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January 5, 2019

"Efficient Institutions and Effective Deterrence: On Timing and Uncertainty of Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this paper recently posted to SSRN authored by Johannes Buckenmaier, Eugen Dimant, Ann-Christin Posten and Ulrich Schmidt. Here is its abstract:

This paper presents the first controlled economic experiment to study celerity, i.e. the effectiveness of swiftness of punishment in reducing illicit behavior.  We consider two dimensions: timing of punishment and timing of the resolution of uncertainty regarding the punishment.  We find a surprising u-shaped relation between deterrence and the delays of punishment and uncertainty resolution.  Institutions that either reveal detection and impose punishment immediately or maintain uncertainty about the state of detection and impose punishment sufficiently late are equally effective at deterring illicit behavior.  Our results yield strong implications for the design of institutional policies to mitigate misconduct and reduce recidivism.

January 5, 2019 at 03:05 PM | Permalink

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