Split Iowa Supreme Court finds Sixth Amendment jury trial rights apply to (unique?) state law restitution provision

A helpful reader made sure I saw the interesting ruling today from the Iowa Supreme Court in Iowa v. Davison, No. 20–0950 (Iowa Apr. 15, 2022) (available here).  The start of the majority opinion should highlight why all Apprendi fans will want to check out this notable new decision:

A jury found the defendant guilty of assault causing serious injury and conspiracy to commit murder in connection with a shooting death.  The district court later awarded restitution against the defendant under Iowa Code section 910.3B (2017).  That law mandates an award of at least $150,000 restitution when “the offender is convicted of a felony in which the act or acts committed by the offender caused the death of another person.” Id. § 910.3B(1).  The defendant now argues that the restitution was statutorily and constitutionally impermissible because the offenses of which he was convicted did not include, as an element, causing the death of another person.

We conclude that Iowa Code section 910.3B does not require a jury finding that the defendant caused the death of another person.  But the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is a different matter.  The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Sixth Amendment requires facts that increase the defendant’s minimum or maximum punishment to be determined by a jury.  Because the $150,000 restitution is punitive in part, awards of such restitution must be based on jury findings.  No jury found that the defendant caused the death of the victim of the shooting.  Therefore, we reverse the award of restitution in this case and remand for further proceedings.

Here is part of the substantive discussion from the majority in Davison:

Courts have generally declined to apply Apprendi to restitution because restitution is usually compensatory and indeterminate. At first glance, Davison’s argument faces a steep climb. Courts considering the matter have ruled overwhelmingly that Apprendi and Southern Union do not apply to criminal restitution. See, e.g., State v. Leon, 381 P.3d 286, 289 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2016) (“Leon acknowledges that no court has applied Apprendi to restitution awards.”); State v. Arnett, 496 P.3d 928, 933 (Kan. 2021) (“[A]t least 11 of 13 federal United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have refused to extend Apprendi and its progeny to orders of restitution, not to mention the many state courts which have followed suit.”)...

Restitution under Iowa Code section 910.3B is punitive and determinate. By contrast, Iowa Code section 910.3B establishes a mandatory minimum of $150,000 awardable only if the defendant’s felonious acts caused the death of another person. It may be a low number for the nonmonetary loss attributable to a death of a human being, but it is a floor—and it is awarded only if certain facts are found to exist.  Under normal circumstances, a victim of crime in Iowa is limited to recovery of “pecuniary damages,” which exclude “damages for pain, suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium.” Iowa Code §§ 910.1(6), .2(1)(a).  Only when the defendant is convicted of a felony in which their acts caused the death of another person may the minimum amount of $150,000 be recovered in addition.  See id. § 910.3B(1).

Like other forms of restitution, the restitution authorized by Iowa Code section 910.3B provides compensation. “It serves a remedial purpose in compensating the victim’s estate.” Klawonn, 609 N.W.2d at 520.

But section 910.3B restitution is also punitive. In our 2000 decision, Izzolena, we detected “several punitive elements” in the statute. 609 N.W.2d at 548.  Restitution under section 910.3B “is awarded in addition to separate restitution for pecuniary damages.” Id. Also, the statute “establishes a minimum threshold amount of $150,000 for all cases, with no required proof of evidence to support damages excluded from the definition of pecuniary damages.” Id. at 548–49. For this reason, we found that the $150,000 restitution was subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution. Id. at 549.

One concurring opinion frames the ruling in a notable way that seems worth highlighting (and which might entail that the Supreme Court would be disinclined to take this case up if there were a future cert petition):

The opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part argues that Apprendi should not be extended to restitution awards, but this merely begs the question. It is not disputed that courts almost uniformly have held that Apprendi does not apply to restitution awards....  And the court’s opinion in this case says nothing different. The question in this case is not, as the dissenting opinion frames it, whether Apprendi should be extended to restitution awards.  Instead, the question is whether section 910.3B is merely a restitution award or whether it also amounts to criminal punishment.  The dissent assumes the former, but our precedents dictate the latter.

And here is the start of the partial dissent:

I join the court’s opinion except for part III.B. I respectfully dissent from the court’s holding extending Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) and its progeny to victim restitution awards.  Our court is the first appellate court in the nation to do so.  Only two justices of the United States Supreme Court have concluded that Apprendi should be applied to require a jury to find all the facts needed to justify a restitution order.  Hester v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 509, 509–11 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., joined by Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).  Seven justices declined to take the bait. See id. at 509 (mem.).  Every federal circuit court of appeals to reach the issue has refused to extend Apprendi to victim restitution awards.  So too has every state appellate court to reach the issue.  I would follow the wisdom of that crowd.

It is not a given that Iowa would seek SCOTUS review of this ruling, and the distinctiveness of Iowa law here might make the SCOTUS Justices disinclined to take up this case even if Iowa does seek cert. That said, it seems worth noting that any forthcoming cert petition on this issue could possible engage some of the Justices who were not on Court back in 2019 when cert was denied in the Hester case.  Back then, Justice Ginsburg and Breyer were apparently disinclined to take up this issue.  But I suspect the new Justice Jackson might be much more interested in expanding Apprendi rights than her former boss has been.  And, as I suggested in this post about Hester, if Justice Barrett is really the originalist that she claims to be, she too might be inclined to join Justice Gorsuch's call to consider this important Sixth Amendment procedural matter.

Though there is much to say about restitution and procedural rights in general (e.g., there is not discussion of burdens of proof or other due process issues in Davison), this cases has me inclined to talk up the broader question of whether the "new" Supreme Court might be somewhat more eager consider and question a lot of pro-state/pro-prosecution doctrines that seem inconsistent with the text and original public meaning of the Bill of Rights.  The Apprendi line of cases helped me to understand that lots of established sentencing doctrines and precedents ought to make real textualists and originalists blush.  If lots of precedents are going to start to be reexamined on textualist and originalist grounds, those ought also to include an array of (mostly pro-state/pro-prosecution) criminal law and procedure precedents.