Wednesday, October 16, 2019
Usual suspects playing usual roles in Malvo argument over juve LWOP sentencing
In recent SCOTUS history, Eighth Amendment cases in the Supreme Court tended to be pretty predictable with certain Justices as regular votes for defendants, others as regular votes for the state, and Justice Kennedy (and sometimes the Chief Justice) being the key swing voter. But Justice Kennedy is now gone, and it appear from this SCOTUS review of the oral argument in Mathena v. Malvo that Justice Kennedy's replacement, Justice Kavanaugh, may be slipping into the swinger shoes:
Kavanaugh asked both Heytens and Spinelli about the broader question of how courts should approach sentencing of juveniles. If Miller and Montgomery require the sentence to consider a defendant’s youth to determine whether he is incorrigible (and therefore should be sentenced to life in prison without parole) or instead simply immature (and therefore should have at least the possibility of parole), Kavanaugh asked, would that requirement be satisfied by a discretionary regime that includes the defendant’s youth among the factors that the sentence must consider or that allows the defense counsel to raise the issue? That proposal seemed to draw support from an array of justices, including Kagan, Justice Sonia Sotomayor and perhaps even Chief Justice John Roberts.
Over at Crime & Consequences, Kent Scheidegger has this accounting of possible head-counting:
I'm sure Justice Kagan would like the Court to just accept Montgomery's recasting of Miller on its face and endorse an intrusive rule for federal micromanagement of juvenile LWOP sentencing, just like the monstrosity we have for capital sentencing. I would be surprised if she has a majority for that. I think Justice Alito (and probably Justice Thomas) would like to overrule Montgomery. I doubt they have a majority for that. Justice Gorsuch seems inclined to a narrow reading of Montgomery, though, because a broad one would implicate the Apprendi rule.
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer question the Virginia Supreme Court's holding that the Virginia system actually was discretionary at the time of Malvo's sentencing. The Fourth Circuit assumed that was correct. They could send the case back to reconsider that point.
With this many splits among the Justices, there is no predicting the outcome.
The full transcript of the argument is available at this link.
October 16, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, October 15, 2019
Rounding up some previews of SCOTUS consideration of DC sniper Lee Malvo's juve LWOP sentence
Tomorrow afternoon, the US Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Mathena v. Malvo, a case that calls upon the Justice to continue struggling with the application of the Eighth Amendment limits on LWOP sentences that was set out in Miller v. Alabama and given retroactive effect in Montgomery v. Louisiana. This SCOTUSblog page has links to all the briefing in this case and sets out this question presented as framed by the state of Virginia:
Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in concluding — in direct conflict with Virginia’s highest court and other courts — that a decision of the Supreme Court, Montgomery v. Louisiana, addressing whether a new constitutional rule announced in an earlier decision, Miller v. Alabama, applies retroactively on collateral review may properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question.
The intricacies of this question presented highlights that the Justice could approach the Malvo case as a small technical matter only about the proper application of prior settled decisions. But because the crimes of Lee Malvo were horrific and the rulings in Miller and Montgomery contentious, there are advocates who wonder and fear that certain Justices may be eager to use this case to cut back on the Court's recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
I have seen a number of notable previews and commentary concerning the Malvo case, and here is a sampling:
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From Amy Howe at SCOTUSblog, "Argument preview: Justices to consider life-without-parole sentences for juveniles in D.C. sniper case"
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From Tom Jackman at the Washington Post, "Supreme Court to consider whether sniper Lee Boyd Malvo should be resentenced"
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From Andrew Cohen at the Brennan Center, "The Supreme Court Must Not Turn Back From Juvenile Sentencing Reform: The case of 'beltway sniper' Lee Boyd Malvo is poised to have a legal legacy far beyond his own."
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From Isa Farrington Nichols at Newsweek, "My Niece Was Murdered In The D.C. Sniper Shootings — but I Support Resentencing For The Teenager Who Killed Her"
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From Kent Scheidegger at Crime & consequences, "SCOTUS Hears D.C. Sniper, Jr. Case Tomorrow"
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From John Ellem at Bloomberg Law, "Listen to States on Child Sentencing, Bipartisan Legislators Tell High Court"
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By RJ Vogt at Law360, "DC Sniper Case Stokes Debate Over Juvenile Life Sentences"
October 15, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, August 24, 2019
Notable Washington Supreme Court discussion of recidivist LWOP sentences while rejecting challenge to use of young adult "first strikes"
Last fall, the Washington Supreme Court showed its willingness to strike down various extreme sentences when it concluded the state's death penalty administration was so arbitrary as to be violative of the state constitution, and soon thereafter in a distinct ruling decided to categorically bar the imposition of a juvenile life without parole based again on the state constitution. But earlier this month, this Court refused to extend this constitutional jurisprudence to LWOP sentences imposed under its recidivist statutes in Washington v. Moretti, No. 95263-9 (Wash. Aug 15, 2019) (available here). Here is how the opinion for the unanimous Court gets started and concludes:
Under the Persistent Offender Accountability Act(POAA), the third time a person is convicted of a "most serious offense," they mustbe sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. RCW9.94A.030(38)(a), .570. This statute is colloquially known as the "three strikes andyou're out" law. State v. Thome, 129 Wn.2d 736, 746, 921 P.2d 514 (1996). These three cases each ask whether it is constitutional to apply the POAA to people whowere in their 30s or 40s when they committed their third strike but were young adultswhen they committed their first strike.
We hold that it is constitutional. Article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution does not require a categorical bar on sentences of life in prison withoutthe possibility of parole for fully developed adult offenders who committed one oftheir prior strikes as young adults. We also hold that the sentences in these cases arenot grossly disproportionate to the crimes....
Petitioners argued that sentencing adult offenders to mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole under the POAA when one of their prior strike offenses was committed as young adults is either cruel, in violation of article I, I section 14 of the Washington Constitution, or cruel and unusual, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States constitution. We hold that it is not.
The petitioners have not shown a national consensus against this sentencing practice, and our own independent judgment confirms that there is nothing to suggest that these petitioners are less culpable than other POAA offenders. The sentences in these cases do| not categorically violate the Washington Constitution. Because our I constitution is more protective than the federal constitution in this context, we need not analyze this question under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, we hold that these sentences are not grossly disproportionate to the offenses under the Fain factors.
Adding to the intrigue of this ruling is a thoughtful concurrence by Justice Yu that was joined by two other members of the court which starts this way:
This case touches on the issue of sentencing individuals to life without the possibility of parole for a wide range of lower level offenses. I agree with the court's narrow holding that there is currently no categorical constitutional bar to the inclusion of an offense committed as a young adult as a predicate for purposes of the Persistent Offender Accountability Act ("Three Strikes Law"), ROW 9.94A.570. But a punishment that may be constitutionally permissible today may not pass muster tomorrow. I therefore write separately to express my growing discomfort with the routine practice of sentencing individuals to life without the possibility of parole, regardless of the offense or the age of the offender.
This court's decision in State v, Gregory limited the array of punishments that may be imposed for the most serious offenses by eliminating the death penalty. 192 Wn.2d 1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018) (plurality opinion). Every death sentence in this state has been commuted to the next most severe punishment available — life without the possibility of parole. Id. at 36. As a result, the range of offenses that require imposition of the most severe punishment the state can impose has been expanded. Persistent offenders who have committed robberies and assaults are now grouped with offenders who have committed the most violent of crimes, including aggravated murder and multiple rapes. The gradation of sentences that once existed before Gregory have now been condensed. As a result, a serious reexamination of our mandatory sentencing practices is required to ensure a just and proportionate sentencing scheme.
August 24, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Recommended reading, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, August 19, 2019
"More than half of Michigan juvenile lifers still wait for resentencing"
The title of this post is the title of this notable recent report from the Detroit Free Press spotlighting how slow the state has been to implement the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment rulings in Miller and Montgomery limiting the use of LWOP for juvenile offenders. I recommend the piece in full, and here is how it gets started:
Three and a half years after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that juvenile lifers should have the opportunity to be re-sentenced and come home, more than half in Michigan are still waiting to go before a judge to learn their fate, according to a Free Press analysis. That means nearly 200 inmates are waiting for a judicial review.
“We are not resolving cases at the rate that you would hope, given that the United States Supreme Court said these sentences should be rare," said Tina Olson, an attorney with the Michigan State Appellate Defender Office (SADO), whose office is representing roughly two-thirds of the state’s cases.
In 2012, the court ruled in Miller v. Alabama that juveniles should no longer be sentenced to mandatory life terms, citing developmental differences in the teenage brain, as well as the ability for rehabilitation. The high court doubled down on the decision in January 2016, ruling in Montgomery v. Louisiana that the Miller opinion should be applied retroactively.
While the 2016 Montgomery decision should have resulted in a clear-cut path for juvenile lifers, the system remains speckled with question marks. And since the opinion left the application of the ruling up to each state, there is little agreement on what this process should look like. Take, for example, Philadelphia County in Pennsylvania, which had almost as many juvenile lifers as the entire state of Michigan. It is expected to complete all but 10 of its resentencing cases by the end of the summer. Not a single juvenile lifer in the county has been given a new life sentence so far.
By and large, prosecutors in Michigan defend the slower process, contending they are thoughtfully weighing each case. "We tried to take a serious look at the criteria set forth in Miller, and put those factors into play when making those decisions on each case," said Kent County Prosecutor Christopher Becker, whose office was responsible for making sentencing recommendations for 23 defendants. Thirteen were originally recommended for continued life sentences — one was subsequently re-evaluated and changed to a term of years.
"I don’t think there is anything wrong with the pace," he said, explaining that a good number of the state's juvenile lifers have not yet served 25-years — the minimum requirement for resentencing — and therefore getting them before a judge is not as paramount. Only four of the 23 juvenile lifers in Becker’s county, for example, have served 25 years so far.
While the state has made progress around resentencing — as of July 1, 86 of the state’s 354 juvenile lifers had been released, a 300% increase since fall 2017 — defense attorneys and a new crop of progressive prosecutorial candidates are raising questions. Olson, and others like her, point to the fact that in July 2016, when Michigan prosecutors had to submit their resentencing recommendations, they, as a whole, requested continued life sentences for 66% of the state’s juvenile lifers — a figure that appears incongruous with the Supreme Court’s ruling that the sentence should just be reserved for "the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption."
While prosecutors have been able to walk back and change recommendations for continued life, and judges can rule against a prosecutor's recommendation, the original sentences more or less placed defendants on a slower track, as those originally recommended for a resentencing (known as a term of years) were prioritized in the process. The 66% that were slotted for continued life were, therefore, de-prioritized.
Under Michigan state law, a recommendation of term of years goes directly to a judge for sentencing, while a recommendation of continued life is a much more time-consuming legal process that can involve a hearing, evidence and witnesses. For several years, Michigan criminal justice players were debating whether these hearings should be heard by a judge or a jury — an uncertainty that, until the Michigan Supreme Court weighed in last summer, prompted many prosecutors to place such cases on hold.
And so, while there are several factors that have contributed to the slow resentencing process — clunky bureaucracy, disagreements over procedures, and a lack of an official database tracking the process — the original resentencing recommendations have been highlighted as a major contributing factor. The first in a litany of interconnected holdups.
August 19, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, August 12, 2019
Federal district court orders Missouri to improve parole procedures to comply with Miller and Eighth Amendment
As reported in this local article, a "federal court has ordered Missouri to overhaul how it handles the parole process for offenders who committed violent crimes as a minor." Here is more about a notable ruling:
U.S. District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey issued declaratory and injunctive relief, ordering the Missouri Probation and Parole Board to improve transparency, accountability, and training for youthful offender parole hearings.
“Specifically, the Court found that a number of Defendants’ policies, practices, and customs combine to deprive those serving [juvenile life without parole] sentences of a meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” the 23-page order states.
The judgment included nearly two dozen procedures — developed through mediation — the state is required to “promptly implement.”... The Missouri Probation and Parole Board has already adopted some of the procedures, such as allowing note taking during hearings.
The extensive changes come as a result of a class action lawsuit, Brown v. Precythe, filed by the MacArthur Justice Center, targeting the parole board’s alleged failure to comply with state and federal law when it comes to juvenile offenders serving mandatory life without parole sentences.
“This is a significant and long-awaited victory,” said Amy E. Breihan, MacArthur Justice Center’s Missouri director. “Seven years after the Supreme Court invalidated these juvenile [life without parole] sentences, Missouri is finally being held accountable for providing impacted folks a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release.”...
In 2016, SB 590 was passed by the Missouri General Assembly and signed into law. The bill, in part, allows offenders sentenced as a juvenile to life without parole prior to Aug. 28, 2016, to “submit to the parole board a petition for a review of his or her sentence, regardless of whether the case is final for purposes of appeal, after serving twenty-five years of incarceration on the sentence of life without parole.”
The original lawsuit alleged the parole board treated those individuals “with arbitrary and cruel practices.” The judge sided with the inmates, ordering an overhaul of how the parole hearings are handled. “Perhaps the most important part of the order,” said Breihan, “is that it prohibits the Parole Board from denying parole based solely on the seriousness of the offense, and requires them to make decisions through a youth-focused lens. Indeed, these decisions should be based on who these men and women have become over time, not their worst act as children.”
The full 23-page court order can be found at this link.
August 12, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, July 09, 2019
En banc Ninth Circuit works through Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and juvenile resentencing under federal guidelines
In this post around this time last year, I noted work on an amicus brief in support of a Ninth Circuit en banc petition in US v. Riley Briones. The original ruling in Briones had a split Ninth Circuit panel affirming the district court's adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines as the key factor in the course imposing a life without parole federal sentence on a juvenile offender. But after granting en banc review, the Ninth Circuit has now vacated the LWOP sentence and remanded for resentencing by a 9-2 vote. The new majority opinion in Briones, available here, has a lot to say about Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and juvenile sentencing, and here are a few excerpts:
Taken together, Miller, Montgomery, and Pete make clear that a juvenile defendant who is capable of change or rehabilitation is not permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt; that a juvenile who is not permanently incorrigible or irreparably corrupt is constitutionally ineligible for an LWOP sentence; and that a juvenile’s conduct after being convicted and incarcerated is a critical component of the resentencing court’s analysis....
We reaffirm that when a substantial delay occurs between a defendant’s initial crime and later sentencing, the defendant’s post-incarceration conduct is especially pertinent to a Miller analysis. See id.; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736 (“The petitioner’s submissions [of his reformation while in prison] are relevant . . . as an example of one kind of evidence that prisoners might use to demonstrate rehabilitation.”). The key question is whether the defendant is capable of change. See Pete, 819 F.3d at 1133. If subsequent events effectively show that the defendant has changed or is capable of changing, LWOP is not an option.
The district court’s heavy emphasis on the nature of Briones’s crime, coupled with Briones’s evidence that his is not one of those rare and uncommon cases for which LWOP is a constitutionally acceptable sentence, requires remand. We do not suggest the district court erred simply by failing to use any specific words, see Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735, but the district court must explain its sentence sufficiently to permit meaningful review. See Carty, 520 F.3d at 992 (“Once the sentence is selected, the district court must explain it sufficiently to permit meaningful appellate review . . . . What constitutes a sufficient explanation will necessarily vary depending upon the complexity of the particular case . . . .”). When a district court sentences a juvenile offender in a case in which an LWOP sentence is possible, the record must reflect that the court meaningfully engaged in Miller’s central inquiry.
And here is a concluding substantive paragraph from the dissent:
Thus, despite evidence of Briones’s rehabilitation, youth when the heinous crimes were committed, and youth-related characteristics, the record supports that Briones’s crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility, as opposed to transient immaturity. The district court therefore imposed a permissible sentence. Notably, the majority does not conclude that a life without parole sentence is impermissible in this case. Instead, although the majority claims otherwise, the majority’s opinion vacates the district court’s sentence because the district court failed to find that Briones was permanently incorrigible. But as discussed above, there is no requirement for the district court to make any specific findings before imposing a life without parole sentence. In short, the majority, citing Montgomery, states that it “do[es] not suggest the district court erred simply by failing to use any specific words,” Maj. at 19. But in clear contravention of Montgomery, that is precisely why it has reversed. We remand for the district court to do again what it has already done.
July 9, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Friday, April 26, 2019
"Individualized Sentencing"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new article available via SSRN authored by William Berry. Here is its abstract:
In Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court proscribed the use of mandatory death sentences. One year later, in Lockett v. Ohio, the Court expanded this principle to hold that defendants in capital cases were entitled to “individualized sentencing determinations.” The Court’s reasoning in both cases centered on the seriousness of the death penalty. Because the death penalty is “different” in its seriousness and irrevocability, the Court required the sentencing court, whether judge or jury, to assess the individualized characteristics of the offender and the offense before imposing a sentence.
