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December 1, 2020

Sixth Circuit panel rules "courts have full discretion" to determine extraordinary and compelling reasons for 3582(c)(1)(A) motions

I only today saw a big notable Sixth Circuit ruling from a few weeks ago discussing the reach and application of the compassionate release provisions amended by the federal FIRST STEP Act.  As regular readers know, in lots of (pre-COVID) prior posts, I made much of the provision of the FIRST STEP Act allowing federal courts to directly reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) without awaiting a motion by the Bureau of Prisons.  The SIxth Circuit's recent ruling in US v. Jones, 20-3701 (6th Cir. Nov. 20, 2020) (available here), constitutes the second big circuit decision ruling that district courts have broad discretion to determine what now qualifies as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction.

The first significant circuit ruling on the reach and application of § 3582(c)(1)(A) came from the Second Circuit in US v. Zullo/Brooker, No. 19-3218-CR (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 2020) (available here; discussed here).  This latest circuit ruling from the Sixth Circuit in Jones folllows the same path by providing a thoughtful and thorough accounting of the history of applicable law on the way to these important statements: 

We now join the majority of district courts and the Second Circuit in holding that the passage of the First Step Act rendered § 1B1.13 “inapplicable” to cases where an imprisoned person files a motion for compassionate release.  See United States v. Brooker, 976 F.3d 228, 234 (2d Cir. 2020).  Until the Sentencing Commission updates § 1B1.13 to reflect the First Step Act, district courts have full discretion in the interim to determine whether an “extraordinary and compelling” reason justifies compassionate release when an imprisoned person files a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion....

By following the Second Circuit’s lead, we weave together three compatible aspirations: preserving as much of § 1B1.13 that can be saved, adhering to Congress’s intent, and respecting the Sentencing Commission’s thoughtful authorship of § 1B1.13’s commentary.  In cases where incarcerated persons file motions for compassionate release, federal judges may skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry and have full discretion to define “extraordinary and compelling” without consulting the policy statement § 1B1.13.  Thus, the district judge in Jones’s case permissibly assumed for the sake of argument that extraordinary and compelling circumstances existed without reference to the policy statement § 1B1.13.

There is a lot more in the Sixth Circuit ruling in Jones worth checking out, but most consequential is this clear statement that district courts are not limited by the (now-dated, pre-FIRST-STEP-Act) language of § 1B1.13 when assessing what may qualifies as "extraordinary and compelling reasons" for a sentence reduction.  I believe a few other circuits are considering this issue now, and it will be interesting to see if any more rule of this matter before we get tho the two-year anniversary of the FIRST STEP Act later this month.

A few of many, many prior related posts:

December 1, 2020 at 11:17 PM | Permalink

Comments

Also, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Tequila Gunn, No. 20-1959.

Posted by: CJ | Dec 2, 2020 8:28:26 AM

Thanks, CJ. Another reader sent this case my way, and I am about to blog it as well. Much appreciated.

Posted by: Doug B. | Dec 2, 2020 8:34:38 AM

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