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August 3, 2019

Rounding up some 2020 criminal justice reform press pieces

In the wake of the latest debate among Democrats vying for a 2020 Prez nomination, the Marshall Project had these two great pieces on the Democratic field and modern political realities:

"Beyond One-Liners: A Guide to the Democratic Debate on Criminal Justice"

"Are Voters Ready to Move on From Willie Horton?  Democratic debates show how far the conversation has come on justice reform."

In addition, a few other media outlets have had recent pieces in a somewhat similar same vein:

"Criminal Justice Reform Advocates See Prime Opportunity in 2020 Election"

"What's wrong with America's criminal justice system? 6 questions for an expert"

August 3, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Consequences of mental and physical health for reentry and recidivism: Toward a health‐based model of desistance"

The title of this post is the title of this recent Criminology article authored by Nathan Link, Jeffrey Ward and Richard Stansfield. Here is its abstract:

During the last few decades, criminologists have identified several adult roles and statuses, including employment, positive family relations, and economic stability, as critical for promoting successful reintegration and desistance.  Very few researchers, however, have investigated the conditions that serve to bring about these transitions and successes crucial for behavior change.  As a complement to a burgeoning amount of literature on the impact of incarceration on health, we emphasize the reverse: Health has important implications for reentry outcomes and reincarceration.

Informed by multiple disciplines, we advance a health‐based model of desistance in which both mental and physical dimensions of health affect life chances in the employment and family realms and ultimately recidivism.  Investigating this issue with longitudinal data from the Serious and Violent Offender Reentry Initiative (SVORI) and structural equation models, we find overall support for the health‐based model of desistance.  Our results indicate several significant pathways through which both manifestations of health influence employment, family conflict, financial problems, and crime and reincarceration.  The findings highlight the need for implementation of correctional and transitional policies to improve health among the incarcerated and avert health‐related reentry failures.

August 3, 2019 in National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

August 2, 2019

Federal circuit judge laments at lengthy how plain error review now works for guideline errors

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the concurring opinion authored by Fifth Circuit Judge Oldham this week in US v. Del Carpio Frescas, No. 17-50245 (5th Cir. July 29, 2019) (available here). The Fifth Circuit panel vacated a sentence on plain error review based on a small guideline calculation problem. Judge Oldham seems quitr grumpy that applicable SCOTUS precedent required this reversal, and he authors a 20-page concurrence to explain why. That opinion starts this way:

Today’s result might surprise the uninitiated: Based on a one-point offense-level miscalculation in the advisory Guidelines, the United States must restart its criminal-justice machinery so it can fix a mistake that’s supposedly so “plain” it cannot be ignored but also so subtle that del Carpio ignored it below.  This result is particularly surprising because, not so long ago, the Supreme Court told us that “[m]eeting all four prongs of [plain-error review] is difficult, as it should be.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009).  But this case illustrates it’s no longer that difficult.  So I agree current Supreme Court precedent requires that del Carpio be resentenced.  I write separately to explain how we got here.

August 2, 2019 in Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Every D.A. in America Should Open a Sentence Review Unit"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new New York Times commentary authored by James Forman Jr. and Sarah Lustbader. Here are excerpts:

What can we do to shrink our prison population, the world’s largest?

Most answers to that question point forward: They look to reduce future arrests, prosecutions and sentences. But such changes, while desperately needed, do nothing for the hundreds of thousands of people who are already serving long sentences in America’s expensive and overcrowded prison system.

And make no mistake about it: There are a lot of people serving extraordinarily long sentences. The state prison population grew 222 percent from 1980 to 2010; the National Research Council attributes half of that growth to an increase in incarceration time. The Sentencing Project reports that one in seven American prisoners is serving either a life sentence or its functional equivalent. (In some states, the number is almost one in three.)  Once, parole boards could truncate some of these long sentences, but the decimation of parole has largely eliminated that possibility.

The explosion in sentence length has turned some prison wings into de facto nursing homes, with prisons responsible for providing costly medical care to a growing elderly population. Keeping people locked up for so long does little for public safety. Most people who commit crimes, including violent crimes, do so while young. Arrest rates for violent crimes peak during people’s late teens (rates for robbery, for example, are highest at age 19), and criminal careers for violent crime typically last only five to 10 years....

Fortunately there is growing momentum to reduce excessive sentences. Legislation authorizing sentence reductions in old cases has passed in California and the District of Columbia. Senator Cory Booker has proposed something similar at the federal level. And in July, more than 3,000 people were released from federal custody under the First Step Act, passed in December, which allows certain federal prisoners to earn early release for good conduct.

But there is another solution to this problem. Prosecutors can recognize their role in creating the crisis and work toward fixing it. They should start by opening “sentence review units,” which would consist of small dedicated teams of lawyers, investigators, data scientists and social workers within the prosecutor’s office. The details would vary by place, but each team would review past cases, and when they find sentences that seem particularly egregious, prosecutors would give these cases a second look....

The concept of sentence review units is not entirely unfamiliar; it builds on conviction review units that root out cases where an innocent person has been found guilty. Sentence review units are similar, but instead of wrongful convictions, they seek out cases where the sentence seems excessive. What counts as “excessive” is necessarily a judgment call, but examples include sentences that in retrospect seem disproportionate to the severity of the offense, or those that are far longer than what a person sentenced today would receive.

Why should prosecutors be the ones to lead the movement to cut down long sentences? Because they were, and in many places still are, a major driver of the country’s sentencing explosion. In the courtroom, they have pushed for maximum sentences and resisted appeals for leniency. In statehouses, they have lobbied legislatures for longer sentences and opposed reform efforts...

Larry Krasner, Philadelphia’s district attorney, intends to open a sentence review unit. “Sometimes extreme sentences reflect unscientific beliefs; sometimes they reflect racism; and sometimes they reflect judges who punish you 10 times harder if you went to trial,” he told us in an interview. In all these cases, he said, the upshot is the same: “There are a lot of people in jail who very clearly don’t need to stay in jail.”