In 2012, the Court expanded this Eighth Amendment concept to juvenile life-without-parole sentences in Miller v. Alabama. Specifically, the Court held that juvenile offenders also were unique — in their capacity for rehabilitation and their diminished culpability — such that they too deserved individualized sentencing determinations. The seriousness of the sentence in question, life without parole, also factored into the Court’s decision to extend the individualized sentencing requirement to juvenile life without parole cases.
Felony convictions, however, are serious too. The current consequences for a felony conviction in most states result in dehumanizing effects that extend far beyond release including loss of right to vote, state surveillance, and loss of the right to own a firearm, not to mention social stigma. As such, this Article argues for an extension of the Court’s Eighth Amendment individualized sentencing principle to all felony cases. Doing so would require the Court to overrule its prior decisions, including Harmelin v. Michigan, but the Court’s opinion in Miller hints at a willingness to do just that.
While initially valuable in ensuring that capital cases received heightened scrutiny, the unintentional consequence of the Court’s differentness principle is that non-capital cases have received almost no constitutional scrutiny. The individualized sentencing determination requirement provides one simple way to begin to remedy this shortcoming.
Adopting this doctrinal extension would have three major consequences: (1) it would provide each defendant his day in court in the face of serious, lifelong deprivations, (2) it would eliminate draconian mandatory sentencing practices, and (3) it would shift the sentencing determination away from prosecutors back to judges.
Part I of the Article describes the evolution of the individualized sentencing doctrine. Part II exposes the unintended consequences of the differentness concept, and unearths the theoretical principles behind individualized sentencing. In Part III, the Article argues for the expansion of the current doctrine and explains why the current roadblocks are not insurmountable. Part IV then explores the consequences of broadening the application of the individualized sentencing doctrine, for defendants, legislators, and judges alike.
April 26, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Tuesday, April 23, 2019
Relying on post-Miller legislation, Illinois Supreme Court rules any juve sentence over 40 years constitutes de facto life sentence
I just saw an interesting ruling handed down last week by the Illinois Supreme Court, Illinois v. Buffer, 2019 IL 122327 (Ill. April 18, 2019) (available here), which concerns what length of sentence should be considered a de facto life sentence triggering the Eighth Amendment sentencing limitations articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller and Montgomery. For folks following closely debates over the reach and application of the Eighth Amendment to juvenile term-of-year sentences, all of Buffer is worth reading (including the extended concurrence). Here is a key passage from the court's opinion:
[In a legislative response to Miller,] the General Assembly has determined that the specified first degree murders that would justify natural life imprisonment for adult offenders would warrant a mandatory minimum sentence of 40 years for juvenile offenders. The legislature evidently believed that this 40-year floor for juvenile offenders who commit egregious crimes complies with the requirements of Miller.
In determining when a juvenile defendant’s prison term is long enough to be considered de facto life without parole, we choose to draw a line at 40 years. This specific number does not originate in court decisions, legal literature, or statistical data. It is not drawn from a hat. Rather, this number finds its origin in the entity best suited to make such a determination — the legislature. The Supreme Court has made clear that “[i]t is for the State, in the first instance, to explore the means and mechanisms for compliance” with eighth amendment mandates pertaining to juvenile sentencing. Graham, 560 U.S. at 75. As this court recognized long ago, “‘[g]reat constitutional provisions must be administered with caution. *** It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.’” People ex rel. Douglas v. Barrett, 370 Ill. 464, 467 (1939) (quoting Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904)).
Extrapolating from this legislative determination, a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile offender provides “‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’” Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 75). We hereby conclude that a prison sentence of 40 years or less imposed on a juvenile offender does not constitute a de facto life sentence in violation of the eighth amendment.
April 23, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Friday, April 12, 2019
Henry Montgomery (of Montgomery v. Louisiana) denied parole yet again at age 72
A few years ago Henry Montgomery won in the Supreme Court with his claim that the landmark Eighth Amendment decision in Miller v. Alabama must be applied retroactively. But that win only garnered him a chance to be paroled after serving more than 50 years on a murder charge as a teenager in the early 1960s. Last year, Montgomery was denied parole as detailed in this prior post, and yesterday he was denied parole again as reported in this local article headlined "After 55 years in prison, Baton Rouge man key to Supreme Court ruling again denied freedom." Here are some details:
Henry Montgomery's victory at the U.S. Supreme Court in 2016 created a way for hundreds of prisoners like him — those convicted of horrific crimes while juveniles — to earn their freedom by demonstrating their rehabilitation since their youth. Yet on Thursday, Montgomery was again denied his own opportunity at a life beyond bars.
The Louisiana Committee on Parole denied Montgomery his freedom for the second time in 14 months, a decision that will keep the 72-year-old confined at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, where he has served 55 years.
At age 17, Montgomery killed East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Deputy Charles Hurt in 1963 and was sentenced to life in prison. But three years ago, the case played the central role in a landmark ruling on juvenile sentences, Montgomery v. Louisiana, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled youth offenders cannot be sentenced to mandatory life without parole, even in prior cases.
And though one of the parole board members Thursday morning cited the court's decision directly, noting "children who commit even heinous crimes are capable of change" — it was not enough. The board must vote unanimously for parole to be granted, and one member, Brennan Kelsey, voted against Montgomery's parole.
Kelsey said he believes the septuagenarian still needs to take more classes and complete more programming. "It's your responsibility to continue to work," Kelsey told Montgomery through a video call between Baton Rouge and the Angola prison. But Montgomery's attorney, Keith Nordyke, responded that he's "not sure what programs are left."
"He's been through all of the programs he could take," Nordyke said. "He's been a force for change and a force for good." Nordyke told the board that Montgomery was imprisoned before programming was available to those sentenced to life terms, but even then, Montgomery started a boxing club that gave young inmates a positive outlet. The lawyer said Montgomery was involved in a Methodist church ministry and organized a literacy program for fellow inmates that included helping them write letters home when they could not read or write themselves. Since programming became available to Montgomery in recent years, he has completed a variety of classes, like anger management and victim awareness.
"We're not quitting, we're not giving up," Nordyke said, calling the decision Thursday disappointing. He said he's unsure what his legal team will do next, but he worries about waiting two more years to again go before the parole board, which is the typical waiting period after a decision. Montgomery will turn 73 in June. "I'm not sure, when you're 73, that two years from now is an adequate remedy for something the Supreme Court ordered," Nordyke said....
The board reconsidered Montgomery's case on Thursday because they conceded an error had occurred during his previous hearing, at which he was first denied freedom. At that hearing in February 2018, two of the three parole committee members voted to deny Montgomery parole, primarily citing Montgomery's lack of classes as reasoning for their vote. But Nordyke requested the board reconsider the case through the board's appeal-like process, alleging the voting members misapplied the laws on youthful offenders in their decision. His request was granted.
The three parole board members on Thursday were different from the three who voted on Montgomery's case last year, yet Kelsey echoed a similar request about more classes, a claim Nordyke called unfair. He said prison officials worked in the last year to find Montgomery additional classes to take after the last hearing, but it was still not enough. "I do feel like the goalposts are moving," Nordyke said. He said there are classes on parenting and substance abuse that Montgomery has not taken, but those courses would not make sense for a 73-year-old man without children who has never struggled with substance abuse....
The warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola, Darryl Vannoy, testified to the board that Montgomery has no issues at the prison. During Montgomery's 55-year incarceration, prison officials said, he has been written up for breaking rules only 23 times, and only twice in the last 17 years. The last two write-ups, in 2013 and 2014, were for smoking in an unauthorized area and leaving clothes on his locker. "He's worked at the same job for 25 years," Vannoy said. Montgomery works at the prison's silk-screen shop. "He's not a problem for us. Real low-key guy, you don't hear anything out of him."...
Hurt's grandson, Lafourche Parish Sheriff's Capt. J.P. deGravelles, said while Montgomery has apologized to his family, that was the first time he heard Montgomery take responsibility for the crime. However, he and his aunt, Linda Hurt Wood, asked the parole board on Thursday to keep Montgomery behind bars. "I did go to Angola and I do forgive Henry Montgomery," Wood said. "Mr. Montgomery received a life sentence and so did we. … I will never have my father back."
DeGravelles said their family was disappointed to learn Montgomery would get a second chance in front of the parole board, less than two years from the last hearing. Typically, prisoners have to wait two years before requesting another parole consideration, but the timeline was expedited when the board granted Montgomery's reconsideration appeal — a process about which deGravelles said his family was kept in the dark, yet he was glad to see how it ended up. "Nobody comes out ahead on this," deGravelles said. "Mr. Montgomery is where he needs to be, and that's where he needs to stay."
April 12, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, April 03, 2019
Fourth Circuit panel rejects claim that Virginia Parole Board must consider age-related characteristics for juve lifer
A helpful reader alerted me to an interesting new Fourth Circuit panel ruling handed down yesterday in Bowling v. Director, Virginia Dep't of Corrections, No. 18-6170 (4th Cir. April 2, 2019) (available here). The start of the Bowling opinion provide a flavor for the constitutional arguments framed by the defendant which did not strike a chord with the panel:
This appeal arises from the Virginia Parole Board’s (“the Parole Board”) repeated denial of parole to Thomas Franklin Bowling (“Appellant”). Appellant was sentenced to life with parole when he was 17 years old. He first became eligible for parole on April 26, 2005. The Parole Board has considered his eligibility and denied him parole annually ever since. Appellant alleges that, because the Parole Board was not specifically required to consider age-related characteristics unique to juvenile offenders when it has processed his parole applications, the Parole Board’s repeated denial of his applications violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
On that ground, Appellant initiated this action against the Director of the Virginia Department of Corrections (“Appellee”). Appellee moved to dismiss Appellant’s complaint, and the district court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss. Regarding Appellant’s Eighth Amendment claim, the district court held that juvenile-specific Eighth Amendment protections do not apply to Appellant because he was sentenced to life with parole. Regarding Appellant’s Fourteenth Amendment claims, the district court held that the Parole Board procedures satisfy procedural due process requirements. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the decision of the district court.
Here is a spare paragraph from the heart of the opinion:
Appellant asks this court to extend the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to juvenile parole proceedings and find that it is cruel and unusual punishment for a parole board to deny juvenile offenders parole without specifically considering age-related mitigating characteristics as a separate factor in the decisionmaking process. Granting that request would require us to extend the legacy of Roper, Graham, and Miller in two ways. First, we would have to find that juvenile-specific Eighth Amendment protections extend to juvenile homicide offenders sentenced to life with parole. And second, we would have to find that those protections extend beyond sentencing proceedings. We decline to go so far.
April 3, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)
Monday, April 01, 2019
"Miller v. Alabama and the Problem of Prediction"
The title of this post is the title of this new paper authored by Mary Marshall now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:
Beginning in 2010, the Supreme Court severely limited states’ ability to impose juvenile life without parole sentences. In a seminal case, Miller v. Alabama, the Court banned mandatory life without the possibility of parole sentences for juveniles and declared that only those juveniles that are “irreparable corrupt” should be made to spend the rest of their lives in prison. While Miller has been the subject of much scholarly debate, there has yet to be any discussion of a core instability at the center of Miller’s mandate: By limiting life without parole sentences only to those juveniles who are “irreparably corrupt” the Court is asking sentencers to predict whether a juvenile will be a danger decades down the road and after a long prison sentence. This Note uses legal and social science literature around the impossibility of long-term predictions about juvenile development to argue that the requirement of prediction in Miller prevents just application of the decision and argues that this instability should lead to a ban on juvenile life without parole sentences.
April 1, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, March 18, 2019
SCOTUS takes up Miller retroactivity, unanimous juries, the insanity defense and criminal preemption in latest order list!
The Supreme Court is back in action this morning and today's order lists includes a list of four cases in which certioriari is granted. Four criminal grants would enough to warm a chilly morning for me, but all four cases involve fairly "big ticket" concerns. With the help of SCOTUSblog, here is the list of granted cases:
Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit erred in concluding — in direct conflict with Virginia’s highest court and other courts — that a decision of the Supreme Court, Montgomery v. Louisiana, addressing whether a new constitutional rule announced in an earlier decision, Miller v. Alabama, applies retroactively on collateral review may properly be interpreted as modifying and substantively expanding the very rule whose retroactivity was in question.
Issue: Whether the 14th Amendment fully incorporates the Sixth Amendment guarantee of a unanimous verdict.
Issue: Whether the Eighth and 14th Amendments permit a state to abolish the insanity defense.
Issue: Whether the Immigration Reform and Control Act expressly pre-empts the states from using any information entered on or appended to a federal Form I-9, including common information such as name, date of birth, and social security number, in a prosecution of any person (citizen or alien) when that same, commonly used information also appears in non-IRCA documents, such as state tax forms, leases, and credit applications.
With so many Graham and Miller follow-up cases in the pipeline, I am not especially thrilled to see the Justices now decide to take up the Malvo case involving a government appeal of a (high-profile) defendant's win on a Miller retroactivity issues. Still, in the wake of the interesting mess that was Montgomery (see my little commentary, "Montgomery's Messy Trifecta), and the addition of two new Justices since then, I am grateful that these enduringly important issues are getting any at all.
Meanwhile, as the Malvo case might only cover a little issue, Ramos, Kahler and Garcia all cover big issues on a big canvas (though the result in Ramos seems easy to predict). And, as always, I welcome reader input on what to expect or look forward to in these arenas.
March 18, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (4)
Saturday, March 09, 2019
Notable review of juvenile lifers in Tennessee
This local article, headlined "3 takeaways from our review of all 185 Tennessee teen lifers," provides an effective review of the maxed-out incarceration of certain youth in the Volunteer State. Here are excerpts:
In December, activists confronted former Gov. Bill Haslam at an education event and demanded that he grant clemency to Cyntoia Brown, a Nashville woman serving a life sentence in prison for a murder she committed at 16.
At the time, the outgoing Republican governor said he wanted to treat the case fairly, along with cases that were similar but had not received the same level of publicity as Brown's case. Indeed, Brown had celebrities — including Rihanna and Kim Kardashian West — advocating on her behalf, and she had a team of powerful lawyers who volunteered to pursue her freedom.
Ultimately, Haslam decided to grant Brown clemency, calling her sentence too harsh. And he acknowledged her case was not unique, saying he hoped "serious consideration of additional reforms will continue, especially with respect to the sentencing of juveniles."
In the wake of his decision, the USA TODAY NETWORK - Tennessee spent weeks reviewing the cases of each of the 185 men and women serving a life sentence — or life without parole — for crimes they committed as teens....
Nearly three-quarters of those serving life sentences for crimes they committed before the age of 18 are African-American men.
Here are some of the other breakdowns of the 185 people serving life. Seven are serving life sentences for crimes committed at age 14; 26 were 15 years old at the time of their crimes; 53 were 16. The rest were 17. Ten are women.
Fourteen are serving life sentences without the possibility of parole, while the remainder face at least 51 years behind bars before their first chance for a parole hearing. The oldest is Robert Walker, sentenced to life in prison for murder in 1972 at age 16. He is now 63....
State Sen. Raumesh Akbari, D-Memphis, said many young defendants face childhood hardships and traumas that can be overcome with time and treatment. “There are so many others like Cyntoia,” Akbari said. “It’s so complicated when you’re dealing with loss of life, but we are talking about children,” she said. “As horrific as it sounds that a child committed murder, the person they are now is not the person they will be in 20 years.”
Indeed, in many of the cases the USA TODAY NETWORK - Tennessee reviewed, court records document a history of abuse suffered by the convicted teens.
A 16-year-old girl sentenced to life in prison in the stabbing death of her mother was repeatedly forced to watch her mother have sex with multiple men.
A 15-year-old boy whose stepfather regularly beat his mother got into a confrontation with the man while asking if he would let them peacefully leave. The boy beat the stepfather to death with a baseball bat.
A 17-year-old boy killed his father after what he and his mother described as years of physical and emotional abuse that had been reported to the state. The father threatened to beat the boy after a suicide attempt and withheld mental health medication, according to the mother. The boy shot his father with a rifle and stole his truck.
The U.S. Supreme Court issued a pair of rulings in recent years that found mandatory life sentences for juveniles are unconstitutional except in rare circumstances.... In Tennessee, the Supreme Court's rulings have not had an impact because there is no mandatory life sentence. Life sentences with the possibility of parole include a mandatory review after at least 51 years served — a length of time advocates call a virtual life sentence.
This companion article, headlined "In Tennessee, 185 people are serving life for crimes committed as teens," includes this discussion of some talk of legislative change:
Sen. Raumesh Akbari, D-Memphis, said many young defendants face childhood hardships and traumas that can be overcome with time and treatment. “There are so many others like Cyntoia,” Akbari said....
