sentences.  Nor could the prosecutors or the courts, as a system with more severe sentences and less flexibility in plea negotiations would likely create many more trials, and longer pretrial processes.  Thus, as much as hyper-aggressive state prosecutors would love to take advantage of the draconian federal sentencing guidelines, doing so is a mistake.

Besides, I’ve never liked the guidelines.  My learned colleagues have argued that the guidelines promote uniformity and proportionality, but I’ve always been of the view that they prevent judges from recognizing each crime’s differences and each individual defendant’s unique circumstances.  I’ve always thought that if you were concerned that judges weren’t being fair and uniform, the solution was to get better judges and to train them better, not handcuff them with complicated rules that try to reduce complex human issues into black and white mathematical formulas.  Although some of these concerns may have been alleviated, in part, by the Booker decision, the guidelines remain an important part of the federal sentencing process.  However, regardless of whether the federal sentencing guidelines assist in the exercise of good judgment or impinge upon it, let that debate stay in federal court.

Richard Spinogatti

Proskauer Rose