Sentencing Law and Policy

Third Circuit panel explores curious loss calculations in federal fraud guidelines

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the interesting Third Circuit panel ruling this past week in US v. Kirschner, No. 20-1304 (3d Cir. April 22, 2021) (available here), discussing loss calculations under the fraud guidelines. There are lots of element to the Kirschner opinion, but the introduction provides an effective overview:

In 2018, Jonathan Kirschner pleaded guilty to one count of impersonating an officer acting under the authority of the United States and one count of importing counterfeit coins and bars with intent to defraud.  At sentencing, the District Court applied to Kirschner’s sentence three enhancements pursuant to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines — a 2-level enhancement because Kirschner’s fraud used sophisticated means; another 2-level enhancement because Kirschner abused a position of public trust to facilitate his crimes; and a 22-level enhancement because the “loss” attributable to his scheme was greater than $25 million but less than $65 million, even though it grossed only about one one-thousandth of that.

Kirschner appeals the District Court’s judgment of sentence and challenges the three enhancements it applied.  For the reasons that follow, we will vacate Kirschner’s sentence and remand for resentencing.  While the District Court was well within its discretion to apply the abuse-of-trust and use-of-sophisticated-means enhancements, we conclude it clearly erred in applying the 22-level enhancement for loss, and we cannot say that the error was harmless.

I have always thought the federal fraud guideline deeply misguided due to commentary basing offense severity calculations on the greater of intended or actual loss (and the guideline is also deeply problematic for placing extreme emphasis on "loss" and by only requiring proof by a preponderance).  In this case, a focus on intended loss meant a guy who netted only about $30,000 selling fake goods when caught was sentenced as if he had netted $36 million! 

Ultimately, the panel here concluded intended loss was not subject to the "deeper analysis" needed to justify the district court's calculation.  But, for those following broader debates over the basic validity of guideline commentary, the panel had this interesting aside:

Under a Guidelines comment, a court must ... identify the greater figure, the actual or intended loss, and enhance the defendant’s offense level accordingly.  Only this comment, not the Guidelines’ text, says that defendants can be sentenced based on the losses they intended.  By interpreting “loss” to mean intended loss, it is possible that the commentary “sweeps more broadly than the plain text of the Guideline.”  United States v. Nasir, 982 F.3d 144, 177 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc) (Bibas, J., concurring).  But Kirschner assumes the comment is correct, and so we will too.

This kind of aside reinforces my sense — or perhaps I should just say my hope — that it is only a matter of time before the US Supreme Court will consider, in some context, the validity of guideline commentary that arguably “sweeps more broadly than the plain text" of the guideline.

Rounding up some early (mostly critical) commentary on Jones

I shared in this post yesterday some of my early thoughts about the Supreme Court's new Eighth Amendment juvenile LWOP decision in Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (S. Ct. April 22, 2021) (available here).  Though disappointed by the outcome, my long-standing concerns with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in this arena (as discussed in pieces here and here) perhaps led me to be not too startled by the Court's work.  But, as evidenced by some of the commentary I have seen about Jones in the last few days, it seems many are quite aggrieved.  Here is an abdridged round up: 

From Josh Blackman, "Conservative Justices Do Not Need To Apologize For Making Socially-Conservative Rulings; I'm looking at you Justice Kavanaugh."

From Rory Fleming, "The Supreme Court’s Abhorrent Decision to Back Life-Without-Parole for Kids"

From Chris Geidner, "Kavanaugh just erased years of precedent to keep kids in jail forever; The Court's conservative wing will now let kids spent their lives behind bars."

From Ruth Marcus, "At the Supreme Court, a tale of two Bretts"

From John Pfaff, "It is ludicrous for the Supreme Court to say children are irredeemable"

From Mark Joseph Stern, "Brett Kavanaugh’s Opinion Restoring Juvenile Life Without Parole Is Dishonest and Barbaric"

From Elliot Williams, "Supreme Court's staggering deviation from precedent"

"Housing the Decarcerated"

The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Norrinda Hayat now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

The coronavirus pandemic exposed an issue at the intersection of the public health, carceral and housing crises — the lack of housing for the recently decarcerated.  Early in the pandemic calls came to release incarcerated persons and cease arrests in light of the risks posed by failing to be able to socially distance while incarcerated.  At the same time, the pandemic forced a national conversation about the sheer number of unhoused persons in our country.  The pandemic created an emergent argument for both broad scale decarceration and publicly funded housing.  The practical process of securing housing for the recently decarcerated, however, is fraught because of what is described in this article as the “culture of exclusion” that has long pervaded subsidized housing policy, enabled by a patchwork of federal laws, including the Anti-Drug Abuse Act (ADA) of 1988 and the Supreme Court case, HUD v. Rucker.

The culture of exclusion is arbitrated by local housing authorities and works on three levels — eligibility, enforcement and set asides.  As a result, formerly incarcerated persons are often rejected outright during the application process.  In addition, persons who live in subsidized housing and are alleged to be engaged in or associated with anyone who is alleged to have participated in criminal conduct can be evicted making subsidized housing itself a pipeline into the prison industrial complex. 

This Article seeks to motivate a pathway towards housing the decarcerated by ending the culture of exclusion.  In Part I, the article briefly updates the status of the prison abolition and right to housing movements. Part II builds on the idea that stable housing for formerly incarcerated persons is essential to the prison abolition movement’s success by reviewing summary results from pilot programs in New York, Washington and Michigan.  Part III suggests that “one strike” policies, have created a broader “culture of exclusion,” which the Supreme Court validated in Rucker, further burdening the process of reentry for the recently decarcerated.  Finally, Part IV, prescribes policy changes that are essential to housing the decarcerated even beyond repealing the ADA and overturning Rucker, including transcending the narrative of innocence, directing PHA discretion to admit not deny and utilizing civil rights laws to equalize voucher holders.

FAMM urges federal BOP to publish memos with home confinement criteria

In this post a few days ago, I asked "Why is DOJ apparently keeping hidden a new memo expanding the criteria for home confinement?". I still do not have an answer to this question, but I see that Kevin Ring at FAMM is hoping to get even more from the BOP via this new letter that starts and ends this way:

I am writing to ask that you publish on the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) website any and all memos sent to wardens about the eligibility critera for CARES Act home confinement.  The BOP’s failure to do so has created uneccessary confusion and frustration for incarcerated people and their families....

Surviving the past 13 months during the spread of COVID-19 has been extraordinarily difficult for people in prison and their loved ones at home.  Please do not add to their hardship by keeping them in the dark about recent and important BOP policy changes that might affect them.

Prior related post:

•  Why is DOJ apparently keeping hidden a new memo expanding the criteria for home confinement?