Gov. Bill Lee's spokeswoman said he is “open to proposals addressing juvenile sentencing,” and a new state panel is considering future reforms. But there remains little consensus among Tennessee policymakers on what to do when children kill.
Akbari is trying to change Tennessee law to lower the minimum time served before a chance for parole to as low as 30 years for juveniles. The proposal could give many of the 185 a second chance at life outside prison walls for the first time in their adult lives.
Her effort is grounded in research about adolescent brain development that shows people do not fully develop rational decision-making abilities until their 20s. Other research has highlighted the impact of adverse childhood experiences on the developing brain, including sexual and physical abuse, poverty and incarcerated parents — events that can negatively wire some children’s brains.
March 9, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Data on sentencing, Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (1)
Thursday, February 21, 2019
"Juvenile Life Without Parole in North Carolina"
The title of this post is the title of this new paper available via SSRN and authored by Ben Finholt, Brandon Garrett, Karima Modjadidi and Kristen Renberg. Here is its abstract:
Life without parole is “an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,” and as the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Graham v. Florida. The United States is the only country in the world that imposes juvenile life without parole sentences. Many of these individuals were sentenced during a surge in LWOP sentences in the 1990s. In the past decade, following several Supreme Court rulings eliminating mandatory sentences of LWOP for juvenile offenders, juvenile LWOP sentencing has declined. This Article aims to empirically assess the rise and then the fall in juvenile LWOP sentencing in a leading sentencing state, North Carolina, to better understand these trends and their implications.
We examine the cases of 94 people in North Carolina who were sentenced to LWOP as juveniles. Their ages at the time of the offense ranged from 13 to 17. Of those, 51 are currently serving LWOP sentences (one more is currently pending a new trial). These cases are detailed in the Appendix. In North Carolina, JLWOP sentencing has markedly declined. Since 2011, there have been only five such sentences. Of the group of 94 juvenile offenders, 42 have so far been resentenced to non-LWOP sentences, largely pursuant to the post-Miller legislation in North Carolina. Over one third of the juveniles sentenced to LWOP, or 32 individuals, were not the killers, but were convicted under a felony murder theory.
These sentences are concentrated in a small group of counties. A total of 61% or 57 of the 94 juvenile LWOP sentences in North Carolina were entered in the eleven counties that have imposed more than three such sentences. We find an inertia effect: once a county has used a JLWOP sentence they have a higher probability of using a JLWOP sentence again in the future. In contrast, homicide rates are not predictive of JLWOP sentences.
We ask whether it makes practical sense to retain juvenile LWOP going forward, given what an unusual, geographically limited, and costly sentence it has become. In conclusion, we describe alternatives to juvenile LWOP as presently regulated in states like North Carolina, including a scheme following the model adopted in states like California and Wyoming, in which there is period review of lengthy sentences imposed on juvenile offenders.
February 21, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Data on sentencing, Detailed sentencing data, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, February 14, 2019
Ninth Circuit going en banc to reconsider intersection of Eighth Amendment juve jurisprudence and federal sentencing guidelines
In this post back in July, I noted work on an amicus brief in support of a Ninth Circuit en banc petition in US v. Riley Briones. The panel opinion in Briones is available at this link, where you will find a split decision in which the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines as the key factor in the course imposing a life without parole federal sentence on a juvenile offender. The amicus brief, which is available here, argued "It is unreasonable — and unconstitutional — for a court to routinely apply the Sentencing Guidelines when a defendant is subject to a Guideline sentencing range of life without parole for a crime committed as a juvenile."
I am now pleased to be able to report that, as of yesterday, the panel opinion in Briones is technically no longer good law thanks to this Feb 13, 2019 order by the Ninth Circuit:
Upon the vote of a majority of nonrecused active judges, it is ordered that this case be reheard en banc pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) and Circuit Rule 35-3. The three-judge panel disposition in this case shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the Ninth Circuit.
Though I am not exactly sure of the timelines for en banc review in the Ninth Circuit, I presume briefing and argument will take a number of months though we might still get a new decision before the end of this year. Meanwhile, folks who follow this area of jurisprudence closely may recall that the Third Circuit is also in the midst of en banc review of related post-Miller Eighth Amendment application issues US v. Corey Grant, No. 16-3820, as discussed in this post from a few months ago. A helpful reader reported to me that oral argument in Grant is scheduled for next week.
I have been a bit surprised that we have not yet seen the Supreme Court take up any follow-up Eighth Amendment cases since it decided Graham and Miller in short succession in 2010 and 2012. It is interesting to speculate if either the Briones or Grant cases might interest the Justices after (inevitable?) big split en banc circuit rulings in these cases.
February 14, 2019 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, January 28, 2019
A year after denial, Henry Montgomery (of Montgomery v. Louisiana) to get parole reconsideration by parole board
In every area of criminal law, as many are seeing in real time with the FIRST STEP Act, the implementation of any legal changes can be almost as important as the legal changes themselves. The high-profile case of 72-year-old Henry Montgomery, who won in the Supreme Court with his claim that the landmark Eighth Amendment decision in Miller v. Alabama must be applied retroactively, continues to demonstrate this fact. Though granted a chance at parole after serving more than 50 years on a murder charge as a teenager in the early 1960s, Montgomery was denied parole in February 2018 as detailed in this prior post.
But now I see this local news piece reporting on the interesting next chapter in this remarkable case under the headline "Louisiana parole board to rehear case of man central to Supreme Court ruling on juvenile lifers." Here are the details:
The Louisiana parole board in April will rehear the case of the 72-year-old Baton Rouge man central to the 2016 U.S. Supreme Court decision on juveniles sentenced to life without parole, granting him a new hearing less than a year after the board first denied his release from prison.
Henry Montgomery, who is serving a life sentence for the 1963 killing of East Baton Rouge Sheriff's Deputy Charles Hurt, will again go before a three-person panel of the Louisiana Board of Pardons and Parole after it accepted his request for reconsideration, the board's appeal-like process to reconsider previous decisions given certain circumstances, like a mistake, misconduct or new evidence. Montgomery's reconsideration hearing has been set for April 11....
"Henry Montgomery has been in prison for over 55 years, longer than any other juvenile lifer in Louisiana," said Andrew Hundley, the executive director of the Louisiana Parole Project, a nonprofit that represents juvenile lifers in their parole hearings and helps them readjust to free society. "We feel strongly that he is a deserving candidate for a second chance and would be a productive member of society, if given the opportunity."
In Louisiana, there were about 300 so-called juvenile lifers in prison, like Montgomery, amounting to the nation's third highest such population. Since the decision in 2016, about 35 juvenile lifers have been released on parole, according to the nonprofit Louisiana Parole Project, all having met certain parameters set out by state law, including having served at least 25 years and completed educational and rehabilitative classes, and having received a unanimous vote from the parole board.
Montgomery, however, has remained in the minority of such cases that have come up for a parole hearing, denied his shot at freedom by the parole board last February, with two of the three board members voting no. The two members cited the small number of classes Montgomery had completed during his decades at Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola.
Typically, prisoners have to wait two years after a denial to apply for a new parole hearing, but a decision reconsideration can be granted if an offender alleges, and the board substantiates, misconduct by a board member, a procedural error or significant new evidence that was not previously available, according to the parole board's policy on reconsideration. While Montgomery's lawyer, Keith Nordyke, filed their initial motion for reconsideration under seal, he said their argument focused on how the board misapplied the law relative to juvenile lifers when deciding Montgomery's case. A seasoned parole board attorney, Nordyke said he only files for reconsideration if he believes a major mistake had been made.
"It's a big deal," Nordyke said of the board's decision to grant Montgomery a new hearing, but noted that he does not believe the decision has any larger implications for other juvenile lifers' cases. "I really believe that all these cases are taken one-on-one, on their merit," Nordyke said.
Francis Abbott, the executive director of the Louisiana Board on Pardons and Parole, said the Montgomery reconsideration decision was made by looking at board policy, but Abbott declined to answer specific questions about the decision. The board policy, updated in 2017, outlines specific considerations for parole committee members when hearing the case of a youthful offender, saying that members "shall give great weight to the fact that youth are less responsible than adults for their actions."
This article from a few months ago from the same news source highlights how Louisiana trails other states like Michigan and Pennsylvania with large juvenile LWOP populations in the number of juve offenders who have secured parole since there Supreme Court determined that Miller had to be applied retroactively.
January 28, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Wednesday, January 23, 2019
"Mass Incarceration Paradigm Shift?: Convergence in an Age of Divergence"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new article just posted to SSRN and authored by Mugambi Jouet. Here is its abstract:
The peculiar harshness of modern American justice has led to a vigorous scholarly debate about the roots of mass incarceration and its divergence from humanitarian sentencing norms prevalent in other Western democracies. Even though the United States reached virtually world-record imprisonment levels between 1983 and 2010, the Supreme Court never found a prison term “cruel and unusual punishment” under the Eighth Amendment. By countenancing extreme punishments with no equivalent elsewhere in the West, such as life sentences for petty recidivists, the Justices’ reasoning came to exemplify the exceptional nature of American justice. Many scholars concluded that punitiveness had become its defining norm.
Yet a quiet revolution in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, a wave of reforms, and other social developments suggest that American penal philosophy may be inching toward norms — dignity, proportionality, legitimacy, and rehabilitation — that have checked draconian prison terms in Europe, Canada, and beyond. In 2010, the Supreme Court began limiting the scope of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles in a series of landmark Eighth Amendment cases. Partly drawing upon the principles in these decisions, twenty-one states have abolished life without parole categorically for juveniles, providing them more protections than under the Eighth Amendment. The narrow focus on the differences between juveniles and adults in the aftermath of these reforms obscured American law’s increasing recognition of humanitarian norms that are hardly age-dependent — and strikingly similar to those in other Western democracies. Historiography sheds light on why the academy has largely overlooked this relative paradigm shift. As America faced mass incarceration of an extraordinary magnitude, research in recent decades has focused on divergence, not convergence.
This Article advances a comparative theory of punishment to analyze these developments. In the United States and throughout the West, approaches toward punishment are impermanent social constructs, as they historically tend to fluctuate between punitive and humanitarian concerns. Such paradigm shifts can lead to periods of international divergence or convergence in penal philosophy. Notwithstanding the ebb and flow of penal attitudes, certain long-term trends have emerged in Western societies. They encompass a narrowing scope of offenders eligible for the harshest sentences, a reduction in the application of these sentences, and intensifying social divides about their morality. Restrictions on lifelong imprisonment for juveniles and growing social polarization over mass incarceration in the United States may reflect this movement. However, American justice appears particularly susceptible to unpredictable swings and backlashes. While this state of impermanence suggests that the reform movement might reverse itself, it also demonstrates that American justice may keep converging toward humanitarian sentencing norms, which were influential in the United States before the mass incarceration era.
Two patterns regarding the broader evolution of criminal punishment ultimately stand out: cyclicality and steadiness of direction. The patterns evoke a seismograph that regularly swings up or down despite moving steadily in a given direction. American justice may cyclically oscillate between repressive or humanitarian aspirations; and simultaneously converge with other Western democracies in gradually limiting or abolishing the harshest punishments over the long term.
January 23, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentencing around the world, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, January 07, 2019
Calling her life sentence "too harsh," Tennessee Gov grants commutation to Cyntoia Brown to be paroled after serving 15 years for juve killing
As reported in this local article, "Gov. Bill Haslam ordered an early release for Cyntoia Brown, a Tennessee woman and alleged sex trafficking victim serving a life sentence in prison for killing a man when she was 16." Here is more about a high-profile clemency grant in a high-profile case:
Haslam granted Brown a full commutation to parole on Monday. Brown will be eligible for release Aug. 7, 15 years after she fatally shot a man in the back of the head while he was lying in bed beside her. She will stay on parole for 10 years.
“Cyntoia Brown committed, by her own admission, a horrific crime at the age of 16," Haslam said in a statement. "Yet, imposing a life sentence on a juvenile that would require her to serve at least 51 years before even being eligible for parole consideration is too harsh, especially in light of the extraordinary steps Ms. Brown has taken to rebuild her life. "Transformation should be accompanied by hope. So, I am commuting Ms. Brown’s sentence, subject to certain conditions.”
Brown will be required to participate in regular counseling sessions and to perform at least 50 hours of community service, including working with at-risk youth. She also will be required to get a job.
In a statement released by her lawyers, Brown thanked Haslam "for your act of mercy in giving me a second chance. I will do everything I can to justify your faith in me." "With God's help, I am committed to live the rest of my life helping others, especially young people. My hope is to help other young girls avoid ending up where I have been."
The governor's long-awaited decision, handed down during his last days in office, brought a dramatic conclusion to Brown's plea for mercy, which burst onto the national stage as celebrities and criminal justice reform advocates discovered her case. In his commutation, the governor called Brown's case one that "appears to me to be a proper one for the exercise of executive clemency." "Over her more than fourteen years of incarceration, Ms. Brown has demonstrated extraordinary growth and rehabilitation," the commutation said.
It was a remarkable victory for Brown after years of legal setbacks. Brown said she was forced into prostitution and was scared for her life when she shot 43-year-old Johnny Allen in the back of the head while they were in bed together. Allen, a local real estate agent, had picked her up at an East Nashville Sonic restaurant and taken her to his home.
Brown, now 30, was tried as an adult and convicted of first-degree murder in 2006. She was given a life sentence. Had Haslam declined to intervene, Brown would not have been eligible for parole until she was 69. The state parole board, which considered Brown's case in 2018, gave the governor a split recommendation, with some recommending early release and some recommending she stay in prison....
In recent years, celebrities have highlighted her case, fueling intense interest and a renewed legal fight to get her out of prison. Activists, lawmakers and celebrities, including Rihanna and Kim Kardashian West, have cited Brown's case as an illustration of a broken justice system. Brown was a victim herself, they said, and didn't deserve her punishment.
The Gov's official press release on this decision is available at this link.
January 7, 2019 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Clemency and Pardons, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (8)
Wednesday, December 26, 2018
Another dive into the choppy waters of Miller and Montgomery implementation
I am sure I have posted any number of articles highlighting that implementation of the Eighth Amendment limit of juvenile life without parole sentences has been choppy at best (see here and here and here for a few more examples). The latest iteration of this depressingly evergreen story comes from Mother Jones here under the headline "The Supreme Court Said No More Life Without Parole for Kids. Why Is Antonio Espree One of the Few to Get Out of Prison?". I recommend this long piece in full, and here is a taste:
As a result of [the Graham and Miller and Montgomery] decisions, the number of states banning life without parole for children in all cases, not just in mandatory sentencing schemes, has quadrupled since 2012. Of the more than 2,600 juvenile lifers in 2016, about 1,700 have been resentenced.
But although Justice Kennedy stated that all but the “rarest of juvenile offenders” should get a shot at parole, some prosecutors continue to argue that many do not deserve this benefit, or that they should serve years longer in prison before they can get out. So far, only 400 juvenile lifers nationwide have been freed.
In part, that’s because the Supreme Court gave states leeway to decide how to review lifers’ cases, leading to inconsistencies across the country. In Pennsylvania, home to the nation’s second-biggest juvenile lifer population, prosecutors are required to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defendant can never be rehabilitated if they want to deny the option of parole during resentencing; otherwise, the presumption is he should be given a second chance. So far, the state has released more than 150 juvenile lifers, many under the jurisdiction of Philadelphia’s District Attorney Larry Krasner, who campaigned last year on a platform of reducing mass incarceration.
But in Michigan, where 363 juvenile lifers were serving mandatory sentences in 2016, there is no such requirement, and prosecutors have argued that nearly two-thirds of juvenile lifers are those rarest offenders who should be kept in prison for good. “Justice in this country is largely based on where you live,” says Jody Kent Lavy, director of the Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth, an advocacy group.
Even Henry Montgomery, who won his Supreme Court case, isn’t free. In February, the Louisiana parole board rejected his request for release, arguing that he had not finished enough classes in prison. His lawyers countered that he hadn’t been given much of a chance: For his first three decades at Louisiana’s notorious Angola prison, lifers like him were prohibited from taking classes. (About a third of juvenile lifers nationally say they have been denied access to prison educational programs.) When the courses opened up, he was deemed ineligible to complete his GED. A judge described him as a model inmate, but family members of the sheriff’s deputy he killed testified against him at the parole hearing. So Montgomery, now 72 years old, was denied. He’ll have to wait a year to reapply.