For now, sentence review remains ad hoc. But demands from citizens and leaders can help these local efforts grow into a national movement. Cutting down excessive sentences will not, on its own, solve the crisis of mass incarceration or bring our prison population in line with the rest of the world. But failing to act will ensure that the wounds caused by those sentences never heal.

Regular readers will not be surprised to know I am a big fan of this idea. Indeed, I wrote an a short article on this very topic nearly a decade ago, titled Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to be Second-Look Sentencers, 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 429 (2010).

August 2, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)

August 1, 2019

"Using the ADA's 'Integration Mandate' to Disrupt Mass Incarceration"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now on SSRN authored by Robert Dinerstein and Shira Wakschlag.  Here is the abstract:

As a result of the disability rights movement's fight for the development of community-based services, the percentage of people with intellectual and developmental disabilities (I/DD) and mental illness living in institutions has significantly decreased over the last few decades.  However, in part because of government failure to invest properly in community-based services required for a successful transition from institutions, individuals with disabilities are now dramatically overrepresented in jails and prisons. 

The Americans with Disabilities Act's (ADA) "integration mandate" -- a principle strengthened by the Supreme Court's 1999 Olmstead v. L.C. decision, entitling individuals with disabilities to receive services in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs -- may provide one avenue to disrupt the school-to-prison pipeline and overrepresentation of people with I/DD and mental illness in prisons and jails.  In this Article, we explore how the federal government and private parties have used--and are beginning to use in new ways -- the integration mandate to advocate for the rights of individuals with disabilities to receive the supports they need to thrive in the community and avoid unnecessary entanglement with the criminal justice system.

August 1, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (2)

Another round of great new Quick Facts publications from US Sentencing Commission

I am always eager to praise the US Sentencing Commission for continuing to produce a steady stream of its insightful little data documents in its terrific series of reader-friendly "Quick Facts" publications ( (which are designed to "give readers basic facts about a single area of federal crime in an easy-to-read, two-page format"). And I have recently seen that there are a number of new Quick Facts on a lot of major federal sentencing topics based on the USSC's recently released 2018 fiscal year data. Here are some these newer publications:

Drugs

Firearms

Offender Groups

August 1, 2019 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines | Permalink | Comments (0)

"The Singularity and the Familiarity of Solitary Confinement"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Judith Resnik now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

More than 60,000 people are held in solitary confinement in U.S. prisons.  This essay explores the ways in which solitary confinement is distinctive and yet also is a familiar feature of U.S. prisons.  To do so, I track the expansion of solitary confinement, analyze the debate in federal courts about its lawfulness, and provide recent data on its widespread use.

In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court condoned the use of solitary confinement, even as it also licensed courts to inquire about whether a particular version imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” on an individual.  If a prisoner can make such a showing, prison officials must provide some procedural buffers against arbitrary placements.

Empirical understandings of the use of solitary confinement comes through nation-wide surveys undertaken by the Association of State Correctional Administrators and the Liman Center at Yale Law School.  Data from 2018 identified more than 60,000 individuals who were placed in cells for 15 days or more for 22 hours or more.  Almost 4,000 people have been so confined for three years or more.

Solitary confinement is thus all too “typical” a facet of prison life.  Yet its commonplace occurrence ought not insulate solitary confinement from the conclusion that it is an illicitly cruel practice that debilitates individuals.  The complexity of doing so stems not only from the widespread use of solitary confinement, but also from the ways in which U.S. prisons are committed to many practices that are isolating and disabling of individuals.

August 1, 2019 in Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)

July 31, 2019

Struggling with an execution protocol, Ohio Gov DeWine delays execution scheduled for Sept 2019 to May 2020

This morning I reported in this post about the discussion and difficulties surrounding Ohio's execution protocol, a matter which needed to be worked out quickly if the state was going to go ahead with a scheduled September execution.  But, as reported in this local article, this afternoon Ohio Gov DeWine "delayed the execution date of convicted murderer Warren Henness, the next Ohio inmate set to be put to death, from Sept. 12 until May 14, 2020."  Here is more:

Gov. Mike DeWine says Ohio may need to stop executing people by injection because state officials have been unable to obtain the necessary drugs, according to a DeWine spokesman.

DeWine, a Greene County Republican, has asked legislative leaders to consider legislation that would change Ohio’s 18-year-old law making lethal injection the state’s sole execution method, according to gubernatorial spokesman Dan Tierney....

In January, a federal judge suggested that Ohio’s current three-drug execution cocktail was unconstitutional, leading DeWine to postpone execution dates for Henness and three other men and order a review of the state’s death-penalty method.

However, since then, state officials have found they’ve been unable to purchase new execution drugs, Tierney said. In addition, as many lethal-injection drugs are manufactured primarily for medical use, Tierney said the governor is concerned that if drug companies find that Ohio used its drugs to put people to death, the companies will refuse to sell any of its drugs (not just the ones used in executions) to the state. That could endanger the ability of thousands of Ohioans – such as Medicaid recipients, state troopers, and prison inmates – to get drugs through state programs, Tierney said.

DeWine has pointedly not said which, if any, alternative execution methods he would prefer to see used in Ohio. Tierney said that’s because the governor is concerned that any such comments could affect ongoing death-penalty court cases.

At least one Ohio death-row inmate has asked to be put to death via firing squad. Tennessee brought back use of its electric chair twice last year, and Oklahoma has been working to execute inmates using nitrogen gas.

Even if state lawmakers agree that Ohio should find another way to kill death-row inmates, as the legislature is currently on summer break, it’s unlikely any change in state law will come before this fall, at soonest.

Senate President Larry Obhof told reporters Wednesday that he looks forward to speaking with the governor and House Speaker Larry Householder about what to do about Ohio’s execution method. “I think all three of us approach the issue with an open mind,” said Obhof, a Medina Republican. Obhof added that he thinks a majority of Ohioans support keeping the death penalty itself as an option, though he noted that the Senate is considering legislation that would prohibit executions of people with severe mental illness.