A few first thoughts on Jones and juve LWOP

Because I am on the road, I have only had a chance to read once and quickly the Supreme Court's new Eighth Amendment juvenile LWOP decision in Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (S. Ct. April 22, 2021) (available here).  Though I will need more reads and more time to come to a fully-formed view on this ruling, I do have a few first thoughts on the work of the Court and various Justices.  Here are some of these first thoughts:

1. I have always seen Montgomery as a somewhat clumsy rewrite and extension of Miller (as I discussed in this short piece), and I am not surprised that a more conservative Court has now stressed the importance of state authority to implement Miller without further constitutional elaboration of what the Jones majority calls "particular policy approaches" to juvenile sentencing.  Because I have long viewed all LWOP sentences, for offenders of any age, as poor policy and constitutionally suspect on various grounds, I am disappointed  the Court now has only three votes to embrace and further extend Mongtomery's extension of MIller.  But since a majority of current Justices now think the Constitution readily permits the sentencing of juveniles to die in prison, it readily follows that a majrity of Justices are disinclined to read substantive constitutional limitations into how this such sentencing takes place in the states. 

2. Speaking of the Justices, this ruling (and I fear others to come) may prevent me from wishfully thinking the current Supreme Court is still inclined to be pro-defendant on big sentencing issues.  For a good number of years before recent changes in personnel, criminal defendants got a whole lot of very big wins from SCOTUS on sentencing issues (despite still often losing in circuit courts and elsewhere).  But this Jones ruling is a clear indication that replacing Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Ginsburg with Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh and Barrett likely means the era of big defense wins in a number of big sentencing cases may be over.  Particularly notable when thinking about the overall Court is how the new Justices may have swayed Chief Justice Roberts, who was with the old majority in Montgomery to extend Miller for the benefit of juveniles, but now is in the Jones majority trmming back the protections of the Eighth Amendment.

3. Speaking of the Chief Justice, I have long hoped that his discussion of as-applied Eighth Amendment claims in Graham might spur many more as-applied Eighth Amendment challenges (especially for cases inolving older teens).  Against that backdrop, I found interesting this statement by the Court toward the end of its Jones opinon: "Moreover, this case does not properly present — and thus we do not consider — any as-applied Eighth Amendment claim of disproportionality regarding Jones’s sentence." This sentence suggests that Brett Jones — as well as every other juvenile sentenced to LWOP in a discretionary scheme — still can and certainly should argue that the particular facts of his case make LWOP unconstitutional as applied.  If future lower court litigation involving Brett Jones or other juveniles might help produce a meaningful as-applied Eighth Amendment jursprudence, perhaps such a jurisprudence could possibly provide some additional protections for a range of persons subject to a range of extreme sentences.

4.  Speaking of additional protections for a range of persons, it is important to remember that even if Jones was resolved in favor of the defendant, the Eighth Amendment would still have been interpreted to provide only the most limited of protections to the most limited set of juveniles convicted of murder.  A lot more than a robust Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is needed to have a real impact on modern mass incarceration and extreme punishments, and it will always be up to legislatures and executive branch officials to enact sounder sentencing laws and apply them in a more humane manner.  Over the last decade, we have, encouragingly, seen many more legislatures and prosecutors do a lot better on sentencing policy and practice.  The Jones ruling is perhaps ultimately just another reminder that steady policy work, rather than sporatic constitutional litigation, remains the surest path to an improved criminal justice system.

"Race-Based Remedies in Criminal Law"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Ion Meyn now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

This Article evaluates the constitutional feasibility of using race-based remedies to address racial disparities in the criminal system.  Compared to white communities, communities of color are over-policed and over-incarcerated. Criminal system stakeholders recognize these conditions undermine perceptions of legitimacy critical to ensuring public safety.  As jurisdictions assiduously attempt race-neutral fixes, they also acknowledge the shortcomings of such interventions.  Nevertheless, jurisdictions dismiss the feasibility of deploying more effective race-conscious strategies due to the shadow of a constitutional challenge.  The apprehension is understandable.  Debates around affirmative action in higher education and government contracting reveal fierce hostility toward race-based remedies.

This Article, however, contends that within the criminal system, strict scrutiny requirements do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to race-based policies.  There is promising decisional law surrounding the use of race-conscious efforts to address criminal-system challenges.  Drawing on this favorable doctrine, the Article tests the constitutionality of race-based remedies in one of the most dynamic areas in the criminal system: the use of risk assessment tools, which jurisdictions are increasingly relying upon to make decisions, even as these tools reproduce racial harms.  To enrich the analysis, the Article presents a case study of a jurisdiction struggling to mitigate racial harms perpetuated by its pre-trial risk assessment tool.

The Article finds reasons to be optimistic about how race-based remedies might fare within the criminal-system context, where courts are predisposed to granting broad discretion to the stated needs of criminal law stakeholders.  Within this unique context, the Article provides a template for a race-based approach that potentially survives an Equal Protection challenge.

"A Courts-Focused Research Agenda for the Department of Justice"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new Brennan Center report.  Here is its introduction:

Millions of individuals interact with the U.S. criminal and civil legal system every year. Many of them look to the courts to defend their rights and ensure fair outcomes — and all too often, courts are falling short.

As a candidate, President Biden committed to combatting mass incarceration, ending the criminalization of poverty, rooting out racial disparities, and refocusing our criminal and civil legal systems on the key principles of equality, equity, and justice. State and federal courts are critical to achieving these goals, but there is much that we don’t know about how they currently function and where reform is most acutely needed.

In order for the Department of Justice (DOJ) to effectively support states, local jurisdictions, tribal governments, territories, and the federal government in refashioning our courts into more just institutions, research and data are urgently required.

There must be an understanding not only of who is entering the court system, but why they are brought into it, and what their experiences illustrate about our vast system of local, state, and federal courts. For example, the Biden administration has emphasized its intention to end the practice of incarcerating people for their inability to pay court debt, yet we still know very little about how these and other predatory court practices function across the country. The Covid-19 pandemic prompted an unprecedented experiment with remote court proceedings in jurisdictions across the country, but we still know very little about how remote court impacts access to justice and the fairness of proceedings.

President Biden has also emphasized the importance of racial, ethnic, gender, and professional diversity on the bench — including nominating judges who bring diversity to the bench. But while the judiciary publishes diversity data about Article III judges, we lack basic information about the demographics or professional experience of many judges in state and Article I federal courts. These are just a few of the data and research gaps that make our courts problematically opaque.

Although just scratching the surface, we offer some recommendations for the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and National Institute of Justice (NIJ) to collect additional data and perform research to better understand how our courts do or don’t work for millions of Americans, as well as setting forth a research agenda that could shed more light on how to improve our nation’s vast system of local, state, and federal courts. 