December 26, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, December 12, 2018
Noting possible Miller follow-up cases on the latest SCOTUS relist list
I continue to wonder when the Supreme Court will take up a new case to clarify (or, ideally, extend) its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence limiting extreme prison sentences set forth in Graham and Miller. The latest Relist Watch from John Elwood at SCOTUSblog spotlights a few cases that might be in the works as the next possible Miller follow-up:
Newton v. Indiana, 17-1511, and Mathena v. Malvo, 18-217, both raise the same issue involving the lawfulness of imposing a discretionary life sentence on a juvenile offender. In Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that “mandatory life without parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’” Four years later, in Montgomery v. Louisiana, the court held that “Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law” that must be given retroactive effect in cases in which direct review was complete when Miller was decided. Numerous state courts and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit have held that Montgomery expanded the prohibition against “mandatory life without parole for those under 18 at the time of their crimes” to include discretionary life sentences as well; other courts have concluded that Montgomery did no such thing. Petitioner Larry Newton, a prisoner, and Randall Mathena, the chief warden of Virginia’s high-security Red Onion State Prison, seek resolution of the issue.
As an aside, the respondent in Mathena v. Malvo will be familiar to anyone who lived in the D.C. area in fall 2002. When he was 17 years old, Lee Boyd Malvo, along with the much older John Allen Muhammad, committed a series of murders known as the “D.C. sniper” attacks. Currently, Malvo is serving multiple life sentences at Red Onion for his role as the triggerman in 10 of the shootings (Virginia executed Muhammad in 2009.).
Because the next SCOTUS conference is not until January 4, we will not know anything more on this front until next year.
December 12, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, December 06, 2018
Tennessee Supreme Court rule in high-profile case that juve life sentence allows for possible release after 51 years
As reported in this local article, "Tennessee Supreme Court said Thursday that Cyntoia Brown, a Nashville woman serving a life sentence in prison for a murder she committed at 16, could be eligible for release after she serves 51 years in prison." Here is more about a notable ruling in a high-profile case:
Brown, now 30, has been locked up since 2004, when she was convicted of shooting 43-year-old Nashville real estate agent Johnny Allen. Her legal team launched a challenge to her life sentence in the federal court system, pointing to a 2012 ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court saying that giving juveniles life sentences without parole was cruel and unusual in most cases.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which is considering Brown’s case, said Tennessee sentencing laws are unclear. Some sections suggested Brown's conviction should lead to life without parole while others suggested she should eventually be released.
During a hearing this summer, Sixth Circuit judges suggested that if Brown would never be eligible for release under state law, her sentence could be overturned. The appeals court asked Tennessee's high court to weigh in before it made a final decision.
The Tennessee Supreme Court’s unanimous answer that Brown would eventually be eligible for release sometime after her 69th birthday could complicate her legal team’s argument.
In its eight-page decision released Thursday, the state Supreme Court determined that a defendant sentenced to life in prison for a first-degree murder committed on or after July 1, 1995, will become eligible after serving a minimum of 51 years in prison. The rule also applies to 14 other offenses including rape, kidnapping and aggravated child abuse. The opinion will be handed over to the federal appeals court for review.
Brown also is asking Gov. Bill Haslam for clemency. The state parole board, which was split in its recommendations, sent the case file to the governor's office in July....
At 16, Brown climbed into a pickup truck on Murfreesboro Pike with Allen, a stranger, drove to his home, got into his bed — then shot him in the back of the head with a .40-caliber handgun as he lay naked beside her. Brown's advocates say she was forced into prostitution in fear of her life and wronged by the legal system. Prosecutors say Brown killed the man to rob him. Following her trial in 2006, Brown was convicted of Allen's murder.
Pop stars such as Rihanna and Kim Kardashian West have taken to social media encouraging Brown's freedom.
The full ruling from the Tennessee Supreme Court is available at this link. Given the SIxth Circuit's existing jurisprudence applying Miller, it now seems quite unlikely Brown will succeed with an Eighth Amendment challenge to her sentence.
December 6, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, December 04, 2018
"Tipping Point: A Majority Of States Abandon Life-Without-Parole Sentences For Children"
The title of this post is the title of this new document from the The Campaign for the Fair Sentencing of Youth. Here is its executive summary:
A majority of states now ban life without parole for children or have no one serving the sentence. A combination of judicial decisions and state legislative reforms have reduced the number of individuals serving by 60 percent in just three years, and that number continues to decline. Today, approximately 1,100 people are serving life without parole for crimes committed as children.
For the approximately 1,700 individuals whose life-without-parole sentences have been altered through legislative reform or judicial resentencing to date, the median sentence nationwide is 25 years before parole or release eligibility. Nearly 400 people previously sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed as children have been released from prison to date. Despite national momentum rejecting life-without-parole sentences for children, racial disparities continue to worsen; of new cases tried since 2012, approximately 72 percent of children sentenced to life without parole have been Black — as compared to approximately 61 percent before 2012.
December 4, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Race, Class, and Gender, Scope of Imprisonment | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, October 18, 2018
Washington Supreme Court declares all juve LWOP cruel punishment and unconstitutional under state constitution
Last week, as noted here, the Washington Supreme Court struck down the state's death penalty based on its arbitrary administration in Washington v. Gregory. Today the same court brings us another big state constitutional opinion in Washington v. Bassett, No. 94556-0 (Wash. Oct. 18, 2018) (available here). The death penalty abolition, interestingly, was unanimous, while this latest opinion divided 5-4. Here is how the majority opinion starts:
At issue here is the constitutionality of sentencing juvenile offenders to life in prison without the possibility of parole or early release. The State appeals a Court of Appeals, Division Two decision holding that the provision of our state's Miller-fix statute that allows 16- and 17-year-olds to be sentenced to life without parole violates the Washington Constitution's ban on cruel punishment. Brian Bassett, recently resentenced to life without parole under the Miller-fix statute, argued at the Court of Appeals that juvenile life without parole is categorically unconstitutional. The court adopted the categorical approach, rather than our traditional Fain proportionality test, and found that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early release constituted cruel punishment. State v. Bassett, 198 Wn. App. 714, 744, 394 P.3d 430 (2017) (puhlished in part); State v. Fain, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980). We affirm the Court of Appeals' decision and hold that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early release constitutes cruel punishment and therefore is unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution.
Here is how the dissent gets started:
The majority's decision to invalidate a provision of our Miller-fix statute, RCW 10.95.030(3)(a)(ii), and to categorically bar the imposition of a juvenile life without parole (LWOP) sentence purports to rest on article I, section 14 of the Washington State Constitution. However, it offers no basis in state law but is simply a reinterpretation of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012). More precisely, the majority takes Miller's federal constitutional requirement — that a sentencing court consider youth and its attendant characteristics as mitigating factors in exercising sentencing discretion to impose LWOP — and uses it to categorically bar the exercise of such discretion under the state constitution. Not only is this contrary to the holding in Miller itself, which does not categorically bar LWOP sentences for juvenile homicide offenders, it also departs from state precedent rejecting similar constitutional challenges and upholding judicial sentencing discretion.
October 18, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Tuesday, October 16, 2018
"'Second Looks, Second Chances': Collaborating with Lifers on a Video about Commutation of LWOP Sentences"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new article authored by Regina Austin now available via SSRN. Here is its abstract:
In Pennsylvania, life means life without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) or “death by incarceration.” Although executive commutation offers long serving rehabilitated lifers hope of release, in the past 20 years, only 8 commutations have been granted by the state’s governors. This article describes the collaboration between an organization of incarcerated persons serving LWOP and the law-school-based Penn Program on Documentaries and the Law that produced a video supporting increased commutations for Pennsylvania lifers. The article details the methodology of collaborative videomaking employed, the strategic decisions over content that were impacted by the politics of commutation, and the contributions of visual criminology to the video’s portrayal of the lifers who participated in the project.
October 16, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Prisons and prisoners, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Monday, October 15, 2018
Federal judge decides Missouri parole practices fail to comply with requirements of Miller and Graham
As reported in this local article, headlined "Missouri violated rights of inmates convicted as juveniles who are serving life without parole, judge says," a federal judge late last week ruled in favor of inmates convicted of murder as juveniles who claimed that Missouri’s parole policies and practices violated their rights in the wake of the Supreme Court's rulings in Miller and Graham. Here are the basics:
A federal judge on Friday said that recent Missouri parole hearings violated the constitutional rights of inmates serving life without parole for offenses they committed when they were juveniles. State officials have 60 days to develop a plan for providing the inmates “a meaningful and realistic opportunity” for parole, U.S. District Judge Nanette K. Laughrey ruled.
The lawsuit was filed by four inmates who are seeking to represent all inmates who were convicted and sentenced to life without parole for an offense that occurred when they were younger than 18. Each of the four inmates was recently denied parole after a hearing, and Laughrey said nearly 85 percent of the class of affected inmates did not receive a parole date after a hearing. The majority were not granted another hearing for the maximum of five years, without an explanation “for the lengthy setback,” she wrote.
In a news release about the ruling Sunday, the Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center of St. Louis, which represents the inmates along with lawyers from Husch Blackwell, said more than 90 inmates are affected.
The parole board’s decision is communicated to inmates on a two-page “barebones, boilerplate form,” with only two available reasons for denying parole: the seriousness of the original offense or that the inmate’s “inability to... remain at liberty without again violating the law,” Laughrey wrote. Even state officials admitted Missouri failed to provide adequate explanation for the decisions, the judge said, and fails to tell inmates what “steps they should to take to become better suited for parole.”
Laughrey wrote that while an adult’s “interest in parole is not constitutionally protected,” a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions “has held that those who were children at the time of the crimes for which they were convicted may be subject to certain additional protections.”...
Laughrey ruled that the state needs to come up with “revised policies, procedures, and customs” that will “ensure that all Class members are provided a meaningful and realistic opportunity for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation,” including those who already had unsuccessful hearings.
The full 27-page ruling in Brown v. Percythe, No. 2:17-cv-04082-NKL (W.D. Mo. Oct. 12, 2018), is available at this link.
October 15, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Thursday, October 04, 2018
Third Circuit going en banc to reconsider reach and application of Eighth Amendment to lengthy juvenile term-of-years sentence
In this post back in April, I noted the remarkable Third Circuit panel opinion in US v. Grant, No. 16-3820 (3d CIr. April 9, 2018) (available here), addressing the application of Eighth Amendment limits on juvenile sentences. The panel opinion in Grant is technically no longer law as of today thanks to this order by the Third Circuit:
A majority of the active judges having voted for rehearing en banc in the above captioned cases, it is ordered that the government’s petition for rehearing is GRANTED. The Clerk of this Court shall list the case for rehearing en banc on February 20, 2019. The opinion and judgment entered April 9, 2018 are hereby vacated.
In short form, defendant Corey Grant in the early 1990 was initially sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed when he was 16-years old. After Graham and Miller, he was resentenced to a 65-year federal prison term. The panel opinion found this term unconstitutional and suggested that "lower courts must consider the age of retirement as a sentencing factor, in addition to life expectancy and the § 3553(a) factors, when sentencing juvenile offenders that are found to be capable of reform." The full Third Circuit is apparently no so keen on this approach, and it will thus address this matter anew in the coming year.
October 4, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, September 19, 2018
"A Way Out: Abolishing Death By Incarceration in Pennsylvania"
The title of this post is the title of this lengthy new report released this week by the Abolitionist Law Center. Here are excerpts from its executive summary:
Over the last 25 years, the number of people serving life-without-parole, or death-by-incarceration (DBI), sentences in the United States has exploded from 12,453 people in 1992 to over 53,000 people today — 10% of whom are incarcerated in Pennsylvania.
With over 5,300 people sentenced to DBI and one of the highest per capita DBI sentencing rates in the country, Pennsylvania stakes a strong claim as the U.S. and world leader in this distinctively harsh form of punishment and permanent exclusion of its citizens. Philadelphia, with nearly 2,700 people serving DBI sentences, is the world’s leading jurisdiction in sentencing people to die in prison —more than any county or parish in the United States and far more than any individual country in the world.
In 1974, fewer than 500 people were serving DBI sentences in Pennsylvania. As of September 2017, 5,346 people are serving death-by-incarceration sentences in Pennsylvania. Despite a 21% decline in violent crime between 2003 and 2015, Pennsylvania’s population of people sentenced to DBI has risen by 40% between 2003 and 2016.6 Pennsylvania ranks near the top of every measure of DBI sentences across the country....
Like most measures of the criminal legal system, death-by-incarceration sentences disproportionately impact communities of color. Black Pennsylvanians are serving death-by-incarceration sentences at a rate more than 18-times higher than that of White Pennsylvanians.
Latinx Pennsylvanians are serving DBI sentences at a rate 5-times higher than White Pennsylvanians. Racial disparities in DBI sentences are even more pronounced than among the overall Pennsylvania prison population, in which 47% of those incarcerated are Black, compared to 11% of the state’s population. Of those serving DBI sentences, however, 65% are Black while 25% are White.
Among other interesting aspects of this big report is this introductory note about terminology:
Throughout this report we use the term Death By Incarceration (DBI) when referring to life-withoutparole (LWOP) sentences. We do this for several reasons. First, it is the preferential term selected by incarcerated people that we work with who are serving these sentences, and we are a movement-lawyering organization that is accountable to the movements we work with. Second, it focuses on the ultimate fact of the sentence, which is that the only way it ends, barring extraordinary relief from a court or the Board of Pardons, is with death. Third, DBI invokes the social death experienced by the incarcerated, as they are subject to degraded legal status, diminished rights, excluded from social and political life, tracked with an “inmate number” like a piece of inventory, and warehoused for decades in this subjugated status. Finally, although DBI in this report is used to refer to LWOP sentences, the DBI label indicates that our concern is not merely with LWOP sentences, but inclusive of other term-of-years sentences that condemn a person to die in prison.
September 19, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Prisons and prisoners, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)
Sunday, September 16, 2018
Making the case for a bill to end juve LWOP in the federal system
Marc Levin and Jody Kent Lavy have this new commentary in The Hill under the headline "Sentencing reform is critical for youth in the justice system." Here are excerpts:
As states across the country move to right-size their prison systems, managing to reduce incarceration, costs and crime, it is important to consider reform at the federal level as well. And when it comes to reforming our sentencing laws, there seems no better place to start than with the most vulnerable among us: our children. The United States is the only country known to impose life without the possibility of parole on people under the age of 18.
Congressman Bruce Westerman (R-Ark.) took the lead on reform by introducing HR 6011, which would end life-without-parole and de facto life sentences for children in the federal criminal justice system. Westermanhas been joined by a bipartisan team of co-sponsors — Karen Bass (D-Calif.), Tony Cardenas (D-Calif.) and Lynn Jenkins (R-Kansas) — but other members of Congress must also show their support in this policy rooted in redemption, rehabilitation, and second chances....
Imposing excessive sentences on children ignores what adolescent development research has documented. And in just the last five years, conservative states like North Dakota, Utah, and Westerman’s native Arkansas have led the way in banning life-without-parole for children. The Arkansas legislation, now titled Act 539, affects more than 100 people in the state and received broad bipartisan support in the legislature. Nineteen other states and the District of Columbia prohibit youth from being sentenced to a life in prison with absolutely no hope of re-entering as a productive member of society and no goal to work toward.
Should it pass, HR 6011 would ensure that children sentenced in the federal system have the opportunity to petition a judge to review their sentence after they have served 20 years in prison. They would then be afforded counsel at each of their review hearings — a maximum of three — where the judge would consider, among other factors, their demonstrated maturity, rehabilitation, and fitness to re-enter society. In other words, this bill does not guarantee release for anyone, but would ensure that children prosecuted and convicted of serious crimes in the federal system are afforded an opportunity to demonstrate whether they are deserving of a second chance. HR 6011 holds children accountable while providing a reason to pursue self-betterment. It gives hope to those who would otherwise be staring down a hopeless life sentence without the possibility of a second chance....
We hope other members of Congress will join Congressman Westerman’s bipartisan efforts to create a more fair and just system for our children who are convicted of serious crimes in the federal system. Mercy is justice, too, and no one is more deserving of our mercy and the opportunity for a second chance than our children.
September 16, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Scope of Imprisonment, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Wednesday, August 29, 2018
Maryland top court issues lengthy split opinions on application of Eighth Amendment limits on juve life sentences
The Maryland Court of Appeals handed down today a very lengthy opinion addressing the application of Eighth Amendment limits on lengthy juvenile sentences. The opinion in Carter v. Maryland, Nos. 54 (Md. Aug. 29, 2018) (available here), gets started this way:
It has been said that “mercy without justice is the mother of dissolution; justice without mercy is cruelty.” A sentence of life in prison without parole may be just for certain adult offenders, but the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishments precludes that sentence for a juvenile offender unless the defendant is an incorrigible murderer. Although there need not be a guarantee of release on parole, a sentence imposed on a juvenile offender must provide “some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” In this opinion, we consider three cases involving crimes that were committed when each Petitioner was a juvenile.
