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November 13, 2023

Supreme Court grants cert on federal drug case concerning expert testimony on defendant's knowledge

This morning brings this new Supreme Court order list that finally has something interesting for criminal justice fans.  Actually, there are two matters of interest, a cert grant in a federal drug case and a lengthy dissent from the denial of cert in a state prison conditions case.  In this post I will cover the cert grant and follow up with a separate post on the cert denial.

The cert grant comes in Diaz v. US, and John Elwood here at SCOTUSblog effectively summarized this case last week after it prompted a relist:

Delilah Diaz was stopped returning from Mexico to her home in California.  Officers were suspicious that Diaz’s window made a “crunching” noise when she rolled it down, so they searched the car and found nearly 28 kilograms of methamphetamine — worth almost $400,000 — in the door panels.  Diaz said that she had borrowed the car from her boyfriend and did not know about the drugs.  At her trial, prosecutors called a law-enforcement agent as an expert witness to testify that in most cases, couriers know they are transporting large quantities of drugs across the border and that traffickers rarely risk the potential of large losses on “blind mules” — couriers who are unaware what they’re carrying. Diaz was convicted.

On appeal, Diaz argued that the testimony was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which states that “[i]n a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged,” which is a question “for the trier of fact alone.” The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed Diaz’s conviction.  It concluded that Rule 704 only bars expert witnesses from stating an express opinion about whether a particular person knew they were committing a crime, not from stating general opinions about similar defendants and the likelihood of their culpability.

Diaz has now petitioned the Supreme Court for review.  She argues that that the testimony would have been thrown out in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, which has held that such testimony is inadmissible.  The 5th Circuit, she notes, includes Texas and, therefore, nearly all of the rest of the southern border, and she argues that the conflict between two border states’ appellate courts must be resolved. The government acknowledges a “disagreement between the Fifth Circuits and other circuits” but it contends that any disagreement “does not warrant this Court’s review.”  The 5th Circuit’s test, the government claims, is heavily “fact dependent.”  The government also argues that any error from admitting the agent’s testimony was harmless because the evidence of guilt in Diaz’s case was strong, because her story was “flimsy”: She didn’t know where her supposed boyfriend lived or his phone number, and although she claimed to dislike driving at night, she arrived at the border at 2 a.m. 

Here is how the petition for cert presents the question in Diaz:

Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) provides: “In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b).

The question is: In a prosecution for drug trafficking — where an element of the offense is that the defendant knew she was carrying illegal drugs — does Rule 704(b) permit a governmental expert witness to testify that most couriers know they are carrying drugs and that drug-trafficking organizations do not entrust large quantities of drugs to unknowing transporters?

November 13, 2023 at 09:49 AM | Permalink

Comments

I am seeing two related issues for the U.S. Supreme Court:

1) Does the rule distinguish between direct/particularized testimony (i.e. this defendant knew that there were drugs in the car) and indirect/generalized testimony (i.e. most drug operations do not trust this level of drugs to first time couriers and the couriers are likely to know that they are transporting controlled substances) from which the jury can infer mental state?

2) At a more general level, how definite does the testimony have to be before it is barred by this rule. Short of testimony in which the witness says that defendant did or did not act with the requisite mental state, is it permissible for witness to testify in a manner that would permit the jury to infer that it is likely or unlikely that the defendant had the requisite mental state.

While this case involves prosecution witnesses, I can easily see the situation in which it is a defense expert.

Posted by: tmm | Nov 13, 2023 12:22:10 PM

No. 1 seems wrong. I don't think this ought to be ok.

Posted by: federalist | Nov 13, 2023 1:13:27 PM

Not seeing the relevance of whether or not "most" couriers know they are carrying drugs.

Posted by: William C Jockusch | Nov 13, 2023 10:43:58 PM

I simply find the agent's "expert" testimony to be too suggestive; I think the point might be argued in closing by an AUSA, but no such expert testimony should be permitted. I agree with the statement above that it doesn't matter what "most drug smugglers" would think or do. The evidence should be restricted to what this defendant did or didn't know or do.

Posted by: Jim Gormley | Nov 14, 2023 6:10:44 AM

It's a question of reasonable inference and juror knowledge. Jurors do not know how drug operations are conducted which allows for expert testimony about drug smuggling operations. If drug smuggling operations do not use blind mules, that evidence makes it more likely that this defendant was not a blind mule (and to be relevant evidence only has to be something that makes it more or less likely that an element of the offense is true. So it meets the relevance requirements (and defendant here does not claim that it doesn't). The issue is whether that evidence which supports the inference of knowledge violates the rule against expert testimony on mental state or is that rule only violated if the expert testifies that defendant had knowledge.

Posted by: tmm | Nov 14, 2023 10:15:30 AM

tmm, see Scalia's dissent in Plata re: experts. It's not directly on point, but it signals a deep distrust of evidence like this.

Posted by: federalist | Nov 14, 2023 11:39:20 AM

I think you are mixing apples and oranges by looking at the Plata dissent.

Plata was a bench trial with Scalia taking the position that on, what constitutes improper prison conditions, an expert is inherently adopting a policy position. I don't think that the language in Plata reflects anything about expert opinion of the type at issue here.

More significantly, the dissent in Plata is based on Justice Scalia's assessment of the proper weight to be given to the testimony rather than, as here, a question of its admissibility under the Federal Rules. As a policy matter, Justice Scalia might have been inclined to discount this evidence, but, in applying the Federal Rules, he would go back to the language of the rule. Unfortunately, here, the language is a little bit ambiguous. The rule clearly bars direct testimony by an expert about the defendant's mental state. But where is the proper line between testimony that says that the defendant knew and testimony explaining how things are typically done which allows the jury to assess other non-expert evidence related to that issue.

Posted by: tmm | Nov 14, 2023 2:47:32 PM

tmm, I think that the aversion is the same. Yes, there are different issues, but the idea that "experts" can be used to walk a jury down the primrose path evokes the same fear as courts following "experts" and calling that evidence.

Posted by: federalist | Nov 14, 2023 3:52:54 PM

Where is the mens rea in the cited statute? I don't see it -- what am I missing?

Posted by: justme123 | Nov 14, 2023 8:29:47 PM

Primrose, post just lists the FRE provision at issue. The underlying statutes with which Diaz was charged were 21 USC 952 and 21 USC 960 (according to Ninth Circuit opinion). Mental state is in 21 USC 960 (knowingly or intentionally).

Posted by: tmm | Nov 15, 2023 10:39:15 AM

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