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June 24, 2022
Are broad drug user gun dispossession statutes now constitutionally suspect after Bruen?
In this post yesterday, I wondered "Are all broad felon-in-possession criminal gun statutes now constitutionally suspect after Bruen?" That question was prompted by the fact that the majority opinion in the Supreme Court's big Second Amendment case, Bruen (basics here), seemed to reject lots of recent lower court rulings and jurisprudence regarding the application of the Second Amendment. Lower courts have, prior to Bruen, generally rejected Second Amendment attacks on federal law's broad criminalization of any felons possessing any guns. But Bruen makes clear that to "justify its [gun] regulation, the government may not simply posit that the regulation promotes an important interest. Rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation."
Because the broad federal felon-in-possession statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), is applied many thousands of times each year, I am expecting a robust new round of litigation on that issue as to whether and when felon dispossession is "consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation." But here I want to flag another notably broad provision of federal firearms law, though one probably unlikely to get nearly the same attention. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3), categorically criminalizes any gun possession by anyone who is an "unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance." In an era in which marijuana use is legal for medical or recreational use in the vast majority of states but still is federal prohibited, this broad federal criminal "unlawful user" gun dispossession statute technically applies to dispossess tens of millions of Americans. As a matter of policy and practice, I sense very few people get actually federally prosecuted and sentenced under just 922(g)(3) even for very serious and dangerous drug use, but it certainly happens sometimes.
Notably, more than a few states also have laws criminalizing gun possession by those his drug use history, and some even extend to users of legal drugs (including alcohol). As one notable example, my state of Ohio, via Ohio Revised Code § 2923.13, prohibits knowingly having any firearm if one "is drug dependent, in danger of drug dependence, or a chronic alcoholic." Arguably, anyone prescribed and using Oxycotin is "in danger of drug dependence," though again I do not think these kinds of laws in Ohio (or in other states) tend to be broadly enforced. Still, these laws probably do get used as a basis refuse to issues some firearm licenses (see generally "Blowing Smoke at the Second Amendment").
Whatever the policy or practical virtues or vices of broad drug user gun dispossession laws, their constitutional status would seem subject to new questions thanks to Bruen. The federal firearm prohibition for anyone who is an "unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance" has been upheld through various balancing tests in lower courts stressing the important government interest in restricting gun access to potentially dangerous individuals. But, now, thanks to Bruen, such a regulation's "important interest" is not what is key for Second Amendment interpretation, "rather, the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation."
I am not legal historian, but I know enough about drug law history to know that there were very few criminal prohibitions on drug use at the time of the ratification of the Second Amendment. Notably, there were some localities and even a state (Maine) embracing alcohol prohibition before and into the Civil War era, but I have no sense of how various early temperance laws may have interacted with gun regulations at that time. I do surmise, from reading then-Judge Amy Coney Barrett's dissent in Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019), that history suggests "founding-era legislatures categorically disarmed groups whom they judged to be a threat to the public safety." Perhaps broad drug user gun dispossession statutes could be justified on that ground, but I have a very hard time viewing modern users of medical marijuana consistent with state law as analogous to those groups considered categorically dangerous in the founding era.
As suggested before, I expect to see a lot more litigation over broad felon-in-possession criminal laws than over broad drug user gun dispossession statutes. Nevertheless, I think this is another interesting area of Second Amendment law that seemed reasonably settled before Bruen and now may be up for new (historical) debate.
Prior recent related posts:
- By 6-3 vote, SCOTUS expands Second Amendment rights by striking down NY public-carry licensing requirements
- Are all broad felon-in-possession criminal gun statutes now constitutionally suspect after Bruen?
June 24, 2022 at 02:47 PM | Permalink
Comments
Doug,
I don’t really get your need for the fainting couch. I thought the decision was pretty clear it was about objective versus subjective criteria. Having a felony is objective. A county sheriff deciding you don’t need one is subjective.
What am I missing?
Posted by: TarlsQtr | Jun 25, 2022 10:21:03 PM
Tarls, my read of the majority in Bruen is that the Second Amendment demands that, even for "objective" firearm regulations, "the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation."
So, for example, though most gun crimes are committed by younger folks, I do not think New York could respond to Bruen by legislating that it will issue "shall carry" licenses only to people over 40 and make gun possession in the home a crime for everyone under 40. Age-based gun criteria is "objective" and NY could "posit that the regulation promotes an important interest." But Bruen says that's not sufficient to overcome the right safeguarded by the Second Amendment; the government must "justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation." Our traditions likely allows prohibiting gun access to juveniles (though even that is debatable), but I do not think they allow setting an age limit at 40.