None of the sentences imposed in these cases was explicitly “life without parole.” In two cases, the Petitioners were sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. In the third case, the Petitioner was sentenced to 100 years incarceration and will not be eligible for parole until he has served approximately 50 years in custody. Each Petitioner asserts that he is effectively serving a sentence of life without parole, because the laws governing parole in Maryland do not provide him with a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” They have each filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence.
With respect to the two Petitioners serving life sentences, we hold that their sentences are legal as the laws governing parole of inmates serving life sentences in Maryland, including the parole statute, regulations, and a recent executive order adopted by the Governor, on their face allow a juvenile offender serving a life sentence a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.” We express no opinion as to whether those laws have been, or will be, carried out legally, as that issue is not before us and may be litigated in the future. With respect to the Petitioner who is serving a 100-year sentence, we hold that the sentence is effectively a sentence of life without parole violative of the Eighth Amendment and that the Petitioner is entitled to be re-sentenced to a legal sentence.
August 29, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, August 13, 2018
Spotlighting challenges surrounding an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence defining adulthood at 18
Beth Schwartzapfel has this effective new Marshall Project piece on the Supreme Court's recent juvenile sentencing jurisprudence under the headline "The Right Age to Die?: For some, science is outpacing the High Court on juveniles and the death penalty." Here are excerpts:
When 15-year-old Luis Cruz joined the Latin Kings in 1991, he was a child by almost any measure: he couldn’t legally drive, drop out of school, or buy a beer. But was he still a child a few years later when — just months after he turned 18 — he murdered two people on the orders of gang leaders?
Earlier this year, a federal judge in Connecticut said yes. The judge decided that a 2012 Supreme Court ruling that forbade mandatory sentences of life without parole for juveniles should apply to 18-year-olds like Cruz, and granted his request to be resentenced. It’s one of a small but growing number of cases in which courts are grappling with what to do with young adults who commit the most serious crimes....
When it comes to the most extreme punishments, the Supreme Court has ruled so far that 18 is a “bright line.” If you’re under 18 at the time of your crime, you can’t be executed. You also can’t be sentenced to life without parole without a hearing to consider your maturity level. But the high court has never extended those protections past age 18.
“The qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in Roper v. Simmons, the first of four modern cases in which the court has laid out its thinking on these issues. “However, a line must be drawn.” The high court has not revisited that line since Roper was decided in 2005. But state and lower federal courts have begun to consider whether people between the ages of 18 and 21 — the period psychologists now call “late adolescence” — should have the same kind of special consideration that younger teenagers get before they face sentencing for murder.
The Roper case was decided at a time when researchers had recently begun imaging adolescents’ brains. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, or fMRI — like the technology doctors use to look inside the brain for tumors or strokes — researchers were able to observe how young people’s brains responded to various situations.... But it wasn’t until recently that scientists began to research what happens to the brain in late adolescence and young adulthood, says Laurence Steinberg, a leading researcher into adolescent development who helped write the American Psychological Association’s briefs before the Supreme Court and who has testified in many of the more recent lower court cases. And when they did, they found that those same youthful qualities seem to persist until the early- to mid-20s.
In one recent study, Steinberg and his colleagues gave a series of tests to more than 5,000 children and young adults across 11 countries. They found that the impulse to chase thrills and look for immediate gratification peaks around age 19 and declines into the 20s. Steinberg describes this system of the brain like the gas pedal in a car. The “brake” system — the ability to plan ahead and consider consequences — takes longer to catch up: it isn’t generally fully mature until the 20s. Steinberg says if he had to draw a new bright line, he would draw it at 21.
“Knowing what we know now, one could’ve made the very same arguments about 18-, 19- and 20-year-olds that were made about 16- and 17-year-olds in Roper,” he testified in a recent Kentucky case.In that Kentucky case, a judge found the state’s death penalty statute unconstitutional because it allows people who were under 21 at the time of their crime to be executed. “If the science in 2005 mandated the ruling in Roper, the science in 2017 mandates this ruling,” he wrote. A Pennsylvania court last year considered an appeal from a woman who was sentenced to mandatory life without parole after serving as a lookout, at 18, during a botched robbery that ended in murder. The court rejected the appeal on technical grounds, but called 18 an “arbitrary legal age of maturity” and said an “honest reading” of the Supreme Court’s ruling would require courts to reconsider it....
Justice Kennedy, who was often the Supreme Court’s swing vote in close cases and who voted in favor of all four of the court’s major rulings extending these protections to juveniles under 18, retired this summer. The court is widely expected to tack right when President Donald Trump’s pick assumes Kennedy’s seat. In light of that, opponents of juvenile life without parole are aiming to keep these cases in lower courts for now, said Marsha Levick of the Juvenile Law Center, which has submitted briefs in support of many of these defendants. They’re not likely to get a friendly hearing on the question of whether 18-, 19- and 20-year-olds are less culpable than adults from the newly composed high court, Levick said.
In the meantime, Steinberg, the psychologist, says he has been hired by the attorneys for Nikolas Cruz, who faces the death penalty as the accused gunman in February’s Parkland school shooting in Florida. Cruz was 19 when he allegedly killed 17 people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School. Steinberg “struggled about this a lot,” he said. But in the end “it’s really hard logically to say, ‘People your age are too immature to be sentenced to death, unless you do something really, really bad.’”
August 13, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics | Permalink | Comments (1)
Friday, August 10, 2018
The War on Kids Post #5
In my last substantive guest post on Sentencing, Law & Policy, I’d like to address some of the juvenile justice reform measures that I think are achievable and worth pursuing in the post-Miller era. In the book, I devote a whole chapter to the reform frontier, and I refer to these measures as part of a war for kids.
Put kids back in juvenile court
For most of the 20th century, it was difficult and rare to move a child into adult court; juvenile court was the default for juveniles. We only moved away from that model because of fear-based and now-debunked theories about juvenile super-predators. As I mentioned in my first guest post, transfer laws have exposed juveniles to sentences that were drafted with adults in mind, including mandatory minimums and decades-long terms. Given what we know about adolescent brain development, and given that the Supreme Court has held that children are different for constitutional purposes, we should return to the default of keeping kids in juvenile court. Even in such a regime, a judge could still determine that extraordinary circumstances warranted transfer to adult court. But those rare, outlier cases should not dictate the norm for juveniles. Today, in the wake of the Miller trilogy, there is newfound traction to the claim that transfer laws (especially direct file laws) are unconstitutional and nonsensical.
Provide age-appropriate sentencing for juveniles
While children continue to be charged in adult criminal court, advocates should insist upon age-appropriate sentencing for them. At a minimum, this means seeking the abolition of juvenile life without parole, and that goal is on the horizon and achievable. Regardless of whether the Supreme Court declares a categorical ban, states are moving in this direction. Beyond this measure, advocates should insist that youth always be a relevant, mitigating variable at sentencing. In particular, consistent with the science of the Miller trilogy, it means that mandatory minimums should never apply to juveniles. I have made this argument before here, and I do in THE WAR ON KIDS, as well. Two states, Washington and Iowa, have already come to this conclusion, as I mentioned earlier this week.
Argue against incarceration for kids as a general matter
In my mind, a key component of a war for kids is the concept that incarceration is fundamentally damaging for juveniles and that we should avoid it whenever possible. This is perhaps one of the most controversial aspects of my agenda for juvenile justice reform, and I know it is the one that draws the most attention. I regularly hear from people who point to the unspeakable cruelty and violence of adolescents in the news, and I certainly do not claim that no juvenile requires secure detention. What I do claim is that we use correctional institutions in too many instances when we need not and that we do damage to juveniles in the process. As the Annie E. Casey Foundation’s recent report on probation makes clear, there are diversion and probation alternatives that are designed to develop youth and keep them out of the cycle of the correctional system.
Create periodic, youth-informed panels for juvenile sentencing review
Neuroscience tells us that the juvenile brain is developing well into the mid-20’s. This means that, even when youth commit serious crimes, if given the right opportunities at rehabilitation, they can mature and outgrow that criminal behavior. Two things follow from this reality. First, even youth who are sentenced to lengthy term-of-year sentences should be eligible for educational and other rehabilitative programs. How else will they embark on a path to demonstrating maturity and rehabilitation, an opportunity the Supreme Court requires? Second, juvenile sentences – especially lengthy ones – should be reviewed periodically for their ongoing legitimacy. Given that the Supreme Court has elevated youth to be a mitigating quality of constitutional significance, the punishment rationale for juvenile sentences cannot be what it is for similarly situated adults. Ongoing, periodic review for youth offenders can serve as a check against the Court’s concern that states not make a judgment at the outset that juvenile “offenders never will be fit to reenter society.”
It’s worth noting that, in order to secure any of these juvenile-specific measures, we must continue to push for criminal justice reform more broadly. This is harder than ever in some ways. We must vigilantly counter the growing rhetoric that says we are a crime-ridden nation and that urges prosecutors to seek the maximum sentence in all cases. And we must insist upon equality in our criminal justice system – a goal our system has espoused but never achieved.
Thank you, Doug and the Sentencing, Law & Policy community for letting me share my work! CHD
August 10, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Guest blogging by Professor Cara Drinan | Permalink | Comments (2)
Wednesday, August 08, 2018
The War on Kids Post #4
In my last post, I discussed the Miller trilogy and states’ attempts to implement those Supreme Court decisions. Today I want to focus on one especially challenging implementation issue: parole.
When the Supreme Court held Miller retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana, it suggested that states could comply with the Miller mandate by employing parole procedures, evidently in an attempt to head off potential state concerns of finality and efficiency. As the Court explained: “Giving Miller retroactive effect. . . does not require States to relitigate sentences, let alone convictions, in every case where a juvenile offender received mandatory life without parole. A State may remedy a Miller violation by permitting juvenile homicide offenders to be considered for parole, rather than by resentencing them.” However, parole post-Miller has proven to be problematic in several respects.
First, typically parole applicants enjoy very few procedural rights because the Supreme Court has treated parole as a privilege – a proceeding in which the prisoner has no liberty interest. Even when the Supreme Court has construed a state’s parole statute to create some liberty interest for prisoners, it has not gone so far as to hold that prisoners are entitled to the aid of counsel. As a result, in 35 states a prisoner has no right to counsel at a parole hearing. In contrast, when a state employs parole as a method for remedying a now-unconstitutional sentence, the prisoner does have a liberty interest at stake, as some lower courts have recognized. At the same time, because juvenile lifers are entitled to a “meaningful opportunity to obtain release,” parole boards across the country are now tasked with examining factors deemed relevant in Miller, including childhood environment and efforts at rehabilitation. Thus, youth offenders seeking parole may be entitled to procedural safeguards, including the right to counsel, never before seen in the parole context.
Second, while parole largely disappeared from the criminal justice landscape in the late 20th century, it has been making a comeback as part of the smart on crime movement – only modern parole is new and different. While discretion and instinct are still relevant, modern parole is largely dependent upon actuarial assessments of prisoners’ risks if released. These risk assessment tools rely upon statistical relationships between both static (e.g. age at date of conviction) and dynamic (e.g. level of education obtained during incarceration) factors. Almost all states employ these risk assessment tools in the parole process.
Here’s the concern post-Miller: the risk assessment tools may rely on factors that defy the Supreme Court’s holding that children are categorically less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation. For example, in many jurisdictions, the tools consider the inmate’s age at first commitment; the younger the age at first commitment, the higher the risk factor and the less likely the inmate is to be released. Similarly, many tools consider factors such as employment history and marital status before incarceration; being single and unemployed increases one’s risk assessment score. Juvenile offenders as a group, precisely because of their youth at the time of conviction, were unlikely to have been married or to have had an employment history. In other words, the risk assessment tools treat youth as an aggravating variable, while the entire logic of the Miller trilogy hangs on youth as a mitigating variable.
Finally, there are several other thorny questions implicated in jurisdictions that employ parole as a Miller remedy. Should states be expected to release a certain percentage of youth offenders seeking parole in order to satisfy the “meaningful opportunity” standard? When a parole board denies release, must it issue a decision and rationale in writing beyond the generic statement that an applicant is not a suitable candidate? What is an appropriate wait period for a board to impose before reconsidering a case? Henry Montgomery himself was denied parole earlier this year and given a two-year setoff period; he’s already 71 and surely at some age a two-year setoff violates the meaningful opportunity standard.
By my count, 11 states today are employing some kind of new, youth-informed parole procedure in order to address prisoners with claims under Miller. Other jurisdictions are employing their previously existing parole mechanisms to do so. Litigation challenging the adequacy of these procedures is already underway, and time will tell how helpful it was for the Court to suggest that states rely upon parole as a Miller remedy.
August 8, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Guest blogging by Professor Cara Drinan, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (12)
Monday, August 06, 2018
The War on Kids Post #3
As Doug’s readers know, in recent years the Supreme Court has limited the extent to which states can expose kids to the most serious sanctions on the books. In a series of cases known as the Miller trilogy (Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama) the Court has held that states cannot execute people for juvenile crimes (Roper); that the Eighth Amendment bars life without parole for juvenile, non-homicide offenders (Graham); and that it similarly precludes mandatory life without parole even for juveniles who commit homicide (Miller). With these decisions, the Court has underscored the idea that “kids are different” for constitutional purposes and state sentencing practices must reflect that fact.
While I address these decisions in some detail in The War on Kids, I know that most of Doug’s readers are familiar with the basics of these decisions and the social science on which they relied. So I want to focus this post on the implementation of the Miller trilogy.
Implementing the Miller trilogy has been messy. First, there was the question of who benefitted from these cases. Roper and Graham were clearly retroactive decisions – they took off the table a form of punishment as it applied to a category of individuals – and each case affected a relatively small pool of prisoners. At the time of Roper, there were 72 death row inmates who had been convicted as juveniles, and according to the Supreme Court, there were 129 juvenile non-homicide offenders serving LWOP at the time of Graham.
Miller, on the other hand, called into question the validity of approximately 2,500 cases nationwide. After some initial confusion among lower courts, the Supreme Court clarified in Montgomery v. Louisiana that the Miller decision applied retroactively. As a result, those 2,500 prisoners whose cases were squarely within the purview of Miller became eligible for some modification of their sentence. (I’ll return in my next post to the Montgomery Court’s suggested and yet problematic method for compliance, parole). In addition, youth offenders across the nation who had been sentenced to de facto life sentences or to sentences of life with parole began to seek judicial relief, arguing that the reasoning of Miller applied to their cases too. In sum, there are now thousands of individuals across the country with legitimate claims to relief under the Miller trilogy.
Second, states have grappled with how to implement a Miller remedy: what should it be? and who should provide it? In recent years, many state legislatures have banned JLWOP. In 2011, the year before Miller, only five states banned JLWOP; today 20 states and D.C. ban the sentence. At the same time, states like West Virginia and Nevada have enacted legislation that not only bans JLWOP, but also permits ongoing, periodic review for youth serving lengthy terms and requires sentencing judges to consider the mitigating aspects of youth. Courts have also focused on the rehabilitative ideals of the Miller trilogy and have struck down lengthy term-of-year sentences as the de facto equivalent of JLWOP. The Massachusetts high court has banned JLWOP and held that youth offenders seeking parole have the right to counsel and expert assistance. The Iowa Supreme Court found that the Miller rationale precludes any mandatory sentence for youth. In sum, many courts and legislative bodies are grappling with when youth offenders should receive a second-look, what term of year sentence is appropriate in lieu of LWOP, and what procedural safeguards apply post-Miller to inmates seeking relief.
As I discuss in the book, this implementation process has been slow and the results have been mixed. Not all states have embraced the science and reasoning behind the Miller trilogy. For example, Michigan incarcerates 363 of the roughly 2,500 inmates nationwide serving JLWOP. Under Miller, those 363 individuals should receive a new sentence that takes into account their youth and other relevant mitigating factors. Moreover, the Miller Court expressly said that, given what we know about adolescent brain development, “appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.” Yet prosecutors in Michigan are seeking to resentence more than half of these individuals to LWOP over great protest from the defense community. Some prosecutors in counties of Pennsylvania and Louisiana have taken equally harsh positions on resentencing JLWOP inmates. At the same time, courts have been split on the question whether Graham and Miller apply to aggregate juvenile sentences that result in a death-in-custody term.
And prisoners feel the geographic disparity post-Miller. Consider Florida, where Terrence Graham originally received JLWOP for the attempted armed robbery of a barbeque restaurant. After the Supreme Court found his JLWOP sentence unconstitutional in 2010, he received a resentencing hearing and a 25-year sentence for his non-homicide crime. In contrast, juvenile homicide offenders in Massachusetts are now parole eligible after serving 15 years and they enjoy a number of procedural rights in the parole process. Post-Miller it is clear that justice can be slow and uneven as a function of federalism.
