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March 22, 2019

California Gov Newsom, on heels of execution moratorium order, now talking up halt to any capital prosecutions

This Los Angeles Times piece, headlined "Gov. Newsom may prohibit new death sentences, setting up possible conflict with Becerra," it appears that the Governor of California may not be content with just delaying all possible executions during his time in office.  Here are some details:

A week after issuing an executive order imposing a blanket moratorium on the execution of California death row inmates, Gov. Gavin Newsom said he is considering a plan to prohibit any new death sentences in local criminal cases.

Newsom’s pronouncement could create conflict with another top Democratic leader, state Atty. Gen. Xavier Becerra, who has supported capital punishment, even though the governor said he wants to work collaboratively with the attorney general.

Newsom reiterated his desire to abolish the death penalty and said he hopes to work with Becerra and others to determine whether, as governor, he can act “on behalf of the people in this state to no longer prosecute death.”

“There is a protocol of death and an administration of death in the state of California, and it consumes the court’s time, it consumes the criminal justice system, it exhausts the soul and the pocketbook,” Newsom said during a conference call with reporters from ethnic news outlets Tuesday. “I would ultimately like to shut down that system of death.”

Though it is not entirely clear how Newsom would carry out such an order, he could either have Becerra direct local district attorneys not to seek the death penalty or order Becerra to not defend appeals. Both approaches would probably face legal challenges....

Asked whether the attorney general will stop defending death sentences on appeal or direct county prosecutors to stop seeking death sentences, a Becerra spokeswoman said he is reviewing what role his office will play.  “The Department of Justice will work with Governor Newsom and his team as he implements his executive order and will continue to hold criminals accountable,” spokeswoman Bethany Lesser said.

After the Times published this story, Becerra requested an opportunity to clarify his position on the death penalty. In a telephone interview Thursday, he declined to answer if he supported or opposed capital punishment. He said only that, as attorney general, it was his duty to enforce the laws in California, the death penalty among them.  “Where I stand personally on it, I have real reservations about the death penalty. I think there is ample proof that it has not worked the way we would want when it comes to undertaking the most severe form of punishment that’s not reversible,” Becerra said....

The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in San Francisco on Monday asked the attorney general’s Department of Justice to indicate whether the governor’s moratorium will affect a death penalty case involving Martin Kipp, who was convicted in the 1983 slaying of Antaya Yvette Howard of Huntington Beach, a former basketball star at Marina High School.  “The Office of the Attorney General is in the process of determining the full effect of the Executive Order on death penalty cases,” the state Department of Justice told the court in a letter.

Even if Becerra disagrees with Newsom, he might not have a choice if the governor decides to force the issue. Because the California Constitution gives the governor “supreme executive power” over the executive branch, Newsom could order Becerra to take action that could suspend all death penalty prosecutions across the state. “In California’s executive branch, the governor has the final word,” said David A. Carrillo, executive director of the California Constitution Center at Berkeley Law.

In 1981, the California Supreme Court ruled that the governor’s constitutional powers give him direct authority over the attorney general. “The constitutional pattern is crystal clear: if a conflict between the Governor and the Attorney General develops over the faithful execution of the laws of this state, the Governor retains the ‘supreme executive power’ to determine the public interest,” the court decision stated....

The constitution also states that the attorney general, as the state’s chief law enforcement officer, has direct supervision over every county district attorney “in all matters pertaining to the duties of their respective offices” — opening up the possibility that he could order locally elected prosecutors to cease seeking the death penalty in murder trials.

Any attempt by the attorney general to dictate how a county district attorney can handle murder prosecutions would almost assuredly be unconstitutional and challenged in court, said Assemblyman Jordan Cunningham (R-Templeton), a former deputy district attorney. District attorneys serve independent of the attorney general, he said. “There’s a lot of D.A.s who I have spoken to, who I know, who aren’t happy with the moratorium that we have now,” Cunningham said. “We don’t live in a system where one person gets elected governor and they get to do what they want by executive fiat.”

Prior related post:

March 22, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Philly DA looking to curtail duration of probation and parole

Many years ago, I heard an academic a lot smarter than me say that the US would never make a serious dent in mass incarceration if and while we still had an even more massive number of persons subject to criminal justice supervision. He suggested that it was unavoidable that some percentage subject to community supervision would end up going back to prison, and so to reduce incarceration levels we had to also reduce supervision levels.

This story is salient this morning because of this notable new press report from Philadelphia headlined "Philly DA Larry Krasner: We took on mass incarceration. Now we’re addressing mass supervision." Here are the basics (with this from the original):

Over his first year in office, Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner rolled out a series of internal policies described as “an effort to end mass incarceration": seeking shorter sentences, diverting low-level offenses from the justice system, and charging crimes at a lower level. 

Now, he’s looking to the next step. “One of our big priorities this year," he said, "is to try to address mass supervision — which, of course, would be both probation and parole.”