SCOTUS affirms juve LWOP sentence, 6-3, in Jones v Mississippi

I am on the road today, and so I am not that surprised the Supreme Court has handed down the big sentencing opinion I have been awaiting all Term.  I hope to comment later today.

UPDATE:  Thanks to airport wifi, I can now provide this link to the full opinion in Jones v. Mississippi, No. 18-1259 (S. Ct. April 22, 2021).  Here is how Justice Kavanaugh's opinion for the Court begins

Under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), an individual who commits a homicide when he or she is under 18 may be sentenced to life without parole, but only if the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.  In this case, a Mississippi trial judge acknowledged his sentencing discretion under Miller and then sentenced petitioner Brett Jones to life without parole for a murder that Jones committed when he was under 18.  The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the discretionary sentencing procedure satisfied Miller.

Jones argues, however, that a sentencer’s discretion to impose a sentence less than life without parole does not alone satisfy Miller.  Jones contends that a sentencer who imposes a life-without-parole sentence must also make a separate factual finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible, or at least provide an on-the-record sentencing explanation with an implicit finding that the defendant is permanently incorrigible.  And Jones says that the trial judge did not make such a finding in his case.

Jones’s argument that the sentencer must make a finding of permanent incorrigibility is inconsistent with the Court’s precedents.  In Miller, the Court mandated “only that a sentencer follow a certain process — considering an offender’s youth and attendant characteristics—before imposing” a life-without-parole sentence.  Id., at 483.  And in Montgomery v. Louisiana, which held that Miller applies retroactively on collateral review, the Court flatly stated that “Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement” and added that “a finding of fact regarding a child’s incorrigibility . . . is not required.” 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016). In light of that explicit language in the Court’s prior decisions, we must reject Jones’s argument.  We affirm the judgment of the Mississippi Court of Appeals.

Justice Sotomayor's dissent, which is joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, starts this way:

Today, the Court guts Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016). Contrary to explicit holdings in both decisions, the majority claims that the Eighth Amendment permits juvenile offenders convicted of homicide to be sentenced to life without parole (LWOP) as long as “the sentence is not mandatory and the sentencer therefore has discretion to impose a lesser punishment.” Ante, at 1. In the Court’s view, a sentencer never need determine, even implicitly, whether a juvenile convicted of homicide is one of “those rare children whose crimes reflect irreparable corruption.” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 209. Even if the juvenile’s crime reflects “‘unfortunate yet transient immaturity,’” Miller, 567 U.S., at 479, he can be sentenced to die in prison.

This conclusion would come as a shock to the Courts in Miller and Montgomery.  Miller’s essential holding is that “a lifetime in prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest children, those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable corruption.’” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 195 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S., at 479–480).  Sentencing discretion is “necessary to separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole from those who may not,” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 210, but it is far from sufficient.  A sentencer must actually “make th[e] judgment” that the juvenile in question is one of those rare children for whom LWOP is a constitutionally permissible sentence.  Miller, 567 U.S., at 480.  The Court has thus expressly rejected the notion that sentencing discretion, alone, suffices: “Even if a court considers a child’s age before sentencing him or her to a lifetime in prison, that sentence still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity.” Montgomery, 577 U.S., at 208 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Today, however, the Court reduces Miller to a decision requiring “just a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth [is] considered.” Ante, at 11.  Such an abrupt break from precedent demands “special justification.” Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part) (slip op., at 6) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court offers none.  Instead, the Court attempts to circumvent stare decisis principles by claiming that “[t]he Court’s decision today carefully follows both Miller and Montgomery.” Ante, at 19.  The Court is fooling no one.  Because I cannot countenance the Court’s abandonment of Miller and Montgomery, I dissent.

"Assessing the Mortality Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Florida State Prisons"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper by multiple authors with this abstract:

Background

The increased risk of COVID-19 infection among incarcerated individuals due to environmental hazards is well known and recent studies have highlighted the higher rates of infection and mortality prisoners in the United States face due to COVID-19.  However, the impact of COVID-19 on all-cause mortality rates in incarcerated populations has not been studied.

Methods

Using data reported by the Florida Department of Corrections on prison populations and mortality events we conducted a retrospective cohort study of all individuals incarcerated in Florida state prisons between 2015 and 2020.  We calculated excess deaths by estimating age-specific expected deaths from mortality trends in 2015 through 2019 and taking the difference between observed and expected deaths during the pandemic period.  We calculated life table measures using standard demographic techniques and assessed significant yearly changes using bootstrapping.

Findings

The Florida Department of Corrections reported 510 total deaths from March 1, 2020 to December 31, 2020 among the state prison population.  This was 42% higher (rate ratio 1.42, 95% CI 1.15 to 1.89) than the expected number of deaths in light of mortality rates for previous years.  Reported COVID-19 deaths in a month were positively correlated with estimated excess deaths (80.4%, p <.01).  Using age-specific mortality estimates, we found that life expectancy at age 20 declined by 4 years (95% CI 2.06-6.57) between 2019 and 2020 for the Florida prison population. 

Interpretation

The Florida prison population saw a significant increase in all-cause mortality during the COVID-19 pandemic period, leading to a decrease in life expectancy of more than four years.  Life years lost by the Florida prison population were likely far greater than those lost by the general United States population, as reported by other studies.  This difference in years lost highlights the need for increased interventions to protect vulnerable incarcerated populations during pandemics.

Split Eleventh Circuit panel rejects equal protection challenge to illegal reentry guideline

Yesterday the Eleventh Circuit handed down an interesting split panel opinion in US v. Osorto, No. 19-11408 (11th Cir. April 20, 2021) (available here). These paragraphs from the start of the majority opinion provides a flavor for the issues and the court's holding:

Defendant-Appellant Juan Carlos Osorto was convicted of illegal reentry after the 2016 Guidelines went into effect.  Because he had committed other offenses both before his original deportation and after it, but before his current illegal-reentry offense, he received offense-level increases under both subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3).  He now challenges both subsections as violations of, among other things, his equal-protection rights.  Osorto (and the Dissent) argue that these guidelines, which apply to only illegal-reentry offenses, discriminate against noncitizens by counting their prior convictions twice — once in the offense level and a second time in the Guidelines’ criminal-history calculation. Meanwhile, Osorto contends, citizens cannot illegally reenter the United States, and generally, no guidelines for other offenses count prior convictions in both the offense-level and criminal-history calculations.  So in Osorto’s view, subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) unlawfully discriminate against noncitizens.

