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June 22, 2019

"Judges should be able to take a 'second look' at prison sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this recent USA Today op-ed authored by Kevin Sharp and Kevin Ring. Based on the title alone, regular readers should know I am keen on the ideas in this piece, and here are excerpts:

It’s time we took bold steps that would give most prisoners an incentive to work hard to change their lives and successfully reintegrate into society, making us all safer when they do. It’s time for Congress and state legislatures to adopt broad “second look” sentencing laws.

We have both worked with people who have taken extraordinary steps to rehabilitate themselves in prison. One of us is a former federal judge who resigned, in large part, because he could no longer stand to impose the excessive and unjust prison terms Congress mandates in so many cases. The other is a former prisoner and the leader of a national organization that works with thousands of families directly impacted by harsh federal and state sentencing laws.

We know that implementing second-look laws, which would allow judges to review every offender’s sentence after a certain period — say 10 or 15 years — could reform our criminal justice system in a way that would recognize the capacity for rehabilitation, ensure public safety and reduce excessive sentences.

Second-look laws would give any individual hoping for a second chance more than enough time to show that he or she has earned it. Knowing that an opportunity for resentencing exists would very likely improve morale and behavior inside prisons, benefiting prisoners and corrections officers alike.

There is nothing more frightening than living in an environment where there is no hope. Moreover, there is ample evidence to suggest that lengthier sentences do not make us safer, yet our country continues to impose some of the harshest prison terms in the Western world....

Although presidents and many governors have the authority to shorten excessive sentences and reward extraordinary rehabilitation, they rarely use it. Over the past 40 years, executives have been loath to take any risks with their political futures. We need to move beyond short-term fear and follow what we know to be true about human nature and people’s capacity to change. Enacting second-look laws would allow us to reduce the unnecessary harm we are causing to some of our fellow citizens and improve public safety for all of us.

Under second-look laws, public safety would be preserved by ensuring that prosecutors, probation officers and pretrial services, along with prison officials, are involved in any resentencing in order to make the court aware of a given individual’s rehabilitation, or lack thereof. It’s more likely that adopting second-look laws would make our communities safer and decrease the strain on our prison system by preventing us from wasting our limited anti-crime resources warehousing people who pose little or no safety risk.

If we want to safely reduce our nation’s prison population, we need to stop throwing people away and start recognizing the human capacity for rehabilitation and redemption. We need to commit to second chances, and we can start by promising to give everyone a second look.

A few of many, many prior related posts and related writings:

June 22, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Rounding up of some political criminal justice reform stories as 2020 election kicks into next chapter

The next phase of the 2020 election season gets started this coming week with the first of what seems likely to be too many Democratic primary debates.  As long-time blog readers know, I always get (too?) excited by what different folks might say on the trail about criminal justice issues, and this season it seem likely that criminal justice issues will get far more attention than any time in recent memory.  Consequently, I am not surprised to be seeing already a number of media stories and commentaries about criminal justice chatter amidst the campaign, and I expect to be having lots to blog about on this front in the months to come.  For now, here is a round up of just a few pieces I have seen this past week in this arena:

June 22, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

June 21, 2019

SCOTUS finds mens rea of "knowing" distributes in gun statute in Rehaif

The Supreme Court ruled for a federal criminal defendant today in classic criminal law mens rea case in Rehaif v. US, No. 17-9560 (S. Ct. June 21, 2019) (available here). Justice Breyer authored the opinion for the Court, which starts this way:

A federal statute, 18 U. S. C. §922(g), provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful” for certain individuals to possess firearms. The provision lists nine categories of individuals subject to the prohibition, including felons and aliens who are “illegally or unlawfully in the United States.” Ibid.  A separate provision, §924(a)(2), adds that anyone who “knowingly violates” the first provision shall be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years. (Emphasis added.)

The question here concerns the scope of the word “knowingly.”  Does it mean that the Government must prove that a defendant knew both that he engaged in the relevant conduct (that he possessed a firearm) and also that he fell within the relevant status (that he was a felon, an alien unlawfully in this country, or the like)?  We hold that the word “knowingly” applies both to the defendant’s conduct and to the defendant’s status.  To convict a defendant, the Government therefore must show that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and also that he knew he had the relevant status when he possessed it.

Justice Alito penned a lengthy dissent, which was joined by Justice Thomas and starts this way:

The Court casually overturns the long-established interpretation of an important criminal statute, 18 U. S. C. §922(g), an interpretation that has been adopted by every single Court of Appeals to address the question.  That interpretation has been used in thousands of cases for more than 30 years.  According to the majority, every one of those cases was flawed. So today’s decision is no minor matter.  And §922(g) is no minor provision. It probably does more to combat gun violence than any other federal law.  It prohibits the possession of firearms by, among others, convicted felons, mentally ill persons found by a court to present a danger to the community, stalkers, harassers, perpetrators of domestic violence, and illegal aliens.

Today’s decision will make it significantly harder to convict persons falling into some of these categories, and the decision will create a mountain of problems with respect to the thousands of prisoners currently serving terms for §922(g) convictions.  Applications for relief by federal prisoners sentenced under §922(g) will swamp the lower courts.  A great many convictions will be subject to challenge, threatening the release or retrial of dangerous individuals whose cases fall outside the bounds of harmless-error review.

June 21, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS finds Batson violation based on "extraordinary facts" in Flowers

The Supreme Court ruled for a criminal defendant today in a Batson challenge in Mississippi v. Flowers, No. 17-9572 (S. Ct. June 21, 2019) (available here). As with all criminal cases, I find the line up of the Justices notable:

KAVANAUGH, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and GINSBURG, BREYER, ALITO, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a concurring opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GORSUCH, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.

Here is part of the start of the lengthy opening of the opinion of the Court:

In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), this Court ruled that a State may not discriminate on the basis of race when exercising peremptory challenges against prospective jurors in a criminal trial.