Philadelphia counted 42,000 people on county supervision at the end of 2017, or one in 22 adults. Statewide, Pennsylvanians are under correctional control at the second-highest rate in the nation, behind Georgia, and has the highest rate of parolees.

“I think people instinctively believed too much supervision is not enough. But it turns out too much supervision is too much. ... It does tremendous harm, and it costs a fortune,” Krasner said in an interview outlining policies to be announced Thursday. Nationally, about 40 percent of people on probation are reincarcerated, making community supervision a major driver of incarceration. About 40 percent of Philadelphia’s jail population is being held on a detainer for a violation of probation or parole.

His plan? To put his office’s weight behind a push to drastically curtail terms of supervision, which can stretch on for years or even decades, long after prison and jail sentences have been concluded.

Under the new policy, on top of any sentence of incarceration for a felony, assistant district attorneys will seek community supervision terms averaging 18 months, with a ceiling of three years. For misdemeanors, they’ll seek probation or parole terms around six months, not to exceed one year of combined community supervision.

March 22, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

March 21, 2019

"Reduce prison populations by reducing life sentences"

The title of this post is the title of this new Washington Post piece authored by Daniel Nagin.  Here are excerpts:

The imprisonment rate in the United States is now five times larger than it was in the early 1970s, and most of that increase happened at the state level.  Marc Mauer and Ashley Nellis of the Sentencing Project have made a bold recommendation for unraveling mass incarceration — abolition of life sentences.  Most lifers are in state prisons.

Research demonstrates that increases in already long prison sentences, say from 20 years to life, do not have material deterrent effects on crime.  There is no good reason for believing that life sentences are a better deterrent than the Mauer-Nellis recommendation of a maximum sentence of 20 years.

The political and social causes for mass incarceration are complex, but the mechanism is easily described — the system sends more people to prison for longer periods of time. One unintended consequence of this is that our prisons have become old-age homes.  Between 1993 and 2016, the percentage of U.S. prisoners ages 50 or older grew from 5 percent to 20 percent, and the number of those ages 40 years or older more than doubled, from 17.9 percent to 40.4 percent.

From a public safety perspective, this makes no sense.  Decades of research by criminologists demonstrate that nature’s best cure for crime is aging — crime is a young man’s game.  The principal driver of the graying prison population is the growing proportion of lifers, mostly in state prison systems.  One in 7 U.S. prisoners is now serving life or a virtual life sentence, a total of more than 200,000 people.  In 1984, there were only about 34,000 lifers....

The Mauer and Nellis proposal for complete abolition of life sentences is probably a bridge too far for our elected state legislators and governors.  But more moderate changes, such as reducing the use of life sentences and increasing the possibility of eventual parole for those serving life, could have a significant effect without jeopardizing public safety.

March 21, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (3)

Might the US Sentencing Commission provide some real-time updates on the implementation of the FIRST STEP Act?

The question in the title of this post first came to mind when I first came across this local article a couple weeks ago reporting that "so far, 14 Rhode Islanders convicted under stiff mandatory-sentencing laws have gained early release under the newly enacted federal law called the First Step Act."  More recently, I saw this extended piece from the Indiana Lawyer with this interesting data report:

Already in the Southern District of Indiana, some 15 offenders have been released from federal prison pursuant to the First Step Act, and another 15 to 20 releases are expected soon.  Though Northern District judges have not yet reduced any sentences under the act, federal defender Jerry Flynn expects reductions and releases to begin in his district soon.

These reports of prison releases from Indiana and Rhode Island appear to be a function of the initial implementation of Section 404 of the FIRST STEP Act, the retroactive application of Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 which lowered crack mandatory minimums.  And these reports have me already wondering about (1) which districts may (or may not) be doing a particularly good job implementing the latest round of crack retroactivity, and (2) whether most defendants now benefiting from crack retoractivity are securing immediate release from prison or are just getting long sentences reduced a bit.

To its credit, the US Sentencing Commission has a long and impressive track record of keeping track of guideline retroactivity and producing lots of good data and analysis of who benefits from retroactivity.  So I am pretty confident the USSC will eventually produce good data on how this crack retroactivity part of the FIRST STEP Act gets implemented.  But, of course, there are many more part of the new Act that may (or may not) be getting implemented effectively right now, and I am less confident that the USSC is tracking or planning to report on developments in these other areas.

To again credit important and helpful work already done by the USSC, the Commission has published an Overview & FAQs (updated Feb. 15, 2019) and a Prison & Sentencing Impact Analysis (published Jan. 18, 2019) on the FIRST STEP Act.  But these documents do not even discuss some facets of the Act that concern matters related to sentencing and the work of federal judges.  I am thinking particularly about sentence modification under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(C)(1)(A) (often called compassionate release).  As noted in this prior post, the FIRST STEP Act now provides that an inmate can bring a request to "modify a term of imprisonment" directly to a sentencing court (rather than needing a motion by the Bureau of Prison) based on the claim that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction."  As noted in this prior post, the press is reporting on some sentence modification motions are being granted.

