SCOTUS to contemplate yet another level of ACCA jurisprudential hell with Shular oral argument

In this post a few years ago, I asked "At just what level of Dante's Inferno does modern ACCA jurisprudence reside?".   That post and that question was prompted by the headaches I get when trying to make sense of the the modern federal court jurisprudence over application of the Armed Career Criminal Act as it relates to whether a defendant's prior conviction qualities as a "violent felony."  But the US Supreme Court is due to hear oral argument tomorrow in Shular v. United States wherein the petitioner is presenting this question:

Whether the determination of a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act requires the same categorical approach used in the determination of a “violent felony” under the Act.

Over at SCOTUSblog in this post titled "Argument preview: Category is: the categorical approach," Leah Litman sorts through the arguments made by the petitioner and the government.  Here are parts of the start and the end of her intricate discussion:

Most of the Supreme Court’s ACCA cases address the meaning of ACCA’s various definitions of “violent felony.”  But Shular’s case concerns the meaning of an ACCA provision that defines “serious drug offense.”  In Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), Congress defined a “serious drug offense” to include an “offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance … for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed by law.”

The probation office determined that Shular’s prior Florida convictions were serious drug offenses and recommended that Shular be sentenced under the ACCA.  Shular objected, arguing that Congress defined “serious drug offense” as a series of generic offenses (manufacturing, distributing or possessing with intent) that do not match Florida’s drug offense.  (Specifically, Shular argued that the generic definitions of the drug offenses contain mens rea, or criminal intent, elements, while Florida’s drug laws do not.)....

There is a good amount of text and structure for the Supreme Court to work with in this case.  But the court may be interested in the implications of both sides’ interpretations. Shular is offering the court a tried-and-true approach that has come under fire in recent years.  The government is asking the court to venture into new terrain, but also does not want the court to consider some of the harder questions and greyer areas that might result from the government’s approach.  Oral argument could allow the justices to test out how the government’s proposed interpretation might work.