In 1996, Curtis Flowers allegedly murdered four people in Winona, Mississippi. Flowers is black. He has been tried six separate times before a jury for murder. The same lead prosecutor represented the State in all six trials.

In the initial three trials, Flowers was convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed each conviction. In the first trial, Flowers was convicted, but the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to “numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.”  Flowers v. State, 773 So. 2d 309, 327 (2000)....

In his sixth trial, which is the one at issue here, Flowers was convicted. The State struck five of the six black prospective jurors.  On appeal, Flowers argued that the State again violated Batson in exercising peremptory strikes against black prospective jurors. In a divided 5-to-4 decision, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.  We granted certiorari on the Batson question and now reverse....

Four critical facts, taken together, require reversal....

We need not and do not decide that any one of those four facts alone would require reversal. All that we need to decide, and all that we do decide, is that all of the relevant facts and circumstances taken together establish that the trial court committed clear error in concluding that the State’s peremptory strike of black prospective juror Carolyn Wright was not “motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent.” Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___, ___ (2016) (slip op., at 23) (internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching that conclusion, we break no new legal ground.  We simply enforce and reinforce Batson by applying it to the extraordinary facts of this case. 

June 21, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (9)

Senator Cory Booker sets out "Restoring Justice Initiative" focused on providing clemency relief to thousands of federal offenders

ImagesAs reported in major media pieces ranging from Fox News to the New York Times to Vox, Senator Cory Booker on Thursday unveiled a major policy proposal as part of his presidential campaign.  The proposal is set for in this extended Medium post, titled "RESTORING JUSTICE: Cory’s Plan to Extend Clemency to People Serving Excessive Sentences."  I recommend this posting in full for all the details, and here are a few highlights (with links from the original):

The Restoring Justice Initiative builds on Cory’s long record of working to reform the broken criminal justice system. Since his days on the Newark City Council and as mayor, Cory has been a relentless advocate for criminal justice reform, building unusual coalitions to make real change.

In the Senate, his work was a critical factor in passing the First Step Act  —  a law that is turning the tide against mass incarceration.  In addition, Cory has pushed for bold legislative reforms, such as the Marijuana Justice Act.

The power to grant clemency, however, is a broad power granted exclusively to the president by Article II of the Constitution without requiring action by Congress  —  a power that President Booker would use immediately to begin correcting some of the most egregious abuses of the failed War on Drugs.

On day one of his presidency, he will initiate a historic clemency process for an estimated 17,000-plus nonviolent drug offenders serving unjust and excessive sentences  —  representing the most sweeping clemency initiative in more than 150 years....

Under the Restoring Justice Initiative, three broad classes of individuals serving sentences in federal prisons would be immediately considered for clemency.  Cory would use the power granted by the Pardon Clause of Article II of the Constitution to issue commutations for broad classes of individuals currently serving sentences for nonviolent drug offenses widely viewed as unduly harsh and rooted in racist and misguided federal policy.

Individuals serving sentences for marijuana-related offenses...

All told, as of 2012, the most recent year for which data is publicly available, 11,533 individuals are currently incarcerated in federal prisons for marijuana-related offenses.

Individuals serving sentences that would have been reduced under the First Step Act, if all the bill’s sentencing provisions had been applied retroactively:

The bipartisan First Step Act, approved by an 87–12 vote in the Senate, reduced the minimum sentences required for certain drug offenses.  Minimum sentences reduced in the First Step Act included mandatory life sentences for a third drug offense (changed to a 25-year minimum sentence); 20-year mandatory minimum sentences for a second drug offense (reduced to 15 years); and fixes to the 924c “stacking” mechanism. However, these reforms were not made retroactive, meaning that someone sentenced on December 20, 2018 is serving more time than someone sentenced a day later (the date the bill was signed) for an identical offense.  As of October 2017, 3,816 individuals in this category would be eligible for a sentence reduction in accordance with the First Step Act through clemency.

Individuals currently incarcerated with unjust sentences due to the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine:

The sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine is a key driver of the gap in incarceration rates between Black and white people. In recent years, we have seen progress righting this historic wrong. For example, the 2010 Fair Sentencing Act reduced the crack-to-powder disparity from 100:1 to 18:1, and the First Step Act made the change retroactive, leading to the release of more than one thousand people. A disparity in sentencing, however, still exists. This effort would eliminate entirely the disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences retroactively, a reform that should have occurred decades ago.

On day one in office, Cory would sign an executive order initiating a clemency process for thousands of people currently serving unjust drug sentences. The EO would charge the Bureau of Prisons, the Defender Services Division of the U.S. Courts, and the United States Sentencing Commission with immediately identifying individuals within the classes cited above that meet the stated eligibility parameters for clemency. It would also enable individuals to self-identify and submit their names for consideration.

The initiative will also revamp and streamline the clemency process more broadly through the creation of an Executive Clemency Panel situated at the White House. For individuals granted clemency, a federal interagency council would make policy recommendations to the Administration and Congress to facilitate their successful reentry, including identifying job and training opportunities, investing in rehabilitation programs, and targeting evidence-based social services.

The bipartisan Executive Clemency Panel would be comprised of advisors representing diverse sets of expertise to expeditiously process all cases.  While the process would operate with a presumption of a recommendation of clemency, the panel would closely review cases and prison history and decline to forward recommendations for individuals who may pose a threat to public safety.  For individuals granted clemency, a federal interagency council would make policy recommendations to the Administration and Congress to facilitate their successful reentry, including identifying job and training opportunities and targeting evidence-based social services.

The panel would also give a special presumption for release for those that are 50 years of age or older and have served lengthy sentences  —  as all evidence suggests that people typically age out of crime and are far less likely to recidivate.  Cory would also appoint a senior official in the White House to advise him on criminal justice issues, charged with advancing a proactive reform agenda.