I think it would be a great service to the federal criminal justice community if the US Sentencing Commission would give focused attention to reporting on FIRST STEP Act implementation.  Indeed, because the USSC has only two active commissioners and seems unlikely to have any more anytime soon, the Commission cannot formally do much more these days than produce research and data.  Today happens to make the three-month anniversary of the FIRST STEP Act being signed in to law, and I think data always makes a great anniversary present.

March 21, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Death by Numbers: Why Evolving Standards Compel Extending Roper’s Categorical Ban Against Executing Juveniles From 18 to 21"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by John Blume, Hannah Freedman, Lindsey Vann and Amelia Hritz.  Here is its abstract:

Nearly fifteen years ago, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of people who were under 18 at the time of their offenses. The Court justified the line it drew based on legislative enactments, jury verdicts, and neuroscience.  In the intervening years, however, much has changed in juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, the legal treatment of young people, and neuroscience.  These changes beg the question: Why 18?  Is the bright-line rule that the Court announced in Roper still constitutionally valid or do the changes since 2005 now point to a new cutoff at 21?

To answer those questions, this Article considers post-Roper developments in the relevant domains to make the case that the 18-year-old constitutional line should be extended to age 21.  It does so by applying the Supreme Court’s evolving-standards-of-decency methodology.  Specifically, the Article examines all death sentences and executions imposed in the United States post-Roper and looks at the current state of neuroscientific research that the Court found compelling when it decided Roper.

Two predominant trends emerge.  First, there is a national consensus against executing people under 21.  This consensus comports with what new developments in neuroscience have made clear: people under 21 have brains that look and behave like the brains of younger teenagers, not like adult brains.  Second, young people of color are disproportionately sentenced to die — even more so than adult capital defendants.  The role of race is amplified when the victim is white.  These trends confirm that the logic that compelled the Court to ban executions of people under 18 extends to people under 21.

March 21, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (5)

March 20, 2019

Post-Johnson litigation creates intricate procedural debates in Eleventh Circuit

Thanks to this post at How Appealing, I just saw that the Eleventh Circuit yesterday needed just one sentence to deny rehearing en banc in US v. St. Hubert, a case concerning vagueness challenges to two federal firearm convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  But judges of the court had a lot to say thanks to the enduring constitutional and procedural mess created by the Johnson case and its progeny and their potential impact on federal prisoners serving all sorts of lengthy mandatory minimum sentences. 

The six distinct opinions concurring and dissenting from the en banc denial, which collective run 88 pages, defy easy summary.  But if anyone thinks they are really, really, really interested in post-Johnson litigation and all its echoes and challenges (both substantively and procedurally), the Eleventh Circuit has provided an extra law-nerd slice of March Madness with St. Hubert.

March 20, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Rounding-up some news and commentary as SCOTUS hears argument on latest round of capital insanity

InsanityAlbert Einstein is generally credited with the aphorism that "the definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting different results." That quote came to mind as I was thinking about the Supreme Court's consideration this morning of a Batson claim in Flowers v. Mississippi. Here is a brief accounting of just some of the backstory of this case (with emphasis added) from this SCOTUSblog post when cert was granted:

[T]he justices will once again review the case of Curtis Flowers, who was sentenced to death for an infamous quadruple murder at a furniture store in Winona, Mississippi.  Flowers was tried six times.  During the first four trials, prosecutor Doug Evans was twice found to have violated the constitutional ban on racial discrimination in selecting jurors: He had struck all 10 of the potential African-American jurors, while he used all of his strikes to remove African Americans from the jury pool in the third and fourth trials.  Flowers’ fifth trial deadlocked, but at his sixth trial, Evans allowed the first African-American juror to be seated but then struck the remaining five African-American jurors. 

Reviewing my blog archives, I noticed that it was nine years ago(!) that I blogged here about a local article and asked "Will sixth time be the charm in capital trial(s) of Curtis Flowers?"

Here are a few up-to-date discussions of and commentary on the case as it now comes before the US Supreme Court on the issue of whether the Mississippi Supreme Court properly applied Batson v. Kentucky in this version of the case:

March 20, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

March 19, 2019

"Mass Incarceration: The Whole Pie 2019"

Pie2019The Prison Policy Initiative has today posted the latest, greatest version of its remarkable incarceration "pie" graphic and associated report on the particulars of who and how people are incarcerated in the United States.  The extraordinary pies produced by PPI impart more information in one image than just about any single resource I can think of.  Here is part of the report's introductory text and the concluding discussion on my favorite law-nerd version of pie day:

Can it really be true that most people in jail are being held before trial?  And how much of mass incarceration is a result of the war on drugs?  These questions are harder to answer than you might think, because our country’s systems of confinement are so fragmented.  The various government agencies involved in the justice system collect a lot of critical data, but it is not designed to help policymakers or the public understand what’s going on.  As public support for criminal justice reform continues to build, however, it’s more important than ever that we get the facts straight and understand the big picture.

