« Rounding up previews of SCOTUS oral argument in "Bridgegate" case | Main | "Who challenges disparities in capital punishment?: An analysis of state legislative floor debates on death penalty reform" »
January 14, 2020
Splitting with other state courts, Georgia Supreme Court upholds use of preponderance standard in LWOP sentencing determination for juve murderer
Yesterday the Georgia Supreme Court rejected a procedural attack on a life without parole sentence given to a 17-year-old murderer and created an interesting little split on the application of Miller and Montgomery in the process. The unanimous ruling in White v. Georgia, No. S19A1004 (Ga. Jan. 13, 2020) (available here), covers a couple of issues, and here is the key passage dealing with the procedure for imposing a LWOP sentence on a juvenile murderer after Miller and Montgomery:
White argues that, as a matter of due process, the State must prove permanent incorrigibility beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the trial court to sentence him to life without parole. At oral argument, White’s counsel cited Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (96 SCt 893, 47 LE2d 18) (1976), which some courts have relied on to conclude that due process demands a finding of permanent incorrigibility beyond a reasonable doubt before a juvenile may be sentenced to life without parole. See Davis v. State, 415 P3d 666, 682 (Wy. 2018); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A3d 410, 454-455 (Pa. 2017). But those decisions ignore United States Supreme Court precedent. That Court has made clear that Mathews does not apply in the context of a state criminal case. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (112 SCt 2572, 120 LEd2d 353) (1992) (“[T]he Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which . . . are part of the criminal process.”). Rather, a state criminal procedure is not prohibited by the federal Due Process Clause “unless it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.” Id. at 445 (citation and punctuation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has held that “application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (117 SCt 633, 136 LE2d 554) (1997). And no Supreme Court decision of which we are aware — much less that White cites — holds that juvenile sentencing of the sort at issue here is an exception to that rule. White has not shown that the burden of proof applied by the trial court here violated his rights under the federal Due Process Clause.
I do not know if Dakota Lamar White might appeal this ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court, but the paragraph above spotlights the clean split in state courts over this issue. of course, SCOTUS is now working toward a decision in the Malvo case dealing with retroactive application in Miller, and it is possible (though not really all that likely) that other Miller application issues could get addressed directly or indirectly in that coming ruling.
January 14, 2020 at 11:01 AM | Permalink