Sounds pretty darn good to me!

Prior recent related post:

June 21, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

June 20, 2019

Georgia completes execution making a total of 1,500 in modern death penalty era

Because Texas has executed so many more murderers than any other state in the modern era, it really should have the "honor" of carrying out any landmark execution.  But, as this CNN article details, Georgia was the state to conduct a landmark execution tonight.  The article is headlined "Georgia inmate is the 1,500th person executed in the US since the death penalty was reinstated," and here are excerpts:

A Georgia inmate convicted in the killing of man who gave him a ride in 1997 died by lethal injection Thursday, the state's Department of Corrections said.  Marion Wilson Jr. is the 1,500th person to be executed in the United States since the return of the death penalty in 1976, according to the Death Penalty Information Center.

His execution was carried at 9:52 p.m. ET at the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison in Jackson, Georgia after the US Supreme Court denied a stay of execution.

Wilson was sentenced to death in 1997 for the murder of Donovan Corey Parks in southeast Atlanta.  Parks was found dead on a residential street after he gave Wilson and another man a ride from a Walmart store.  Parks had gone to the store to buy cat food and accepted to give them a ride when they approached him in the parking lot, authorities said.

June 20, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Death Penalty Reforms | Permalink | Comments (0)

SCOTUS plurality says SORNA delegation of statute's reach to Attorney General "easily passes constitutional muster"

The Supreme Court this morning finally released its opinion in Gundy v. US, 17-6086 (S. Ct. June 20, 2019) (available here). Justice Kagan authored the lead opinion (joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg and Sotomayor), which starts this way:

The nondelegation doctrine bars Congress from transferring its legislative power to another branch of Government. This case requires us to decide whether 34 U.S.C. §20913(d), enacted as part of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), violates that doctrine. We hold it does not.  Under §20913(d), the Attorney General must apply SORNA’s registration requirements as soon as feasible to offenders convicted before the statute’s enactment.  That delegation easily passes constitutional muster.

Here is the full text of Justice Alito's concurrence, which served to provide the key fifth vote for the outcome:

The Constitution confers on Congress certain “legislative [p]owers,” Art. I, §1, and does not permit Congress to delegate them to another branch of the Government. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001). Nevertheless, since 1935, the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments and has upheld provisions that authorized agencies to adopt important rules pursuant to extraordinarily capacious standards. See ibid.

If a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that effort.  But because a majority is not willing to do that, it would be freakish to single out the provision at issue here for special treatment.

Because I cannot say that the statute lacks a discernable standard that is adequate under the approach this Court has taken for many years, I vote to affirm.

Justice Gorsuch's opinion, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, starts this way:

The Constitution promises that only the people’s elected representatives may adopt new federal laws restricting liberty. Yet the statute before us scrambles that design.  It purports to endow the nation’s chief prosecutor with the power to write his own criminal code governing the lives of a half-million citizens.  Yes, those affected are some of the least popular among us.  But if a single executive branch official can write laws restricting the liberty of this group of persons, what does that mean for the next?

Today, a plurality of an eight-member Court endorses this extraconstitutional arrangement but resolves nothing.  Working from an understanding of the Constitution at war with its text and history, the plurality reimagines the terms of the statute before us and insists there is nothing wrong with Congress handing off so much power to the Attorney General.  But JUSTICE ALITO supplies the fifth vote for today’s judgment and he does not join either the plurality’s constitutional or statutory analysis, indicating instead that he remains willing, in a future case with a full Court, to revisit these matters.  Respectfully, I would not wait.

The time it took for Gundy to be resolved and this outcome suggests that the delay of Justice Kavanaugh's confirmation turned out to be a big deal in this one case.

June 20, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)

June 19, 2019

New Compassionate Release Clearinghouse to match lawyers with prisoners seeking release after FIRST STEP Act

This new press release, titled "FAMM, Washington Lawyers’ Committee, NACDL Launch Compassionate Release Clearinghouse," reports on an exciting new resource for helping to better implement a part of the FIRST STEP Act. Here are the details:

Thousands of sick, dying, and elderly federal prisoners who are eligible for early release will now have access to free legal representation in court through the newly established Compassionate Release Clearinghouse. The clearinghouse, a collaborative pro bono effort between FAMM, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, and the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), is designed to match qualified prisoners with legal counsel should they need to fight a compassionate release denial or unanswered request in court.

“People who can barely make it out of their beds in the morning should not have to go into court alone against the largest law firm in the nation,” said Kevin Ring, president of FAMM. “Congress was clear that it wanted fundamental changes in compassionate release, yet we’ve seen prosecutors continue to fight requests from clearly deserving people, including individuals with terminal illnesses. It’s gratifying to know we will be able to help people in a tangible and meaningful way.”

The Compassionate Release Clearinghouse recruits, trains, and provides resources to participating lawyers. The Clearinghouse’s design and implementation is being assisted by the Washington, D.C., law firm of Zuckerman Spaeder LLP through its partner Steve Salky.

“Sick and dying prisoners for years were unjustly denied release on compassionate release grounds by the Bureau of Prisons,” said Jonathan Smith, Executive Director of the Washington Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs. “Now, prisoners will be assisted by dedicated and high-quality lawyers in seeking relief from the courts, evening the playing field, and allowing many of these prisoners to return home.”

The effort was made possible by the passage of the First Step Act, which addresses a well-documented, three-decades-long issue in which sick, elderly, and dying prisoners have been routinely denied early release by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Until December 2018, there was no mechanism to challenge or appeal those decisions. Now, prisoners are allowed to appeal directly to a sentencing judge if their petitions are denied or unanswered.

Since the passage of the First Step Act, prisoners have been filing motions for release, and some have been challenged by federal prosecutors. The Compassionate Release Clearinghouse will make sure those prisoners have an attorney to fight for them in court.