This report offers some much needed clarity by piecing together this country’s disparate systems of confinement.  The American criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 109 federal prisons, 1,772 juvenile correctional facilities, 3,163 local jails, and 80 Indian Country jails as well as in military prisons, immigration detention facilities, civil commitment centers, state psychiatric hospitals, and prisons in the U.S. territories.  This report provides a detailed look at where and why people are locked up in the U.S., and dispels some modern myths to focus attention on the real drivers of mass incarceration.

This big-picture view allows us to focus on the most important drivers of mass incarceration and identify important, but often ignored, systems of confinement.  The detailed views bring these overlooked systems to light, from immigration detention to civil commitment and youth confinement.  In particular, local jails often receive short shrift in larger discussions about criminal justice, but they play a critical role as “incarceration’s front door” and have a far greater impact than the daily population suggests.

While this pie chart provides a comprehensive snapshot of our correctional system, the graphic does not capture the enormous churn in and out of our correctional facilities, nor the far larger universe of people whose lives are affected by the criminal justice system.  Every year, over 600,000 people enter prison gates, but people go to jail 10.6 million times each year.  Jail churn is particularly high because most people in jails have not been convicted.  Some have just been arrested and will make bail within hours or days, while many others are too poor to make bail and remain behind bars until their trial.  Only a small number (less than 150,000 on any given day) have been convicted, and are generally serving misdemeanors sentences under a year....

Now that we can see the big picture of how many people are locked up in the United States in the various types of facilities, we can see that something needs to change.  Looking at the big picture requires us to ask if it really makes sense to lock up 2.3 million people on any given day, giving this nation the dubious distinction of having the highest incarceration rate in the world.  Both policymakers and the public have the responsibility to carefully consider each individual slice in turn to ask whether legitimate social goals are served by putting each group behind bars, and whether any benefit really outweighs the social and fiscal costs.

Even narrow policy changes, like reforms to money bail, can meaningfully reduce our society’s use of incarceration.  At the same time, we should be wary of proposed reforms that seem promising but will have only minimal effect, because they simply transfer people from one slice of the correctional “pie” to another. Keeping the big picture in mind is critical if we hope to develop strategies that actually shrink the “whole pie.”

March 19, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

Important new empirical work on expungement realities in Michigan

Via this great new post at the Collateral Consequences Resource Center, I see that Sonja Starr and J.J. Prescott have this great new article titled "Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An Empirical Study."  Here is the article's abstract:

Laws permitting the expungement of criminal convictions are a key component of modern criminal justice reform efforts and have been the subject of a recent upsurge of legislative activity.  This debate has been almost entirely devoid of evidence about the laws’ effects, in part because the necessary data (such as sealed records themselves) have been unavailable.  We were able to obtain access to deidentified data that overcomes that problem, and we use it to carry out a comprehensive statewide study of expungement recipients and comparable non-recipients.

We offer three key sets of empirical findings.  First, among those legally eligible for expungement, just 6.5% obtain it within five years of eligibility.  Drawing on patterns in our data as well as interviews with expungement lawyers, we point to reasons for this serious “uptake gap.”  Second, those who do obtain expungement have extremely low subsequent crime rates, comparing favorably to the general population — a finding that defuses a common public-safety objection to expungement laws.  Third, those who obtain expungement experience a sharp upturn in their wage and employment trajectories; on average, within two years, wages go up by 25% versus the pre-expungement trajectory, an effect mostly driven by unemployed people finding jobs and very minimally employed people finding steadier or higher-paying work.

The CCRC posting about this article highlights that the good news in the form of positive outcomes for those who get records expunged are dimmed by the bad new of low rate of expungement. The CCRC posting goes on:

Finally, and perhaps most disturbingly, few of the people who are intended beneficiaries of Michigan’s expungement law actually obtain this relief, either because they don’t apply for it or because their applications for expungement are not approved.  The authors find six reasons that account for this “uptake gap” (which is greater for people with misdemeanors than felonies):

  • lack of information about the availability of relief;
  • administrative hassle and time constraints;
  • cost (including court filing fees, lost wages, and transportation costs);
  • distrust and fear of the criminal justice system;
  • lack of access to counsel; and
  • insufficient motivation to remove conviction.

In addition, while not a part of the “uptake gap” strictly speaking, the authors note that “every advocate that we spoke to also emphasized the stringency of the eligibility requirements, which in their view exclude a great many worthy candidates.” 