We disagree.  First, Osorto’s challenge to § 2L1.2(b)(2) is foreclosed by our binding precedent in the form of Adeleke.  Second, Osorto (and the Dissent) consider the wrong universe of individuals.  Subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) do not apply to all noncitizens convicted of any crime in the United States; rather, they apply to only those noncitizens who both have illegally reentered the United States and have been convicted of other crimes.  This is important because, third, through § 1326(b), Congress has determined that illegally reentering the United States after being deported following conviction on another crime is a more serious offense than simply illegally reentering the United States, and that conduct should be deterred.  The challenged guidelines reflect the national interests that Congress permissibly has endorsed through its enactment and amendment of § 1326(b).  Fourth, Congress has entrusted the Sentencing Commission with direct responsibility for fostering and protecting the interests of, among other things, sentencing policy that promotes deterrence and appropriately punishes culpability and risk of recidivism — the interests the Sentencing Commission cited in issuing the challenged guidelines. Finally, subsections 2L1.2(b)(2) and (3) are rationally related to the Commission’s stated interests in issuing them.  So after careful consideration, and with the benefit of oral argument, we must uphold the guidelines at issue and affirm Osorto’s sentence.

Here is part of the start of the dissenting opinion by Judge Martin:

Mr. Osorto challenges Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(3) on equal protection grounds.  This Guideline makes for tougher sentences for defendants who commit a designated offense after reentering the United States without authorization.  See USSG § 2L1.2(b)(3).  This list of designated offenses does not include the offense of unauthorized reentry itself.  See id. Meanwhile, a defendant is already punished for both the unauthorized reentry and any other offense that leads to the increased punishment imposed by § 2L1.2(b)(3) on account of the calculation of a defendant’s criminal history under the Sentencing Guidelines.  See USSG § 4A1.1(b).  The result is that any offense committed after unauthorized reentry is double-counted for noncitizens in their Guideline calculation based on little more than their immigration status.  Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2(b)(3) therefore subjects noncitizen defendants to more severe punishment than citizens who commit the same crime.  Mr. Osorto argues that this more severe punishment imposed upon him because he is a noncitizen violates his Fifth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws.  U.S. Const. Amend. V; see United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (“The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the laws”).  I believe he is right.

Notable new US Sentencing Commission primers on federal crime victim rights

The US Sentencing Commission has just released a couple of new primers on crime victims' right in the federal criminal justice system. Here are links to USSC pages about the short reports and descriptions:

Crime Victims' Rights

(April 2021) This primer provides a general overview of crime victims’ rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act (“CVRA”), as described in 18 U.S.C. § 3771, the related provisions of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (“MVRA”) and the Victim and Witness Restitution Act (“VWRA”), and the Amy, Vicky, and Andy Child Pornography Victim Assistance Act of 2018. The Sentencing Guidelines implement the CVRA through USSG §6A1.5 and the related restitution provisions through USSG §§5E1.1 and 8B1.1.  Although the CVRA applies broadly to pretrial, trial, sentencing, and post-sentencing proceedings, this primer focuses primarily on its application to sentencing and post-sentencing issues, including revocations of probation, supervised release, habeas proceedings, and parole proceedings.  This primer is not intended as a comprehensive compilation of case law or as a substitute for independent research and primary authority.

Economic Crime Victims

(April 2021) This primer provides a general overview of selected guideline issues related to victims in offenses sentenced under §2B1.1 (“Larceny, Embezzlement, and Other Forms of Theft; Offenses Involving Stolen Property; Property Damage or Destruction; Fraud or Deceit; Forgery; Offenses Involving Altered or Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the United States”).  Although the primer identifies some of the relevant cases and concepts, it is not intended as a comprehensive compilation of the cases or analysis related to these issues.

Great coverage of the success of "The Mother Teresa of Pot Prisoners"

In years past, I have tended to dislike the uptick in marijuana media coverage around 4/20 because a range of serious issues, and especially serious criminal justice issues, often seemed not to get the serious coverage that they deserved.  But with marijuana reform continuing to pick up momentum, I think the 4/20 media mania is getting a little better.  And I will always be grateful for whatever leads to media coverage of my favorite advocate of criminal justice reform in the marijuana space.  She is the focal point of this lengthy new Input piece with this great full title: "How ‘The Mother Teresa of Pot Prisoners’ saved her brother from dying behind bars: Beth Curtis’ LifeforPot.com may look janky, but it’s been amazingly effective in getting nonviolent marijuana offenders out of prison."  I recommend the piece in full, and here are snippets:

On 4/20, Craig [Cesal] will be on a fishing trip in West Palm Beach with a group of other marijuana offenders who’ve managed to have their sentences reduced. “There’s a cannabis company that’s paying to fly a bunch of us former pot lifers down,” Cesal says. “Of course, Beth is going down, because we all have ties to her.”

The “Beth” he’s referring to is 79-year-old Beth Curtis from Zanesville, Ohio, the founder of LifeforPot.com, an amateurish little site she built in 2009 to raise awareness about people like Craig — or more specifically, people like her brother, John Knock, who was sentenced to two life terms plus 20 years for a first-time nonviolent marijuana-only offense. Beth has spent more than a decade aggressively advocating for federal clemency on Knock’s and others’ behalf, earning her the nickname the Mother Teresa of Pot Prisoners.

Curtis hoped that by giving people like her brother a presence on the internet, her website would help to raise public awareness about an aspect of criminal justice sentencing most people didn’t seem to know about. “When I talked about somebody serving life for marijuana, honestly people didn’t believe it,” she says. “They’d think, ‘There has to be a dead body somewhere.’ Indeed, there do not have to be any dead bodies, or even a gun.”...

When I ask Curtis if she built the site herself, she laughs out loud. “Yes, can’t you tell?” she replies. Clunky as it is, the current version is much improved from the original, which she built using “CafePress or something” and became a running joke among her friends. When an article in the Miami New Times mentioned her “scrappy-looking site,” fellow clemency advocate Dennis Cauchon called her and said “You know, ‘scrappy’ rhymes with something,” she relates. “And that’s indeed true,” she adds.

Crappiness aside, the site’s been effective. Of the 39 people featured on Life for Pot, 24 have been granted clemency or compassionate release — including, most recently, Knock, who was granted clemency by President Trump in January.

“She did it,” Knock, 73, says of his sister. “One little lady, barely five feet tall, and she just kept pushing and pushing and pushing.” For someone as driven as Curtis, failure was not an option: “I couldn’t imagine that I would die while he was still confined behind bars. The thought sickened me.”

Why is DOJ apparently keeping hidden a new memo expanding the criteria for home confinement?

The question in the title of this post is what I keep wondering as days pass since I saw this FAMM press release from last Friday and yet still fail to see any updated official information from the Department of Justice or the the Bureau of Prisons.  The FAMM press release, dated April 16, 2021, starts this way (my emphasis added):

FAMM President Kevin Ring released the following statement in response to the Department of Justice (DOJ) releasing a memo expanding the criteria for home confinement.

