« May 9, 2021 - May 15, 2021 | Main | May 23, 2021 - May 29, 2021 »

May 22, 2021

Ninth Circuit panel interprets FIRST STEP amendment to statutory safety valve to greatly expand who can avoid federal mandatory-minimum sentences

A helpful reader made sure I did not miss a significant new Ninth Circuit panel ruling in US v. Lopez, No. 19-50305 (9th Cir. May 21, 2021) (available here).  Here is how the opinion gets started:

Title 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f), commonly called the “safety valve,” allows a district court to sentence a criminal defendant below the mandatory-minimum sentence for certain drug offenses if the defendant meets the criteria in § 3553(f)(1) through (f)(5).  In 2018, Congress amended one of the safety valve’s provisions: § 3553(f)(1).  See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221. Section 3553(f)(1) focuses only on a criminal defendant’s prior criminal history as determined under the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1). As amended, § 3553(f)(1) requires a defendant to prove that he or she “does not have” the following: “(A) more than 4 criminal history points . . . (B) a prior 3-point offense . . . and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense.” Id. § 3553(f)(1)(A)–(C) (emphasis added).

As a matter of first impression, we must interpret the “and” joining subsections (A), (B), and (C) under § 3553(f)(1). If § 3553(f)(1)’s “and” carries its ordinary conjunctive meaning, a criminal defendant must have (A) more than four criminal-history points, (B) a prior threepoint offense, and (C) a prior two-point violent offense, cumulatively, before he or she is barred from safety-valve relief under § 3553(f)(1).  But if we rewrite § 3553(f)(1)’s “and” into an “or,” as the government urges, a defendant must meet the criteria in only subsection (A), (B), or (C) before he or she is barred from safety-valve relief under § 3553(f)(1). Applying the tools of statutory construction, we hold that § 3553(f)(1)’s “and” is unambiguously conjunctive. Put another way, we hold that “and” means “and.”

I believe that this statutory construction means that even more federal drug defendants will be able to benefit from the statutory safety valve thanks to the FIRST STEP Act than some may have thought. But, as the main opinion explains as it concludes, it is the statutory text that ultimately matters:

We recognize that § 3553(f)(1)’s plain and unambiguous language might be viewed as a considerable departure from the prior version of § 3553(f)(1), which barred any defendant from safety-valve relief if he or she had more than one criminal-history point under the Sentencing Guidelines.  See Mejia-Pimental, 477 F.3d at 1104.  As a result, § 3553(f)(1)’s plain and unambiguous language could possibly result in more defendants receiving safety-valve relief than some in Congress anticipated.

But sometimes Congress uses words that reach further than some members of Congress may have expected.  See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749 (noting that Congress’s plain language sometimes reaches “beyond the principal evil [that] legislators may have intended or expected to address,” but courts remain obligated to give Congress’s language its plain meaning) (citation and quotation marks omitted).  We cannot ignore Congress’s plain and unambiguous language just because a statute might reach further than some in Congress expected.  See id. (“[I]t is ultimately the provisions of [Congress’s] legislative commands rather than the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed.”) (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

Section 3553(f)(1)’s plain and unambiguous language, the Senate’s own legislative drafting manual, § 3553(f)(1)’s  structure as a conjunctive negative proof, and the canon of consistent usage result in only one plausible reading of § 3553(f)(1)’s “and” here: “And” is conjunctive.  If Congress meant § 3553(f)(1)’s “and” to mean “or,” it has the authority to amend the statute accordingly.  We do not.

May 22, 2021 in Drug Offense Sentencing, FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Implementing retroactively new USSC crack guidelines, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes | Permalink | Comments (1)

Noticing a lack of pleas, so far, in Capitol riot prosecutions

I keep saying that the high-profile Capitol riot prosecutions provide an interesting lens on how a set of distinctive cases work their way through the federal criminal justice system.  This recent Reuters piece, headlined "Few plea bargains in U.S. Capitol riot cases as prosecutors stand firm," provides another interest update on these cases:

Nearly four months after the U.S. Capitol attack, just one of more than 440 people charged has pleaded guilty, a sign of tough conditions set by prosecutors for plea deals and resistance by defense lawyers to their demands.  This reflects the high stakes of cases stemming from the worst violence at the Capitol in modern history, which left five people dead.

U.S. officials have suggested in court hearings that defendants might be interested in pleading guilty, a move that typically can result in a shorter sentence.  Prosecutors routinely seek to resolve cases through plea bargains.  But legal experts said it is relatively early in this process for either prosecutors or defense lawyers to be reaching quick deals.

Lawyers for more than a dozen defendants said plea talks so far have foundered because prosecutors demanded their clients turn over social media data, cell phones and other evidence, while also pushing for prison sentences they would not accept.  Without plea deals, hundreds of separate trials will move forward, a time-consuming process now extended by a case backlog resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

Moreover, without evidence provided under plea bargains, federal prosecutors may have a harder time building cases against leaders of the violence on more serious charges such as conspiracy or violation of laws intended to fight organized crime....

The charges have ranged widely, from disorderly conduct to assaulting officers and conspiracy. Key conspiracy cases have largely focused on leaders of the right-wing Oath Keepers and Proud Boys groups. They face charges of obstruction of an official proceeding, destruction of government property and occupying a restricted building.

Some defendants facing lesser charges have been surprised by prosecutors' demands. Defense lawyers have complained that their insistence on obtaining cell phones and other physical and digital evidence is excessive. That data could be used to build cases against planners of the violence.

Attorney Steven Metcalf said he rejected a plea deal that would have sent his client Richard Barnett to prison for several years. The man from Gravette, Arkansas was seen in a widely circulated photograph sitting at a desk with his feet up in House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's office. "We might consider something more reasonable," Metcalfe said....

Former federal prosecutor Laurie Levenson, a law professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles, said that by taking a tough stand in plea-bargain negotiations, prosecutors are "sending a message" about how seriously they take the riot cases. "It is still relatively early in the process," Levenson said. "Prosecutors don't want to ... set the standards too low. There's not a lot incentive for prosecutors to give a sweetheart deal."

Prosecutors are also likely focused on amassing as much evidence as they can, she said, hence the requests for defendants to surrender phones and other data. The one person who has pleaded guilty so far, Oath Keepers founding member Jon Schaffer, agreed to turn over "any and all evidence" of crimes that he was aware of and to fully cooperate with prosecutors, according to his plea deal filed in federal court.