March 19, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Misdemeanor Appeals"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new empirical article authored by Nancy King and Michael Heise. Here is its abstract:

Misdemeanor cases affect far more people than felony cases, outnumbering felony cases by more than three to one.  Yet very little empirical information exists on many aspects of misdemeanor prosecutions.  This Article provides the first quantitative look at appellate review in misdemeanor cases, nationwide.  It uses data drawn from a random sample of direct criminal appeals decided by every state appellate court in the nation, unpublished aggregate data on misdemeanor trial court cases provided by the Court Statistics Project, and published state court statistics.

We provide the first estimate of the rate of appellate review for misdemeanors, concluding that appellate courts review no more than eight in 10,000 misdemeanor convictions, and disturb only one conviction or sentence out of every 10,000 misdemeanor judgments.  This level of oversight is much lower than that for felony cases, for reasons we explain.  To develop law and regulate error in misdemeanor cases, particularly in prosecutions for the lowest-level offenses, courts may need to provide mechanisms for judicial scrutiny outside the direct appeal process.

Additional findings include new information about the rate of felony trial court review of lower court misdemeanor cases, ratios of appeals to convictions for various misdemeanor-crime categories, detailed descriptive information about misdemeanor cases that reach state appellate courts, the results of a complete statistical analysis examining which features are significantly associated with a greater or lesser likelihood of success, including crime type, claim raised, judicial-selection method, and type of representation, and the first quantitative look at how misdemeanor appeals differ from felony appeals.

March 19, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offense Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

Federal judge pens extraordinary and compelling order requesting US Attorney to vacate old stacked 924(c) conviction in extraordinary and compelling case

I learned last night of a remarkable new four-page order entered in US v. Marks, No. 03-CR-6033 (WDNY March 14, 2019) (available for download below).  Chad Marks' case has been followed for years by clemency advocates like Amy Povah, and this CAN-DO profile page has lots of background materials about his case, his requests for clemency, and all the positive work he has done since being sentenced many years ago to 40 mandatory prison years due to extreme recidivist stacking § 924(c) firearm charges. 

As informed readers know, the FIRST STEP Act eliminated the provisions of federal law that had required multiple § 924(c) firearm mandatory-minimum sentences to be stacked to include recidivist 25-year terms.  But it did not make this change retroactively applicable to offenders like Mr. Marks' who were subject to its severe terms in prior years.  This new order by US District Judge David Larimer speaks to this reality, and here is part of what it has to say:

Although the First Step Act and the Guideline changes referenced in it benefit many, it does not appear that Marks would benefit directly because the changes to Section 924(c) do not appear to be retroactive. One option now is for those in the system to say to Mr. Marks, “too bad, the changes don’t apply to you and you must serve the lengthy remainder of your 40-year term, and perhaps die in jail.”

Chad Marks has now filed a pro se motion (Dkt. #491) requesting this Court, in part, to request the United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, James P. Kennedy, Jr., to consent to vacating one of Marks’ Section 924(c) convictions, which would, in effect, remove the draconian, mandatory 25-year consecutive sentence.

Admittedly, this is not a typical request. Marks makes this request, though, relying on several cases from other districts throughout the country where the U.S. Attorney did precisely what Marks seeks here. Marks relies principally on the case of U.S. v. Holloway, 68 F. Supp. 3d 310 (E.D.N.Y. 2014). That thoughtful opinion is annexed to Marks’ motion as Exhibit A. In the Holloway case, the defendant was convicted of three Section 924(c) violations for three separate car jackings over a two-day period. He received a mandatory sentence of 57 years. In Holloway, District Judge John Gleeson remarked that such a stacking sentence “would be laughable if only there weren’t real people on the receiving end of them.”

Prosecutors spend their days seeking convictions and appropriate sentences. What is sought here is different, but in his decision in Holloway, Judge Gleeson praised the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York for agreeing to vacate a prior conviction in that particular and unusual case. He noted that prosecutors can and should use their vast power to remedy injustices in an appropriate case.

So, what to do?  Does this defendant, Chad Marks, deserve this remedy? In my more than 30 years as a district court judge, I have never known a prisoner to do more to make changes in his life while incarcerated. Marks’ acts and accomplishments while incarcerated for the last decade are truly extraordinary. Marks has obtained a college degree, participated in about 100 rehabilitative programs, has received numerous awards and citations, is engaged as a GED teacher and has mentored other inmates. Marks has recounted many of these accomplishments in his motion (Dkt. #491, page 7). The record reflects extraordinary accomplishments.

Extraordinary cases require extraordinary care and sometimes extraordinary relief.  I urge all to review Judge Gleeson’s thoughtful decision in the Holloway case. The criminal “justice” system is about justice and fairness ultimately.  Chad Marks was convicted of serious crimes, but I believe that Marks is not a danger and is not now the person convicted of these charges in 2008, which involved a rather small-scale drug case.  All of Marks’ co-defendants have completed their sentences.

