Interesting split Fourth Circuit panel debate while upholding resentencing to 52 years for violent offenses by 15-year-old

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the interesting discussion of sentencing practices and outcomes by a Fourth Circuit panel yesterday in US v. Friend, No. 20-4129 (4th Cir. June 28, 2021) (available here). The first paragraph of the majority opinion sets the terms:

Appellant Philip Friend, who actively participated as a fifteen-year-old juvenile in a series of violent carjackings, challenges the fifty-two-year sentence imposed by the district court after a remand in this case.  Our remand instructed the district court to give a more thorough explanation for its sentence, with the prospect that a more tempered sentence might also result.  United States v. Friend, 755 F. App’x 234 (4th Cir. 2018).  These things have now both come to pass. The offenses in question occurred long ago, but their consequences have been long lasting. Because the district court acted within its discretion in imposing the present sentence, we affirm.

And here is a key passage from the majority's extended discussion and the concluding sentiments of the majority (cites removed):

But to sum it up, it is clearly permissible for a sentencing court to weigh the gravity of the offense or the impact a defendant’s crimes have had on a community and to vindicate that community’s interest in justice.  That after all, is the reason a defendant is before the court.  An exclusive focus on one factor impermissibly vitiates the requisite individualized consideration.  On the other hand, for appellate courts to micromanage sentencings and demand a district court assign equal weight to each § 3553(a) factor would also disregard a sentencing’s individualized inquiry and toss our deferential abuse-of-discretion review to the winds.  Ultimately, defendant’s disagreement with the district court’s weighing of the sentencing factors is not enough to find the sentence procedurally unreasonable....

To find this sentence unreasonable would displace the discretion that district judges possess in setting sentences. We are a court of appellate review, not a panel of appellate sentencers. District courts are granted exceptional discretion in sentencing for a reason.  They view the full criminal tableau first-hand, and they weigh the conflicting evidence and competing arguments. Their choices are not easy. When a court abuses its discretion, it is this court’s duty to correct the error. But when a district court is responsive to our mandates and reasonably exercises its sentencing power, we must respect its judgment.  So we do here.

Writing in dissent, Judge Floyd explains at length why he sees matters differently. His opinion starts this way:

At the age of fifteen, Philip Bernard Friend and various members of his family committed a series of extremely serious crimes.  Nobody disputes the severity of those offenses or the irreparable harm that Philip visited upon the lives of his victims and their families.  But this appeal tests the legality of the district court’s imposition of a fifty-two year sentence on a juvenile offender.  Today, the majority declares Philip’s half-century sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable.  Because I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion on either score, I respectfully dissent.