The lawyer for Jacob Chansley, the man nicknamed the "QAnon Shaman" who was photographed wearing a horned headdress inside the Capitol, said the prosecutors he has talked to appear to have less leeway to negotiate deals without consulting Washington than he normally encounters in federal cases. "We have been working as collaboratively as we can with the government," said Albert Watkins, a St. Louis lawyer who represents Chansley and three other Jan. 6 defendants....

At a court hearing this month, prosecutors indicated that senior officials had approved possible plea deal offers for four defendants charged with attacking police in a Capitol tunnel with firecrackers and chemicals. But lawyers for some of them said no offers have materialized....

Plea discussions appear to be advanced in the case of at least one other accused rioter, court records showed. Douglas Jensen of Des Moines, Iowa, faces charges including violent entry of the Capitol and disrupting government business. Court records showed that a conference in early May was postponed until June while the parties decide if they want to proceed with a plea. Jensen’s lawyer declined to comment.

I am quite confident that many of these cases will be resolved via pleas and that there will not be "hundreds of separate trials" moving forward.  Indeed, because prosecutors are still building more cases and likely still figuring out relative culpability, it is not all that surprising that they are aggressively seeking cooperation and information in the plea negotiation process before agreeing to reduced sentences.  Also, as Prof Levenson rightly highlights, federal prosecutors are likely disinclined to have early pleas involve less serious charges with what may be perceived as light sentencing outcomes, both because of the optics of any deal perceived to be "sweetheart" and because early plea deals often set benchmarks for later plea negotiations and sentencings.  In other words, these case still reflect classic federal prosecutorial dynamics, even if plea deals are being struck a little more slowly.

Prior related posts:

May 22, 2021 in Celebrity sentencings, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

May 21, 2021

"Population-Based Sentencing"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Jessica Eaglin available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

The institutionalization of actuarial risk assessments at sentencing reflects the extension of the academic and policy-driven push to move judges away from sentencing individual defendants and toward basing sentencing on population level representations of crimes and offenses.  How have courts responded to this trend?  Drawing on the federal sentencing guidelines jurisprudence and the emerging procedural jurisprudence around actuarial risk assessments at sentencing, this Article identifies two techniques.  First, the courts have expanded individual procedural rights into sentencing where they once did not apply.  Second, the courts have created procedural rules that preserve the space for judges to pass moral judgment on individual defendants.  These responses exist in deep tension with policymakers’ goals to shape sentencing outcomes in the abstract.  While courts seek to preserve the sentencing process, advocates encourage the courts to manage the population-based sentencing tools. The courts’ response is potentially problematic, as refusal to regulate the tools can undermine criminal administration.  However, it presents an underexplored opportunity for courts and opponents of the recent trend toward institutionalizing actuarial risk assessments to jointly create the intellectual and policy-driven space for more fundamental, structural reforms relating to the U.S. criminal legal apparatus. This Article urges the courts and legal scholars to consider these alternatives going forward.

May 21, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Recommended reading, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

Notable data on BOP resistance to compassionate release requests from federal prisoners

As regular readers likely surmise, I have been quite pleased that federal courts have seized their new authority under the FIRST STEP Act to directly reduce sentences under the (so-called compassionate release) statutory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) without awaiting a motion by the Bureau of Prisons.  This BOP "First Step Act" page reports that there have been a total of 3,414 "Compassionate Releases / Reduction in Sentences" approved by courts since passage of the FIRST STEP Act, but the BOP has not reported on how many of such motions have been support by the BOP.  But this week, a letter from the BOP to members of Congress (which was apparently written in mid April and can be downloaded below) provides more details on how many compassionate release requests have been made and how few have been endorsed by the BOP.

Specifically, the letter to members of Congress authored by Ken Hyle, BOP's General Counsel, reports that since March 1, 2020, a little over 30,000 compassionate release requests were made by federal prisoners,  Of that number, only 374 of these requests were recommended for approval by prison wardens and then only 36 were approved by the BOP's Director.  In other works, during global pandemic, only about 1 out of 83 requests for compassionate release got approved by a federal warden, and then less than one out of every 10 requests approved by a warden was approved by the BOP Director.

Thankfully, federal judges had a much more fulsome view of compassionate release during a pandemics.  Specifically, given that around 3250 motions for compassionate release were granted by judges during the pandemic, it seems that for every compassionate release motion found satisfactory by the BOP Director, there were an additional 90 motions that federal judges concluded were satisfactory to  justify a sentence reduction under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

Download Response from BOP re. compassionate release during COVID 4.16.21

May 21, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

May 20, 2021

Rounding up a lot of interesting new news and commentary

Many days it often seems like there is just too much notable news coverage and good commentary on sentencing matters for me to keep up.  Today was one of those days, and so I will catch up with a round-up of headlines and links:

From Brittany K. Barnett via USA Today, "Release people incarcerated under draconian marijuana laws"

From the Christian Science Monitor, "What Supreme Court’s jettisoning of precedent may mean for future"

From Daniel Nichanian at The Appeal, "Wins for Larry Krasner and New Allies Signal Reformers' Growing Reach"

From the Desert News, "Sen. Mike Lee and Orrin Hatch: Botching criminal justice reform comes at a steep cost"

From NorthJersey.com, "NJ allows non-violent drug offenders to apply for new sentences"

From NPR, "Congress Wants To Set Up One-Stop Shops To Help Ex-Inmates Stay Out Of Prison"

From Udi Ofer at The Hill, "President Biden can prevent over 4,000 people from being sent back to prison"

From WSB-TV (Georgia), "Some local judges offering sentence reductions to offenders who get vaccinated"

May 20, 2021 in Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (0)

"But Who Oversees the Overseers?: The Status of Prison and Jail Oversight in the United States"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article by Michele Deitch in the American Journal of Criminal Law.  Here is part of the issue's introduction:

In 2010, I published research demonstrating that external oversight over prisons and jails was a rarity in the United States.  Ten years later, this article reveals a similar conclusion — despite the extraordinary concerns surrounding conditions of confinement and the treatment of people in custody, relatively few jurisdictions have established independent agencies tasked with scrutinizing these institutions and addressing the problems they find.  However, there have also been significant signs of change over the last decade: the national landscape for independent correctional oversight is improving, with greater awareness of this issue, more calls for the creation of oversight mechanisms, more concrete efforts to establish these entities, and the successful implementation of several new oversight bodies.