A few (of many) prior recent related posts:

July 31, 2019 | Permalink | Comments (1)

Two more open access articles from FSR issue on "The Tyranny of the Trial Penalty"

In this post last month, I highlighted the publication of the latest extraordinary (double) issue of the Federal Sentencing Reporter titled "The Tyranny of the Trial Penalty: The Consensus that Coercive Plea Practices Must End."  As mentioned before, this FSR issue includes 16(!) original pieces on various aspects of "The Trial Penalty," and it is fully available on-line at this link

As also mentioned before, though a full subscription to FSR is needed for full on-line access to all FSR content, the University of California Press has graciously agreed to make various articles from this special issue available to all on-line for a limited period.  Valuably, the issue's terrific introduction authored by Norman Reimer, executive director of NACDL, and his colleague Martín Sabelli, NACDL's second vice president, is to remain freely available for an extended period of time.  And now I see that these two additional pieces are now accessible to all (with a few paragraphs quoted here):

The “Virtual Extinction” of Criminal Trials: A Lawyer’s View from the Well of the Court by Frederick P. Hafetz

Twenty-five years earlier, nearly 20 percent of defendants in the federal criminal justice system went to trial.  By the time the Lorenzos were indicted in 2004, only 4 percent went to trial. That number has since decreased even further so that now less than 3 percent go to trial.  Since the mid-1980s, as Manhattan federal judge Jed Rakoff states, federal criminal trials have undergone a “virtual extinction.”

This dramatic decline in the frequency of criminal trials in the federal system is mirrored in the state system as well.  While data in the state criminal justice systems on the number of trials is not maintained as comprehensively as it is in the federal system, available data and studies show a similar pattern of decline, although not as sharp as in the federal system.  In New York, California, and Illinois, for example, the percentage of defendants going to trial is less than-one half of what it was thirty years ago.

Why the Founders Cherished the Jury by Vikrant P. Reddy and R. Jordan Richardson

You would be hard-pressed to find a Constitutional issue that garnered more agreement among the Founders than the right to trial by jury.  As historian William Nelson notes, “For Americans after the Revolution, as well as before, the right to trial by jury was probably the most valued of all civil rights.”  Writing in 1788, Alexander Hamilton observed that among the “friends and adversaries of the plan of the [Constitutional] convention, if they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury.” Hamilton’s chief political rival, Thomas Jefferson, echoed these sentiments, and considered trial by jury as the “only anchor ever yet invented by man, by which a government can be held to the principles of its constitution.”

Prior related posts:

July 31, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (4)

"Federal Criminal Risk Assessment"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Brandon Garrett recently posted to SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Risk assessments are a common feature of federal decisionmaking, including across a range of administrative agencies.  However, in federal criminal law, risk assessments have been only haltingly adopted.  Decisions regarding bail, sentences, and prison programming have largely been made based on official discretion.  Risk assessment instruments are currently used in federal courts pre-trial, post-conviction, and in federal prisons regarding security levels and reentry, with highly uneven results to date.  The adoption of the FIRST STEP Act, which has the ambition to transform the federal prison system through use of risk instruments, has the potential to introduce a more legitimate, transparent, and validated approach, using instruments developed publicly and, ideally, implemented consistently.

Questions remain regarding whether the risk and needs instrument adopted will then be successfully and consistently implemented to assign inmates to programs, whether there will be adequate resources for those programs, and what the effectiveness of those programs will be.  Prior efforts in the federal system, including concerns raised by reports and audits of federal risk assessment, as well as evidence from efforts in states and locally, suggest reason for caution and care as this new system is implemented. Important lessons can be learned from the successes and the failures of prior efforts to improve outcomes in the criminal system.

July 31, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

The long legacy of drug wars: Eighth Circuit panel affirms LWOP sentence for drug dealer as reasonable

As long-time readers likely realize, I do not blog much these days about how federal circuit courts are conducting reasonableness review of sentences — largely because there are precious few cases in which circuit judges seriously question (or even seriously engage with) the sentencing judgments of district courts.  A helpful reader alerted me to a reasonableness review decision from the Eighth Circuit today which provides another example of how disinclined circuit courts are to question even the most extreme prison sentences.

US v. Duke, No. 18-1371 (8th Cir. July 310, 2019) (available here), involves the appeal after a resentencing of a man originally sentenced three decades ago.  Back then, arguably at the height of the modern drug war, "Ralph Duke was sentenced in 1990 to a term of life imprisonment plus forty years for committing several serious drug trafficking and firearms offenses."   Here is a description of Duke's crimes from this latest opinion:

Duke controlled all phases of a drug trafficking organization in the Minneapolis/St. Paul area from 1984 through June 1989.  He purchased cocaine primarily from a Colombian-affiliated source in Houston or from sources in Los Angeles.  The cocaine was transported to Minnesota in vehicles owned by Duke and driven by younger members of his drug trafficking organization.  Duke then distributed kilograms of cocaine to dealers for resale at the street level in smaller quantities.  Duke laundered the proceeds of drug sales by purchasing homes and cars in the names of others.  All told, Duke and his organization trafficked over fifty kilograms of cocaine before law enforcement interrupted their operations.  When Duke was apprehended in May 1989, officers found two loaded handguns in his bedroom and two assault shotguns and two AR-15 semi-automatic rifles in his residence.  The government charged at least twenty-five people as a result of the investigation of Duke’s organization. 

In other words, Duke was a big-time drug dealer in the 1980s, though it does not appear that he was actively involved in any violent activities or that his case involved other aggravating factors (though I suppose he might be called a drug kingpin).  But back in the 1990s, when the drug war was ranging and the federal sentencing guidelines were mandatory, perhaps it is not surprising that the federal district judge originally imposed an LWOP sentence on Duke.