“We’re grateful that that the new administration heeded the widespread calls to make more people eligible for home confinement,” Ring said. “The original criteria were too narrow. These changes will protect vulnerable people in federal prisons.

“We are extremely disappointed, however, that the administration has not rescinded or overruled the legal memo that could force people on home confinement back to prison when the pandemic subsides.  Thousands of families are rightfully anxious that they will be separated again soon.  We worry that today’s announcement will result in more families being in the same boat.”

I understand why the FAMM release expresses concern that the Biden Administration has not yet addressed the worrisome OLC memo discussed in this post that would require returning some folks to prison post-pandemic.  But, in the short term, I am quite concerned that an important memorandum expanding the criteria for home confinement seemingly has not yet been made widely publicly available.

Notably, on this DOJ coronavirus page, there is no link to or any reference to a new DOJ memo on home confinement criteria.  And this BOP COVID page still states expressly that "eligibility requirements for an inmate to be considered for Home Confinement are set forth in the Attorney General's March 26 and April 3, 2020 Memoranda."  Given these webpages, one might say that DOJ and BOP are now not just guilty of a lack of transparency on an important matter of public concern, but they are actually providing misleading information about what the current home confinement criteria are right now.

Misleading information about home confinement criteria is not just problematic for persons in federal prisons and their families who might think they ought to be eligible for home confinement.  It is also problematic for federal judges around the country who are considering compassionate release motions and who might be influenced by the new home confinement criteria in their decision-making.  And, most fundamentally, it is problematic for the American people who have every right to expect and demand that consequential criminal justice decisions by government actors will be transparent and clear, not hidden and opaque.

UPDATE:  The folks at FAMM have posted here what looks like the full text of the new "Updated Home Confinement Guidance under the CARES Act  [as of] April 2021"  Here is how this document gets started:

On Wednesday, April 14, 2021, FAMM received the text of a memo outlining new criteria for home confinement under the CARES Act.  As of this time, the memo has not been shared online by the BOP or Justice Department, but a BOP spokesperson confirmed to The Marshall Project that this memo was sent to all BOP facilities.

Frustratingly, it is hard to tell from the text of this still-officially-secret DOJ memo just how the criterial for home confinement has been changed and how many current federal prisoners might be impacted by the change.  Moreover, the memo also says that it "provides updated guidance and direction and supercedes the memorandum dated November 16, 2020," but I am not sure that November 16 memo was ever made public.  Sigh. 

Derek Chauvin found guilty on all three homicide charges in killing of George Floyd, now on to sentencing phase with Blakely factors

The high-profile trial of Derek Chauvin for killing George Floyd resulted in a jury verdict this afternoon in a Minnesota court with guilt verdict on all three homicice charges of second-degree unintentional murder, third-degree murder, and second-degree manslaughter. It is my understanding that, under Minnesota state sentencing guidelines, Chauvin would get a prison term of 12.5 years absent proof of aggrvating circumstances, so-called Blakely factors.

I believe that the the prosecution was prepared to argue numerous aggravating Blakely factors to the jury, but that CHauvin's legal team waived its right to jury determination on these issues so that they will now be argued to the judge. Though I am not an expert on Minnesota law, I believe that a judicial finding of aggravating factors in the coming weeks could make Chauvin eligible to receive a sentence up to the 40-year maximum on the second-degree unintentional murder conviction.

The Robina Institute has this helpful primer on Minnesota sentencing law, and it makes this important point about the usual approach to sentences increased based on aggravating factors under the state's sentencing guidelines:

The Guidelines do not themselves limit the degree of durational (length-of-custody) departure, but case law provides that upward departures may not exceed twice the presumptive prison term (the middle figure in grid cells above the disposition line; the sole figure in cells below the line) except in rare cases of extremely aggravated circumstances. (Cite to:  State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1981). See also State v. Jackson, 749 N.W.2d 353 (Minn. 2008) (upholding the rule from Evans despite 27 years of changes to the guidelines).)

Harsh penal treatment of some Capitol rioters being criticized by notable progressive

Politico continues its terrific coverage of prosecution of the Capitol rioters with this lengthy new piece fully headlined "Jan. 6 defendants win unlikely Dem champions as they face harsh detainment; 'Solitary confinement is a form of punishment that is cruel and psychologically damaging,' Sen. Elizabeth Warren said."  I am always pleased to see politicians who express concerns about the operation of our justice systems do so no matter who the defendants happen to be.  Here is how this story starts: 

Sen. Elizabeth Warren fled the Capitol on Jan. 6 from a mob she later called domestic terrorists. Now she and another Senate Democratic leader are standing up for their attackers' rights as criminal defendants.

Most of the 300-plus people charged with participating in the Jan. 6 Capitol riot have been released while they await trial, but dozens of those deemed to be dangerous, flight risks or at high risk of obstructing justice were ordered held without bond. D.C. jail officials later determined that all Capitol detainees would be placed in so-called restrictive housing — a move billed as necessary to keep the defendants safe, as well as guards and other inmates.  But that means 23-hour-a-day isolation for the accused, even before their trials begin.

And such treatment doesn't sit well with Warren or Senate Majority Whip Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), two of the chamber's fiercest critics of solitary confinement.  “Solitary confinement is a form of punishment that is cruel and psychologically damaging,” Warren said in an interview.  “And we’re talking about people who haven’t been convicted of anything yet.”

The Massachusetts Democrat, a member of Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer's leadership team, said that while some limited uses of solitary confinement are justified, she’s worried that law enforcement officials are deploying it to “punish” the Jan. 6 defendants or to “break them so that they will cooperate.”

Her sentiments are shared by Durbin, who also chairs the Senate Judiciary Committee and expressed surprise that all of the detained Jan. 6 defendants were being kept in so-called “restrictive housing.”  While their defense of accused rioters' rights as criminal defendants is unlikely to change the Justice Department's handling of those cases, it's a notable case of prominent progressives using their political clout to amplify their criminal justice reform calls even on behalf of Donald Trump supporters who besieged the entire legislative branch in January.

Durbin, who has long sought to eradicate solitary confinement, told POLITICO that such conditions should be a “rare exception," for accused insurrectionists or any other prisoners. “There has to be a clear justification for that, in very limited circumstances,” he said.

D.C. government officials say the pandemic already has sharply limited freedom of movement in the jail where most Jan. 6 defendants are held.  In fact, the entire jail has been subject to strict lockdown procedures since the onset of the pandemic, a determination that has caused broader controversy about prisoners' rights.  But restrictive housing is a maximum-security designation, and the blanket designation for the Capitol defendants — which isn't expected to ease even if pandemic era restrictions do — is a notable decision for a large group of inmates who have yet to be tried for their alleged crimes.