This article builds on my 2010 report to highlight those recent developments and to assess the current state of correctional oversight in the United States.  Part I describes the concept of correctional oversight and explains its goals to improve transparency and increase accountability within prisons and jails.  It goes on to outline the benefits of oversight that can accrue to diverse stakeholders, including incarcerated persons, correctional administrators, policymakers, judges, the media, and the public at large.  This section also discusses the prevalence of independent oversight bodies in other countries, and how the lack of such oversight makes the United States an anomaly on the world stage.

In Part II, I discuss America’s historical reliance on court oversight as a way to address problematic institutional conditions and how this has inhibited the development of preventive oversight mechanisms.  But as litigation has become a less reliable tool for prison reformers, and as the drawbacks of court oversight have become more obvious, advocates have begun to emphasize the need for preventing harm through routine inspections of facilities rather than waiting until conditions hit rock bottom to get involved in reform efforts.

Part III examines the growing interest in correctional oversight and discusses recent calls for the development of independent oversight mechanisms in this country.  Since 2006, there has been a series of notable highlights in the nascent oversight movement, and this section sets forth a chronology of those key events.

Part IV describes a multi-year research project conducted at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs at the University of Texas to find, interview, and catalog all external prison and jail oversight bodies that currently exist for adult correctional facilities around the nation.  This part of the article presents and analyzes the key findings about these various oversight bodies.  In this section, I also highlight those jurisdictions that have established oversight bodies since 2010, to show the shifting landscape of correctional oversight in the United States. This section of the article also includes charts with lists of various prison and jail oversight bodies at the state and local levels.

Finally, Part V concludes with an overall assessment of the status of correctional oversight in the United States.  That assessment mixes optimism and excitement about the future of oversight with a dose of realism about the challenges ahead and a recognition that we continue to trail our peer nations when it comes to belief in the critical importance of independent oversight.  But still we must push on in our efforts to promote transparency and accountability in all places of confinement.

May 20, 2021 in Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

May 19, 2021

Senate Judiciary Committee to mark up three criminal justice and sentencing reform bills

I was pleased to see today this press release from Americans for Prosperity noting that the US Senate Judiciary Committee has a meeting scheduled on Thursday which includes plans "to mark up three key bills: the First Step Implementation Act, the COVID-19 Safer Detention Act, and the Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act."  Here is how the press release describes these bills:

I have blogged about all these bills in these prior posts:

Senators Durbin and Grassley introduce new "First Step Implementation Act"

Senators Durbin and Grassley re-introduce "COVID-19 Safer Detention Act" 

Senators Durbin and Grassley re-introduce "Prohibiting Punishment of Acquitted Conduct Act" 

It is exciting to all three of these bill poised to move forward in the legislation process.  None alone would be a massive reform, but all together would be a significant advance in federal criminal justice reform.

May 19, 2021 in FIRST STEP Act and its implementation, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

Texas completes first state execution of 2021

As reported in this AP piece, headlined "Absent media, Texas executes inmate who killed great aunt," Texas completed an execution this evening.  Here are some of the details:

A Texas man convicted of fatally beating his 83-year-old great aunt more than two decades ago was executed Wednesday evening without media witnesses present because prison agency officials neglected to notify reporters it was time to carry out the punishment.

Quintin Jones received the lethal injection at the state penitentiary in Huntsville for the September 1999 killing of Berthena Bryant, agency spokesman Jeremy Desel said about 30 minutes after Jones was pronounced dead.

Desel never received the usual phone call from the Huntsville Unit prison to bring reporters from The Associated Press and The Huntsville Item to the prison.  He and the media witnesses were waiting in an office across the street. 

“The Texas Department of Criminal Justice can only apologize for this error and nothing like this will ever happen again,” he said. He said the execution, the first in Texas in nearly a year, included a number of new personnel who have never participated in the process....

The previous 570 executions carried out by Texas since capital punishment resumed in 1982 all had at least one media witness. “My assumption is there will be a thorough investigation into how this all transpired and what was missed that allowed it to happen, and I expect that investigation is already underway,” Desel said.

There were no unusual circumstances with the execution itself, he said, relying on accounts from agency officials who were inside the death chamber.  Jones made a brief statement thanking his supporters and expressing love for them...

As the lethal dose of pentobarbital was administered, he took four or five deep breaths followed by “a long deep snore,” Desel said. Jones was pronounced dead at 6:40 p.m., 12 minutes after the drugs began.

Less than an hour before the scheduled punishment, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to halt the 41-year-old man’s execution....

Some of Bryant’s family members, including her sister Mattie Long, had said they didn’t want Jones to be executed. Jones is Long’s grandnephew.  “Because I was so close to Bert, her death hurt me a lot. Even so, God is merciful. Quintin can’t bring her back. I can’t bring her back. I am writing this to ask you to please spare Quintin’s life,” Long wrote in a letter that was part of Jones’ clemency petition with the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles.

The board denied Jones’ clemency petition on Tuesday and Gov. Greg Abbott didn’t go against that decision and also declined to delay the execution.  Abbott has granted clemency to only one death row inmate, Thomas Whitaker, since taking office in 2015.

On Wednesday, Jones’ attorney filed a civil rights complaint against the board, alleging race played “an impermissible role” in its denial of Jones’ petition.  Jones’ attorney argued the case was similar to that of Whitaker’s and the only difference was that Whitaker is white and Jones was Black.  U.S. District Judge George C. Hanks Jr. dismissed the complaint, writing that Jones didn’t present direct evidence of his allegation....

Jones was the first inmate in Texas to receive a lethal injection since the July 8 execution of Billy Joe Wardlow. Four other executions had been set for earlier this year but were either delayed or rescheduled. While Texas is usually the nation’s busiest death penalty state, in 2020 it executed only three inmates — the fewest executions in nearly 25 years, mainly because of the pandemic.

May 19, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms | Permalink | Comments (1)

US Sentencing Commission releases lots of notable new data and "Quick Facts" reports

I was pleased to receive an email from the US Sentencing Commission today titled "What's New in Federal Sentencing?".  This email provided links and brief highlights of a lot of new items and data just posted to the USSC's website.  Here is a sampling from the email:

NEW First Step Act Data

The U.S. Sentencing Commission published updated data on sentence reductions pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Under Section 404, defendants sentenced before the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 are eligible for a retroactive sentence reduction. 