“NACDL is proud to participate in this critically important effort,” said NACDL Executive Director Norman L. Reimer. “To make the promise of the First Step Act a reality for qualified sick, elderly, and dying prisoners, the nation’s criminal defense bar is committed to recruiting pro bono attorneys to be champions for those in need. Additionally, NACDL’s First Step Implementation Task Force will aggregate resources to support attorneys who undertake this important work.”

The Clearinghouse started matching attorneys with prisoners in need in February, and has matched more than 70 cases with pro bono attorneys. The Clearinghouse is actively recruiting additional attorneys and law firms to join in the effort.

As regular readers may recall (and as I have stressed in a number of prior posts), because  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), the provision of federal law often known as "compassionate release," allows a court to reduce a prison sentence based on any and all "extraordinary and compelling reasons," it should not only be the "sick, dying, and elderly federal prisoners" who are potentially eligible for early release.  But, as this press release highlights, because there is already a history of extreme resistance toward releasing even the most deserving under this provision, it is heartening to see these groups work to make sure prisoners can get needed legal help to benefit from the reforms Congress is surely eager to see given full effect.

A few prior related posts on § 3582(c)(1)(A) after FIRST STEP Act:

June 19, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Confined and Costly: How Supervision Violations Are Filling Prisons and Burdening Budgets"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new dynamic online report from the Council of State Governments Justice Center. Everyone should check out the link to the report to see the dynamic features built therein, and here is some of the text from the report (with all caps from the original):

Probation and parole are designed to lower prison populations and help people succeed in the community. New data show they are having the opposite effect. Until now, national data regarding the impact of probation violations on prison populations have been unavailable, resulting in a lopsided focus on parole. The Council of State Governments (CSG) Justice Center recently engaged corrections and community supervision leaders in 50 states to develop the first complete picture of how probation and parole violations make up states’ prison populations. The analysis revealed a startling reality.

45% OF STATE PRISON ADMISSIONS nationwide are due to violations of probation or parole for new offenses or technical violations.

Technical violations, such as missing appointments with supervision officers or failing drug tests, account for nearly 1/4 OF ALL STATE PRISON ADMISSIONS.

On any given day, 280,000 PEOPLE in prison — nearly 1 IN 4 — are incarcerated as a result of a supervision violation, costing states more than $9.3 BILLION ANNUALLY.

Technical supervision violations account for $2.8 BILLION of this total amount, and new offense supervision violations make up $6.5 BILLION. These figures do not account for the substantial local costs of keeping people in jail for supervision violations.

IN 13 STATES, MORE THAN 1 IN 3 PEOPLE in prison on any given day are there for a supervision violation.

IN 20 STATES, MORE THAN HALF OF PRISON ADMISSIONS are due to supervision violations.

Variation in these proportions across states is shaped by the overall size of each state’s supervision population, how violations are sanctioned, whether those sanctions are the result of incarceration paid for by the state or county, and how well state policy and funding enable probation and parole agencies to employ evidence-based practices to improve success on supervision.

June 19, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Testing Periods and Outcome Determination in Criminal Cases"

The title of this post is the title of this important new article authored by Fiona Doherty and now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This Article introduces the concept of “Testing Periods” to explain how U.S. courts sort criminal defendants for incarceratory and non-incarceratory results. A Testing Period is a time period during which a criminal defendant agrees to abide by a set of prospective rules (such as avoiding “dirty urines” and remaining “clean” from drugs and alcohol), typically, but not always, as a function of plea bargaining.  Prosecutors and judges set the rules, and defendants must demonstrate that they can follow the rules to pass the test and successfully avoid prison.  Juries play no role in the system, and due process requirements diverge sharply from traditional norms.

The outcomes of most criminal cases are now determined through Testing Periods, which go by varied names like probation, problem-solving courts, suspended sentences, conditional plea agreements, and deferred adjudication.  The pervasiveness of Testing Periods has changed the orientation of outcome determination in criminal cases away from a retrospective analysis to a prospective one: Outcomes no longer depend on a backward-looking examination of the facts of a criminal charge, but instead on whether a defendant can pass a forward-looking test.  The power to create and administer Testing Periods has become the power to determine who goes to prison and for what reason.  The Article concludes that the widespread use of Testing Periods has recreated dynamics from a much older method of resolving criminal cases: the testing models used in the medieval ordeal system to separate “clean” defendants from “dirty” ones, and the “worthy” from the “unworthy.” 

June 19, 2019 in Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Noticing that early federal prisoner release often means earlier deportation for non-citizen offenders

The Marshall Project has this new piece spotlighting how the FIRST STEP Act will result in expedited deportation for some of the prisoners getting their sentences reduced.  The piece is headlined "First Step Offers Release for Some Prisoners—But Not Non-Citizens: About 750 federal inmates will be transferred to Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody starting in mid-July." Here are excerpts:

President Trump convened a news conference last week to celebrate the release of 3,000 federal prisoners on July 19 as part of the First Step Act. But not all of those inmates will actually walk free: 750 non-citizens could well face deportation....

The 750 non-citizens released from federal prisons will be held for transfer to Immigration and Customs Enforcement custody so ICE can start the deportation process, according to the Bureau of Prisons.

While the Trump administration has pressed to increase deportations, there is ample precedent for non-citizens being released from prison, only to be ejected from the country. In 2015, during the Obama administration, more than 6,000 prisoners were released after the nonpartisan U.S. Sentencing Commission revised sentencing guidelines for some drug crimes. More than 20 percent of those released were sent to ICE to face deportation....

About 35,000 people of foreign or unknown origin make up nearly 20 percent of all federal prisoners in Bureau of Prisons custody. People from Mexico constitute the largest population of non-citizens with prisoners born in Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Cuba as the next largest identifiable groups....

Nearly half of foreign-born federal prisoners are incarcerated for drug trafficking or related offenses, while those convicted of immigration offenses such as illegal reentry after deportation make up 28 percent.