In my next post, I’ll focus specifically on state attempts to use parole in order to comply with Miller.
August 6, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Guest blogging by Professor Cara Drinan, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (6)
Friday, August 03, 2018
VA Asks Supreme Court for Delay in Resentencing Malvo
As reported in this Washington Post piece, Virginia is asking the Supreme Court to delay the resentencing of convicted Beltway sniper, Lee Boyd Malvo. Here is more:
Virginia on Thursday asked the Supreme Court to put on hold a lower court’s decision that requires new sentences for Beltway sniper Lee Boyd Malvo, who was confined to life imprisonment for his deadly teenage rampage.
The commonwealth said it wants the high court to overturn a decision by a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit in Richmond. But in the meantime, it asked the court to simply delay any resentencing process.
“This case involves one of the most notorious serial murderers in recent history,” Virginia Solicitor General Toby J. Heytens wrote in a petition to Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., who hears emergency applications resulting from 4th Circuit decisions.
“The issue presented by this stay application is whether Virginia will be required to commence (and potentially conclude) the process of resentencing Malvo — risking additional trauma to his numerous victims and their families and exposing the Commonwealth to significant cost — before” the Supreme Court can decide whether the 4th Circuit got it right.
August 3, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Guest blogging by Professor Cara Drinan, Jackson and Miller Eighth Amendment cases, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)
Monday, July 30, 2018
A deep dive into various big and little juvenile life without parole stories
The Dublin Review has published this very lengthy discussion of juvenile life without parole sentences under the simple headline "A different season." The lengthy piece is authored by Andrew Purcell, and it cannot be readily summarized. Here is one snippet:
Many of Pennsylvania’s district attorneys have responded to the Supreme Court’s Montgomery decision by striking plea deals with the longest-serving prisoners. Others, in conservative counties, have not. By late September 2017, 173 of the state’s 517 juvenile lifers had been re-sentenced, and 77 paroled for time served. Most of the released prisoners are from Philadelphia, creating a small community of men with the shared experience of being locked up their entire adult lives, adapting to a world that has moved on without them. Courtney ‘Juan’ Boyd, recently released after serving thirty-six years, was calling John to ask about a re-sentencing hearing the previous night for a prisoner called Andre Martin. At fifteen, Martin shot a police officer in the head from a window at the Wilson Park projects. He had forty-one years in already, and the prosecution was seeking sixty to life, supported at the hearing by the dead cop’s family and a roomful of police officers. Judge Barbara McDermott gave him forty-four to life. In three years, the opposing sides will meet again at an equally charged parole hearing, to argue about whether or not Martin should be released.
Each of the fifty states has responded differently to the Montgomery v Louisiana ruling, and there are also variations within states, as district attorneys interpret the concept of ‘permanent incorrigibility’. In Michigan, for instance, prosecutors initially sought new life-without-parole sentences for 236 of the 363 men and women serving mandatory life terms for crimes committed as minors, a clear deviation from the Supreme Court’s intent to reserve the punishment for ‘the rarest of juvenile offenders’. The Oakland County DA has asked for life without parole in forty-four of forty-nine cases; ‘These are young Hannibal Lecters,’ county sheriff Michael Bouchard told the press. In Missouri, teenage lifers are now eligible for parole once they have spent twenty-five years in prison, but of twenty-three who have applied, twenty have been denied. In Maryland, all 271 juvenile lifers are parole-eligible, but no such prisoner has been released in two decades.
All over the country, lawsuits are establishing whether and how Montgomery should affect discretionary sentences. ‘We think the Montgomery standard is impossible [for prosecutors] to beat, in that everyone is capable of rehabilitation given the proper support,’ said Brooke McCarthy of the Juvenile Law Centre. ‘To say that you can never fix someone in the future, no matter what, is such an incredibly difficult standard to reach. Some district attorneys have gotten clever … so rather than asking for life without parole they’re asking for fifty-, sixty-, seventy-five-year minimums.’
July 30, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (2)
Tuesday, July 24, 2018
A friendly brief on the intersection of Eighth Amendment juvenile sentencing jurisprudence and the federal sentencing guidelines
I was pleased to have as one project this summer helping to draft an amicus brief in support of a Ninth Circuit en banc petition in US v. Riley Briones. In a split decision handed down in May, a panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court adoption of the the federal sentencing guidelines as the key factor in the course imposing a life without parole federal sentence on a juvenile offender. The panel opinion is available at this link, with Judge Johnnie Rawlinson authoring the majority opinion (joined by district judge David Ezra) and Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain authoring the dissent.
The amicus brief which can be downloaded below argues, in short form, that “It is unreasonable — and unconstitutional — for a court to routinely apply the Sentencing Guidelines when a defendant is subject to a Guideline sentencing range of life without parole for a crime committed as a juvenile.” In longer form, here is the start of the brief's "Summary of Argument":
The Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has long stressed that youth must matter in sentencing. Nearly four decades ago, in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), the Supreme Court, explaining why an offender’s age and maturity is critical to any assessment of just punishment, stressed that “youth is more than a chronological fact” and that “minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment expected of adults.” Id. at 115–16. More recently, in a line of cases beginning with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids execution of juvenile offenders), and extending now through Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing a juvenile offender to life without parole unless his crime reflects irreparable corruption), the Court has developed substantive and procedural rules to operationalize the Eighth Amendment mandate that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” Id. at 733 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012)); accord Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010). This constitutional principle flows from the reality that children, compared to adults, are less mature, more susceptible to negative influences, and more capable of reform — and so any penological justifications for the harshest adult punishments “collapse in light of ‘the distinctive attributes of youth.’” Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733–34 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 472). Thus, both sound sentencing policy and settled constitutional doctrine forbid a sentencing court from treating a juvenile as though he were an adult.
Yet that is precisely what the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines encourage sentencing courts to do. Problematically, the Guidelines have no provisions that readily permit consideration of “the distinctive attributes of youth.” The Guidelines — designed with adult offenders in mind — give no attention to any youth-related consideration in standard offense-level calculations, and they discourage consideration of age “in determining whether a departure is warranted” except in “unusual” cases. U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1. Given that the Guidelines impart to sentencing courts a strong “anchoring” effect — as the Supreme Court has recognized, see Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. 530, 541–42 (2013) — and that in a majority of cases judges do not deviate from the Guidelines range absent a government motion to do so, routine application of the Guidelines to juvenile offenders is fundamentally inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
The highly deferential standard of review that appellate courts apply to within-Guidelines sentences only exacerbates the tensions between standard Guideline-sentencing procedures and constitutional requirements. Absent searching substantive review of Guidelines sentences, an appellate court risks endorsing a sentencing system that unconstitutionally discourages consideration of an offender’s youth and its attendant characteristics. The Guidelines, if applied in their standard manner to a juvenile offender, thus result in a federal sentencing regime that is fundamentally inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment requirements articulated in Roper, Graham, Miller, and Montgomery.
A terrific pair of lawyers at Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox helped make this brief become a reality (and get filed), and I am also thankful to a group of academics who signed on to this brief.
July 24, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (1)
Monday, July 16, 2018
Spotlighting disparities in resentencing of juve LWOP cases in Pennsylvania ... and and broader post-Miller challenges
The Philadelphia Inquirer has this effective new article headlined “Why are juvenile lifers from Philly getting radically different sentences from those in the rest of Pennsylvania?”. Here are excerpts:
While Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court has attempted to create clear guidelines for that work, now that more than 300 juvenile lifers have been resentenced across 31 counties, the disparities are striking.
“It’s still very county-dependent, fact-dependent, and there are still a lot of politics involved,” said Brooke McCarthy, who has been tracking the results for the Philadelphia-based nonprofit Juvenile Law Center. “If you look at the outcomes in Allegheny County, they are night and day from what we’re seeing in Philly. That’s true in various counties: In Bucks County, one judge has been handling the sentencing, and she’s been particularly harsh. Different folks are handling the same facts differently.”
In Philadelphia, the average sentence for a juvenile lifer has been 31 years to life. In Bucks County, no one has received less than 40 years....
County by county, judges have disagreed about whether sentences on multiple homicides ought to run concurrently or be stacked consecutively.
A Lancaster County judge last year imposed consecutive 40-years-to-life sentences for Michael Lee Bourgeois, for killing his adoptive parents in 2001 with three accomplices. And, in Allegheny County, a judge imposed three consecutive 25-to-life sentences on Donald Zoller, who killed three people when he was just 14; he won’t go before the parole board unless he lives to be 89.
But in Philadelphia, it’s been a different story. Jose Hernandez, convicted of killing four family members as a teen, received 45 years to life after the district attorney tried to offer him even less time. And another juvenile lifer, Jorge Cintron Jr., was resentenced to 30 years to life for three murders; he could be released by age 47.
Judges have also differed when it comes to tacking on additional time for associated charges, such as robbery, conspiracy, or possession of a firearm....
According to a Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision last year, a juvenile must be found to be “permanently incorrigible” before a life sentence can be imposed.
Now, state appellate courts will have to weigh in on a slew of follow-up questions being lobbed from all across the commonwealth. What comprises a de facto life sentence: Is 50 years too long? Is it constitutional to stack consecutive sentences such that a juvenile who is not incorrigible has no hope of release? What is a juvenile anyway — do 18-year-olds count? And, what factors must judges consider in the resentencings, which are supposed to take into account the reduced culpability of an immature, impulsive youth, as well as his or her capacity for change?...
In Michigan, home to 360 teen lifers, the state has sought to reimpose life without parole in more than half of its cases. In Virginia, Renwick said, “the commonwealth has fought at every step to prevent” resentencings. And in Illinois, which is working through the resentencings of about 100 juvenile lifers, Shobha Lakshmi Mahadev, a professor at the Children and Family Justice Center at Northwestern University School of Law, said the vast majority are being resentenced to 50 or 60 years in prison, many with no opportunity for early release.
Other states, such as Louisiana, have addressed the issue legislatively, by creating across-the-board parole eligibility — though in some jurisdictions that still means few, if any, lifers are actually being released.
“What these decisions have done is opened up this conversation and this question: How do you sentence a child or an adolescent? What our systems did before was just to treat kids as adults — and that is unconstitutional and, given what we know now, inappropriate,” Mahadev said.
July 16, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, June 30, 2018
"Originalism and the Common Law Infancy Defense"
The title of this post is the title of this new article by Craig Lerner now available via SSRN. Though I consider any article about the Eighth Amendment to be timely, this one seems even more so with the recent retirement announcement of Justice Anthony Kennedy, who was often a "swing" SCOTUS voter in Eighth Amendment cases. Here is this article's abstract:
Justice Thomas and the late Justice Scalia consistently argued that the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment was to foreclose only those modes or acts of punishment that were considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. With respect to juvenile criminal responsibility, this would mean that the Constitution contemplated an infancy defense no broader than what existed in 1791. Yet the common law infancy defense, as sketched by originalist judges, seems barbaric. It treated all fourteen-year-olds as adults, and it permitted the imposition of punishment — even capital punishment — on offenders as young as seven.
This Article argues that the common law infancy defense was more nuanced than modern observers often recognize. With respect to misdemeanors, the defense was more broadly applicable than is typical today. Even with respect to felonies, offenders under the age of fourteen could be found liable only after an individualized inquiry as to their capacity to distinguish right from wrong. The eighteenth-century culture and common law had higher expectations of juvenile abilities than prevail today; and not surprisingly, young people proved more mature than modern adolescents, who are told repeatedly that they are frail and vulnerable.
This Article speculates on how the original meaning of the Eighth Amendment, assuming it incorporates the common law approach to juvenile responsibility, might be applied to modern conditions, given the diminished maturity of young people. However, the Article questions whether young people today are as immature as advertised; indeed, the study of the common law infancy defense could prompt a reconsideration of contemporary attitudes about the capacities of young people.
June 30, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Purposes of Punishment and Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (3)
Friday, June 22, 2018
Fourth Circuit affirms ruling that DC sniper Lee Malvo entitled to resentencing due to Miller and Montgomery
Last year, as reported in this prior post, a US District Judge concluded that infamous sniper Lee Boyd Malvo was entitled to re-sentencing as a consequence of Supreme Court rulings precluding mandatory life sentences for juvenile murderers. Yesterday, the Fourth Circuit affirmed that decision in a unanimous panel ruling in Malvo v. Mathena, No. 17-6746 (4th Cir. June 21, 2018) (available here). This ruling gets started this way:
In Virginia in 2004, a defendant convicted of capital murder, who was at least 16 years old at the time of his crime, would be punished by either death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, unless the judge suspended his sentence. After a Virginia jury convicted Lee Boyd Malvo of two counts of capital murder based on homicides that he committed in 2002 when he was 17 years old, it declined to recommend the death penalty, and he was instead sentenced in 2004 to two terms of life imprisonment without parole, in accordance with Virginia law. Thereafter, Malvo, again seeking to avoid the death penalty, pleaded guilty in another Virginia jurisdiction to one count of capital murder and one count of attempted capital murder — both of which he also committed when 17 years old — and received two additional terms of life imprisonment without parole.
After Malvo was sentenced in those cases, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions relating to the sentencing of defendants who committed serious crimes when under the age of 18. It held that such defendants cannot be sentenced to death; that they cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole unless they committed a homicide offense that reflected their permanent incorrigibility; and that these rules relating to juvenile sentencing are to be applied retroactively, meaning that sentences that were legal when imposed must be vacated if they were imposed in violation of the Court’s new rules. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016).
In these habeas cases filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, we conclude that even though Malvo’s life-without-parole sentences were fully legal when imposed, they must now be vacated because the retroactive constitutional rules for sentencing juveniles adopted subsequent to Malvo’s sentencings were not satisfied during his sentencings. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order vacating Malvo’s four terms of life imprisonment without parole and remanding for resentencing to determine (1) whether Malvo qualifies as one of the rare juvenile offenders who may, consistent with the Eighth Amendment, be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole because his “crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility” or (2) whether those crimes instead “reflect the transient immaturity of youth,” in which case he must receive a sentence short of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734.
June 22, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (6)
Thursday, June 21, 2018
Split Michigan Supreme Court rejects Sixth Amendment challenge to state's new juve LWOP statute
Ruling 4-2, the Michigan Supreme Court issued a lengthy opinion yesterday upholding the procedures of its new juvenile sentencing statute. The majority opinion in Michigan v. Skinner, No. 152448 (Mich. June 20, 2018) (available here), gets started this way:
At issue here is whether MCL 769.25 violates the Sixth Amendment because it allows the decision whether to impose a sentence of life without parole to be made by a judge, rather than by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that MCL 769.25 does not violate the Sixth Amendment because neither the statute nor the Eighth Amendment requires a judge to find any particular fact before imposing life without parole; instead, life without parole is authorized by the jury’s verdict alone. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals in Skinner and affirm the part of Hyatt that held that “[a] judge, not a jury, must determine whether to impose a life-without-parole sentence or a term-of-years sentence under MCL 769.25.” People v Hyatt, 316 Mich App 368, 415; 891 NW2d 549 (2016). However, we reverse the part of Hyatt that adopted a heightened standard of review for life-without-parole sentences imposed under MCL 769.25 and that remanded this case to the trial court for it to “decide whether defendant Hyatt is the truly rare juvenile mentioned in [Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012)] who is incorrigible and incapable of reform.” Hyatt, 316 Mich App at 429. No such explicit finding is required. Finally, we remand both of these cases to the Court of Appeals for it to review defendants’ sentences under the traditional abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
The dissenting opinion gets started this way:
There is much in the majority opinion with which I agree. For example, I agree that if MCL 769.25 can reasonably be construed in a constitutional manner, we should so construe it. And I generally agree with the majority’s discussion of the applicable legal principles. But I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that there are two reasonable ways of interpreting MCL 769.25, one of which is constitutional. Reading the statute as “murder-plus” would violate the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), and its progeny. And I disagree with the majority that reading the statute as “murder-minus” cures all its constitutional deficiencies. In my view, reading the statute as murder-minus renders it unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v Alabama, 567 US 460; 132 S Ct 2455; 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), and Montgomery v Louisiana, 577 US ___; 136 S Ct 718; 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016). Read either way, MCL 769.25 suffers from a constitutional deficiency.
