Supreme Court delivers split decision for federal defendants in sentence modification cases of Hughes and Koons

Though the Supreme Court's ruling today about wedding cakes is sure to be what is most remembered from the first set of June 2018 opinions, the Court gave sentencing fans a lot to review with opinions in Hughes v. United States and Koons v. United States.  The opinion in Hughes v. United States, No. 17–155 (S. Ct. June 4, 2018) (available here), will be a disappointment to some SCOTUS-watchers because the Court avoided addressing the Marks rule concerning fractured opinions.  But Hughes will not be a disappointment those sentencing fans who will be excited to see that Justice Gorsuch joined a majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy in favor of a broad interpretation of who is eligible for sentence modification under retroactive guideline reductions. The opinion in Koons v. United States, No. 17- 5716 (S. Ct. June 4, 2018) (available here), was a unanimous opinoin authored by Justice Alito, which informed readers likely know means it federal prosecutors prevailed.

Here are some key sentences from the Hughes majority:

To resolve the uncertainty that resulted from this Court’s Opinion of the Court divided decision in Freeman, the Court now holds that a sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement....

This interpretation furthers §3582(c)(2)’s purpose, as well as the broader purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act.  “The Act aims to create a comprehensive sentencing scheme in which those who commit crimes of similar severity under similar conditions receive similar sentences.” Freeman, 564 U.S., at 533. “Section 3582(c)(2) contributes to that goal by ensuring that district courts may adjust sentences imposed pursuant to a range that the Commission concludes [is] too severe, out of step with the seriousness of the crime and the sentencing ranges of analogous offenses, and inconsistent with the Act’s purposes.” Ibid.  And there is no reason a defendant’s eligibility for relief should turn on the form of his plea agreement.

Here is the start of the unanimous (and very short) Koons opinion:

Under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2), a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction if he was initially sentenced “based on a sentencing range” that was later lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission.  The five petitioners in today’s case claim to be eligible under this provision.  They were convicted of drug offenses that carried statutory mandatory minimum sentences, but they received sentences below these mandatory minimums, as another statute allows, because they substantially assisted the Government in prosecuting other drug offenders.  We hold that petitioners’ sentences were “based on” their mandatory minimums and on their substantial assistance to the Government, not on sentencing ranges that the Commission later lowered. Petitioners are therefore ineligible for §3582(c)(2) sentence reductions.