Once detained by ICE, those released from federal prisons can theoretically be released on bond, said Ricardo S. Martinez, a chief U.S. district judge and chair of a federal judicial committee that reviews criminal justice bills and laws. “But more likely they are held until they can be repatriated back to their country of origin,” he said.

June 19, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)

June 18, 2019

"Abolishing the death penalty requires morality"

The title of this post is the headline of this new commentary authored by Stephen Cooper, which is a response to a recent commentary by Austin Sarat (blogged here).  Here are excerpts:

In “How to Convince Americans to Abolish the Death Penalty,” Amherst College Professor Austin Sarat asserts “important lessons about how abolitionists can be successful around the country” can be learned from New Hampshire – which just last month became the twenty-first state to abolish capital punishment — including: “The moral argument doesn’t work.”...

Sarat’s regretful and regressive capitulation to the fallacious dogma of retribution is, therefore, in my opinion, as disturbing as it is disappointing.

In his book “The Ethics of Punishment,” Sir Walter Moberly sagely observed about retribution that “[t]he executioner pays the murderer the compliment of imitation,” and, more keenly: “Much demand for retribution certainly has a shady origin.  It springs from the crude animal impulse of the individual or group to retaliate, when hurt, by hurting the hurter. In itself such resentment is neither wise nor good and, in its extreme forms, it is generally condemned as vindictive.”...

The constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment bears no asterisk for crimes committed by “society’s most despised.”  Abolitionists should continue to proudly and affirmatively demand the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee of dignity for everyone, while continuing to make reasoned morality-and-dignity-based arguments to end the death penalty — when it makes sense to — notwithstanding whether or not this strategy was employed during the recent abolitionist success in New Hampshire.

Demanding dignity for society’s most despised is the lifeblood of our weakened, chronically underperforming Eighth Amendment.  And it is still at the heart of what it means to be an abolitionist.

Prior related posts:

June 18, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (15)

Good day for thinking hard about sentencing second looks and second chances

I am greatly enjoying day two of the great "Rewriting the Sentence" conference at Columbia Law School (previously noted here and here and here and being live streamed here).  This afternoon, I have the honor of moderating a panel titled "Sentencing Second Chances: Addressing Excessive Sentencing With Escape Valves," and then will get to attend another later panel on "The Role of Mercy and Dignity in Criminal Justice: From Restoration to Clemency."   I am so excited this conference has two panels addressing, in varied ways, issues surrounding the correction or adjustment of problematic sentences.  As regular readers know, I have been thinking and writing about these issues a lot in recent years, making the case that they are particularly critical issues in an era of mass incarceration.  So I am so very glad this afternoon will be filled with robust discussions of sentencing second looks and second chances.

Excitingly, on the same day I am talking about these issues, Shon Hopwood has just published some important new writings on these topics.  Specifically, over at Prison Professors, Shon has this new important post titled "A Second Look at a Second Chance: Seeking a Sentence Reduction under the Compassionate Release Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as Amended by the First Step Act."  This post, which should be read in full and includes important links, overviews a set of new writings by Shon on second looks and second chances.  I plan to blog more about Shon's work in this space, and here I will start with the start of his posting:

There is a viable argument for why federal district court judges can use the compassionate release statute, as amended by the First Step Act, as a second look provision to reduce a sentence for people in federal prison if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” are present.  Over the weekend, I posted both a law review article (entitled Second Looks & Second chances that will be published by Cardozo Law Review) and a sample brief (that will form the basis of challenging Adam Clausen’s ridiculous 213-year federal sentence).  Both discuss the reasons why federal judges can and should give sentence reductions in cases where people in federal prison have a demonstrated record of rehabilitation in addition to compelling reasons why they were sentenced too harshly. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

In my article, I explain that there is a long history of second look provisions in American law, and why second look provisions are normatively desirable.  More importantly, the text and history of Section 3582(c) supports the view that, when Congress first enacted the compassionate release statute in 1984, it intended compassionate release to act as a second look provision to take the place of federal parole, which Congress was abolishing.  The problem was that Congress gave the power to trigger a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”).

Leaving the BOP Director with ultimate authority to trigger and set the criteria for compassionate release sentence reductions created several problems.  The Office of the Inspector General found that, among many other problems, the BOP failed to provide adequate guidance to staff regarding the criteria for compassionate release and that BOP had no timeliness standards for reviewing such requests.  As a result of these problems and others, the OIG concluded that: “BOP does not properly manage the compassionate release program, resulting in inmates who may be eligible candidates for release not being considered.”

Congress heard the complaints. Congress passed, and President Trump signed, the First Step Act of 2018, which, among other things, changed the procedures and ultimately the criteria for when a person in federal prison can seek a sentence reduction under the compassionate release statute in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  After the changes made by First Step, federal prisoners can file a motion for a sentence reduction, and federal district courts are authorized to reduce a sentence even if the BOP fails to respond or even in the face of BOP opposition to a sentence reduction.

Under the First Step Act, Congress took the power that previously resided with the BOP Director to trigger and set the criteria for sentence reductions and transferred it to Article III courts — where it should be.

A few prior related posts on § 3582(c)(1)(A) after FIRST STEP Act:

June 18, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Most US drug arrests involve a gram or less"

The title of this post is the title of this new short piece by Joseph Kennedy (which condenses some of his really important work set forth in this recent full article, "Sharks and Minnows in the War on Drugs: A Study of Quantity, Race and Drug Type in Drug Arrests"). Here are excerpts:

U.S. drug laws are designed as if every offender was a dedicated criminal like Walter White, treating the possession or sale of even small quantities of illegal drugs as a serious crime requiring serious punishment.

I have studied the war on drugs for a number of years.  Last December, my colleagues and I published a study on U.S. drug arrests, showing that roughly two out of every three arrests by state and local law enforcement target small-time offenders who are carrying less than a gram of illegal drugs.

