A habeas example of man bites dog: New York loses habeas appeal based on procedural default

Frequently, state prisoners seeking relief in federal courts through habeas petitions fail even to get their potentially valid substantive claims heard because of some procedural default in prior efforts to challenge their conviction.  Today, in Stevens v. Miller, No. 11-5343 (2d Cir. Apr. 10, 2012) (available here), the procedural shoes ends up on the other foot.  The legal backstory for this ruling is complicated (and includes Apprendi jurisprudence), but this paragraph from the start of the discussion highlights the basics:  

The State claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying its Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The State’s primary argument on appeal is that the district court should 5 have granted its motion because Portalatin constituted a supervening change in governing law that called into question the correctness of the district court’s judgment [which granted habeas relief to the defendant].  It also points to other circumstances it believes make this case “extraordinary.”  The State asserts, among other things, that it had no reason to suspect that the district court would issue a ruling when it did, that the Clerk’s Office failed to provide the State notice of judgment, that Stevens’s counsel “misled” the district court, and that “comity concerns” counsel in favor of granting the State’s motion.  We find that, even when viewed in the light most charitable to the State, the State’s motion is nothing more 17 than one premised on its own mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and neglect –- in other words, an untimely Rule 60(b)(1) motion masquerading as a Rule 60(b)(6) motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the State its requested relief.