Data Highlights

Through September 30, 2020, the Commission received the following information from the courts: 

  • 3,705 offenders were granted a sentence reduction under Section 404.
  • 65% were assigned to the highest Criminal History Category (VI). 
    • 56% were Career Offenders.
  • 45% received a weapon-related sentencing enhancement.
  • Offenders received an average decrease of 6 years in their sentence. 
    • The original average sentence was 274 months.
    • The new average sentence was 202 months.
  • 87% of granted motions were made by the defendant, 9% by the attorney for the government, and 4% by the court.

Quick Facts 

The Commission continues to update QuickFacts with new data. Recently updated QuickFacts include:

QuickFacts publications give readers basic facts about a single area of federal crime in an easy-to-read, two-page format. The Commission releases new QuickFacts periodically.

May 19, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

"The Origins of the Superpredator: The Child Study Movement to Today"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new report from the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth.  Here is its introduction:

The 1995 superpredator narrative is often called out as the impetus for our nation's harmful sentencing policies for Black children.  After all, 75 percent of all kids sentenced to life without parole (JLWOP) were sentenced in the 90s or later, and 70 percent of this population are kids of color (60 percent Black).  But the pseudo-scientific, unsubstantiated, and racialized superpredator theory is actually part of an American tradition of deeming some children something other than children.

The term superpredator first appeared in a publication by American political scientist John J. DiIulio, Jr. in 1995. DiIulio predicted that a wave of teenagers driven by "moral poverty" numbering in the tens of thousands would soon be on the streets committing violent crime. These "hardened, remorseless juveniles" were framed in the article as a pressing "demographic crime bomb."  DiIulio's narrative used racist tropes to further stoke fear — broadly attributing "moral poverty" to "Black inner-city neighborhoods" and families and specifically and repeatedly calling attention to gang violence and "predatory street criminals" among "Black urban youth." 

Five years later, DiIulio renounced the superpredator theory, apologizing for its unintended consequences.  While Dilulio predicted that juvenile crime would increase, it instead dropped by more than half.  Conceding that he made a mistake, Dilulio regretted that he could not “put the brakes on the super-predator theory” before it took on a life of its own.

Despite his later distancing from the idea, DiIulio's terminology spread like wildfire through major news outlets and academic circles.  Coming just a few years after headlines using "wilding" and "wolf pack" to describe five teenagers convicted and later exonerated of raping a woman in Central Park, the rhetorical dehumanization of youth suspected of violence was not new, but DiIulio's coining of "superpredator" lent new credibility and energy.  The superpredator myth reinforced and sought to legitimize longstanding fears of Black criminality, disguised as developmental science and resting on pseudo-scientific assumptions that certain children are not children at all.

While the widespread adoption and popularization of DiIulio's rhetoric and the broader tough on crime atmosphere of the 1990s is instructive in examining our extreme sentencing policies, it is important to place them in the context of our long history of only regarding some children as worthy of protection.  This report highlights the superpredator theory as one manifestation of a longstanding practice in which policymakers, lawyers, and academics classify children on the basis of moral and racial beliefs.  These classifications permit racially biased perceptions of deviance to replace chronological age as the defining characteristic of youth.

This report takes as its jumping off point the Child Study movement of the 19th century, which had long lasting impact on the contours of academic inquiry and the American legal system.  The Child Study movement itself was of course rooted in a deeply racist culture, profoundly influenced by the justifications used to uphold slavery and Jim Crow, and with its own ideological predecessors dating back to the Enlightenment of the 18th century.

May 19, 2021 in Examples of "over-punishment", Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

OG progressive prosecutor Larry Krasner wins big in Philadelphia DA primary

This week's primary election for Philadelphia District Attorney was reasonably seen as a kind of referendum on the progressive prosecutor movement.  (See this AP piece, headlined "Prosecutor’s reelection pits reform against rising gun crime.")  Larry Krasner is seeking a second term after pushing a wide array of criminal justice reforms during his first three years in office; former assistant DA Carlos Vega had the backing of the city's police as he sought to dislodge Krasner during the Democratic primary. 

Some polling seemed to suggest this could be a close race, but tonight it appears that DA Krasner has secured the Democratic nomination by a wide margin (and thus all-but-certain re-election in a deep blue city).  As of this writing (around midnight), this election website reports, with over 80% of the divisions reports, Krasner has roughly 65% of the vote to Vega's 35%.

UPDATE: This piece from The Intercept, headlined "Philadelphia District Attorney Larry Krasner Trounces Police-Backed Primary Challenger," provides lots of context, and I found these passages notable as DA Krasner considers his plans for the coming years:

Since his election in 2017, Krasner has become a symbol of the burgeoning movement to elect reform-minded prosecutors. “Krasner has been kind of a model,” said Scott Roberts, senior director of criminal justice campaigns at Color of Change, a racial justice group that supported several such prosecutors’ bids and endorsed Krasner.  “I can’t tell you how many potential DA candidates I have talked to who lead with, ‘I’m going to be the Larry Krasner of fill-in-the-blank city.’”

But Krasner’s election and the reforms he enacted as soon as he took office also sparked a fierce backlash — making him a national target for law enforcement groups and prominent Republicans.  Former President Donald Trump, for example, claimed in 2019 that prosecutors in Philadelphia and Chicago “have decided not prosecute many criminals” who pose a threat to public safety.

Krasner’s reelection bid came as an increase in gun violence in many U.S. cities — including Philadelphia — and calls to reduce the scope of policing prompted a return to tough-on-crime rhetoric and rebuke of reformist efforts.  But other reform-oriented DAs in cities with considerable gun violence — like Chicago’s Kim Foxx and St. Louis’s Kim Gardner — recently won reelection bids despite sometimes vicious attacks on them.

According to a recent poll by Data for Progress, many of the reforms Krasner enacted remain popular with voters in Pennsylvania. Sixty-four percent of people surveyed expressed support for limitations to the use of cash bail, 60 percent were in favor of the decriminalization of drug possession, 75 percent favored sentence reductions for good behavior, and 68 percent supported terminating probation when supervision is no longer needed.  Just this week, a Philadelphia City Council committee advanced a measure outlining procedures for a new police oversight board that will go to a full council vote later this week — the result of years of organizing by local activists who have pushed to create a body with power and funding to hold police accountable for misconduct, with renewed energy after police met protests last summer with brute force.