Virtually all states treat as felonies the sale of any amount of illegal drugs.  The thinking behind these laws is that you cannot catch the big fish without catching some minnows as well.  Many states also treat the mere possession of any amount of a hard drugs, such as cocaine, heroin or meth/amphetamine, as a felony....

We wanted to find out how often the police made arrests involving large quantities of drugs.  To make things manageable, we narrowed our study to three evenly spaced years, 2004, 2008 and 2012.  The resulting data set contained over a million cases, with usable data found in over 700,000 cases.  We believe our study is the most comprehensive study of drug arrest quantity undertaken to date....

Our study found that, by and large, state and local police agencies are arresting small fish, not big ones.  Two out of three drug offenders arrested by state and local law enforcement possess or sell a gram or less at the time of arrest. Furthermore, about 40% of arrests for hard drug are for trace amounts — a quarter of a gram or less.

Because possessing any amount of a hard drug and selling any illegal drug is a felony in virtually every state, the small size of these quantities matter.  They suggest that very minor offenders face felony liability.  Felony convictions make it difficult for ex-offenders to secure good jobs.  They carry many other harmful collateral consequences.

There are few truly big, or even medium-sized, offenders in the remaining arrests.  Arrests for quantities of hard drugs above five grams range between 15 and 20 percent of all arrests, and arrests for a kilogram or more are less than 1%.

What’s more, the racial distribution of these small quantity arrests reveal importance differences between arrests for different types of drugs.

Our study confirms that blacks are disproportionately arrested for crack cocaine offenses, as are whites for meth/amphetamine and heroin offenses.  When it comes to possession of a quarter gram or less, police arrest almost twice as many blacks as whites for crack cocaine.  However, they arrest almost four times as many whites as blacks for heroin and eight times as many whites as blacks for meth/amphetamine.

Offenders of color are, by and large, not significantly more serious offenders in terms of quantity of drugs.  They just possess and sell drugs that are the most frequent target of arrest.  Our study showed about twice as many arrests for crack cocaine as for meth/amphetamine and almost four times as many arrests for crack cocaine as for heroin.

Finally, this study shows that 71% of drug arrests are not for hard drugs, but for marijuana.  The majority of those arrests are also for tiny quantities: 28% for trace amounts and almost 50% for a gram or less.  Once again, blacks are disproportionately arrested for marijuana offenses, making up about a quarter of all marijuana arrests despite being about 13% of the population.

Illegal drugs are ultimately sold in small quantities to users, so it’s not surprising that there are more small quantity offenders in the pool of drug arrestees.  But this study suggests that the majority of state and local drug enforcement resources are spent catching these small fish.  The drug war is not being waged primarily against the Walter Whites, but against much less serious offenders.

Prior related post:

June 18, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Drug Offense Sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Race, Class, and Gender | Permalink | Comments (4)

June 17, 2019

Seeking thoughts as we approach six months of implementing (and overseeing the implementation) of the FIRST STEP Act

I have been spending the day at Columbia Law School attending the great "Rewriting the Sentence" conference previously noted here and here and here.  All the panels have been terrific, and I am now blogging during the panel titled "A Federal Legislative Look: The First Step Act, and the Next Steps" because its moderator, the indefatigable Holly Harris, has urged everyone to get the word out that Representatives Doug Collins and Hakeem Jeffries have talked up a (needed) oversight hearing on FIRST STEP Act implementation "sooner rather than later."  The panel has emphasized that effective implementation of FIRST STEP is just as important as its initial passage, and it seems everyone recognizes that an oversight hearing in Congress can aid with effective implementation.

Speaking of implementation and oversight, I have been meaning to post these two recent letters sent to, and then coming from, the Department of Justice on this front:

Download Letter to AG William Barr and AD Hugh Hurwitz (1)

Download 2019-6-7 First Step Act - COURTESY COPY

There is far too much in both these letters to summarize easily what is herein. But those interested in many specifics of the FIRST STEP Act will be very interested in these letters.

Finally, as noted in the title of this post, we are getting ever closer to the six month mark since the FIRST STEP Act become law, and I would be grateful (in the comments or in other fora) to hear from all sort of folks about their views on the first six months of FIRST STEP implementation.

June 17, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Notable new comments from new Deputy AG Jeffrey Rosen to sheriffs

I have not recently posted too many speeches on crime and punishment from Justice Department leaders in part because there have not been too many of these speeches as DOJ leadership has been in transition. But today, Jeffrey Rosen delivered these extended remarks to the National Sheriffs' Association, which he describes as his "first public speech as Deputy Attorney General of the United States." The whole speech is worth reading, and here are some excepts:

Under this administration, we are not using top-down, one-size-fits-all solutions to crime.

Instead, since 2017, each of our 93 U.S. attorneys in your local communities has been directed to develop a customized crime reduction plan for their district — based on the input that they receive from state and local officials like you. We want you to tell us where the biggest dangers are in your counties — and then we’ll help you put the people who commit crimes behind bars.

We call this program project safe neighborhoods, and it is a proven strategy. Interestingly, it was modeled after a program that Attorney General Barr had created during his previous tenure as Attorney General. One of Attorney General Barr’s first policy decisions during his second tenure as Attorney General was to order the creation of a state and local law enforcement coordination section at the department, which will be responsible for further strengthening lines of communication between all levels of law enforcement....

And we have another message for violent criminals: I am happy to report that in the last fiscal year, the Justice Department charged the greatest number of violent crime defendants since we started to track this category more than 25 years ago — back when Bill Barr was Attorney General for the first time.

Department of Justice prosecutors also charged more than 15,000 defendants with federal firearms offenses, which is a record. They broke that record by a margin of 17 percent. What often is misunderstood about such statistics, however, is that many of these federal cases simply adopt and prosecute the great work done by state and local law enforcement in investigating and arresting the most dangerous criminals in our communities....