But fast forward nearly 30 years, and Duke had the chance to benefit from a full resentencing in 2018 due to various legal developments.  Circa 2018, the federal sentencing guidelines were now advisory and, according to Duke, a lower sentence was justified in light of his "exceptional institutional conduct over the last 29 years, lack of criminal history, age, medical history, family ties, rehabilitation, remorse, and low risk of recidivism."  But the same federal district judge was unmoved and decided to give Duke an LWOP sentence yet again.  And the Eighth Circuit panel, in the ruling linked above, decided this LWOP sentence was reasonable.

When Booker was first decided and circuit courts were tasked with reasonableness review based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), I had sincerely hoped appellate judges would come to embrace the task of ensuring sentences were "not greater than necessary to comply with the purposes set forth" by Congress.  But it became all too clear all too quickly that all too few circuit judges were eager to rigorously review long prison sentences, especially if those sentences fell within calculated guideline ranges.  Years later, even with mass incarceration and long sentences for drug offenses subject to considerable criticism, we still see federal judges finding no problem with giving a "death-in-prison" sentence based on drug dealing many decades ago.

July 31, 2019 in Booker in district courts, Booker in the Circuits, Drug Offense Sentencing, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Ohio Gov DeWine now reportedly prepared to move forward with executions he delayed ... even without new lethal-injection protocol

As reported here six months ago, the Governor of Ohio has imposed something of a de facto moratorium on executions in the state not long after taking office because of concerns over the state's (historically troubled) lethal injection protocol.  But this new local article, headlined "DeWine now OK with ‘pouring fire in vein’ executions," reports on new developments suggesting new executions might go forward with an old execution protocol. Here are the details:

Despite saying in February that “Ohio is not going to execute someone under my watch when a federal judge has found it to be cruel and unusual punishment,” Gov. Mike DeWine will consider using that same method in an upcoming execution, his spokesman said Tuesday.  The state’s lawyers have argued before a federal appeals court that Ohio’s current three-drug mixture can be used despite the lower court ruling likening it to waterboarding and pouring fire in the prisoner’s veins.

The governor earlier this year delayed four executions and ordered corrections officials to come up with a new death penalty protocol after a federal judge sitting in Dayton raised serious questions about the existing one.  Tuesday’s news comes after U.S. Magistrate Judge Michael Merz took the unusual step last week of ordering lawyers for the state to show DeWine a brief they filed in a death-penalty appeal. The brief appeared to be at odds with DeWine’s public position on Ohio’s controversial death-penalty protocol, Merz said in the order.

Merz is presiding in a lawsuit over whether Ohio’s death-penalty protocol violates constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. He ruled in January that experts had convinced him that Ohio’s condemned were likely to experience severe pain using the protocol.  However, Merz did not stop the execution of Warren Keith Henness because, the judge ruled, Henness didn’t propose a viable alternative method of execution as required by a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision.

In response to Merz’s ruling, DeWine in January delayed Henness’s execution, saying the state would devise a new protocol.  Then in March, he delayed three more.  But now Henness’s new execution date is just six weeks away and the governor’s spokesman couldn’t say Monday how close the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction is to coming up with a new protocol.

A puzzled Judge Merz last week noted that in their appellate briefings the state’s lawyers voiced strong support for the death protocol that Merz — and presumably DeWine — found so problematic.  The state has “vigorously defended the existing protocol and criticized (Merz) for suggesting a stay of this litigation until the governor’s directions (to develop a new one) are carried out, as if it were (Merz’s) personal agenda rather than that of the governor,” Merz wrote, justifying his order that state lawyers show DeWine the appellate brief. “The court merely wishes to ensure that the governor has had an opportunity to see for himself whether he perceives this inconsistency.”...

But lawyers for Ohio said even if the condemned could feel pain after being injected with Midazolam, it still would not amount to constitutionally prohibited cruel and unusual punishment. “If hanging does not produce an unacceptable degree of pain even though it usually results in suffocation, then it follows that Midazolam does not cause ‘severe pain and needless suffering’ even if it is ‘certain or very likely to cause’ suffocation,” they wrote in their brief to the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati.

They were quoting from Justice Neil Gorsuch’s opinion in Bucklew v. Precythe, the U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent ruling regarding the death penalty. In discussing hanging, Gorsuch was arguing that at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, people didn’t see hanging as intentionally cruel, unlike practices such as disemboweling or burning the condemned while they were still conscious....

Press secretary Dan Tierney said there’s nothing unusual about DeWine delaying executions over concerns about Ohio’s death penalty at the same time the state’s lawyers are in court defending it. “Their job is to defend the laws as valid and constitutional until they’re proven otherwise,” Tierney said. Tierney and the state’s lawyers are holding out the possibility that Henness might be executed using Ohio’s existing three-drug protocol — an issue that Tierney said has “not been fully litigated.”

Asked whether DeWine might restart executions using the current protocol if the state’s lawyers prevail in that litigation, Tierney said in an email, “Understand that these are hypothetical scenarios, but if the court overturns the factual record in the lower court, or the factual record otherwise changes through the legal proceedings, the governor will certainly review that new evidence regarding the protocol and take it under consideration.”

Henness and his lawyers might find that litigation difficult.  The Supreme Court — particularly it’s conservative majority — has since 2008 shown itself to be increasingly skeptical of prisoners’ claims that various methods of lethal injection amount to cruel and unusual punishment.  They’ve voiced suspicions that what prisoners and anti-death-penalty advocates really are aiming for is a backdoor abolition of execution.

A few (of many) prior recent related posts:

UPDATE: This new local article, headlined "Ohio can’t get drugs for a new execution method, DeWine admits," highlights how drug acquisition issues continue to cause problems for the Buckeye state's effort to get its machinery of death operational:

Ohio Gov. Mike DeWine said Wednesday that state prison officials are finding it impossible to find any company to supply drugs an execution alternative to one that essentially has been declared cruel and unusual. He said he would talk to Statehouse leaders about legislation allowing a different execution method.  Some Ohio death row inmates have been asking to be executed by firing squad, while two Tennessee inmates last year opted to be executed in the electric chair. Ohio’s “Old Sparky” has been in storage for years.