Asked about the Democratic senators’ concerns, a spokesperson for the D.C. Department of Corrections touted the growing number of educational programs and limited amenity access that inmates are now offered.  “We appreciate the concern, patience and support of our neighbors as we work to keep all within DOC safe, as well as support the public safety of all in the District,” said spokesperson Keena Blackmon.

Warren and Durbin's interest in the conditions facing detained Jan. 6 defendants come amid a massive Justice Department push to arrest and prosecute the hundreds of people who breached the Capitol and threatened the peaceful transfer of power to the Biden administration.

Prior related posts:

• "Many Capitol rioters unlikely to serve jail time" because some facing only misdemeanor convictions
• Noting the importance of charging policies and practices (and consistency?) as federal rioting charges get resolved from coast-to-coast

Mixed messages on mandatory minimums from executive branch in New Jersey witrh a retroactive kicker

In this post last month, I flagged the debate in New Jersey where the Governor was threatening to veto a bill to repeal mandatory minimums for certain non-violent crimes because it repealed too many mandatory minimum sentences.  Sure enough, that veto happened yesterday, but so too did an interesting related action from the NJ Attorney General.  This Politico piece, headlined "Murphy vetoes mandatory minimum bill as Grewal unilaterally eliminates some sentences," provides these details (with some emphasis added):

Gov. Phil Murphy on Monday vetoed a bill that would do away with mandatory minimum prison terms for non-violent crimes, excising sections that would eliminate the sentences for corruption offenses.  At the same time, Attorney General Gurbir Grewal issued a directive requiring that prosecutors make use of a provision in New Jersey law allowing them to set aside mandatory minimum sentences for drug-related crimes.

“I am particularly troubled by the notion that this bill would eliminate mandatory prison time for elected officials who abuse their office for their own benefit, such as those who take bribes.  Our representative democracy is based on the premise that our elected officials represent the interests of their constituents, not their own personal interests,” Murphy wrote in his veto message, which also took a shot at former President Donald Trump.  “I cannot sign a bill into law that would undermine that premise and further erode our residents’ trust in our democratic form of government, particularly after four years of a presidential administration whose corruption was as pervasive as it was brazen.”

The two executive actions are the culmination of an eight-month political fight between the Murphy administration and the Democrat-controlled Legislature over what began as benign legislation that followed exactly the recommendations of the New Jersey Criminal Sentencing & Disposition Commission.  The commission, in a November 2019 report, recommended eliminating mandatory sentences for a wide swath of mostly drug and property crimes with the aim of reducing racial disparities among the incarcerated.

Murphy’s conditional veto essentially returns the legislation, NJ S3456 (20R), to its initial form — which did not address corruption offenses — before state Sen. Nicholas Sacco began a successful effort to change it. Grewal’s directive may help allay the concerns of criminal justice advocates who did not want to see mandatory minimum sentences upheld over a political fight, leading some to throw their support behind the legislative effort.  The directive goes further than the legislation would have, applying retroactively to prisoners serving mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses.  The directive does not apply to mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent property crimes, and it was not immediately clear how many inmates are serving time under those laws.

“It’s been nearly two years since I first joined with all 21 of our state’s County Prosecutors to call for an end to mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug crimes,” Grewal said in a statement.  “It’s been more than a year since the Governor’s bipartisan commission made the same recommendation. And yet New Jerseyans still remain behind bars for unnecessarily long drug sentences.  This outdated policy is hurting our residents, and it’s disproportionately affecting our young men of color.  We can wait no longer. It’s time to act.”

New Jersey Together, a coalition of criminal justice reform advocates, said in a statement that “ending mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent drug crimes prospectively and for those currently incarcerated will be a huge step in the right direction.” “Now, the work should begin with the governor and the Legislature to make this permanent and to end mandatory minimum sentencing as a whole,” the group said.

Amol Sinha, executive director of the ACLU-NJ, said in a statement that even though Grewal’s directive takes “significant steps to mitigate the harms of some of the most problematic mandatory minimums,” his group is “disappointed” because “our state falls short by failing to enact legislation that can promote justice for thousands of New Jerseyans.” Sinha urged the Legislature to concur with Murphy’s veto....

Grewal’s directive allows prosecutors to seek periods of parole ineligibility “when warranted to protect public safety based on the specific facts of the case.”  Advocates have long sought to repeal mandatory minimum sentences, especially those that came about as part of the “War on Drugs.”  For instance, New Jersey imposes harsh mandatory sentences for those caught selling drugs within 1,000 feet of a school, a crime far more likely to harshly punish dealers in denser urban areas and who are more likely to be Black and Hispanic.  At the time of a 2016 report by The Sentencing Project, New Jersey incarcerated white people at a rate of 94 per 100,000 compared to 1,140 for Black and 206 for Hispanic people.

A bill that mirrored the recommendations of the New Jersey Criminal Sentencing & Disposition Commission was nearing the final stages of the the legislative process when Sacco (D-Hudson) quietly requested an amendment to eliminate the mandatory minimum sentences for official misconduct.  Sacco later acknowledged to POLITICO that he requested the amendment. Walter Somick, the son of Sacco‘s longtime girlfriend, is facing several corruption-related charges, including official misconduct, over an alleged no-show job at the Department of Public Worker in North Bergen, where Sacco is mayor and runs a powerful political machine....

“I am cognizant of the fact that Attorney General‘s directives could be changed in a future administration by the stroke of a pen, and thus recognize that there is still a need to permanently codify these changes in statute,” Murphy said. “I remain hopeful that the Legislature will concur with my proposed revisions, which reflect the Commission’s evidence-based recommendations and its desire that these recommendations apply prospectively and retroactively.”

Because I generally view all mandatory minimum sentencing provisions for nonviolent offenses to be problematic, I am a bit disappointed by the veto of the legislative reform here.  But because I generally favor retroactive reforms to enable excessive prior prison terms to be addressed, the retroactive relief made possible by the NJ AG is a comforting related development.  The basics of the AG action is discussed in this official press statement and the full 11-page directive can be accessed at this link.

Prior related posts:

• New Jersey commission releases big report recommending numerous big sentencing reforms
• Will NJ Gov veto a bill to repeal mandatory minimums for certain non-violent crimes because it repeals too many?

New report highlights need for improved criminal justice data and means thereto

I was very pleased to see that Arnold Ventures has produced this great new report focused on the need for, and means to, better criminal justice data infrastructure. At this webpage, Stuart Buck describes the effort this way:

One of the most notorious process problems with America’s criminal justice system is the lack of data. For an institution charged with administering justice and responsible for decisions that profoundly impact people’s lives, it is frighteningly antiquated when it comes to collecting and analyzing data. Experts say long-term, sustainable change is doomed if we can’t track our changes and their impacts.... For years, criminologists and other experts have made the point that criminal justice data is so scarce or unreliably reported that in most jurisdictions, we can barely come up with a simple count of the number of people charged with misdemeanors each year.