I request that the United States Attorney for the Western District of New York, James P. Kennedy, Jr., carefully consider exercising his discretion to agree to an order vacating one of Marks’ two Section 924(c) convictions.  This would eliminate the mandatory 25-year term that is now contrary to the present provisions of the statute. Congress has now recognized the injustice of “stacking.”

To facilitate that review, I request that Marks’ appointed counsel, Jillian S. Harrington, Esq. provide a filing listing in detail the many, many accomplishments, awards and other matters involving Marks while he has been incarcerated. In addition, counsel should list the scores of rehabilitative programs that Marks successfully completed.  Marks has described many of his accomplishments in his pending motion, but I leave it to counsel to provide a detailed supplement to assist the U.S. Attorney’s review as well as this Court’s.

Download 3-18-19 LARIMER ORDER

I am so very pleased to see this federal judge enter this formal order urging the US Attorney to vacate a charge in order to do justice in this extraordinary and compelling case.  However, I keep using the term "extraordinary and compelling" in this post because I do not think the federal judge here has to rely on the US Attorney to do justice in this case now that the FIRST STEP Act has changed the process around judicial consideration of sentence modifications under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(C)(1)(A).

As noted in this prior post, the FIRST STEP Act now provides that an inmate can bring a request to "modify a term of imprisonment" directly to a sentencing court (rather than needing a motion made by the Bureau of Prison) based on the claim that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." This is what gets described often as the "compassionate release" provision of federal law, and most generally assume that it is only applicable to sick and dying prisoners. But, ever the textualist, I am eager to highlight to everyone that Congress only formally requires a judge to find "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." As I read this new Marks order, I think Judge Larimer has already essentially made such a finding.

That all said, even though I think Judge Larimer has authority to do justice for Mr. Marks without awaiting action by the local US Attorney, I still think it strategically wise to see the prosecution's involvement in his effort to do justice. With the buy-in by the local prosecutor and vacating of a one of Mr. Marks' 924(c) convictions, there would likely be no appeal and likely no impediment to a Mr. Marks getting released in short order. If Judge Larimer were to act on his own using § 3582(C)(1)(A), however, the feds could possibly appeal and seek to block any early release.

March 19, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

March 18, 2019

Notable new materials on economic sanctions from The Hamilton Project

The Hamilton Project has assembled some notable new materials under the heading "The Economics of Bail, Fines, and Fees in the U.S. Criminal Justice System."  An event last week on this topic with multiple notable discussants is recorded here, and this one-pager reports on three papers with this introduction to the set:

Monetary sanctions have played a role in the U.S. criminal justice system since its founding, but the way these sanctions — bail, fines, fees, and forfeitures — are used has changed dramatically over time and across jurisdictions, as illustrated in the recent Timbs v. Indiana Supreme Court ruling.  These sanctions have important effects on who is detained and convicted, their subsequent labor market outcomes, and the priorities of law enforcement agencies.  New, rigorous research has provided an opportunity to implement evidence-based reforms: making better use of alternatives to cash bail, adjusting individual sanctions to reflect ability to pay, and breaking the link between sanction revenue and the budgets of law enforcement agencies.

Here are links to these three notable new papers and related materials:

March 18, 2019 in Fines, Restitution and Other Economic Sanctions, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Don't Overlook First Step Act Pilot Programs"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new Law360 commentary authored by By Addy Schmitt and Ian Herbert.  I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts (with footnotes omitted):

Much attention has been paid to the provisions in the law designed to address systemic issues for defendants in drug cases.... The First Step Act also includes numerous changes to address quality-of-life issues for current inmates and to help individuals transition back to society following their incarceration....

However, two programs are particularly notable because of the potential they hold to reduce prison sentences for certain prisoners by up to one-third.  The first is a pilot program that will allow the Bureau of Prisons to release to home confinement inmates over 60 years old who have served at least two-thirds of their sentences.  The second is a recidivism reduction program that will allow prisoners to earn credit worth up to one-third of their sentences for participation in programming designed to reduce recidivism.

Both programs have their faults and come with caveats.  As others have written, Congress gave the attorney general great power to decide how to implement the programs, which could hamper their effectiveness.  But combined, the two programs have the potential to offer substantial reductions in sentences, particularly to elderly and nonviolent prisoners....

One of the most profound changes that the First Step Act makes for currently incarcerated individuals is to reauthorize and expand a pilot program that allows for early release to home confinement for elderly, nonviolent prisoners.

The pilot program was created by the Second Chance Act of 2007, but it contained some important restrictions that reduced the impact of the program.  First, it was not required at all BOP facilities.  Second, it only applied to prisoners over 65 years old who had served the greater of 75 percent of their sentence or 10 years in prison.  Third, prisoners who were serving life sentences or who had been convicted of crimes of violence, sex offenses or terrorism-related offenses were ineligible, as were prisoners who attempted to escape.