DeWine delayed four executions early this year after a federal judge in Dayton said Ohio’s current intravenous protocol came perilously close to violating constitutional protections against cruel and unusual punishment. One was rescheduled for Sept. 12, but DeWine on Wednesday said that was under review....

Ohio had been buying the drugs through its Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services and then driving them down to the death house at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility without telling drug makers what the substances would be used for.  However, DeWine said the drug makers have told the state that if they suspect that any of their products would be used in executions, they would stop selling to the state altogether, potentially depriving tens of thousands of Ohioans of important medicine. “We are in a very difficult situation,” DeWine said.

July 31, 2019 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

July 30, 2019

A (depressing) first term commutation scorecard for recent US Presidents

By my count, thanks to two commutations granted yesterday, President Donald Trump has now commuted six prison sentences during the first two-third of his first term in office.  (For those interested in an accounting, the folks who have received commutations are Sholom Rubashkin, Alice Marie Johnson, Dwight and Steven Hammond, Ronen Nahmani and Ted Suhl.  All of Prez Trump's clemency work is detailed on this wikipedia page.) 

Given that there are over 177,000 persons serving federal prison sentences, six commutations is, by all sensible measures, a very small number.  The granting of only six commutations seems especially disappointing given that last year Prez Trump was talking about considering clemency requests that including "3,000 names, many of those names have been treated unfairly, ... [and] in some cases, their sentences are far too long."  Six commutations to date also seems quite small in light of the advocacy by Alice Marie Johnson, Prez Trump's most famous commutation recipient, who has urged the President to free "thousands more" federal prisoners like her.

But if we bring a little historical perspective to this story, six commutations during a president's first Term in office starts looking a lot better — primarily because the clemency records of recent presidents is so very awful.  Specifically, using the official clemency statistics here from the Office of the Pardon Attorney (and perhaps being off a little because of the fiscal year accounting), here is a first term commutation scorecard for US Presidents over the last half century:

Prez              Commutations in first term

Nixon             48

Ford               22

Carter            29

Reagan           10

HW Bush         3

Clinton            3

W Bush            2

Obama             1

Trump              6

As informed readers know, back in Nixon's day, the federal prison population was only just over 20,000.  That so very few federal prisoners have recently received clemency while the federal prison population has swelled makes these numbers even more depressing.  The also look terrible if we look back further historically, as almost every other 20th Century US President (except for Dwight Eisenhower) granted a hundred or more commutations while in office (with Woodrow Wilson granting 341 in 1920 alone).

July 30, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)

Rounding up capital commentary in response to AG Barr's effort to restart the federal machinery of death

Unsurprisingly, Attorney General William Barr announcement of a change in the federal execution protocol and scheduling of five federal executions (basics here) has prompted lost of reactions from the commentariat.  Here is just a sampling of some notable reactions and discussions I have seen: 

From The Atlantic, "Barr Doesn't See What's Wrong With the Death Penalty"

From Fox News, "Robert Blecker: AG Barr is right to resume death penalty for vicious killers"

From Fox News, "Hannah Cox: AG Barr is wrong to resume executions -- Death penalty goes against conservative principles"

From The Hill, "The death penalty is racially biased, fiscally irresponsible and very inaccurate"

From The Intercept, "With Federal Executions Looming, the Democrats' Death Penalty Legacy Is Coming Back to Haunt Us"

From New York magazine, "The Death Penalty Is Already a Farce. William Barr’s Plan Might Make It Torturous."

From Slate, "Trump’s Death Penalty Obsession Won’t Stem the Tide Against Executions"

From Spectator USA, "The death penalty is red tape threaded into a noose: On conservative grounds it is no longer defensible"

From Time, "Why the Justice Department's Plan to Use a Single Drug for Lethal Injections Is Controversial"

From The Washington Examiner, "Former death penalty proponent Biden flip-flops as federal cases advance"

 

Prior recent related posts:

July 30, 2019 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Public Perceptions of Plea Bargaining"

The title of this post is the title of this new article now available via SSRN authored by Thea Johnson. Here is its abstract:

Several studies indicate that the public disapproves of plea bargaining, the most common method of resolving cases in the criminal system.  However, such studies assume a common understanding of plea bargaining with no basis for this assumption.  Although there are a few basic constitutional requirements for a plea bargain, what it is, why it is used, and how plea bargains are performed remains a matter of some debate.  Scholars, for instance, paint a particularly dark picture of plea bargaining, where, among other flaws, the innocent are regularly coerced into pleading.  This view of plea bargaining is quite different from the version portrayed on TV, where the guilty are punished, the innocent spared, and plea bargains provide only as much benefit to a defendant as a reasonable society can tolerate.  Given these disparate views, this essay asks: what does the public understand a plea bargain to be?

In (partial) response to this question, this essay does three things.  First, it examines the gulf between "insider" narratives, among practitioners and scholars, and "outsider" narratives, such as portrayals of plea bargaining on fictionalized legal dramas, about how and why plea bargaining happens.  Second, it asks: What narrative, if any, does the public believe about plea bargaining? It reviews the scholarship in the field of public perceptions of plea bargaining and finds that although the literature provides some evidence that the public disapproves of plea bargaining, the average person’s understanding of the plea bargain is essentially unknown.  In response to this lack of research, this essay lays out the findings of a study, conducted by the author, about perceptions of plea bargaining among a group of law students and finds that this population adopts pieces from each narrative in their understanding of plea bargaining.  Third, this essay concludes with an explanation of why it is critical to study the public’s understanding of plea bargaining and proposes some areas of future study.  Given that the criminal justice system touches the lives of so many people in the country and that plea bargaining is the primary means of resolving cases in the criminal system, the public’s conception about this secretive practice has meaningful implications for the legitimacy of the system itself.