June 21, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Blakely in the States, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (5)
Thursday, June 14, 2018
Sixth Circuit panel struggles to figure out Tennessee law to assess Miller challenge in high-profile case
As reported in this local article, headlined "While considering Cyntoia Brown's case, appeals court scrutinizes conflicting sentencing laws," an interesting federal circuit panel struggled during oral argument today to sort through applicable state sentencing law in an interesting Eighth Amendment habeas case. Here are the details:
A federal appeals court seems poised to consult the Tennessee Supreme Court before they rule on the case of Cyntoia Brown, a Nashville woman serving a life sentence in prison for a murder she committed at 16. Brown's attorneys this year appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Cincinnati, arguing her life sentence was unconstitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2012 that giving juveniles life sentences without parole was cruel and unusual in most cases.
Brown, now 30, has been locked up since 2004, when she was convicted of shooting 43-year-old Nashville real estate agent Johnny Allen. Allen had picked her up at an East Nashville fast food restaurant and drove her to his home. Prosecutors said she committed a cold blooded murder, then robbed Allen before she fled with his car. Advocates for Brown say she was a victim of child sex trafficking who feared for her life, and that her age and fetal alcohol syndrome made it impossible for her to consider the full ramifications of her actions.
Attorneys representing the state have argued the 2012 ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court does not apply in Brown's case because she is not serving a true life sentence. They cite parts of Tennessee law that suggest Brown could be eligible for release after 51 years behind bars. The three-judge panel in Cincinnati suggested at multiple points that if she was serving a 51-year sentence, the U.S. Supreme Court ruling might not apply.
But Brown's attorneys pushed back, citing another section of the law that says "there shall be no release eligibility" for offenders convicted of first degree murder, like she was. Thorny questions on sentencing law in Tennessee dominated the debate on both sides of the oral arguments Thursday morning, which lasted less than an hour....
At multiple points, the judges read directly from contradictory passages in Tennessee code, as they tried to decipher what portions applied to Brown's case. They suggested that they might seek clarification from the Tennessee Supreme Court before moving forward. Judge Joan L. Larsen, who was appointed by President Donald Trump, asked multiple questions about the proper way to do so.
Judge Amul Thapar, another Trump appointee, aggressively questioned the argument from state attorneys that case law had established a way to cherry pick parts of Tennessee sentencing law to apply to Brown while ignoring other parts. Thapar rubbed his face and shook his head while questioning attorneys on dueling sections of the law. "We're trying to guess what Tennessee is doing here," Thapar said, later adding, "The way I read this statute is that she's got life without the possibility of parole."
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals has already sided with the state on this issue, saying that Brown's sentence is not entirely for life. But Brown's attorneys say the Tennessee Court of Appeals issued a conflicting ruling.
Judge Julia Smith Gibbons, who was appointed by former President George W. Bush, said she couldn't believe a Tennessee court hadn't issued a definitive ruling on the appropriate reading of the sentencing law. Gibbons said Brown's case "raises some interesting, tricky issues."
If the panel does ask the Tennessee Supreme Court to clarify sentencing in this case, that court could decide whether or not it would offer an answer. The appeals court would then take the response into consideration while ruling on the broader case. "Can we certify that to the Tennessee Supreme Court and ask them?" Thapar said. "If they're ever going to answer one question that's the one to answer."...
The judges did not address the argument from Brown's attorneys that she should not be held responsible for a premeditated murder at 16 because fetal alcohol syndrome had slowed her mental development.
The pending federal appeal is one of multiple tracks Brown's attorneys are pursuing in their high-profile attempt to get her out of prison. Brown also is asking Gov. Bill Haslam for clemency; the state parole board made conflicting recommendations to the governor after a hearing in May. Brown's previous appeals have been denied. But a surge of interest from news outlets, celebrities and national legal groups has galvanized efforts that are unusual for a case like hers.
Brown was featured in the documentary "Me Facing Life: Cyntoia's Story" by filmmaker Dan Birman. In 2016, a joint reporting project on juvenile sentencing laws by the USA TODAY NETWORK - Tennessee, Dan H. Birman Productions and "Independent Lens" explored Brown's trial and conviction in depth. Then, in 2017, celebrities including Rihanna and Kim Kardashian West called for Brown's release, dramatically increasing the scrutiny of the case. On social media, the hashtag #FreeCyntoiaBrown went viral.
June 14, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (0)
Saturday, May 19, 2018
Noting the distinctive juve sentencing realities to face the Texas school mass murderer
Yet another horrific school shooting, this time by a juvenile offender, provides yet another need to work through modern sentencing realities facing a mass murderers. This local article reviews the sentencing basics under the headline "The accused Santa Fe shooter will never get the death penalty. Here’s why." Here are excerpts:
The high school junior accused of gunning down 10 students and teachers at a Santa Fe school is facing a capital murder charge - but he’ll never face the death penalty, even in Texas. Some day, he’ll even be eligible for parole.
Though Dimitrios Pagourtzis was charged as an adult and jailed without bond, even if he’s found guilty he can’t be sentenced to death because of a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court ruling. And in the Lone Star State, he can’t be sentenced to life without parole as the result of a 2013 law that banned the practice for minors....
The Santa Fe High School student admitted to the mass shooting that killed 10 and wounded 10 others early Friday, according to court documents. He planted fake explosives and selected his targets so as to spare the students he liked, he later told police.
For an adult, that sort of crime could lead to the death chamber. Murders involving multiple victims can be charged as capital offenses, and for adults that leaves two options: death or life without parole.
At one time, those options were both on the table for teens, too. But then in 2005, Christopher Simmons, a Missouri killer condemned to die, won a landmark case in the Supreme Court. After surveying practices in death penalty states, the justices decided that the national consensus was against executing minors. Only a few states — including Texas — were the outliers still carrying out death sentences for those convicted of crimes committed as minors....
Before the court’s decision, Texas had been the biggest executioner of juvenile offenders, Dunham said. Across the nation, there were 22 convicts executed for crimes committed as juveniles - and more than half of them were in Texas. After the court eliminated the practice, in June 2005 Gov. Rick Perry commuted a slew of death sentences to life, removing 28 prisoners from death row, including 12 from Harris County.
Then in 2012, the Supreme Court took it one step further when the justices struck down mandatory life without parole sentences for juveniles. The following year, Texas legislators passed a law making life with parole — instead of life without parole — the only sentencing option for minors charged with capital crimes. For life sentences where parole is an option, Marzullo said, the first chance at release comes after 40 years in prison.
Whether or not he’s ultimately convicted, the accused Santa Fe shooter will be behind bars for the foreseeable future. During his first court appearance Friday night, a judge opted to hold him without bond. "At the moment he's in solitary confinement," Judge Mark Henry said after the teen's first court appearance Friday evening. "He's going to be here a while."
Because Pagourtzis slaughtered 10 people and injured many more, his case has me wondering about the application of consecutive sentences under Texas laws to potentially extend the period in which a juvenile offender would not be eligible for parole under life sentences. As regular readers know, there is a robust debate in lower courts about whether and how the Supreme Court's announced Eighth Amendment jurisprudence limiting life without parole for juvenile offenders ought to be applied in cases in which a juvenile has committed multiple very serious crimes. That debate may well end up impacting how this latest school shooter gets sentenced.
May 19, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (11)
Thursday, May 17, 2018
"Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas"
The title of this post is the title of this notable new paper available via SSRN authored by Leah Litman that is a must read for anyone following post-Miller or post-Johnson litigation (and who isn't?). Here is the abstract:
Although it has long been thought that innocence should matter in federal habeas corpus proceedings, innocence scholarship has focused almost exclusively on claims of factual innocence — the kind of innocence that occurs when new evidence reveals that the defendant did not commit the offense for which he was convicted. The literature has largely overlooked cases where a defendant was convicted or sentenced under a statute that is unconstitutional, or a statute that does not apply to the defendant. The Supreme Court, however, has recently begun to recognize these cases as kinds of innocence and it has grounded its concern for them in innocence-related considerations.
This Article highlights how the doctrine has started to treat these “legal innocence” cases as cases in which defendants are innocent, as well as the reasons why it has done so. As this Article explains, legal innocence is conceptually and inextricably linked with factual innocence; in both kinds of cases, the defendant was convicted or sentenced under a law she did not violate. These cases raise similar concerns and implicate many of the same features of our criminal law system. By recognizing the emerging category of legal innocence as a kind of innocence, this Article maps out how the existing federal habeas system can provide relief to legally innocent defendants.
May 17, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Vagueness in Johnson and thereafter, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)
Tuesday, May 15, 2018
Lots of juvenile sentencing developments as Oklahoma sorts through application of Miller
Last week brought interesting developments in the arena of juvenile sentencing in Oklahoma thanks to all three branches of the state government. As this local article details, the Oklahoma legislature earlier this month passed, with some controversy, a new law to seeking to operationalize existing Eighth Amendment limits on LWOP sentences for juveniles:
Senate Bill 1221 would put sentencing for teen killers in the hands of a judge, not the jury that convicted them.... The bill passed Wednesday in the state Senate would require judges to determine sentencing based on a number of factors including the underage killers’ maturity, psych tests, and take jury’s out of the sentencing equation.
But some lawmakers cried foul. “We are going to circumvent an Americans right to equal protection under the law because the kid is 17 years old not 21,” said Senator AJ Griffin (R) Guthrie.... “It’s disrespectful to the citizens of this state that elected us and put us here in order to do our job. If an adult deserves a jury a kid deserves a jury,” Senator Griffin said.
As this excerpt indirectly reveals, because jury sentencing is the norm in Oklahoma, this new law would have created a distinctive judge-centric sentencing procedure just for juvenile murders in Oklahoma. But before Oklahoma's Governor acted on this bill, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (the state's highest criminal court) handed down a big new juve sentencing ruling in Stevens v. Oklahoma, 2018 OK CR 11 (Ok. Crim. App. May 10, 2018) (available here). Stevens is yet another notable example of another state court working through just how Miller and Montgomery should be applied, and it includes these notable passages (with most cites removed):
In all future trials where the State intends to seek a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for an offender who committed his or her offense under the age of eighteen (18) years of age the State shall give notice of this fact by stating at the bottom of the Information in bold type: "The State is seeking the punishment of life without the possibility of parole for the offense of Murder in the First Degree, as Defendant (state last name here) is irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible." See Parker v. State, 1996 OK CR 19, ¶ 24, 917 P.2d 980, 986 (adopting notice pleading). Both parties shall be afforded full discovery on this issue in accordance with established discovery law. 22 O.S.2011, § 2001 et seq. The assigned trial judge has the authority under our Discovery Code to issue any orders necessary to accomplish this task.
The Sixth Amendment demands that the trial necessary to impose life without parole on a juvenile homicide offender must be a trial by jury, unless a jury is affirmatively waived. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). The defendant's trial shall be bifurcated and the issue of the defendant's guilt shall be separately determined from the enhancement of his or her sentence.... [E]ach party shall be afforded the opportunity to present evidence in support of its position as to punishment in the second stage of the trial. The trial court shall submit a special issue to the jury as to whether the defendant is irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible....
It is the State's burden to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible. Luna, 2016 OK CR 27, ¶ 21 n. 11, 387 P.3d at 963 n. 11; see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (holding facts increasing punishment beyond the maximum authorized by a guilty verdict must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt). The State shall have the opportunity to present any evidence tending to establish this fact subject to the limitations of 12 O.S.2011, § 2403. Generally, this will include, but not be limited to, evidence concerning the defendant's: (1) sophistication and maturity; (2) capability of distinguishing right from wrong; (3) family and home environments; (4) emotional attitude; (5) pattern of living; (6) record and past history, including previous contacts with law enforcement agencies and juvenile or criminal courts, prior periods of probation and commitments to juvenile institutions; and (7) the likelihood of the defendant's rehabilitation during adulthood. See Luna, 2016 OK CR 27, ¶ 20, 387 P.3d at 962; Cf. 10A O.S.2011, § 2-5-205(E).
Similarly, the defendant must be permitted to introduce relevant evidence concerning the defendant's youth and its attendant characteristics. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 ("[A] judge or jury must have the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for a juveniles."). Generally, this will include, but not be limited to, evidence concerning the defendant's: "(1) chronological age and its hallmark features--among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences; (2) the incompetencies associated with youth--for example, his inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own attorneys; and (3) whether the circumstances suggest possibility of rehabilitation." Luna, 2016 OK CR 27, ¶ 20, 387 P.3d at 962 (quotations and citation omitted).
If the sentencer unanimously finds that the defendant is irreparably corrupt and permanently incorrigible it is then authorized to consider imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. If the sentencer does not make this finding it is prohibited from considering a sentence of life without the possibility of parole and may only impose a sentence of life imprisonment.
Notably, Oklahoma's Governor followed up all this activity by vetoing the bill that would allow for juvenile sentencing to be before a judge. Gov Mary Fallin's veto statement here states:
Senate Bill 1221, also known as the Alyssa Wiles Juvenile Life Without Parole Sentencing Act, has provisions that, are in my opinion, in violation of the United States Supreme Court decision in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 SCt. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407. That decision was followed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in its decision rendered May 10, 2018, in Roberts A. Stevens v. The State of Oklahoma. Case No. PC-2017-219.
In case anyone cares, I believe there is at least a plausible argument that Apprendi jurisprudence does not demand that a jury make the essential "findings" that Miller and Montgomery seem to make constitutionally required under the Eighth Amendment for sentencing a juvenile to life without parole. Readers with long memories may recall that I have long argued that Blakely's Sixth Amendment rule makes most sense only when applied to offense facts rather than to offender characteristics. The Supreme Court has vaguely, but not conclusively, rejected such a conceptual distinction in the reach of the Sixth Amendment. But even though I can see possible constitutional uncertainty as to how offender-eligibility factors are must be adjudicated under the Supreme Court's Sixth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, I think it may well be sound practice for these kinds of determinations to be given to juries (perhaps particularly in a state with a strong tradition of jury involvement in sentencing decision-making).
May 15, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Blakely Commentary and News, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (3)
Thursday, May 10, 2018
Oregon Supreme Court upholds 112-year aggregate sentence for juve mass murderer Kip Kinkel
A helpful reader made sure I did not miss the notable Oregon Supreme Court's ruling today in Kinkel v. Persson, 363 Or 1 (Oregon May 10, 2018) (available here). The defendant in this case, Kip Kinkel, is a high-profile juvenile offender because back in 1998, at age 15, he killed his parents and then the next day at his high school shot two classmates and wounded 25 others. The start of the Oregon Supreme Court majority opinion explains the sentencing proceedings and the court's ruling:
Petitioner pled guilty to four counts of murder and 25 counts of attempted murder, as well as pleading no contest to a twenty-sixth count of attempted murder. As part of a plea bargain, petitioner and the state agreed that he would receive concurrent 25-year sentences for the four murders. They also agreed that each side would be free to argue that the mandatory 90-month sentences for each of the attempted murders should run consecutively or concurrently. After a six-day sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered that 50 months of each 90-month sentence for attempted murder would run concurrently but that 40 months of each of those sentences would run consecutively to each other and to the four concurrent 25-year sentences. As a result of that ruling, petitioner’s aggregate sentence totals slightly less than 112 years.
In this post-conviction proceeding, petitioner argues that, because he was a juvenile when he committed his crimes, the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of an aggregate sentence that is the functional equivalent of a life sentence without the possibility of parole. Petitioner’s federal argument entails primarily three issues. The first is whether, as a matter of state law, petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim is procedurally barred. See ORS 138.550(2) (barring post-conviction petitioners from raising grounds for relief that were or reasonably could have been raised on direct appeal); Verduzco v. State of Oregon, 357 Or 553, 355 P3d 902 (2015) (applying a related statute). If it is, the second issue is whether Montgomery v. Louisiana, ___ US ___, 136 S Ct 718, 193 L Ed 2d 599 (2016), requires this court to reach petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim despite the existence of that state procedural bar. Third, if petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim is not procedurally barred, the remaining issue is whether and how Miller v. Alabama, 567 US 460, 132 S Ct 2455, 183 L Ed 2d 407 (2012), applies when a court imposes an aggregate sentence for multiple crimes committed by a juvenile.
As explained below, we hold that, even if ORS 138.550(2) does not pose a procedural bar to petitioner’s Eighth Amendment claim, his claim fails on the merits. More specifically, the issue in Miller was whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited a juvenile from being sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a single homicide. The Court held that such a sentence could be imposed but only if the trial court found that the crime reflected irreparable corruption rather than the transience of youth. The Court did not consider in Miller whether a juvenile who has been convicted of multiple murders and attempted murders, as in this case, may be sentenced to an aggregate consecutive sentence that is the equivalent of life without the possibility of parole. This case thus poses a different issue from the issue in Miller. Beyond that, we conclude that the facts in this case, coupled with the sentencing court’s findings, bring petitioner within the narrow class of juveniles who, as Miller recognized, may be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
May 10, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Offense Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (3)
Wednesday, May 09, 2018
Detailed review of Illinois juve offenders serving just barely "less than life"
The Chicago Sun-Times has published this extensive look by Injustice Watch at how the Illinois has sentenced (and largely failed to resentence) a set of juvenile offenders serving extreme long prison sentences . The full lengthy title of this piece sets forth its essential elements: "Less than life: Across the country, juvenile offenders are being released from prison based on recognition that human brains continue to develop for the first two and a half decades of life. Nevertheless in Illinois, many who commit crimes as teenagers are likely destined to die in custody." Here is an excerpt:
In Illinois, it is rare for juveniles who did not receive automatic life prison terms to win new chances at sentencing, leaving most of those with long sentences to languish in prison for decades, an Injustice Watch review found.