“With all the noise that goes on, the attacks, what have you, we know that the agenda is still very popular,” said Roberts. “People want to see these prosecutors’ offices being focused on bringing down incarceration rates, and holding police accountable.  And they’re actually looking for other solutions for violence, they’re not willing to buy into the narrative that they hear from police unions and conservative politicians.”

May 19, 2021 in Elections and sentencing issues in political debates, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

May 18, 2021

Idaho delays scheduled execution for terminally ill condemned man to allow for commutation hearing

As reported in this new AP piece, a "scheduled June execution for an Idaho man who is dying of terminal cancer has been canceled so the state’s Commission of Pardons and Parole can consider whether to commute his sentence."  Here are a few details:

Gerald Ross Pizzuto Jr. was scheduled to die by lethal injection on June 2 in connection with the 1985 murders of two people at a remote Idaho County cabin.  On Tuesday, the Idaho Commission of Pardons and Parole granted Pizzuto’s request for a commutation hearing, and attorneys for the state and Pizzuto agreed that the execution should be stayed until the hearing is concluded.  The hearing will be held in November, the commission said....

Pizzuto, 65, has terminal bladder cancer, diabetes and heart disease and is confined to a wheelchair.  He’s been on hospice care since 2019, when doctors said he likely wouldn’t survive for another year....

Court records show Pizzuto’s life was marred by violence from childhood.  Family members offered gruesome testimony that Pizzuto was repeatedly tortured, raped and severely beaten by his stepfather and sometimes by his stepfather’s friends, and he sustained multiple brain injuries.

Pizzuto was camping with two other men near McCall when he encountered 58-year-old Berta Herndon and her 37-year-old nephew Del Herndon, who were prospecting in the area. Prosecutors said Pizzuto, armed with a .22 caliber rifle, went to the Herndon’s cabin, tied their wrists behind their backs and bound their legs to steal their money.  He bludgeoned them both, and co-defendant James Rice then shot Del Herndon in the head. Another co-defendant, Bill Odom, helped bury the bodies and all three were accused of robbing the cabin.

Pizzuto is one of eight people on Idaho’s death row.  Idaho has executed three people since capital punishment was resumed nationwide in 1976.  Keith Eugene Wells was executed in 1994, Paul Ezra Rhodes was executed in 2011 and Richard Albert Leavitt was executed in 2012.

May 18, 2021 in Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"The Feminist Script for Punishment"

The title of this post is the title of this new article/book review by I. India Thusi now available via SSRN.  Here is its abstract:

In her new book, The Feminist War on Crime, Professor Aya Gruber provides a critique of feminists, who have sought political vindication through a governance of punishment. Professor Elizabeth Bernstein coined the term “carceral feminism” to describe the feminist commitment to “a law and order agenda and . . . a drift from the welfare state to the carceral state as the enforcement apparatus for feminist goals.”  While feminist movements have expanded the opportunities available to women and girls, too often their means for achieving these accomplishments have been paved on a path of the privileges of feminist elites.  These privileges are immune from the pressures of multiple forms of subordination that form the interstitial web of inequality that many other women encounter.  These other women are also Other women, in that they are often outsiders in American society, not just because they are women, but also because they are women of color, poor, immigrant, less educated, disabled, and/or queer.  The positionality of these Other women is important because they often have personal experiences that make engagement with the state apparatus for punishment undesirable.  Black feminists advanced the concerns of the Other women through their activism for state responses that address the systemic, material conditions that make women vulnerable to violence, rather than through engagement with the technologies of punishment.  Other women have experienced state violence, either through the inherited trauma that runs in their blood from the violence against their ancestors, or through their daily experiences of everyday subordination within their communities. White, elite feminists have often missed their perspectives.  Or, at times, they have outright demeaned their perspectives. Either way, the path to gender equality has had an unsettling entanglement with carcerality. And the logics of punishment and imprisonment have informed feminist demands for reforms. This feminist fascination with the carceral is the subject of Gruber’s book.

Gruber’s historical analysis of the entanglement between feminism and incarceration illustrates that the feminist rage against the patriarchy has at times transformed into retributivist impulses to punish, which contradict feminist values and exacerbate social injustice. Gruber recounts several examples of feminist campaigns that advanced a feminist script for punishment.  Many of these campaigns were motivated by the laudable aim of eradicating violence against women and improving women’s ability to lead safe and healthy lives.  The various feminist campaigns for more punishment occurred in different decades and had various leaders. But they all share a common script about punishment.  They developed similar story lines about women.  They painted victims and villains that look remarkably similar through the decades.  They subscribe to the same dominant story about the role of the criminal law as a sword against perpetrators.  While the individual characters in the script vary and are not always identical, many of the elements that advance their pleas for additional punishment are remarkably similar.  These stories follow the same script: a feminist script for punishment.

May 18, 2021 in Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Race, Class, and Gender, Recommended reading | Permalink | Comments (1)

Lots of criminal justice discussion of later at Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform

I have not done a round-up of posts from my blogging over at Marijuana Law, Policy & Reform in a little while, and I am especially eager to flag again this earlier post requesting information from any and all folks teaching (or interested in teaching) a law course on drugs generally or cannabis in particular (sought via a short survey at go.osu.edu/teaching-drugs-survey).  In addition, below are some more recent posts at the intersection of criminal justice reform and marijuana reform from MLP&R

May 18, 2021 in Drug Offense Sentencing, Marijuana Legalization in the States, Pot Prohibition Issues | Permalink | Comments (1)

Uninspired comments and plans emerging from Biden White House concerning clemency vision

The New York Times has this new story that reinforces some of the buzz I have been recently hearing that Prez Biden is disinclined to significantly transform either the process or the practice of federal clemency anytime soon.  Regular readers know I have been urging clemency action by Prez Biden since his first days in office, but the first line of the article suggests we ought not expect any grants until at least mid to late 2022: "Administration officials have quietly begun evaluating clemency requests and have signaled to activists that President Biden could begin issuing pardons or commutations by the midpoint of his term."

The article does goes on to suggest Prez Biden might at least be considering a clemency approach akin to what Prez Obama eventually adopted at the very end of his second term. But it sounds like any program would still be administered through the Pardon Attorney's office still problematically located in the Department of Justice.  Here are excerpts of a piece worth reading in full:

Mr. Biden’s team ... has signaled in discussions with outside groups that it is establishing a more deliberate, systemic process geared toward identifying entire classes of people who deserve mercy.  The approach could allow the president to make good on his campaign promise to weave issues of racial equity and justice throughout his government.