July 30, 2019 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

July 29, 2019

Prez Trump gets back to using his clemency pen with two commutations and five pardons

As reported in this article from The Hill, "President Trump on Monday commuted the sentences of two nonviolent criminals and granted pardons to five others who previously pleaded guilty to nonviolent crimes but have completed their sentences." Here are details:

The White House announced that Trump commuted the sentence of Ronen Nahmani, who was convicted in 2015 and sentenced to 20 years in prison for conspiring to distribute a synthetic drug known as spice. The White House said Nahmani was a first-time offender with no prior criminal history who has five young children at home and a wife battling terminal cancer. The release also noted his case for an early release received support from bipartisan lawmakers.

Trump also commuted the sentence of Ted Suhl, an Arkansas man who was convicted in 2016 on four counts of bribery after prosecutors said he took part in a scheme to increase Medicaid payments to his company. Suhl appealed the ruling, but it was upheld, and he intended to file for an appeal with the U.S. Supreme Court. The White House noted his "spotless disciplinary record" while incarcerated and highlighted his support from former Gov. Mike Huckabee and former U.S. Attorney Bud Cummins.

In addition, Trump granted executive clemency to five people. The president pardoned John Richard Bubala, who pleaded guilty in 1990 to improper use of federal government property by transferring automotive equipment to the town of Milltown, Ind. Trump also pardoned Roy Wayne McKeever, who pleaded guilty in 1989 after he was arrested for transporting marijuana from Mexico to Oklahoma. McKeever was 19 at the time and served one year in jail.

Rodney Takumi received a pardon for a conviction over a 1987 arrest while he was working at an illegal gambling parlor. Takumi now owns a tax preparation franchise within the Navajo Nation, the White House said.

Trump granted clemency to Michael Tedesco, who was convicted in 1990 of drug trafficking and fraud. Former President Obama had pardoned Tedesco in 2017, but the fraud conviction remained on his record due to a clerical error. Trump's pardon will remove that charge, allowing Tedesco to obtain state licenses needed for his business.

The president also pardoned Chalmer Lee Williams, who was convicted in 1995 of several crimes related to theft of firearms and checked luggage during his time as a baggage handler. Williams served four months in prison and two years of supervised release. His voting rights in Kentucky were restored in 1998, the White House said....

With Monday's announcements, Trump has now pardoned or reduced the sentences of 19 individuals since taking office.

I had literally written to someone just today that I had largely given up on Prez Trump using his clemency powers regularly, and here he goes again. I was involved in helping to write an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to take up the Nahmani case, so I am very pleased to see that the executive branch provided some relief to an extreme sentence after the judicial branch failed to do so.

Here are the official statements from the White House on these new clemency grants:

President Trump Commutes Sentence of Ronen Nahmani

President Trump Commutes Sentence of Ted Suhl

Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Grants of Clemency

July 29, 2019 in Clemency and Pardons, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Split Michigan Supreme Court finds due process precludes use of acquitted conduct at sentencing

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the rich opinions coming today from the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Beck, No. 152934 (Michigan July 29, 2019) (available here).  Here is part of the start of the majority opinion authored by Chief Justice McCormack:

In this case, we consider whether a sentencing judge can sentence a defendant for a crime of which the defendant was acquitted.

That the question seems odd foreshadows its answer. But to explain the question first: Once a jury acquits a defendant of a given crime, may the judge, notwithstanding that acquittal, take the same alleged crime into consideration when sentencing the defendant for another crime of which the defendant was convicted?  Such a possibility presents itself when a defendant is charged with multiple crimes.  The jury speaks, convicting on some charges and acquitting on others.  At sentencing for the former, a judge might seek to increase the defendant’s sentence (under the facts of this case, severely increase, though we consider the question in principle) because the judge believes that the defendant really committed one or more of the crimes on which the jury acquitted.

Probably committed, that is: A judge in such circumstances might reason that although the jury acquitted on some charges, the jury acquitted because the state failed to prove guilt on those charges beyond a reasonable doubt.  But the jury might have thought it was somewhat likely the defendant committed them.  Or the judge, presiding over the trial, might reach that conclusion.  And so during sentencing, when a judge may consider the defendant’s uncharged bad acts under a lower standard — a mere preponderance of the evidence — the judge might impose a sentence reflecting both the crimes on which the jury convicted, and also those on which the jury acquitted but which the judge finds the defendant more likely than not did anyway.  Is that permissible?

We hold that the answer is no. Once acquitted of a given crime, it violates due process to sentence the defendant as if he committed that very same crime.

Justice Viviano authored a lengthy solo concurrence that starts this way:

In every criminal trial, jurors are instructed, “What you decide about any fact in this case is final.”  But if a judge may increase a defendant’s sentence beyond what the jury verdict alone authorizes — here, based on the judge’s finding that the defendant committed a crime of which the jury just acquitted him — a more accurate instruction would read: “What you decide about any fact in this case is interesting, but the court is always free to disregard it.” Though I concur fully in the majority opinion, including its holding that due process precludes consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, I write separately to explain (1) why I believe that, because defendant’s sentence would not survive reasonableness review without the judge-found fact of homicide, his sentence also violates the Sixth Amendment, and (2) why I believe more generally that the consideration of acquitted conduct at sentencing raises serious concerns under the Sixth Amendment.

And Justice Clement authored an extended dissent for herself and two other that concludes this way:

The majority’s holding may be difficult to apply, and it directly contradicts existing precedent.  The presumption of innocence does not prohibit the trial court from considering conduct underlying acquitted charges when sentencing a defendant for convicted offenses as long as the conduct is relevant and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. The contrary conclusion is belied by the majority’s failure to cite any supporting precedent for its conclusion.  Accordingly, I dissent from this Court’s reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  I would have affirmed the holding of the Court of Appeals that the trial court did not err by considering conduct underlying defendant’s acquitted charge but reversed insofar as the Court of Appeals remanded this case for a Crosby hearing.  Pursuant to this Court’s decision in People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453, 460-461; 902 NW2d 327 (2017), I would have instead remanded this case to the Court of Appeals so that it could determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality.