Our efforts have produced results. In the two years before President Trump took office, there was a significant nationwide increase in violent crime: the violent crime rate went up by nearly seven percent. Robberies went up. Assaults went up nearly 10 percent. Rape went up by nearly 11 percent. Murder increased by a shocking 21 percent.

But today, under President Trump’s administration, crime rates have been falling. Homicide rates and violent crimes went down in 2017. Murders fell an additional 5.8 percent and violent crime fell an additional 4.5 percent last year in 2018. And, I am happy to report, in the first three months of this year, this downward trend has continued: once more murders and violent crimes are down even from last year.

But there remains one area in which far more progress needs to be made — and that is with regard to drug abuse. We are facing a grave situation today. In 2017, 70,000 Americans lost their lives to drugs — more than lose their lives in car crashes.

But we all know that the toll of drug abuse is not only in lives. It is the families torn apart by these drugs and the negative effects that ripple through our communities. Drug abuse has also led to millions of property crimes and violent crimes.

So I want to stand here today and underscore again what you heard from Attorney General Sessions last year: that the Department of Justice is here with you shoulder to shoulder in this fight against the drug epidemic ravaging our communities.

Over the last two years, under this administration, we have gained ground on multiple fronts. First of all, we have dramatically reduced the number of opioid prescriptions. Prescriptions for the seven most frequently abused prescription opioids are down more than 21 percent since 2016 — down to the lowest level in at least a decade.

Meanwhile the Department has increased its drug-prosecution productivity. The number of defendants charged with federal opioid-related crimes increased by 28 percent in 2018.

In confronting drug-related crime, another key element is the crisis at our southern border. For four years in a row, the Drug Enforcement Administration has stated publicly that “Mexican transnational criminal organizations are the greatest criminal drug threat to the United States; no other group is currently positioned to challenge them.” In some ways, it’s a misnomer to call it the “crisis at the border.” It gives the impression that everything is contained just a few states bordering Mexico. Not so. We all know that the crisis at the border is a driver to the drug crisis in our communities, oftentimes hundreds of miles away from the actual border.

The DEA so tells us that the majority of the heroin, cocaine, methamphetamine, and fentanyl in this country got here across our southern border. Having a porous southern border makes every county in America more vulnerable to these drugs — whether your county is near the border or not.

June 17, 2019 in Criminal justice in the Trump Administration, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

Via lengthy opinions, SCOTUS preserves "dual sovereignty" doctrine in Gamble

Unsurprisingly, the Supreme Court has decided not to overturn its longstanding "dual sovereignty" doctrine in the case of Gamble v. US, No. 17-646 (S. Ct. June 17, 2019) (available here). Here is how the Court's majority opinion, authored by Justice Alito, gets started:

We consider in this case whether to overrule a longstanding interpretation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. That Clause provides that no person may be “twice put in jeopardy” “for the same offence.” Our double jeopardy case law is complex, but at its core, the Clause means that those acquitted or convicted of a particular “offence” cannot be tried a second time for the same “offence.” But what does the Clause mean by an “offence”?

We have long held that a crime under one sovereign’s laws is not “the same offence” as a crime under the laws of another sovereign. Under this “dual-sovereignty” doctrine, a State may prosecute a defendant under state law even if the Federal Government has prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal statute.

Or the reverse may happen, as it did here. Terance Gamble, convicted by Alabama for possessing a firearm as a felon, now faces prosecution by the United States under its own felon-in-possession law. Attacking this second prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, Gamble asks us to overrule the dual-sovereignty doctrine. He contends that it departs from the founding-era understanding of the right enshrined by the Double Jeopardy Clause. But the historical evidence assembled by Gamble is feeble; pointing the other way are the Clause’s text, other historical evidence, and 170 years of precedent. Today we affirm that precedent, and with it the decision below.

Notably, Justice Thomas pens an extended concurrence in Gamble, but does so "to address the proper role of the doctrine of stare decisis." Thereafter, Justice Ginsburg authors a lengthy dissent, and Justice Gorsuch authors an even longer dissent. I hope to have more to say about all these opinions in the days to come, but the close of Justice Gorsuch's dissent seem immediately blogworthy:

Enforcing the Constitution always bears its costs. But when the people adopted the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, they thought the liberties promised there worth the costs. It is not for this Court to reassess this judgment to make the prosecutor’s job easier. Nor is there any doubt that the benefits the framers saw in prohibiting double prosecutions remain real, and maybe more vital than ever, today. When governments may unleash all their might in multiple prosecutions against an individual, exhausting themselves only when those who hold the reins of power are content with the result, it is “the poor and the weak,” and the unpopular and controversial, who suffer first — and there is nothing to stop them from being the last. The separate sovereigns exception was wrong when it was invented, and it remains wrong today.

June 17, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

Another notable new GVR by SCOTUS "to consider the First Step Act of 2018" over DOJ opposition

In this post two weeks ago, I flagged the interesting Supreme Court decision in Wheeler v. US to grant, vacate and remand the case to allow courts below "to consider the First Step Act of 2018."  In that case, petitioner asserted that a provision of the FIRST STEP Act changed the applicable mandatory minimum while his case was on appeal.  The Government responded that the FIRST STEP Act was not applicable once a case was on appeal, but SCOTUS decided to send the case back to the Third Circuit to consider the issue.

Now a second case, Richardson v. US, No. 18-7036, has received similar treatment via this new SCOTUS order list. In Richardson, the defendant received an extremely long sentence has on stacked 924(c) gun counts, and following the passage of the FIRST STEP Act, Richardson filed this supplemental brief asserting he is now "entitled to be resentenced under the recently passed First Step Act of 2018."  Once again, the Justice Department asserted in this response that "the First Step Act is unambiguously inapplicable here" and so provides "no sound basis" for a grant, vacate and remand. 