The White House has publicly offered few details about his plans for issuing pardons, which wipe out convictions, and commutations, which reduce prison sentences.  But White House officials have indicated in private conversations with criminal justice activists, clemency seekers and their allies that Mr. Biden’s team is working with the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon Attorney to process clemency requests with an eye toward having the president sign some before the 2022 midterm elections.

“We asked them not to wait to the end of a term to execute pardon and commutation power for photo ops, and they definitely assured us that is not this administration’s plan,” said DeAnna Hoskins, the president of the criminal justice group JustLeadershipUSA, who participated in a Zoom session for former prisoners with White House officials last month. “This administration is looking at early on,” said Ms. Hoskins, who worked on prisoner re-entry issues for county, state and federal government agencies after serving a 45-day sentence for theft in 1999.

Participants in the Zoom session and other meetings with the White House have come away with the impression that Mr. Biden intends to use clemency grants — which are among the most unchecked and profound powers at a president’s disposal — to address systemic issues in the criminal justice system.  The Biden campaign hinted at such an approach in its criminal justice platform, which indicated that he intended to use clemency “broadly” to “secure the release of individuals facing unduly long sentences for certain nonviolent and drug crimes.”

Among those supporting the administration’s efforts is Susan E. Rice, who leads Mr. Biden’s Domestic Policy Council. She is focused on instilling racial equity in all of the administration’s initiatives and has recruited a team with deep roots in civil rights and justice....  But the White House has indicated that it will rely on the rigorous application vetting process overseen by the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon Attorney.

Mr. Biden’s White House has already signaled that even its allies will have to go through the process, as was made clear to Desmond Meade, who in 2018 led a successful push to restore voting rights to more than 1.4 million Floridians with felony convictions.  Mr. Meade, who has expressed interest in a federal pardon for a decades-old military conviction for stealing liquor and electronics on Navy bases while he was serving in the Army, was steered this year to the Justice Department’s pardon attorney...  In an interview, Mr. Meade said that the department’s clemency process was “way too bureaucratic,” adding that “the pardon application in itself is daunting, and it screams that you need to hire an attorney to make that happen.”  He said he was among the activists who urged White House officials to consider moving the process out of the Justice Department, noting the paradox of entrusting an agency that led prosecutions with determining whether the targets of those prosecutions deserve mercy.

But the Biden administration is not inclined to circumvent the department, according to a person familiar with the White House’s thinking. Instead, Mr. Biden’s team has pointed to the approach adopted by President Barack Obama, who issued more than 1,900 clemency grants.  Most went to people recommended by the Justice Department, many of whom had been serving sentences under tough antidrug laws, including those convicted of low-level, nonviolent crimes like possession of cocaine.

In outreach sessions to criminal justice activists, White House officials have collected recommendations on categories of clemencies that should be prioritized.  The sessions have included groups with strong connections in the Black community and those that aggressively opposed Mr. Trump, including the American Civil Liberties Union, as well as the libertarian Cato Institute and the Prison Fellowship, which counts evangelical conservatives among its staff and supporters....

The A.C.L.U. highlighted those prisoners and others in an online and newspaper advertising campaign during Mr. Biden’s inauguration week.  It urged him to grant clemency to 25,000 people in federal prison, including “the elderly, the sick, those swept up in the war on drugs and people locked up because of racist policies of the past that have since been changed.”  Udi Ofer, the director of the A.C.L.U’s justice division, said that Mr. Biden “has a special obligation given his history to use the power of clemency to fix these issues, because he was the architect of so many of the mass incarceration policies that we are now trying to repeal.”

I suppose I should be pleased that clemency issues continue to get significant attention, but I remain displeased that all we have seen so far is a lot of clemency talk (or proclamations about second chances) and no actual clemency grants.  Notably, recent polling shows lots of support for commuting the sentences of a wide variety of persons serving problematic sentences, and  almost everyone readily recognizes that there are many, many persons in the federal criminal justice system still subject to problematic sentences.  I say "almost everyone" because I sense that federal prosecutors working in the Department of Justice do not see all that many federal sentences as so problematic, which is why so many others (myself included) think it so problematic that the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon Attorney continues to serve as the gatekeeper (and wet blanket) in the federal clemency process.  

A few prior recent related posts:

May 18, 2021 in Clemency and Pardons, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

May 17, 2021

After embracing new firing squad option, will South Carolina seek to move quickly forward with "old school" executions?

As reported in this new AP piece, "South Carolina Gov. Henry McMaster has signed into law a bill that forces death row inmates for now to choose between the electric chair or a newly formed firing squad in hopes the state can restart executions after an involuntary 10-year pause." Here are more details that prompt the question in the title of this post:

South Carolina had been one of the most prolific states of its size in putting inmates to death. But a lack of lethal injection drugs brought executions to a halt.

McMaster signed the bill Friday with no ceremony or fanfare, according to the state Legislature’s website. It’s the first bill the governor decided to deal with after nearly 50 hit his desk Thursday. “The families and loved ones of victims are owed closure and justice by law. Now, we can provide it,” McMaster said on Twitter on Monday.

Last week state lawmakers gave their final sign offs to the bill, which retains lethal injection as the primary method of execution if the state has the drugs, but requires prison officials to use the electric chair or firing squad if it doesn’t.

Prosecutors said three inmates have exhausted all their normal appeals, but can’t be killed because under the previous law, inmates who don’t choose the state’s 109-year-old electric chair automatically are scheduled to die by lethal injection.  They have all chosen the method that can’t be carried out.

How soon executions can begin is up in the air.  The electric chair is ready to use.  Prison officials have been doing preliminary research into how firing squads carry out executions in other states, but are not sure how long it will take to have one in place in South Carolina.  The other three states that allow a firing squad are Mississippi, Oklahoma and Utah, according to the Death Penalty Information Center.

Three inmates, all in Utah, have been killed by firing squad since the U.S. reinstated the death penalty in 1977.  Nineteen inmates have died in the electric chair this century, and South Carolina is one of eight states that can still electrocute inmates, according to the center.

