Wisconsin Supreme Court upholds sentence despite judge's reference to defendant's "baby mama"

As noted in this post from January 2009, an intermediate Wisconsin court had ordered a new sentencing hearing for a drug defendant because the sentencing judge referred to the man's "baby mama" and asked him where "you guys" find women to support them while they stay home. Now, as reported in this AP story, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has reversed this reversal.  Here is how the main opinion in Wisconsin v. Harris, 2010 WI 79 (July 14, 2010) (available here), gets started:

Following his conviction and sentencing for drug-related crimes, Landray M. Harris moved for relief from his sentence on the grounds that the court made inappropriate comments reflecting racial and gender stereotypes during the sentencing hearing.  The circuit court denied the motion, and in an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals reversed and held that the defendant was entitled to resentencing.

This case concerns the proper legal principles that govern review of a sentence when a defendant claims the circuit court imposed its sentence on the basis of race or gender.  The court of appeals adopted, and Harris endorses, a new "reasonable observer" test which queries whether the circuit court's comments suggest to a reasonable observer that the court improperly relied on race or gender when imposing its sentence. The State maintains that a reasonable observer's perception of the court's comments is not indicative of whether the court improperly relied on race or gender.

We agree with the State and reject the reasonable observer test created by the court of appeals. Sentencing decisions are afforded a presumption of reasonability consistent with Wisconsin's strong public policy against interference with a circuit court's discretion.  Our review of sentencing decisions is therefore limited to determining whether the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion. Discretion is erroneously exercised when a sentencing court actually relies on clearly irrelevant or improper factors, and the defendant bears the burden of proving such reliance by clear and convincing evidence. It is beyond dispute that race and gender are improper factors; they may not be relied upon — at all — in the imposition of a sentence.

After reviewing the sentencing transcript in context and as a whole, we conclude that Harris has not met his burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually relied on race or gender.  The circuit court considered the proper factors — it evaluated the gravity of the offense, Harris's character, and the public's need for protection.  The circuit court thoroughly explained its reasons for the sentence it imposed, and all of the potentially offensive comments flagged by both Harris and the court of appeals bear a reasonable nexus to proper sentencing factors.  Because Harris has not shown that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals.

In not-quite-releated news via the always hard-hitting US Magazine, Levi Johnson is now engaged again to his baby's mama (or perhaps Briston Palin should be called a baby mama grizzly, or the baby mama baby of a mama grizzly).