In the end, it seems SCOTUS thought there was a sound basis for a GVR in this case, because that is just what the Court did in order to enable the Sixth Circuit have the first crack at what I call a "pipeline" issue about the applicability of the FIRST STEP Act to cases in the pipeline when the Act was passed.

June 17, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

June 16, 2019

Alaska Supreme Court finds due process flaw in state's sex offender registry scheme

Last Friday, the Alaska Supreme Court in Doe v. Alaska Department of Public Safety, No. 7375  (Alaska June 14, 2019) (available here) decided that part of its state’s Sexual Offender Registration Act violates due process.  Here is how the majority opinion starts and concludes:

&This appeal presentstwo questions concerning theAlaska SexualOffender Registration Act (ASORA). The first is whether ASORA’s registration requirements may be imposed on sex offenders who have moved to the state of Alaska after committing sex offenses elsewhere. The second iswhetherASORAviolates due process by requiring all sex offenders to register without providing a procedure for them to establish that they do not represent a threat to the public. We conclude that ASORA’s registration requirements can constitutionally be applied to out-of-state offenders. We also conclude that ASORA violates due process, but its defect may be cured by providing a procedure for offenders to establish their non-dangerousness....

The superior court correctly concluded that Doe must register under ASORA. ASORA has effects that are both punitive and regulatory in nature. The former prevent retroactive application of the act under the ex post facto clause of the Alaska Constitution,but they do not preclude imposing registration duties on out-of-state offenders who are present in the state.

The superior court also correctly recognized that registration may seriously affect Doe’s liberty interests. But the court did not strike a proper balance between Doe’s liberty interests and ASORA’s public safety purposes when it concluded that ASORA may be applied to Doe without affording him the right to a hearing to show that he does not pose a risk to the public sufficient to require continued registration. Doe’s affected liberty interests are fundamental and thus protected from infringement by state action except under a narrowly drawn statute reasonably designed to achieve a compelling state interest. If Doe can show at a hearing that he does not pose a risk requiring registration, then there is no compelling reason requiring him to register, and the fact that ASORA does not provide for such a hearing means that the statute is unnecessarily broad.

The flaw in ASORA identified in this case is that it does not provide Doe with an opportunity to be heard. This can best be cured by providing him with such an opportunity.

June 16, 2019 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)

Noting that nearly all Democratic candidates are against the death penalty

This lengthy new San Francisco Chronicle article, headlined "Nearly all Democratic candidates oppose death penalty as public opinion shifts," reports on the new political reality surrounding death penalty view of leading candidates.  Here are excerpts:

Not so long ago, opposing the death penalty was pretty much a death knell for a presidential candidate.  Michael Dukakis, for one, sank his remaining hopes in 1988 when he told a debate questioner he would oppose execution even for someone who had raped and murdered his wife.

Now, in what appears to be another sign of a public turnabout on the issue, nearly all of the Democratic presidential hopefuls — with the notable exception of former Vice President Joe Biden — say they are against capital punishment....

If candidates “thought they were going to hurt themselves by coming out against the death penalty, I really think very few would do it,” said Jessica Levinson, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles who specializes in election law and governance.  “I think the consensus (among candidates) is, this is where public opinion is or is about to be.”

Opinion polls indicate a decline in nationwide support for the death penalty, from 80% in a 1994 Gallup survey to 56% in October 2018.  A Quinnipiac University poll in March 2018 found that respondents favored life without parole over the death penalty for murder by 51% to 37%. And the polls say Democrats, who will vote in next year’s primaries, are more than three times as likely as Republicans to oppose the death penalty.

The president ... has direct authority over only the federal death penalty, which accounts for a fraction of the more than 2,700 death sentences now pending in the United States, including 735 in California.

Condemned federal prisoners include a few notorious cases — like Tsarnaev and Dylann Roof, the white supremacist who slaughtered nine African Americans at a South Carolina church in 2015 — but most of the 62 were convicted of murders that came under federal jurisdiction because they took place in federal prisons or other U.S. property or were connected to federal drug crimes.  The last federal execution took place in 2003.

Somewhat relatedly, Nicholas Kristof has this lengthy essay in the New York Times proving arguments for death penalty opposition unde the headline "When We Kill: Everything you think you know about the death penalty is wrong."

June 16, 2019 in Death Penalty Reforms, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Science and Ethics of Algorithms in the Courtroom"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Kia Rahnama now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

This Article analyzes the societal and cultural impacts of greater reliance on the use of algorithms in the courtroom.  Big-data analytics and algorithms are beginning to play a large role in influencing judges’ sentencing and criminal enforcement decisions.  This Article addresses this shift toward greater acceptance of algorithms as models for risk-assessment and criminal forecasting within the context of moral and social movements that have shaped the American justice system’s current approach to punishment and rehabilitation.

By reviewing salient problems of scientific uncertainty that accompany the use of these models and algorithms, the Article calls into question the proposition that greater reliance on algorithms in the courtroom can lead to a more objective and fair criminal sentencing regime. Far from liberating the society from the biases and prejudices that might pollute judges’ decision-making process, these tools can intensify, while simultaneously concealing, entrenched cultural biases that preexist in the society.

Using common themes from the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS), including boundary-work analysis and Public Understanding of Science (PUS), this Article highlights unique technical characteristics of big-data analytics and algorithms that feed into undesirable and deeply-held values and beliefs.  This Article draws attention to specific gaps in technical understanding of algorithmic thinking, such as the black box of algorithms, that can have discordant impact on communicating uncertainty to the populace and reduce accountability and transparency in regulating the use of algorithms.  This Article also provides specific policy proposals that can ameliorate the adverse social and cultural effects of incorporating algorithms into the courtroom.  The discussion of policy proposals borrows from the STS literature on public participation in science and encourages adoption of a policy that incorporates diverse voices from political actors, most affected communities, and the offenders themselves.

June 16, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Technocorrections | Permalink | Comments (0)