Based on my too-quick scan of these opinions, it seems that the majority's holding is grounded on federal constitutional law (rather than just on state constitutional law). This means the state of Michigan could reasonably opt to seek further review in the US Supreme Court. Give Justice Gorsuch's work to date on similar issues and Justice Kavanaugh's past statements about acquitted conduct, I really hope Michigan might try to garner the Justices' attention on this conceptual and practically important topic.

July 29, 2019 in Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (7)

"The Effect of Public Health Insurance on Criminal Recidivism"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new empirical paper recently posted to SSRN and authored by Erkmen Giray Aslim, Murat Mungan, Carlos Navarro and Han Yu. Here is its abstract:

The prevalence of mental health and substance abuse disorders is high among incarcerated individuals.  Many ex-offenders reenter the community without receiving any specialized treatment and return to prison with existing behavioral health problems.  We consider a Beckerian law enforcement theory to identify different sources through which access to health care may impact ex-offenders' propensities to recidivate, and empirically estimate the effect of access to public health insurance on criminal recidivism. 

We exploit the plausibly exogenous variation in state decisions to expand Medicaid under the Affordable Care Act.  Using administrative data on prison admission and release records from 2010 to 2016, we find that the expansions decrease recidivism for both violent and public order crimes.  In addition, we find that the public coverage expansions substantially increase access to substance use disorder treatment.  The effect is salient for individuals who are covered by Medicaid and referred to treatment by the criminal justice system. These findings are most consistent with the theory that increased access to health care reduces ex-offenders' perceived non-monetary benefits from committing crimes.

I think the punchy way to pitch these findings would be to say that Obamacare reduces crime and limiting or eliminating Obamacare risks increasing crime.  Very interesting (though not all that surprising for folks who think through issues at the intersection of criminal justice and health care access).

July 29, 2019 in National and State Crime Data, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)

Will criminal justice reform take on a bigger role in round two of the 2020 Democratic Prez candidate debates?

190717174548-cnn-democratic-presidential-debate-large-169The next round of debates among the Democratic candidates eager to take on Prez Trump in Nov 2020 takes place this week in Detroit (and this local article provides a partial review and preview of the candidates).  I have an inkling that Prez Trump's varied attacks on various Democratic members of Congress may take up a lot of the conversation, but I am of course hoping that we get more focus on criminal justice reform issues.  For various reasons, I think we might.

For starters, federal criminal justice developments have been in the news quite a bit of late.  Two weeks ago, we had the implementation of the FIRST STEP Act kick into a new gear (basics here), and last week Attorney General William Barr announced a change in the federal execution protocol and the scheduling of five federal executions (basics here).  These developments certainly could justify a focused question ("Will you pledge to commute all federal death sentences as Prez?") or general question ("What should be prioritized in the NEXT STEP Act?") on federal criminal justice reforms.

In addition, a number prominent candidates, in particular Joe Biden, Cory Booker and Pete Buttigeig, have put forth major criminal justice reform plans in recent weeks.  These candidates now have developed positions and "talking points" on various criminal justice reform topics, and they may be interested in bring up their plans in more general discussions to highlight their priorities.

And speaking of Joe Biden, it is possible that some of his competitors might think that he can be attacked based on his past role in various federal laws that are now the subject of much justified criticism.  With Biden seemingly still the front-runner, there might be an interest in bringing up his criminal justice reform past.  This new lengthy Washington Post article, headlined "How an early Biden crime bill created the sentencing disparity for crack and cocaine trafficking," certainly tees up one possible line of attack.  Here is an excerpt:

As he makes another bid for the White House, Biden, now 76, is facing criticism over his past advocacy for tough-on-crime policies, particularly his authorship of the 1994 omnibus anti-crime law that is blamed for accelerating incarceration rates, especially of black men.  One of his Democratic rivals, Sen. Cory Booker of New Jersey, last week said that the law “inflicted immeasurable harm on black, brown, and low-income communities.”  Booker is expected to raise the issue again before a national audience during this week’s primary debate.

Biden’s role in passing the lesser-known 1986 law and creating the crack-powder disparity reveals how he grappled with policies years earlier that would affect the black community.  The episode could further complicate his ongoing struggle to reconcile his decades-long record with changing political and societal norms....

An examination of Biden’s work on a half-dozen criminal justice bills found that his legislation included liberal priorities but also broadly served to push federal criminal policy to the right in response to a surge of violent crime.  Biden’s language and policy positions were mainstream for Democrats at the time, reflecting a political consensus around tough-on-crime policies during the crime wave that began in the 1970s and efforts by many in the party to assert a more centrist image.

Critics now say those policies helped fuel incarceration and racial disparities in the criminal justice system — and are calling on Biden to take responsibility for his part....

The Anti-Drug Abuse Act authorized more than $1 billion for drug enforcement, education and treatment programs.  But one of its most consequential provisions was the “100-1” rule, so named because it required a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for trafficking in 500 grams of powder cocaine or five grams of crack.

Though Biden took responsibility for the formula in 2002, it is unclear exactly how it came to be part of his bill.  The ratio was more aggressive than proposals from either the Reagan administration, which sought a “20-1” rule, or House Democrats, who held the majority and sought a “50-1” rule, but less aggressive than the “1,000-1” ratio proposed by Sen. Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.), the co-chairman of Biden’s working group.

The process had turned into a political “bidding war” between Republicans and Democrats, who were courting fearful voters ahead of the 1986 elections, said Eric Sterling, a former House Democratic staffer who worked on the 50-1 proposal.

No experts recommended a 100-1 ratio, said Sterling, now president of the Criminal Justice Policy Foundation, a drug policy and criminal justice reform group, who said he regrets working on the House proposal.  “Biden was the lead anti-drug guy among the Democrats.  As ranking member, he had critical sign-off authority on legislation.  A lot of these concerns about the 100-to-1 ratio really are questions that Biden needs to answer for,” Sterling said in an interview this month.