Turning then to federal law, we might debate whether federal law's criminalization of gun possession for anyone "who is unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance" and for anyone "who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" is objective or subjective. But that is not how the Bruen court has articulated the criteria for Second Amendment analysis. Rather, what matters according to Bruen is whether a law regulating gun keeping and bearing is "consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation."
I am not a historian, but as non-historian judges and others now have to explore the historical record, I surmise historical tradition does not "affirmatively prove" that certain drug users or all felons were regularly excluded from gun rights. Again, maybe the government will be able to make the historical case for these kinds of very broad exclusions from the Second Amendment, but that seem to be the critical concern after Bruen.
Posted by: Doug B. | Jun 26, 2022 8:17:55 AM
Doug --
You're doing a lot a hypothesizing about what the Bruen decision implies MUST happen next. My guess is that those best positioned to muse about that question are the people who agree with Bruen's reasoning and think it was correctly decided.
Do you think Bruen was correctly decided?
Posted by: Bill Otis | Jun 26, 2022 2:30:59 PM
Bill, my textual approach to constitutional interpretation leads me to think Heller/McDonald/Bruen are correct to embrace an individual right to "keep and bear arms." But, because I share your view that rights are not absolute, I generally thought most (but not all) lower courts were doing a reasonable job balancing competing interests through intermediate scrutiny analysis after Heller. Still, I have never understood how or why an elderly woman living in a dangerous neighborhood who may have committed an economic offense years before should be forever subject to federal criminal punishment for keeping a single gun in her home when her (statistically more dangerous) male neighbor with multiple violent misdemeanor offenses retains his constitutional right to guns.
In other words, I thought lower courts could have done a better job making likely dangerousness the touchstone of intermediate scrutiny. But that is now water under the bridge, as Bruen says intermediate scrutiny is not the proper test for applying the Second Amendment. Bruen instructs "the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation."
Because I surmise dangerousness concerns have been consistent with "this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation," I am hopeful about and supportive of the new Bruen approach. But the devil may be in the application, and I have already heard complaints and concerns about how inconsistently a historical test may be applied. Indeed, I think Justice Thomas' opinion has much outcome-oriented analysis: he discounts the history that disagrees with his desired ends and stresses the history that supports his conclusions. Indeed, in a lot of originalist analysis, I often see policy preference creeping in, especially when history is textured.
Those concerns aside, my commitment to the rule of law is what drives my questions about whether FIP laws and drug user dispossession laws are now constitutionally suspect. I think all legislators, executive branch officials and judges should feel duty bound to try to apply the new Bruen opinion in good faith. They all swear an oath the the Constitution, and Bruen is now the new law of the land regarding the Second Amendment's reach and application.
Of course, many legislators, executive branch officials and judges may not, as a matter of personal policy preference, agree with Heller, let alone Bruen's new accounting of how the Second Amendment is to be applied. But such personal view does not mean they do not need to try to apply this new decision in good faith. Are you suggesting that only those who agree with Bruen have any obligation or ability to figure out what it means and how legal actors must respond?
Ultimately, I tend to view history as an important, but not fully dispositive, aspect of modern constitutional interpretation. So maybe it is most accurate to say I am hopeful Bruen is an improvement of Second Amendment jurisprudence, but I am not entirely sold on its history-only approach. And, from our other thread, I sense you are not too keen on a history-only approach as well.
Does that answer your question?
Posted by: Doug B. | Jun 26, 2022 6:54:50 PM
Doug --
Thank you for that detailed and thoughtful answer. I appreciate it. You know me to be a simpleminded man, so as best I can distill it, I think what you're saying is that yes, you think Bruen was correctly decided, but you're not altogether on board with the reasoning. We agree then that the case was correctly decided.
Posted by: Bill Otis | Jun 26, 2022 10:35:44 PM
"You're doing a lot a hypothesizing about what the Bruen decision implies MUST happen next. My guess is that those best positioned to muse about that question are the people who agree with Bruen's reasoning and think it was correctly decided."
This a VERY strange assertion. The people best positioned to predict the consequences of a Supreme Court decision are the ones who agree with it? That makes no sense. Good lawyers think through the consequences of legal reasoning all the time without agreeing with the reasoning. That's what makes them good lawyers!
Posted by: WTF | Jun 27, 2022 9:11:15 PM