The First Step Act changed the first two of these restrictions (though it left the requirements in the third).  The First Step Act directed the attorney general to make the program available at all BOP facilities, reduced the eligibility age to 60 years old, reduced the amount of time that a prisoner had to serve before being eligible from 75 percent to two-thirds of his or her sentence, and, most importantly, removed the requirement that the prisoner must serve at least 10 years prior to becoming eligible.

The result of these changes is that nonviolent prisoners over 60 could serve as much as one-third of their prison sentence in home confinement rather than in a BOP facility.

Unfortunately, these substantial reductions in terms of imprisonment are not yet guaranteed.  Though the law says that the attorney general “shall conduct a pilot program” in all facilities, it does not require release of anyone, saying only that the attorney general “may release some or all eligible elderly offenders” to home confinement.

However, while the attorney general is not required to release any prisoners under the pilot program, a separate provision of the First Step Act mandates that the BOP shall “to the extent practicable, place prisoners with lower risk levels and lower needs on home confinement for the maximum amount of time permitted” under the law.  Thus, the elderly release pilot program, coupled with the directive to move low-risk prisoners to home confinement, sends a clear signal that Congress intended for the attorney general to utilize the benefits of home confinement.

The pilot program began with the start of fiscal year 2019, and the attorney general is given authority to release eligible offenders upon written request from the BOP or prisoners who meet the criteria described above.  For that reason, nonviolent prisoners over 60 years old who have served more than two-thirds of their sentence should request to take part in the program immediately.

March 18, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS takes up Miller retroactivity, unanimous juries, the insanity defense and criminal preemption in latest order list!

The Supreme Court is back in action this morning and today's order lists includes a list of four cases in which certioriari is granted.  Four criminal grants would enough to warm a chilly morning for me, but all four cases involve fairly "big ticket" concerns.  With the help of SCOTUSblog, here is the list of granted cases: 

Mathena v. Malvo18-217

Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in concluding — in direct conflict with Virginia’s highest court and other courts — that a decision of the Supreme Court, Montgomery v. Louisiana, addressing whether a new constitutional rule announced in an earlier decision, Miller v. Alabama, applies retroactively on collateral review may properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question.

 

Ramos v. Louisiana18-5924

Issue: Whether the 14th Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict.

 

Kahler v. Kansas18-6135

IssueWhether the Eighth and 14th Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.

 

Kansas v. Garcia, 17-834

Issue: Whether the Immigration Reform and Control Act expressly pre-empts the states from using any information entered on or appended to a federal Form I-9, including common information such as name, date of birth, and social security number, in a prosecution of any person (citizen or alien) when that same, commonly used information also appears in non-IRCA documents, such as state tax forms, leases, and credit applications.

With so many Graham and Miller follow-up cases in the pipeline, I am not especially thrilled to see the Justices now decide to take up the Malvo case involving a government appeal of a (high-profile) defendant's win on a Miller retroactivity issues. Still, in the wake of the interesting mess that was Montgomery (see my little commentary, "Montgomery's Messy Trifecta), and the addition of two new Justices since then, I am grateful that these enduringly important issues are getting any at all.

Meanwhile, as the Malvo case might only cover a little issue, Ramos, Kahler and Garcia all cover big issues on a big canvas (though the result in Ramos seems easy to predict).  And, as always, I welcome reader input on what to expect or look forward to in these arenas.

March 18, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

March 17, 2019

Encouraging new reports about encouraging new compassionate release realities thanks to FIRST STEP Act

In this post last month, which was titled "Compassionate release after FIRST STEP: Should many thousands of ill and elderly federal inmates now be seeking reduced imprisonment in court?," I speculated about the possible impact of a key change of the FIRST STEP Act allowing federal courts to directly reduce sentenced under compassionate release statutory provisions.  Excitingly, in recent days I have seen two article reporting on encouraging action in this arena:

From the Houston Chronicle, "‘Pill mill’ doctor among first released under law for dying prisoners"

From NPR, "Seriously Ill Federal Prisoners Freed As Compassionate Release Law Takes Effect"

Here is an excerpt from this latter piece:

FAMM's Facebook group has been sharing information about how to prepare petitions for release. And the group's lawyers are doing what they can to support families seeking help, too.

"Now, thanks to the First Step Act, when I hear from someone struggling with the compassionate release process, I don't have to say, 'I'm sorry,' " FAMM general counsel Mary Price told NPR.  "Instead, I can say, 'Let me see if I can find you a lawyer.' "

Price said the new possibilities opened up by the law have changed her work. "It is the most amazing feeling to work with the many lawyers who are filing and beginning to win compassionate release motions for prisoners who I know would never have made it to court, were it up to the BOP."