Arnold Ventures released a list of six recommendations for how the new Biden administration could improve criminal justice data and research in order to support reform. The report is the product of an expert roundtable that we organized with the guidance of Jane Wiseman from the Harvard Kennedy School, and it has been signed by over 25 national experts. The report addresses the Biden administration because the federal government must take the leadership role on this issue — indeed, a major problem with criminal justice data is that there are many thousands of county and state agencies reporting data in inconsistent ways (or not at all).

The 25-page report should be read in full, but its executive summary provides a helpful overview.  Here are excerpts from that summary:

The Biden administration has shown a willingness to push for bold ideas, with early executive orders advancing racial equity, making greater use of facts and data in federal policymaking, and ending for-profit federal prisons. Comprehensive criminal justice reform should be an important next step on the Biden administration’s agenda... 

An ambitious criminal justice reform agenda will require a strong commitment to building a modern, nimble, comprehensive data infrastructure.  Accomplishing this goal will serve multiple purposes.  An effective data infrastructure will promote transparency and allow the public to hold its officials accountable.  A modern data architecture will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of justice agencies.  A strong data system will provide a baseline for measuring progress toward better outcomes, in particular progress toward racial equity.

Unfortunately, criminal justice reform is made more difficult by data that is incomplete and fraught with error.  Indeed, due to the lack of reliable data, it is often difficult even to document systemic racism in the justice system (such as racial disparities in misdemeanor arrests), let alone to promote solutions to the fair and impartial administration of justice. 

In this moment of heightened awareness of the fragile compact between the public and those whose job it is to make our communities safe, it is time to reimagine both the system and its underlying data infrastructure.  Recommendations toward that end developed by a group of experts include:

• Recommendation #1: Establish an accurate baseline of facts about the criminal justice system, and envision a 21st century system

• Recommendation #2: Radically increase accountability of the justice system through data transparency

• Recommendation #3: Modernize the production and dissemination of criminal justice statistics

• Recommendation #4: Improve the integrity of data used for decision-making, research, and policy

• Recommendation #5: Make criminal justice data more actionable, by linking data for greater insight, and by building capacity to turn insight into action

• Recommendation #6: Harness modern technology to equip decision-makers with more timely and accurate information

This report describes each recommendation, along with implementation action steps.

Previewing how SCOTUS will sort through Rehaif reverberations

Writing over at SCOTUSblog here, Evan Lee effectively previews the pair of criminal cases that the SUpreme Cout will hear Tuesday morning. The post is titled "Pondering the aftermath of a landmark ruling in felon-in-possession cases," and here is how it starts and concludes:

On June 21, 2019, the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Rehaif v. United States, holding that a conviction under the federal statute penalizing felons in possession of a firearm requires not only the defendant’s knowledge that he possessed a gun, but also that he knew he had the legal status of a convicted felon.  The 7-2 decision overruled precedent in every circuit that had considered the issue.  Rehaif applies to every federal felon-in-possession conviction not yet final as of the date of that decision.  Now the question is whether some or all of those cases need to be sent back for new pleas or trials.

On Tuesday, in the companion cases of Greer v. United States and United States v. Gary, the court will hear argument on how to sort out the affected cases.  Greer asks whether jury verdicts are valid if there was no consideration at trial of whether the defendant knew of their felon status; Gary presents a similar question in the context of guilty pleas.  Perhaps even more important than the issue of plea versus jury verdict is the question of whether the defendant should have to prove that he likely wouldn’t have been convicted if knowledge of felon status had been an essential element of the offense when he was first charged.  Still another critical question is what materials a court may look to in deciding whether the defendant suffered such “prejudice.”...

At oral argument, if Justices Stephen Breyer (the author of Rehaif), Elena Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor show no interest in the structural error argument, it may be doomed, as the more conservative justices seem unlikely to be more enthusiastic.  Perhaps the most interesting thing that might emerge at argument is questioning about the psychology of felons.  Can counsel for Greer and Gary offer a sufficiently plausible scenario or scenarios in which felons might not actually realize that they fit into the “felon” box for purposes of the statute?  For example, do some felons erroneously believe that a guilty plea or suspended sentence keeps them out of that category?  For that matter, do some felons believe that if they have “paid their debt to society” by serving their prison sentences, their felon status has been legally erased?  Scenarios like these could give rise to some interesting hypotheticals at argument.

"Qualifying Prosecutorial Immunity Through Brady Claims"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper now available via SSRN and authored by Brian Murray, Paul Heaton and Jon Gould. Here is its abstract:

This Article considers the soundness of the doctrine of absolute immunity as it relates to Brady violations.  While absolute immunity serves to protect prosecutors from civil liability for good-faith efforts to act appropriately in their official capacity, current immunity doctrine also creates a potentially large class of injury victims — those who are subjected to wrongful imprisonment due to Brady violations — with no access to justice.  Moreover, by removing prosecutors from the incentive-shaping forces of the tort system that are thought in other contexts to promote safety, absolute immunity doctrine may under-incentivize prosecutorial compliance with constitutional and statutory requirements and increase criminal justice system error.

The Article seeks to identify ways to use the civil justice system to promote prosecutorial compliance with Brady, while recognizing the need to provide appropriate civil protections to enable prosecutors to fulfill their unique role within the criminal justice system.  After developing a novel taxonomy of Brady cases, evaluating such cases against basic tort principles, and considering the prosecutorial community’s views regarding appropriate Brady remedies, it proposes a statutory modification of absolute immunity that might better regulate and incentivize prosecutor behavior, reduce wrongful convictions, and improve access to justice.

SCOTUS grants cert on Confrontation Clause case, and Justice Sotomayor has much to say about two criminal case denieal

The Supreme Court is back in action this morning after a short hiatus, getting started with this new order list that has most of its limited action in criminal law cases.  Specifically, the Justices granted certiorari in a single case, Hemphill v. New York, 20-637, which presents this criminal procedure issue:

Whether, or under what circumstances, a criminal defendant, whose argumentation or introduction of evidence at trial “opens the door” to the admission of responsive evidence that would otherwise be barred by the rules of evidence, also forfeits his right to exclude evidence otherwise barred by the confrontation clause.

In addition, in Brown v. Polk County, No. 20–982, a case concerning Fourth Amendment requirements for a penetrative cavity search of a pretrial detainee, Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued this lengthy statement respecting the denial of certiorari.  And in Whatley v. Warden, Ga. Diag. & Classification Prison, No. 20–363, a case concerning defense counsel's failure to object to a capital defendant's shackling, Justice Sotomayor issued this lengthy dissent from the denial of certiorari.

