Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Jackson) talks up Excessive Fines Clause after SCOTUS majority finds tax forfeiture is a taking

A civil case on the Supreme Court's docket that I have been watching as the Term winds down is Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota, which presented these issues: (1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment's takings clause; and (2) whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt, plus interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.  The Supreme Court this morning handed down a unanimous opinion in Tyler, and the opinion for the Court, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, concludes this way:

The Takings Clause “was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.” Armstrong, 364 U.S., at 49.  A taxpayer who loses her $40,000 house to the State to fulfill a $15,000 tax debt has made a far greater contribution to the public fisc than she owed.  The taxpayer must render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, but no more.

Because we find that Tyler has plausibly alleged a taking under the Fifth Amendment, and she agrees that relief under “the Takings Clause would fully remedy [her] harm,” we need not decide whether she has also alleged an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27. The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed.

But while the Court as a whole dodged the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, a concurring opinion by Justice Gorsuch (joined by Justice Jackson) had lots to say on the topic.  Here are a few passages from a short concurrence:

Given its Takings Clause holding, the Court understandably declines to pass on the question whether the Eighth Circuit committed a further error when it dismissed Ms. Tyler’s claim under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Ante, at 14.  But even a cursory review of the District Court’s excessive-fines analysis — which the Eighth Circuit adopted as “well-reasoned,” 26 F. 4th 789, 794 (2022) — reveals that it too contains mistakes future lower courts should not be quick to emulate.

First, the District Court concluded that the Minnesota tax-forfeiture scheme is not punitive because “its primary purpose” is “remedial” — aimed, in other words, at “compensat[ing] the government for lost revenues due to the nonpayment of taxes.” 505 F. Supp. 3d 879, 896 (Minn. 2020).  That primary-purpose test finds no support in our law. Because “sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose,” this Court has said that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to any statutory scheme that “serv[es] in part to punish.” Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (emphasis added).  It matters not whether the scheme has a remedial purpose, even a predominantly remedial purpose.  So long as the law “cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,” the Excessive Fines Clause applies.  Ibid. (emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted)....

Second, the District Court asserted that the Minnesota tax-forfeiture scheme cannot “be punitive because it actually confers a windfall on the delinquent taxpayer when the value of the property that is forfeited is less than the amount of taxes owed.” 505 F. Supp. 3d, at 896.  That observation may be factually true, but it is legally irrelevant.  Some prisoners better themselves behind bars; some addicts credit court-ordered rehabilitation with saving their lives.  But punishment remains punishment all the same....

Third, the District Court appears to have inferred that the Minnesota scheme is not “punitive” because it does not turn on the “culpability” of the individual property owner.  505 F. Supp. 3d, at 897.  But while a focus on “culpability” can sometimes make a provision “look more like punishment,” this Court has never endorsed the converse view.  Austin, 509 U.S., at 619.  Even without emphasizing culpability, this Court has said a statutory scheme may still be punitive where it serves another “goal of punishment,” such as “[d]eterrence.”  United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998).  And the District Court expressly approved the Minnesota tax-forfeiture scheme in this case in large part because “‘the ultimate possibility of loss of property serves as a deterrent to those taxpayers considering tax delinquency.’” 505 F. Supp. 3d, at 899 (emphasis added).  Economic penalties imposed to deter willful noncompliance with the law are fines by any other name.  And the Constitution has something to say about them: They cannot be excessive.