Lawyers for the men with potentially imminent death dates are considering suing over the new law, saying the state is going backward.  “These are execution methods that previously were replaced by lethal injection, which is considered more humane, and it makes South Carolina the only state going back to the less humane execution methods,” said Lindsey Vann of Justice 360, a nonprofit that represents many of the men on South Carolina’s death row.

From 1996 to 2009, South Carolina executed close to average of three inmates a year.  But a lull in death row inmates reaching the end of their appeals coincided a few years later with pharmaceutical companies refusing to sell states the drugs needed to sedate inmates, relax their muscles and stop their hearts.  South Carolina’s last execution took place in May 2011, and its batch of lethal injection drugs expired in 2013.

I am struck by the report here that South Carolina has a "109-year-old electric chair." It makes me wonder, only half-jokingly, if they might try to find some really old guns for use in a firing squad.  Gallows humor aside, I sincerely wonder how quickly South Carolina will seek to set execution dates for condemned prisoners who has exhausted all their appeals and how quickly the inevitable litigation over this new law will make its way through the court system.

May 17, 2021 in Baze and Glossip lethal injection cases, Death Penalty Reforms, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)

SCOTUS rules unanimously that "community caretaking" does not create special exception to Fourth Amendment for warrantless home entry

Though I will be thinking a lot about what a split Supreme Court did to Teague doctrine today with its ruling in Edwards v. Vannoy (discussed here), the Court also was notably unanimous this morning in another criminal case, Caniglia v. Strom, No. 20–157 (S. Ct. May 17, 2021) (available here). The start and close of the short opinion for the Court by Justice Thomas serves as a useful summary:

Decades ago, this Court held that a warrantless search of an impounded vehicle for an unsecured firearm did not violate the Fourth Amendment.  Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).  In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that police officers who patrol the “public highways” are often called to discharge noncriminal “community caretaking functions,” such as responding to disabled vehicles or investigating accidents.  Id., at 441.  The question today is whether Cady’s acknowledgment of these “caretaking” duties creates a standalone doctrine that justifies warrantless searches and seizures in the home.  It does not....

What is reasonable for vehicles is different from what is reasonable for homes.  Cady acknowledged as much, and this Court has repeatedly “declined to expand the scope of . . . exceptions to the warrant requirement to permit warrantless entry into the home.”  Collins, 584 U.S., at ___ (slip op., at 8).  We thus vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Intriguingly, Justices Alito and Kavanaugh write distinct concurring opinions, both longer than the opinion of the Court, in order to set out questions unresolved and examples of what Justice Kavanaugh views as "warrantless entries that are perfectly constitutional under the exigent circumstances doctrine."  Here is a notable passage from Justice Alito's concurrence that brings to mind a famous commercial (footnotes removed):

Today, more than ever, many people, including many elderly persons, live alone.  Many elderly men and women fall in their homes, or become incapacitated for other reasons, and unfortunately, there are many cases in which such persons cannot call for assistance.  In those cases, the chances for a good recovery may fade with each passing hour.  So in THE CHIEF JUSTICE’s imaginary case, if the elderly woman was seriously hurt or sick and the police heeded petitioner’s suggestion about what the Fourth Amendment demands, there is a fair chance she would not be found alive.  This imaginary woman may have regarded her house as her castle, but it is doubtful that she would have wanted it to be the place where she died alone and in agony.

May 17, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

By 6-3 vote, SCOTUS in Edwards v. Vannoy rewrites Teague to say all new procedural rules not retroactive in federal habeas

The Supreme Court this morning handed down an opinion in Edwards v. Vannoy, No. 19–5807 (S. Ct. May 17, 2021) (available here), which holds that the "Ramos jury-unanimity rule ... does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review." Justice Kavanaugh wrote the opinion for the Court, and it starts this way:

Last Term in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), this Court held that a state jury must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant of a serious offense.  Ramos repudiated this Court’s 1972 decision in Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, which had allowed non-unanimous juries in state criminal trials.  The question in this case is whether the new rule of criminal procedure announced in Ramos applies retroactively to overturn final convictions on federal collateral review.  Under this Court’s retroactivity precedents, the answer is no.

This Court has repeatedly stated that a decision announcing a new rule of criminal procedure ordinarily does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.  See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion); see also Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639–640, and n. 20 (1965).  Indeed, in the 32 years since Teague underscored that principle, this Court has announced many important new rules of criminal procedure.  But the Court has not applied any of those new rules retroactively on federal collateral review.  See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 421 (2007) (Confrontation Clause rule recognized in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), does not apply retroactively).  And for decades before Teague, the Court also regularly declined to apply new rules retroactively, including on federal collateral review.  See, e.g., DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 (1968) (per curiam) (jury-trial rule recognized in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), does not apply retroactively).

In light of the Court’s well-settled retroactivity doctrine, we conclude that the Ramos jury-unanimity rule likewise does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review.  We therefore affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.

Notably, the Edwards Court here goes beyond saying that it refuses yet again to find a procedure to meet the "watershed" exception to the retroactivity limits in Teague, it says there is no longer to be such an (hypothetical) exception:

At this point, some 32 years after Teague, we think the only candid answer is that none can—that is, no new rules of criminal procedure can satisfy the watershed exception. We cannot responsibly continue to suggest otherwise to litigants and courts.... It is time — probably long past time — to make explicit what has become increasingly apparent to bench and bar over the last 32 years: New procedural rules do not apply retroactively on federal collateral review. The watershed exception is moribund. It must “be regarded as retaining no vitality.” Herrera v. Wyoming, 587 U.S. ___, ___ (2019) (slip op., at 11)(internal quotation marks omitted).

Justice Kagan authors the dissent (joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor), and its starting passage concludes this way:

The majority cannot (and indeed does not) deny, given all Ramos said, that the jury unanimity requirement fits to a tee Teague’s description of a watershed procedural rule.  Nor can the majority explain its result by relying on precedent.  Although flaunting decisions since Teague that held rules non-retroactive, the majority comes up with none comparable to this case.  Search high and low the settled law of retroactivity, and the majority still has no reason to deny Ramos watershed status.