A few of many prior recent related posts:

July 29, 2019 in Campaign 2020 and sentencing issues, Drug Offense Sentencing, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

July 28, 2019

"The Agony & the Ecstasy of #MeToo: The Hidden Costs of Reliance on Carceral Politics"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper authored by Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Many have considered the conversation sparked by #metoo as a necessary and overdue interrogation of not only the spectre of common sexual harms in American society, but also the inadequacy of traditional mechanisms of accountability.  Against this backdrop, smaller-scale flashpoints have erupted over perceived inadequacy of punishment, such as the successful campaign to recall California judge Aaron Persky from the bench over what many saw as leniency in the widely- publicized case of People v. Brock Turner.  This paper analyzes the complex relationship between #metoo and the carceral state.

In arguably the most punitive nation on the planet — particularly when considering the breadth and scope of public post-conviction registries — I argue that seeking to address broad and systemic failures of accountability by advocating for more severe punishment paradoxically undermines the larger goals of #metoo to the extent that those goals are concerned with effectively challenging systems that perpetuate sexual harms.  An approach that harmonizes efforts to prevent sexual harms and bring those who cause harm to account without endorsement of carceral politics is explored.

July 28, 2019 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (0)

"After the First Step Act, we all have a role to play to build a society of second chances"

The title of this post is the headline of this notable new Fox News commentary authored by Craig DeRoche, who is the senior vice president of advocacy and public policy at Prison Fellowship. I recommend the piece in full, and here are excerpts:

FSA’s federal sentencing and prison system reforms still face key administrative and financial challenges.  Since May 2018, the Bureau of Prisons has lacked a permanent director.  The agency urgently needs a committed, effective leader to drive implementation of the reforms in the FSA. Five vacancies on the U.S. Sentencing Commission also mean that the sentencing reforms included in the FSA are yet to be incorporated into the sentencing guidelines used by federal judges.

In other significant ways, the FSA has yet to live up to its promise.  Evidence-based programming to reduce recidivism, a much-touted pillar of the bill, is not yet fully funded or implemented.  Further, the BOP has yet to allow faith-based prison programs with a proven record of recidivism-reduction, including Prison Fellowship, to function as reentry programs outside the chaplaincy.

As the largest Christian nonprofit serving prisoners and their families, we urge Congress to exercise its oversight and budgetary powers to ensure this historic achievement in federal criminal justice reform does not falter before its potential is realized.  And the public must let Congress know how important it is that these reforms be implemented fully and without unnecessary delay.

Ultimately, it will not be Congress, the Bureau of Prisons, or the White House that must live with the successes or failures of the FIRST STEP Act.  It will be the families with a loved one in federal prison, the incarcerated men and women working toward their second chance, and the countless neighborhoods to which they return after release.

The Bureau of Prisons is the largest single prison system in the United States.  The men and women behind its bars, despite the choices that got them there, have great, untapped potential.  They can return to society as better citizens, neighbors, employees, moms and dads. And when these former prisoners succeed, crime rates go down.

But it will take the full implementation of the FSA, putting the tools for success in the hands of those who need them. And it will take all of us — employers, faith communities, social service organizations, and ordinary citizens — doing our part to come alongside government, advocating for continued reform and building a society of second chances.

FSA was never meant to be the last step toward criminal justice reform.  Rather, in a time of marked political division, it is the first milestone, reminding us all what is possible when we choose to walk the path of restoration together.

July 28, 2019 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Reentry and community supervision, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

One last reminder of two recent paper calls on SCOTUS and on the CSA

With deadlines now approaching, I figured today provided a good time to post a reminder about these two timely call for papers on subjects and projects in my world:

Seeking Commentaries for Federal Sentencing Reporter Issue on “The October 2018 SCOTUS Term and the Criminal Justice Work of its Members”

FSR is open and interested in publishing pieces addressing an array of topics relating to the current Supreme Court's work on the criminal side of its docket.  Commentaries can focus on a single case (or even a single opinion in a single case) or they can address a series of cases or a developing jurisprudence.  Contributors are also welcome to discuss the voting patterns and rulings of a particular Justice or of the Court as a whole.  How the Court selects criminal cases for review or what topics should garner the Justices' attention in the years ahead are also fitting topics.  In short, any engaging discussion of the work of the current Court on criminal justice matters will fit the bill.

FSR pieces are shorter and more lightly footnoted than traditional law review pieces; ideally, drafts are between 2000 and 5000 words with less than 50 footnotes.  Drafts need to be received on or before August 1 to ensure a timely publication, and should be sent to co-managing editors Douglas Berman (berman.43 @ osu.edu) and Steven Chanenson (chanenson @ law.villanova.edu) for consideration.

Call for Papers: "The Controlled Substances Act at 50 Years"

Although the federal drug war has been controversial since its inception, the CSA’s statutory framework defining how the federal government regulates the production, possession, and distribution of controlled substances has endured.  As we mark a half-century of drug policy under the CSA, the Academy for Justice at the Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law and the Drug Enforcement & Policy Center at The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law are together sponsoring a conference to look back on how the CSA has helped shape modern American drug laws and policies and to look forward toward the direction these laws could and should take in the next 50 years.

The conference, "The Controlled Substances Act at 50 Years," will take place on February 20-22, 2020, at Arizona State University Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law in Phoenix, Arizona.  As part of this conference we are soliciting papers for the February 22 scholarship workshop. Junior scholars are encouraged to submit, and will be paired with a senior scholar to review and discuss the paper.

Each paper should reflect on the past, present or future of the Controlled Substances Act and drug policy in the United States.  Participants should have a draft to discuss and circulate by February 10.  The papers will be gathered and published in a symposium edition of the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, a peer-reviewed publication.  Participants should have a completed version to begin the publication process by March 15.  Final papers may range in length from 5,000 words to 20,000 words.  Deadline: Please submit a title and an abstract of no more than 300 words, to Suzanne.Stewart.1 @ asu.edu by August 15, 2019.  Accepted scholars will be notified by September 15, 2019.

July 28, 2019 in Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (0)