Interrogating recent research indicating nonprosecution of certain misdemeanors lowers reoffense

A few weeks ago in this post I flagged the notable new empirical research indicating that nonprosecution of nonviolent misdemeanor offenses produced a large reductions in the likelihood of new criminal complaints.  This research is rightly getting a lot of attention, though this new National Review piece wonders if it might be getting too much attention.  The piece, by Charles Fain Lehman, is headlined "Progressives Are Overreacting to a Startling Crime Study."  And though I might dicker with some points made in the piece, I recommend the full discussion.  Here are excerpts:  

Every year, something like 13 million misdemeanor charges are filed in the United States. These charges, ranging from traffic violations to serious assaults, may be less flashy than felonies, but they are the main way Americans experience the criminal-justice system.

We prosecute misdemeanors because, among other things, we want there to be fewer of them, and we believe prosecution deters reoffending.  But a recent blockbuster paper makes a startling claim to the contrary: Prosecuting misdemeanants actually increases the likelihood that they will offend again.

The paper has been heralded by supporters of progressive district attorneys who have used their position to unilaterally impose reforms on the criminal-justice system, including refusing to prosecute many misdemeanants.  Boston D.A. Rachael Rollins, who provided the data for the study, has claimed it confirms the wisdom of her approach.  So have other reformers such as Chicago-area state’s attorney Kim Foxx and San Francisco district attorney Chesa Boudin.

Policy-makers, however, should exercise caution before reaching such expansive conclusions.  The paper can just as easily be read to endorse more modest reforms — especially keeping in mind long-established principles of criminal justice on which it is silent....

Most of the non-prosecution effect they measure is the result of first-time offenders, who become much more likely to commit crime if prosecuted.  By contrast, prosecuting repeat offenders of any sort has little discernible effect on the likelihood they will offend again in the future....  Diverting [first-time misdemeanants] offenders, with the threat of more serious punishment if they reoffend, could help clear dockets while minimizing crime. It would also free ADAs to focus on repeat misdemeanants....

The above approach is different from the idea that we should in general prosecute misdemeanants a lot less — a valid interpretation of the paper’s findings, but not necessarily the right one, for two reasons.

First, deterrence is not the only reason to prosecute an offender.  Advocates of not prosecuting misdemeanors tend to invoke “victimless” crimes such as drug possession and prostitution. But misdemeanors can also include offenses such as simple assault and auto theft — crimes that harm others.  Such crimes reasonably elicit a demand for retributive justice. It offends our moral sensibilities to think that a person who commits a serious but not felonious assault could get off scot-free.

Second, systematic reductions in leniency may affect all criminals’ decision-making, increasing their propensity to offend in the long-run. The paper shows that Rollins’s move toward non-prosecution of misdemeanors did not in the aggregate increase misdemeanor offenses, but the data it uses account only for the period between her election in January 2019 and March 2020, when the coronavirus crisis began.  It’s entirely possible that criminals will adapt, and misdemeanor offending will increase, in the long run....

Coming face to face with the justice system can be time-consuming and exhausting, and may, at the margins, increase rather than reduce a person’s propensity to offend.  Even those of us highly concerned with public safety should be interested in creative solutions that minimize crime and disorder.

At the same time, policy-makers should not get ahead of themselves — as some have in the rush to defund police departments and decrease the use of more serious charges.  Good research is the basis of good policy, and this research makes a valuable contribution to public-safety policy.  But we should be cautious in how far we go with it — careful changes around the edges are always safer than blanket transformations.

Prior recent related post:

• New empirical study finds "nonprosecution of a nonviolent misdemeanor offense leads to large reductions in the likelihood of a new criminal complaint" 

Big new report examines "U.S. Criminal Justice System in the Pandemic Era and Beyond"

I just saw this big new 350+ page report from the Priority Criminal Justice Needs Initiative, which is a partnership of the RAND Corporation, the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), RTI International, and the University of Denver.  The full report title highlights what it tackles and why it is so long: "The U.S. Criminal Justice System in the Pandemic Era and Beyond: Taking Stock of Efforts to Maintain Safety and Justice Through the COVID-19 Pandemic and Prepare for Future Challenges."  This webpage provides highlights, and here are excerpts therefrom:

In an effort to gather lessons learned from the responses of different justice agencies to the pandemic, the Priority Criminal Justice Needs Initiative convened a set of workshops at the end of September 2020 with justice agency representatives and others to take stock of what had been done and look toward the future.  A variety of common challenges and innovations were identified in the workshops that assisted in continuing the operation of the system through the pandemic and also might support broader reforms and justice system innovation going forward.

Key Findings

Shifts in crime during the pandemic had implications throughout the system

• Increases in such offenses as domestic violence created new needs, made some strategies for responding more difficult, and magnified demands on service providers.

Physical infrastructure can constrain responses to infectious disease

• Responding to the pandemic required space to physically distance, and the high density of many facilities in the criminal justice system made that exceedingly difficult.

A shift to virtual access to justice could be valuable, but it could leave some behind

• Connecting to the justice system virtually was useful during the pandemic, and preserving it going forward could be valuable. For tasks where it is appropriate, virtual justice can make participation in justice processes much less burdensome for the public and save resources for justice agencies.
• However, shortcomings in the availability, speed, and capacity of internet infrastructure mean that the benefits of virtual options will not be universally shared.

A justice system can respond more effectively than a group of justice organizations acting independently

• Collaborating with public health agencies was noted as important. Panelists discussed examples where the decisions in one part of the system affected others, and although those choices might have been unavoidable, more coordination and information-sharing might have cushioned effects throughout the system.

Challenges remain to protect the health and safety of emergency responders during large-scale disasters

• Mental health consequences from the stresses of the pandemic already are occurring, and panelists wondered whether responders would have long-term consequences from COVID-19.

Recommendations

• Panelists identified several promising practices related to virtual components of the justice process that stakeholders might consider continuing. For law enforcement and the courts, panelists recommended maintaining virtual access to the courts, virtual police calls for service, and elements of in-person court processes, such as jury selection. Panelists also recommended maintaining virtual connectivity between courts and corrections agencies. For community corrections and victim services organizations, panelists recommended maintaining virtual service-delivery models.
• Panelists identified work models and processes that will be useful beyond the pandemic, including flexible schedules, telework models, and paperless processes to improve efficiency.
• Panelists noted communication and connectivity practices, including use of virtual platforms to support leadership and community situational awareness among law enforcement. For institutional corrections, panelists recommended maintaining expanded use of virtual and video visitation systems. For victim services, panelists recommended maintaining alternative approaches to reach victims in need, such as text lines.
• Panelists also identified some sector-specific recommendations, such as integrating corrections agencies into public health planning, preserving reductions in inmate density to reduce disease risk, and strengthening partnerships to enable service delivery to victims during crisis periods.