So everything rests on the majority’s last move — the overturning of Teague’s watershed exception.  If there can never be any watershed rules — as the majority here asserts out of the blue — then, yes, jury unanimity cannot be one.  The result follows trippingly from the premise.  But adopting the premise requires departing from judicial practice and principle.  In overruling a critical aspect of Teague, the majority follows none of the usual rules of stare decisis.  It discards precedent without a party requesting that action.  And it does so with barely a reason given, much less the “special justification” our law demands.  Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 266 (2014).  The majority in that way compounds its initial error: Not content to misapply Teague’s watershed provision here, see ante, at 10–14, the majority forecloses any future application, see ante, at 14–15.  It prevents any procedural rule ever — no matter how integral to adjudicative fairness — from benefiting a defendant on habeas review.  Thus does a settled principle of retroactivity law die, in an effort to support an insupportable ruling.

May 17, 2021 in Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)

SCOTUS grants cert on a capital habeas procedure case, while Justice Sotomayor makes district statement about capital sentencing process

The Supreme Court is back in action this morning, and the big news from this new order list is its decision to grant cert on an abortion case from Mississippi.  But the Court granted cert in a couple of other cases, including a capital case from Arizona, Shin v. Ramirez, No. 20-1009, which raises this issue:

Whether application of the equitable rule the Supreme Court announced in Martinez v. Ryan renders the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which precludes a federal court from considering evidence outside the state-court record when reviewing the merits of a claim for habeas relief if a prisoner or his attorney has failed to diligently develop the claim’s factual basis in state court, inapplicable to a federal court’s merits review of a claim for habeas relief.

In addition, at the end of the order list, Justice Sotomayor has a statement respecting the denial of certiorari in a capital case out of Texas, Calvert v. Texas, No. 20–701.  The statement laments various procedural developments in this case and ends this way:

Although this case does not meet this Court’s traditional criteria for certiorari, it still stands as a grim reminder that courts should rigorously scrutinize how States prove that a person should face the ultimate penalty.  Juries must have a clear view of the “uniquely individual human beings” they are sentencing to death, Woodson, 428 U.S., at 304 (plurality opinion), not one tainted by irrelevant facts about other people’s crimes.  The Constitution and basic principles of justice require nothing less.

May 17, 2021 in Death Penalty Reforms, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

May 16, 2021

"Bars Behind Bars: Digital Technology in the Prison System"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper now available vis SSRN authored by Paolo Arguelles and Isabelle Ortiz-Luis. Here is its abstract:

With little opportunity to engage with technology while behind bars, returning citizens are finding themselves on the far side of the digital divide and increasingly vulnerable to recidivism.  Investing in a well-run digital literacy program for our prison system is an innovative solution to a persistent problem and a rare win-win situation for inmates, prison officials, and American taxpayers.

We begin by discussing how inmate tablet distribution programs mutually benefit both inmates and prison officials.  We then explore prison profiteering by technology companies as a potential obstacle to the successful administration of technology programs, discussing the emergence of virtual monopolies in the prison technology space, their history of controversial pricing practices, and how these practices are perpetuated through prison tablet programs.  We then present novel insights into how competitive bidding can be used as a public policy instrument to regulate competition, specifically in the context of prison technology.  We argue that a traditional bidding framework is insufficient to act as a policy instrument and propose an alternative incentive-based framework toward this end.  We conclude by outlining several practical recommendations that prison officials should consider when administering digital literacy programs in their facilities.

May 16, 2021 in Prisons and prisoners, Technocorrections, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)

More details on "Justice Counts," a notable (and needed) criminal justice data collection effort

Justice-Counts-Powerpoint2-scaled-500x500-c-defaultI flagged in this post a few weeks ago the great online panel event hosted by the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center, in collaboration with National Association of Sentencing Commissions, titled "Justice Counts: Using Data to Inform Policy and Bolster Public Safety."  I am pleased to be able to now report that the video and transcript of this event are now available at this DEPC webpage, and the discussion has me quite excited for the Justice Counts data collection efforts that, as this website explains, aspires to provide "public, aggregate criminal justice data, which will provide policymakers in every state with timely information about their criminal justice systems, existing gaps in data collection, and opportunities to do better." 

Helpfully, the folks at ASU Crime and Justice News covered this event and provided an effective written summary of the discussion at this link.  Here are excerpts of this accounting of efforts to account for justice:

Criminal justice policy makers long have been plagued by a lack of good data on how the justice system operates, from arrests to imprisonments. In an effort to fill many of the gaps, the Council of State Governments Justice Center (CSG) has launched a project called Justice Counts that will provide state-by-state numbers on important parts of the justice process.  A website under development for the last year is expected in June to begin displaying numbers from state corrections systems, including counts of prisoners and people on probation and parole. 

In the past, such national data has been available on a consistent basis from the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics, which collects it from the states but often publishes it a year or more later, making it immediately out of date....  The new corrections data to be published should be timely after a year in which there have been more shifts than usual in prison and jail populations during the coronavirus pandemic, with many states and localities freeing inmates in advance of their expected release dates.

CSG staffers gave a preview of the new site on Tuesday to a webinar sponsored by the National Association of Sentencing Commissions and the Drug Enforcement and Policy Center at The Ohio State University. 

All states were asked to provide data to the central site. It is not yet available on a uniform basis because states compile it at different intervals, whether daily, weekly or monthly.

As of now, CSG has current prison population data from 36 states and numbers on various aspects of corrections, such as the number of state prisoners sent by courts or behind bars because they violated parole conditions, from varying numbers of states, ranging from seven in one category to 19 in another.  Eventually, the website will feature metrics such as the cost of corrections systems and whether they are achieving their goals.

Some recent related posts:

May 16, 2021 in Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Recommended reading, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)

"Drug Supervision"

The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Jacob Schuman now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:

Criticism of harsh drug sentencing laws in the United States typically focuses on long prison sentences.  But our criminal justice system also inflicts a significant volume of drug-related punishment through community supervision — probation, parole, and supervised release.  Over one million people are under supervision due to a drug conviction, and drug violations are among the most common reasons for revocations. In an age of “mass supervision,” community supervision is a major form of drug sentencing and drug policy.

In this Article, I show that drug sentencing is central to the federal system of supervised release.  While Congress created supervised release as a program of transitional support for former prisoners, the system has instead become a drug- control network focused on public safety.  The mandatory revocation provision at 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) in particular was designed to immediately imprison people with drug addiction at the first sign of drug use.  This targeting of drug activity for enhanced punishment is so extreme that it violates the jury right under the Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in United States v. Haymond.

May 16, 2021 in Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Drug Offense Sentencing, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Reentry and community supervision | Permalink | Comments (0)