A review of custody data from the Illinois Department of Corrections revealed that, as of last December, at least 167 current inmates were arrested for crimes as juveniles and are set to serve 50 years or more in prison without parole eligibility, leaving them likely to die in custody but not eligible for resentencing under the dictates of Miller. (It is not possible to know the exact number of young offenders serving long sentences at the Illinois Department of Corrections because the agency does not specifically keep track of that information.)
The imposition of long sentences is especially harsh in Illinois, a state which does not afford parole to most prisoners and which requires offenders convicted of murder to serve 100 percent of their punishment, with no chance of early release based on factors like good conduct or rehabilitation. Such sentences almost certainly lead these inmates to either spend the rest of their lives incarcerated or be released with precious little life left.
Research indicates that incarceration has a jarring effect on life expectancy. In studying a group of inmates released from New York state correctional facilities over a 10-year period, Vanderbilt University Professor Evelyn Patterson found that the former prisoners could expect to shave two years off of their average life expectancy for every one year of incarceration. Furthermore, Patterson found, undoing the negative effect on longevity takes time. It took former inmates two-thirds of the time spent in custody back on the outside to recover from the harm of incarceration on life expectancy. The United States Sentencing Commission considers a 39-year prison sentence the equivalent of life.
Because Illinois almost entirely abolished parole in 1978, these juvenile offenders do not get the same chance to show rehabilitation and change that they might get in other states. About a third of states do not currently employ the traditional practice of parole for newly convicted inmates, according to a report published by the University of Minnesota’s Robina Institute of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice, but Illinois is one of three states nationwide that stopped utilizing parole four decades ago, making it nearly non-existent for the current prison population.
The approximately 80 juvenile offenders in Illinois who became eligible to have their sentences reconsidered [after Miller] all were convicted of killing more than one person — Illinois law mandates life for anyone convicted of multiple murders. By contrast, Illinois state appellate judges have mostly declined to find that the cases of other violent youthful offenders ... fall under the protections outlined in Miller.
There is no national legal standard on how many years is too many for a juvenile to serve. Courts across the country have differed on the issue, creating varied standards on what length of a prison term can legally be considered a life sentence. “Getting rid of formal life without parole was the tip of the iceberg,” said Marsha Levick, deputy director and chief counsel for the Pennsylvania-based Juvenile Law Center, which has advocated for lesser sentences for juveniles convicted of crimes.
Across the country, about a dozen states have passed laws requiring that young defendants sentenced to long prison terms get a chance at parole. Legislators in Illinois have proposed a bill that would give periodic parole opportunities to newly convicted young offenders; so far those efforts have stalled.
May 9, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Prisons and prisoners, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Scope of Imprisonment, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (0)
Wednesday, April 25, 2018
New Jersey Supreme Court finds unconstitutional requiring juveniles to be subject to lifetime sex-offender registration
The Supreme Court of New Jersey yesterday handed down a lengthy unanimous opinion in Interest of C.K., No. A-15-16 (N.J. April 24, 2018) (available here) declaring that the state's sex-offender registry law is unconstitutional as applied to some juvenile offenders. Here is how the opinion begins:
Juveniles adjudicated delinquent of certain sex offenses are barred for life from seeking relief from the registration and community notification provisions of Megan’s Law. N.J.S.A. 2C:7-1 to -11, -19; N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g). That categorical lifetime bar cannot be lifted, even when the juvenile becomes an adult and poses no public safety risk, is fully rehabilitated, and is a fully productive member of society. Defendant C.K. was adjudicated delinquent for sex offenses committed more than two decades ago and now challenges the constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(g)’s permanent lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles.
Subsection (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2 subjects all sex offenders, including juveniles, to presumptive lifetime registration and notification requirements. Unlike subsection (g), however, subsection (f) allows a registrant to seek relief from those requirements fifteen years after his juvenile adjudication, provided he has been offense-free and is “not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others.” Subsection (g) imposes an irrebuttable presumption that juveniles, such as defendant, are irredeemable, even when they no longer pose a public safety risk and are fully rehabilitated.
The record in this case reveals what is commonly known about juveniles -- that their emotional, mental, and judgmental capacities are still developing and that their immaturity makes them more susceptible to act impulsively and rashly without consideration of the long-term consequences of their conduct. See State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017). The record also supports the conclusion that juveniles adjudicated delinquent of committing sex offenses, such as C.K., who have been offense-free for many years and assessed not likely to reoffend, pose little risk to the public. Indeed, categorical lifetime notification and registration requirements may impede a juvenile’s rehabilitative efforts and stunt his ability to become a healthy and integrated adult member of society.
We conclude that subsection (g)’s lifetime registration and notification requirements as applied to juveniles violate the substantive due process guarantee of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Permanently barring juveniles who have committed certain sex offenses from petitioning for relief from the Megan’s Law requirements bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. In the absence of subsection (g), N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f) provides the original safeguard incorporated into Megan’s Law: no juvenile adjudicated delinquent will be released from his registration and notification requirements unless a Superior Court judge is persuaded that he has been offense-free and does not likely pose a societal risk after a fifteen-year look-back period.
Defendant may apply for termination from the Megan’s Law requirements fifteen years from the date of his juvenile adjudication, and be relieved of those requirements provided he meets the standards set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:7-2(f).
April 25, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Collateral consequences, Criminal Sentences Alternatives, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Sex Offender Sentencing | Permalink | Comments (2)
Sunday, April 15, 2018
Interesting intricate ruling from Wyoming Supreme Court about limits on extreme aggregate sentences for juve murderers
For whatever reason, the last few months have brought a number of big notable opinions from an array of courts concerning the reach and application of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence limiting severe sentences for juvenile offenders. See examples here and here and here and here from the Third Circuit, the District of Connecticut, and the Iowa Supreme Court and the Georgia Supreme Court.
The latest (and perhaps longest) such opinion was handed down on Friday by the Wyoming Supreme Court in Davis v. Wyoming, 2018 WY 40 (April 13, 2018) (available here). The majority opinion in Davis covers an array of substantive and procedural issues, and it start and ending provide a flavor of its work:
In 1982, when Donald Clyde Davis was seventeen years old, he and a friend picked up a hitchhiker, robbed, and then murdered him. Mr. Davis pled guilty to first degree murder, felony murder, and aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a consecutive twenty-to-fifty-year sentence for aggravated robbery. Following the decisions of Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), Montgomery v. Louisiana, U.S. , 136 S.Ct. 718, 193 L.Ed.2d 599 (2016), Bear Cloud v. State, 2013 WY 18, 294 P.3d 36 (Wyo. 2013) (Bear Cloud II), and the Wyoming Legislature’s amendment to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-301(c), after serving over thirty-three years, Mr. Davis was granted parole from his life sentence, began serving his consecutive twenty-to-fifty-year sentence, and received a new individualized sentencing hearing. After the hearing, the district court declined to modify his original sentence. Mr. Davis appeals and raises a number of issues regarding his sentence. We will reverse and remand with instructions to conduct a new individualized sentencing hearing....
We find that the district court abused its discretion by weighing Mr. Davis’ youth as an aggravating instead of mitigating factor; considering the nature of the crime to only a limited extent and failing to consider the participation and potential peer pressure of Mr. Davis’ codefendant; placing undue significance on dated psychological evaluations; concluding that he was not capable of rehabilitation without the benefit of expert testimony concerning Mr. Davis’s potential for rehabilitation, and by considering Mr. Davis’ disciplinary record in prison without taking into account the fact that for the majority of his incarceration he had no hope of release, and without weighing his accomplishments and personal growth while in the penitentiary. The district court’s failure to consider Mr. Davis’ family and home environment and whether he might have been convicted of a lesser offense but for incompetencies associated with youth, without providing an explanation for omitting analysis of those factors, also constituted an abuse of discretion. Finally, the district court abused its discretion by failing to make a finding of permanent incorrigibility based upon its analysis of all the Miller factors. When the Miller factors are not properly considered and weighed and when there is no finding of permanent incorrigibility, or when a finding of permanent incorrigibility is not supported by the Miller factors, the resulting sentence violates the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we reverse. At the time of the hearing and the district court’s decision, the parties and the district court did not have the advantage of our rulings concerning the procedure, burdens, and potentially relevant evidence for a Miller determination, contained here. Consequently, remand for an additional sentencing hearing and resentencing is appropriate. On remand, the sentencing court should approach the case with the understanding that, more likely than not, life without parole is a disproportionate sentence for Mr. Davis, and it should consider the Miller factors and decide whether he is the truly rare individual mentioned in Miller who is incapable of reform.
The dissent opinion in Davis likewise covers lots of group, but its start spotlights an issue that I suspect will be setting US Supreme Court attention relatively soon:
As I observed in Sam v. State, 2017 WY 98, ¶ 88, 401 P.3d 834, 862 (Wyo. 2017), reh’g denied, and Sen v. State, 2017 WY 30, ¶¶ 36-37, 390 P.3d, 769, 779 (Wyo. 2017) (Sen III), the United States Supreme Court has not prohibited consecutive sentences for juveniles who commit multiple crimes including murder. The U.S. Supreme Court never found such sentences to be “the functional equivalent of life without parole.” I continue to disagree with the concept of “de facto life without parole” arising from consecutive sentences for separate crimes. In my opinion, the U.S. Supreme Court established a process to assure that a juvenile offender’s age, immaturity and potential for improvement are considered in sentencing. Unfortunately, some courts, including this one, have focused on the result of the sentencing, rather than on the process.
I recognize some states have concluded that Miller, Graham and Montgomery point to a conclusion that lengthy consecutive sentences for juveniles, when aggregated, are the same as a single sentence of life without parole. Other states have not done so. I find the better logic supports those states who have not expanded the holdings in Miller, Graham and Montgomery. Within the past year, Missouri, Colorado and Pennsylvania have all determined that Miller and Montgomery do not apply to the aggregation of consecutive term of years sentences for multiple crimes committed by a defendant under the age of 18.
April 15, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered, Who Sentences | Permalink | Comments (9)
Tuesday, April 10, 2018
Federal district judge finds Michigan's elimination of good-time credit in Miller fix unconstitutional
As reported in this local article, a "federal judge has ruled a Michigan law violates the constitution by not allowing juvenile lifers to earn good-time and disciplinary credits while in prison." Here is more:
Following [the Supreme Court's ruling in Miller], the state put into law the ability to sentence child killers to a number of years with a chance of parole. Because that law does not allow those offenders to earn good-time credits, Goldsmith ruled it is unconstitutional and ordered the state calculate good-time and disciplinary credits for those who have already been re-sentenced under that law within 14 days.
“Today’s ruling is a tremendous victory for fairness in our criminal justice system,” Dan Korobkin, ACLU of Michigan Deputy Legal Director and one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys said in a statement. “Hundreds of youth who were serving unconstitutional life sentences will now benefit from good-time credits they earned in prison for good behavior, credits that were taken away from them by mean-spirited retroactive legislation in 2014.”
There are more than 360 people in the system who were children at the time of their crimes, including four from St. Clair County: Jimmy Porter, Raymond Carp, Michael Hills and Tia Skinner. “Restoring these credits to individuals who earned them will likely save the state millions of dollars, and will give deserving individuals a chance to reunite with their families when they no longer pose a threat to society,” Korobkin said.
The full ruling in Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-cv-14568 (April 9, 2018), is available at this link. Here is how it begins:
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that juveniles convicted of first-degree murder cannot be subject to mandatory life sentences without parole. Because of their lesser culpability and greater capacity to change, they must be sentenced under a process that gives them an individualized opportunity to present mitigating circumstances to avert such a harsh sentence. In response, the Michigan legislature enacted legislation that purported to comply with the Court’s ruling, which included the possibility of being resentenced to prison for a term of years. However, the legislature provided that in calculating any such sentence, the youth offenders were not to receive any credit -- known as good time or disciplinary credit -- even though such credits were earned while the youth offenders served their illegally imposed sentences. In that respect, the legislative response ran afoul of our Constitution’s ban on ex post facto laws -- the constitutional guarantee that laws may not retroactively criminalize conduct or enhance the punishment for criminal acts already perpetrated. For this reason, the Court must declare that provision of the statute unconstitutional and order that the youth offenders receive the credit that they have previously earned.
April 10, 2018 in Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (8)
Monday, April 09, 2018
Big Third Circuit panel ruling asserts age of retirement should be central to applying Eighth Amendment limits on long juvenile sentences
The Third Circuit today handed down a huge ruling today in US v. Grant, No. 16-3820 (3d CIr. April 9, 2018) (available here), to address the application of Eighth Amendment limits on juvenile sentences. The panel opinion runs nearly 50 pages (followed by a 10+ page partial dissent), but these paragraph sets up the context and part of the heart of the opinion (with emphasis in original):
This case presents several difficult challenges for this Court. It calls upon us to decide a novel issue of constitutional law: whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits a term-of-years sentence for the duration of a juvenile homicide offender’s life expectancy (i.e., “de facto LWOP”) when the defendant’s “crimes reflect transient immaturity [and not] . . . irreparable corruption.” Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016). Next, if we find that it does, then we must decide what framework will properly effectuate the Supreme Court’s determination that the Eighth Amendment affords nonincorrigible juvenile offenders a right to a meaningful opportunity for release. Furthermore, we must take great pains throughout our discussion to account for the substantive distinction that the Supreme Court has made between incorrigible and non-incorrigible juvenile offenders in order to ensure that the latter is not subjected to “a punishment that the law cannot impose upon [them].” Id. (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004)).
Our decision today therefore represents an incremental step in the constitutional discourse over the unique protections that the Eighth Amendment affords to juvenile homicide offenders....
[W]hat is clear is that society accepts the age of retirement as a transitional life stage where an individual permanently leaves the work force after having contributed to society over the course of his or her working life. See, e.g., Retirement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“Termination of one’s own employment or career, esp. upon reaching a certain age . . . .”). It is indisputable that retirement is widely acknowledged as an earned inflection point in one’s life, marking the simultaneous end of a career that contributed to society in some capacity and the birth of an opportunity for the retiree to attend to other endeavors in life.
As we stated above, a non-incorrigible juvenile offender is not guaranteed an opportunity to live a meaningful life, and certainly not to a meaningful retirement. Nevertheless, in order to effectuate the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of meaningful opportunity for release, a juvenile offender that is found to be capable of reform should presumptively be afforded an opportunity for release at some point before the age of retirement. Cf. Graham, 560 U.S. at 58 (“To determine whether a punishment is cruel and unusual, courts must look beyond historical conceptions to the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102)). A sentence that preserves the juvenile offender’s opportunity to contribute productively to society inherently provides him or her with “hope” to “reconcil[e] with society” and achieve “fulfillment outside prison walls.” Id. at 79. It also accounts for the Court’s trepidation that LWOP sentences deprive non-incorrigible juvenile offenders of vocational training opportunities, which presumably otherwise prepare them to become productive members of society’s working class. See id. at 74.
Accordingly, lower courts must consider the age of retirement as a sentencing factor, in addition to life expectancy and the § 3553(a) factors, when sentencing juvenile offenders that are found to be capable of reform. Critically, under all circumstances, lower courts must only consider the uniform national age of retirement. Otherwise, estimates of retirement ages that account for locality, state, gender, race, wealth or other differentiating characteristics raise similar constitutional concerns to those plagued by reliance on life-expectancy tables alone. Without fixing the age of retirement to a uniform standard, classes of juvenile defendants that retire on average later in life would unreasonably be subjected to longer sentences. Cf. Mathurin, 868 F.3d at 932 (sentencing juveniles based solely on mortality tables “would unquestionably lead to challenges from defendants from longer-living ethnic groups who would be subject to longer sentences based on that ethnicity”).
Because I am on the road today, I may not be able to review and further comment on this big opinion for some time. But I surmise there is a whole to worth discussing in this opinion, and I hope commentors might share a range of thoughts about it.
April 9, 2018 in Assessing Graham and its aftermath, Assessing Miller and its aftermath, Offender Characteristics, Procedure and Proof at Sentencing, Sentences Reconsidered | Permalink | Comments (1)