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January 8, 2019

Florida Supreme Court confirms Sixth Amendment rights still of sentencing consequence

Though decided a few weeks ago, I just recently saw the notable Florida Supreme Court ruling in Brown v. Florida, No. SC18-323 (Fla. Dec. 20, 2018) (available here). Here is how it begins:

We review the Fifth District Court of Appeal’s decision in Brown v. State, 233 So. 3d 1262 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017). In Brown, the Fifth District expressly declared valid section 775.082(10), Florida Statutes (2015), which requires that a qualifying offender whose sentencing scoresheet totals 22 points or fewer be sentenced to a nonstate prison sanction unless the trial court makes written findings that a nonstate prison sanction could present a danger to the public. We have jurisdiction.  See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. As explained below, because subsection (10) requires the court, not the jury, to find the fact of dangerousness to the public that is necessary to increase the statutory maximum nonstate prison sanction, we hold that subsection (10) violates the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and quash the Fifth District’s decision.

And here is a key part of the court's analysis:

We agree with Brown that subsection (10) unambiguously sets the statutory maximum penalty, for Apprendi purposes as defined by Blakely, as “a nonstate prison sanction,” § 775.082(10), Fla. Stat., for her and similarly situated offenders. This is because, absent a factual finding of “dangerousness to the public” — a finding not reflected in the jury’s verdict on the theft charge — the statute plainly states that “the court must sentence the offender to a nonstate prison sanction,” id. (emphasis added), given the crime charged and Brown’s criminal history as reflected on her criminal punishment code scoresheet.  Although it would have been possible for the Legislature to have written this statute as a “mitigation statute,” giving the court discretion to impose up to five years unless the defendant proved non-dangerousness, the Legislature did not do so. We read statutes as they are written.

Accordingly, we hold that subsection (10) violates the Sixth Amendment in light of Apprendi and Blakely based on its plain language requiring the court, not the jury, to find the fact of dangerousness to the public necessary to increase the statutory maximum nonstate prison sanction.

January 8, 2019 at 11:34 PM | Permalink

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