The challenge of modern federal sentencing: "there are 15 distinct factors in 3553(a)"

The line in quotes in the title of this post is a phrase that was uttered yesterday by Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein during Supreme Court oral argument in Chavez-Meza v. United States. (The full argument transcript is available at this link.)  Based on my review of the transcript, I think DAG Rosenstein did himself proud before SCOTUS, and I am especially proud of his accounting of the many factors in 18 USC � 3553(a).

Specifically, I am keen on this accounting of the 3553(a) factors because I have long preached that there are four distinct sentence factors packaged in 18 USC � 3553(a)(1), which calls upon courts to consider "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant."  Often when talking to students about a sentencing problem I give, I stress that plain text of � 3553(a)(1) indicates Congress wants judges to consider distinctly an offense's nature (drugs or fraud) as well as its circumstances (lengthy or limited); to consider distinctly a defendant's history (abused or educated) as well as his characteristics (remorseful or brazen).  I think DAG Rosenstein's statement that "there are 15 distinct factors in 3553(a)" is built upon counting � 3553(a)(1) as itself having four factors.

Moving beyond my own quirky affinity for � 3553(a)(1), I wonder if readers can readily think of any other area of federal law that calls upon judges to consider "15 distinct factors" as part of their decision-making.  I do realize that many capital sentencing statutes call upon juries and/or judges to balance or weigh even more factors that appear in 18 USC � 3553(a).  But I would be especially eager to hear from folks about other areas of law that but a comparable factor burden on federal judges.