Notable new compassionate release ruling finds trial penalty/co-defendant disparity to be extraordinary

A helpful colleague flagged for me a notable new federal district court sentence reduction opinion, US v. Cannon, No. 4:95-cr-30 (CDL), 2025 WL 326065 (MD Ga. Jan. 29, 2025).  I recommend the opinion in full (though I have not found a non-Westlaw version), and the very paragraph helps highlight why the opinion is a great read:

‘Tis the season to get out of jail early.  The former President, on his way out the door, commuted the sentences of thousands of federal prisoners, including several sentenced by the undersigned who had received lawful sentences for serious and dangerous criminal conduct.  The incoming President issued hundreds of pardons and commutations before the paint was completely dry on the walls of the refreshed Oval Office.  While the magnitude of these sentence reductions appears unprecedented, the Executive Branch does not have the monopoly on mercy and compassion.  Congress within the last fifteen years has enacted the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 and the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (hereinafter “FSA”). During that time, numerous retroactive amendments to the federal sentencing guidelines and statutory sentencing laws have been adopted, resulting in the reduction of thousands of sentences for federal prisoners.  By recently expanding the grounds for granting “compassionate release,” Congress and the Sentencing Commission have created a pseudo-parole system within the Judicial Branch administered by district judges, federal magistrates and probation officers.  These new justifications for sentence reductions provide hope for prisoners who unsurprisingly respond with motions for compassionate release.  The Defendant in this case has previously filed two such motions, both of which were denied.  He now presents another one; and the third time may very well be the charm.

The opinion is legally notable because the US District Judge Clay Land decided not to rely on USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6) as the basis for the sentence reduction even though a magistrate judge had so recommended.  Instead, Judge Land opted to rely on USSG § 1B1.13(b)(5) (the “catch-all” provision), and here is part of his explanation:

The Court finds that under the limited circumstances here, the disparity of Cannon's sentence compared to that of his codefendants is of similar gravity to warrant a reduction of his sentence.  Here, Cannon suffered a substantial penalty by exercising his constitutional right to require the Government to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of a unanimous jury.  As previously explained, Cannon, as the 23-year-old get-away driver, received a sentence of 1,313 months (109 years and 5 months) — essentially a life sentence for a young man four years removed from being a teenager.  Although his conduct was serious and facilitated the criminal conduct of his codefendants, his personal conduct was primarily limited to driving the get-away vehicle.  While a gun was found under the seat of his car, the evidence did not indicate that he ever discharged the gun.  No one was physically harmed as a result of his conduct in driving the car.  At the time of his sentencing, he had a criminal history category of III.  Under later retroactive amendments to the sentencing guidelines, his criminal history category would be considered category II. His codefendants, who arguably engaged in more violent and dangerous conduct by entering the targeted establishments of the robberies and actually holding up the victims at gunpoint, made plea deals with the Government which resulted in sentences of 240 months for one defendant and 300 months for the other.

The Court understands that sentence disparities between codefendants are often ordinary.  But when that disparity is as large as it is here and when the criminal conduct of the defendant who received the substantially higher sentence was clearly less dangerous than that of his codefendants, such circumstances may rise to extraordinary.