A few prior related posts:

March 17, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

Split Seventh Circuit panel tangles with Second Amendment's second-class status and felon exclusion from right to bear arms

As noted in this post from last year, Justice Thomas has lamented in a cert denial that the Second Amendment has become "constitutional orphan" seemingly relegated in some settings to second-class status.  I have long thought this second-class status is demonstrated by the willingness of lower courts to uphold lifetime, blanket prohibitions on persons with certain criminal histories from being about to possess a gun.  The Seventh Circuit had another ruling in this arena last week in Kanter v. Barr, No. 18-1478 (7th Cir.  March 15, 2019) (available here).  Here is how the majority opinion starts and concludes:

Rickey I. Kanter pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.  Due to his felony conviction, he is prohibited from possessing a firearm under both federal and Wisconsin law. At issue in this case is whether the felon dispossession statutes—18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and Wis. Stat. § 941.29(1m)—violate the Second Amendment as applied to Kanter. Even if Kanter could bring an as-applied challenge, the government has met its burden of establishing that the felon dispossession statutes are substantially related to an important government interest. We therefore affirm the district court....

In sum, the government has established that the felon dispossession statutes are substantially related to the important governmental objective of keeping firearms away those convicted of serious crimes. Because Kanter was convicted of a serious federal felony for conduct broadly understood to be criminal, his challenge to the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is without merit.

New Circuit Judge Amy Coney Barrett, excitingly, takes her own thoughtful look at these issues in an extended scholarly opinion. Her dissenting opinion concludes this way: 

If the Second Amendment were subject to a virtue limitation, there would be no need for the government to produce — or for the court to assess — evidence that nonviolent felons have a propensity for dangerous behavior.  But Heller forecloses the “civic right” argument on which a virtue limitation depends.  And while both Wisconsin and the United States have an unquestionably strong interest in protecting the public from gun violence, they have failed to show, by either logic or data, cf. Skoien, 614 F.3d at 642, that disarming Kanter substantially advances that interest.  On this record, holding that the ban is constitutional as applied to Kanter does not “put[] the government through its paces,” see Williams, 616 F.3d at 692, but instead treats the Second Amendment as a “second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other Bill of Rights guarantees,” McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 780 (2010) (plurality opinion).  I therefore dissent.

March 17, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Second Amendment issues | Permalink | Comments (1)

"Criminal justice reform must do more than shrink prison populations"

The title of this post is the headline of this recent Hill commentary authored by David Harding, Jeffrey Morenoff and Jessica Wyse. I recommend the full piece, and here are excerpts:

Senator Cory Booker (D-NJ) introduced the Next Step Act on March 7, an expansion of the criminal justice reform started with December’s First Step Act.  We applaud the Next Step Act for essential reforms, including reducing mandatory minimums for nonviolent drug offenses.

Yet, reversing the harms that have been created by decades of mass incarceration and an overly punitive and racially-biased criminal justice system requires more than reversing past policy mistakes.  Reform should go beyond shrinking prisons to providing those whose lives have been impacted by mass incarceration with real opportunities that lead to reintegration into society after release....

[R]eintegration requires more than just determination and work ethic, a key finding of our three-year study of the day-to-day lives of formerly incarcerated individuals. About a third struggle with hunger, homelessness and housing instability.

Chronic physical and mental health problems are also common.  Jobs are scarce for those with criminal records, who disproportionately move into communities like Detroit with high unemployment.  Half of those released from prison return within three years.  The period immediately after release is both a time of great risk and an opportunity to ensure that each person starts with a strong foundation of health and material security.

This “re-entry moment” is one of optimism, commitment to a new life and family support, but also a critical time of struggle with hunger, homelessness, employment and sobriety.  Investments in housing, health and employment services during the re-entry moment can create that foundation.

The Next Step Act contains worthy provisions for removing barriers to employment, including certain occupational licensing barriers for those with criminal records.  Yet our research shows that securing a job is only part of the reason for low rates of employment after release.

Education is essential to improving reintegration into the labor force.  Formerly incarcerated workers experience high rates of job turnover, in part because that is common in the low-skill jobs they find.  To improve employment for those like Randall, we should empower more community colleges to offer prison education with a seamless transition into community programs.

Time in prison can be better used to prepare for release.  Research shows that intensive treatment and prison education programs reduce recidivism, and incarcerated individuals are eager to take part in them.  Yet too many prisoners sit idle during their time in prison or engage in make-work jobs like cleaning and gardening....

Just as the federal government supports local efforts in education, health care and policing, it can support state and local reintegration efforts through funding, technical support and evaluation of promising programs.

Can we afford to support reintegration?  Each federal prisoner costs almost $32,000 a year, and in some states that figure is over $80,000.  The money saved by reducing imprisonment can create a virtuous cycle if it is reinvested in reintegration, which will result in fewer people returning to prison.

March 17, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (1)