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June 3, 2019

Splitting 5-4 in a distinctive way, SCOTUS rules against defendant seeking to avoid tolling of supervised-release term

The Supreme Court handed down four opinions this morning, but only one came in a criminal case and the opinion was not in one of the cases that so many criminal justice court-watchers are eagerly waiting for (like Gundy or Gamble or Haymond).  But the ruling this morning in Mont v. US , No. 17-8995 (S. Ct. June 3, 2019) (available here), on a technical issue of when federal supervised release terms run, should capture the attention of SCOTUS watchers because of the distinctive (and I think unprecedented) line-up of the votes in this 5-4 split opinion: 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, ALITO, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. SOTOMAYOR, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, KAGAN, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined.

The ruling of the Court begins and ends this way:

This case requires the Court to decide whether a convicted criminal’s period of supervised release is tolled — in effect, paused — during his pretrial detention for a new criminal offense. Specifically, the question is whether that pretrial detention qualifies as “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction for a Federal, State, or local crime.” 18 U. S. C. §3624(e). Given the text and statutory context of §3624(e),we conclude that if the court’s later imposed sentence credits the period of pretrial detention as time served for the new offense, then the pretrial detention also tolls the supervised-release period.....

In light of the statutory text and context of §3624(e), pretrial detention qualifies as “imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction” if a later imposed sentence credits that detention as time served for the new offense.  Such pretrial detention tolls the supervised-release period, even though the District Court may need to make the tolling determination after the conviction.  Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Sixth Circuit.

The dissent begins this way:

A term of supervised release is tolled when an offender “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction.” 18 U. S. C. §3624(e).  The question before the Court is whether pretrial detention later credited as time served for a new offense has this tolling effect.  The Court concludes that it does, but it reaches that result by adopting a backwardlooking approach at odds with the statute’s language and by reading the terms “imprisoned” and “in connection with” in unnatural isolation.  Because I cannot agree that a person “is imprisoned in connection with a conviction” before any conviction has occurred, I respectfully dissent.

Though I will need to read the opinion closely to see whether there are some possible broader implications of this ruling, but this case shows yet again that Justice Gorsuch is much more inclined to vote in favor of criminal defendants (in non-capital cases) than other GOP appointees. And here we have Justice Ginsburg proving to be the swing voter delivering a loss to a criminal defendant.

June 3, 2019 at 10:30 AM | Permalink

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